T5 B2 de La Vina - Gustavo FDR - Dec 99 DOJ IG Draft Report - Border Patrol Efforts Along The Northern Border 090

U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
Inspections Division
DRAFT REPORT
Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border
A-99-04
NOTICE - THIS DRAFT RESTRICTED TO OFFICIAL USE ONLY
This document is a DRAFT report prepared by the Office of the Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Justice. It has not been fully reviewed within the Department and
is, therefore, subject to revision. Recipients of this draft report must not show or
release its contents for purposes other than official review and comment
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY
December 1999
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MEMORANDUM FOR DORIS MEISSNER
COMMISSIONER
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
FROM: ROBERT L ASHBAUGH

ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL
SUBJECT: Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border,

Inspection Number A-99-04
In our continuing effort to address illegal immigration issues, we examined the

Border Patrol's efforts, in its eight northern sectors, to control illegal activity between
the ports of entry along the Canadian border. We focused on: identifying what illegal
activity occurs along the northern border; determining how the Border Patrol collects
and assesses information about illegal activity and how the Border Patrol responds to
it; and evaluating the allocation of Border Patrol resources to the northern border.
The Border Patrol faces significant enforcement challenges along the Canadian
border, even though the volume of illegal alien and drug trafficking is much less than
along the Mexican border. Between fiscal year (FY) 1993 and FY1998, the Border
Patrol's eight northern sectors apprehended 81,285 deportable Individuals, Including
5,704 smuggled aliens. Although the total number of incidences are low, Border Patrol
Agents (BPAs) in the northern border sectors encounter organized criminal activity
more often than BPAs along the southwest border. According to workload data for the
time period above, the northern border sectors were 14 times as likely to encounter an
alien involved with smuggling weapons and 9 times as likely to encounter an alien
involved with smuggling drugs than sectors along the southwest border. What these
statistics fail to show, however, is the illegal activity that goes undetected due to limited
staffing and other resources.
According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) Anti-Smuggling

Strategy, "Intelligence information suggests that use of the Northern border by
smuggling organizations is on the rise." The Border Patrol has reported an increase in
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Doris Meissner
Page 2
nationals from the People's Republic of China and South Korea attempting illegal entry
on the northern border, and Border Patrol officials report that Mexicans are flying to
Canada and later crossing into the United States. Drug smugglers have also targeted
the northern border. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police recently reported that
75 percent of the marijuana grown in Canada—including hydroponically grown varieties
that sell for as much as $6,000 a pound—and 70 percent of the cocaine smuggled into
Canada ultimately are destined for the United States.
Despite an abundance of anecdotal information, we found that INS is unable to

accurately assess the level of illegal activity along the northern border given the Border
Patrol's lack of staffing and resources. The lack of concrete information on the
magnitude of illegal activity along the northern border places the Border Patrol at risk of
being unable to respond to that illegal activity and makes it difficult for the Border Patrol
to assess the need for and proper placement of its resources. In addition, Border
Patrol and INS officials described to us various shortcomings of the data commonly
used to track illegal activity.
The Border Patrol's capacity to respond is disproportionate to the amount of

illegal activity. We conclude that the 311 BPAs (as of September 30, 1999) on board in
the northern border sectors cannot adequately patrol the approximately 4,000-mile
border with Canada. (By contrast, the sectors along the southwest border have
7,706 BPAs to patrol a border that is less than half as long.) Northern border sector
officials reported that some shifts have no coverage, which leaves the border open to
illegal activity. Such situations become more likely when BPAs are detailed to support
operations on the southwest border, for example. Even though the total number of
BPAs nationwide has steadily increased since FY1994—a net increase of 4,386
through FY 1999—the number of BPAs assigned to the northern border sectors
actually declined between FY 1994 and FY 1997. In FY 1998, northern sectors filled
vacancies, raising the number of BPAs, and in FY 1999, 22 new BPA positions were
allocated to northern border sectors.
We conclude that INS needs to reassess the Border Patrol's overall approach to
securing the northern border. We recommend that the INS Commissioner direct the
Border Patrol to outline the approach it will take-^rior to and during Phase IV of its
strategic plan—to secure the northern border. Given the workforce increases
elsewhere within the Border Patrol, the Commissioner should evaluate whether there is
a continuing need to detail BPAs out of northern sectors.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
BACKGROUND 2
RESULTS OF THE INSPECTION , 7
THE BORDER PATROL FACES INCREASING ILLEGAL ACTIVITY

ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER 8
• Illegal immigration and alien smuggling 8
• Drug smuggling 10
INS IS UNABLE TO ASSESS THE LEVEL OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY

ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER 13
• Existing data do not provide an accurate measurement of illegal activity... 14
BORDER PATROL'S CAPACITY TO RESPOND

IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE AMOUNT OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY 15
• Allocation of BPAs to northern sectors showed no increase
until FY 1999 16
• Northern border sectors have shifts with no coverage 17
• Lack of personnel limits the Border Patrol's intelligence capabilities 19
• Northern border sectors lack crucial equipment 19
OTHER FACTORS AFFECT THE BORDER PATROL'S

ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITY. 21
• Details have an adverse effect on northern border operations 21
• Lack of detention space undermines deterrence 22
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24
APPENDIX I: THREATS ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER 26
APPENDIX II: INSPECTION METHODOLOGY 29
U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT

Office of the Inspector General
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INTRODUCTION
Since its creation in 1924, the Border Patrol has operated with the
following mission: to detect and prevent the smuggling and illegal entry of
undocumented aliens into the United States and to apprehend persons in the
United States whose status is in violation of immigration law. In 1991, the Office
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) added to the Border Patrol's
responsibility by designating it as the entity with primary responsibility for the
interdiction of drugs on U.S. land borders between the ports of entry.
This Inspection examined the Border Patrol's efforts, in its eight northern
sectors, to control illegal activity between the ports of entry along the
approximately 4,000-mile border between the United States and Canada. We
focused on the following areas:
• identifying what illegal activity occurs along the northern border,

• determining how the Border Patrol collects and assesses information
about illegal activity and how the Border Patrol responds to it, and
• evaluating the allocation of Border Patrol resources to the northern
border.

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BACKGROUND
Border Patrol Strategic Plan
In 1994, the Border Patrol issued its Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994
and Beyond. This plan outlines four phases for controlling U.S. borders,
beginning with the areas experiencing the greatest illegal activity:
• Phase I - Control San Diego and El Paso Corridors

• Phase II - Control South Texas and Tucson Corridors
• Phase III - Control Remainder of Southwest Border
• Phase IV - Control all the United States Borders/Adjust to Flow
There are no specific goals to be achieved in each phase of the plan and no
target dates for completing one phase or beginning another. The plan dictates
that when the Border Patrol achieves control in one area—"control" is not
specifically defined but largely indicated by an increase in the flow of illegal traffic
to other areas—it will move on to the next phase of the plan. According to
headquarters officials, the Border Patrol is currently engaged in Phase II, for the
most part, although some Phase I operations continue as necessary. Efforts to
secure the northern border are part of Phase IV, which, based on the current
strategic plan, has no projected start date.
The Border Patrol's strategic plan recognizes that as Border Patrol Agents
(BPAs) curtail illegal activity in one area, such activity will increase in other areas.
This scenario has played out across the southwest border (e.g., Operation
Gatekeeper in San Diego, California, has pushed further east individuals looking
to cross the Mexican border into the United States), and now signs indicate that
illegal activity being thwarted on the southwest border is beginning to crop up
along the northern border.
The landscape of the northern border
The northern border presents unique challenges for the Border Patrol. In
contrast to the southwest border, a heavily guarded, closed border, partially
controlled by walls and fences, the northern border is an open border, devoid of
manmade barriers, that includes vast, densely forested areas that are difficult to
patrol. Equally difficult to patrol are the many lakes—including the Great Lakes—
and rivers along the northern border. In addition, the northern border undergoes
seasonal changes that require adjustments in enforcement operations. For
example, in the winter, frozen lakes and rivers along the northern border are
easily traversed on foot or by snowmobile, increasing the number of accessible
smuggling corridors.
U. S. Department of Justice DRAFT

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Influences on the other side of the border affect the Mow of traffic into the
United States. Major Canadian cities in close proximity to the border-
Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal—have large and diverse ethnic populations
and thus are useful transit points for individuals of many nationalities who wish to
illegally cross the border into the United States. Within these cities, aliens are
able to reside in communities of their own ethnic background while they make
arrangements, in their own language with individuals of their own culture, to enter
the United States.
The Border Patrol on the northern border
The nearly 4,000 miles of border between the United States and Canada
are managed by 8 of the Border Patrol's 21 sectors. (See the map below.)
Northern Border Patrol Sectors
11 BPA*
SUttom
(BPAs on board at northern border sectors M of September 30,1999)

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Each sector has a headquarters and four to nine stations and substations
(hereinafter referred to as "stations"), depending upon factors such as the size of
the area covered by the sector and the level of illegal activity. The sector
headquarters houses the sector's administrative offices, the communications
center, the intelligence unit, and the offices of the Chief Patrol Agent the Deputy
Chief Patrol Agent and the Assistant Chief Patrol Agents. The stations serve as
bases from which the BPAs can patrol the border and perform their other
enforcement duties. Each station is managed by a Patrol Agent in Charge and is
staffed by varying numbers of BPAs. In northern border sectors, because of the
low number of BPAs, it is not unusual for a station to have only one or two BPAs
assigned to it Consequently, such stations, cannot provide 24-hour coverage.
Border Patrol staffing
As of September 30,1999,311 of the national total of 8,364 BPAs

(3.7 percent) were assigned to the approximately 4,000-mile northern border. In
keeping with its strategic plan, the Border Patrol deploys the majority of BPAs to
the approximately 2,000-mile southwest border. In FY 1999, 7,706 BPAs (92.1
percent of total BPAs) were assigned to the 9 southwest Border Patrol sectors
(76 stations). The remaining 347 BPAs were assigned to the coastal sectors,
headquarters, INS regional offices, and the Border Patrol Academy.
Allocation of Border Patrol Agents
Canadtan Border
3,»«7 miles, 311 BPAa en board t lZJnlMpwBPAcHibawd
Mexican Border
1.9J3 miles, 7,706 BPAs on board
t tJCnlnpvBPAonlmRl
•
The number of BPAs nationwide has increased significantly since the

enactment of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which
authorized the deployment of an additional 1,000 BPAs a year for each of the
four years beginning with FY 1995. (The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 contained language that mandated these
increases through FY 2001.) From FY 1995 through FY 1998, all additional
BPAs were allocated to the southwest border. In FY 1999, at the direction of
Congress, 22 of the 1,000 authorized BPAs were allocated to the northern
border.
Congress remains intent on the Border Patrol hiring additional BPAs,

despite INS's FY 2000 budget request which retained: FY 1999 staffing levels for
the Border Patrol. INS cited the need for a year of assessment after six years of
growth, during which time the number of BPAs has sometimes outstripped the
U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT 4~ ~ "I "^

Office of the Inspector General ..__. jT- .7 \~
I inspections Division -r.rpectlor.? Orvir
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Border Patrol infrastructure's ability to support them. At the same time, the
Border Patrol has not been able to attract sufficient numbers of recruits to offset
attrition and to show a net increase in BPAs to the levels mandated by Congress.
Even when the Border Patrol has hired more than 1,000 new BPAs in a year, the
net gain has been less than 1,000 for four of the last five fiscal years. (See the
table below.)
Table 2: BPAs Hired FY1994 through FY1999
FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99

BPAs hired 461 1005 1474 1656 1971 1126
BPAs attrited 200 350 477 706 895 679
Net gain in BPAs 261 655 997 950 1076 447
Source; INS Human Resources
Congressional interest in the northern border
Hearings held in April 1999 by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on

Immigration and Claims and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration
illustrate Congress's increasing interest and concern about the vulnerability of the
northern border and the need for more BPAs there.
• April 14—House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims,

"Oversight Hearing on law enforcement problems at the border
between the United States and Canada, focusing on the issues of drug
smuggling, illegal immigration and terrorism." Many of the witnesses
appearing before the Subcommittee expressed their belief that illegal
activity along the northern border was increasing and that serious
threats exist, such as terrorist organizations establishing themselves in
Canada. The witnesses also described the lack of Border Patrol
staffing and resources and the effect this has had on the Border
Patrol's ability to address illegal activity and monitor threats.
Subcommittee Chairman Lamar Smith stated, "So few agents cannot
monitor a border thousands of miles long 24 hours everyday." In
response to a question from the Subcommittee Chairman, INS's
Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations, who was a
panel member and testified before the Subcommittee, acknowledged
that INS needs to put more BPAs and more of its resources on the
northern border.
• April 27—Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, hearing on

The Need for Additional Border Patrol at the Northern and Southern
Borders." In his opening remarks. Subcommittee Chairman Senator
Spencer Abraham stated, "Illegal immigration and drug smuggling are

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serious problems in America. Our Border Patrol is the first line of

defense to deter illegal entry. The job it does is critical Despite
[the Border Patrol's] efforts, according to INS, there are an estimated
250,000 or more new illegal immigrants in the United States each year.
The majority come across our borders, surreptitiously or otherwise.
This is an intolerably high amount and I am committed as is this
subcommittee to provide the support required to bring it down." He
went on to say, "Simply put, the time has come to add more Border
Patrol Agents. The time has also come to allocate a significant net
increase in the number of agents on the northern border." Despite the
support from Congress, the Subcommittee Chairman noted what he
termed "resistance" on the part of the INS to provide Congress with a
•blueprint* for the allocations necessary for the Border Patrol to hire
and absorb large numbers of additional BPAs.
U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT 6

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DRAFT
RESULTS OF THE INSPECTION
Border Patrol sectors on the Canadian border face significant law

enforcement challenges, even though the volume of known illegal alien and drug
trafficking is much less than it is along the Mexican border. Between FY
1993 and FY 1998, the Border Patrol's eight northern sectors apprehended
81,285 exportable individuals, including 5,704 smuggled aliens. In addition, the
northern sectors apprehended 4,384 non-deportable individuals—legal
permanent residents and U.S. citizens—for criminal activity (e.g., alien
smuggling). These statistics quantify the successes of the Border Patrol.
However, they do not provide an indication of the nature or extent of illegal
activity that goes undetected due to limited staffing and resources.
Although the numbers of incidences are low, BPAs in the northern border
sectors experience organized criminal activity more often than BPAs along the
southwest border. According to Border Patrol workload data (G-23 data) for FY
1993 through FY 1998, the BPAs in northern border sectors were 14 times as
likely to encounter an alien involved with smuggling weapons and 9 times as
likely to encounter an alien involved with smuggling drugs when compared to
BPAs in southwest sectors.1
Illegal activity along the northern border is facilitated by the fact that it is
an open border and one that includes unpatrolled waterways and vast stretches
of wilderness with little enforcement presence. Border Patrol officials report that
smuggling activity along the northern border goes in both directions, with
smugglers often moving a different commodity in each direction. Besides illegal
aliens, illicit trade includes drugs, guns, currency, and other contraband.
Smugglers will adjust their illegal activities depending upon the profits and the
risks. For example, intelligence officials told us that some organized smuggling
rings are switching from drug smuggling to alien smuggling because the
penalties if they get caught with illegal aliens will not be as severe as the
penalties would be for drug trafficking.
BPAs and other law enforcement officers we interviewed and intelligence

reports we reviewed indicated that illegal activity along the northern border—
illegal Immigration, alien smuggling, drug trafficking—is increasing. In addition to
the illegal activity that is detected. Border Patrol and INS officials believe a great
G-23 data is part of an INS system used to track workload statistics. From the 6-23 data, we
determined the percentage of apprehended Individuals who exhibited selected characteristics
(e.g., alien with weapon) for the eight northern border sectors and the nine sectors with
responsibility for the land border with Mexico. We then divided the percentage for the northern
border sectors by the percentage for the southwestern sectors. These calculations allowed us to
determine how likely northern border sectors were to encounter a given characteristic (based on
individuals located) compared with the southwestern sectors.

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deal of illegal activity goes undetected because there are not enough BPAs to
monitor it and there is only limited surveillance equipment available to detect it
THE BORDER PATROL FACES INCREASING ILLEGAL ACTIVITY ALONG

THE NORTHERN BORDER
Many of the BPAs we interviewed stated that illegal activity along the
northern border is increasing. The Deputy Chief Patrol Agent from Blaine sector
summarized their observations when he told a Congressional Subcommittee In
April 1999 that '[t]en years ago we experienced very little alien or drug smuggling
activity along the [northern] border. We know now that illegal smuggling activity
takes place on a daily basis."2
Illegal immigration and alien smuggling
INS's 1997 Anti-Smuggling Strategy document states that "[intelligence

information suggests that use of the Northern border by smuggling organizations
is on the rise. In general, the document says, alien smuggling operations are
growing in volume and sophistication. The Criminal Intelligence Service Canada,
an organization that coordinates intelligence gathering efforts of several
Canadian law enforcement agencies, stated in its 1998 annual report that many
illegal aliens use Canada as a transit point on their way to the United States. In
many cases, their entry into Canada is facilitated by the fact that they do not
need a visa to enter Canada.4 Northern Border Patrol sectors have identified
trends in illegal immigration and alien smuggling operations, including an influx of
nationals from China, South Korea, and Mexico crossing the border illegally.
The Canadian Border Intelligence Center reported in its FY1998 Northern

Border Report that *[t]here has been a steady increase in the apprehension of
undocumented Chinese nationals over the past several years.' Although the
total number is low, there has been a 56 percent increase in apprehensions of
Chinese nationals in northern border sectors from FY 1996 to FY 1998. In
2Testimony of Deputy Chief Patrol Agent Eugene R. Davis, Blaine Sector, before the
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, April 14,1999.
3 A working group, directed by INS's Office of Field Operations and composed of representatives
from the Border Patrol, Investigations, Intelligence, International Affairs, and Asset Forfeiture,
drafted INS's national Anti-Smuggling Strategy to "disrupt the means and methods which facilitate
alien smuggling utilizing traditional and non-traditional enforcement efforts.*
4 Canada allows citizens of more than 50 countries to enter Canada without a visa (The number
fluctuates because Canada rescinds its visa waiver for a country when significant immigration
abuse occurs.) The United States requires a visa for citizens of more than 20 of the 50 countries
for which Canada has waived the visa requirement
U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT 8 - —~

Office of the Inspector General ^ m1rn-
Inspections Dhnsion ^ or 7lS !i~
-'"
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December 1998, a joint operation, led by INS investigators and involving law
enforcement agencies in the United States and Canada, broke up a smuggling
ring that for two years had used the Akwesasne Mohawk Territory in New York to
smuggle approximately 3,600 undocumented Chinese nationals into the United
States.5 'According to INS reports, smugglers charged individuals as much as
$47,000 each to transport them from China and get them jobs, mainly in New
York City. The smugglers may have netted as much as $170 million. As a result
of the investigation, 35 suspected smugglers were arrested, and warrants were
issued for 12 others.
In February 1996, the Blaine sector's Anti-Smuggling Unit reported that

South Koreans were illegally crossing the border from Canada into the United
States at a rate of about 50 a month and said that the number was growing
daily.8 The Anti-Smuggling Unit attributed the increase in illegal entry by Korean
nationals to the fact that Canada dropped Its visa requirement for South Koreans
in 1994. Besides illegal entry by South Koreans into the United States, there is
also the threat of fraud associated with the South Korean passports. Citizenship,
and Immigration Canada, a Canadian governmental agency, has issued an alert
noting an increase in the number of fraudulent South Korean passports being
used by Chinese to travel illegally to Canada.7
Like South Koreans, Mexicans are not required to obtain a visa to enter
Canada. Consequently, the Border Patrol is reporting that Mexicans are flying
into Canada and later crossing illegally into the United States. In March 1999,
BPAs in the Detroit sector apprehended two Mexicans illegally entering the
United States via the Detroit/Windsor train tunnel. According to Border Patrol
agents who have apprehended Mexican nationals, Mexicans have said "the word
is out* in Mexico that it is easier to get into the United States at the northern
border because there are fewer BPAs in the north. Also, aliens can cross the
northern border by simply walking through a remote area or crossing a railroad
bridge and do not incur smugglers' fees. Airfare to Canada ($500 for a flight
between Mexico City to Vancouver, Toronto, or Montreal) is often less than the
cost of smugglers' fees along the southwest border—the average fee paid is
$800 per person.8 This situation provides aliens another incentive for entering
5The Akwesasne Mohawk Territory straddles the border, flanked on one side by the state of New
York and on the other by two Canadian provinces, Ontaflo and Quebec. This configuration raises
questions of jurisdiction, which are compounded by the Mohawks' daims of sovereignty.
Smugglers take advantage of the conflicting authorities. The Swanton sector issued a report
which stated that 50 aliens a week smuggled through the territory was a conservative estimate.
The report indicates that drugs, guns, and other contraband are also moved through the territory.
' "Koreans stream across U.S.-Canada border illegally,' The Associated Press (Seattle),
February 18.1996.
7 Canada Immigration Alert #98/27, Altered South Korea Passport.
* INS's Intelligence Dally Report, August 26,1999.
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DRAFT
the United States illegally along the northern border. INS headquarters
intelligence officials said that, as control of the southwest border is achieved,
more Mexicans will come into the United States from Canada.
Drug smuggling
The porous nature of the border, coupled with limited enforcement,

reduces the Gkelihood of interdiction between the ports of entry. Therefore, as
noted by various intelligence sources, drug smugglers have targeted the northern
border. Border Patrol officials report that smugglers simply walk across the
border in remote areas, carrying drugs in backpacks, or use all-terrain vehicles
and snowmobiles to transport their illicit cargo. And intelligence reports indicate
that, increasingly, drug smugglers are using technological aids, such as night
vision goggles and Global Positioning System equipment, to help them navigate
through remote areas, where it is easier to evade law enforcement officers.9
Along the northern border, BPAs face a number of drug interdiction challenges,
including organized crime groups (see Appendix I) trafficking in potent
hydroponic marijuana, cocaine, and heroin:
Canada produces at least 800 metric tons (881.6 U.S. tons) of marijuana
annually.10 Most of that is hydroponic marijuana with a THC content of 20 to
30 percent, which, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) reports, can sell
for as much as $6,000 a pound.11 (In contrast, Mexican marijuana has a lower
THC content, usually ranging between 0.5 and 7 percent, and sells for about
$700 a pound.) The RCMP estimates that 75 percent of all the hydroponic
marijuana grown in Canada is destined for sale in the United States.
The hydroponic marijuana produced in British Columbia is known as "BC

Bud." This marijuana is being smuggled in large quantities into the United
States. In the past five years, the Blaine sector has experienced a significant
increase in marijuana seizures. (See the table on the next page.)
8The Global Positioning System (GPS), which originated with the military, is a navigational
system that uses signals from three satellites to pinpoint latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates,
accurately marking locations and guiding the user to them. GPS equipment is especially useful to
smugglers navigating at night
10 Drug Situation Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Intelligence Directorate,
March 1999.
11 THC stands for tetrahydrocarmabinol, the main psychoactrve Ingredient in marijuana.
12Joint Task Force Six, Project North Star Intelligence Architecture Assessment, July 1,1999,
p. 1-C-2.

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Table 3: Total Marijuana Seizures in Blaine Sector
Fiscal Year Pounds of marijuana seized

1995 25.0
1996 73.8
1997 116.5
1998 692.1
1999 1166.2
source; Blai Sector Intelligence Unit
The Blaine sector's success in interdicting drugs has pushed some of the
marijuana smuggling east into the Spokane sector, according to reports of
seizures and BPAs we interviewed. The situation is serious enough that
Northwest law enforcement officials have requested that the Northwest High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area be expanded to include Spokane and eastern
counties in Washington.
Production of potent hydroponic marijuana has also spread to the other

provinces of Canada (one eastern strain is known as 'Quebec Gold"). In the last
10 years, U.S. and Canadian law enforcement agencies have experienced an
87 percent increase in seizures of marijuana during border crossings in the Great
Lakes Region.14
RISK AND PROFIT INFLUENCE DRUG TRAFFICKING
One factor that has encouraged widespread growing operations in Canada is the fact that
penalties for growing marijuana in Canada an Jess stringent than they are in the United
States. Growers convicted in Canada pay fines, but few, if any, serve/a//fine. While
producers face lower risks, they can make greater profits seing marijuana In the United
States because of the difference In value between the U.S. dollar and the Canadian dollar
and the higher price the marijuana brings in the United States. Consequently, RCMP
officials beieve cross-border smuggling of marijuana is fflrery to continue to increase.
13
A High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area [HIDTA] is an area with critical drug trafficking problems
as designated by the Director of the ONDCP. Within the HIDTA, federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies coordinate efforts to combat the illegal drug trade. The coordinated
agencies receive federal money for equipment and overtime pay, as well as access to federal
databases, crime analysts, and international investigative teams.
14
Joint Task Force Six, Project North Star Intelligence Architecture Assessment, July 1.1999.
p. 1-B-6.

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DRAFT
Besides marijuana, other drugs increasingly are being smuggled across

the northern border into the United States:
• At least 70 percent of the estimated 16 to 26 tons of cocaine smuggled

' into Canada annually is destined for the United States, according to
the RCMP. Joint Task Force Six, a military task force that provides
support to law enforcement agencies conducting counter-drug
operations, has reported that in the eastern provinces of Canada
outlaw motorcycle gangs, who have links with Colombian cartels, are
suspected of moving large amounts of cocaine into the United States.15
Both RCMP officials and BPAs told us that the increasing incidence of
crack cocaine, which requires a large volume of powdered cocaine to
produce and, therefore, is an indicator of cocaine supply, tells them
that the overall supply of cocaine is increasing. As the amount of
cocaine in Canada increases, the potential for cocaine smuggling into
the United States increases.
• Various intelligence sources report that heroin from Asia is being

shipped by organized crime groups to Vancouver, British Columbia,
which the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) says is
"experiencing an Asian heroin epidemic."10 From Vancouver, heroin is
transported to various parts of the United States (e.g., Seattle and New
York City). Heroin is prevalent throughout Canada, and law
enforcement agencies on both sides of the border are concerned
because they have detected decreasing prices for heroin and
increasing purity of the heroin available. These factors increase the
severity of the heroin problem.
• The Canadian government has placed no legal controls upon the

precursor chemicals that are used to manufacture methamphetamine.
These substances, which are being bought in large quantities with
cash and under assumed names, are then smuggled across the border
into the United States for use in clandestine methamphetamine labs.
Such labs are a particular concern for the Grand Forks sector because
the Border Patrol recently discovered a methamphetamine lab in one
of the many abandoned farms that exist in close proximity to the
Canadian border. •
A March 1998 special report issued by the NOIC stated: The northern
border of the United States is quickly becoming a major concern for law
15 Joint Task Force Six, Project North Star Intelligence A/cWtecfuro Assessment, July 1,1999,
p. 1-A-3.
10The National Drug Intelligence Digest, The National Drug Intelligence Center, December 1998,
P-4.

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DRAFT
enforcement officials, and it is perhaps the largest intelligence gap concerning

drug trafficking to the United States Anecdotal evidence obtained through
telephone conversations with DEA employees near the northern border indicates
that federal interdiction and enforcement efforts on the border are insufficient—a
serious disadvantage for law enforcement entities in this area."17
CROSS-BORDER DRUG SMUGGLERS MAKE MILLIONS
One example of a highly successful drug smuggSng organization was the William Greer
group, which for many years smuggled drugs across the border between Quebec and
Vermont Beginning in the late 1970s, the group, through coordinated efforts of its
members on both sides of the border, smuggled multi-ton amounts of marijuana into the
Untied States, smuggled mult-ton toads of hashish into Canada via the Saint Lawrence
Seaway, and laundered millions of dollars. The smugglers operated in remote areas of
the border, avoiding law enforcement officers, unS11990 when one member of the group
was arrested crossing the border on an all-terrain vehicle with $1.3 million dollars. In
1991, the smuggling organization sustained another btow when authorities seized over
50 tons of hashish in the Saint Lawrence Seaway. Greer and other members of the
organization were convicted in Canada and served prison sentences. Upon their release,
they were deported to the United States, where they were also indicted. However, while
on baa, between 1995 and 1997, they continued their smuggling operations, transporting
hydroponic marijuana from Canada Into Vermont In Canada they paid about $1,800 per
pound for the marijuana, which they sold for about $4,300 a pound in New York City.
Source: DEA's Northeastern Unfed SfatesCanada Border hteUlgenot Assessment Feb. 1999
INS IS UNABLE TO ASSESS THE LEVEL OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY ALONG

THE NORTHERN BORDER
Because the Border Patrol lacks the resources to monitor illegal activity
along the northern border, ft cannot accurately quantify how many illegal aliens
and drug smugglers it fails to apprehend. The number of BPAs available simply
cannot patrol the entire length of the border. "Force-multipliers," such as
cameras and sensors, aid the Border Patrol irTrts surveillance and interdiction .
activities, but the northern border sectors do not have adequate amounts of such
equipment For example, at the time of our inspection, the Spokane sector had
identified 65 smuggling corridors along the more than 300 miles of border within
its area of responsibility. However, the sector had only 36 sensors with which to
monitor those corridors. In corridors not tracked by sensors, smugglers can
Marijuana: Domestic Situation Report, Special Report, The National Drug Intelligence Center,
17
March 1998. p. 10.

DAG006-0246
DRAFT
operate without being detected, much less apprehended, and there is no way to
measure the volume of traffic.
Border Patrol officials and other law enforcement officials with whom we
spoke expressed a common belief that the amount of illegal activity occurring
along the northern border is much greater than the Border Patrol has been able
to document Joint Task Force Six summed up the situation in the following
statement "Due to the lack of a substantial law enforcement presence along the
US/Canadian border, it is easier to identify intelligence gaps than it is to identify
the actual threat"18
The lack of concrete information on the magnitude of illegal activity

occurring along the northern border places the Border Patrol at risk of being
unable to respond to that illegal activity. Without complete information, it is
difficult for the Border Patrol to assess the need for and proper placement of its
resources along the northern border. During our site visits, we observed that the
northern border sectors are placing BPAs and equipment (e.g., sensors and
cameras) in areas where they have experienced the greatest levels of illegal
activity, and thus are making the best use of the resources they have. But
without consistent, concrete data to document the illegal activity within their
sectors, it is difficult for sector officials to support the requests for additional
resources that they submit to INS regional directors and Border Patrol
headquarters. And, in turn, without adequate data for the northern border
overall, regional and headquarters officials cannot make informed decisions
about how to allocate the limited resources available.
Existing data do not provide an accurate measurement of illegal activity
INS officials indicated to us that INS's only official data are those supplied
by its Office of Statistics, such as the G-23 data we obtained. In addition, INS
officials indicated that the G-23 data are the principal measurement tools used by
INS. These data indicate that the number of alien apprehensions along the
northern border dropped 7 percent between FY1994 and FY 1998. In addition,
the number of non-deportable individuals apprehended, the incidences of drugs
seized, the number of alien smugglers located, and other key measures of illegal
activity have all declined during this same period.
f
These data do not provide an accurate picture of illegal activity along the
northern border, however. According to INS officials, the G-23 data are collected
mainly to track workload activities, which reduces their value for intelligence
purposes. INS officials described to us other shortcomings of the data and data
collection methods. A discussion of these various points follows.
11 Joint Task Force Six, Project North Star Intelligence Architecture Assessment, July 1,1999,
p. Hi.

DAG006-0247
DRAFT
• Workload focus: The G-23 data track workload activities (e.g., the number of
hours BPAs spent on border control) and the results of those activities (e.g.,
number of aliens apprehended). Consequently, the G-23 data reflect the
outcomes of the hours BPAs spent on certain activities and do not provide an
accurate measure of overall Illegal activity. For example, we found that as the
number of hours BPAs spent detailed to the southwest border increased, the
number of apprehensions reported for the northern border sectors decreased.
Between FY1995 and FY 1996, the number of apprehensions in northern
sectors dropped 18 percent For this same period, the northern border
sectors experienced a 151 percent increase in the number of hours BPAs
spent detailed out of their sectors. (Apprehensions in FY 1997 returned to
FY 1995 levels when the northern border sectors detailed fewer BPAs to the
southwest border.)
• Influence of outside factors: As a measure of workload activities, the

G-23 data are heavily influenced by changes in how the work is performed.
For example, the Border Patrol recently revised its enforcement strategy,
placing greater emphasis on direct border control, where BPAs concentrate
efforts on preventing aliens from crossing the border, rather than on Interior
enforcement, where multiple aliens can be apprehended at a single home or
work site. Border Patrol officials with whom we spoke believe this accounts
for the 21 percent drop in apprehensions from FY 1997 to FY 1998 for the
northern border sectors.
• Source of illegal activity not always captured: Although the G-23 data do
record information about how and where an alien entered the country, they do
not track the point of entry for drugs and other contraband. Without that
information, it is not possible to track trends in cross-border trafficking.
• Shortcomings of data collection: An INS official knowledgeable about the

G-23 data described to us various shortcomings in the methods used to
collect these data. For example, the computerized G-23 data are produced
from paper forms, which means the data collection is manual. Incorrectly
recording information, filling out the forms incompletely, or misunderstanding
where to record information can affect the resulting computerized data. In
addition, some data are based on information reported by apprehended aliens
and may be questionable. For example, if an apprehended alien states he
was smuggled across the Canadian border, the Border Patrol has no way to
verify his statement
BORDER PATROL'S CAPACITY TO RESPOND IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO

THE AMOUNT OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY
Data that do exist indicate that at current staffing levels, illegal activity
exceeds the Border Patrol's capacity to respond. Northern border sectors use
DAG006-0248
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various methods to track their ability to respond to illegal activity, including the
following:
• Sensor hits: Many northern border sectors have only recently begun to track
their rate of response to sensor hits, and the amount of data available varies
widely.10 Although we cannot make accurate comparisons from sector to
sector because only three of the eight sectors were able to provide limited
data, it would be accurate to say that, on average, the northern border sectors
respond to about 50 percent of their sensor alerts. The Border Patrol cannot
determine the nature and extent of illegal activity that may be associated with
the 50 percent of sensor hits to which BPAs cannot respond.
• Bonier Activity Reporting: Sectors in the Central and Western Regions have
begun to use a Border Activity Reporting system, dividing the sectors into
grids and tracking intrusions, responses, apprehensions, and enforcement
hours. Using this system, the Havre sector concluded that it is not able to
successfully patrol remote areas of the border at current manpower levels. .
Havre also reported that in its preliminary efforts to identify corridors of entry
along the northern border, it discovered that cross-border activity was greater
than previously estimated.
• Cameras: Camera footage can be used to analyze situations when BPAs

were unable to respond to illegal activity. For example, Spokane sector
reviews the output from Its cameras and compares the number of illegal
crossings recorded when no BPA was able to respond with the number of
incidents in which a BPA responded to activity picked up by the cameras and
made apprehensions. After making these comparisons, the sector assessed
itself to be only six to seven percent effective at its current staffing level.
Because of the low staffing level, BPAs are unable to respond to a substantial
portion of the illegal activity occurring in the sector.
Allocation of BPAs to northern sectors showed no increase until FY1999
Even though the total number of BPAs nationwide has steadily increased
since 1994, the number of BPAs on the northern border actually declined for
three years due to attrition and to the lack of money to cover moving expenses of
BPAs who might otherwise have relocated to the northern border to fill a vacancy
there. No new BPA positions were allocated to northern sectors until FY 1999.
(See the table on the next page.)
19Sensors are electronic devices that the Border Patrol places strategically along the border to
monitor crossing activity. There are various kinds of sensors—some detect motion, some are
sensitive to ground vbrations—but their common purpose is to signal an alert when persons or
vehicles pass near them. (Animals can also set off a sensor.) Such an alert is called a hit.

DAG006-0249
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Table 4: BPAs in Northern Sectors FY1994 through FY1999
FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99

BPAs Authorized 295 295 295 295 295 317
BPAs on Board (Sept 30)" 306 296 292 267 289 311
Source: Border Patrol Headquarters
In FY 1999, 22 more BPAs were allotted to three northern sectors: Blaine

(7 BPAs), Detroit (7 BPAs), and Swanton (8 BPAs). Headquarters Border Patrol
officials told us that it was only because of pressure from Congress that those
22 BPAs were assigned to the northern border despite the fact that beginning
with its FY 1998 budget submission, INS said that it would begin allocating
additional BPAs to the northern border. The Border Patrol officials said that
allocating additional BPAs to the northern border at this time is not in keeping
with the Border Patrol's Strategic Plan, although they did acknowledge that the
northern border does need more agents.
Northern border sectors have shifts with no coverage
Shifts with no Border Patrol coverage leave the northern border wide open
to criminal activity. Intelligence officers told us that criminals monitor the Border
Patrol's radio communications and observe their actions. These criminals know
the times when the fewest BPAs are on duty, and they plan their illegal
operations accordingly. The Border Patrol realizes this risk, but, because of the
low numbers of BPAs in northern border sectors, the Border Patrol simply cannot
cover all shifts 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. (Most sector officials we
interviewed believed around-the-clock coverage was the minimum acceptable
level of coverage for Border Patrol stations.) At some northern sector stations,
there is no one on duty from midnight to 8 a.m. When BPAs are detailed out of
their sectors or a BPA is on sick leave, some day shifts may not be covered. At
the beginning of the 1999 calendar year, of the 53 Border Patrol stations in
northern sectors. 13 stations (24.5 percent) had only 2 BPAs and 2 stations
(3.8 percent) had only 1 BPA assigned to them.21 At those stations, it is virtually
impossible to achieve 24-hour coverage 7 days a week.
The lack of coverage for some shifts not only affects the Border Patrol's
ability to make apprehensions, it also limits the Border Patrol's ability to observe
20One reason that the northern border exceeded its authorized levels in FY 1994 and FY 1995
was that the Border Patrol authorized compassionate transfers to the northern border for some
BPAs (e.g., due to health concerns). However, as BPAs left the sectors (eg., retired), the sectors
were not allowed to replace them if the sectors were above their authorized levels.
21These numbers come from the INS Employment Report for the first pay period in 1999, ending
January 16,1999. These numbers can change from one pay period to the next due to attrition or
reassignment of BPAs.

DAG006-0250
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and record the level of illegal activity that occurs. Some of the sectors are aware
of illegal activity but do not have enough BPAs to monitor it For example, BPAs
in the Grand Forks sector identified a possible alien and drug smuggling
organization along the Minnesota border but reported: "A true assessment of the
organizational capabilities and the intent to break the law is unknown at this time.
With the lack of technological resources (i.e. sensors, cameras, etc.) the limited
two-agent staffing at the Warroad, [Minnesota] station can conduct sporadic
surveillance only."22
Recognizing the importance of coverage, all of the northern sectors

expressed the need for additional BPAs to ensure minimally adequate coverage
of their areas of responsibility. Enforcement challenges vary by sector, and the
methods sectors employ to analyze their staffing needs are not uniform.
Therefore, it is difficult to precisely calculate the number of BPAs needed on the
northern border. However, most of the northern sectors' strategic plans include a
recommended number of additional BPAs needed. According to the sectors'
calculations, estimates range from a low of 21 (Houlton) to a high of
104 (Detroit).
ARE THERE ENOUGH AGENTS TO GO AROUND?
Twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week equals 168 hours each week, the number of
hours needed to operate a Bonier Patrol station around-the-clock If the Havre sector
operated all of its nine stations in this manner, the sector would need 1,520 hours of
staffing each week. However, with the 25 agents on board at the end of FY1998, the
sector had 1,000 hours available each week (25 agents times 40 hours per week).
Therefore, the sector would be 520 hours shortof providing around-the-chck coverage at
its nine stations. IJhe total hours worked would fall short of the houts needed by 270,
even if each agent worked 10 hours of overOme each week.) These assumptions do not
take into account annual leave, sick leave, details, training, or other activities fag., jury
duty) that reduce the availabiSty of BPAs. Based on the G-23 data for the Havre sector, in
FY1998, there were an average of 262 hours attributed to leave, details, etc., each week.
That would mean that the sector would in fact be 762 hours short of providing around-the-
clock coverage at Us nine stations. (Of the northern border sectors, Vie Havre sector has
the most extreme shortage when the total number of hours needed for coverage is
comparedtotoenumber of BPAs available.) '
Grand Forks sector's First Quarter Intelligence Estimate, January 18.1999.

DAG006-0251
DRAFT
Lack of personnel limits the Border Patrol's Intelligence capabilities
Although Border Patrol officials with whom we spoke along the northern
border recognized the importance of having good intelligence operations, they
indicated that the limited staffing made it difficult to collect and disseminate
intelligence information as completely as is necessary for them to be effective.
Generally, northern border sectors have only one intelligence agent per sector
and that agent works at the sector headquarters. BPAs at the stations are
assigned intelligence tasks, such as writing intelligence reports, as collateral
duties.
Most of the sectors identified the lack of intelligence analysts and

intelligence aides as a serious problem. BPAs are collecting information and
issuing intelligence reports, but little effort is spent on analyzing the information
or using it to identify significant trends. Headquarters Intelligence Branch officials
we interviewed agree that the sectors need more intelligence staff, and they
would like to see each sector have, at a minimum, at least one intelligence
analyst and one intelligence aide/data input derk. Achieving this level of staffing,
by their estimate, would require approximately 10 additional positions for the
northern border.
Northern border sectors lack crucial equipment
Priorities set by the Border Patrol's strategic plan dictate that the needs of
the southwest border come first when equipment is allocated. Although the
northern border does receive some new equipment, several northern sectors
have made requests year after year for equipment they still have not received.
Throughout our inspection, northern border sector officials expressed needs for
everything from better vehicles to more sensors. Because the needs of the
various sectors are diverse and the availability of equipment somewhat
dependent upon which region the sector falls in, we are highlighting only a few
crosscutting needs here:
Radios
Smugglers and criminals are listening in on the Border Patrol's radio

transmissions, which compromises enforcement operations and threatens officer
safety. For this reason, almost everyone we interviewed—from INS regions,
Border Patrol sectors, and other agencies—voiced the need for the Border Patrol
to have secure radios.
The Department of Justice has a plan for a consolidated Justice Wireless

Network (JWN) that will provide secure communications for all Department
components. According to the plan, all INS locations will have secure
communications by the year 2005. The JWN plan supersedes previous INS
plans for the installation of a secure radio network. At the time of our review,

Office of me Inspector General
DAG006-0252
DRAFT
northern Border Patrol sectors were not aware of the JWN plan and
implementation schedule.
Cameras
Cameras are an important force multiplier in northern border sectors

because they alow the Border Patrol to monitor the border when there are not
enough BPAs on duty to patrol the area. The Integrated Surveillance Intelligence
System (ISIS), which uses a remotely operated camera to view the area where a
sensor has been activated, supplies BPAs with immediate information about
what has tripped the sensor, allowing them to make an informed decision about
how they need to respond to the situation. The camera allows them to see if the
sensor was activated by an animal, or to determine whether the traffic that
tripped the sensor is legitimate or illegitimate.
Cameras have proven instrumental in identifying illegal activity and

ensuring apprehensions (when BPAs are available to respond). All of the
northern border sectors have requested cameras in their recent budget
submissions. Some requests are for cameras where none currently exist and
some are requests to replace antiquated equipment. INS's FY 2000 budget
request allocates an additional $10 million for ISIS, of which at least $5 million is
earmarked for the northern border.
Although cameras multiply the Border Patrol's surveillance capabilities,

they cannot stand alone as an enforcement tool. BPAs are needed to respond to
illegal activity captured on camera. In some cases, there are not enough BPAs
to respond. However, even in those cases, cameras can still have a positive
effect: they can record cross border activity so that the Border Patrol can get an
accurate picture of what is going on, whether or not it has the capacity to
respond. Thus, cameras can help pinpoint areas that should be targeted for
future enforcement operations or areas that need additional resources.
Boats
Because of the number of waterways along the northern border, boats can
be essential to the Border Patrol (e.g., Detroit and Buffalo sectors are
responsible for border composed entirely of water). However, some northern
sectors are lacking necessary boats, and some sectors have boats that are
inappropriate for the particular needs of the sector. Problems relating to boats
include, but are not limited to, the following:
• In the Blaine sector, the Strait of Juan de Fuca provides an easy avenue
for maritime smuggling. The Border Patrol recognizes the need to patrol
the Strait, and various sources (e.g., the RCMP, the local sheriff) have
reported boats traveling in that area at night with no running lights in order
to avoid detection. The responsibility for monitoring the Strait of Juan de

DAG006-0253
DRAFT
Fuca falls to the Port Angeles Border Patrol station. However, that station
does not have a boat, despite the fact that the BPAs who were assigned
to the station when it was opened had all undergone training for boat
patrol.
The Detroit sector is responsible for patrolling a border that consists

entirely of water. (Besides the Great Lakes, three rivers—-the Detroit, the
St Clair, and the Si Mary's—provide potential smuggling routes.)
Patrolling by boat is essential in this sector, yet one of the Border Patrol
stations does not even have a boat At two of the stations, the boats in
operation are old boats that had been taken out of service in other sectors,
repaired, and sent to Detroit
The Houtton sector's Calais station is responsible for patrolling

1,000 miles of Atlantic coastline but does not have a boat suitable for its
needs. The boat that the station has been using is a speedboat that was
seized in Miami sector and then retrofitted for Houtton. In FY 1997, the
boat was out of service because of heeded repairs. In FY 1998, the
station logged only 152 hours of boat patrol before it had to remove the
boat from service because of excessive repair costs.
OTHER FACTORS AFFECT THE BORDER PATROL'S ENFORCEMENT

CAPABILITY
Details have an adverse effect on northern border operations
Virtually everyone we spoke with during our site visits, whether from the
Border Patrol or from an outside entity (e.g., local police departments, the DBA,
the RCMP), said that detailing BPAs from northern sectors to the southwest
border to support the BPA-intensive operations there has had an adverse effect
on operations in northern sectors. Because of the already small numbers of
BPAs in northern sectors, detailing three or four BPAs significantly reduced a
sector's staffing and sometimes caused a lack of coverage for entire shifts. It
also caused a lack of continuity in organized enforcement operations.
To assess the extent of BPA hours lost to details, we looked at hours

recorded as details out of the northern border sectors from the G-23 data. We
found that BPAs assigned to the northern border sectors recorded 374,766 hours
as details out of the sectors from FY 1993 through FY 1998. The details greatly
reduced the hours available for conducting enforcement operations on the
northern border. (See the table on the next page.)
U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT 21.

DAG006-0254
DRAFT
Table 5: Details Out of Northern Sectors 1993-1998
FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96a FY97 FY98

Detail hours 36,524 44,363 50,835 127,727 56,610 58,707
FTEs" • 17.6 21.3 24.4 61.4 27.2 28.2
Percentage of BPA
hours lost to details 3.3% 5.6% 7.7% 19.8% 8.4% 8.5%
Source; INS Workload Statistics
Besides the loss of staff hours, details have other negative effects. BPAs
have reported that their absence during details has caused them to lose contact
with confidential informants necessary to their work and has cost them credibility
with local law enforcement entities, who feel they cannot plan enforcement
operations with BPAs who could be detailed out of the sector on short notice.
All of the northern sectors reported that details affected their ability to
organize operations. A typical statement appears in the Canadian Border
Intelligence Center's Northern Border Report FY 98 (p. 12): "The Havre Sector's
decrease in apprehensions is directly related to the required resources dedicated
to support operation 'Rio Grande' [in Texas]. The Sector was unable to mount
any significant operational initiatives during FY 98."
Lack of detention space undermines deterrence
More often than not, once BPAs have processed apprehended aliens,
they release the aliens pending a court date. A previous Office of the Inspector
General review found that if aliens are not detained, they generally will not
appear for their court date and will not leave the United States if ordered
deported.26 Releasing apprehended aliens is common practice because of
23 Hours detailed out of the northern border sectors 'spiked* in FY 1996 as BPAs were sent to the
southwest border in support of Operation Gatekeeper in the San Diego sector and Operation
Hold the Line in the El Paso sector.
24We determined the number of full-time equivalents (FTEs) for each fiscal year by dividing the
total number of hours detailed out that fiscal year by 2,080—the standard number of hours for
which a full-time employee is paid (52 weeks multiplied ty 40 hours per week). The number of
hours that a full-time employee actually works is generally less than 2,080 hours due to variables
such as holidays, annual leave, sick leave, etc.
25The Border Patrol does detain apprehended aliens when required by law to do so (e.g.. in the
case of aliens who are aggravated felons).
26 In our March 1996 report entitled Immigration and NaturaToation Service's Deportation of
Aliens After Final Orders Have Been Issued, DOJ/OIG report number I-96-03, we found that INS
was successful in deporting only about 11 percent of non-detained aliens after final orders had
been Issued.

DAG006-0255
DRAFT
shortages in detention space. Funding for detention is not under the Bonder
Patrol's control, and the sectors' ability to detain apprehended aliens is often
subject to restrictions placed on them by INS Districts.
Many BPAs we spoke with expressed frustration with the inability to detain
apprehended aliens, a practice referred to as the "catch and release program.'
Releasing so many aliens does not achieve the deterrence that the Border Patrol
strives to promote. Aliens interviewed by BPAs after apprehension reported that
smugglers had assured them that even if they, were apprehended while being
smuggled into the United States, they would later be released. Thus, the risks in
making an illegal entry appear to be low, and many aliens are willing to take
them. A report published by the Swanton sector concludes that *[d]oing away
with or significantly modifying this practice which has been derisively termed the
'catch and release program* would have to be an Integral part of any strategy
aimed at reducing the flow of aliens from Canada "^
U.S. Border Patrol, Swanton, Vermont, Sector, Alien Smuggling Assessment, Akwesasne
27
Reservation. New Yor*. April 11.1996, p. 4.

DAG006-0256
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We found that serious illegal activity—illegal immigration, alien smuggling,

drug trafficking—is occurring along the northern border. And the level of illegal
activity is likely much greater than the Border Patrol can document, given the
general lack of intelligence information relating to the northern border and the
limited number of BPAs available to patrol the area and collect intelligence
information. Based on interviews with BPAs and other law enforcement officers,
as well as intelligence reports we reviewed, we conclude that illegal activity is
increasing along the northern border and that smuggling operations are
becoming increasingly sophisticated.
The Border Patrol's Strategic Plan, issued in 1994, does not address the
northern border until the fourth and final phase of the plan. Presently, the Border
Patrol is in Phase II of its strategic plan and no date has been indicated for
implementation of Phase IV. In addition, the plan does not articulate the
strategies that the Border Patrol will use to control the "increased entries" it
anticipates along the northern border once it has achieved'control of the
southwest border. Our findings suggest that Phase IV of the plan needs to be
developed in greater detail to address the problems facing the northern border
sectors. Securing the northern border requires careful planning, built upon
reliable data, the knowledge and insights of individuals experienced in securing
the northern border, as well as lessons the Border Patrol has learned while
implementing the strategic plan on the southwest border. Therefore, we
recommend that
1. The INS Commissioner direct the Border Patrol to outline the approach
it will take, prior to and during Phase IV, to secure the northern border,
including, but not limited to. the following:
• identifying and implementing accurate methods for collecting

data to quantify the level of illegal activity and to support
decisions about the allocation of personnel and equipment;
• determining the minimum number of intelligence analysts and

intelligence aides needed to accurately assess the level of
illegal activity; and
• determining the minimum number of BPAs the northern border

sectors require to address existing gaps along the northern
border (e.g., the number of BPAs necessary for sectors to cover
all shifts at all stations).

DAG006-0257
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A topic that requires more immediate attention is the detailing of BPAs

from already under-staffed northern sectors, which has had an adverse effect on
enforcement operations. Despite the steadily increasing numbers of BPAs
assigned to the southwest border over the past six years, there has been no
corresponding decrease in the number of BPAs detailed out of northern sectors.
Therefore, we recommend that
2. The INS Commissioner evaluate whether there is a continuing need to

detail BPAs out of northern sectors at the current levels.

Inspections Division —
DAG006-0258
DRAFT
APPENDIX I: THREATS ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER
Organized Crime and Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs
The Border Patrol's enforcement along the northern border is made more
difficult by the proliferation of organized crime groups and outlaw motorcycle
gangs that are active in Canada and engage in cross-border crime. These
groups are organized, well armed, and equipped with technological equipment to
help them monitor and evade enforcement officers. Some of these crime groups
have forged alliances with each other, which increases their power. Other crime
groups are in open conflict with each other, increasing the violence in their
regions and the burden to law enforcement officers. All of these crime groups
traffic in illegal drugs. They also smuggle aliens, weapons, cigarettes, alcohol,
and anything else that will gain them a profit. Some of these groups are
described below.
• Asian-based organized crime (AOC) groups control the importation of

heroin into Canada and distribution throughout North America,
including the United States. These groups, which include Triads
(Chinese mafia), gangs such as the Big Circle Boys (whose members
are primarily from the south of China), and Vietnamese crime groups,
are also increasingly involved in the cocaine, trade and in hydroponic
marijuana growing operations. AOC groups are also involved in alien
smuggling.
• Traditional (Italian-based) organized crime (TOG) groups pose a

serious threat in Canada. Their efforts are focused on drug smuggling,
primarily cocaine and hashish, although they are increasingly involved
in distributing heroin. They engage in various other illegal activities,
including money laundering, gambling, and counterfeiting. TOC
groups have formed alliances with other organized crime groups, thus
increasing their power.
• East European-based organized crime (EEOC) is concentrated in the

Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver areas, although it has expanded to
all parts of Canada. EEOC groups maintain ties with crime groups in
Russia, Europe, and the United States and are involved in numerous
illegal activities. In Canada, EEOC groups are currently expanding
their trafficking in drugs, particularly cocaine, heroin, and anabolic
steroids.
• Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) are well-organized and well-armed

and are active in the drug trade, as well as other illegal activities. The
Hells Angels have 16 chapters in Canada and are one of the most
U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT ~ 26~

DAG006-0259
DRAFT
powerful criminal organizations in the country. In Quebec, a rival gang,

the Rock Machine, is involved in armed conflict with the Hells Angels,
which has caused numerous homicides. Recently, the Rock Machine
has affiliated itself with the Bandidos, a well-known OMG, causing
' authorities to predict an escalation of OMG violence in Quebec and
Ontario.
A number of the officials we interviewed pointed to the Hells Angels as a

significant threat along the northern border. In British Columbia, five chapters of
the Hells Angels control the hydroponic cultivation of marijuana and its export to
the United States.1 In the eastern provinces of Canada, the Hells Angels control
the distribution of cocaine. Hells Angels members have infiltrated the ranks of
longshoremen working in the ports of Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Montreal,
Quebec; this allows them access to container shipments of drugs coming into
Canada. From these ports they distribute the drugs, often transporting them
across the border into the northeastern United States. In Quebec, an alliance
exists between the Sicilian Mafia and the Hells Angels for the purpose of
smuggling drugs.
Intelligence reports and interviews we conducted with Border Patrol

officials indicate a growing threat from Vietnamese crime groups, which are
smuggling marijuana and cocaine from Canada into western parts of the United
States. These groups, characterized by extreme violence and the use of
automatic weapons, are also becoming more involved in manufacturing
methamphetamine. The NDIC reports: "Vietnamese criminal enterprises are
proliferating in the United States and Canada. Vietnamese criminal enterprises
In the United States present a formidable threat; the FBI considers Vietnamese
criminal enterprise activity its principal Asian threat"2
The threat of terrorism
Most of the world's prominent terrorist organizations have established

operational bases in Canada, and these organizations help facilitate the illegal
transit of members into the United States.3 In the last five years, several
suspected terrorists—Palestinians and Sikhs and nationals of Jordan, Iraq, Iran.
Lebanon, and Ireland—have been involved in smuggling incidents or have
applied for entry into the United States from Canada. Some of these individuals
had been convicted of terrorist acts. A Palestinian arrested in July 1997 and
charged with planning to bomb the New York City subway system had been
1 Criminal Intelligence Service Canada. Annual Report on. Organized Crime in Canada, 1998.
2U.S. Department of Justice National Drug Inteligence Center. Product No. 984.0273-001,
February 1998, Conference Report Asian Heroin Flows into North America, p. 4.
3 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Public Report, 1997.

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DRAFT
previously arrested three times attempting to enter the United States illegally
from Canada in the Blaine sector.4
An RCMP officer we interviewed said he sees Canada as a stepping stone

for terrorists on their way to the United States. He told us about an individual,
previously arrested in New York by the DEA for importation of heroin, who
bought 60 acres of land along the border with part of the property on each side.
That individual has known ties to terrorist organizations and is linked to the Air
India bombing.5 Another RCMP officer cautioned that terrorists using Canada as
a base are destined for the United States.
INS headquarters Intelligence Branch officials we interviewed expressed

concern about the threat of terrorists using the Windsor Tunnel route for access
from Canada into the Detroit area. The largest concentration of persons from the
Middle East in North America is located in the Toronto/Detroit area. Joint Task
Force Six reports that some elements of this population are using money from
drug sales to finance terrorist groups in their home countries.6
4Bombs in Brooklyn: How the Two Illegal Aliens Arrested for Plotting to Bomb the New York
Subway Entered and Remained in the United States, Michael R. Bramwich, Inspector General.
March 1998.
5On June 22,1985, a bomb placed on Air India Flight 182 in Canada exploded in-flight, killing
329 people. The RCMP continues to investigate the incident, the worst act of terrorism in
Canadian history.
6 JointTask Force Six, Project North Star Intelligence Architecture Assessment, July 1.1999,
p. 1-B-5.
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APPENDIX II: INSPECTION METHODOLOGY
During our Inspection, we collected information from a variety of sources

about illegal activity along the northern border and the Border Patrol's efforts to
control it. We spoke with Office of the Inspector General investigators in area
offices near the northern border, and we held conference calls with each of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) regional offices and with the
northern Border Patrol sectors that we did not visit To obtain information on the
Border Patrol's strategic plan, its response to illegal activity and its allocation of
resources, we interviewed key officials from-several INS headquarters offices,
including the Border Patrol, the Office of Border Coordination, the Electronic
Systems Branch, and the Radio Systems Section. We obtained INS workload
(G-23) data for Border Patrol sectors and analyzed the data FY1993 through FY
1998/
To determine the level of threats and illegal activity along the northern .
border, we interviewed officials from INS's Intelligence Branch and examined
Border Patrol intelligence reports, weekly intelligence summaries, and Quarterly
and Annual Intelligence Estimates. We also collected and reviewed more than
50 reports from such sources as the National Drug Intelligence Center, the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Office of National Drug Control Policy,
the military's Joint Task Force Six, the U.S. Customs Service (USCS). and the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
In May 1999, we made week-long site visits to four of the eight northern
Border Patrol sectors: Blaine, Washington; Buffalo, New York; Detroit, Michigan;
and Swanton, Vermont In each sector, we interviewed key Border Patrol
officials, toured the border area, and reviewed strategic plans, staffing records,
intelligence reports, and other documents. To gain a complete picture of illegal
activity along the border and efforts being made to combat it, we also interviewed
officials from INS district offices and from other agencies that work with the
Border Patrol, such as DEA, the USCS, the RCMP, local police departments, and
U.S. Attorneys' offices. Throughout the course of this inspection, we interviewed
more than 150 individuals.
1 The data contained in this report are the most recent data available at the time the report was
written. However, INS's workload data for FY 1999 were not then available. Consequently, any
statistics from workload data reflect FY 1998 numbers.
U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT . 29

Office of the Inspector General '
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NOTICE - THIS DRAFT RESTRICTED TO OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FROM: ROBERT L ASHBAUGH

SUBJECT: Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border,

In our continuing effort to address illegal immigration issues, we examined the

According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) Anti-Smuggling

Despite an abundance of anecdotal information, we found that INS is unable to

The Border Patrol's capacity to respond is disproportionate to the amount of

RESULTS OF THE INSPECTION , 7

THE BORDER PATROL FACES INCREASING ILLEGAL ACTIVITY

INS IS UNABLE TO ASSESS THE LEVEL OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY

BORDER PATROL'S CAPACITY TO RESPOND

OTHER FACTORS AFFECT THE BORDER PATROL'S

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24

APPENDIX I: THREATS ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER 26

APPENDIX II: INSPECTION METHODOLOGY 29

U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT

• identifying what illegal activity occurs along the northern border,

U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT

Border Patrol Strategic Plan

• Phase I - Control San Diego and El Paso Corridors

The landscape of the northern border

U. S. Department of Justice DRAFT

The Border Patrol on the northern border

Northern Border Patrol Sectors

(BPAs on board at northern border sectors M of September 30,1999)

U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT

Border Patrol staffing

As of September 30,1999,311 of the national total of 8,364 BPAs

Allocation of Border Patrol Agents

The number of BPAs nationwide has increased significantly since the

Congress remains intent on the Border Patrol hiring additional BPAs,

U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT 4~ ~ "I "^

Table 2: BPAs Hired FY1994 through FY1999

FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99

Congressional interest in the northern border

Hearings held in April 1999 by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on

• April 14—House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims,

• April 27—Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, hearing on

U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT

serious problems in America. Our Border Patrol is the first line of

U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT 6

RESULTS OF THE INSPECTION

Border Patrol sectors on the Canadian border face significant law

BPAs and other law enforcement officers we interviewed and intelligence

U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT 7

THE BORDER PATROL FACES INCREASING ILLEGAL ACTIVITY ALONG

Illegal immigration and alien smuggling

INS's 1997 Anti-Smuggling Strategy document states that "[intelligence

The Canadian Border Intelligence Center reported in its FY1998 Northern

U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT 8 - —~

In February 1996, the Blaine sector's Anti-Smuggling Unit reported that

The porous nature of the border, coupled with limited enforcement,

The hydroponic marijuana produced in British Columbia is known as "BC

U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT 10

Table 3: Total Marijuana Seizures in Blaine Sector

Fiscal Year Pounds of marijuana seized

Production of potent hydroponic marijuana has also spread to the other

RISK AND PROFIT INFLUENCE DRUG TRAFFICKING

U.S. Department of Justice DRAFT 11

Besides marijuana, other drugs increasingly are being smuggled across