The Foreign Policy Strategies of The European Union and Russia - Case Study of Ukraine

GROUP
The Foreign Policy Strategies of the European Union and Russia Case study of Ukraine
Semester Project
CristinaStoica DanielaPurdel JesperBlaabjergHolm NadiaAndersen TroelsRyeAndersen 21DECEMBER2010
Group 5, The Foreign Policy Strategies of the European Union and Russia
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................. 1 Abbreviations and Acronyms............................................................................................................... 3 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 4 2. Problem ............................................................................................................................................ 5 2.1. Problem area ............................................................................................................................. 5 2.3. Problem formulation ................................................................................................................. 6 2.4. Relevance .................................................................................................................................. 6 2.5. Delimitation .............................................................................................................................. 7 3. Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 10 3.1. Method of investigation .......................................................................................................... 10 3.2. Techniques of investigation .................................................................................................... 11 3.3. Case Study approach ............................................................................................................... 13 3.4. Data Collection or Source of Data .......................................................................................... 14 3.5. Synopsis .................................................................................................................................. 14 4. Theory ............................................................................................................................................ 16 4.1. Liberal Intergovernmentalism ................................................................................................. 19 4.2. Classical realism ..................................................................................................................... 20 4.3. Analytical Strategy.................................................................................................................. 24 4.4. Operationalization of Foreign Policy Strategy........................................................................ 24 4.5. Operationalization of Classical Realism ................................................................................. 25 5. Foreign policy strategies ................................................................................................................ 28 5.1. EU - Ukraine ........................................................................................................................... 28 5.1.1. The energy foreign policy strategy of the EU towards Ukraine ...................................... 30 5.1.2. The trade foreign policy strategy of the EU towards Ukraine ......................................... 32 5.1.3. Visa free travel ................................................................................................................. 34 5.1.4. Institutional reform .......................................................................................................... 35 5.2. Russia - Ukraine ...................................................................................................................... 36 5.2.1. Trade as a strategic sector of Russian Economy .............................................................. 37 5.2.2. Russias Energy Strategy ................................................................................................. 39 5.2.3. Black Sea Defence ........................................................................................................... 41 6. Analysis.......................................................................................................................................... 47 6.1. EU ........................................................................................................................................... 47 6.1.1. Geography ........................................................................................................................ 47 6.1.2. Natural resources & Trade ............................................................................................... 47 6.1.3. Military ............................................................................................................................ 49 6.1.4. Population ........................................................................................................................ 49 6.1.5. Quality of diplomacy ....................................................................................................... 50 6.2. Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 51 6.2.1. Geography ........................................................................................................................ 51 6.2.2. Trade & natural resources ................................................................................................ 52 6.2.3. Military ............................................................................................................................ 53 6.2.4. Population ........................................................................................................................ 55 6.2.5. Quality of Diplomacy ...................................................................................................... 56 7. Comparison .................................................................................................................................... 58 7.1. Geography ............................................................................................................................... 58
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7.2. Natural resources & Trade ...................................................................................................... 59 7.3. Military.................................................................................................................................... 60 7.4. Population ............................................................................................................................... 61 7.5. Quality of diplomacy .............................................................................................................. 62 8. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 64 9. Limits ............................................................................................................................................. 65 10. Perspective ................................................................................................................................... 66 11. Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 67 Books: ........................................................................................................................................ 67 Articles: ...................................................................................................................................... 68 Official documents & Press releases:......................................................................................... 70 Websites: .................................................................................................................................... 72 Appendix ............................................................................................................................................ 74 A.1. Agreements ............................................................................................................................ 74 A.1.01. NIPs ............................................................................................................................... 74 A.1.03. PCAs ............................................................................................................................. 75 A.1.04. ENP ............................................................................................................................... 75 A.1.05. EU-Ukraine Action Plan ............................................................................................... 76 A.1.06. Memorandum of Understanding - on co-operation in the field of energy between the European Union and Ukraine..................................................................................................... 77 A.1.07. EU-Ukraine Association Agenda .................................................................................. 78 A.1.08. SCAs between Russia and Ukraine in Energy .............................................................. 78 A.1.09. Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of Cooperation in the energy sector. .................................................................................................................................................... 79 A.1.10. CIS ................................................................................................................................ 80 A.1.11. CISFTA 1993 ................................................................................................................ 80 A.1.12. SES 2003 ....................................................................................................................... 81 A.1.13. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership 1997 ............................................. 82 A.1.14 Dagomys Agreement 1992............................................................................................. 82 A.1.15 Yalta Agreement 1992 ................................................................................................... 82 A.1.16. Radisson (Sochi) Agreement 1995................................................................................ 83 A.1.17. 1997, Accord on the division of the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine ..... 83 A.1.18 Black Sea Fleet Deal Renewed 2010 ............................................................................. 84 A.2. Tables ..................................................................................................................................... 85 Table 1: Realism ........................................................................................................................ 85 Table 2: Countries ...................................................................................................................... 85 Table 3: Russian Foreign Trade (2007) with CIS Countries ..................................................... 86 Table 4: Russian Foreign Trade in 2006 .................................................................................... 86 Table 5: The dependence of individual countries on gas imports from Russia (2007) ............. 87
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AP BSF CIB CIS CISFTA CSP EAEC EaP EC ENPI ENP EP EU EUAA EurAsEC FSU FTA IR LI LotEUAA MoU NERC NIP PCA PCA RSFSR SCAs SES SSR Tacis US USSR WTO The EU/Ukraine Action Plan Black Sea Fleet Comprehensive Institution Building Programme The Commonwealth of Independent States Commonwealth of independent states free trade agreement Country Strategy Paper European Atomic energy Community The Eastern Partnership European Commission European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Ukraine European Neighbourhood Policy European Parliament European Union EU-Ukraine Association Agenda EurAsian Economic Community p.38??? former soviet union countries Free Trade Agreement International relations Liberal Intergovernmentalism List of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda priorities for 2010 Memorandum of Understanding: On Co-operation in The field of energy between The European Union and Ukraine National Electricity Regulatory Commission of Ukraine National Indicative Programme Partnership and Co-operation Agreement Partnership and Cooperation Agreement: Between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Agreements of strategic cooperation Single Economic Space, Common Economic Space, EEA Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States United States of America The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics World Trade Organisation
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1. Introduction
This paper analyses the foreign policy strategies of the European Union (EU) and Russia in the post-Soviet space. Analysing the various national strategies can in itself be very interesting, taking into consideration that they are interacting on an international level and discovering if they are conflicting seems even more appealing. This paper will not have an in-debt look at the outcome of international relations, but rather focus on the individual behaviour of the actors while analysing their activities at an inter-state level. During the last decades the EU and Russia developed their economies and gained importance as trade partners on the global scale. After the cold war, the former communist states were attracted by the democratic system seeing the EU as an ideal model, which spread the interest of the EU towards the former soviet states. The EU developed its Neighbourhood Policy towards its new neighbours, which by Russia was dubbed the "near abroad" and considered its natural sphere of interest. Many scientists see this development of a shared neighbourhood as potential source of tensions. Especially the foreign policies regarding Ukraine, now located between new member states of the EU and Russia, seem to be an important variable in EU-Russian relations. This paper is going to analyse the foreign policy strategies of the EU and Russia towards Ukraine. Adopting a classical realist view, the main goal of the two parties is to maximize their power, this is possible in various areas. This paper will identify in which of these areas the different parties are interested based on the agreements they signed with Ukraine in these domains. To allow a comparison, the EU is treated as a unitary actor, speaking with a common voice, during the whole analysis. To understand the functioning of the EU, being a supranational institution composed of various states, which could all have different positions concerning a specific matter, this paper is using liberal intergovernmentalism. This paper finally concludes whether the two foreign policy strategies in Ukraine are conflicting and if so in what areas.
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2. Problem
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the area surrounding our chosen problem in order to place it in relation to the academic area of study, and to present our problem formulation. Furthermore the relevance of the problem is presented along with the delimitations we make in order to conduct our investigation.
2.1. Problem area

Since the 1990s the geostrategic conditions in Europe changed a lot with the collapse of the Soviet system, emergence of the newly independent countries and an ever-developing EU. The EU was enlarging and developing policies towards its new neighbourhood. The eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007 were not only special due to their size and the enormous increase in population in the EU but also due to the fact that most of these new member states were former members of the Soviet Union and thus to a smaller or larger extent under the influence of Russia. What the position of Russia is regarding the importance of the EU in the newly independent states is debatable but most scholars see this situation as complicated, as Paul Flenley claimed in 2008 In this there is a potential for tension with Russia (Flenley 2008, p. 189). Especially Ukraine seems to be tilting between the two actors, Russia and the EU, and their political systems. In the 2004 Orange Revolution the population rose up against the electoral victory of Viktor Yanukovych because massive election fraud was suspected. In the end the pro-European Viktor Yushchenko won the elections preaching to favour the Ukrainian relations with the EU. In 2010 however, the population voted in favour of the pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych who came to power and established a new government. Russia and the EU seem to have different approaches towards partner countries. Many scholars state that the EU has developed structural foreign policy during the last decades, whereas Russia was feared for its military power during the cold war. In 1997 Russia signed a Black Sea Defence Treaty with Ukraine. On the other hand the EU and Ukraine signed a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) that implies binding commitments and obligations for Ukraine. At first sight the two countries seem to have different ways to handle their relations with partner countries.
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2.3. Problem formulation

On the basis of our problem area we have formed the following problem formulation: What are the Russian and the EU foreign policy strategies towards Ukraine and is there a conflict between the two? We find that the best way to analyse this problem is by parting the paper in two connected parts. First we describe and analyse the two foreign policy strategies and their goals on the basis of the agreements made between the countries from a classical realist point of reference, to seek to explain the rationales behind the states actions. Second, in a comparative analysis we try to conclude whether the two strategies conflict. We believe that it is necessary to make a detailed analysis of the two foreign policies before making the comparison of the two strategies. Our problem formulation is an investigative problem formulation, built around two questions. In the first part of the problem formulation we will investigate the two foreign policy strategies and their goals. In the second part we will compare the findings from the first part and by doing this be able to answer the question; is there a conflict between the two foreign policy strategies?
2.4. Relevance
In a global perspective the foreign policies of Russia and the EU is a very interesting area of study as Russia can be described as a former super power aspiring to regain its former power in foreign relations. While the EU has not historically been seen as a very strong player on the international stage it has from the days of the European Coal and Steel community expanded its power as an actor in foreign relations. The most recent expansion came with ratification of the Lisbon Treaty where among other things the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was created. In a more regional view the foreign policies of the EU and Russia are very interesting especially when we look at Eastern Europe where both Russia and the EU have great economic and security interests and were Russia also has some great historical and cultural interests. There are multiple reasons why the Ukrainian context is relevant when looking at the two foreign policy strategies of the EU and Russia. The first reason is the history of Ukraine; Ukraine has through history been allied with countries which are now part of the EU, allied with Russia and also
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been a part of the USSR. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian Act of Independence in 1991, Ukraine has moved closer to the EU. The second reason is that Ukraine is a very large country (603550 km2 and 46 million people) bordering both Russia and the EU (Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) and therefore is interesting both as a trading partner and as a partner in many other aspects. Two examples of this is that the EU works closely with Ukraine in fighting organized crime and that Russia is leasing naval bases in Sevastopol for the Black Sea Fleet (Encyclopdia Britannica 2010). The third reason for its relevance is that the gas pipelines that goes through Ukraine and carries gas from Russia to the EU has been the cause for multiple crises between both Russia and Ukraine but also Russia and the EU. The fourth reason why we find that Ukraine is the place to observe the foreign policy strategies is the non-conclusive alignment of Ukraine to neither Russia nor the EU. Ukraine is a former member of the USSR and a present member of the CIS and has signed SES. At the same time Ukraine has made it clear that in the future it wants to join the EU and has signed plans like the PCA and the AP and are participating in programs as the ENP and the Eastern Partnership, that means Ukraine has strong ties with both the EU and Russia and therefore a country where we can observe both foreign policy strategies in play. The foreign policy strategies of the EU and Russia have been vividly described and analysed by different scholars - like Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu in A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations (Leonard & Popescu 2007) or James Hughes in EU relations with Russia partnership or asymmetric interdependency?(Hughes 2006).
2.5. Delimitation
It is necessary for us to make some delimitations in order to write this paper, we are going to explain those in this section. In terms of time, our investigation is limited to the period of 1991-2010 as it marks the foreign relations between the parties after the independence of Ukraine. The paper is furthermore limited by the fact that it is not looking at the Russian foreign policy towards the EU and vice versa, as this investigation would be a much larger task and too broad to make a sufficiently detailed analysis of
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the foreign policy relations. Most importantly we consider the foreign policy relations towards Ukraine being a very interesting case study for how these two powers conduct foreign policy. We can only base our description and analysis of the foreign policy strategies on information that is publicly available. There could be silent agreements between countries that could be part of a strategy, or complex actions taken to achieve a hidden aim. We cannot take these possibilities into consideration but have to base our paper on the publications and official agreements publicly accessible. The framework, which can be applied in the cases of the EU and Russia foreign policy analysis, situates the EU at a state level. This complex structure is placed during our investigation in the international system as a single voice in order to be compared with Russias relative power situation that shapes their relations and the overall intentions as states. The result is a ready-made but flexible framework that situates the EU closer to the border between theory and practice. The member states different positions and the interests behind them will not represent the main focus of this paper. In order to explain the EUs limits in coordinating its common position examples from different areas will be brought in the current discussion. Therefore, the analyses performed on the two foreign policy strategies is focused on a state level and through this approach, the EU and Russia are two main actors constituent as part of our subject of investigation. Moreover, the development of the EU and Russia foreign policy in the case of Ukraine has to be seen in the context of the EU-Russia relationship in the actual shared neighbourhood. The focus of this paper is placed on the understanding of the EU-Russia state-level context of foreign policy strategies used in Ukraine, while the domestic internal logic of this state remains limited in the paper. From this perspective obvious economic, political and social implications for Ukraine will be left outside our investigation area, albeit, for the purpose of this paper Ukraine is directly relevant and useful by bringing an outline in the analysis of the two foreign policies strategies that must share it. Furthermore, due to internal integration problems (e.g. impediments to trade and efficient allocation of resources) in the 1990s and the enlargement eastwards, the EU urged the development of foreign policy in the East and started a new era in the relationship with Russia. The EU-Russia relationship and aspects such as Black Sea as well as several other elements of eastern enlargement, besides the case of Ukraine, are not the subject of this paper. Thus, the history of the EU foreign
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policy in east is therefore longer, the paper will focus mainly on the period after 1998, a key year, when the strategic view of the EU foreign policy started to strengthen the partnership with its former soviet neighbours. In order to best serve its primary purpose the limitations brought to the three dimensions (time, theory and subject of investigation) briefly mentioned above are necessary in order to better organise data and to focus on the foreign policy arguments.
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3. Methodology
The purpose of this chapter is to describe our methodological considerations in our paper but also to be a tool that produce and convey the results of the paper. This chapter will contain an explanation of our choice of method, a justification of our choice of theory and data plus a description of our analytical strategy. In the first part of the chapter we will illustrate why we choose to use the qualitative analysis method in order to explore foreign policy strategies processes applied through the case study method used in order to establish the potential existence of a conflict of interests between the EU and Russia in Ukraine. The second part explains how our methodological approach is suitable to explore foreign policy strategies and to identify a potential conflict in the theoretical context of classical realism. Finally, our approach is illustrated in the last part of the chapter with a presentation of our analytical strategy.
3.1. Method of investigation

Our problem formulation consists of two connected parts and therefore we are using two stages during the method of investigation. In the first part of our research we are using the qualitative method based on documents analysis as we choose to illustrate the foreign policy of the EU and Russia towards Ukraine using a common framework. There are two main types of approaches used for political science analysis originating from sociological science. First is the objective approach, called positivism. Starting from a theory the positivist paradigm can test any hypothesis by assuming that all social phenomena can be explained just by observing their causes and effects (Guba & Lincoln 1994, p. 106). This approach, in which a theory is generated by qualitative data and the hypothesis it can be proved or not by the data, is known in the literature as the hypotheticodeductive method (Ibid.). However, we do not find this approach suitable for our research, since from a positivist point of view what cannot be observed does not exist and the foreign policy strategies chosen to be the object of our analysis, to a large extend are made up of unobservable processes. The second type of approach, labelled interpretivism (or antipositivisim), is based on subjective research. Opposite to the positivism, this approach uses the inductive method. Interpretivism analyses the world by studying the subjects and describing their dynamics (Williams 2000, p. 209). In order to obtain a complete understanding on the results of our investigation, we use the second type of approach, interpretivism. Using classical realism as the theory in the process of answering our problem formulation we will interpret whether or not there is a conflict of interest
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in foreign policy strategies in Ukraine between the two parties applying theory to the data collected in our case study. Qualitative analysis method is our choice in developing the methodological process because of its advantages while working in an inductive interpretive paradigm. As the quantitative methods, the qualitative method we chose is also focused on finding a connection between the meaning of the texts and theories. The quantitative method would not serve our purpose as it would seek to explain a phenomenon or event instead of understanding a problem (Bryman & Rose in Devine, 2002, p. 199). The most criticised aspect of the quantitative method is that it is missing syntactical and semantic information embedded in the text (Weber as quoted by Wildemuth and Zhang, 2009, p. 308). Therefore, we find the qualitative method, more suitable since it can help give an understanding of the investigated subject, instead of explaining it which would require a hypothesis to test, and therefore would be quantitative. After illustrating the two foreign policies an in-depth investigation will be conducted in order to establish whether or not there is a conflict of interest between the two strategies towards Ukraine. We consider the case study method suitable for this level of investigation because of its ability to exemplify an abstract concept in a concrete setting. The goal at this stage of our research is to observe and interpret the dynamics of the Russia and EU foreign policies strategies and the interaction between them. Inevitably this type of methodological approach has also disadvantages. The qualitative analyses lack objectivity and moreover, a case study is difficult for making any general conclusions of findings. There are furthermore a number of technical and epistemological problems in this approach, such as inconsistencies in data, insecurity in establishing the priority of the data, or the validity of the results that will be explained in our limits of investigation.
3.2. Techniques of investigation

The main argument of choosing the method is technical superiority. When we choose techniques we have to take into consideration a set of epistemological arguments about the different ways of understanding the social world (Devine 2002, p. 200). Therefore, our assumptions about knowledge will be based in hermeneutics. We will start from the position that there is no universal truth, and that we can achieve knowledge by interpreting actions within social context and afterwards give them meaning (Bryman & Bell 2007, p. 25).
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The term of hermeneutics goes back in time, referring to Hermes, the Greek god who was thought to be an interpreter by Socrates in Platos masterpiece: The Republic. Hermeneutics seek to explain the processes of understanding and how previously acquired knowledge affects learning and understanding, and its origins can be found in ancient Greek history and culture (Abulad 2007, p. 12). Contemporary hermeneutics has been fundamentally redefined in the book by the German philosopher: Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002). With this book Wahrheit und Methode, the author revolutionized the whole concept of interpreting and understanding written texts, through the relationship between presupposition and new knowledge and how they form a collision of horizons (Abulad 2007, p. 17). Gadamer presents the idea of intentionality which refers to the fact that every consciousness is a consciousness-of-something. If traditionally the subject and the object were totally detached one from the other, in Gadamers opinion the two of them are linked (Abulad 2007, p. 18). A text is filtered and interpreted by each reader in a different way as each reader possesses different knowledge and comes from a different background. At the same time, a text reflects the horizon of its own author. Thus, the action of reading can be understood as a fusion of horizons: the horizon of the author and the one of the reader (Abulad 2007, p. 18). The act of reading involves what Gadamer defined as a historically affected consciousness which represents the result of the collision of horizons. Both the writer and the reader interprets the text according to their own life experience and culture of their own time, this is also referred to as the presupposition (Ibid. p. 19). Gadamer stresses the limited role of method and the priority of understanding as a dialogic, practical, situated activity. Understanding is determined by the matter to be understood which means that understanding is possible precisely because of prior knowledge and involvement (Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy 2010). The main idea that derives from Gadamers work is the fact that there is no absolute truth or absolute objectivity, no one possesses complete knowledge over everything and thus we cannot expect our study to be thorough. Even though arguments will be sustained by data, our analysis will be, however, influenced by our own interpretation of facts.
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3.3. Case Study approach

The case study research method was defined as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, which uses multiple sources of evidence (Yin 2004, p. 23). Scholar Bent Flyvbjerg describes the case study as a scientific tool which in his opinion produces a context dependent knowledge that makes it possible to move from a lower to a higher level in the learning process and is therefore very important in social sciences (Flyvbjerg 1991, p. 142). We do as Flyvbjerg believe that the case study is a very important scientific tool. We choose to use the qualitative case study to analyse the potential conflict of interest between the foreign policy strategies of the two parties, Russia and the EU in Ukraine. One of the other reasons for doing a case study is that it a case study focuses on a limited number of events or conditions and their relationship (Dooley 2006, p. 335). In our case that means that we do not look at if the general foreign policy strategies of the two parties clash nor if they clash in Eastern Europe, we are only looking at the specific case of Ukraine. We are using the qualitative case study to shed a light on the interaction between the two foreign policy strategies in Ukraine. What is different from other methods is that we are not trying to find an overrepresentation of repetitions; instead we are trying to get an insight into the complex strategies and goals that is the foreign policy strategies of the EU and Russia. In our research we are going to use the case study method defined as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, which uses multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2004, p. 23). The research will be based on documents that are either agreements between the two parties or publications that describe the foreign policy strategies. The qualitative type of research is following a tendency which can be observed in a long period of time, usually years. Given the volume of the data in this type of research, the need to concentrate on a small number of variables is inevitable. The period of time on which we are going to investigate is 19912010. Moreover, the case study method involves an analysis of a single case: a comparison between the foreign policy strategies of two states: Russia and the EU. The analysis extends over a longer period of time, in our case almost two decades (19912010). Because of its main focus on explanation, this method allows us to discover not only the actual facts, but also their possible causes and effects.
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The selection of cases for the case study is a complex matter as researchers choose certain cases based on their relevance to the subject. Atypical or extreme cases can be more revealing than average ones because they involve more actors and more mechanisms. The deeper causes of a problem and its consequences might be more important in understanding the matter than a simple description of events. Critical cases, extreme and deviant cases and paradigmatic cases are the three most essential (Seale et al. 2004, p. 425). One of the main drawbacks of analysing foreign policy through a case study is the shifting nature of the world of foreign policy (Caporaso 1986, p. 32). However, the field focuses mainly on the policies of national governments and their implications on the external world.
3.4. Data Collection or Source of Data

The data foundation of this paper is the agreements between both the EU and Ukraine respectively Russia and Ukraine and official publications describing the foreign policy strategies of the EU or Russia towards Ukraine. We believe that through these types of documents we can have the best basis for analysing the foreign policies and goals of the EU and Russia. The reason for using both agreements and publications that describe the foreign policies is that the Russian agreements are not publicly available to the same extent as on the EU side or only available in Russian, which creates a need for alternate sources.
3.5. Synopsis
The first chapter is a short introduction to this paper giving an impression of the importance analysing the foreign policy strategies of the EU and Russia in Ukraine. The second chapter will explain the framework of the problem that we are going to analyse in this paper. It will illuminate the problem area in which originates the problem formulation. Furthermore it will show the relevance of this defined problem as well as the limitations. The third chapter expounds the methodology followed through this paper. The fourth chapter explains the theory chosen for this paper, starting with an introduction explaining the choice. It gives an overview of the classical realist theory as well as of the liberal intergovernmentalism and explains how both will be used in the analysis. The fifth chapter gives a description of the foreign policies of the EU and Russia in Ukraine based on the agreements. This part is split up into the main foreign policy areas for the two countries. In the first section of this chapter we describe the agreements between the EU and Ukraine. After a
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general introduction, we have a closer look into the following topics: energy, trade, visa free travel and institutional reform. Regarding the agreements between Russia and Ukraine we focus on trade, energy and the black sea. In chapter six we will analyse the descriptive part guided by our operationalization of the classical realism parameters. The theory gives some examples of areas in which power is pursued; these areas will be our basis for the analysis of the two foreign policy strategies in Ukraine. This means that we will analyse the foreign policy strategies between the EU and Ukraine, as well as between Russia and Ukraine, in the areas of geography, trade, military, population and quality of diplomacy. In the seventh chapter we will continue our investigation using the findings of the analysis and interpret them by comparing the two foreign policy strategies. The interpretation of the results will be based on the classical realist assumption that all countries seek the maximization of power, with the purpose of concluding whether the two foreign policy strategies clash, and if so how they clash. In the eighth chapter we draw the final conclusions of our paper. First of all we will present the conclusions of each area that we previously focused on, and after that we will sum up the final results and conclude whether the two foreign policy strategies clash or not. In the ninth chapter we outline the limits we encounter during our investigation. The limits are regarding the theory, the availability of data and continuity of policies. In the tenth chapter we address the perspective of our project. We discuss the areas we have not dealt with in this project, and, point out topics for further investigation or interest.
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4. Theory
To understand an international political topic or problem one could use a variety of theories, that have different assumptions and perspectives, the main theories are: constructivism, liberalism and realism. Constructivism stresses the importance of identities by claiming that identities and interests do not exist separately from the social situations to which they are appropriate (SterlingFolker 2006, p. 116). Another central concept is the possibility of radical change and scholars like Adler or Wendts analysis of the role of ideas, norms and culture. However, we do not believe that norms and identities can help us understand the foreign policies of the EU and Russia. Another approach is liberalism theory claiming first of all that the state is not the main actor but its national position is influenced by a plurality of rational actors that all pursue their individual interests. Furthermore this theory asserts that interdependence in particular political issues creates common problems and that cooperation would be the best solution although there are many barriers. However these barriers can be reduced by improving the knowledge of every actor. Information and communication can play an essential role in overcoming barriers to collective action (SterlingFolker 2006, p. 57) We believe that an investigation of the foreign policy strategies of the EU and Russia in Ukraine would get too complex by taking a multitude of actors into consideration. Based on this idea we prefer the realist perspective. The realist shared assumptions of these theories are anarchy, state as unitary rational actor and the state determines the outcome of international system seeking for survival. However realism embodies a wide range of theories: classical realism, structural realism, offensive realism, defensive realism, neoclassical realism. Offensive realism claims that states seek to maximise power whereas defensive realism believe that the nation-states want to maximise security. A separation of both concepts, power and security, seems not possible for the analysis of the foreign policies of the EU and Russia. Classical realism explains the existence of conflicts through the human lust for power (Sterling-Folker 2006, p. 15) because in anarchy the state has to fight for power to survive. Structural realists add to the realist idea the model of power balancing. Waltz defines the notion of poles referring to major powers hence the international system may be characterised as unipolar, bipolar or multipolar. (Beavis 2010) Structural realism seeks to explain international political outcomes (Sterling-Folker 2006, p. 40). Neoclassical realism is a combination of classical realism and neorealism by pointing out the fight for relative power and security between actors on different levels in a system of anarchy. Perception of power, prestige, the position of the state in the international system and the foreign policy executive are important concepts of this theory. Both structural and neoclassical realism seem not to
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be efficient comparing the foreign policy strategies of the EU and Russia, so we decided to analyse our problem from a classical realist point of view. However we know that the EU is not a unitary actor, as the classical realism defines it, this can be problematic. We therefore use liberal intergovernmentalism to prove that we know the EU is not unitary but we choose to treat it as that nonetheless. Other options for doing that could be for example Multi-level governance or neo-functionalism Multi-level governance indicates that the decision-making power is held by a variety of actors. However this theory claims that taking decisions at the supranational level minimizes the state power, so it is a zero-sum game (Welz 2008, p. 91). Neo-functionalism agrees that the decision making process is influenced by various actors and point out the importance of interest groups and lobbies for the decision taking of the state. However this theory claims that the interests of the countries converge and that association of interests create a spill-over effect (Welz 2008, p. 35-36). (I)nterests organizations contribute to a positive-sum game, and, in the end, upgrade the common interest (Welz 2008, p. 79). Liberal intergovernmentalism explains integration being the result of discussions between states, being guided by the wish to maximize its domestic interests (Welz 2008, p. 35-36). This would be the pendant to classical realism at the bargaining in the EU internal level. Liberal Intergovernmentalism differs from intergovernmentalism by basing its explanation of the European integration in the treaties instead of in the development of the EU being a product of the cold war, meaning that the national interests are not fixed but change over time. Daniel Wincott, who is the most outspoken critic of LI, criticises it claiming that LI is in fact not an actual deductive theory, but merely an approach with a set of methodological assumptions, since it lacks a set of deductive parameters (Wincott 1995, p. 600). However our usage of this theory is limited to the fact that we want to show that the EU is not a unitary actor even though we treat is as one during the analysis for this no more than a set of assumptions are needed, so the critique does not affect our purpose. In this part we are going to show that we are aware of the different critiques that are surrounding Classical realism. Today, the logics, the coherence and the predictions of realism are challenged. The first challenge was brought by the destabilisation of the bi-polar international system built by USSR and US on
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policies of mutual containment that became a uni-polar system after the collapse of USSR in 1991. Secondly, the consequences of this destabilisation placed the focus rather on economic aspects than politics in international relationships. Thus even reduced, we still consider the viability of realism theory significant. In the contemporary world of politics, the realism theory still has some insights to offer about some sets of circumstances. Analytically, realism is most definite when it is investigating situations in which constraints imposed by the international system threaten minimalist state objectives: the protection of territorial and political integrity. Realism can offer its most precise explanations when states have few options because they are narrowly constrained by the international distribution of powerRealism is less analytically precise when the international system is not tightly constraining. (Krasner 1992, p. 40) Through the classical realism approach this paper tries to explain if there is a conflict between the EU and Russian strategy towards Ukraine in terms of the principal actors. The theory is not seen as an edifice of truth or a picture of reality but more as a depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connections among its parts (Boltzman as quoted by Waltz, 1979, p. 8). Rather than primitive as some of the critics found classical realism we characterise it as being more abstract which makes it very useful in putting order in our massive subject. Theories usually isolate a realm in order to explain what goes with it. The question is not if this isolation is realistic but if this isolation can prove itself useful (Waltz 1979, p. 8). By simplifying the reality through omission or through reduction of scale, the rational actor model proposed by classical realism becomes viable in analysing the two foreign policies. Whiteout departing from reality, the rational actor model pictures reality in a very simplified way, while moving away from reality we can explain it (Waltz 1979, p. 7). In our approach theory explains regularity of behaviour and leads one to expect that the outcome produced by interacting units will fall under specified ranges (Ibid.). One of the reasons for our choice is that when using classical realism as our main theory we will treat the EU as a unitary actor (with a single voice) and not the different national states. We consider this theoretical approach is both possible and necessary; possible because even though the foreign policy strategies of the EU are just the aggregated behaviour of the nation states it is still to a large extent a unified foreign policy strategy and necessary because when using the classical
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realism theory the analysis would be so complex that the conclusion would be irrelevant if the national states are taken in as having different foreign policy goals. Some critiques like the one of Kenneth Waltz that Realism suffers from oversimplification, meaning that it fails to explain many important aspects of international relations due to the fact that it does not treat the multiple levels of decision making and many other dimensions: Realism simply fails to explain most of international relations. Anarchy, egoism and the distribution of capabilities cannot explain the vast majority of what happens in such relations.(Donnelly 2005, p. 53).
4.1. Liberal Intergovernmentalism

We will in this chapter make a description of liberal intergovernmentalism, we do that to show that we are aware that the foreign policy strategy of the EU is not the work of a unitary actor but instead the aggregated behaviour of multiple national states. One of the reasons for this is that when using classical realism as our main theory, we will treat the EU as an international actor (with a single voice) and not the different national states. We consider this theoretical approach is both possible and necessary; possible because even though the foreign policy strategies of the EU are just the aggregated behaviour of the nation states it can be argued that it is still to a large extent a unified foreign policy strategy. Moreover it is necessary because when using the classical realism theory the analysis would be firstly of all so complex that the conclusion would be irrelevant if the national states are taken in as having different foreign policy goals and secondly impossible because classical realism doesnt believe in the functioning of supra-national institutions like the EU. Andrew Moravcsik developed in the 1990s LI which is built on the intergovernmentalist thesis that was developed by Stanley Hoffman in the 1960s who was one of the first to apply the realist theories to the EC. LI is a multidimensional framework used to analyse the process of European integration. LI draws in elements from a number of traditional schools like international relations theory, international political economy and intergovernmental negotiation analysis but unlike some of these schools LI does not threat the EU or regional integration as a unique sui generis activity and LI seeks to specify the motivations of social actors, and leaders and to derive predictions of their aggregated behaviour or the dynamic that is the effect of their interaction in a way that can be empirical tested (Disegni 2010, p. 2) (Wiener 2009, p. 67).
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LI is in a sense also a broad theory as it seeks to explain the evolution of regional integration in a broad sense. LI is not a narrow theory of a single political activity but instead a theoretical synthesis or framework. It seeks to link multiple theories and factors into a single coherent approach that can explain the course of regional integration over time instead of trying to explain integration with just one factor (Wiener 2009, p. 68). LI is based two assumptions that are all very closely linked to one another:
1.
States are actors. The states achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining and not through central authority making and enforcing political decisions. The assumption of LI is not realist where national security is the dominant motivator, identities are not uniform and interstate institutions are not insignificant, instead LI sees the member states as the pre-eminent decision-making power and political legitimacy (Wiener 2009, p. 68).
2. States are rational actors. This means that they define their priorities through a cost and
benefit analysis, in order to achieve a set of consistently ordered goals and objectives. Collective outcome are explained by aggregated individual actions and agreement to cooperate or establish international institutions is explained as a collective outcome of independent state choices and intergovernmental negotiations (Wiener 2009, p. 68). Another way to explain the states as actor and the states as in a three-stage framework it that states first define their preferences, then bargain agreements and then create or adjust institutions to secure those outcomes. In LI each stage is separate and explained by a separate theory and outcomes are explained only in muliticausal sequence. To make LI useful in analysing European integration LI adopts a specific theory for each step; a liberal or societal theory of national preference information, a bargaining theory of international negotiations and a functional theory of institutional choice. (Wiener 2009, p. 69)
4.2. Classical realism

Table1 (see Appendix A.2.) gives an overview of the important assumptions classical realism makes, which we are going to specify in the following part. Classical realism is founded on a pessimism regarding moral progress and human possibilities as Robert Gilpin once noted (Clinton 2007, p. 53). According to the realist perspective, humans have incompatible goals which conflict and make them act against each other. In Hans Morgenthaus
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view human individuals are characterised by a profound lust for power, are self-interested and competitive. In Politics among nations (2005) the founding book of international relations, Morgenthau argues that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. As a consequence of what has been affirmed, statesmen act according to their interest, defined in terms of power (Morgenthau 2005, p. 4). Inspired by Nietzschean philosophy, Morgenthau suggests that the human lust for power translates into an animus dominandi, or a desire to dominate (Busser 2006, p. 2). One of the most important antecedents of realist thinking, Niccol Machiavelli, argues that "how men live is so different from how they should live that a ruler who does not do what is generally done, but persists in doing what ought to be done, will undermine his power rather than maintain it" (Machiavelli as quoted by Brown et al. 2002, p. 261). Consequently, statesmen should be more aware of the interests of the states they lead, rather than the morality of their actions. International politics can be defined as a state of nature characterized by competition, continual insecurity and potential or actual conflict in Hobbess view (Jahn 2006, p. 253). In 1651 Hobbes argues in the book De Cive that peoples desires will always represent a driving force for war: Wherever good and evil are measured by the mere diversity of present desires and hence by a corresponding diversity of yardsticks, those who act in this way will find themselves still in a state of war (Hobbes as quoted by Jahn, 2006, p. 255). He continuous Warre of every man against every man is deeply rooted in the human condition. The Hobbesian social contract transfers the anarchy of the pre-Leviathan society from the individual level to the international level; the various people tolerate global chaos in exchange for internal peace. Even for E.H. Carr, in his book The Twenty Years Crisis, the lust for power derives from human nature. Carr explains that the exercise of power always appears to beget the appetite for more power (Carr quoted by Busser, 2006, p. 3). According to him, power is the driving force for even more power. Hence, as soon as they achieve their aims and satisfy their ambitions, statesmen, will set even higher goals, they will want to acquire even more power. The assumption of classical realists that humans are selfish gains importance moreover since they assume that statesman are taking decisions on state level. They continue this thought while claiming that the states behave selfishly in the international relations. Such a view suggests that states are
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unified, purposive and rational actors in international relations in the way that individuals are in society. (Steans & Pettiford 2005, p. 56) The selfish behaviour of the states is due to the fact that the classical realists believe that international politics are ruled by anarchy because there is no higher authority that could rule the sovereign states. This leads to the idea that there is no guarantee for security which creates mistrust. They argue that the absence of a supreme power capable of enforcing order across the entire system means that individual states are in a permanent state of insecurity and must be prepared to do whatever they can to survive in this hostile self-help environment. (Griffiths et al. 2002, p. 8). This strongly connects anarchy to the seeking for security of the state in the international system. In classical realism the ultimate goal of the state is security, and that can only be insured by a high relative power in comparison to other states. That means that the national interest in classical realism is defined by the maximisation of power (Hobson 2003, p. 47), and power in classical realism will always be at least partly military (Griffiths et al. 2008, p. 217), this is because that states that have strong military capabilities can repel attacks against themselves, which means that a strong military ensures the states security and that is therefore the reason why the military force is considered to be the mediator of international disputes. Since military and power are considered so important for the state security the factors that they depend on are also considered very important, these are among others; population, natural resources, geographical factors and the type of government of the state (Steans et al. 2005, p. 61). Morgenthau claims that interests are defined by power is a general truth however interests will change over time adapting to the environment. Interest and the tools of power will differ over time and over history. (Elias et al. 2007, p. 48). Power is generally defined as the ability to influence other states: no particular power factor or relationship is immune to change (Griffiths et al. 2008, p. 259). The general definition of power is may compromise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man (Morgenthau 2005, p. 11). In an interstate level this can be seen at two levels, the internal dimension and the external one. As Griffiths defines the internal dimension: The internal dimension of power is autonomy (Griffiths et al, 2008, p. 258). The capacity to do something is the internal dimension whereas the external dimension is the capacity to exercise control over others. Through this perspective there seem to be two different types of actors, some seeking power as their ultimate goal and some others seeking power as a tool to reach their final aim. Furthermore there is also the differentiation between hard power and soft power, where the first one is using physically damage and military force, whereas the latter uses influence.
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Classical realism considers a good foreign policy as being a rational foreign policy that minimises risks maximising benefits while compiling both the moral concept of prudence with the political requirement of success (Morgenthau 2005, p. 10). Even if the moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of state in their abstract universal formulation they still must be filtered through concrete circumstances. Both, the state and the individual must judge political action through the moral standard, the difference is that while an individual may sacrifice himself for a moral principle like liberty, the state is not allowed to let moral principles interfere in its pursue of success (Ibid, p.14). Being aware about the importance of moral significance, classical realism is also aware about the tensions between moral requirements and the successful political actions consequently in the eventuality of a cross-road, the success of the nation is the ultimate choice. Another distinction made by classical realism is between the moral principles of a nation and the moral laws of the universe. The nations particular aspirations and actions should not be stopped by the presupposition of what is good or evil among all nations. The solution stays in the interest of the state that is explained in terms of power which can save a nation both from the moral excess or the politically folly (Ibid, p.15). It is made a clear line between truth and idolatry and the foreign policy of a nation should always act in the terms of truth. Morgenthau presents the political sphere as being autonomous from the others. Not being unaware of the importance and relevance of other schools standards, classical realism takes into consideration other standards of thoughts only when they are appropriate to the political sphere and it is here that political realism takes issue with the "legalistic-moralistic approach" to international politics (Ibid. p.16). Politics among Nations written by the realist Hans J. Morgenthau in 1948 is a central book in the IR realist literature that dominated the IR theories for more than three decades and passed through seven editions, from 1948 to 2005 making its text the most long lasting one that the history of IR can attest. In our project we are using the 7th edition revised by Kenneth Thompson and David Clinton. The 2005 book in addition to the other editions brought some new perspectives on the classical realism relevance for the contemporary IR era. Some scholars maintain sceptical about the fact that the new perspectives, brought by Thompson and Clinton, do not respect the original concepts of Morgenthau. However, our approach is mainly based on the six principles of classical realism and we find this edition useful since it can offer without altering the 1948 text of
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Morgenthau about these principles, new leads in relating Morgenthaus concepts with the current context of the world of politics
4.3. Analytical Strategy

We will in the first part of our paper operationalize our theory and the concept of foreign policy to build an analytical platform from where we can analyse the documents describing the Russian and the EU foreign policy strategies and their goals this will give us the starting point for our comparative analysis of the two strategies that should make it possible to conclude whether the two strategies clash.
4.4. Operationalization of Foreign Policy Strategy

The literature of International Relations has provided many definitions of foreign policy as its complex nature is open for interpretation of what foreign policy actually is as a concept, as a phenomenon and as an area of study. In this project we treat foreign policy as a phenomenon and we understand it as the IR schools define it through their approaches. From this perspective, one can identify different interpretations of the foreign policy phenomenon dynamics as the schools of IR theory understand them through the different views on the world of politics. Therefore, the three main IR schools are assumed as being the key dynamics that are behind the foreign policy choices being the national security in realism, economic statecraft in liberalism, and normative foreign policy in constructivism (Smith et al. 2008, p. 8). The underlying forces that shape a countrys foreign policy (international influences, actors, objectives) and the development of the phenomenon itself, build the framework offered by the three types of international thinking in order to understand the foreign policy within the international system. In realism the main objective of the foreign policy is the state power, the actor that develops the foreign policy is the state, and the process is influenced within the international system by anarchy (Tsygankov 2006, p. 15). Kaukeleire and MacNaughtan in their 2008 book The foreign policy of the European Union define the foreign policy as: that area of politics which is directed at the external environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests, values and goals (Kaukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008, p. 19). Although the current international relations environment has become more complex, the one-sided understanding of a foreign policy of an actor is still the most commonly used lens in conceptualizing and recognizing the foreign policy (Ibid.). Therefore, in order to obtain a broad understanding of foreign policy, Kaukeleire and MacNaughtan make a distinction between conventional foreign policy defined by them as being oriented towards states,
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military security, crisis and conflicts(Kaukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008, p. 25) and the structural foreign policy to which the authors refers as being the foreign policy conducted over the longterm, seeks to influence or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security, and mental structures (Ibid.). While the conventional foreign policy can be described as a foreign policy through conventional means such as military power (also referred to as hard power), the structural foreign policy may be characterized by usage of development aid, structural funds and other monetary or otherwise beneficial agreements for the states (also referred to as soft power) (Ibid.). Hard power is mainly based on coercion and it represents a dominant dimension of foreign policy while the soft power shapes preferences and makes the other states want to obtain what the states using soft power plans to offer them-not a dominant dimension (Ibid., p. 23). This distinction made by Kaukeleire and MacNaughtan points out that even if they are not commonly used in IR research the non-dominant dimensions of foreign policy (such as soft power) have become increasingly important in conducting foreign policies and we cannot ignore them in our analytical approach (Ibid., p.20). These categorizations (structural and conventional foreign policy) will be used as a tool in determining the foreign policy strategies of the EU and Russia towards Ukraine, by supplying a framework for the foreign policy agreements. Continuing the list of distinctions, we also make a difference between the concept and the strategy of a foreign policy. We use the term foreign policy strategy in much the same way, as a term that describes the intended actions and goals of one state towards another. We distinguish between the foreign policy and the foreign policy strategy in the sense that we see the foreign policy strategy as a mainly theoretical object because we do not look into the implementation of these strategies. This means that when the foreign policy of the EU is to promote institution building in Ukraine we merely look at the goal of the strategy and the promise made to Ukraine, not the actual implementation where the actual institutional building is taking place. This can be done because we are not interested in the successfulness of the foreign policy strategies but only if the strategies and their goals clash.
4.5. Operationalization of Classical Realism

In this part we are going to operationalize our theory in a way that it can be used in the analysis of the foreign policy strategies of the EU and Russia towards Ukraine. The part of the theory that is best suited for this analysis is the claim of Morgenthau that consider states being selfish while seeking to achieve their national interest through maximization of power. The assumptions from
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classical realism that international politics is based on anarchy and that behaviour of states is guided by the human nature will be our framework. The above mentioned framework will be the basis of our analysis. However, we recognise these assumptions as being enough general and that an operationalization of these concepts is not necessary so far. Starting from classical theory we chose the maximization of power being the national interest as the main concept of our research. Following this, we derive from the theory several areas in which power can be obtained: Geography Trade / natural resources Military Population Quality of diplomacy We define geography as the power a state pursues a general geographical location or in a specific geographical particularities of another country. Trade/natural resources are defined as the search for power over or access to natural resources from another country and improve trade relations with another country to strengthen the economic power of the state. We define military as aiming to strengthen the military capabilities of the state through cooperation with another country or by taking over military facilities and units of another country. We define the power over population as influencing the population of another country in order to improve their position towards the state and its political system. Finally the quality of diplomacy is defined as the improvement of institutions and diplomatic relations between two countries facilitating the search of influence that makes it easier for the state to influence another country through diplomatic relations. The indication of a country seeking to increase its power within a specific area is that the country is either taking steps towards controlling or influencing that area or part of it. We are going to analyse the data presented in the descriptive part to see if we can find proof of pursuit of influence or power in the specified areas in any of the two foreign policy strategies. By doing this we will answer the first part of our problem formulation clarifying the foreign policy strategies of the EU and Russia. Furthermore, we will lay the ground for comparing the two foreign policy strategies seeking the answer to whether they clash or not.
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Classical realist theory claims that countries always seek to maximize power, so we assume that if both countries want to maximize their power in the same areas and in the same ways, than they clash. On the other hand if both countries are interested in a same area but in a different way a complete clash cannot be identified. Finally if one of the countries is not trying to get power in an area the other one is interested in, there is no clash at all.
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5. Foreign policy strategies

5.1. EU - Ukraine
Since Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, the EU has been seeking economic integration and political cooperation which is proven by the fact that the first top-level meeting between the President of the European Commission (EC) and the Ukrainian President took place already in 1992 (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine 2010). In 1994 the first agreement between the EU (composed of 12 member states) and Ukraine is signed, and the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (PCA) comes into force in 1998 as the second of nine agreements with Eastern European, Central Asian and Southern Caucasus countries. These partnerships with the new independent states promulgate the principles of democracy, international law and human rights and have the aim to favour political dialogue, trade and investments (European Commission 2007a). Ukraine signalled in 2003 that its aim is to become a member of the EU which was recognised by the EU who however prioritised the progressive integration of Ukraine into the internal market. The idea of a Neighbourhood Program (ENP), suggested by the Commission in 2003 to avoid "new dividing lines at the borders of the enlarged Union", (European Commission 2004, p. 3) developed into an important Foreign Policy tool to disperse stability, security and wealth. For Ukraine this meant that it had become a priority partner country as it is "the core interest of the EU to have an independent, politically stable and economically strong Ukraine as a (direct) neighbour". (Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine 2003, p.1) The ENP is implemented in the respective framework created by the PCAs. (European Commission 2007a) and lead to the establishment of a three year Action Plan creating common objectives to favour further economic integration. Another event showing the intention of Ukraine to deepen its democratic reform was the Orange Revolution end of 2004, where the population protested against corruption during the elections. This episode came to an end with the decision of the Supreme Court to re-vote and the result of Viktor Yushchenko, the pro-European candidate vaunting democracy, being the winner. This political change led to new foreign policy goals of Ukraine. Since then the approximation of Ukraine to Europe and its integration into European-Atlantic structures is of most priority. (BAFA 2010)
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In 2007 an overarching scheme for the period 2007-13 is listed in the Ukraine Country Strategy Paper (CSP) which specifically deals with the criteria and overall aims of the strategies. The EC conducted a review in 2008 of the EUs efforts in Ukraine and came to the result that the aims of this CSP are still relevant. This is due to the fact that institutional reforms are hard to pull through when a country is combating internal corruption and applying for loans from the IMF, the latter was necessary due to the financial crisis causing the deterioration of economic conditions. (European Commission 2010d, p. 4-6) A visa facilitation and readmission agreement entered into force in 2008 and shortly after this the negotiations of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and Ukraine started. These discussions that are still going on are favoured by the fact that Ukraine finally became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in that year. In 2009 the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda, replacing the Action Plan, was established smoothing the creation of the Association Agreement. The main aim of the Association Agenda, shaped by common principles, is to "help to consolidate democratic reforms,..., the fight against corruption as well as increasing citizens' participation in public decision-making in Ukraine" (Co-operation council 2009, p. 4) Furthermore, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative, which is built on and complementary to bilateral agreements, was launched. The EaP aims to integrate the eastern partner countries and the EU but also the partner countries among themselves and is in favour of continuing reforms. In the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit it is clarified as following "the Eastern Partnership will seek to support political and socio-economic reforms of the partner countries, facilitating approximation towards the European Union". (Council of the European Union 2009, p. 6) Ukraine joined the European Energy Community, after implementing an EU gas law. The accession condition for this organisation, liberalising the energy markets, is the implementation of legal acts in electricity, gas, environment and renewable energy. The Commissioner for Energy, Gnther Oettinger said: Ukraine will have access to a pan-European energy market, based on the principles of solidarity and transparency. For the Community, Ukraine is an important new member and security of supply further improved" (European Commission 2010b). The EU is, since the ending of the soviet period, seeking cooperation and integration in various areas with Ukraine. We will now have a deeper look at four main domains, which are mentioned in
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most of the agreements signed during the last decades with Ukraine: energy, visa migration, institutional reform and trade.
5.1.1. The energy foreign policy strategy of the EU towards Ukraine
Since the PCA was signed in 1998 the EU and Ukraine have signed a substantial amount of other agreements most of them have had energy as one of the focus areas. In many of the agreements there is a distinction between nuclear energy on the one side and other kinds of energy on the other. In nuclear energy the focus has mainly been on the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster and how to prevent future disasters like that. This is seen for an example in Article 62 of the PCA where one of the initiatives is a joint study of the scientific problems related to the accident at Chernobyl. Furthermore this is also seen in the Road Map for Nuclear Safety of Operating Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants in the Memorandum of Understanding - on co-operation in the field of energy between the European Union and Ukraine (EU-Ukraine 2005a, p. 9). The area of other kinds of energy like oil, gas and electricity has a few more different focuses the main three of them are the environment, security of supply, energy trade. The focus on the environment is seen in the PCA with the promotion of cooperation to lower the impact of energy production, supply and consumption on the environment, (EU-Ukraine 2003, p. 16) in the AP which aims on adopting action plans to improve energy efficiency and enhance renewable energy and also to cooperate on energy conservation papers.(EU-Ukraine 2005b, p. 56) This focus on the environment in connection with energy is continued in the road map in the Memorandum of Understanding where the EU and Ukraine recognises the importance of improving the environmental impact of coal combustion in Ukraine towards EU levels (EU-Ukraine 2005a, 3). The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Ukraine (NIP 2007-2011), relies mostly on the agreements from the EU-Ukraine in the energy area, but also adds the agreement to improve the energy efficiency of Ukraine and promoting renewable energy sources (European Commission 2007b, p. 14). Also in the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda the focus on the environment is continued with the agreement to exchange expertise in order to improve energy efficiency and renewable energy (Co-operation council 2009, p. 22). The European Neighbourhood and Partnership InstrumentUkraine (NIP 2011-2013) builds mostly on earlier agreements especially the EU-Ukraine, and focuses in the environmental area mostly on lowering the CO2 emissions, in Ukraine (European Commission 2010b, p. 19).
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Security of supply is also an issue that takes focus in the different agreements, in the PCA the parties agree to improve the quality and security of energy supply, (EU-Ukraine 2003, p. 16). In the AP some of the initiatives are both increasing the performance of the infrastructure and developing new infrastructure for diversification of oil and gas.(EU-Ukraine 2005b, p. 53) In the Memorandum of Understanding there is a Road map for enhancing the security of energy supplies and the transit of hydrocarbons where one of the agreements are that the EU and Ukraine shall create a joint EUUkraine Hydrocarbon Technical Support Group to advise on transit and supply issues.(EU-Ukraine 2005a, p. 8) The ENPI (CSP) specifies that Energy Security projects in Ukraine are of such an importance that projects dealing with energy infrastructure/network can in some case get special treatment for financing, the ENPI says that these projects can enjoy targeted interest rates, subsidies or other beneficial means of financing (European Commission 2007a, p. 14). In the List of EUUkraine Association Agenda priorities for 2010 one of the priorities is to fully implement the joint declaration of the investment conference on the rehabilitation and modernisation of the Ukrainian gas transit network of March 2009. (European Commission 2010b, p. 6) A focus on the security of supply is also found in The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Ukraine (NIP 2011-2013) where among other things they agreed on a support to Ukrainian gas purchase from Russia in order to secure the supply of energy resources to the Ukrainian and European costumers (European Commission 2010b, p. 19). The point of energy trade is also found in many of the agreements. The PCA is presenting an agreement to introduce institutional, legal, fiscal and other conditions necessary to encourage increased trade and investment of energy (EU-Ukraine 2003, p. 16). In the Memorandum of Understanding the Road map for integration of electricity and gas markets EU and Ukraine agreed to integrate the Ukrainian electricity and gas markets into the EUs internal energy market and to change the energy market structure of Ukraine to an open market (EU-Ukraine 2005a, p. 6). The EU-Ukraine Association Agenda also focuses on the integration of the energy markets especially with the agreement working towards the integration of the power system of Ukraine into the European electricity network. (Co-operation Council 2009, p. 22) in the newest agreement the List of the EU-Ukraine Association priorities for 2010 Ukraine and the EU agree to make the functioning of the Ukrainian market of natural gas be in line with the EC norms (European Commission, 2010b, p. 6).
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The agreements between the EU and Ukraine do not change their focus points much from the AC in 1998 to the List of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda priorities for 2010 agreed in 2010, the main change in the agreements has been the fact that the later agreements have more specific points than the earlier once but the main points of interest remains the same all the way through.
5.1.2. The trade foreign policy strategy of the EU towards Ukraine
One of the first major agreements between the EU and Ukraine was the PCA. The focus of trade in the PCA was manly on removing barriers like quantity restrictions and different kinds of import taxes and the agreement on the fact that goods have to be traded at marked related prices. Even though the PCA focuses on the liberalisation of trade between the EU and Ukraine, it is not an agreement of complete liberalisation, in fact there are still a few loopholes. For example Article 18 states that one party may take action if an imported product threatens to cause substantial injury to domestic producers. In that case it can be brought up in the Cooperation Committee that shall seek a solution acceptable for both parties, is that not possible within 30 day then the party that requested action be free to restrict import of the product as they wish. However the PCA does not deal with all kinds of goods for example Article 14 states that textiles are governed by a former treaty, Article 22 that coal and steel are not included and Article 23 states that nuclear materials shall be subject to a specific agreement between European Atomic Energy Community and Ukraine (EAEC) (EUUkraine 2003, p. 5-6). One of the new focus areas that emerges in the AP is the agreement to work towards preparing Ukraine for accession to the WTO, (EU-Ukraine 2005b, p.26) but the AP also keeps some of the focuses that were in the PCA like the removal of trade restrictions between the two parties (EUUkraine 2005b, p.31) and an agreement to work towards market prices for goods. Because of the more concrete agreements in the AP some of the trade related agreements in the AP are found outside the specific trade agreements like for an example in the agreement to facilitate trade through modernisation of sanitary and phytosanitary sectors (EU-Ukraine 2005b, p.32) or improving the judicial system to have, impartial and uniform review of administrative actions and appeal procedures for trade and investment issues.(EU-Ukraine 2005b, p.43) One of the exceptions from the PCA agreement was the steel and coal market, in the AP that is not the case anymore, the EU and Ukraine agreed on liberalisation of the steel market (EU-Ukraine 2005b, p.25). The promotion of trade is one of the sub-priorities of The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Ukraine (NIP 2007-2011), where some of the objectives are to facilitate trade and
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improve investment climate and thereby contributing to a process that will result in economic and social reform in such a way that Ukraine will gradually align with the EUs market and social standards (European Commission 2007b, p. 10). In the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Ukraine (CSP), the EC presents a priority to offer support for the process of market and regulatory reform in areas such as customs legislation, company law, technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment etc. (European Commission 2007a, p. 14) The EU-Ukraine Association Agenda deals with many different aspects of trade between the EU and Ukraine for an example the EU and Ukraine agreed to improve standardisation and technical regulation in Ukraine and to reduce trade barriers between the parties. (Co-operation Council 2009, p. 17) The EU-Ukraine Association Agenda also continue the focus on sanitary and phytosanitary measures with agreements like the one to improve animal health and welfare in Ukraine (Cooperation Council 2009, p. 17). To improve trade the parties have agreed on an effective dialogue regarding capital movements and payments, (Co-operation Council 2009, p. 18) and monitoring Ukrainian state aid to facilitate fair competition(Co-operation Council 2009, p. 18). As in both the PCA and the AP the parties agreed in the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to make free trade easier by removing different trade barriers by measures like improving the Ukrainian Customs legislation and establishing mechanisms for exchange of data about goods and vehicles (Co-operation Council 2009, p. 20-21). The focus on trade continues in the List of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda priorities for 2010, in this agreement again there is a focus on technical regulations with an agreement to develop Ukrainian legislation on technical regulation and standardisation among other things to remove trade barriers between the parties. Within the sanitary and phytosanitary measures in this agreement there is an agreement to develop a comprehensive strategy reform of areas like animal welfare (European Commission 2010a, p. 4). The List of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda priorities for 2010 also deals with the Ukrainian costumes service and exchange of information for goods and vehicles like the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda (European Commission 2010a, p. 5). In The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Ukraine (NIP 2011-2013) the focus on trade is mainly on the establishment of a free trade area that will make the trade relations
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between EU and Ukraine more stable and predictable through the approximation of areas such as technical regulations, competitions policy, customs etc. (European Commission, 2010a, p. 15).
5.1.3. Visa free travel
The promise of visa free travel is present in all the Ukraine-EU agreements since the collaboration begun. However little progress has been made towards realising it, partly due to a fear that it will cause massive migration flows to other European countries, but also because this is the main incentive the EU has to offer Ukraine in return for the reforms which the EU demands, apart from membership, which still seems unlikely to take place anytime soon (EurActiv & Reuters 2010). The areas of visa and migration are typically some of the most debated topics in the EU countries, and also the areas where the EU can offer strong incentives for the partnership countries to push through the, at times, very tough reforms the EU demand of its partner countries. Examples of such reforms could be anti-corruption measures, institutional and economic restructuring. In 2010 the EU Visa Code comes into force by the 22 member states of the EU and three associated states (inter alia Ukraine). This document "increases transparency, develops legal security and ensures equal treatment of applicants..." (Council of the European Union 2008) However it is supplementary to the Visa agreement signed with Ukraine in 2008. Currently Ukraine is the country in the EaP, which is the furthest along in the process towards getting a visa agreement with the EU, and Ukraine dropped the visa requirement for EU citizens in 2005. Ukraine is the non-EU country besides Russia that receives the most visas, which could be proof of a strong wish amongst the Ukrainian population to go to the EU, hence why the EU is reluctant to grant Ukraine further visa liberalisation (see Table 2, Appendix A.2.) (EurActiv & Reuters 2010). Ukraine getting a free visa agreement still remains doubtful, although it is a stated aim in the previously mentioned priorities for action: (The EU will) actively pursue the visa dialogue, developing the relevant conditions, with the longterm perspective of establishing a visa-free regime between the EU and Ukraine, as agreed at the EU-Ukraine Paris Summit of September 2008 with special attention to issues such as document security, illegal migration including readmission, public order and security, and external relations. (European Commission 2010a, p. 3)
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5.1.4. Institutional reform
In the previously mentioned AP agreed by the EU-Ukraine, the matter of institution building is very broad. It ranges from Ensure(ing) democratic conduct of presidential (2004) and parliamentary (2006) elections, in accordance with OSCE standards and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, including on the media; to Continue administrative reform and strengthening of local selfgovernment, through appropriate legislation, in line with those standards, contained in the European Charter on Local Self Government (EU-Ukraine 2005b, p.5). The first phase of the previously mentioned CSP, the NIPs (2007-2010) that comes to an end this year, had as its aims to improve public finance management, transparency in government and public accountability (mainly corruption issues), and both concretises and develops the goals of the AP (European Commission 2007b). Examples of these programmes could be the Support to Good Governance: paper against corruption in Ukraine which is a training seminar of corruption detection and investigation of corruption offences which was held with Ukrainian police officers, or the Regulatory and Legal Strengthening of Energy Regulation in the National Electricity Regulatory Commission of Ukraine (NERC) which was the first completed official EU Twinning programme in Ukraine (Twinning 2010). The institutional reform scheme, which the EU launched in the framework of the EaP in 2008 is called the Comprehensive Institution Building Programme (CIB) and is scheduled to take effect in 2011 with the second phase of the NIP. It has an additional sum of Euro 175 million to be used in aligning the Ukrainian institutions with European standards and the principles of good democratic governance (European Commission 2010c, p. 3). It is stated in the agreement that the CIB demands are a prerequisite for any talks on visa liberalisation, making this the pivotal demand towards Ukraine. The new step towards increasing the institution-building with the CIB was also welcomed by the EP in the 2009 review of the ENPI (European Parliament 2009), following a critique that the Commission was not giving sufficient incentives to push these strenuous reforms through. The CIB is carried out by the EU institution-building tool by the name of Twinning, which historically has been used as the implementing tool for almost all EU institution building programmes. The name is derived from the policy implementation ideology which is to twin the European model in partner countries through development programmes. In the Twinning tool Ukraine is in the relatively new group (2005) of countries that were named the Tacis or Newly Independent States.
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The demands set for Ukraine through the CIB are, on top of those from the first phase of the NIP, improvements within administration of justice and human rights which suggests that some progress has been made in turning an out-dated soviet system into a European looking institutional framework, but that there is a long way to go (European Commission 2007b).
5.2. Russia - Ukraine

To understand the relationship between Russia and Ukraine one has to go many years back in time because Ukraine was already in the 17th century part of Russia guaranteeing protection to part of the Ukrainian lands. After a short period of independence in the 20th century Ukraine became a member country of the Soviet Union. This shows that, although Ukraine has been an independent state since 1991, it has a common history with Russia exercising power during many years to that territory. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 2010a) In 1991 the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created, an international body based on sovereign equality, by Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. As the foreign ministry explains "During the first years of the countrys independence its main foreign policy priorities were directed at winning international recognition of Ukraine explains the Ministry of foreign affairs of Ukraine and continues establishing equal relations with other countries, first of all, with the former Soviet republics as well as with neighbouring states and the most powerful nations in the world." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 2010b) Russia wants to deepen the cooperation with the CIS members, the latter however have no unanimous position towards this, especially Ukraine is opposed to further integration. However, in 1993, the Heads of the CIS States signed an Agreement forming an Economic Union based on free movement, coordinated policies and favouring direct production relations (Statistical committee of the CIS 2010). Further agreements were signed by most of the members to deepen integration, so did Ukraine by signing in 2003 an Agreement on Formation of Common Economic Space (CES). In 1997 Russia and Ukraine signed the "Peace & Friendship" treaty recognising that Sevastopol belongs to Ukraine. This former soviet military base at the black sea was divided between Russia and Ukraine and can be identified as a potential source of trouble between the two countries because it is a base for a foreign state on the Ukrainian territory. One major topic between Russia and Ukraine is energy, especially the Ukrainian-Russian gas relationship. The contracts related to this domain are signed between two companies Gazprom and
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Naftogaz but have however big national relevance. The two companies were disputing on various occasions which led to a cut of gas supply by Russia. In 2008 one of these conflicts lead to the fact that the gas supply to EU member states was blocked, that lead to a loss of 30 per cent of EUs gas imports (Gas Coordination Group 2009, p.1). The Gas Coordination Group, chaired by the EC, reacted on this gas supply crisis and discussed with both parties to reach a solution of the problem. The two companies have agreed in 2009 on an 11year contract respecting a commonly agreed European formula that is defining the price. This long term contract should guarantee that "that the situation with the termination of gas transit via Ukraine to European consumers will never repeat."(Gazprom 2009) As we can see the relationship between Russia and Ukraine depends a lot on some specific topics, especially energy, trade, visa and defence are important areas. This is why we are going to analyse those topics more in debt in the following part.
5.2.1. Trade as a strategic sector of Russian Economy
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991 the economic transition period had many effects on Russian trade: the volume decreased drastically (the key exports oil and arms declined sharply until 1994), the geographically distribution of Russias exports changed completely (the trade with Western Europe grow continuously reaching in 1994, 36 per cent of Russias exports), and the trade ratio with the ex-soviet states went down to 17 per cent from the total Russian trade in 1995 from 59 per cent in 1991 (Curtis 1996). Recognizing the need to formulate a different vision in foreign policy in the next years Russia started to build an area of economic unity with its major trade partners from the ex-soviet sphere through Union of Russia and Belarus (1997) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (see Table 3 Appendix A.2.). The commitments mentioned in the CIS Economic Union agreement were: 1) the execution of a number of agreements and protocols directed at creation of envisioned customs union; 2) the execution of a free trade agreement (SES); 3) the execution of certain labour market agreements (The Chinese university of Hong Kong, 2010). The 1993s agreement between Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic (CISFTA) was the first step in establishing an Economic Union. Trade barriers are abolished and it applies for all goods originated in a member state that is exported to another member states. From the CIS countries Ukraine is the largest trade partner for Russia (see Table 4 Appendix A.2.) and the trade policy towards this
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country is mainly driven in accordance with Russias vision on its so-called natural sphere of influence. Russias trade policy towards Ukraine is currently conditioned by three types of demands: Firstly the Ukraine should stay out of the organisations against Russia controlled by the US (e.g. NATO); secondly Ukraine should maintain good conditions for the Russian naval base in Sevastopol before and even after 2042 (when the current agreement expires); thirdly Ukraine should let Russia to secure control on its key industrial assets such as steel and aviation industries (Burkovsky & Haran, 2010, p. 217). On 31 May 1997 the two states signed in Kiev, The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership which was meant to gain Ukrainian confidence by becoming strategic partners and to strengthen the relations between the two slavish states. The Treaty established a model of economic collaboration between Russia and Ukraine that should be constructed on the basis of equal rights partnership sharing mutual respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders (RussiaUkraine 1998). The new model of cooperation is based on the principle that a good neighbourhood relationship represents an important factor to increase security and stability in Europe. The treaty includes a joint statement on the Black Sea fleet that will permit Russia to operate in Ukraine in the return of cutting off Ukraines debt (mostly money owned for oil), and it ensures the people from Sevastopol - the city that houses Russian fleet, that this place will not become a Russian military annex (Specter 1997). Another integration attempt was made in 2003, when Russia signed with its three main trade partners, the ex-soviet republics, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan an agreement on establishing the Common Economic Zone. Ukraine accepted to join the Agreement on the Establishment of a Single Economic Space (SES) only if the formation and the functioning of the free zone will be made in accordance with the framework of Ukrainian Constitution. Moreover, Ukraine status as a SES member is only formal, mainly because of the incompatibilities in implementing the agreements on free trade (the provisions of the agreement and the concept of establishment faces the incapability of implementation in Ukraine) (Pylypenko 1997, p. 130). This is because on one hand, Russia blocks the establishment of a Free Trade Zone within the borders of CIS, on the other, the pre-entry reforms in WTO (improving efficiency and increase production) are incompatible with SES reforms (dependency on Russian oil and gas, single currency) and it complicates Ukrainian entry into WTO.
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The Program for Russians economic cooperation with Ukraine for 2007, a bilateral agreement that was signed annually in order to agree on a list of products and the volumes that are going to be supplied in between the parties. In the Agreement on Cooperation in Production was signed every year on different products but mainly on products with higher added value, namely metal products, engineering products, foodstuffs and chemical products. This four category of products represented in 2004, 90 per cent of Ukrainian exports to Russia (Grytsenko 2009). In the period 2000-2004 the intensified economic relations between Russia and Ukraine had a notable political dimension on Russia since Ukraine announced its intention to participate in the regional integration plan (EurAsEC, SES) (Ibid.). It became more than common knowledge the Russian political influence in Ukraine. The economic interdependence between Russia and Ukraine was constantly maintained by the Russian political vector. Relations with Ukraine offered something for everyone in the Russian foreign policy elite: economic priorities for advocates of the liberal agenda, security objectives for great power ideologists and supporters of an independent foreign policy line, and a pan-Slavism for believers in a CIS-first outlook. (Lo 2002, p. 81). Concluding through this assumption it becomes easier to understand the various efforts the two states made to establish bilateral relations in spite of the rich history full of conflicts and trade disputes they share. Even so, the problem of Russian interference was constantly debated and after the Orange Revolution, which Russia could not prevent, Ukrainian authorities started to find ways to prevent the future attempts of Russias direct political intervention.
5.2.2. Russias Energy Strategy
Energy is set to remain one of the key themes in European Policy and Russian oil and natural gas industries play a major role in the European energy market. Russia holds the world's largest natural gas reserves, the second largest coal reserves, and the eighth largest oil reserves. Russia is also the world's largest exporter of natural gas and the second largest oil exporter (Energy Information Administration 2006). Given its position as a leader in supplying natural gas, the Russian energy strategy is oriented towards maintaining the created dependencies on energy consumption and raising the security of energy assets for countries in Central and Eastern Europe (see Table 5 Appendix A.2.). This type of dependence can create vulnerability for countries with which Russia established one-way
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relationships. Being a critical access point for Russias oil and gas to Europe, but also a major energy consumer, Ukraine is one of the most vulnerable countries to the Russian domination of the energy market. The pipelines from Ukraine carried 22 per cent from Russias oil exports to Europe, according to a 2006 paper of the International Energy Agency and 84 per cent of Russias natural gas exports and 14 per cent of Russian oil exports pass through Ukraine (Ibid.). Russias energy policy may use Ukrainian energy dependency to interfere in its domestic affairs or to pressure the strategic partner to make foreign policy concessions. The most recent from the many examples that history can present is that after the elections from 2004, when a pro-western president was elected, Gazprom raised energy prices to Ukraine. When Ukraine refused to pay its debts (mostly money for the oil), Gazprom cut off its gas supplies (Kondrat 2006). As a consequence, the trust relationship between the two countries degraded in the last years mainly because of the gas price disputes. The most significant measure Ukraine took in order to reduce its vulnerability was signing long term bilateral gas and oil supply and conditions of transit agreements with the Russian state-controlled company Gazprom such as the 1992-2000 Agreements of strategic cooperation (SCAs) in the gas and oil sector. Even though during the years the number of agreements that the two countries signed proves that none of the initial agreements were respected from both sides. The two countries had several disputes that moreover affected the other European countries that rely on the gas exported by Russia through Ukraine. In 2006 because of Ukraines refusal to seal a gas supply gas contract over 2006, Russia suspended gas shipments to Ukraine. After four days the Ukrainian company, NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy finally settled their surrounding cooperation with the Russian Gazprom agreeing on a fixed price of 230 US dollar per 1000m3 if Ukraine can ensure uninterrupted gas transit via its territory. The Gas transit contract was signed on 4 January 2006 and the under market prices for gas and transit were established for a five years period (ITAR-TASS 2008) In 2008, Ukraine fails to pay its 2 billion US dollar as debt to Russia, and a new gas crisis starts; this time the crisis is most evenly shared between the two countries since Gazprom made their specific aims and strategy more visible: If Ukraine agrees to transfer to market prices then the gas price starting from January 1, 2009 will be amount to 418 US dollar per 1,000m3 (Gazprom, 2008). Gazprom is supplying gas to Ukraine at 179.5 US dollar per 1,000m3. The debt of Ukraines Naftogaz Ukrainy (Oil and Gas of Ukraine) for gas supplied in November and December is 2.118 billion US dollar with fines (Ibid.). After several negotiations, on 2 October 2008 the two countries
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sign the Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of Cooperation in the gas sector: One of the key provisions of the Memorandum is a possibility to transfer to direct long-term relations between Gazprom and NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy, starting from January 1, 2009 (Gazprom, 2008). Through this contract Russia reserves the right to sell 7.5 billion m3 per year of gas directly to ultimate Ukrainian consumer. The Memorandum confirms the intention to establish mutually agreed prices for Ukraine and tariffs for gas transit. The two energy operators from Russia and Ukraine, Gazprom and NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy, signed an agreement. The principles of long-term cooperation in gas sector respecting the lines of the Memorandum and adding the following: * * * * Naftogaz debts owed to RUE would be converted into a debt to Gazprom; A long-term contract, providing for the three-year transition to market, economically based and mutually agreed gas prices was to be signed by 1 November 2008; Naftogazs guarantee of reliable and uninterrupted transit would apply to volumes of at least 120 bcm/year; That a two-month supply contract would be concluded by 30 October 2008 for Central Asian gas to be supplied by Gazprom to Naftogaz at $179.50/mcm (implying that the intermediary RUE and the trader UkrgazEnergo would be removed from the import business immediately); * That the January 2006 agreements would be annulled as soon as the conditions of this agreement were met. (Yeremenko as quoted by Pirani et al. 2009, p.14) In order to start a new era of cooperation as strategic partners, in the recent bilateral agreement signed on 21 April 2010, the two countries agreed on a discount of 30 per cent in price of natural gas sold to Ukraine in exchange of Russian naval base extension in the port of Sevastopol, Ukraine for 25 years (Watson & Tkachenko, 2010).
5.2.3. Black Sea Defence
After the breakup of the USSR, most of Russias military resources and combat equipment were still placed in Ukraine. In addition to this, The Black Sea Fleet and its supporting infrastructure was stationed in Crimea, autonomous region of Ukraine.(Kessler Jr. 2001, p.11). Out of the 26 Black Sea ports that belonged to the Soviet Union, 19 of them, including the important port of Sevastopol, became Ukraines assets after the partition of the USSR. However, over the years, the BSF strategic value and power has decreased severely. Firstly, the fleet has become very old and out-dated and secondly its combat capabilities are limited. Thirdly, the BSF would hardly have any
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power in a serious conflict. Should a conflict between Russia and NATO arise, Turkey could prevent Russian ships from entering the Mediterranean, in which case the BSF could only attack Turkey, Romania or Bulgaria (Gorenburg 2010). Nonetheless, the BSF has a great symbolic significance both for Russia and Ukraine. As Leonid Radzikhovsky affirms, the BSF is a prestige fleet or a PR flotilla for both states. While for Russia the BSF represents a symbol of its past greatness, for Ukraine it symbolizes independence from Russia. Moreover, the present location of the BSF in Sevastopol is very advantageous for Russia. Basing the BSF in Sevastopol absolves Russia from the concern of finding another location and spending large sums of money in order to sustain the expenses of the fleet in Novorossiisk or elsewhere. Not only that Novorossiisk is less central than Sevastopol in the Black Sea, but it also has a poor climate and a limited space for military ships (Ibid). Furthermore, the BSF has proved its military importance in the region, during the Georgian War in August 2008. The BSF ships have offered naval support for the Russian ground forces and it was available for transporting refugees out of the conflict zone (Gorenburg 2009). These are the main reasons why Russia was and still is very interested in leasing the port of Sevastopol. After 5 years of diplomatic negotiations, on 28 May 1997 the prime ministers of Russia and Ukraine sign the Black Sea Fleet Agreement. By this the two countries split the Black Sea Fleet fifty-fifty and Russia leases the port of Sevastopol for twenty years and Russia agreed to credit Ukraine with 526 million US dollar, a sum that would make up for a part of Ukraines debt to Russia of 3 billion US dollar. According to the above mentioned agreement, Crimea and implicitly Sevastopol legally become a sovereign part of Ukraine (Felgenhauer 1999, p.1). The Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Agreement aimed to reconcile both states interests .Ukraines main purpose was to maintain independence from Russia and sovereignty over Crimea and Sevastopol. On the other hand, Russias main goal was to gain a permanent base for their ships and to gain control over this naval base in order to reaffirm its symbolic authority in relation with Turkey, the Caucasus and the future Caspian oil flows (Felgenhauer 1999, p.2). Both parties won something through this agreement Russia acquired ships and the right to base them, and Ukraines fleet was financially backed up by the Russians. As Tyler Felgenhauer states in the case study Ukraine, Russia and the Black Sea Fleet Accords, the BSF negotiations focused on three main topics: the division of the warships into a truncated
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Russian BSF and a Ukrainian navy, Russian naval basing rights in Sevastopol and the question of ultimate sovereignty over the peninsula. The issue of the ships, vessels and other assets was never a key aspect of the negotiations and it was approached only during the late talks. Housing thousands of Russian sailors, officers and their families in Sevastopol was, instead, an important aspect of the debate (Felgenhauer 1999, p.3). All the BSF negotiations revolved around the status of the Crimean peninsula, which was always marked by ethnic tensions due to its large Russian population. In spite of the tensions in the area and of Russias desire to annex this territory, Crimean and Ukrainian parliaments decided in July 1992 that Crimea remain under Ukrainian jurisdiction but still retain economic and cultural autonomy (Felgenhauer 1999, p. 4). The dispute over Crimea and particularly Sevastopol began in January 1992 when Russia claimed 100 per cent ownership over the entire BSF and sovereignty over Sevastopol. By April the tensions between the two states reached a serious crisis as each of them started threatening the other with the use of military force. In the end, the presidents of the countries Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk decided to resolve the dispute in a peaceful manner by forming a commission which would negotiate the division of the BSF between the two states. By the end of April 1992, the establishment of a moratorium and a joint commission monitoring the moratorium was agreed upon by both states (Felgenhauer 1999, p.5). On June 23rd 1992, the two states negotiated the Dagomys Agreement. After a series of incidents, the two countries had several meetings in Sevastopol during which Russia suggested splitting the BSF ships 80:20 in favour of Russia and then 60:40, both of which suggestions were rejected by Ukraine. The Ukrainian official response reflected that they were not willing to make any compromise: Everything stationed or deployed on [Ukraines] territory must belong to Ukraine. The Russian Fleet may only temporarily and by mutual agreement be based on Ukrainian territory (Felgenhauer 1999, p.7). A few months later, on 2 August 1992 Yeltsin and Kravchuk signed the Yalta Agreement which was presumably equally favourable for both sides (Felgenhauer 1999, p.7). According to the Yalta Agreement the BSF would be placed under joint control of Ukraine and Russia and the two governments were to have equal authority over the appointment and dismissal of the fleets top officers. Regarding the period of the joint control, they agreed upon a period of three
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years, after which a different agreement would be adopted. The division of the fleet during the interval was not strictly established. An essential component of the Yalta Agreement stated the abolishment of Russian sailors oaths of allegiance towards Ukrainian government. The question of whether to consider the fleet a nuclear force was problematic as it was unclear how many, if any, nuclear forces were stored at the fleets bases. Admiral Felix Gromov, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian navy declared that the tensions between the two countries and the respective ministries of defence was lifted and denied that Ukraines participation in the joint command made it a nuclear power. Moreover, Lt. General Valery Manilov, press secretary to the CIS Joint Armed Forces responded to the Yalta Accords as follows: At long last an accord on the BSF has been reached The possibility has emerged of settling the partition in a civilized manner within three years. Within this period both Russia and Ukraine can work out what kind of fleet they need. For the present, the tension among the officers corps and the inhabitants of Sevastopol has been lifted (Felgenhauer 1999, p.8). Because of Russian BSF commander Admiral Kasatonovs resistance towards the Ukrainian attempt of possessing a navy high school in Sevastopol, Ukraine sent a note of protest to Russia and on 31 March 1993, Ukraines Ministry of Defence issued a statement by which it was analysing proposals concerning the invalidation of the Yalta deal. Ukraines Ministry of Defence accused Russian Ministry of Defence of constant violations of bilateral accords. Ukraine Ministry of Defence even claimed that Ukrainian funding of the joint-command had paid for Russian interests and uses. The Russian nationalists have always considered the fleet and its bases in Sevastopol as being completely Russian. One of the greatest supporters of this idea was Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi. Rutskoi was never in favour of splitting up the BSF and as a consequence, it was unlikely that the deal of splitting it would ever be approved by both parliaments and put into practice. The Black Sea Fleet relations were aggravated by the Odessa incident (8 April 1994), an important conflict that occurred during the spring of 1994 between the two countries. A Russian research ship departed from the Ukrainian port of Odessa with 10 million US dollar worth of equipment which was considered as an act of piracy by the Ukrainians (Felgenhauer 1999, p. 12). In response to the
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incident, the following night Ukrainian commandos arrested three Russian officers involved in the Odessa incident and brutalized some Russian sailors and their families. The Russian and Ukrainian Defence Ministries were assigned to stop the incidents and calm the relations between the two parties. On 12 April 1994 the two sides resumed the talks and started with the proposal of giving Russia most of the BSF and leasing a naval base on Ukrainian territory. The document was signed by Yeltsin and Kravchuk after a CIS summit meeting in Moscow. The parties decided to divide up the personnel, ships, bases and other assets within no more than 10 days and also to give Russia a nominal 80-85 per cent ownership of the BSF in exchange of a compensation for Ukraine (Felgenhauer, 1999, p13). In spite of the pessimism concerning the efficiency of this document, this was the only time Kravchuk agreed to lease one Ukrainian naval port Sevastopol to Russia on the grounds that thousands of Russian officers and their families lived in Sevastopol. Not only the above mentioned reason was taken into account by the Ukrainian side, but also the financial aspect, namely the fact that Ukraine owed Russia more than 3.2 billion US dollar for oil and gas (Felgenhauer 1999, p.13). This document truly mitigated the most profound conflict between Ukraine and Russia but Russia refused to sign it before the elections. One of the most important agreements in the BSF talks was The Radisson (Sochi) Agreement. Very important names from both sides attended the meetings, such as Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, the naval commanders from each country and the respective foreign ministers. They decided splitting the fleet, Russia buying 81.7 per cent of all the vessels, leaving 18.3 per cent to Ukraine. Russia could continue using the base at Sevastopol, but for this it had to pay rent to Ukraine, in the form of energy supplies mainly. Ukraine was also allowed to use other parts of Sevastopols large base for its small fleet (Felgenhauer 1999, p.17). The Union of Officers of Ukraine asked for the abolition of the Sochi BSF accord and accused Kuchma of submission to Yeltsins orders. Consequently, Sochi BSF accord had failed but the authorities denied this fact. In September 1995, the Ukrainian parliament speaker argued that there was no stalemate in the negotiations (Felgenhauer 1999, p.18). The foreign minister of Russia Andrei Kozyrev and his Ukrainian counterpart Grennady Ukovenko met in October 1995 but the negotiations did not move much further. They agreed upon issuing a joint communiqu. The relation between the two states worsened when Russias newly-appointed chief security official,
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former presidential candidate and general demagogue Alexander Lebed started predicating that Sevastopol was and always will be a Russian city and that it had not officially been presented as a gift in 1956. Lebeds actions and his open letter to the BSF newspaper might have affected the next meeting of the two heads of state. The final BSF accords were signed in Kiev on the 28 May 1997 and acoording to this final accord, Ukraine agreed to join operational-strategic exercises with the Russian BSF (Felgenhauer 1999, p. 21). The Black Sea Fleet Deal is still a key issue in the external relations of Russia and Ukraine nowadays. On 27 April 2010, the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) ratified the Kharkiv agreement that prolongs Russian lease over the Black Sea Fleet for 25 additional years. The agreement was reached after two months of negotiations between Ukrainian President Viktor Yanuchovich and his Russian counterpart in Kharkiv (Ukraine), and it also incorporated an agreement regarding the cutting down of prices for natural gas that Ukraine buys from Russia as it was stated in the online magazine Suite 101.
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6. Analysis
6.1. EU
6.1.1. Geography
We have defined the geography in Classical Realism as when a state pursues power through the geographic location or a special geographic particularity of another country. As described before Ukraine is one of the largest countries in Europa and borders the EU on its western border. One can therefore argue that this geographic location of Ukraine makes Ukraine very interesting for the EU in its attempt to secure its eastern borders. In the agreements we see that the EU is trying to insure a democratic progress in Ukraine e.g. in the 2004 and 2006 elections in Ukraine. This can be seen as a strategy to stabilize Ukraine and thereby secure the EU. This same strategy, we can also assume, is part of the program called Support to Good Governance that aims to combat corruption in Ukraine and thereby stabilize and reduce crime in Ukraine. These initiatives can be seen as an attempt from the EU to increasing its power by securing its outer borders. We also understand that the EU is interested in the geographic location of Ukraine in connection with the energy trade from Russia to the EU, since a large part of the energy imported from Russia goes through Ukraine. In this case it is difficult to say that the EU wants to increase its power in this specific area, because the EU is dependent the energy transfer from Ukraine. So, it can be argued that the EU is instead interested in, decreasing the loss of power over its energy supply. This can e.g. be seen in the agreements where the EU and Ukraine agrees to improve the efficiency of the energy infrastructure in Ukraine. These strategies show that t-he EU is very interested in Ukraine because of the geographic location of the country and are trying to use it in its favour, and by doing so increasing its the power and security.
6.1.2. Natural resources & Trade
The natural resources and trade we have defined as the state seeking access or supremacy over natural resources of another country and strengthening its economic power through trade with another country. For the EU natural resources and trade are very important areas in their foreign policy strategy towards Ukraine. The areas have three important areas: security of gas supply, trade (especially coal and steel) and environmental awareness. Ukrainian gas infrastructure is a crucial area for the EU due to the issue of security of supply of gas from Russia, as a lot of European countries are dependent on stabile deliveries of Russian gas
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through Ukraine. This can be seen in multiple places in the description of the EU foreign policy strategy where the EU and Ukraine agree on improving security of the supply of energy and on developing new infrastructure for oil and gas. This is also emphasised by the 2005 MoU securing the integration of the Ukrainian gas and electricity networks to the EU in order to allow smooth energy trade between the two parties. This effort needed significant EU investment in the Ukrainian infrastructure. When we look at the agreements, especially the MoU, we can also identify that the EU and Ukraine are agreeing on plans to improve the energy efficiency and promote renewable energy in Ukraine. This is not something that gives the EU a direct power gain in Ukraine but it can be seen as an attempt from the EU to make Ukraine less dependent on Russian energy and thereby make it easier for Ukraine to align itself with the EU. Furthermore from a trade perspective, this could lead to a dependence of Ukraine on technology from the EU. The second area is trade, especially coal and steel trade between the EU and Ukraine. The EU hesitated with allowing Ukraine full tariff-free access to the European market, but finally granted it, after considerable changes in the functioning and build-up of the Ukrainian internal market. As we show in the description of the EU foreign policy strategy the agreements have many initiatives that are meant to remove trade barriers like e.g. in the PCA where the parties agree to remove like quality restrictions and import taxes. However we find also less direct measures, like for example in the AP where they agree to improve the judicial system to secure more uniform administrative actions and appeal procedures or the agreement to work towards market prices for goods and the agreement to modernize the sanitary and phytosanitary sectors. Furthermore the NIP (2007-2011) has as objective to improve the investment climate in Ukraine is also a sign that the EU is trying to improve its trade with Ukraine. These agreements give a picture of the EU trying to improve its power trough trade by giving Ukrainian raw materials easier access to the marked in the EU and by opening the Ukrainian market to goods produced in the EU and thereby facilitating growth in the EU. As seen from the examples above there is a clear sign that the EU is trying to improve its power through both a better access to the natural resources coming from Ukraine and by improving the trade relations.
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6.1.3. Military
We define the military aspect in Classical Realism as an intention to increase power trough military as trying to strengthen the state through cooperation with another country or by taking over military units or facilities in another country. The EUs military interest in Ukraine is very limited according to the agreements which focus more on structural type of foreign policy than conventional foreign policy. This is due to the fact that the conventional foreign policy at the European level is underdeveloped to the point that no common army has been made nor has any coherent EU level strategy been presented. We have therefore not found prove that the EU is trying to increase its power through military.
6.1.4. Population
In the operationalization we describe the search of power through population as the state trying to give the population of another country a more positive image of the state and its political system. In the case of the EU foreign policy in Ukraine this strategy can be seen in both the part about visa free travel and the one about institutional reform. In the visa free travel we can speculate that the EU has many different goals with the strategy of negotiating with and indicating to Ukraine that they will in the future be able to get visa free travel to the EU. Among these goals we find that it is very possible that the EU is trying to improve the image in the general Ukrainian population by showing that they are regarded as such an important partner that they can receive the benefit of visa free travel into the EU. A more direct approach for improving the image and thereby the power the EU in Ukraine is seen in the institutional reforms where the EUs strategy involves the reduction of poverty, the improvement of health and education systems, and the improvement of worker health and safety. In the institutional reform is also mentioned the agreement to insure that the elections in 2004 and 2006 should be conducted in a democratic manner including the media. This shows the population of Ukraine that the EU is prepared to improve the democracy and the freedom of the press in Ukraine and by doing that furthering their influence in their own country. In the institutional reforms part further initiatives are described that can among other things improve the image of the EU, especially the agreement to improve the transparency of the Ukrainian government and the battling of corruption. These initiatives, like the agreements about the elections, are showing an interest in improving democracy in Ukraine, which would be beneficial for the population. All these agreements show that part of the EUs foreign policy strategy in Ukraine is to make initiatives that will have a positive effect on the general Ukrainian population and can thereby
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indicate that the EU are committed to improve the daily life for the Ukrainians and make the EU a more interesting alternative for alignment. In a classical realist perspective this shows that the EU is trying to improve the power and thereby the security of the state by forging a more positive image of the EU in the Ukrainian population.
6.1.5. Quality of diplomacy
In the operationalization we define quality of diplomacy as the states enhancing its influence in another country by improving the diplomatic tools that are used for political discussions and cooperation between the parties. In the description of the EUs foreign policy toward Ukraine we can find multiple examples of agreements to both the building of diplomatic institutions and other ways improving the diplomatic link between the EU and Ukraine. First of all the agreements explained in the descriptive chapter are both a tool by themselves and a product of these tools, because without diplomacy of good quality agreements like these would not be possible and at the same time some of the initiatives within the agreements are focused on the improvement of diplomacy. An example of these improvements can be the Cooperation Committee which is mentioned in the PCA and can be used for mediating in disagreements about trade. By setting up such an institution the quality of diplomacy is improved between the parties and thereby increasing the power of the EU regarding internal affairs in Ukraine. The same kind of improvement of the quality of diplomacy is also seen in the agreement to make nuclear material subject to a specific agreement between the EAEC and Ukraine. That agreement can be seen as an establishment of a framework of diplomacy where the EU will gain influence in the decision-making process concerning nuclear materials in Ukraine. Larger frameworks such as the ENP and EaP can also be seen as tools for improving the quality of diplomacy between the parties and improving the power of the EU because that gives the EU influence on some of the socio-economic reform initiatives taken in Ukraine. More specifically this can be seen in initiatives like the CIB and the Twinning tool that is part of the EaP that is aimed at aligning the Ukrainian institutions of Ukraine with those of the EU. First of all this shows the influence the EU has got through the diplomatic connections but also it can be seen as furthering the improvement of the quality of diplomacy between the two parties as the communication between institutions that work by the same standards will be easier. From all the examples of the EU trying to improve the quality of diplomacy towards Ukraine that we stated, it could be argued that the EU sees this as a basis for the rest of the foreign policy strategy towards Ukraine. This argument is based on the fact that the establishment of frameworks for diplomacy can be seen in most of the areas where there are political communications between
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the two parties and that these are very comprehensive. Therefore it is very likely that the EU is trying to improve its power in Ukraine through the establishment of quality diplomacy.
6.2. Russia
6.2.1. Geography
As presented in the operationalization of classical realism we define geography as the pursuit of power from the geographic location or the geographic specifics of another country. This can be mainly observed in the description of the Russian foreign policy in two places. The first is illustrated in the situation of transferring energy from Russia to the EU across the Ukrainian territory. As it can be perceived in the several strategic cooperation agreements in gas sector, especially those discussing the conditions of transferring gas and oil through Ukrainian territory, Russia is trying to gain as much control as possible over the Ukrainian infrastructure. The Russian interest in this infrastructure used to transfer energy from Russia to the EU can e.g. be seen in the agreement between Gazprom and NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy stating the obligation of the Ukrainian Naftogaz to guarantee a reliable and uninterrupted transit of gas through Ukraine. Even if this agreement might have been successful, historically other attempts to secure the gas flow have been less successful. This is for example the case for the SACs that ended up not being respected by the two parties and resulted in Russia cutting off gas once to Ukraine and once to Ukraine and the rest of the countries from the EU. This shows that Russia is trying to use the geographic location of Ukraine to its advantage but the success of the strategy can be argued not to have been great. The geographic aspect can also be noticed in several agreements the two states signed trying to solve the BSF issues in Sevastopol. This is clearer illustrated in the case of the several disputes over the Crimea peninsula that belongs to Ukraine but it has a large ethnic Russian population a legacy of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, Russia always wished and formally required since 1992 sovereignty over Sevastopol, a Crimean city. This position of Russia is also demonstrated by the former Russian presidential candidate, Alexander Lebed who expressed publically in 1995 that Sevastopol always was and always will be a Russian city. The Dagomys (1992), Yalta (1992) Sochi (1995) and Kharkov (2010) agreements present the several attempts of the two states to split the base of Sevastopol between them. Finally they ended up by the Russian Black Sea fleet renting the base in Sevastopol until 2042 in return of according preferential prices on gas and oil to Ukraine. In connection with our definition of the aspect of geography in our operationalization this can be seen as a foreign policy strategy that aims to gain power over a specific geographic
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particularity in Ukraine. In this context it has to be mentioned though that this strategy has not been successful since, through the many years of negotiations, Russia has only managed to obtain a leasing agreement of the BSF and the naval base in Sevastopol.
6.2.2. Trade & natural resources
In the operationalization of classical realism we define trade and natural resources as the states intention to achieve power over or access to the natural resources of another country as the state is trying to improve its trade relations with another country in order to increase the states economic power. We have not found much evidence that Russia is actively pursuing access to or power over Ukrainian natural resources, but we have found that Russia is seeking to secure some key industrial assets such as steel and aviation industries, and it also ensures stable maintenance of the Ukrainian economy and power recourses by investing in this areas. As it can be observed in the Memorandum of Principles of non-use of special measures against imports of goods originating from customs territories of the parties Russia and Ukraine, 90 per cent of Russian imports from Ukraine are metal products, engineering products, foodstuff and chemical products, all being mainly products with high added value. Due to the big production share and investments in these industries it could be concluded that the Russian strategy is to maintain and secure these industries. We can clearly observe in this context that Russia tries to gain access to the key industries of Ukraine such as chemical industry, metallurgy, metal engineering and metal working, in order to ensure its main imports. It becomes visible that the Russian foreign policy strategy aims to gain power over some of the Ukrainian natural resources (as well as industrial resources) which means that Russia, at least to some extent, is trying to increase its power in this aspect. Our findings in the description of the Russian foreign policy show that trade is a very important part of the Russian foreign policy strategy towards Ukraine. This is not least due to the fact that Ukraine is a very important trade partner for Russia, importing gas, oil, mineral oil, nuclear fuel and mechanical engineering production. As the 2007 ABN AMRO report shows the total value of Ukrainian export market in 2006 was about 15 billion US dollar and represents 5 per cent of Russian exports, situating Ukraine as the forth importer of Russian products after EU-25, USA and China (see Table 5 in appendix A.1). This aspect can explain in some extend the focus that Russia has in maintaining good trade relationships with Ukraine. The Russian focus in trading with the former Soviet republics and especially Ukraine is e.g. seen in the establishment of the CIS that aims
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a creation of a customs union, a free trade agreement, and certain labour reforms. This kind of economic cooperation can also be observed in The Program for Russian economic cooperation with Ukraine of 2007 and The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership where among other things the two parties establish a model for economic collaboration. These agreements show that Russia is very keen to improve its power through trading with Ukraine, but it is not the only goal of the Russian strategy because for Ukraine the close economical trading relationship has its price. Russia has demanded specific actions in return from Ukraine these are e.g. that Ukraine should stay out of organizations like NATO, that Ukraine should maintain good conditions for the naval base in Sevastopol and that Russia should gain control over some key Ukrainian industrial assets. So what we see is that Russia is both improving its economic power, but at the same time is using its economic power in order to gain influence in other areas. This tendency shows that when the soft power dimension of Russian foreign policy failed, Russia started to use the hard power dimension in its strategy in order to achieve power. Even if the several disputes on gas and oil between the two states are different in context, we can identify some similar particularities. Each time these agreements made with Ukraine in gas and oil sector failed, Russia either raised the prices on gas and oil or cut-off the supply of these exports (hard power). These aggressive actions can also be explained through the lack of efficient foreign policy instruments of soft power that Russia had for the moment. Furthermore, we can observe that in the trade area of its foreign policy, not all of the attempts that Russia has made to improve its trade relations with Ukraine have been successful. This aspect can e.g. be seen in the establishment of the SES where Ukraine is only a formal member as it has not implemented the necessary agreements. This shows that even though the foreign policy strategy of Russia seems be to improve its power through trade agreements with Ukraine, this strategy might not always prove itself as being successful. While the soft power dimension of its foreign policy failed, as we can observe Russia started to use the hard power dimension in its strategy
6.2.3. Military
The military parameter of classical realism represents one of the most important parameters of our analysis because it expresses in the clearest way possible a countrys will for power. As it was previously mentioned, the military realms main aim is to strengthen the military capacities of a state through cooperation with another country or by taking over the military facilities of another
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country. The military area encompasses best the main instruments of hard power and it reflects the conventional foreign policy of a country. Searching in the agreements between the two states during the period 1991-2010 we can spot that the Russian-Ukrainian political and military relations have revolved around the Black Sea Fleet negotiations due to the strategic importance of the port of Sevastopol and the supporting infrastructure of the fleet. As the Russian officials assert and the BSF agreements are pointing out, the Russian negotiations focus mostly on keeping the access to the port of Sevastopol for its Black Sea Fleet. Russias reason for this effort proves to have a double nature. Firstly, losing access to the Sevastopol port would affect Russias capacity of influencing the region a great deal. Secondly none of its seven Black Sea ports can be utilized for military purposes. Searching through the historical background of the two states, we can witness how after the separation of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states claimed sovereignty over the former Soviet Unions possessions within their own boundaries. Russia was the first one to claim sovereignty over Sevastopol, the home of the Black Sea Fleet, and then Ukraine followed suit. As the descriptive part shows Russia first expressed its desire to maximize power in order to achieve its national interest in 1992 when it claimed 100 per cent ownership of the Black Sea Fleet. Soon after that, Ukraine did the same thing, which lead to serious disagreements between the two states. The first agreement signed by the two countries regarding the Black Sea Fleet (the Dagomys agreement) shows how Russia attempts to pursue its national interest and to gain increased control over the region. During the meetings of the two states and negotiations within The Dagomys Agreement, Russia proposed splitting the BSF first 80:20 in its own favour and then 60:40, but Ukraine refused both of these proposals. A few months later, an agreement equally in favour of both countries was needed. The Yalta agreement was meant to place the BSF under joint control and authority. Following the lead of the historical background, we can observe that later some disagreements between the two countries arose, as Russia refused to acknowledge Ukraines nuclear power. According to the Ukrainian Minister of Defence, Russia violated the bilateral agreements, which mirrors once more its desire to maximize control over the region, irrespective of the means it has to use. The departure of a Russian research ship carrying equipment, worth 10 million US dollar, from the Ukrainian port of Odessa on 8 April 1994 aggravated relations between Russia and Ukraine and it can be interpreted as a self-interested action, directed towards the satisfaction of its national
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interest. The tensions that resulted from this incident have been soon appeased by the summit meeting held in Moscow, which was mostly advantageous for Russia, allowing it to have 80-85 per cent ownership of the BSF, in exchange for a financial compensation for Ukraine. According to the Radisson (Sochi) Agreement, the BSF vessels were bought mainly by Russia (81.7 per cent), who also had the right to use the base at Sevastopol in exchange for a rent offered to Ukraine. As mentioned in the operationalization of our theory, states seek to increase their control over other states by using the military facilities of other countries, which is exactly what Russia managed to do with the BSF vessels and infrastructure according to this agreement. The final accords were reached in Kiev on 28 May 1997 and they resulted in the 50-50 partition of the BSF and Russia leasing the port of Sevastopol for 20 years in exchange for 97.75 million US dollar per year for Ukraine. Although this agreement presumably guards Ukraines sovereignty over the Crimean Peninsula and originally it seemed fair to both parties, it was based on a big compromise on the part of Ukraine and it totally placed it in a subordinate position. Out of the 19 ports that Ukraine has at the Black Sea, most of them are either civil ports or were demilitarized over time, which makes Sevastopol probably the most important port at the Black Sea and Ukraine had to lease it to Russia. As we can see, Russia tries to secure its military capabilities in the port of Sevastopol and even if this has less importance for the rest of the world, since NATO can block any military attempts from Turkey in that area, thinking from the perspective of countries like Georgia for example the Russian focus in keeping access in Sevastopol for the Black Sea fleet represents a way of strengthening Russian military power.
6.2.4. Population
In our investigation we have operationalized the concept of population through the parameter of power and we defined it as the state trying to obtain power by improving the view of the state in the eyes of the population of another country. In the description of the Russian foreign policy strategy there is little evidence of Russia trying to increase its power through the population dimension. The intention of Russia to obtain power by improving its image of the state in Ukraine can only be observed in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine. This treaty, that was signed in order to improve the trust relationships between the two states, ensures the population of Ukraine that Russia is a friendly cooperative neighbour and that Russia will develop its relationship with Ukraine in terms of mutual respect for the state and for its population. By looking more at the details of this treaty, we find that after obtaining a lease for its
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Black sea Fleet Russia ensured the population of Sevastopol that their city will not become a Russian military annex. Researching the BSF negotiations and the strategic cooperation agreements we can observe that, to a certain extent, many of the Russian foreign policy initiatives, rather than seeking improvement of the state image in the eyes of Ukrainians population, can be seen as doing the exact opposite. This is especially apparent in the energy area and the security and defence area of the Russian foreign policy strategy. Firstly, in the BSF negotiations and agreements, Russia is pursuing a policy that is far from appreciated by the Ukrainian population. Secondly the gas relationship between Russia and Ukraine is also politically oriented. The various episodes of gas price fluctuations and cut-offs of supply do not show a considerable share of attention from Russia towards Ukrainian population. The Russian political vector that dominates its economic relations with Ukraine is especially illustrated in the 2010 Kharkov Agreement, where Russia and Ukraine are mixing economic aspects, like the gas prices, with non-economic aspects, like the base of Black Sea Fleet. The 2010 agreement shows clearer the political vector that Russia is using in order to develop its strategy. By reducing the gas prices by 30 per cent for Ukraine in return of the extension of the Black Sea Fleet lease of 25 years. Russias political way to become present in that area is far to be liked in eyes of Ukrainian population. As a result, after reviewing the population dimension of Russian foreign policy, we can conclude that it remains unexercised. After analysing the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership and the other agreements we identified only an interest from Russia towards the population of Sevastopol. This could also be due to the fact that the major ethnic group in Sevastopol is formed by Russians. Therefore we cannot consider that on the population dimension Russia is seeking to obtain power.
6.2.5. Quality of Diplomacy
The strategy of increasing power trough quality of democracy was defined as the state trying to improve diplomatic institutions and diplomatic relations and in that way increase the influence of the state in another country. In the Russian foreign policy strategy we have found indications of this behaviour for example in the establishment of the CIS. This organization can be interpreted as a tool used to negotiate trade issues where Russia can e.g. get influence on some of the labour market reforms made in the other countries. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership can also be seen as both, a tool to increase the quality of diplomacy and a product of an already good diplomatic relationship between the two countries. The establishment of the SES can be seen as an
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attempt for further improvement of the quality of diplomacy between the states, but since Ukraine ended up only being a formal member and not implementing the agreements, this can be seen as a failed attempt and maybe even a product of a quality of relationship that is not so strong as it should have been to completely integrate Ukraine in the institution. Other attempts that can be seen just as unsuccessful are the accords meant to resolve the BSF issues in Sevastopol. The multiple energy crises between Russia and Ukraine can also be seen as a product of an insufficient quality of diplomacy between the states. In this area, as well as in trade area and BSF accords, there have been attempts to make agreements that would resolve in a diplomatic way the many disputes. However these agreements have not been as successful as Russia might have hoped since the last decade diplomatic attempts did not manage to obtain a good relationship with Ukraine in the energy sphere. From this perspective we can interpret the several disagreements between the two states regarding different areas (energy conflicts, territorial disputes, security of assets) as a failure of Russian foreign policy that have might be using inefficiently the quality of diplomacy instrument.
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7. Comparison
7.1. Geography
As our analysis shows, the EU is using the geographical location of Ukraine in order to increase its power. In fact, the EU is aiming to securing its outer borders by stabilizing the Ukrainian democracy and reducing the crime and corruption in Ukraine. Furthermore the EU is interested in strengthening its power by making use of the position of Ukraine between the EU and Russia and to have a secure transfer of energy from Russia to the EU. The analysis of the Russian foreign policy strategy shows us that Russia is also interested in enhancing its power by exploiting the position and infrastructure of Ukraine so as to transfer energy from Russia to the EU. Moreover, Russia also has an interest in increasing its power by gaining access to the geographically important port in Sevastopol and annexing the Crimean peninsula with a large ethnic Russian population that also hosts the Black Sea Fleet. When comparing the two strategies within the geographical area we can identify both, similar areas of interest and areas where only one of the strategies is represented. The two areas in the foreign policy strategies are; the outer borders of the EU and the military port in Savastopol and the Crimean peninsula for Russia seem to be areas not provoking a conflict since those are part of one of the foreign policy strategies and cannot be found in both of them. On the other hand the interest in using the geographical position and infrastructure of Ukraine in order to transfer energy from Russia to the EU is part of both foreign policy strategies. Our analysis suggests that these strategies actually have more or less the same aim: a stable transfer of energy from Russia to the EU. Even though the goals are the same that does not mean that there cannot be detected some differences in the two foreign policy strategies. We can see that the EU favours investments and improvements of the Ukrainian energy infrastructure which Russia is not. Another difference can be identified while looking at the position of Russia in the energy sphere and its concerns about the Ukrainian payments for energy. Russia is often using conventional tools such as cutting off the energy supply as a mean of pressuring Ukraine to pay for the energy provided. An overall look shows that both parties are trying to increase their power in the area of geography but this situation does not necessarily imply that there are major conflicts between the two strategies. The fact that Russia is using the withholding of energy as a mean to pressure Ukraine to pay for the energy is opposed to the EU strategy of securing the flow of energy to the EU. We can therefore conclude that within the area of geography the main foreign policy strategies do not
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conflict but that through which Russia is using the energy flow to pressure Ukraine is a field where the two strategies do conflict.
7.2. Natural resources & Trade

Our analysis of the foreign policy strategy of the EU towards Ukraine shows that within the area of natural resources and trade the EU wants to increase its power by utilizing the energy infrastructure of Ukraine in order to gain access to Russian energy. The strategy of the EU is also to develop the renewable energy in Ukraine, to make Ukraine less dependent of Russian energy and instead make Ukraine dependent on technology from the EU. It could therefore be argued that the EU is trying to both get a gain of relative power over Russia and to amplify its power by making Ukraine dependent on products from the EU. The EU is also trying to improve its economic power by improving the trade relations with Ukraine. The Russian foreign policy strategy within this area is also utilizing Ukrainian infrastructure to transport energy from Russia to the EU and thereby increase the Russian economic power. Another part of the Russian foreign policy strategy towards Ukraine is to boost its economic power by securing and investing in industrial assets in Ukraine. The wish to enhance the economic power could also be found in multiple attempts of making a closer economic relationship between the former soviet states and among them Ukraine. These agreements are e.g. the CIS and the SES, and in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership signed between the Russia and Ukraine. Another aspect of the foreign policy strategy is to use its economic power to shape the foreign policy of Ukraine like pressuring Ukraine to stay out of NATO. Another point of investigation regarding the utilization of Ukrainian infrastructure for the transfer of energy was presented in the comparison of the geographical strategies. We have found that even though the goals of the EU and Russia might seem to be the same, there is still a conflict based around the fact that Russia is using the energy as a method to pressure Ukraine. Even if, while investigating the interest that both state have in the Ukrainian infrastructure in the geographical area, we identify no sources of conflict, between the two strategies on the natural resources and trade area the situation looks different. The strategy of the EU to promote renewable energy in Ukraine, we believe, can be seen as conflicting with the Russian strategy on the natural resources dimension. First of all, the use of renewable energy, being an alternative to the energy supplied by Russia, will make Ukraine less dependent on Russia. This situation can also result in a conflict with the general Russian strategy to develop the trade area and seek to improve trading relations between Russia and Ukraine. The EU promotion of renewable energy conflict with the Russian trade
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strategy towards Ukraine is explained by the fact that the technology for renewable energy will be imported from other countries than Russia (among others the EU). Furthermore, as the analysis on trade area shows both the EU and Russia are very focused on improving their trade relations with Ukraine; this can be seen as a conflict because of the differences of trade reforms (e.g. standards of goods) that Russia and the EU try to implement in Ukraine. One can argue that Ukraine cannot focus its trade on more than one party at the same time. Adopting a different viewpoint, the fact that both Russia and the EU are both trying to increase their trade relations with Ukraine, can also mean a growth in Ukrainian economy. This can be beneficial for both the EU and Russia. The Russian strategy to secure industrial assets in Ukraine can also be seen as a direct conflict with the EU strategy of improving trade relations with Ukraine. This can be explained by the fact that Russian owned industries in Ukraine might have a greater incentive to trade with Russia and Russian companies than their counterparts in the EU. One can argue that at a first level there are several potential sources of conflicts in the area of natural resources and trade. First, Ukraine is Russian main trade partner, after the EU, USA and China, therefore Russian foreign policy on trade dimension is very focused on Ukraine. The source of conflict is created by the fact that the EU foreign policy strategy and the WTO arrangements are moving the Ukraine center of interest from the Russian agreements to the EU and new era of trade cooperation. Second, the Russian strategy in the natural resources dimension is based on big investments in the Ukrainian key industrial assets ensuring control over these areas. The EU strategy on natural resources indirectly proposes alternatives for Ukraine to decrease its economic dependency on Russia. This situation creates a conflict with the Russian foreign policy based on the dependency created for its gas and oil supply towards Ukraine. Even though we consider these as remaining only sources of conflicts and through our analysis we could not find any direct conflict between the two foreign policies on the natural resources and trade area. The way in which Russia is developing its foreign policy strategy in Ukraine is not directly hindered by the focus of the EU foreign policy strategy in Ukraine on the same dimensions of the trade and natural resources area. In fact in this area we see that the two foreign policy strategies are both concerned with the same dimensions of the foreign policy but they have different goals within these.
7.3. Military
When we analyse the foreign policy strategy of the EU we find that the EU is not trying to increase its power in Ukraine through military means. The lack of EU military interests in Ukraine can
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maybe partly be explained through the fact that the EU ensured the area on this aspect and any military attempt from the bases situated in Ukraine can be blocked by NATO since the only countries that can be attacked are Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. At the same time when we look at the Russian strategy in this area we find that there are very strong indications that Russia is trying to increase its military power in Ukraine. This aspect becomes especially obvious in the BSF negotiations where the goal of Russia is to obtain supremacy over the strategically important military port in Sevastopol and the navy fleet located there. From the analysis we have conducted on the military dimension, at a first level we identified no direct conflict between the two foreign policies especially since we have not found that the EU has any military interest in Ukraine and the BSF which is the Russian main point of military interest in Ukraine has limited capabilities and its importance is mostly symbolic remembering the Russian military greatness from the past. At a second level, as we identified in the dimension of trade and natural resources, the EU promotion of renewable energy strategy has potential to destabilize Russian monopoly in the energy sphere in Ukraine. It can be argued however that this strategy might be conflicting with the strategy of Russia that achieved an extended lease for its military BSF using its leading position in the energy sphere to influence Ukraine. Since the EU interest in Ukraine is capable to decrease Russian influence in Ukraine, we can identify at this level a source of conflict between the two foreign policies. On a third level, analysing the strategies of the two states further as it can be seen in the population area, the EU aims to make the EU a more desirable alternative than Russia in the eyes of the Ukrainian population. If the Russian strategy on the military dimension succeeds in its aim it would be immensely unpopular in the Ukrainian population. This aggressive image of Russia can prove itself useful for the EU foreign policy strategy, which rather than indicating a potential conflict between the two foreign policies it can prove exactly the opposite. This means that we do not see any obvious conflict in this area but if we bring in other areas we might speculate that there could be some conflict the strategies (or even that the Russian strategy might help the EU achieve its goals.
7.4. Population
In our analysis of the EU foreign policy strategy on the population parameter of power we identified multiple initiatives that aim to extend its power in Ukraine by making the image of the EU more positive in the eyes of the Ukrainian population. These initiatives can be seen in a number of actions e.g. improving democracy as seen in connection with the 2004 and 2006 elections further
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public health and education as seen in initiative to reform these sectors and negotiating about visa free travel. The analysis of the Russian foreign policy in the same area shows that if Russia has a similar strategy this is neither stated nor detectable in the agreements. The Russian foreign policy strategy on the population dimension is only directed towards the Russian ethnic population living on the Crimea peninsula. This fact can be observed in the BSF negotiations and in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership. Besides the lack of initiatives that aim to extend Russian power through the population dimension, we actually see that the Russian strategy might be counteracting an increase in power based on the image towards the Ukrainian population e.g. in the energy crises and the inter-ethnic conflicts. From these two analyses we can see that there is no direct conflict between the two strategies on the population dimension of power. Thus, one will need to question if, even though it is not a specific part of the Russian foreign policy seeking to improve the state image through the population of Ukraine, it is improbable that the other Russian interests in Ukraine do not get affected if the strategy of the EU succeeds and the Ukrainian population turns their back on Russia and see the EU as a more promising alternatives for their lives. What we see is that the two strategies do not conflict within this area but the facts deducted only from the agreements might not give the full picture.
7.5. Quality of diplomacy

We have analysed the foreign policy strategies of Russia and the EU from the parameter of quality of diplomacy. We found that the EU is very keen on strengthening its power by improving the quality of diplomacy. An indication of this is the immense amount of agreements signed between the EU and Ukraine and in the establishment of institutions like the Cooperation Committee. In specific areas we see this strategy e.g. in the area of nuclear material where there has been made agreements between the EAEC and Ukraine and in the agreements within the ENP and EaP that gives the EU leverage in the socio-economic reforms in Ukraine. As mentioned in the analysis this all these agreements can be seen as such an important tool that it is the basis for all of the rest of the foreign policy strategy. From the analysis of the Russian foreign policy strategy in this area we find that Russia, like the EU, is interested in enlarging their power by improving the quality of diplomacy with Ukraine, which can be seen in the establishment of institutions such as the CIS and the SES and in agreements like The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership.
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It is obvious that both the EU and Russia has a foreign policy strategy that is supposed increase the power of the state. It can therefore be argued that there would be a conflict between the two strategies. That is not necessarily the whole truth however as it can be argued that one country can maintain good diplomatic relations with more than one country at the time, and that the two foreign policy strategies could both have aims in this area without conflicting.
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8. Conclusion
In the comparison chapter we find areas of real conflict, potential conflict and areas with no obvious conflict. If we look at the area of geography for example, we find that both the EU and Russia are trying to utilize the geographical position of Ukraine to transfer energy from Russia to the EU. However, as Russia is using the energy transfer as a tool to pressure Ukraine this can result in a direct conflict with the strategy of the EU that seeks to secure the flow of energy. We found in the areas of trade, population and quality of diplomacy some potential conflicts. In the trade area we see that both the EU and Russia are trying to improve their relations with Ukraine. This does not necessarily imply that there is a conflict between the two strategies as long as Ukraine continues the trade relationship with both Russia and the EU. Nevertheless, if the result of one of the strategies makes Ukraine focus more on one trade partner than on the other, then there would be a conflict. As long as Ukraine chooses to trade equally with the two actors, there will probably be no conflict. We also believe that this same potential conflict is noticeable in the quality of diplomacy dimension as both the EU and Russia are trying to improve this. As in the trade area, this only becomes a conflict if Ukraine is improving diplomacy with one of the parties and consequently the other one will be neglected. We identified a potential conflict in the area of population in the case of a successful strategy of the EU. This could lead to several actions of the Russian foreign policy becoming unpopular in the eyes of the Ukrainian population. As mentioned before we also find one area where neither a concrete nor a potential conflict can be identified in the military area we believe that the fact that the EU has not real foreign policy strategy in that are makes a conflict more or less impossible. The Russia foreign policy strategy in this area are very clear but the EU has not made any obvious strategy visible in the agreements that we have analysed and we must therefore argue that a conflict in this area seems unlikely, In conclusion we can say that the EU and Russia are both trying to increase power in all the areas we have analysed except for the EU in the military area. This would suggest that there is a major conflict between the two foreign policy strategies, but in our analysis and comparison we have found that even though we do find some areas of conflict and potential conflict we find no evidence for an overall conflict between the two foreign policy strategies.
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9. Limits
In our investigation we have encountered some limitations, both in the planning phase and in the execution of the investigation. These limitations revolved around incoherency/unavailability of data and about the fact of treating the EU as a unitary actor. The first limitation presented itself when researching into the agreements between Russia and Ukraine. Most agreements were not published in English. For some agreements the original text could be found in Russian, others couldnt be found at all. We tried to solved the first problem while using online translation software (Google translate) to translate the agreements, as we did not have the funds to hire a professional translator, nor were there translated versions of these documents available. For those agreements we could not find the original text, we were trying to find a high-quality second hand sources (online journals, books and articles) which described the relations in question or the agreements between the parties. We realize that this is not optimal but important to understand the agreements. However we do believe that having mediocre translations and good second hand sources gave us a cohesive and realistic description and analysis of the relationship between Ukraine and Russia despite this limitation. The second limitation concerns the fact of treating the EU as a unitary actor. The decision to use the EU as unitary actor is done to be able to analyse our problem from a classical realist point of view, as classical realism does not have the tool to deal with a supranational organization like the EU. The third limit we met was the fact that foreign policy faces changes over time, and that we are interpreting agreements signed over a time period of nearly two decades as being the same strategy. To be able to track these changes we consider necessary to establish the period of analysis between two or five years as each part of the foreign policy strategies are not the same. Therefore in order to get a unitary and complete picture we had to use agreements from a long period of time.
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10. Perspective
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight and discuss areas of academic interest that either were not treated in this paper or emerged as interesting areas for further investigation. The first topic that arises as a big question from this investigation revolves around what power is today, and is this even something that can definitively be proven, or does it change along with the level of threat a state encounters, a change in government or change in the type of government? What power is necessarily depends on the area investigated, and our case study of Ukraine does not provide a clear image of either the EU or Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine being either soft or hard. This is due to the main strategies used by the actors. Additionally the plentiful examples of Russian military intervention as part of the Russian foreign policy (examples could be Russian military intervention in Chechnya or Georgia), combined with the usage of economy and other means of soft power is what problematizes this definition of power as either soft or hard in general. On top of this come the pipeline-policies which are hard to define as either hard or soft, but definitely a tool used in the foreign policy. This area is therefore a very complicated topic which could be the topic of further investigation. The second topic concerns the effectiveness of programmes, and results created by the agreements as being uncertain. The European Parliament has been investigating this, but as the nature of this investigation is very subjective it would be a natural next step moving forward from this paper to look into the effectiveness, result and effects of these strategies. And also whether these strategies move the alignment of a country like Ukraine in the direction of either the EU or Russia, and especially whether this moving is a zero-sum game, would be an interesting area for further study.
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Appendix
A.1. Agreements
A.1.01. NIPs
The National Indicative Programme is a plan in the ENPI spanning three years each, in this case for the Ukraine they span from 2007-2010 and from 2010 to 2013. The NIPs are specifications of the more general CSPs implementation of the overall strategies for the country, by choosing a limited number of more specific policy areas to focus on. These plans are typically very specific in terms of the relation they have with the overall strategy and goals for the development of the country in question. The NIPs are produced by the European Commission, and steer the actual concrete EU strategy in Ukraine. The first NIP(2007-10) has as its three main priorities: - Support for democratic development and good governance - Support for regulatory reform and administrative capacity building - Support for infrastructure development The second NIP (2010-13) has as its three main priorities: - Good governance and rule of law - Facilitation of the entry into force of the EU Ukraine Association Agreement(including deep and comprehensive trade) - Sustainable development A.1.02. CSPs The CSP between the EU and Ukraine and is a strategy plan for the ENPI assistance given to Ukraine in the period 2007-2013. It is divided into the previously mentioned two part NIPs. The fact that the CSP is a very general description of EU policy towards Ukraine is seen in the areas treated in the paper: - Objectives of EU/EC cooperation with Ukraine
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- The political, economic and social situation - An overview of the past and on-going EC assistance - The EC Response strategy (European Commission)
A.1.03. PCAs
These agreements are signed by the EU and a partner country favouring political dialogue and strengthening the link between the two parties. The EU has chosen this tool with nine countries located east of the EU member states to establish a "basis for cooperation in legislative, economic, social, financial, scientific, civil, technological and cultural fields" (European Commission 2007) so that the positions on international issues, especially security and stability, can converge. The EU supports the reform efforts of the country with the aim to create stable democracies based on a market economy, while offering favourable trade conditions. The countries have agreed on the fact that, if the partner country becomes part of the GATT and WTO, they will accord to one another special treatment regarding trade, as for example they will guarantee free transit of goods, extinct import restrictions and trade at the official market price. The PCAs, concluded for a 10 year period, create special institutions. The so called Cooperation Council is supervising the implementation of the agreement and the respect of the principles the countries have agreed on, that are respect for democracy, international law and human rights. The Cooperation Council, meeting once a year at ministerial level, is assisted by a Co-operation Committee which is composed of members of the EU Council and Commission on the one hand and the representatives of the Government of the country on the other hand. The regular dialogue guaranteed by this agreement between the two parties takes place at different levels.
A.1.04. ENP
The EC outlined in 2003 that a dividing line between the EU and its neighbours has to be avoided, this lead to the initiative of the ENP having as aim to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security of both sides. This bilateral policy is based on common values like democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance market economy and sustainable development. (EC, 2010) This policy favours the realisation of reforms in the partner countries, while offering "political
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association, deeper economic integration, increased mobility..." (EC, 2010) supported by the EU through funding. The decision on the starting point and the tools of the ENP is based on a country paper established by the EC. This leads to the creation of a bilateral Action Plan defining a 3-5 year agenda for political and economic reforms tailored to the country's need and capacities. The progress of this agenda is yearly evaluated by papers of the EC since 2006. This programme is additional to regional or multilateral initiatives like the EaP or the black sea synergy and build on existing agreements like the PCA. The institutions created through those agreements are responsible to monitor the ENP because this policy does not establish proper institutions.
A.1.05. EUUkraine Action Plan
In 2002 the Copenhagen European Council recognised that with the enlargement of 2004 the EU would get an important opportunity to develop and increase its relations with Ukraine. Therefore the Commission presented in 2004 the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy paper and the EU-Ukraine Action Plan (AP) as the tool to achieve the objectives of that strategy within three years. The AP was jointly drafted to ensure that the EU and Ukraine developed increasingly close relations to the point beyond co-operation to gradually integrating economically and deepening political cooperation. The AP was supposed to fulfil the provisions of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with a clear set of priorities and objectives for specific action and was supposed to ensure relationship progress based on commitments and common values. The AP had six main chapters:

Political dialogue and reform Economic and social reform and development Trade, market and regulatory reform Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs Transport, energy information society and environment People-to-people contacts.
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Within these six chapters the AP maps out areas where more work is needed to ensure Ukrainian political and economic transition, where there are problems and challenges of common interest and how to strengthen links and increase relations between the EU and Ukraine. Furthermore the AP was giving Ukraine access to Euro 250 million of financing from the EIB and the EU promised an intent to open up negotiations regarding visa facilitation and enhanced cooperation in many areas such as energy, transport and environment. Also the AP was going to help the process of granting Ukraine Market Economic Status and re-launching a study on whether it would be feasible to make a free trade agreement between Ukraine and the EU. (EUUkraine 2005b, p. 1-2)
A.1.06. Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of energy between the European Union and Ukraine
The MoU was signed on the 1 September 2005 by the EU and Ukraine. It presents a list of issues that Ukraine shall focus on to become an energy efficient economy and join the EU energy market:

Reforming electricity tariffs and gas pricing; Easing the impact of reforms on vulnerable customers; Reducing unregulated losses; Reducing network losses, in particular, transmission losses; Increasing energy efficiency necessary to abate demand; Ensuring full payments for providing gas and electricity; Diversifying supply, including energy substitution by, e.g., renewable energy sources, whilst maintaining a free market framework;
Optimising the energy mix in electricity generation with a view to increasing efficiency, environmental safety, operational reliability, and security of supply
The MoU creates a platform for further institutional reforms and is part of the EU strategy to create a secure supply network.
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A.1.07. EUUkraine Association Agenda
The EUAA is an instrument to prepare for and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement that is supposed to replace the AP. The EUAA is supposed to together with the Association Agreement promote further political association and to integrate Ukraine into the EU through a framework of realizable objectives. These objectives democratic reforms, anti-corruption, greater participation of the citizens in the public decision making in Ukraine and the establishment of a free trade area between the EU and Ukraine. (Co-operation Council 2009 2 and 3)
A.1.08. SCAs between Russia and Ukraine in Energy
1992 Agreement of natural gas and gas transit through territory of Ukraine In 1992 Russia agrees to supply Ukraine natural gas in quantity of 69.8 billion cmc for domestic consumption and in return Ukraine will transit 98.9 billion cmc of Russian gas through its territory. The transit security will be ensured by the UkrGazprom and Gazprom. The gas transported across Ukraine is Russian property and cannot be used by Ukraine in domestic interest. The prices for the transportation but also for the gas supplied directly for Ukraine are established separately in an intergovernmental agreement (RussiaUkraine 1992). 1994 SCA in oil sector The 1994 agreement signed between Russia and Ukraine established the conditions on delivering oil and oil products and on the transport of these across Ukrainian territory. Russia and Ukraine agreed the transition to payment for oil and oil prices and world market for coordinated policy in oil prices and oil and tariffs for the transportation, aimed at providing mutual economic benefits The guidance of this agreement was made by the Agreement between Ukraine and the Government of the Russia of Free Trade signed on 24 June 1993. Therefore, the two countries established Ukraine should pay the oil at the price established in accordance with its quality based on the worlds market prices, and charge the relevant ministries and departments with the method agreed. Ukraine is paid for the transit in oil rates and it should ensure the return of derivate products from crude oil back in Russia (RussiaUkraine 1994). Agreement to guarantee the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine 2000 The agreement is extended to the 2001 agreement on additional measures to ensure the Russian transit gas through Ukraine. Ukraine will ensure the transit of 124.6 billion cm of Russian natural
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gas. The transit conditions will be ensured by Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukraine. The gas prices and the conditions of transit established were changed in the extended agreements (RussiaUkraine 2000). Agreement between Russia and Ukraine on measures on measures to ensure strategic cooperation in gas sector (SOCHI) 2004 The agreement signed by Russia and Ukraine in Sochi, 18 August 2004, establishes the conditions to enlarge volumes of natural gas transit to European countries and to ensure stable, efficient and safe operation and development of a unified gas supply system of the Russian Federation and Ukrainian gas transport system (RussiaUkraine 2004). Agreement on the transit of oil through the territory of Russia Signed in 2004, this agreement was based on the terms and conditions of the Treaty between the Russian and Ukraine on economic cooperation for 1998 and the Agreement on the procedure of transit (1992). The established terms were: Ukraine will ensure free oil transit across their territories and cannot be used for the partys needs. Russia will establish the schedules and Ukraine will ensure the security of the transit. The tariffs established for this transit are the same for Russia as for the other users of Ukrainian pipelines. The parties should not interrupt or cut off the supplies to solve conflicts and disagreements between countries; these shall be solved through negotiation.
A.1.09. Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of Cooperation in the energy sector.
The Memorandum was signed in 2008 by the ministries of Russia and Ukraine and set out the next elements of collaboration in the energy sphere (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, 2009, p.14): From 1 January 2009, Naftogaz would buy gas directly from Gazprom, and would be the sole importer to Ukraine. (This ruled out a return of UkrgazEnergo.) This arrangement would be dependent on clearance of Ukrainian debts, timely payment for future deliveries, and access to Ukrainian customers for Gazprom subsidiaries (implying a continuation or expansion of the 2008 arrangement, whereby Gazprom Sbyt sells 7.5 bcm to Ukrainian industrial customers); Import prices and transit tariffs to be raised step by step to market, economically based and mutually agreed levels within three years;
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The necessity for uninterrupted transit of gas across Ukrainian territory on a long-term basis was recognized; Gazprom and Naftogaz would jointly export some gas to Europe, including incremental volumes from storage. (This gave Ukraine the prospect of exposure to the European market from which it had effectively been excluded by the 2006 agreement.)
A.1.10. CIS
On the 8 December 1991 the head of states of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus met in Minsk (the official location of the Commonwealth bodies) to establish the Commonwealth of Independent States as free association of former Soviet republics, with common defence forces and a common economic space (Brzezinski, 1997, p.43-44). The overall aim of this agreement is to favour the relationship between the countries which is seen as essential to establish peace and security. The agreement guarantees equal rights to the citizens of the parties, protection and development of ethnic and culture but also claims that weapons and military spending should be cut however this latter is only possible if the parties respect each other. This is why the CIS agreement is based on the principles of mutual recognition and respect for state sovereignty and the principles of equality and non-interference in internal affairs, repudiation of the use of force and of economic or any other means of coercion, settlement of problems by mediation and other generally recognized principles and norms of international law (Brzezinski, 1997, p.44). Furthermore the agreement, open to all former USSR members, highlights the need to conclude further agreement on cooperation in various spheres.
A.1.11. CISFTA 1993
During September 1993, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic established an Agreement on the creation of a Free-Trade Area. This agreement, being one step in the process of establishing an Economic Union, should set up the conditions for a free movement of goods and services allowing mutual trade which would provide stability and growth of the economies. (Ukraine et al. 1993, p.1) First objective of the agreement is to gradually abolish all trade barriers, like customs duties, taxes, subsidies, different systems of settlement and payment, etc. Furthermore the parties should harmonize their legislations and cooperate regarding their economic policies, trade policies with third parties and different sectors (Ukraine et al. 1993, p.2-5). Transit is seen as essential element in this agreement and the parties agree on the fact that conditions for transit should not be worse than
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the conditions provided by the Contracting Parties for their own consignors and consignees and for their goods (Ukraine et al. 1993, p.4) The agreement applies for all goods originated in a member state that is exported to another member states. The agreement points out that it is possible to conclude other international agreement however the other countries should get informed. The Contracting Party that intends to conclude preferential trade and integration agreements with NonMember States of this Agreement shall in advance notify other Contracting Parties about this and shall inform them of expected conditions of its participation in the mentioned agreements. (Ukraine et al. 1993, p.7)
A.1.12. SES 2003
The Single Economic Space (also called Common Economic Space, the EEA or Common Economic Area) was signed in September 2003 by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine after a draft was created in February of the same year. The agreement gives a definition of the term single economic space being an economic area composed of a customs union and unified foreign trade (President of Russia, 2003, p.1). A goal of the agreement is to develop internal and external trade and investments. This means that the parties develop their economies mutually so that the unity is more competitive on the international market. The agreement lists a variety of objectives like the harmonization of macroeconomic policies and legislation concerning competition policies, the establishment of conditions for free movements of goods, the merge of regulations and standards, etc. All these objectives should favour the formation of a free trade zone without exceptions and limitations (President of Russia, 2003, p.1-2). The agreement created new bodies, where the sovereign member states transfer part of their responsibilities. One body is the Council of Heads of State, every country has one vote in this body, which takes the decisions regarding formation and functioning of the EEA (President of Russia, 2003, p.2). This body should gain importance over time. The agreement is more a framework that will develop over time. The agreement states: EEA is formed in stages, with the possibility of multi-level and multi-integration. (President of Russia, 2003, p.2) and continues explaining what this means Split-level and multi-integration means that each party shall independently determine in which of the directions of integration or integration of individual activities it participates and to what extent. In concrete this means that every country can decide the level of integration it prefers. Taking the next step of integration will also be freely defined by each country.
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A.1.13. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership 1997
Through the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership, Russia and Ukraine are drawing on the historically close links and relations of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of Russia and Ukraine noting that the treaty between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR of 19 November 1990 facilitated the development of good-neighbourly relations between the two states reaffirming their obligations arising from the agreement between Russia and Ukraine on the further development of relations between the two states, signed in Dagomys on 23 June 1992 (RussiaUkraine 1998). The two countries believe that the strengthening of relations of friendship, good-neighbourliness and mutually beneficial cooperation serves the fundamental interests of their peoples and promotes the cause of peace and international security. The treaty reaffirms the commitment to the standards of international law and above all the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, and adhering to commitments assumed within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Ibid.). The two countries have agreed on the fact that Sevastopol belongs to Ukraine, and that Russia can use it in a leasing for its Black Sea Fleet in return of cutting off its previous debt. The Article 1 mentions that the high contracting Parties as friendly, equal, and sovereign states shall base their relations on mutual respect and trust, on a strategic partnership and cooperation (Ibid.)
A.1.14 Dagomys Agreement 1992
According to the Dagomys Agreement, which was signed at the Russian Black Sea resort town of Dagomys on 23 June 1992, the BSF had to be split 80:20 per cent in favour of Russia or 60:40 per cent in favour of Russia, both of which proposals were disproved by Ukraine.(Felgenhauer 1999, p.6)
A.1.15 Yalta Agreement 1992
According to the Agreement signed in Yalta on 3 August 1992, the BSF was displaced from the military command of the CIS and placed under the joint control of Ukraine and Russia. The period of joint control would be of three years, after which a different agreement would have to be signed. In addition to this, the oaths of allegiance that Russian sailors were supposed to swear to the Ukrainian government were abolished. (Kessler Jr. 2001, p. 17)
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A.1.16. Radisson (Sochi) Agreement 1995
The BSF Agreement was signed on the 10th of June 1995 and it stated that the Russian Federation and Ukraine have fully resolved to strengthen friendship and cooperation . The first two articles of the Agreement alleged that the Russian Federation BSF and the Ukrainian Navy would be both formed on the basis of the BSF (in Sevastopol) but separated from each other and also that the Russian Federation of the BSF will use the installations of Sevastopol and other basing and deployment locations for ships, aviation, shore-based troops, and operational, combat, technical and rear support installation in Crimea. (Brzezinski 1997, p. 288) Article no. 4 presented the percentage of ships and vessels that the countries were to receive, and that is 81.7 per cent for the Russian Federation and 18.3 per cent for Ukraine. Article no. 6 stated that special agreements shall be adopted if both countries are interested in using the same installations (which are designated for the use of one of the countries only). The next article affirmed that all the officers of the BSF have the right to determine their future service. The Russian Federation committed itself to participate in the socio-economic development of Sevastopol sphere and the population centres where the Russian Federation BSF would be based according to the following article (Ibid.). According to Article no.9, the two countries would cooperate in the naval sphere so as to maintain stability in the Black Sea region. The procedure for cooperation would be organized by the Agreement on Cooperation between the Russian Federation Fleet and the Ukrainian navy. Article no. 11 announced the creation of a Russian-Ukrainian Joint Commission consisting of the state delegations of the Russian Federation and Ukraine whose role was to monitor the fulfilment of the accords on the BSF (Brzezinski 1997, p.288).
A.1.17. 1997, Accord on the division of the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine
On 28 May 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed an historic accord on the division of the BSF, after five years of discussion, disagreements and controversy (The Ukrainian Weekly). Ukraines Prime Minister, Pavlo Lazarenko, accompanied by Ukraines President Leonid Kuchma together with their Russian counterparts: Viktor Chernomyrdin and Boris Yeltsin respectively, signed three documents on the disposition of the BSF at Mariinsky Palace. The agreement offered Russia the opportunity to have a 20-year lease on two of the bays in the city of Sevastopol, allowing Russia to renew the agreement with five more years, with the permission of Ukraine. According to this agreement Russian ships and troops will be stationed at the bases in Sevastopol Bay and
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Quarantine Bay. Ukraines ships will be kept in Striletskyi Bay, while the Southern Bay will be demilitarized starting from June 12. Moreover, the Russian Navy was allowed to make use of the test range at Fedosia, the Hvardiiskyi Aerodrome and the Yalta Sanitorium, a communications station and a rocket fuel depot (Ibid.). Russia accepted providing with only 25,000 military personnel and limiting Russian armour to 132 vehicles, artillery to 24 pieces, and aircraft to 22. According to the agreement, Ukraine would receive from Russia 526.5 million US dollar in return for the portion of the fleet which had been given to Russia in 1994 (through an agreement signed by presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk. The compensation would result in a debt relief to Ukraine for oil and gas purchases from Russia. Even though, during the negotiations, Ukraine asked for 424.7 million US dollar a year from Russia, in the end the two countries reached a compromise and Ukraine accepted to receive only 100 million US dollar a year.
A.1.18 Black Sea Fleet Deal Renewed 2010
On 21 April 2010 Ukrainian President Viktor Yanuchovick and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev signed the package of agreements extending the Black Sea Fleets lease for another 25 years after its expiry date in 2017, with a five-year prolongation option. As compensation, Ukraine will have discounts on Russian gas and also be able to ask for a higher rent from the fleets Crimean facilities, for which Moscow is now paying 98 million US dollar annually. According to this last agreement Russia will offer Ukraine a 30 per cent discount on natural gas, but no more than 100 US dollar per 1,000 cubic meters. Starting from 28 May 2017 Russia engaged itself in paying 100 million to Ukraine per year for the naval base. The gas discount will be deducted from this amount. One fact worth mentioning is that Ukraine has been paying one of the highest prices in Europe for natural gas in Europe (330 US dollar for 1,000 cubic meters), as stated in the online newspaper Suite 101.
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A.2. Tables
Table 1: Realism
Source: Weber, 2001, p.15

Table 2: Countries
Source: Europe without Barriers, Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine
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Table 3: Russian Foreign Trade (2007) with CIS Countries
(Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan)
Source: http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~chegeo/index.htm
Table 4: Russian Foreign Trade in 2006
Source: ABN AMRO Group Public Affairs Paper. Russia a promising and exciting business environment. Economics Department/Sector Research, September 2007
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Table 5: The dependence of individual countries on gas imports from Russia (2007)
Country
Gas from
imports Dependence on natural gas imports Share of transit via Russia from Russia Ukraine in total gas
(billion m3)
Percentage share in Percentage share in imports from Russia consumption imports 100.0% 99.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 78.8% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Lithuania 3.72 Slovakia Estonia Finland Latvia Czech Republic Bulgaria Greece Austria Hungary Slovenia Poland 2.8 3.16 5.4 7.85 0.59 6.86 6.22 0.85 4.58 1.64 6.8
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 96.5% 78.9%
78.6% 77.6% 64.0% 58.8% 58.0% 41.8% 39.3% 28.2% 26.7% 13.4%
100.0% 77.0% 55.9% 75.1% 58.2% 67.7% 43.3% 86.0% 30.7% 13.3%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 40%* 49% 100% 100% 100%
Germany 38.3 Romania Italy France 4.5 22.6 5.7
Source: IEA, Natural Gas Information 2008, news agencies, corporate websites, (*) source: Gas System for 2007
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

2.1. Problem area

2.3. Problem formulation

3.1. Method of investigation

3.2. Techniques of investigation

3.3. Case Study approach

3.4. Data Collection or Source of Data

4.1. Liberal Intergovernmentalism

4.2. Classical realism

4.3. Analytical Strategy

4.4. Operationalization of Foreign Policy Strategy

4.5. Operationalization of Classical Realism

5. Foreign policy strategies

5.1.4. Institutional reform

5.2. Russia - Ukraine

7.2. Natural resources & Trade

7.5. Quality of diplomacy

Official documents & Press releases:

A.1.07. EUUkraine Association Agenda

A.1.13. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership 1997

A.1.16. Radisson (Sochi) Agreement 1995

Source: Weber, 2001, p.15

Table 3: Russian Foreign Trade (2007) with CIS Countries

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 96.5% 78.9%

Germany 38.3 Romania Italy France 4.5 22.6 5.7

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