COMMISSION SENSITIVE

•^^ CHAPTER LEAD DRAFTER |

1. The Foundation of an Islamic Army
1.1 The fatwa of February 1 998 May
1 .2 Islamist extremism and its appeal in the Islamic world May
1 .3 The rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda MacEachin
1 .4 Al Qaeda and the Muslim world Dowling
1 .5 Attacking the United States MacEachin
-^
II. Counter-terrorism Evolves
2.1 From the old terrorism to the new: The case of WTC I MacEachin
2.2 Adaptation - or non-adaptation - in the law enforcement community FO
2.3 ... the intelligence community FO
2.4 ... the Departments and the Congress FO
2.5 ...the White House FO

III. Responses to al Qaeda's Initial Assaults /

3.1 Before the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania Albion '/
3.2 Crisis Bass ^
3.3 Post-crisis diplomacy Allan ,/
3.4 Military options Jenkins i/
3.5 Clandestine and covert action Albion ^
3.G •i 1.\> d^si i/
IV. Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland
4.1 Terrorist entrepreneurs Snell
4.2 Plans, targets, and requirements De
4.3 Choosing the attackers: recruitment, vetting, and training De
4.4 Seeing aircraft as weapons? May
4.5 A money trail? Roth

V. From Threat to Threat

5.1 The Millennium crisis Linden
5.2 Post-crisis reflection: an agenda for 2000 Albion
5.3 The attack on the U.S.S. Cole Grandrimo
5.4 Change and continuity Hurley
5.5 A new strategy? Bass I,/

VI. The Attack Looms

6.1 Going to California Snell
6.2 California and Florida Jacobson
6.3 Final strategies and tactics Kim
6.4 Assembling the teams Kim
6.5 The 'summer of threat' Grewe
6.6 Late leads? Al Mihdhar and Moussaoui Grewe

VII. The Four Flights

7.1 The hijacking of AA 1 1 and UA 175 Johnstone
7.2 FAA and NORAD Farmer
7.3 Losing AA 77 Farmer
7.4 Improvising a homeland defense Farmer
7.5 The battle for UA 93 Raidt

VIII. Heroism and Horror

8.1 Emergency plans Caspersen
8.2 Agencies and firms implement the plans Caspersen
8.3 The World Trade Center Caspersen
8.4 Fateful choices in emergency response Caspersen

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN
3517 International Court, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN
cc
No. Amb./6/04 Junr22,2004.

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I am addressing this letter to you with reference to the recent Staff

Statements that contain following unwarranted remarks on the nature of the
relationship that existed between Pakistan and the then Taliban regime in
Afghanistan:

• "Pakistan did not break with the Taliban until after 9/11, although it
was well aware that the Taliban were harbouring Bin Laden."
• "The Taliban's ability to provide Bin Laden a haven in the face of
international pressure and UN sanctions was sufficiently facilitated by
Pakistani support."
• "Pakistan benefited from the Taliban-Al Qaeda relationship as Bin
Laden' s camps trained and equipped fighters for Pakistan's ongoing
struggle with India over Kashmir."

2. Moreover, several newspapers have carried a statement attributed to

you, alleging that "there were a lot more active (Al Qaeda) contacts, frankly,
with Iran and with Pakistan than there were with Iraq". Los Angeles Times
of 21 June 2004, has carried an article, allegedly based on statements
attributed to the Commission members and staff that:

• "Pakistan and Saudi Arabia helped set the stage for the September 1 1
attacks by cutting deals with the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden."
• "Pakistan provided even more direct assistance, its military and
intelligence agencies often coordinating efforts with the Taliban and
Al Qaeda."
• "Such efforts allowed Al Qaeda' s network of cells to burrow deeply
into the social and religious fabric of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,
enabling the organization to survive the U.S. led demolition of its
headquarters in Afghanistan in 2001, to regroup and to launch new
 waves of attacks—including the kidnapping and beheading of an
American engineer in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, last week."
• "The governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia intentionally ignored
Bin Laden's efforts in their countries or even cut deals with him,
either out of sympathy with his efforts or to protect themselves from
attack."
• "Saudi and Pakistani governments played important roles in the
growth of Al Qaeda."
• "Many US officials believe that both governments have been slow to
purge their ranks of pro Al Qaeda, pro Taliban elements."
» "Pakistanis, meanwhile, were in with the Taliban and Al Qaeda up to
their eyeballs".
» "Bin Laden, for instance, negotiated his 1996 move to Afghanistan
through Pakistan's powerful military intelligence leadership". "He
wouldn't go back there without Pakistan's approval."
• "Pakistani intelligence officers also allegedly brought Bin Laden to
meet Mullah Omar soon after his arrival in Afghanistan and then
helped forge an alliance between the men that enabled the Taliban to
trample competing factions and take over much of Afghanistan."
• "ISI also was instrumental in helping Al Qaeda set up an
infrastructure in its own country and in Afghanistan and the two
outfits jointly operated training camps along the border where
militants were taught guerilla warfare,"
• "Bin Laden has had personal relationships with top intelligence
officials from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, dating to the early 1980s,
when they became involved in the decade long war that expelled the
Soviet occupying army from Afghanistan."

3. First of all, let me clarify the reasons for Pakistan's recognition of the
Taliban regime. As a matter of policy, Pakistan has always maintained
diplomatic relations with the sitting government in Kabul, irrespective of its
political and ideological inclinations, including its policies towards
Pakistan. This has been a geopolitical necessity because the two countries
have a common border that is inhabited by populations with close links on
either side of it. Accordingly, it was not practicable for Pakistan to eschew
ties with any government in Kabul. Pakistan maintained diplomatic relations
even with hostile regimes in Kabul, including the Communist regimes of
Tarakai and Hafizullah Amin, and the Soviet imposed regimes of Babrak
Karmal and Najibullah.
4. Maintaining diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime did not
imply Pakistan's approval or endorsement of its policies. On the contrary,
Pakistan tried its best to persuade the Taliban regime to take account of
international opinion and to comply with UN Security Council resolutions,
including the handing over of Osama Bin Laden to an appropriate tribunal to
answer charges against him.

5. It is simply inaccurate to state that Pakistan in any way enabled the

Taliban to harbour Osama Bin Laden. The Taliban were not open to
discussion on this matter. As the international isolation of the Taliban grew
their dependence on Osama Bin Laden also developed. That was why we did
not support the isolation of the Taliban regime despite our distaste for its
policies. Whatever influence we were able to wield with the Taliban was,
contrary to the allegations cited above, an influence on behalf of moderation
and reason and not extremism and violence. Unfortunately, our influence
was always limited and as the Taliban felt increasingly isolated and
besieged, our influence with them declined.

6. The allegation that "Osama Bin Laden trained fighters for Pakistan's
struggle with India over Kashmir" is both inaccurate and misleading. The
Kashmiris' struggle for freedom predates the arrival of Osama Bin Laden in
Afghanistan and is rooted in the alienation of the Kashmiri people and their
determination to resist military occupation and repression. To imply that the
freedom struggle in occupied Kashmir owes anything to Osama Bin Laden is
just about as unfair as one can get.

7. Similarly, there is no basis to the several allegations to the effect that

the Government of Pakistan facilitated Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan. On the contrary, we saw the growing influence of Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan as a threat to our own security and a recipe for disaster in
Afghanistan. In cooperation with the UN, the US and other neighbours of
Afghanistan, we sought to rninirnize external influences in Afghanistan and
we sought to apprise the Taliban of the dangers their association with Al
Qaeda spelled for Afghanistan.

8. It is particularly disappointing to read these allegations at a time when

Pakistani soldiers are sacrificing their lives and President Musharraf has
risked his personal safety in the good fight against Al Qaeda, Taliban and
other extremist elements. It is no exaggeration to say that as a result of the
cooperation between Pakistan and the US the back of Al Qaeda has been
broken and, we trust, a re-visitation of the awful tragedy of September 11,
2001 has been rendered extremely unlikely.

Yours sincerely,

(Ashraf Jehangir Qazf

Mr. Thomas H. Kean,

Chairman,
NationAlCommission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street, SW
Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407
Washington Office*
Tel: (202) 331-4060
Fax: (202) 296-5545

TOTflL P.04
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 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Stephanie Kaplan

Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2004 10:58 PM
To: Len Hawley
Cc: Antwion M. Blount
Subject: Your Sections

Len:

The deadline for submitting draft sections in Chapters 9-16 was this past Wednesday. I have to send all of the
chapters to Philip in Charlottesville so that he can work on all of the policy chapters. Those unclassified sections I
have received thus far have already been emailed to Philip. Tony is coming to the office in the morning to
transmit the classified sections.

You have two options for transmittal on Friday:

1)
Send whatever you have to Tony via classified email so that he can include it in the classified
transmission to Philip in the morning. He is only coming in for this purpose, and this is a one shot deal for
the next three days.
2) Convert your drafts into unclassified versions (if possible), have Tony transfer them to the unclass side,
and submit them via unclass email later in the day.

Either way, the drafts must be submitted tomorrow. If you are not finished, you should simply submit what you
have done thus far, and we will take it from there.

Many thanks,
Stephanie
STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN
9-11 COMMISSION
1(202)331-1125
F (202) 296-5545
www.9-11commission.gov

6/11/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Philip Zelikow

Sent: Friday, June 04, 2004 2:33 PM
To: Team Leaders
Cc: Front Office
Subject: Workplan on Report -- Update

Team Leaders -

We need any still outstanding draft input for Chapters 9-16 by COB on Wednesday, June 9.

Commissioners will have the opportunity to work on drafts of chapters 1 -4 in the days to come. We will try to give
them the revised Chapter 2 by Monday morning, June 7.

Next week is then a good window if you or your colleagues have suggestions for further improving the chapters
you've been helping to write. It would be good to have that further round of comments by Friday, June 11.

Philip

6/4/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Warren Bass

Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 2004 8:00 PM
To: Dan Byman :9/Il Personal Privacy
Cc: Mike Hurley /
Subject: Nag, nag, nag /

OK—12.2 is done. There's a "WB edits" version on the share drive. ;

It features my finest aphorism yet Let me know when you find it and cut it immediately but.
Off to NYC Weds aft and all day Thurs, but on the cell if you need to gabj [ In here on Fri, despite the
federal holiday (and I must say that shutting down the federal government in ms nonor is a touch Reagan would
surely have gotten a kick out of).

6/9/2004
Mike Hurley
From: Daniel Byman
Sent: Wednesday, June 02, 2004 7:54 PM
To: Mike Hurley
Subject: Re: Team 3 Chapter 5 edits

Mike,

I'm not sure where the FO is these days. Are they ready to review chapter 9? If so, I'm
happy to send up what we have, though of course I'd like Warren to scrub it.

More than my other work for the Commission, I think 9.3 is rough. It _should_ be heavily
revised by the FO, as it is a "bridge" piece whose content will depend heavily on what is
before and after it.

Dan
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Alexis Albion

Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2004 8:33 PM
To: Team 3
Subject: chapter 3 latest version

TeamSmates:

You should find the latest version of our edited chapter 3 in the usual place on the class drive—it's marked as
LATEST VERSION.

Warren and I discussed today that it would be a great idea if we could find time Monday afternoon to get together
and go through the whole thing together, just to make sure that what we send forward represents something we're
all OK with.

I'll be at CIA tomorrow morning—will get back as soon as I can.

--Alexis

5/24/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Scott Allan

Sent: Saturday, May 22, 2004 10:41 PM
To: Team 3
Subject: chapter 3

TeamSmates:

With Nat in Fla, and after having finally finished editing the FO's draft of Chapt 3.3 - I'm off to the Tombs (or
maybe La Taberna) to enjoy my last evening of bachelordom.

Thanks for covering for me the next two weeks - my edits to chapter 3 should be self explanatory. PZ encouraged
me to add more detailed footnotes which you'll see. I think the facts are under control but I'm still a little
concerned about the tone of the thing. Give a ring before you discuss the edits with the FO. There were a few
footnotes in my subchapter lacking sources and I tracked down most of them. However some may be from PZ's
NSC/CIA notes, but feel free to update them if you know the sourcing.

I worked with Doug on Chapt 1 today but didn't get a chance to look at Chapter 2. I'm not sure how much State
Dept info there is but Len and Bonnie might want to give it a quick once over.

I've printed out a fresh diplomacy rd map and it's in the front of my safe shelf should you need it. There is also a
Sudan redwell with all my important doc's if PZ/EM needs to review them.

Alexis - thanks for the Yohimbe tablets and the Jack. Combining the two really got me through this evening's
editing session!

-SHA

5/24/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Warren Bass

Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2004 11:41 AM
To: Team 3
Subject: Philip update

Just FYI, Philip dropped by; he says he's eager to seeJQhapter 5 and wants to make sure we're freeing ourselves
from that in order to have time to turn to reviewing his and Ernie's revisions on Chapter 3. He says those could
arrive as early as tomorrow. He also says he may want us to help out on Chapter 2, which he says attempts to take
a "not banal" look at how U.S. institutions arose, looking back to Hoover at the FBI and "Wild Bill" Donvan at
OSS.

Their plan is to get Chapters 1-4 to commissioners as early as the end of next week. He mentioned the word
"crash" about our look at Chapter 3 when it's back.
Warren

5/21/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Stephanie Kaplan

Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2004 6:14 PM 9/11 Personal Privacy
To: staff
Subject: In New York

Colleagues:

I will be in the New York office in preparation for the hearing beginning tomorrow through Wednesday. You can
reach me on my cell phone | | or through the office's main line (212/264-1505).

If you wish to submit a draft section for the final report while I am away, please send it to Front Office and Ernest
May via class/unclass email so that they can have access to the material during my absence. If you have any
other report-related questions, please don't hesitate to contact me.

Thanks,
Stephanie

STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN
9-11 COMMISSION
7(202)331-1125
F (202) 296-5545
www.9-11commission.gov

5/13/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Warren Bass

Sent: Monday, May 17, 2004 9:36 AM
To: Nicole Grandrimo; Sarah Linden
Cc: Mike Hurley; Alexis Albion
Subject: Chapter 5

Just came round to see you, Niki and Sarah, but here's a quick heads-up: Philip has just gotten back (on loan)
some of his notes on memos from Berger to POTUS. He'd like us to incorporate this material—as well as some
fresh stuff on the Cole (non)response that Alexis and I saw on Friday at NEOB—into Chapter 5. He says that he
won't be able to turn to Chapter 5 until after he gets back from NYC, so we have today, Tuesday, and Wednesday.
You're welcome to see the relevant sections of Philip's notes, too. Much of the most dramatic stuff was already
reported out in the staff statements and is already incorporated in the drafts we currently have, so I think we'll
spend more time on the new NEOB material than on the Philip notes. (Then again, what do I know.)
So suggest we crack 'em back open and stitch the new stuff in. Please let us know what's the most sensible way to
proceed—pop by if you have a sec.
Thanks much,
Warren

5/17/2004
CBSNews.com: Print This Story Page 1 of 2

®CBSNEWS.com
Bush Meets Bill, Then Al
Dec. 19, 2000

For the first time since the election and all that followed, President-elect George W. Bush met with the man he'll
succeed and with the man he defeated.

The Texas governor called his Tuesday afternoon White House visit with President Clinton, "a high-energy
moment."

Bush later met with Vice President Al Gore, who strode through falling snow outside his official home at the Naval
Observatory to greet his former rival with a prolonged handshake and pat on the back.

"We're going to have a private discussion," Gore said when asked about his advice for the president-elect.

Lasting less than 20 minutes, the meeting took place almost a week after Democrat Gore conceded the White
House to Republican Bush in the disputed presidential election.

Earlier, the Texas governor met with the man he will replace as the nation's leader on January 20. Bush and Mr.
Clinton met first in the Oval Office for an hour and then walked over to the residence where they talked over lunch
in the family dining room for about 70 minutes. They were alone most of the time.

"The president told me that they covered primarily foreign policy," White House spokesman Jake Siewert
said. "He talked about some of the hot spots around the world and some of the challenges the new
administration will face and the state of play in some of those places that make headlines in the news
here in America."

The Bush-Clinton meeting brought together the incoming chief executive, who has pledged to restore "honor and
dignity" to the White House with the man whose two terms in office gave that pledge traction among many
voters.

"I'm grateful and I'm looking forward to the discussion. I'm here to listen, and if the president is kind
enough to offer some advice... I will take it in," Bush told reporters inside.

"I just told him, my only advice to anybody in this is get a good team and do what you think is right," Mr.
Clinton said.

The president seemed more relaxed than his successor. Mr. Clinton sat back in his chair, elbow propped on one
arm, his legs crossed and gesturing smoothly with his hands. Bush sat very straight, both feet planted firmly on
the floor, his hands in his lap, looking straight ahead rather than at the president.

Bush, the first son of a president to follow in his father's footsteps since John Quincy Adams in 1825, is certainly
no stranger to the White House, but Tuesday's visit was his first as president-elect. The meeting comes eight
years after Bush's father, President George Bush, showed Mr. Clinton - then the president-elect - around the
place, shortly after Mr. Clinton defeated the elder Bush.

In response to a foreign policy question, Mr. Clinton said that no decision had yet been made on whether he will
make a trip to North Korea in the closing days of his term.

"This is something that I want to consult with the president-elect and his team about, and we'll see what
the facts ar. And I'll try to do what's best for the country," he said.

Mr. Clinton added he still sees North Korea's missile program as the biggest current threat.

"We may have a chance to put an end to it. And if we can, I think we should," he said.

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/12/19/politics/printable258263.shtml 5/22/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Alexis Albion

Sent: Saturday, May 15, 2004 10:19 AM
To: Team 3
Subject: 5.2

You can review my post-millennium section now—it's in the usual place, marked AA 5.2

Thanks!

—Alexis

5/15/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Warren Bass

Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2004 7:37 PM
To: Team 3
Subject: 5.5

Is pretty much ready to ship to the FO. The copy is in the usual folder. If anyone wants to have a last glance before
we move it forward, please feel free—grateful for your comments. It's now 20 pp. of main text. My apologies to
Scott; I tried to weave the main diplomatic points in, but I cut some stuff—sorry, man.
Anyway, feel free to track-changes up a copy for yourselves. If anyone wants me to wait to ship, please let me
know.

Thanks, all...

5/15/2004
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