[Bolet P] Case for Article 2 of the Civil Code Article 2.

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988 FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents. FACTS BACKGROUND: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their but the former failed to do so. FIRST CASE: RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. September 9, 1987 - last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. September 30, 1987 motion for extension denied. October 27, 1987 denied Petitioners MFR filed on September 24, 1987. ISSUE 1. Whether or not filing of MFR be extended. 2. Non-publication of Habaluyas Case in the Official Gazette

3. Ignorance of the legal counsel regarding rules on filing MFR HELD 1. NO. In Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. BACAYA RULING: Stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit: In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

CASE AT BAR: FILED PETITION FOR EXTENSION MORE THAN A YEAR AFTER THE GRACE PERIOD 2&3. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals

[Donna I] Case for Article 2 of the Civil Code Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. Farinas v. Executive Secretary et al. 417 SCRA 503 ISSUE/S

Election Practices is broad and could encompass entire election exercise including the filing of candidacy of elective officials. The effectivity clause of RA No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due process clause of the Constituion as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property.

FACTS Petition for certiorari and prohibition The petition seeks to declare Section 14 of RA no. 9006 (The Fair Elections Act) Unconstitutional as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides: o Sec. 67 Candidates holding elective office-Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. o Reason for the petition: The unconstitutionality rose upon the violation of Section 26 of article 6 of the constitution requiring every law to have only one subject, which should be expressed in its title. o RA No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while section 67 of the Omnibus election code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office rather than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity o Petitioners also asserted that Sec 14 violates equal protection clause because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving Section 66 intact which imposes similar limitation to appointive individuals. o Sec. 66 Candidates holding appointive office or position- Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including members of the AFP, and officers of government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing his certificate of candidacy. Respondents defense: o Section 14 of RA No. 9006 as it repeals Section 67 of Omnibus Election Code is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair

The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9006. Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 be rendered unconstitutional because it as it expressly repealed Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and violated the one-subject-one title rule? Whether Section 14 of RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider? *rider- additional provision added to a bill or other measure under the consideration by a legislature having little connection with the subject matter of the bill. FOR ARTICLE 2 OF THE CIVIL CODE, WE ARE CONCERNED WITH: Whether RA 9006 (The Fair Elections Act) null and void in its entirety which provides this act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of due process. How is the clause this law shall take effect immediately upon its approval be interpreted?

RULING Petition was dismissed. The title and the objectives of RA No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. Section 14 of RA 9006 is not a proscribed rider. There is no dissimilarity between Section 67 (OEC) and RA No. 9006 and does not violate the one-subject-one title rule. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be so long as they are not inconsistent with the general subject. Effectivity clause of RA No. 9006 is defective but not renders the entire law invalid. (as laid down in Tanada v. Tuvera) This law shall take effect immediately upon is interpreted, as the law will take into effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of General Circulation. [John Tan] Case for Article 2 of the Civil Code

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. Garcillano vs. House of Representatives [23 December 2008] G.R. No. 170338 [name of ponente] FACTS

BACKGROUNDER. Petitioner Virgilio Garcillano filed a petition to stop and prevent the House of Representatives in playing the Garci tapes for they were alleged to be illegally obtained. The said tapes contained conversations about the plan to manipulate the elections favoring Gloria Arroyo. The recordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted separately by each House. The Court dismissed G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic [what made it moot and academic?]. The Court stressed the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies. [PRESENT CASE?] As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275 [which case is this? Please specify as you are introducing a new G.R. No.], the Court granted [the petition?]. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. The present Senate of the 14th Congress conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the Hello Garci tapes. Also, the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspaper of general circulation only in 1995 and 2006. The present Senate did not publish these rules when they first opened the session [please explain this a bit more using the dates involved, for example, why do they have to re-publish the rules as alleged?]

intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. What constitutes publication was set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Court cited the case of Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigators that the phrase duly published rules and procedure requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. The composition of the Senate changes by the end of each term because Senatorial elections are held for every three years. Not having published its Rules of Procedures, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate were therefore changeable [you mean, they are null and void?]. Thus, stressing the principle that the Senate was not a continuing body. The Court also said that the respondents cannot justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication requirement by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and that they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page. The Court also stated that the respondents invocation of the provisions of RA 8792 or Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 was incorrect. It stressed that the law merely recognized the admissibility in evidence of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents but such does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and regulations. As in the case of Tanada vs Tuvera, the Court cited that publication must be made in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation, [pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code and amended by E.O. 200].

[Patricia L] Case for Article 2 of the Civil Code Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos (27 January 2004) 421 SCRA 148 Carpio-Morales, J. FACTS

ISSUES

Whether or not the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate Committee governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have been published in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution? Specifically: A. Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress? B. What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional requirement?

RULINGS The Court cited section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is

BACKGROUNDER. President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 279 which authorizes the DENR Secretary to accept, evaluate and consider foreignowned corporations proposal submitted to them [and make Financial and Technical Assistant Agreements (FTAA) with them?]. o The validity of the said Order was put into question because of its date of effectivity, which, as indicated in Section 8 of the EO, states: it shall take effect immediately after publication.

 ISSUE

The contention of the petitioners regarding the effectivity of the order was rooted on the fact that it failed to comply with the 15-day period required by Article 2 of the Civil Code for law to take into effect. [THE CASE. This is a petition for review at the SC as to the validity of the EO?] o

Whether or not Executive Order No. 279 is valid.

RULING Yes, the EO is a valid and correct law regardless of the specified date of effectivity indicated in Section 8. o What is essential is the publication of the law, this being an indispensible requirement for the effectivity of all laws. o As to the 15 day requirement, the Court ruled that the 15-day period stated in Article 2 of the Civil Code applies only to statutes that do not provide for its date of effectivity. Therefore, the legislature may exercise its own discretion on either lengthening or shortening the 15day requirement provided in the Civil Code. [Oliver T] Case for Article 2 of the Civil Code Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. Tanada vs. Tuvera (December 1986) FACTS

The Court ruled that publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. This is a basic requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Thus, the Court declared that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. PRESENT CASE. 29 December 1986 (NB: after the EDSA revolution). Petitioners made a motion for reconsideration/clarification of the SC decision. o

ISSUES

The petitioners wanted clarification on the following points: o 1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"? o 2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? o 3. What is meant by "publication"? o 4. Where is the publication to be made? o 5. When is the publication to be made? (NB: Prof. Sena said that they only clarified as to how, where and when is publication to be made)

FIRST CASE. 25 April 1985. Lorenzo Tanada, representing a nationalist group of lawyers called MABINI petitioned the Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus (NB: this is a court order requiring another court, government official, public body, corporation, or individual to perform a certain act) to compel Juan Tuvera, in his capacity as Executive Assistant (Prof. Sena said he was Executive Secretary) to the President, et. al. to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamation, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. o Reason for the petition: peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution. o Respondents defense: The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

RULINGS/DOCTRINES ESPOUSED The Court declared that all laws (see below which ones) shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. Details of the replies to the questions posed above: o 1-2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly (see below which laws are required to be published). o 3. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws o 4. Publication must be made in the Official Gazette (NB: The Court commented on the erratic releases and limited readership of the Official Gazette and that newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people because they are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. However, the Court said that they do not have a choice but to declare what is written in Article 2 of the Civil Code, that is, publication must be made in the Official Gazette. To change a

legislation is outside the Courts competence. Hence, the issuance of Executive Order No. 200. Read the separate digest about it). o 5. Publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. The date of effectivity can be reduced or be made longer than 15 days. If it is not specified, it shall be 15 days following the publication. Those required to be published o all statutes, including those of local application o private laws o presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers pursuant to a valid delegation; including those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements o administrative rules and regulations, if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. o the charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place o circulars issued by the Monetary Board, if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act Those not required to be published o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public o Letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties o Instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. o Municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code. Additional key ideas to remember: o Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. o unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. o omission of publication would offend due process o conclusive presumption: that every person knows the law. This relates to Article 3 of the Civil Code: ignorantia legis no excusat.

the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable.

[Gerald N] Case for Article 3 of the Civil Code Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. ATCI Overseas Corporation, Amalia G. Ikdal and Ministry of Public Health-Kuwait vs. Josefa Echin (11 October 2010) G.R. No. 178551 FACTS

BACKGROUNDER. Josefa Echin was hired by ATCI Overseas Corporation on behalf of its co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health in Kuwait under a twoyear contract signed through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). o Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees will undergo a probationary period of 1 year. Unfortunately, respondent allegedly did not pass the probationary period, thus she was terminated from employment [after 8 months of work in Kuwait?]. Respondent went back to the Philippines in 2001. FIRST STAGE. On Jul 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI and the Ministry. The labor arbiter held that the respondent was illegally dismissed, there being no just cause to warrant her dismissal. SECOND STAGE. Petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals, but the same affirmed the NLRC decision. Petitioners motioned for reconsideration but denied. FINAL STAGE. Now, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari arguing and maintaining that the respondents employment contract stated that her employment shall be governed by Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. Hence, the laws of Kuwait should apply in the case at bar, and not the Philippine Labor Laws.

ISSUE

Whether or not the laws of Kuwait maintained by the petitioners should be applied in the case at bar.

RULING No. Petitioners failed to plead and prove the foreign law they were invoking. o The Court applied the doctrine of processual presumption declaring that the party invoking the application of a foreign law must properly plead and prove that foreign law. Failure to do so would mean that

the courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as ours. The local court is presumed to know only domestic laws. To plead and prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court Process: 1. Present a certified copy of the foreign law [from the office that generated it, say, legislature] 2. It must be authenticated by the pertinent officer in the Philippine consular office in that foreign country.

Note: The proper word is not allege but plead as decided by the Court that a foreign law must be pleaded and proved. [Bianca H] Case for Article 8 of the Civil Code Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. Ayala Corporation vs. Rosa-Diana Realty & Development Corp (01 December 2000) G.R. No. 134283 FACTS

property and informs the public that there is a potential claim against it /notice of pending case], but then again, it was denied by the CA. o Rosa-Diana filed a demurer [NB: this is a request to a court pleading that it should dismiss a lawsuit on the grounds that there is no legal claim made or for which relief can be granted] saying that: 1) Ayala does not enforce the deed restrictions uniformly and strictly; 2) Ayala lost its rights to enforce the restrictions due to its own acts and omissions [is this because Ayala allowed exemptions to the rule in the past?]; and 3) deed restrictions are no longer valid and effective against buyers in Ayalas controlled subdivision [why?]. Trial Court sustained [do you mean: CA sustained Trial Courts decision?] on the grounds that Ayala violated the contract by allowing Manuel Sy and Ka Kieng to not conform to it. o CA affirmed the trial courts decision by citing the Ray Burton Dev. Corp case against Ayala (which is still a pending case in SC and not yet decided) ruling that Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed restrictions in dispute (estoppel) applying the doctrine of stare decisis. PRESENT CASE. Ayala filed a motion for reconsideration at the CA and it was denied, hence, this petition for review at the SC.

ISSUES

BACKGROUNDER. Ayala Corp. owned a parcel of land located in Salcedo Village, Makati City. They sold it to Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng with the following conditions: 1) to build on the loot [is this really loot or lot?] and submit the building plans to the vendor before 30 September 1976 for approval; 2) that the construction should start on or before 30 March 1977 and completed in 1979; and 3) that there should be no resale of the property. o However, Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng failed to comply with the said conditions and decided it to sell to Rosa Diana Realty and Development Corporations (1989) with the consent of Ayala Corp. Rosa Diana passed the first set of plans complying with the conditions but the plans that were passed for the construction did not conform to the conditions. FIRST STAGE. Because of the foregoing, Ayala Corp filed a case (Trial Court) against Rosa Diana with a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order to compel the latter to comply with the contractual obligations. The case was denied. SECOND STAGE. [Shall we suppose that this was filed to the CA given the conclusion at the end of the sentence?] Ayala tried to cause the annotation of a notice of Lis Pendens [NB: This is a notice of pending action, that is, giving notice to the defendant who owns the real estate that there is a claim on the

Whether or not Ayala is guilty of estoppel. [can you explain estoppel?] [In order to relate it to our discussion, perhaps we can add: Does the stare decisis doctrine apply in deciding for this case?]

RULING No. The Ray Burton Case should not be applied to the case at bar since the said case is still pending in the SC. The stare decisis doctrine should only be applied when there is a final judgment done by the SC with the same issues and facts and reasons behind its decision. Furthermore, the ruling of CA regarding estoppel is just an obiter dicta [NB: an opinion of the judge, not related to the matter at hand] which means that it is not important in the case and can be omitted since it can stand without it. [want to add other matters discussed by Prof Sena during the class?] [Ronel M] Case for Article 8 of the Civil Code Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. Co vs Court of Appeals (28 October 1993) 227 SCRA 444

FACTS

Last September 1, 1983, Albino Co, the petitioner, delivered a post-dated check to a salvaging firm to guarantee a performance of obligation. The check issued by the petitioner was dishonored by the draweebank because it was assessed as CLOSED ACCOUNT. It was dishonored two (2) days after it was deposited last January 3, 1984. A criminal complaint for violation of BP blg 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law was filed by the salvaging firm against the petitioner with the RTC of Pasay City. The said court convicted the petitioner of the crime charged. Co appealed to the CA with the contention that the case of QUE v PEOPLE that was used as the basis for its verdict of conviction should not be applicable to the case at bar. This was because last December 15, 1981, the Ministry of Justice issued an official pronouncement, Circular No. 4, stating that delivery of rubber or bouncing check as a guarantee for an obligation was not a punishable offense or in violation of BP 22. But last August 8, 1984, the Ministry of Justice reversed its pronouncement through Circular no. 12 that there was a misinterpretation of BP 22 and the said act is already a violation of BP 22.

FACTS

BACKGROUND. After being married for more than 18 years, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations: 1. 2. 3. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession, as an anesthesiologist; Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking; His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.

4. ISSUE Whether or not Albino Co is guilty on violation of BP 22. RULING NO. Since the petitioner relied only on the official opinion of the Ministry of Justice that such check did not fall within the scope of BP 22, it would be prejudicial to the petitioner if the case of Que v People stating that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of obligation is covered by BP 22 be given retroactive effect. The doctrine of Mala Prohibita or the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being "has the law been violated?" is not applicable to the case at bar because the petitioner put reliance on the opinion of the Attorney of the government which was only reversed after the petitioner committed the said act. Mala Prohibita cannot override the principle of prospectivity at the case at bar. So the SC revered and set aside the assailed decisions of the CA and the RTC and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner was dismissed. [Azalea M] Case for Article 8 of the Civil Code Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. Ting vs Velez-Ting (2009) Nachura, J.

To support her claim, Carmen presented Dr. Trinidad-Oate, a psychiatrist, but instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamins deposition because the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder. With the given facts, the regional trial court, on January 9, 1998, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of Benjamin and Carmen null and void pursuant to the article 36 of the Family code. The aggrieved party, Benjamin, appealed to the Court of Appeals and on October 19, 2000 rendered its decision reversing the decision of RTC. The CA states that there is no proof obtained to support the conclusion of Dr. Trinidad-Oates statement for it was only based on theories and not on facts, which is contrary to the guidelines set forth in the Santos vs Court of Appeals and Rep. of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals and Molina. But Carmen appealed on the grounds that the filing of her case came before the Molina case, which was only decided on February 13, 1997, so it cannot be applied retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. But in a resolution dated March 5, the CA was directed to resolve Carmens motion for reconsideration and on November 17, 2003 it issued an amended decision reversing its first decision.

SUMMARY. RTC annulled the marriage; RTC rejected Benjamins motion for reconsideration; CA reversed RTC; CA reverted to the RTC decision after Carmens appeal; now this petition for review at the SC.

ISSUE

and if necessary, the municipal treasurer of Tobaco to release the deposit of 160 and return it to the owner, Chua Jan. Proceedings were forwarded to Supreme Court by means of proper bill of exceptions (This means: The statement in writing, of the objection made by a party, to the decision of the court and is signed and sealed by the judge/court who/which made the decision) ISSUE Whether or not the court of first instance erred in dismissing the appeal without rendering any judgment for reasons of the following: the court has always dismissed the cases of this nature; that the judge is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights, that he does not know where to find the law on the subject matter and that he knows of no law that governs the questions concerning cockfights RULING YES, the court has erred. The lack of knowledge of the court with regard to the law applicable in the case at bar and its lack of knowledge of the rules applicable to it are not valid reasons to dismiss the case without deciding the issues. If there is really no law applicable, the customs of the place should be observed, and in the absence thereof, the general principles of law. [Kyle N] Case for Article 9 of the Civil Code Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. Reyes vs. Lim (11 August 2003) FACTS

WON the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases should not apply with the present case for it will run counter the principle of stare decisis.

RULING The guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina cases can be applied with the present case. According to the SC, such argument, that judicial decisions cannot be applied retrospectively is no longer new. It was also raised in the cases of Pesca vs Pesca and as well in Antonio vs Reyes and the court, in these cases, explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted [Family Code on 3 August 1988]. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith. [Julia M] Case for Article 9 of the Civil Code Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. Chua Jan vs. Bernas (August 1916) FACTS BACKGROUND. June 26, 1913: A cockfight was held between the two cocks owned by Chua Jan and Bernas. They both put up a wager of Php 160 each. The referee declared the defendants cock the winner. FIRST CASE. Chua Jan filed a suit against Bernas in the Justice of the Peace Court saying that his rooster be declared the winner instead. The court declared the match a draw. SECOND CASE: Bernas appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of the Province of Albay. The plaintiff also filed a complaint in the same court and prayed that the court render judgment ordering Bernas to abide by and comply with the rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay the stipulated wager, to return the other like amount being held by Tomas Almonte, owner of the cockpit. The CFI dismissed the appeal of Bernas. FINAL CASE: On plaintiff's motion, the court ordered the provincial treasurer of Albay,

FIRST CASE. On 23 March 1995, petitioner David Reyes filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against respondents Jose Lim (Lim), Chuy Cheng Keng (Keng) and Harrison Lumber, Inc. (Harrison Lumber). o The total consideration for the purchase is TWENTY EIGHT MILLION (P28,000,000.00) PESOS payable as follows: (a) TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS upon signing of the Contract to Sell; (b) The balance of EIGHTEEN MILLION (P18,000,000.00) PESOS shall be paid on or before March 8, 1995 o As they were not able to pay (b) on March 8, 1995, they were required to pay a penalty of four percent (4%) per month of the TEN MILLION (400,000.00) PESOS until they completely vacate the premises. o On 3 May 1995, Keng and Harrison Lumber alleged that Reyes approved their request for an extension of time to vacate the Property

ISSUES

due to their difficulty in finding a new location for their business. Incidentally, Lim also learned that Reyes had already sold the same property to Line One Foods Corporation (Line One) for P16,782,840 on 1 March 1995 ,that is, even before the condition for them to complete the balance on May 8. o On 6 March 1997, Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit their P10 million down payment with the cashier of the RTC. The trial court granted this motion. SECOND CASE WITHIN THE SAME RTC [Reyes Motion for Reconsideration]. The RTC denied Reyes motion in its Order dated 3 October 1997. In the same Order, the trial court directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down payment to the Clerk of Court on or before 30 October 1997. THIRD CASE [Reyes petition for certiori at the CA]. On 8 December 1997, Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Reyes prayed that the Orders of the trial court dated 6 March 1997, 3 July 1997 and 3 October 1997 be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On 12 May 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. o CA ruled that the trial court could validly issue the assailed orders in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction [NB: Equitable jurisdiction is a system of justice designed to supplement the common law by taking action in a reasonable and fair manner which results in a just outcome. Applying that point in the case at bar, the RTC has the right to issue the Orders they made that are now being questioned by Reyes in the exercise of equity jurisdiction] o CA held that the assailed orders merely directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million to the custody of the trial court to protect the interest of Lim who paid the amount to Reyes as down payment. This did not mean that the money would be returned automatically to Lim. FINAL CASE. This petition for review at the Supreme Court. o

Whether the CA erred in alleging that the trial court could issue the questioned Orders on grounds of equity when there is an applicable law on the matter, that is, Rules 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. [NB: Equity here is applied because the requirements in Rules 57-61 do not exactly apply to the case at bar. Thus, the CA & RTC ruled that the 10M down payment being deposited in the court is to prevent unjust enrichment of Reyes because Lim cant claim the property back as it had been sold to Line One]

Whether the CA erred in holding that the trial court could issue the questioned Orders dated March 6, 1997, July 3, 1997 and October 3, 1997, requiring petitioner David Reyes to deposit the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) during the pendency of the action, when deposit is not among the provisional remedies enumerated in Rule 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. [NB: These rules are about provisional remedies regarding situations that pertain to preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, replevin (this is a procedure whereby seized goods may be provisionally restored to their owner pending the outcome of an action to determine the rights of the parties concerned), and support pendent lite particularly with regards to property management such as scope and requirements]

RULINGS SC affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Reyes argues that a court cannot apply equity and require deposit if the law already prescribes the specific provisional remedies which, in this case, does not include deposit. However, this case is precisely one where there is a hiatus (this means, a gap) in the law and in the Rules of Court. If left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment of Reyes at the expense of Lim. Why is there hiatus in the law? Because the rules do not cover the case at bar, which fails to meet any of the requirements necessary (as also explained above): preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, replevin, and support pendent lite. This is a case of silence or insufficiency of the law and the Rules of Court. In this case, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates the courts to make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. This calls for the application of equity, which fills the open spaces in the law. The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another is embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code [Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.]. This principle applies not only to substantive rights but also to procedural remedies [NB: substantive rights are basic human rights whereas procedural remedies are merely for correcting faults]. One condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved party has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict (a delict is a violation of law/ tort) or any other provision of law. Courts can extend this condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved party, during the pendency of the case, has no other recourse based on the provisional remedies of the Rules of Court. There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million down payment to prevent unjust enrichment by Reyes at the expense of Lim.

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[Al P] Case for Article 10 of the Civil Code Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. People vs. Purisima (November 20,1978) FACTS

How would the SC construe the intent and spirit of the law in case of ambiguity?

BACKGROUND. There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review in this case filed by the People of the Philippines represented by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General. They were consolidated in this one decision as they involve one basic question of law. The respondents are three judges of the Courts of First Instance (CFI), two in Manila and another in Samar. THE CASE. The common accusation in the 26 cases for review is "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. o The three Judges issued Orders quashing or dismissing the accusations to respondents of the 26 cases that the information gathered did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by PD # 9 because it failed to state the second essential element of the crime: that the carrying of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon outside of the residence of the accused is in furtherance, an occasion of, connected with, or related to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. They reasoned out that it is this second essential element of the crime that makes the act of carrying any of the weapons described in the P.D. criminal. Why? Because that will show the motive or purpose of the possession of the weapon. o The petitioner said that P.D. 9(3) covers all situations where a person carries outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the P.D. regardless of the motive, intent or purpose. Thus, creating ambiguity in the construction and interpretation of the said P.D. o The three judges said that in case of ambiguity, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and the scope of the P.D. to search its intent and spirit. Hence, this review by the Supreme Court.

RULING: The Court DENIED the 26 petitions for review and AFFIRMED the orders of the three Judges dismissing or quashing the Information provided. Statutory Construction in relation to Art 10 of the CC: o In case of ambiguity, construction and interpretation of a legislative measure must be done in order to determine the intent and spirit of the law. Due to the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree. This can be found among others in the preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. It is presumed that P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President with no intent of rendering hardship or producing oppressive results, which may be regarded as a possible abuse of authority or an act of oppression. o In the case at bar, we can say that the intention of the law is to foster peace and harmony by preventing the carrying of weapons that may cause harm to others, but not to unscrupulously accuse anyone who may be carrying a weaponfor reasons other than causing harm to othersof criminal offence. o The said explanation thus elaborates what is stated in Article 10 of the Civil Code: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. [Marivic B] Case for Article 12 of the Civil Code Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue use of the Firm Name Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes and Petition for Authority to continue use of the firm name Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo. (30 July 1979) 92 SCRA 12 FACTS

ISSUES:

Whether or not the information filed by People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under P.D. # 9?

FIRST STAGE. two consolidated petitions in a resolution of September 2, 1976 were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip and Atty. Herminio Ozaeta to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. Petitioners argue the following: (1) under Article 1840 of the Civil Code, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner;

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(2) the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner specifically in profession such as accountancy and engineering; (3) the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership does not violate the Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics; (4) there is no possibility of imposition or deception; (5) no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partners name in a professional firms name; (6) the continued use of a deceased partners name in the first name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by US Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world. The Supreme Court cited the Deens case and the Perkins case (Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation) which had the same issues and arguments laid down in the case at bar. In these said cases, the Court ruled that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which could give rise to the possibility of deception.

supplement the statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute). A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence and in this case, the petitioners did not sufficiently prove that the issue at hand is considered a fact. The court cited the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, as quoted below. o The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name. o The public relations value of the use of an old firm name tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firms reputation established by deceased partners. Other Rulings of the Supreme Court: The use in their partnership names of the names of the deceased partners is under Article 1815 of the Civil Code which clearly implies that a firm name of a partnership must be either be those of a living partners and to those who are third persons or non-partners should be living persons who can be subject to liability nevertheless the heirs of the deceased lawyers cannot be held liable their deceased lawyers clients under Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Article 1840 is within Chapter 3 of the Title IX of the Code which basically deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership (I cannot understand this part). Furthermore, article 1840 is more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot rise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers.

ISSUE Whether or not a firm name with the names of partners who had passed away is considered a custom?

RULING No. Our local customs do not permit or allow the continued use of a deceased or former partners name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm who are still alive. In the history of law firms in the Philippines would show that how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. There is still the possibility of deception because more often than not a person in need of legal counsel is guided by the names in the firm title. On the other hand, U.S Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased partners name in the firm name of law partnerships because it is sanctioned by American customs and does not offend any American statutory provision or legislative policy. . In the Philippines, however, there is no local custom that sanctions that practice. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom (NB: Juridical custom can

The partnership for the practice of law is substantially different from those of engineering and accountancy because the former is a relationship or association for a particular purpose. Law is not a trade, business or of holding

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property but a profession which is defined by the Dean Pound as a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service.

The practice of law is related to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary money-making trade. o

Accordingly, the Supreme Court rendered a decision that the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners are advised to drop the names of Sycip and Ozaeta from their respective firm names. Dissenting Opinion by AQUINO, J He reiterated Article 1840 of the Civil Code and Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics. Moreover, in his opinion, the petition may be granted with the condition that it may be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein. The reason for this is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. He emphasized that this act is not illegal or unethical because this was practiced before the war by the law firm of James Ross. The name of James Ross was retained despite of his death in the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso. He pointed out that no one complained of this said retention in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. [Allen M] Case for Article 12 of the Civil Code ARTICLE 12 A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. MARTINEZ v. VAN BUSKIRK (27 December 1910) 18 PHIL 79 FACTS

The defendant did not deny the incident but guaranteed that his cochero/driver was a good servant. The unfortunate incident was only triggered by the noise and whip made by another driver passing by causing the horses to be irritated and frightened. He was not able to stop the horses from running into the carromata because he himself was thrown off the ground. [Apparently, the horses were left standing and upon irritation, suddenly ran frantically, hitting Martinez carromata] Ruling on the matter, the lower court initially found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him for Php 442.50 with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from the 17th day of October 1908 and for the costs of action. However, there is no general law of negligence in the Philippines except for Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code, which have some exceptions on the issue of negligence. [N.B. The New Civil Code, which we are studying in class, took effect in 1950] [THE PRESENT CASE. This is an appeal to the court to reverse the decision]

ISSUES

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of negligence for the accident caused by the cochero of his wagon. [As to the Article covered by the Art 12 of the New Civil Code: on whether a prevailing custom could be used to fill in the gap of a lack of a general law on negligence.]

THE FIRST CASE. On September 11, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, Ermita, Manila. Along the left-hand side of the street, she observed that a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant [Van Buskirk: the employer of the cochero of the wagon] was coming at a great speed. In order to give the defendants delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, she decided to occupy the sidewalk and stop. However, to her great surprise, the defendants wagon driven by two horses ran into her carromata and overturned itseverely wounding her on the head and her child, including the carromata itself.

RULING [No. The cochero of the defendant was not found guilty of negligence.] Citing several jurisprudence related to the case, such as Hayman v. Hewitt, Griggs v. Fleckenstein, inter alia [this is Latin for among other things; please remember it because we wont explain it again in future digests], the Supreme Court REVERSED, without special finding as to the costs, the previous ruling of the lower court. The High Tribunal held that it is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver the merchandise of the kind being delivered at the time of injuryand in the manner in which it was then being deliveredand that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the way in which they were left at the time of the accident. Such has been the custom in all cities. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. [How is this related to Art 12 of the New Civil Code? Acts that have not been destructive and consequently approved by society are considered as customs. Their corresponding acts have been permitted by society because they are beneficial rather than prejudicial to it. And so, they cannot just be considered unreasonable. In the case at bar, it has been a universal practice among merchants who deliver goods using wagons during that time to leave horses in the

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way they were left during the accident. In general, this practice had not been causing accidents, hence, it would be unfair for the cochero to be penalized for doing something that had become a universal practice, a custom. He could not be held negligent just because that customary act now led to an accident.] *ASM 6/18/2013

o [Philip P] Case for Article 13 of the Civil Code Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. State Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (13 November 1992) 215 SCRA 734; G.R. No. 99308 Melo, J: FACTS BACKGROUNDER. In 1979, Sabina Vda. De Cuenca (Cuenca) obtained two separate loans from State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) amounting to P160,000.00 and P500,000.00, respectively. As a security, she then mortgaged her properties at Tandang Sora and Timog in Quezon City. Cuenca was unable to pay her obligations on the maturity date. And despite the extensions and the subsequent demands from SIHI, Cuenca was still unable to settle her dues. FIRST STAGE. Because of the foregoing, SIHI initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding which was set on March 22, 1983. This was once more delayed by Cuenca, on account of her request to SIHI to buy her more time to pay. Failing once more, SIHI finally decided to push through with the auction sale [of her properties?] on August 8, 1983. The certificate of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on August 24, 1983. A year later, on August 24, 1984, she filed a case before the RTC and sought to annul the foreclosure sale. She argued that the sale is invalid, and even if it were [Am I correct in removing the not to make it consistent with the preceding clause?], she was able to redeem the property by filing a suit before the RTC. [FINAL STAGE: Is this a petition for certiorari at the SC? What was the decision of the CA as the case is now entitled SIHI vs CA?] ISSUE Granting that the foreclosure was valid [according to the CA?], was Cuenca able to redeem the property within the period prescribed by law?

RULING No, Cuenca was not able to redeem her properties within the prescribed period. Section 6 of RA 3135 (the law governing foreclosures) [what is the title of this law?] state that properties may be redeemed within one year from and after the date of sale. Art. 13 of the Civil Code indicates that by one year, it is understood to be 365 days. It also states that computations exclude the counting of the first day and includes the counting of the last day. In the case at bar, since the certificate of sale was encoded on August 24, 1983, the counting of 365 days would have started on August 25 and would end by August 23, 1984 (it being a leap year). Assuming that the complaint filed on August 24, 1984 did have the effect of a formal offer to redeem (although the Supreme Court ruled on the contrary), it would still have been immaterial in redeeming the properties since it was executed only after the prescribed period for redemption had already lapsed.

[Cristopher R] Case for Article 15 of the Civil Code Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Llorente vs. Court of Appeals (2000) 399 PHIL 342 FACTS BACKGROUNDER. Lorenzo Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from 10 March 1927 to 30 September 1957. He was married to Paula on 22 February1937. When the Pacific War broke out, Lorenzo was dispatched to the United States and Paula stayed at Camarines Sur. On 30 November 1943, she was given US citizenship issued by the US District Court, Southern District of NY. o When the Philippines was liberated in 1945, Lorenzo asked for a leave to return to the Philippines to visit his wife. Upon his return, he discoved that Paula was living in and having adulterous relationship with Lorenzos brother, Ceferino. o Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and did not want to live with her anymore . On 2 February1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that: (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault

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o o

and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. Lorenzo returned to the United States and on 16 November 1951 and filed for divorce at the Superior Court of the State of California (San Diego County). Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and she actively participated in the proceedings (although without being there physically present). On 27 November 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia on 16 January 1958. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit: (1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein; (2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur; (3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines; (4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves; (5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my La st Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age; (6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond; (7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me (8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal

o o

o o

properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament FIRST STAGE. On 14 December 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. On 18 January 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. On 24 January 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate [NB: probate is when the courts decides the legal validity of the will] On 11 June 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. SECOND STAGE. On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended that: (1) she was Lorenzos surviving spouse; (2) the various properties were acquired during their marriage, and (3) Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime [NB: legitime is similar to inheritance, but technically they are different. It is like mandatory inheritance] and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. On 18 May 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a decision that the divorce between Lorenzo and Paula to be null and void and therefore his marriage to Alicia was also void. Alicia was also not to receive any part of the estate of Lorenzo. The court also nullified the validity of the will of Lorenzo and gave Paula her share of the conjugal properties. Paula was also given 1/3 share of the estate and the illegitimate children Raul, Luz and Beverly were also given 1/3 share in the estate and a partition of the free portion on equal shares. THIRD STAGE. Alicia filled a motion for reconsideration but was denied on 14 September 1987. The court also modified its decision declaring Raul and Luz as not children legitimate or otherwise and declared Beverley as the only illegitimate child [the court ruled that Raul and Luz were NOT children of Lorenzo in any capacity, legitimate or illegitimate. The court did not state any reason for declaring this] FOURTH STAGE. On 28 September 1987, respondent Alicia Llorente appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the courts decision] FIFTH STAGE. On 25 August 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, denied the motion for lack of merit. FINAL STAGE: This petitition for review at the SC. ISSUES Is the family rights and duties binding to Lorenzo? Who are entitled to benefit from the estate of Lorenzo?

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RULING The SC set aside the ruling of the RTC and the CA stating that ARTICLE 15 of the civil code because at the time of Lorenzos divorce to Paula, marriage to Alicia, and the execution of his will and his death, he was a US citizen.

[Joicey C] Case for Article 15 of the Civil Code Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. G.R No. 80116.June 30, 1989 Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653 FACTS BACKGROUNDER. On September 7, 1979 Imelda Pilapil (petitioner) got married to Erich Ekkehord Geiling (private respondent), a German national, at the Federal Republic of Germany and gave birth to a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling. FIRST STAGE: After three and a half years of marriage, the private respondent filed a divorce at the Schoneberg Local Court in Germany claiming failure in marriage. The local court granted the divorce on January 15, 1986, and custody of the child was given to the petitioner. SECOND STAGE: Five (5) months after the divorce was granted, the private repondent filed two (2) complaints for adultery claiming that the petitioner had an affair with a certain James Chua (1st complaint under Judge Cruz) and Willian Chia (second complaint precided by respondent judge Ibay-Somera) The complaints were raffled at the RTC in Manila. o On March 14, 1987, the petitioner prayed to the Secretary of Justice to order the RTC to dismiss the cases or complaints filed against her. The proceedings were deferred and the records were elavated and reviewed by the Department of Justice. o The first complaint under Judge Cruz was suspended and the other case under respondent judge was moved for reset of proceedings. o The petioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings for the second complaint until after the pending resolution of the petition for review before the Secretary of Justice and also filed a motion to quash the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.However, the lower court (under respondent judge whichthe complaint was not suspended) denied her motion. o when the responded refused to be arraigned, the respondent judge considered it as a direct contempt and ordered the petitioner to be detained until submit

herself for arraignment. FINAL STAGE. On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari, a temporary restraining order and for the annulment of order by the lower court (by respondent judge) denying her motion to quash. the petition was anchored on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio, since purported complaint, a foreigner does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint of adultery". October 21, 1987 this court issued a temporary restraining order for the implementation criminal case of adultery under the respondent judge and secretary of justice acted on the resolution which he issued a resolution directing the respondent judge to move for dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. ISSUE Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery? RULING No. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except when filed with a written complaint of the offended spouse. However, the private respondent does not qualify as an offended spouse because when he filed the criminal complaint of adultery, the marriage with the petitioner had already been voided as they had been divorced under Germany law. The latter is recognized in the Philippines in so far as the private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of the status of a person. Moreover, under the American Jurisprudence on the cases involving the statutes in that jurisdiction which are pari materia [on the same subject or matter which should be construed with reference to each other] in ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery as cited in the Loftus case in Iowa [understood as it is the same ruling given in this case]. The court also cited the case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr., et al where the court ruled that after the divorce has been made between the Filipina(petitioner) and American private respondent, the latter could no longer sue the petitioner, as her husband, in any state of union. Wherefore, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is set aside and another one entered dismissing the complaint Criminal Case no. 87-52435 (2nd complaint above) for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent. This case is under art 15, which in the matter relating to the status of the petitioner

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and her then husband, the divorce decreed obtained abroad was honored legally by our constitution and the law relating to filing a criminal case like adultery is not binded anymore for the reason that they have already settled their marriage which was filed by the private responded. [Dahl T] Case for Article 15 of the Civil Code Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City, and RICHARD UPTON, respondents. (8 October 8 1985) 139 SCRA 139 FACTS

BACKGROUNDER. Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while his former husband, the private respondent, is a citizen of the United States. The two got married in Hongkong in 1972, lived in the Philippines after their marriage and begot two children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, United States in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time, to Theodore Van Dorn. FIRST STAGE. Private respondent filed a suit against the petitioner, dated June 8, 1983, in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the RTC, Branch CX in Pasay City. Private respondent contends that petitioners business in Ermita, Manila (the Galleon Shop) is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. o Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein the private respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no conjugal property. o The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case at bench. The Petitioner now filed a Petition for Certiorary and Prohibition to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch CX.

RULING YES. It is binding in private respondent as an American citizen, and the Philippines recognizes the foreign divorce provided they are valid according to their national law. The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations, had obtained juri sdiction over private respondent who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the US. The decree is binding in private respondent as an American citizen. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in this case as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own Countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate (to refuse to accept), he is estopped (prohibited/ prevented/ forbidden) by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be observed. Additional notes: o The petitioners Motion to Dismiss the case is GRANTED. o The Supreme Court ordered the respondent Judge to dismiss his decision in Civil Case No. 1075-P, in which he denied the petitioners Motion to Dismiss the case and Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively. [Mirabel O] Case for Article 16 of the Civil Code Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of

ISSUE

Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

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testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. o Aznar vs. Garcia January 31, 1963 7 SCRA 95 FACTS

BACKGROUNDER. Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of nine years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary (not the same as a resident, residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile.) until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California. o In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a (legacy) sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). o In the case at bar, Aznar is the executor of the will. FIRST STAGE. Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied o Under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile (the place he was staying). o On the other hand, counsel for Maria asserted that the national law of the deceased must apply. Illegitimate children are not entitled to anything under California law. FINAL STAGE. The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the succession rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California. Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Thus, filed to SC for motion to review.

The Supreme Court, deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen, said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: one for the residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. As the Supreme Court found that the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California, he being domiciled in the Philippines. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, was to be followed. Since Mr. Christensen, although an American citizen originally from California, had been residing in the Philippines until his death, the rule under California law on those domiciled in other jurisdictions apply. Hence, the SC remanded the case to the lower court asking them to determine successional rights under Philippine law.

[Angelica N] Case for Article 16 of the Civil Code Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Bellis vs. Bellis (6 June 1967) 20 SCRA 358 Bengzon, J. FACTS BACKGROUNDER. This is a direct appeal to the Supreme Court upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila approving the project of partition filed by the executor. o Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. He had two wives: Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced and with whom he had five legitimate children namely Edward, George, Henry, Alexander and Anna. Violet Kennedy who survived him and with whom he had three legitimate children namely Edwin, Walter and Dorothy, and He also had three illegitimate children: Amos Jr., Maria and Miriam. o On August 5,1952, Amos executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his

ISSUE

Whether or not the national law of Edward Christensen be applied in determining the succession rights of his heirs.

RULING

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distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000 to his three illegitimate children or P40,000 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives in equal shares. On July 8,1958, Amos died, a resident of Texas. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15,1958. The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as the executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies. On January 17,1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. On the other hand, Amos Bellis Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him. The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executors final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Article 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes. The illegitimate children opposed the wills on the ground that Philippine laws should be apply and the national law of the deceased be disregarded and that they have been deprived of their legitimes (to which they would be entitled, if Philippine law were to apply) This appeal is filed by Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis (illegitimate children of Amos Bellis) against Edward Bellis, et al. (legitimate children of Amos Bellis). ISSUE Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate childrens successional rights? RULING The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that there are no forced heirs or legitimes under the laws of the state of Texas. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.

Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. The Court applied what was in the written will of Amos Bellis and affirmed the decision of the probate court that the said children (Maria and Miriam) are not entitled to their legitimes because the Texas law must be apply since it is the national law of the deceased.

[Mayelle I] Case for Article 16 of the Civil Code Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be governed by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Testate Estate of Bohanan vs. Bohanan, et al. January 30, 1960 106 PHIL 997 FACTS This case is an appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the objections to the project of partition and approval of said project filed by Magdalena Bohonan, Mary Bohonan and Edward Bohonan. BACKGROUNDER. C.O. Bohonan, the testator, was born in Nebraska and selected Nevada as his domicile and permanent residence, and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. Notwithstanding his long residence in the Philippines, he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada. On April 23, 1944, he executed his will in Manila giving large legacies to his grandson (P90,819.20 in cash and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies), brother and a sister (same amount) and small amount to his two children (P6,000 each) and nothing to his wife. FIRST STAGE. The wife Magdalena C. Bohanan and her two children questioned the validity of the testamentary provisions in the testators last will and

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testament, claiming that they have been deprived of their legitime [NB: this is the portion of a parents estate of which he cannot disinherit his children, without legal cause]. o M. Bohanan argued that the trial court erred when it recognized her Reno divorce with the testator [NB: Reno is a city in western Nevada which is noted as a gambling resort and for its liberal laws that enable quick marriages and divorces], contending that the said divorce should not be declared a nullity in this country. The court refused to recognize Bohanans claim on the ground that the laws of Nevada allowed the testator to dispose all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Moreover, there is no community property owned by the former spouses when the divorce was issued and it appears that M. Bohanan married Carl Aaron subsequently. o Another is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia Bohanan, who only received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each. They argued that they were not given their proper shares in the estate which, in accordance with the Philippine laws, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator Mr. Bohonan.

[Bianca H] Case digest for Article 19 Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Albetz Investments, Inc. v CA February 28, 1977 FACTS This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals entitled Spouses Calma v Albetz Invetsments, Inc. Preliminary Facts: The Calma spouses were the lessees of Lot no 27 pt., Block No. BP-52 of a subdivision plan and located No. 816 Prudencio Street, Sampaloc, Manila. The defendant Albetz Investments, Inc., the lessor, demanded the lessees to leave or vacate the premises because they need it in order to construct a new building. However, the lessees refused causing Albetz to file an action of unlawful detainer against Vicente Calma in the Municipal Court; the court ruled against Calma asking them to vacate the said premises and pay for the rentals. As the order became final and executory the court issued a writ of execution commanding the sheriff to move the defendants in the premises and to collect the damages. Calma et al did not vacate but filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance Manila however it was denied; with that, Calma appealed to the SC. While the case is pending, Attorney Meneses (Attorney of Albetz) filed a motion for demolition (opposed by Calma) which the Municipal Judge approved giving 30 days to Calma from the receipt to vacate and remove their houses on the premises for the demolition order to proceed. Again, Calma did not vacate. Upon the motion of Albetz, the court authorized and ordered the sheriff to destroy, demolish, and remove the house. The above mentioned pending case (certiorari) was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Calma filed an action for specific performance with injunction against Albetz to sell the land to them at a reasonable price. However, it was denied; four days after, the sheriff, with the order of demolition, demolished the premises without issuing any new writ. Calma filed a case to the Court of First Instance of Manila against Albetz alleging that 1) the demolition is illegal because it was made 8 months after the issuance of demolition order and 2) the manner of demolition was indiscriminate, causing damage to properties. The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (Calma), awarding them damages. The defendant (Albetz) appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence the case to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the appellate court and the lower court erred in demanding that an order of demolition which is not implemented within 60 days becomes a nullity. WON the demolition was carried out on a manner consistent with justice and good faith

ISSUE Whether or not Philippine laws apply to a foreign testator?

RULING No. Since the testator, who died in 1944, was a citizen of Nevada, Article 10(2) of the old Civil Code (which is the same as Article16(2) of the new Civil Code) applies. It states that the national law of the person whose succession is in question shall govern. Therefore, o Mr. Bohanan allowed his estate to be governed by the laws of Nevada (particularly Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925), thereby allowing him to dispose all of his properties by will/testament according to his own preference. The Court ruled that the order approving the project of partition must be made in accordance with the testamentary provisions of the national law of the testator Bohonan pursuant to Article 10 of the old Civil Code and it is hereby affirmed.

ISSUE

HUMAN RELATIONS

RULING No

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 1.

Racio Decidendi: The Calma spouses are aware of the demolition since they are responding to it by filing cases which also resulted to some delays hence they are given sufficient time to comply to the order to vacate. Furthermore, in the case of Acibo v Macadaeg, it is decided that an order of demolition is not appealable, hence, there is no point to wait until the order would be served. They should have already vacated the premises. -Section 14 Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court and Section 1 Commonwealth Act No 39- removal of improvements on project of execution- not to destroy unless the following requisites are present: 1) special order of the court, 2) issued upon petition of the judgment creditor after due hearing, 3) after the former has failed to remove the same within reasonable time fixed by the court With regard to the manner of the demolition (case focuses here): a. In the course of the demolition, which was, according to the evidence for the plaintiffs, indiscriminate, the personal properties were just carelessly placed between the house and the fence, and they were left in the house and they were damaged by falling debris. As there was no one to take care (of them), many of the properties were lost and damaged by falling debris. b. Even though Albetz have legal right to claim the land, such right should not have been exercised in such a manner as to unduly prejudice its owners. According to Article 19 of the Civil Code: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith In the case, it was not carried out in a manner consistent with justice and good faith, it was done in a swift and unconscionable manner.

damages. It likewise seeks to annul the resolution dated November 16, 1995 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. FACTS

2.

On December 27, 1970, herein petitioner, Petrophil Corporation (Petrophil), and private respondent Dr. Amanda Ternida-Cruz entered into contract, allowing the latter to haul and transport any and all packages and/or bulk products of Petrophil. The contract provided that Petrophil could terminate the contract for breach, negligence, discourtesy, improper and/or inadequate performance or abandonment. Dra. Cruz was also required to reserve the use of at least two (2) units of tank trucks solely for the hauling requirements of Petrophil. o It was also stipulated in the paragraph 11 of the contract that the contract shall be for an indefinite period, provided that Petrophil may terminate said contract at any time with 30 days prior written notice. Dra. Cruz received a letter on May 21, 1987 that Petrophil was terminating her hauling contract in accordance with paragraph 11 thereof. o Private respondent appealed to Petrophil for reconsideration but said appeal was denied on June 5, 1987. FIRST STAGE: Dr. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila on June 23, 1987 in a Civil Case No. 87-40930, against Petrophil seeking the nullity of her termination of the contract and declaring its suspension as unjustified and contrary to its terms and conditions. o On March 11, 1988, the other herein private respondents, Jessie De Vera, Marcial Mulig, Antonio and Rufino Cuenca, all tank drivers of Dra. Cruz, also filed a complaint in Civil Case No. 88-43946 for damages against Petrophil Operations Manager Antonio Santos, Pandacan Terminal Manager Crispino A. de Castro, and Pandacan Terminal Superintendent Jaime Tamayo. o The two cases were consolidated and jointly tried. DRA. CRUZS TESTIMONY: She claimed that the termination of her hauling contract was a retaliation against her for allegedly sympathizing with the then striking Petrophil employees and informing the PNOC president of anomalies perpetrated by some of its officers and employees. DRIVER JESSIE DE VERAS TESTIMONY: The termination of Dra. Cruzs contract was intended to silence her. Further, he testified that before the termination of the contract, Petrophil officials reduced their hauling trips to make life harder for them so that they would resign from Dra. Cruzs employ, which in turn would result in the closure of her business. PETROPHILS ANSWER: Petrophil denied the allegations and professed that the hauling trips were reduced not because Dra. Cruz was being punished but

[Dahl T] CASE DIGEST FOR ARTICLE 20 Article 20- Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. PETROPHIL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. AMANDA TERNIDACRUZ, JESSIE DE VERA, MARCIAL MULIG, ANTONIO CUENCA, and RUFINO CUENCA, respondents. G.R. No. 122796 December 10, 2001 QUISUMBING, J.: PETITION This petition seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 26, 1995, affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 87-40930 for specific performance with preliminary injunction and Civil Case No. 88-43946 for

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because the company was assigning hauling trips on the basis of compartmentation and not on a first-come first-serve. o Witnesses for Petrophil testified that on April 25, 1987, there was a stike at the Pandacan terminal and Dra. Cruz and her husband were at the picket line (a line of people picketing a business, organization, or institution; a person posted for a demonstration or protest). They also refused to load petroleum products, resulting in the disruption of delivery to service stations in Metro Manila and in the provinces, which in turn resulted in loss of sales and revenues. Because of this act of herein respondent, the management terminated the hauling contract. On MAY 29, 1991 TRIAL COURTS DECISION ordered the defendant Prtrophil to pay plaintiff Dra. Cruz the sum of P309, 723.65 as unearned hauling charges and P20,000 as attorneys fees and expenses of suit. The trial court also ordered Petrophil to pay each of plaintiffs Jessie de Vera and Rufino Cuenca the sums of P64,390.00 and P5,000.00 as unearned income and attorneys fees, respectively. SECOND STAGE: Dra. Cruz alleged that the trial court erred in not awarding actual damages from loss of income during the illegal and arbitrary suspension of the hauling contract. She asked that Petrophil be ordered to pay her the sum of P309,723.65, representing the unearned hauling charges that ended in 1990 and until said amount is paid and settled; and to award compensatory, exemplary and moral damages. The COURT OF APPEALS, on September 26, 1995, affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It held: Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification that the amount of P309, 723.65, awarded as unearned hauling charges should earn legal interest from May 29, 1991 until fully paid. SO ORDERED. FINAL STAGE: in this petition for review, Petrophil alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in rendering a decision that: o UNLAWFULLY SET ASIDE A VALID AND EXISTING CONTRACTUAL STIPULATION BETWEEN PARTIES. o IMPOSED TORTIOUS LIABILITY WHERE THE REQUISITES PRESCRIBED BY LAW FOR SUCH LIABILITY WERE NOT ESTABLISHED AT ALL BY THE EVIDENCE. o HENCE, THIS PETITION.

Whether or not herein petitioner was guilty of arbitrary termination of the contract, which would entitle Dra. Cruz and other private respondents to damages.

ISSUE

RULING YES. In terminating the hauling contract of Dra. Cruz without hearing her side on the factual context above describe, petitioner opened itself to a charge of bad faith. While Petrophil had the right to terminate the contract, petitioner could not act purposely to injure private respondent. o It was nowhere in the record do we (Supreme Court) find that the petitioner asked Dra. Cruz to explain her actions, Petrophil simply terminated her contract. o In BPI Express Card Corporation vs. CA, 296 SCRA 260, 272 (1998), it was held that there is abuse of a right under Article 19 of the New Civil Code if the following are present: 1) there is a legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised in bad faith; 3) for the sole purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. All these three elements are present in the case at bar. Hence, we (Supreme Court) are convinced that the termination by petitioner of the contract with Dra. Cruz calls for appropriate sanctions by way of damages. Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it imposed a tortious liability where the requisites therefore were not established by the evidence. There is no other evidence that the termination of the contract was done with deliberate intent to harm or the sole purpose of prejudicing the respondent-drivers. Petitioner adds that the termination was an exercise of a right and directed primarily at Dra. Cruz. Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides that every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the damage done. o Petitioner might not have deliberately intended to injure the respondent-drivers. But as a consequence of its wilful act directed against Dra. Cruz, respondent-drivers lost their jobs and consequently suffered loss of income. o Note that under Article 20, there is no requirement that the act must be directed at as specific person, but it suffices that a person suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful act of another in order that indemnity could be demanded from the wrongdoer. o The appellate court did not err in awarding damages to respondentdrivers. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated September 26, 1995 and November 16, 1995, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.

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Case for Article 21 of the Civil Code Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. [Patricia L] Velayo vs. Shell (31 October 1956)

proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Velayos appointment as CALIs assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice. ISSUE Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.

FACTS Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell and CALI offered its C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three-man working committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALIs asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane in California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted. Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALIs asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALIs assets. CALI then filed for insolvency

RULING Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. [The main point could be this as regards Art 21: Shell already knew that CALI is at the brink of bankruptcy and unless its creditors agree together on how to dispose of its remaining assets fairly, it may file for insolvency. In spite of that, Shell-Phils seemed to want to get an upper hand in the negotiations such that it appointed Shell-USA to

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act on their behalf and file a claim for CALIs C-54 plane.

This produced a

commotion among the other creditors, hence, leading to loss or injury. Velayo vs Shell: Detailed Version FACTS: The Commercial Air Lines, Inc., which is referred to as CALI, is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the Philippines laws and is previously engaged in air transportation business. The Shell Company, which is the defendant, is on the other hand, a corporation organized under the laws of England and duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Since the start of CALIs operations, its fuel needs were all supplied by the Defendant. Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, its Credit Manager who extended credit to CALI, was in charge of the collection thereof. However, all matters referring to extensions of the term of payment had to be decided first by Mr. Stephen Crawford and later by Mr. Wildred Wooding, who represented in this country Defendants Board of Directors, the residence of which is in London, England. As of August, 1948, the books of the Defendant showed a balance of P170,162.58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI. Even before August 6, 1948, Defendant had reasons to believe that the financial condition of the CALI was for from being satisfactory. On August 6, 1948, the management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors (excepting only the insignificant small claims) and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation. The persons present, including Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, signed their names and the names of the companies they represented on a memorandum pad of the law firm Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing. What occurred in that meeting may be summarized as follows: xxx. Then followed a discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for the accounts due to the employees, the Government and the National Airports Corporation. The representatives of the latter Messrs. Vicente H. Liwag, C. Dominguez and Pacifico V. Agcaoili, contended that their accounts were preferred. The other creditors disputed such contention of preference. No understanding was reached on this point and it was then generally agreed that the matter of preference be further studied by a working committee to be formed. The creditors present agreed to the formation of a working committee to continue the discussion of the payment of claims and preferences alleged by certain creditors, and it was further agreed that said working committee would supervise the preservation of the properties of the corporation while the creditors attempted to come to an understanding as to a fair distribution of the assets among them. From the latter exhibit the following is copied: 4. Certain specific matters such as the amount owing to the Philippine Air Lines, Inc., and the claims of Smith, Bell vs. Co., (representing Lloyds of London) that its claim should be offset against the payments which may be due to CALI from insurance claims were

not taken up in detail. It was agreed that these matters together with the general question of what are preferred claims should be the subject of further discussions, but shall not interfere with the consummation of the sale in favor of PAL. 5. The creditors present agreed to the formation of the working committee to supervise the preservation of the properties of the corporation and agreed further that Mr. Fitzgerald shall represent the creditors as a whole in this committee. It was understood, however, that all questions relating to preference of claims can be decided only by the creditors assembled. 6. It was the sense of the persons present that, if possible, the insolvency court be avoided but that should the creditors not meet in agreement, then all the profits from the sale will be submitted to an insolvency court for proper division among the creditors. To this working committee, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, Credit Manager, of the Defendant, Atty. Agcaoili of the National Airports Corporation and Atty. Alexander Sycip were appointed. After the creditors present knew the balance sheet and heard the explanations of the officers of the CALI, it was their unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits against this corporation but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets, although the management of the CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets, it would file insolvency proceedings. Mr. Fitzgerald did not decline the nomination to form part of said working committee and on August 9, 1948, the 3 members thereof discussed methods of achieving the objectives of the committee as decided at the creditors meeting, which were to preserve the assets of the CALI and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors. Atty. Sycip made an offer to Mr. D. Fitzgerald to name a representative to oversee the preservation of the assets of the CALI, but Mr. Fitzgerald replied that the creditors could rely on Col. Lambert. Atty. Pacifico Agcaoili promised to refer the arguments adduced at the second meeting to the General Manager of the National Airports Corporations and to obtain the advice of the Corporate Counsel, so the negotiation with respect to the division of assets of the CALI among the creditors was left pending or under advice when on that very day of the meeting of the working committee, August 9, 1948, which Mr. Fitzgerald attended, Defendant effected a telegraphic transfer of its credit against the CALI to the American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., assigning its credit, amounting to $79,440.00, which was subsequently followed by a deed of assignment of credit dated August 10, 1948, the credit amounting this time to the sum of $85,081.29. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not under the facts of the case, the Defendant Shell Company of the P. I., Ltd., taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALIs airplane C -54 at the Ontario International Airport within the Country of San Bernardino, State of California, U. S. A., (Which knowledge it acquired: first at the informal luncheon-meeting of the principal creditors of CALI on August 5, 1948, where its Credit Manager, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, was selected to form part of the Working Committee to supervise the preservation of CALIs properties and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors and thus avoid the institution of insolvency proceedings in court; and

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Subsequently, at the meeting of August 9, 1948, when said Mr. Fitzgerald met the other members of the said Working Committee and heard and discussed the contention of certain creditors of CALI on the accounts due the employees, the Government and the National Airports Corporation who alleged that their claims were preferred), acted in bad faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of the other creditors of CALI present in said meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., for the sum of $79,440 which was subsequently followed by a deed of assignment of credit dated August 10, 1948, amounting this time to the sum of $85,081.28 (Exhs. Z), thus defeating the purpose of the informal meetings of CALIs principal creditors end depriving the Plaintiff, as its Assignee, of the means of obtaining said C-54 plane, or the value thereof, to the detriment and prejudice of the other CALIs creditors who were consequently deprived of their share in the distribution of said value; and (2) Whether or not by reason of said betrayal of confidence and trust, Defendant may be made under the law to answer for the damages prayed by the Plaintiff; and if so, what should be the amount of such damages. We see that Plaintiff, as Assignee of the Insolvent CALI, had personality and authority to institute this case for damages, Whether the payment of damages sought to be recovered from Defendant may be ordered under the Law and the evidence of record. RULING: IF ANY PERSON, before the assignment is made, having notice of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, or having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced, embezzles or disposes of any money, goods, chattels, or effects of the insolvent, he is chargeable therewith, and liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought to be embezzled or disposed of, to be received for the benefit of the insolvent estate. The writer of this decision does not entertain any doubt that the Defendant taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among them, and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such understanding as it was really the case schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States, where CALIs plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvents property depriving the latter and the Assignee that was latter appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane. In addition to the aforementioned Section 37, Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides the following: Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. It maybe said that this article only contains a mere declarations of principles and while such statement may be is essentially correct, yet We find that such declaration is implemented by Article 21 and sequence of the same Chapter which prescribe the following: Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to; another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The Code Commission commenting on this article, says the following: Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. But, it may be asked, would this proposed article obliterate the boundary line between morality and law? The answer is that, in the last analysis, every good law draws its breath of life from morals, from those principles which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. If this premises is admitted, then the proposed rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which cause damages. When it is reflected that while codes of law and statutes have changed from age to age, the conscience of man has remained fixed to its ancient moorings, one cannot but feel that it is safe and salutary to transmute, as far as may be, moral norms into legal rules, thus imparting to every legal system that enduring quality which ought to be one of its superlative attributes. Furthermore, there is no belief of more baneful consequence upon the social order than that a person may with impunity cause damage to his fellow-men so long as he does not break any law of the State, though he may be defying the most sacred postulates of morality. What is more, the victim loses faith in the ability of the government to afford him protection or relief. A provision similar to the one under consideration is embodied in article 826 of the German Civil Code. The same observations may be made concerning injurious acts that are contrary to public policy but are not forbidden by statute. There are countless acts of such character, but have not been foreseen by the lawmakers. Among these are many business practices that are unfair or oppressive, and certain acts of landholders and employers affecting their tenants and employees which contravene the public policy of social justice. Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which compels the return of a thing acquired without just or legal grounds. This provision embodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, which has been one of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries. It is most needful that this ancient principles be clearly and specifically consecrated in the proposed Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no one may unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of another. The German Civil Code has a similar provision (art. 812). (Report of the Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 40- 41). From the Civil Code Annotated by Ambrosio Padilla, Vol. I, p. 51, 1956 edition, We also copy the following: A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: Even if an act or event causing damage to anothers property was not due to the fault or negligence of the Defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was

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benefited., with mere much more reason the Defendant should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence. It may be argued that the aforequoted provisions of the Civil Code only came into effect on August 30, 1950, and that they cannot be applicable to acts that took place in 1948, prior to its effectivity. But Article 2252 of the Civil Code, though providing that: Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may be prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, shall have no retroactive effect. implies that when the new provisions of the Code does nor prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation and it cannot be alleged that in the case at bar Defendant had any vested or acquired right to betray the confidence of the insolvent CALI or of its creditors said new provisions, like those on Human Relations, can be given retroactive effect. Moreover, Article 2253 of the Civil Code further provides: But if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which may give rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin. and according to Article 2254, no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the right of others. In case of Juan Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Company, (82 Phil., 359; 47 Off. Gaz., [5] 2023), one of the question at issue was whether or not the provisions of the New Civil Code of the Philippines on moral damages should be applied to an act of negligence which occurred before the effectivity of said code, and this Court, through Mr. Justice Briones, sustaining the affirmative proposition and citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1941, and November 14, 1934, as well as the comment of Mr. Castan, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Spain, about the revolutionary tendency of Spanish jurisprudence, said the following: We conclude, therefore, reaffirming the doctrine laid down in the case of Lilius (59 J. F. 800) in the sense that indemnity lies for moral and patrimonial damages which include physical and pain sufferings. With this (doctrine), We effect in this jurisdiction a real symbiosis 1 of the Spanish and American Laws and, at the same time, We act in consonance with the spirit and progressive march of time (translation) The writer of this decision does not see any reason for not applying the provisions of Section 37 of the Insolvency Law to the case at bar, specially if We take into consideration that the term any person used therein cannot be limited to the officers or employee of the insolvent, as no such limitation exist in the wording of the section (See also Sec. 38 of the same Act), and that, as stated before, the Defendant schemed and affected the transfer of its credits (from which it could derive practically nothing) to its sister corporation in the United States where CALIs plane C-54 was then situated, succeeding by such swift and unsuspected operation in disposing of said insolvents property by removing it from the possession and ownership of the insolvent. However, some members of this Court entertain doubt as to the applicability of said section 37 because in their opinion what Defendant in reality disposed of was its own credit and not the insolvents property, although this was practically the effect and result of the scheme. Having in mind this objection and that the provisions of Article 37 making the person coming within its purview liable for double the value of the property sought to be disposed of constitute a sort of penal clause which shall be strictly construed, and

considering further that the same result may be obtained, by applying only the provisions of the Civil Code, the writer of this decision yields to the objection aforementioned. Articles 2229, 2232, 2234, 2142, and 2143 of the Civil Code read as follows: Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Art. 2232. In contracts quasi-contracts, the Court may award exemplary damages if the Defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the Plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages should be upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the Plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages. Art. 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. Art, 2143. The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do not exclude other quasicontracts which may come within the purview of the preceding article. In accordance with these quoted provisions of the Civil Code, We hold Defendant liable to pay to the Plaintiff, for the benefit of the insolvent CALI and its creditors, as compensatory damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at the time aforementioned and another equal sum as exemplary damages. There is no clear proof in the record about the real value of CALIs plane C-54 at the time when Defendants credit was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States. [Terence D] Case for Article 21 of the Civil Code Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Pe vs. Pe G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: FACTS A married man and a Chinese national, Alfonso Pe (defendant) engaged in a romantic relationship with Lolita Pe, who was 24 years old and unmarried.

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Sometime in 1952, Alfonso frequented Lolitas house on the pretext1 that he wanted to teach her how to pray the rosary. He and Lolita eventually fell and in love and conducted clandestine trysts2. They also exchanged love notes. Then sometime in 1955, Lolitas parents learned of the rumors surrounding the relationship between Alfonso and their daughter. Thereafter, Alfonso was forbidden to enter their house and see her, but the affair between him and Lolita continued nonetheless. In addition, Lolitas parents even filed deportation charges against him. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared. After she was gone, her brothers and sisters found that her clothes were gone. They did, however, find a note on which something was written in handwriting recognized to be Alfonsos. The note said: Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.Reply Love Lolitas disappearance was reported to the NBI, and her whereabouts up to this present [are] still unknown [at the time when SC had to decide on the case].3 Lolitas parents, brothers and sisters (plaintiff) filed an action before the Court of First Instance to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages from Alfonso. The CFI dismissed the complaint. It declared that Alfonso could not be held liable for damages because plaintiffs failed to prove that hebeing aware of the fact that he had been marrieddeliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolitas affection.

case. It concluded that Alfonso, through an ingenious scheme of trickery, seduced Lolita to the point that she fell in love with him. Furthermore, it added: The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.5 [Philip P] Case for Article 21 of the Civil Code Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. WASSMER VS. VELEZ 12 SCRA 648 (1964) Bengzon, J.P. FACTS Francisco X. Velez (Paquing) and Beatriz P. Wassmer (Bet), following their mutual promises of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. In preparation, the couple applied for a license to contract marriage. The marriage was soon made public: Preparations were made, invitations sent, dresses and gifts ordered. Two days before the big day, he left a note before Bet, saying that the wedding should be postponed. Paquing then left for Mindanao. And a day before the wedding, he promised Bet through a telegram that nothing changed rest assured coming soon. But he never returned, nor was he heard from again. Bet soon sued Paquing for damages. Defendant then filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings, and motion for new trial and reconsideration. Bet won in the lower court, which led Paquing to appeal before the SC. He asserts that the judgment against him is contrary to law, since mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.

ISSUE RULING The Supreme Court ruled that Alfonso is liable for damages, under Article 214 of the Civil Code. It did not agree with the view expressed in the CFIs ruling on the Can Alfonso be held liable for damages? ISSUE

Whether or not the circumstances above-mentioned are a breach of promise to marry.

1 2

for the reason engaged in romantic relationships without the knowledge of Lolitas parents 3 Im curious: Was Lolita Pe ever found? I wonder how she looks now. I even wonder if she is already dead. 4 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

RULING No, the circumstances above-mentioned goes beyond a breach of a promise to marry [which is not actionable]. In the case at bar, a promise was not only made but was supported by all the necessary preparations and formalities. While a mere breach of promise to marry is not punishable by law, the actions of Paquing were clearly injurious to the good customs of the countrywith him walking out two days before the wedding. Article 21 of the Civil Code speaks

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for itself. It requires any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy [to] compensate the latter for the damage. [Joice C] Case for Article 21 Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. GR No. 97336 February 19, 1993 Gashem Shookat Baksh, petitioner vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and Marilou T. Gonzales, respondents Davide, Jr., J.: FACTS

BACKGROUNDER: Private respondent Marilou T. Gonzales, 22 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community, without the assistance of a counsel, filed a complaint on Regional Trial Court Branch 38 in Lingayen Pangasinan, a complaint for damages against the petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh, Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig Dagupan City, an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. Before August 20, 1987, the petitioner courted and proposed to marry the private respondent who then accepted his love on the condition that at the end of the semester which was October that year, they would get married. Sometime in August 20, 1987, the then virgin private respondent was forced by the petitioner live with him at the Lozano Apartments. o However, a week before the filing of the complaint, the petitioners attitude towards her started to change, he maltreated and threatened to kill her. She sustained injuries. The petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement during the confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig and asks her not to live in with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. On the other hand, the petitioner only admitted personal circumstances of the parties and not the allegations brought by the private respondent. FIRST STAGE: After conducting a pre-trial on January 25, 1988, the trial court issued Pre-trial Order favouring the private respondent and ordered the petitioner to pay for the damages and attorneys fee. The decision of the RTC was anchored on its findings that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private

respondent, (d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfil his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. SECOND STAGE: The petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the respondent Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and in (b) ordering him to pay for damages, attorneys fee, litigation expenses and cost. On February 18, 1991, the CA promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial courts ruling and be made liable in violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. The petitioner filed his instant petition contradicting all the factual findings and circumstances and insisting that the Article 21 of the Civil Code is not applicable to him as he did not do any moral wrong, injury or violated any good customs or public policy and is not conservant of Filipino customs and public policy and that the mere breach of promise to marry is not actionable. FINAL STAGE: On August 26, 1991, the Supreme Court gave due course to the petition and required each parties to submit their respective Memoranda which they complied with. Upon the submission of their respective thesis, the credibility of the witnesses in the trial court was also raised. But SC equally settled the rule that only questions of law may be raised on a petition for certiorari and the petitioners contention did not fall on any exceptions thus:

ISSUE

Whether or not the breach of promise to marry is actionable for this particular case.

RULING: YES. While the general rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong as laid down in the history of America and England which has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse than hby designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so called Heart Balm suits [NB: these are suits for breach of promise to marry] in many of the American states. This Code contains a provision on Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts (NB: Tort is an injury or wrong that is not criminal in nature) or quasi-delict (NB: Quasi-delict is an act whereby a person, without malice, but by fault, negligence or imprudence not legally excusable, causes injury to another) in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of

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moral wrongs which are impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Thus, the court holds that where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfil that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle [NB: to do something by means of flattery] her to accept him and to obain her consent to the sexual act COULD JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF DAMAGES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 21 NOT BECAUSE OF SUCH PROMISE TO MARRY BUT BECAUSE OF THE FRAUD AND DECEIT BEHIND IT AND THE WILLFUL INJURY TO HER HONOR AND REPUTATION WHICH FOLLOWED THEREAFTER. IT IS ESSENTIAL HOWEVER, THAT SUCH INJURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS OR PUBLIC POLICY. The court found that that it was the petitioners fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under Article 337 or 338 of the RPC [NB: these refer to seduction of a virgin below 18 years old] because the private respondent was above eighteen. Thus, this court clearly suggests that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. The private respondent is clear to have unstable life, inferior educational background, poverty and dishonourable employment while the petitioner will be soon becomes a doctor. These statements reveal the true motive of the petitioner towards the private respondent, obviously, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive, marrying with a woman with such circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the private respondent believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his lifes partner. He was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipinos concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. *Supreme Court finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition was denied, with cost against the petitioner.

contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

July 10, 1992 CONRADO BUNAG, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA CIRILO REGALADO, J: PETITION: reversal of CA decision on May 17, 1991 which affirmed the decision of RTC Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite FACTS

[Denise P] Case for Article 21 of the Civil Code Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is

Plaintiff-appellant: Zenaida Cirilo (26 years old, Commerce college graduate) Defendant-appellant: Conrado Bunag, Jr. & Conrado Bunag, Sr. The plaintiff-appellants story: o In the afternoon (4:00pm) of September 8, 1973, Cirilo was walking on her way to San Juan de Dios canteen for merienda when Bunag (Jr.) came in a car with an unidentified male companion. o It was established that Cirilo and Bunag were sweethearts but had a quarrel two weeks before that day. He invited her to Aristocrat Restaurant to talk things over. She obliged because she believed in his sincerity. o Upon reaching San Juan St. in Pasay City, the car abruptly turned right. Cirilo protested but was frightened by the threats of the two, saying that she should not make any noise as they would bump the car against the post in the street if she did. o They went through F.B. Harrison Blvd. and reached a motel. Cirilo was dragged from the car and taken inside the motel where Bunag deflowered her against her will and consent. Despite her struggles, she could not match the strength of the two men being a woman with small stature. Bunag forced her to lie down while his companion removed her panty and then left. Bunag said his companion would come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender her virginity. o Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how blood came out of her private parts after her vagina was penetrated by the penis of defendant Bunag, Jr. o Cirilo pleaded Bunag to allow her to go home but he said he would only let her go after they married. o They went to Bunags grandmother Juana de Leons house in Pamplona, Las Pias, arriving at 9:30 p.m. About 10 p.m., Conrado Bunag, Sr. arrived and said that Cirilo and Bunag would apply for a marriage license tomorrow (Monday) at Bacoor. o After filing, they went to live at Juana de Leons house as husband and wife from Sept. 8, 1973 to Sept. 29, 1973. On Sept. 29, Bunag left and never returned. On Oct. 3, 1973, Cirilo went back to her parents.

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Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by the defendantappellants. o Cirilos Uncle Vivencio Bansagan affirmed in testimony that on Sept. 8 she arrived at home at 9 p.m. His efforts to search for her were unsuccessful. He told Cirilos mother that she might have married. In the afternoon of the next day (Sunday), Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite barrio captain Jacinto Manalili and Francisco Cabrera informed Cirilos mother that Cirilo and Bunag were at Cabreras house. The uncle went to the house at the request of his sister and found them. At De Leons house, he met Bunag Sr. who said, Pare, the children are here already. Let us settle the matter and have them married. o Cirilo talked to her uncle, saying she lost her honor and she would bear her sufferings as both Bunag and his father promised marriage. The defendant-appellants story: o Conrado Bunag, Jr. denies the abduction and rape of Cirilo. Bunag claims that they eloped on Sept. 8 because his father opposed the relationship. o The defendants insist that the couple made prior plans to elope and get married. These were known to some friends, including Architect Chito Rodriguez. o Guillermo Ramos, Jr. accompanied his friend, the defendant, to meet Cirilo and her officemate, Lydia, in the vicinity of San Juan de Dios Hospital. They proceeded to have merienda at its canteen then Ramos took Lydia to Quirino Ave. for her to get a ride home. Then Cirilo and Bunag went to Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels but it was full. They proceeded to Holiday Hotel. After three hours, they went to Juana de Leons house and stayed until Sept. 19. o Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with the plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats made to his life prompted him to break off their plan to get married. o Bunag Sr. denied having gone to De Leons house and promising that the couple would be married. He said he called Atty. Conrado Adreneda, Bunag Jr.s employer (Mandala Corp.), thrice between Sept. 8 to 9, asking for his sons whereabouts. He was told of the elopement on the afternoon of Sept. 9 by his mother Candida Gawaran. He also denied having met with Cirilos relatives and agreeing to their plans for marriage. Other details: o Cirilo filed for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry against the petitioners. o August 20, 1983: trial court found that petitioner abducted and raped respondent. Bunag Sr. was absolved from any and all liability. o Moral damages: P80,000 o Exemplary damages: P20,000 o Way of Temperate damages: P20,000 o Attorneys fees and costs of suit: P10,000 o Respondent appeals lower courts decision in absolving Bunag Sr. from liability. o

Bunags claimed trial court erred: o 1) in finding that defendant-appellant Bunag Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant o 2) in finding that defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. o 3) in awarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of defendants-appellants' promise of marriage May 17, 1991: CA dismissed both appeals and affirmed RTCs decision.

Bunag Jr. with petition for review contends that: 1) respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents for petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law on preparation of judgment 2) it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that there was forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive damages RULINGS o Petitioner argues that both courts did not consider the alleged facts that Cirilo agreed to marry and that it was a case of simple elopement and agreement to marry. o What the petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented before o The Supreme Court said statutory and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law. o It is not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by lower court. o The Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals in favor of Cirilo. o Petitioner also claims that the trial court erred in awarding damages in the breach of promise to marry. o we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. o It is only when the plaintiff has to recover the wedding expenses he incurred that civil action is valid. o However, award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in Article 2219 of Civil Code. Further, pursuant to Article 21 of the Civil Code, in relation to par. 10 of Art. 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. o Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended

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to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. Generally, every person criminally liable for felony is also civilly liable. Criminal liability will five rise to civil liability only if the criminal act results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.

outcome of a lawsuit] ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of Four Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant. Second Stage: Court of Appeals On appeal taken by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CFI, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.

ISSUE Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.

[Allen M] Case for Article 21 Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Francisco Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals G.R. 14628, September 30, 1960 J. Concepcion FACTS October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu and a life insurance underwriter, filed with her natural child Chris Hermosisima, for moral damages against Francisco Hermosisima arising from an alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry Soledad Cagigas. Petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than the mother of his child, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, intimacy developed between Soledad and the petitioner. One evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in the petitioners cabin M/V Escao to which he was then atta ched as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married [the petitioner here] one Romanita Perez. First Stage: Court of First instance (CFI) of Cebu o The Court decided that Chris Hermosisima is a natural child of Francisco Hermosisima and confirmed the order of pende lite [NB: pendent elite means the action is pending, that is, it describes a matter which is dependent upon the

RULING Although Articles 43 and 44 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage, these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. Accordingly, Articles 56-65 pertaining to the same subject were also inserted in the Philippine Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I, but these articles were also, however, eliminated in Congress by reason of breach of promise to marry is not actionable as decided in De Jesus v. Syquia. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. Article 2219 of the Civil Code [NB: this covers moral damages due to seduction] was also contemplated to have existed in the case at bar considering the existence of seduction allegedly committed by the petitioner. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed (see the breakdown of costs above), therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance.

Case for Article 22 of the Civil Code Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. [Oliver T] Obana vs CA (29 March 1985) Complete Reference: ANIANO OBAA, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANICETO SANDOVAL,

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respondents. G.R.NO. L-36249 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: FACTS

SANDOVAL is the owner and manager of the "Sandoval and Sons Rice Mill" located in Rosales, Pangasinan. He is engaged in the buying and selling of palay. On November 21, 1964, SANDOVAL was approached by a certain Chan Lin who offered to purchase from him 170 cavans of clean rice (wagwag variety) at the price of P37.26 per cavan, delivery to be made the following day at petitioner's store in San Fernando, La Union, with payment to be made thereat by Chan Lin to SANDOVAL's representative. SANDOVAL accepted the offer as he knew petitioner and had had previous transactions with him. These were delivered accordingly but when the truck driver attempted to collect the purchase price from Chan Lin, the latter was nowhere to be found. The driver tried to collect from petitioner [Obana; the storeowner where the goods were delivered], but the latter refused stating that he had purchase the goods from Chan Lin at P33.00 per cavan and that the price therefore had already been paid to Chan Lin. He said that Chan Lin swindled Sandoval. SANDOVAL, as plaintiff, filed suit for replevin [NB: legal action where the owner of movable goods is given the right to recover them from someone who should not have them; often used in disputes between buyers and sellers] against petitioner [then the defendant], before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, which ordered petitioner-defendant to pay to SANDOVAL one-half () of the cost of the rice or P2,805.00. Obana appealed to the CFI of La Union, which dismissed the complaint against him. At the CA, Sandoval obtained a reversal in his favor. Now at the SC, Obana said that this is a case of swindling by Chan Lin to Sandoval.

At the very least, Chan Lin had a rescissible [revocable] title to the goods for the non-payment of the purchase price, but which had not been rescinded at the time of the sale to petitioner. However, it was found that 3days after the delivery, Chan Lin returned Obanos money. Obanoo claimed that he then returned the cavans of rice to Sandoval. But Sandovals driver said Obano never returned the sacks of rice. They would have withdrawn the replevin case had the sacks of rice been returned. o Having been repaid the purchases price by Chan Lin , the sale, as between them, had been voluntarily rescinded, and petitionerdefendant was thereby divested of any claim to the rice. Technically, therefore, he should return the rice to Chan Lin, who was ready to return the rice to Sandoval. Sandoval has all the right to recover the rice and rescind the contract as he was not paid [principle of equity]. Obano cannot unjustly enrich himself at the expense of Sandoval. Hence Article 21 of the Civil Code has been affirmed by the SC: Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. o

Article 26 Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence: (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

ISSUE

Shall Obano return the sacks of rice to Sandoval as the formers possession of them violates Article 22 of the Civil Code?

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. Case for Article 26 of the Civil Code Padalhin vs. Lavina G.R. 183026 November 14, 2012 Facts: Nelson Lavia and Nestor Padalhin were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul General, respectively. During their stay in Kenya, the residence of Lavina was raided twice. The first raid happened in April 18, 1996 and the second raid happened in April 23, 1996, where photographs of the residence were taken without the presence and consent of the residents (Lavina). Subsequently, both Nestor and Lavia were recalled from their posts in Kenya.

RULING Yes. Below is the reasoning of the court. Ownership was transferred to Chan Lin when the cavans of rice were delivered to Obanos store. This was agreed upon in the contract between Sandoval and Chan Lin. o There was a perfected sale. Article 1475 of the Civil Code lays down the general rule that there is perfection when there is consent upon the subject matter and price, even if neither is delivered. o Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. o Art. 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.

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On November 17, 1997, Lavia filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Nestor, in which the RTC ruled in favor of Lavina for there was apparent violation of the privacy of Lavina and the fact prevailed as to the admission of Nestor that he caused the action of taking pictures of the raw elephant tusks found in the residence. The case went to CA in which the CA sustained the decision of the RTC with modification as to the damages to be awarded. The case reached the Supreme Court Nestor argued that he did the taking of pictures without malice or without bad faith, and that he did such an act with the end in mind of protecting and upholding the image of the Philippine diplomatic corps in Kenya. Nestor said that he never meant to cause Lavia harm, damage or embarrassment. On the other hand, Lavinas complaint is mainly anchored on Article 19 in relation to Articles 21 and 26 of the New Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not Nestors action is contrary to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 and 26 of the New Civil Code and shall indemnify Lavina. Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Nestors participation in the invasion of Lavinas diplomatic residence and his act of ordering an employee to take photographs of what was inside the diplomatic residence without the consent of the plaintiff-appellant were clearly done to prejudice the latter. As already exhaustively discussed by both the RTC and the CA, Nestor himself admitted that he caused the taking of the pictures of Lavina's residence without the latter's knowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates that he did so without bad faith or malice. However, Nestor's surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith. Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one's residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion Case for Article 26 of the Civil Code RCPI vs Verchez G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006 On January 21, 1991, Editha Verchez was confined at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On even date, her daughter Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) immediately hied to the Sorsogon Branch of the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. whose services she engaged to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) who was residing at Quezon City reading: "Send check money Mommy hospital." For RCPIs services, Grace paid P10.502 for which she was issued a receipt.

After RCPIs first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it did not inform Grace of the nondelivery thereof and waited for 12 days before trying to deliver it again, knowing as it should know that time is of the essence in the delivery of telegrams. When its second long-delayed attempt to deliver the telegram again failed, it, again, waited for another 12 days before making a third attempt. Such nonchalance in performing its urgent obligation indicates gross negligence amounting to bad faith. It took 25 days, for RCPI to deliver the telegram. On April 17, 1992, Editha died. The delay of the telegram disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among the members of the family of Verchez as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of the late Editha to their damage and prejudice, for which they prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message. Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not locate the address of Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the telegram. Issue: Whether or not RCPI is liable for damages under Art. 26 of the New Civil Code. Ruling: Yes. RCPIs negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Case for Article 26 of the Civil Code Castro vs. People Facts: This case is a petition on certiorari emanated from the complain for grave oral defamation filed by Atty. Albert P. Tan against the petitioner Jerome Castro The petitioner is the assistant of headmaster in the Reedly International School, while the private respondent Atty. Albert Tan is a parent of Justin Albert ,who is studying in the said School. The RIS issued a letter to the parents of Justine Albert that their son

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accumulated 34 code violation including public display of affection and conduct unbecoming of a gentleman. As a sanction, RIS exclude their son from participating in the graduation ceremony. But Atty. Tan filed a complain in the Department of Education alleging that the dismissal of his son was undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation ------------Dep-Ed rendered its decision in favor of Tan, ordering the RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any condition. Thus he was able to participate in the graduation ceremony On the day of the graduation ceremony, Atty. Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parenr at RIS. During their conversation, Tan intimated that he was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their personal capacities, including the petitioner who was the assistant headmaster. Then Chin made a call to the petitioner and told him the plan of Tan to sue the officers of RIS in their personal capacity, at the end of their conversation the petitioner told ching okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to tan, thats dangerous . Ching then made another phone call to atty. Tan and informed him that the petitioner said talking to him is dangerous Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the office of the City prosecutor of Mandaluyong city against the petitioner on August 21, 2003 On Nov. 3, 2003, petitioner was charge with oral defamation in the Metropolitan trial court (MeTC) o The prosecution essentially tried to establish that the petitioner depicted Tan as dangerous man through the testimony given by Ching. Then Atty. Tan added that petitioner probably took offense because of the complaint he filed against RIS in the Dep-Ed o The petitioner denied harboring ill-feelings against Tan despite the latters complaint against RIS in the Dep-Ed. Although he admitted conversing with Ching on the telephone The MeTC rendered its decision in favored of Atty. Tan finding the petitioner guilty beyond doubt of the crime of grave oral defamation. On appeal, the RTC affirmed and modified the decision of MeTC declaring that the petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation. But because Tan filed his complaint in the office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City on August 21, 2003, the RTC ruled that prescription already set in, therefore acquitted petitioner on that ground The office of the Solicitor General fled a petition for certiorari in the court of appeals assailing the decision of the RTC ( acted in grave abuse of discretion when it downgraded petitioners offense)----- the CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, therefore CA reinstated the MeTC decision

Petitioner appealed in the Supreme Court in the contention that CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari inasmuch as the OSG raised errors of judgment but failed to prove that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, double jeopardy attached when RTC acquitted him. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner violated article 26 when he announced that the Private respondent is a dangerous man HELD: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could have been guilty of violation of article 26 of the civil code if it was raised in the case. Since the petitioner is an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. The action of the petitioner could cause moral damage to the private respondent that would allienation from his friends Article 26 every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: 1)xxxxxx 2)xxxxxx 3) intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; Case for Article 29 of the Civil Code Anita Cheng v Spouses Sy G.R No. 174238 July 7,2009 Facts:

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Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. _______________________________________________________________CCCase for Article33 of the Civil Code DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC. (DMPI-ECCI) v. VELEZ 371 SCRA 72 Pardo, J. Facts: On February 18, 1994, an information for estafa was filed against Carmen Mandawe (an employee of the DMPI-ECCI) at the RTC Misamis Oriental Branch 37. Respondent Eriberta Villegas alleged that she entrusted Carmen with the amount of P608, 532.56; and after telling the latter to deposit the money with the teller of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, failed to account the same to the respondent. On March 29, another case was filed at the RTC Misamis Oriental Branch 20 against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money, damages and preliminary attachments. The foregoing events prompted petitioner DMPI-ECCI to dismiss the civil case. It argued that the civil case cannot prosper since there is still a pending criminal case which arose from the same facts. On 1996, the trial court ruled in favor of DMPI-ECCI. It was eventually reversed after a motion for reconsideration by Villegas. In effect, DMPIECCI petitioned for a special civil action for certiorari to annul the said order. Issue: Whether or not the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action. Held: Yes, the civil case could prosper even if there exists a pending criminal case arising from the same facts, and the filing of the civil action was not reserved. As a general rule, every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. From here it may be inferred that for every offense, two classes of injuries arise: a social injury which may be redressed by the imposition of penalties, and a personal injury which may be compensated through indemnities. This means that ordinarily, two things may happen when a person files a criminal action (Section 1, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure): 1. The civil action for the recovery of civil liability is deemed filed with the criminal action; 2. The offended party a) waives the civil action, b) reserves the right to institute it separately, or c) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. However, Section 2 states that should the offended party choose to do any of the things under No. 2, the separate civil action may not prosper until final judgment had

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been rendered to the criminal action. The reason is simple: no damages may be claimed against a person proven to be innocent. The case at bar, however, is not part of the general rule. Section 3 reads: In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action (Italics provided). Since the charge brought forth falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be filed separately from the criminal action, even without reservations. Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. Case for Article36 of the Civil Code DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, vs. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents. A prejudicial question is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. FACTS:

well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 ( People of the Philippines v Cleofe S. Janiola ), alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases. Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case. October 16, 2007, the MTC granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings of the private defendant. March 12, 2008.- Denied the Motion for reconsideration filed by the Petitioner on Nov 29, 2007. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled: Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character.

THE STORY: The Petitioner and the private respondent entered into a construction agreement. However the private respondent allegedly stopped the construction for no valid reason. On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as

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The Case: Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City.

THE HON. JOSELITO C. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 66 of the RTC of Makati City, and FANNIE TORRES-TY, Respondents. FACTS I. Sometime in August 2000, Rosemary Torres Ty-Rasekhi (Rosemary), the sister of petitioners (Krizia) late father Alexander Torres Ty, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of her (Rosemarys) mother, Bella Torres, before the RTC of Pasig City. At first, the petitioner opposed but eventually agreed to enter into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT which was APPROVED by the RTC of Pasig. II. Subsequently, Peter Ty and Catherine Ty-Chavez filed with CA a Petition to Annul Judgement Approving the Compromise Agreement. They alleged that they are biological children of Bella Torres and are entitled to participate in the settlement. Later, private respondent Fannie Ty likewise claimed to be a biological child of Bella and filed a petition-in-intervention in the action for annulment of judgement. The three of them alleged that they held several discussions with Rosemary pertaining the settlement of Bellas estate. However, in subsequent discussions, Rosemary made kwon to them her intention to get a disproportionately larger share of the estate, but they did not agree. III. They were not aware that Rosemary had filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and that a judgment by compromise agreement was rendered by the RTC of Pasig City. It was not disclosed in the compromise agreement that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were also Bellas heirs. It was only sometime in June 2004 that they came to know of the decision by compromise agreement of the Pasig City RTC. IV. Petitioner and Rosemary filed their answers to the petition for annulment of judgment and the petition-in-intervention. They denied that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were heirs of Bella for, as far as they knew, the three were literally purchased from third persons who represented to Bella and Alejandro Ty (Bellas husband) that they were abandoned children. This is not known to the three. However, Alejandro and Bella did not legally adopt them. V. While the action for annulment of judgment was pending before the Court of Appeals, Fannie filed a complaint for falsification and perjury against petitioner and Rosemary. Fannie alleged that petitioner and Rosemary falsely and maliciously stated in the pertinent pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City that the late Bella had only two heirs, namely the two of them. (Criminal Cases against Petitioner and Rosemary) VI. Petitioner and Rosemary forthwith filed a joint motion to suspend the preliminary investigation on the ground of a pending prejudicial question before the Court of Appeals. They argued that the issue of whether Peter, Catherine, and Fannie are related to Bella was pending before the Court of Appeals This was denied by the Prosecutor and found probable cause against petitioner and Rosemary for two counts of Falsification of Public Documents. According to the Prosecutor, the issue before the Court of Appeals in the action for annulment of judgment is the validity

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197. RULING: THE PETITION MUST BE GRANTED. ( REVERSAL OF THE AUGUST 26, 2008 DECISION ) SEC. 7 OF RULE 111. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.) Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement. Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.

Case for Article36 of the Civil Code KRIZIA KATRINA TY-DE ZUZUARREGUI, Petitioner, - versus -

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of the compromise agreement while the criminal case involves their liability for falsification of public documents. This was affirmed by MeTC. RTC (Judge Joselito Villarosa) likewise denied the petition on the grounds that there was no prejudicial question. The RTC held that there was no prejudicial question as the quantum of evidence in the civil action for annulment of judgment differs from the quantum of evidence required in the criminal action for falsification of public documents. This was also denied by CA. Hence, elevated it to SC. ISSUE: WON the proceedings in this case be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question.

related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no

HELD: YES

necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if

Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a criminal action may be suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action, to wit:

the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil case are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would also determine the judgment in the criminal case. A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that the case pending before the Court of Appeals is principally for the determination of the validity of the compromise agreement which did not include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine, and Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are also biological children of Bella and Alejandro. On the other hand, Criminal Case before the MeTC involve the determination of whether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in executing pleadings containing untruthful statements Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately that she and Rosemary were the only legal heirs of Bella.

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it must appear not only that said civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

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It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal cases for falsification of public documents. The criminal cases arose out of the claim of Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that they are also the legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that they are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in her estate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against petitioner who could not have committed falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City, the truth of her statements regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been judicially settled. Case for Article36 of the Civil Code TE vs. CA (November 29, 2000) 346 SCRA 327 Petitioner: Arthur Te Respondents: Court of Appeals and Liliana Choa Kapunan, J. -petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: September 14, 1988 Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married but did not live together although they meet each other regularly. After giving birth to a baby girl on April 21, 1989, Arthur stopped visiting her. Though their marriage was still subsisting, Arthur contracted to a second marriage with Julieta Santella on May 20, 1990. FIRST STAGE: Upon learning about the second marriage of Arthur, Liliana filed before the RTC of QC an information charging Arthur with bigamy on Aug. 9, 1990. MEANWHILE, Arhutr Te filed before the RTC of QC (July 20, 1990) an action for the annulment of his marriage with Liliana on the grounds that: 1) she concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage; and 2) she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations Liliana also filed with Professional Regulation Commission administrative case against Te and Santella for revocation of their engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together (still get married even though they both know that Te is already married) The prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy

-TE filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioners counsel during the hearings of said case -DENIED by RTC SECOND STAGE: Petitioner (Te) filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for: (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioners counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioners [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused Petitioner also filed a motion to suspend the proceedings with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC for the revocation of his engineering license -DENIED -petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused its discretion The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated in the Court of Appeals. RULING of CA: The appellate court upheld the RTCs denial of the motion to inhibit, affirmed the RTCs denial of the demurrer to evidence, denied petitioners motion to suspend the proceedings and it did not find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Boards Order denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings. -Arthur filed motion for reconsideration but was denied THIRD STAGE: Te filed instant petition for review on certiorari in the SUPREME COURT ISSUES:

1)

2) 3)

WON public respondent committed a serious error in refusing to suspend the legal [criminal and administrative] proceedings despite the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage (*pertinent to the topic which is about PREJUDICIAL QUESTION) WON public respondent gravely abused its discretion and committed an error of law in not holding that the demurrer to evidence should have been given due course WON public respondent committed a serious legal error in not holding that the trial judge a quo should have inhibited himself

RULING: The petition is denied for lack of merit. 1) No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also

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that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions (*as explained in RABUYAs book, prejudicial question takes place where a civil action and criminal action both pend) The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioners argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code which states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In Landicho vs. Relova, the court held that annulment of marriage should be judged by competent courts and to be judged by persons themselves. Civil case for annulment of petitioners first marriage did not give rise to prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting. Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. There is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. -Sec. 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body. 2) In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the

prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second, petitioners allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecutions evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the trial courts finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense. 3) We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above. Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case. This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioners motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial. The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioners motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioners counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioners counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judges duty to disposing of the courts business promptly.

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