20Reyes vs.Lim, Harrison Lumber et al.

GR 134241 Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer had entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land. Ten million(10,000,000.00) was initially paid by Lim upon the signing of the contract, the with a remainingbalance of 18,000,000.00 to be paid when the present occupant of the property, HarrisonLumber, vacates the same and an Absolute Deed of Sale is executed. A penalty was to be paidby Reyes, to be taken against the remaining balance, if the property is not vacated within adesignated period.Reyes would accuse Lim and Harrison Lumber, who had still not vacated the property, of connivance and files a civil case against them. An offer would be made by Lim of to pay thebalance, and a subsequent offer would be made by Reyes to return the downpayment. Later, itwas revealed that the property had already been sold to a third party.In a the original case, Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the10,000,000.00 downpayment with the RTC cashier. The trial court grants this motion. ReyesMotion to set Aside the Order and MotforReconsideration would be denied by the trial court.Reyes petition for certiotrari was denied by the CA, hence this petition.Reyes avers that the trial court erred when it ordered the deposit of the downpayment, as saiddeposit is not among the provisional remedies provided for in the Rules of Court .Issue: Is the order to deposit the down payment subject matter of the case proper considering thatit is not among the provisional remedies provided for in the Rules of Court Ruling: While the matter of deposit is not provided for the in the Rule of Court, this is a case when thereis a hiatus in the law. If left alone, such hiatus would result to the unjust enrichment of Reyes atthe expense of Lim. This calls for application of equity which fills the open spaces of the law. Art.9 of the Civil Code mandates the courts to make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or inefficiency of the laws.As the contract between the parties can no longer be enforced, a rescission of the contractcreates the obligation to return the thing subject matter of the contract.UnderArt 22, the principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another applies to substantive rights and procedural remedies. As the aggrieved party has no other actions available based on any other provision of contract or law, courts can extend this conditionto the hiatus in the Rules of Court.

23TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAO Case Digest

TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAO FACTS: In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American. In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not

grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar. Whether or not the divorce and the second marriage of Escao were valid. Whether or not sexual infidelity of Escao may beinvoked by Tenchavez as a ground for legal separation. HELD: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez: His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents. On the part of Escaos parents: It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only. The Supreme Court held that the divorce is notvalid, making the second marriage void since marriageties of Escao and Tenchaves is existing.Tenchavez can file a petition for legal separationbecause Escao committed sexual infidelity because ofthe fact that she had children with the American.Sexual infidelity of a spouse is one of thegrounds for legal separation.

24Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. Case Digest

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139 Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no community property.

Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter. Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.

25Republic vs Orbecido III

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Par 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration but it was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Art 26 of the FC. HELD: In view of the foregoing, the SC states the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorcecapacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred from remarrying.

27 Bellis vs Bellis Case Digest

Bellis vs Bellis FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

28 IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.ADOLFO C.

AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor andHeir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellantJanuary 31, 1963 FACTS:Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided andconsequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where hebecame a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in thiscountry he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5,1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir,but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to havebeen declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California lawshould be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile;

that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must beincreased in view of the success ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On theother hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts mustimmediately apply the internal law of California

on the matter; that under California law there areno compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by himin absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his willremain undisturbed. ISSUE:Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen? RULING:The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are tworules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled inCalifornia; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California.The California conflict rule says: If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personalproperty is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of hisdomicile. Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines,ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referringto both country back and forth

29RCPI VS. COURT OF APPEALS143 SCRA 657

FACTS:Petitioner was a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmittingmessages. One of its employees had committed an error of sending libelous messages to acertain Loreto Dionela. As a consequence, a case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of LegaspiCity, and the decision was in favor of Dionela. When it was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the RTC was affirmed. RCPI then went to the Supreme Court, praying that it was not liable to the respondent since the criminal act from which the civil liability arouses was an act of its employee; there was no sufficient publication of the libelous telegram; and that the liability of the petitioner arising from Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code was erroneous. ISSUES:1. Whether or not Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code was violated by RCPI, as claimed by theCourt of Appeals.2. Whether or not Dionela was entitled to have some indemnifation from the petitioner due to damages incurred by the latter .RULING:Respondent committed breach of contract through the negligence of its employees. It was stillsaid to be liable since every time a person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. In contracts, the negligence of the employee is the negligence of the employer. Libelous messages or matters were included in the messagetransmitted, without the knowledge or consent of the sender. Breach of contract was committed then. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence, the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioners business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. Res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) was the doctrine applied by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury. The Court affirmed the assailed decision

30
TANJANCO vs. COUIRT OF APPEALS L-18630 December 17, 1966

FACTS:

Petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted respondent Araulli Santoshe expressed and professed his undying love and affection towards her which she eventually reciprocated. For one year from Dec. 1953Dec. 1954, petitioner succeeded in having carnal access to her, because of his protestation of love and promise of marriage. She got pregnant, for which she resigned from her work as IBM secretary to avoid embarrassment. He refused to marry her nor give support. Thus, she filed for an action before the trial court to compel him to recognize the unborn child and provide support. The complaint was dismissed for failure to state the cause of action. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that cause of action existed for damages as premised on Art. 21. ISSUE: Whether or not breach of a promise to marry is an actionable wrong. HELD: The case under Art. 21, cited as an example by the Code Commission, refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than sexual intercourse, or a breach or promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yielded. Where for one whole year, a woman of adult age maintained intimate sexual intercourse, such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion. Hence, no case is made under Art. 21, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by CFI in dismissing the complaint. In US v. Bustamante, 27 Phil 121: To constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. Decision of CA reversed; that of CFI affirmed.

31CONSTANTINO vs. MENDEZ Case Digest

CONSTANTINO vs. MENDEZ G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992 FACTS: It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. The case was filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial District and docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges, among others, that sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan professedhis love and courted Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man

except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of P5,000 to P8,000. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs. In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. By way of counterclaim, he further prayed for the payment of exemplary damages and litigation expense including attorney's fees for the filing of the malicious complaint On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint reiterating his previous answer denying that Michael Constantino is his illegitimate son. ISSUE: WON Ivan sired the still unborn child of Amelita. NO HELD: It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based on the evaluation of the evidence on record is controlling on this Court as the same is supported by the evidence on record. Even the trial court initially entertained such posture. It ordered the recognition of Michael as the illegitimate son of Ivan only when acting on the motions for reconsideration, it reconsidered, on October 21, 1976, its earlier decision dated June 21, 1976. Amelita's testimony on cross-examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of November, 1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is inconsistent with her response that she could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November, 1974 (Ibid, p. 106). Sexual contact of Ivanand Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974. Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so that as correctly pointed out by private respondent's counsel, citing medical science (Williams Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of conception must be close to 267days", the conception of the child (Michael) must have taken place about 267 days before August 3, 1975 or sometime in the second week of November, 1974. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November, 1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez requesting for a conference, prepared by her own counsel Atty. Roberto Saren as to whom she must have confided the attendant circumstances of her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that Amelita is four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of actual pregnancy, the child was conceived on or about October 11, 1974. Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December8, 1975, p. 65) is belied by Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason for her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiations is established by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed. As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that more sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery.

Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 3, 1975, p. 83).Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.

33GASHEEM SHOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS Case Digest

GASHEEM SHOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the trial court a complaint against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement of marriage. Respondent alleged that she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. Petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges. Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her. She accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. Petitioner then visited the respondents parents in Banaga, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. Sometime on August 20, 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartment. She was a virgin before she began living with him.A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated her and threatened to kill her, and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in BacolodCity. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount not less than P45,000, reimbursement for actual exp enses amounting to P600, attorneys fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as maybe just and equitable, which then rendered decision by court in favor of private respondent. Issue: Whether or not damages is recoverable for breach of promise to marry. Held: The Supreme Court held that when a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in the sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art. 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

34Wassmer vs Velez Case Digest

Wassmer vs Velez G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964 Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer are to be wed. 2 days prior the ceremony, Francisco left, leaving a telegram he will come back but never did. Beatriz filed for damages, and judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages. Defendant now asserts that the judgment against him is contrary to law, given that there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is actionable. Held: No it is not, but this case is not a mere breach of promise to marry. He must be held answerable for the damages in accordance with Art. 21. The SC maintained that though breach of promise to marry is not actionable, the defendants act is still punishable under Article 21 of the Civil Code which states that any p erson who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In this case, plaintiff already arranged everything for the wedding, like the wedding gowns, invitations, matrimonial bed, etc. The SC held that this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry A wedding has been formally set and all the preparations have been made, only for the groom to walk out 2 days before. This is contrary to good customs, since defendant acted in a reckless and oppressive manner.

36 Valenzuela Hardwood and Industial Supply Inc. vs Court of Appeals

On January 16, 1984 plaintiff Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply Inc. entered into an agreement with the defendantSeven Brothers whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel the formers lavan round logs. On January 20, 1984 plaintiff insured the loss and/or damages with defendant South Sea Surety and insured company for 2 million pesos on January 24, 1984, plaintiff gave the check in payment of the premium on the insurance policy. In the meantime, the said vessel sank on January 25, 1984 resulting in the loss of the plaintiffs insured logs. Plaintiff demanded payment of the proceeds and lost claim for the value of the lost logs to insurance company and Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation respectively to which both of them denied liability. After due hearing, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Both defendants appealed. The CA affirmed in part the RTC judgment by sustaining liability of South Sea Surety but modified it by holding that the Seven Brothers was not liable for the lost of the cargo. The CA held that the stipulation in

the character party that the ship owner would be exempted from liability in case of loss or even for negligence of its agent is valid. ISSUE: Whether or not patrimonial rights may be waived. HELD: As a general rule, patrimonial rights may be waived. In the case at bar, the waiver of petitioner per contractual stipulation and that it is solely responsible for any damage to the cargo, thereby exempting the private carrier from any responsibility for loss or damage thereto. The Supreme Court cited Article 6 of the Civil Code which states that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a person of a right recognized by law.

Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-56169 FACTS: Carlos Telosa who is
a fisherman and farmer with very limited education acquired a loan from the Rural Bank of Lucena. In exchange for the granted loan, his property located at Bo. Amugeria, Malunay, Quezon, with an area of fifty thousand square metres was mortgaged. Several months after the said transaction, the Rural Bank of Lucena became a distressed bank. The Monetary Board later decided to liquidate the Rural Bank of Lucena. Among the assets inventoried was the mortgaged property of Carlos Telosa. In the document shown in the records of the bank, it specified that the principal amount owed to them by Carlos Telosa was P5,000.00. Carlos Telosa fully aware of the fact that the obliged amount was only P300.00 not P500.00 submitted an affidavit in protest of the demand letter submitted to him. Claiming that payments did not satisfied the whole balance of P9,032.22, the Central Bank extra judicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and sell it in a public auction. To restrain the auction of the mortgaged property, a complaint was filed by the widow and children of Carlos Telosa before the Court of First Instance of Quezon seeking that the mortgage executed bu Carlos Telosa is null and void. ISSUE: Whether the extra judicial foreclosure of the property should continue? HELD: The court has ruled that the heirs of Carlos Telosa are entitled to the appeals they have submitted. Due to the fact that the contract entered upon by Carlos Telosa was anomalous in nature. This was proved by a receipt which served as evidence showing that the receive amount was on P300.00, and a testimony of Ponciano Mendoza who was present during the transaction stating that Carlos Telosa was made to sign blank forms by the Rural Bank of Lucena. This then proves that the said bank has taken advantage of the limited education of Carlos Telosa. Art 25 After doing an intensive research with the aid of the internet and the different books covering the civil code of the Philippines, I found out that article 25 which states that Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable institution has no jurisprudence provided by the supreme court. This provision was approved by the congress because they were aware of the anomalous and unquestionably shameful iniquities existing in our society and they are quite anxious that the social order be not unnecessarily jeopardized, especially during periods of national distress or emergency and economic difficulties by ostentatious display of wealth by the affluent. It was enforced by President Ferdinand Marcos during martial law through general order 15. GENERAL ORDER No. 15

WHEREAS, one of the objectives for the issuance of Proclamation No.1081, dated September 21, 1972, placing the entire country under martial law, is to effect social, economic and political reforms, and thus bring about the transformation of a new society in our country, one infused with a profound sense of discipline, and social conscience; WHEREAS, every citizen and resident of the Philippines should participate in bringing about anew and reformed society in our country; WHEREAS, every effort to save and economize on the nation's already scarce resources should be exerted; WHEREAS, among others, Article 25 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No.386) enjoins against thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of emergency; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No.1081, dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No.1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby call upon every resident and citizen of the Philippines, including all elective local officials from provincial governors and city mayors down to barrio captains and councilmen, to avoid and prevent, as the case may be, ostentatious display of wealth and extravagance, including lavish town fiestas or social gatherings. To this end, they are directed to limit town fiestas and other local festivities to one day, which should be as simple and economical as possible. All concerned, particularly the local executives aforementioned, are enjoined to comply with and to enforce this Order. Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.

37

Rongavilla vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 83974. August 17, 1998

Ponente: Justice Quisumbing Facts: The complainants in this case were Mercedes de la Cruz, age 60, and Florencia de la Cruz, age 71. Both are spinsters, uneducated in English, but knows how to read and write in Tagalog. They earned their livelihood as embroiderers and dressmakers. Both were living in house constructed in a parcel of land consisting of 131 square meters. On May, 1976, the complainants borrowed P2, 000 from Dolores Rongavilla, their niece, for the purpose of having their dilapidated roof repaired. After a month, one of the defendants, visited her aunts and asked them to sign a document which was written in English. When the complainants asked, in Tagalog, what the document was all about, the defendant replied that it was just a document admitting their debt of P2, 000. Hence the complainants signed it. After four years, Dolores Rongavilla asked the complainants to vacate the land claiming that she and her husband were already the owners of the land. It was only then that the sisters learned that what they have signed four years ago was a deed of sale of their property to the defendants. Then the complainants filed a complaint to declare the sale as null and void. Issue: Whether or not the Court should declare that the deed of sale to be void, due to the fraudulent nature in which the signature to the deed was secured. Held: Yes. The Court is of the opinion and so holds that there was fraud exercised by the defendants in securing the signature to the deed of sale. Undoubtedly the deed of sale is simulated, fictitious and void. TheCourt also declared that public policy

is also well served in defending the rights of the aged to legal protection, including their right to property that is their home, as against fraud, chicanery and abuse of trust and confidence by those who owed them respect and candor.

39 Quimiguing vs. Icao Case Digest

Quimiguing vs. Icao 34 SCRA 132 Facts: Carmen Quimiguing, a student, and Felix Icao, married, were neighbors. They had carnal intercourse several times until Carmen became pregnant. Assisted by her parents, she filed a claim for support at P120/month plus damages. Icao filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the child is yet unborn. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint, Carmen amended it but the trial court disallowed it. Issue: Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmens complaint. Held: Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it.

40JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO Case Digest

JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO Facts: Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building. Building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didnt want to leave so he left with his son, his sons wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez . As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days. Feb. 10, 1945: on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled that son outlived his mother. Issue: Order of death of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. Held:

Reversed.Art. 43 civil code: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or morepersons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges prior death of either must provethe allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place. In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died before his mother. The presumption that AJ died before her son was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.

Family code 2PT&T vs. NLRC Case Digest

PT&T vs. NLRC 272 SCRA 596 FACTS: PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies. ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee. HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code: ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage. The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

3Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals Case Digest

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [GR 107383, 20 FEBRUARY 1996]
Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Martins secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martins Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party.

Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

4Silverio vs Republic Case Digest

Silverio v. Republic GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007 Facts: Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first name in his birth certificate to facilitate his marriage with his fianc. A year before, Silverio has underwent sex re-assignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his first name from Rommel to Mely.
Issue: Should the court allow the change of name? Held:

No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex re-assignment, the determination of a persons sex at the time of birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. It held that while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. There is no special law in the country governing sex reassignment and its effect. (visit fellester.blogspot.com) This is fatal to petitioners cause. The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner will have serious and wide -ranging legal and public policy consequences, i.e., substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations and substantially affect the public policy in relation to women in laws such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code, etc.

5Republic vs. Cagandahan Case Digest

Republic vs. Cagandahan GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008 FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff. ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted. HELD: The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

6 Restituto Alcantara vs Rosita Alcantara

Restituto filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita alleging that on 8 Dec 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a fixer who could arrange a marriage for them before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got married on the same day. Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was again celebrated without the parties securing a marriage

license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. evidenced by acertification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case forconcubinage against Restituto. ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid. HELD: The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondentsmarriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites ofmarriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

7Balogbog vs Court of Appeals Case Digest

Balogbog vs. CA GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997 FACTS: Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their AuntLeoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents' estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu

City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed totheCourt of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower court's decision. Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They havethree children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito andGeneroso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the validity of the marriage betweentheir brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a policeinvestigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino. In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parent's marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoywho both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have threechildren. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriagecertificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war. On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence inAsturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that theoffice did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by AssistantMunicipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well. Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been provenin accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at thetime of the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by acertified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been keptor have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such asthat of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is alsosubmitted in evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalina's marriage is valid. HELD: Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavinoand Catalina's marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their grandparents' estate. The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect,having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of thatcode of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was broughtin the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related tovested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man anda woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would notmean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in this case evidenceconsisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino andCatalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and thatthey are recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
8 Madridejo v. Gonzalo de Leon Digests for Persons Compilation v1.0 > Madridejo v. Gonzalo de Leon February 9, 1909, Ross, J. Facts:

Flaviana Perez, a widow from a previous marriage to de Leon, lived with Pedro Madridejo and a son named Melecio was born to them. Three years later, the couple got married under circumstances of articulo mortis. The priest who solemnized the marriage failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the marriage can be considered valid. Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Persons Digests v1.0 Page No. 20 Yes, the failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate does not affect the validity of their marriage because it is only an irregularity of a formal requisite. (2) WON the marriage legitimized Melecio Madridejo. No. To be legitimized by a subsequent marriage of ones parents, a natural child must be acknowledged before or after the celebration of the said marriage. Plaintiff in this case did not meet these requirements and is thus void of legitimacy.

9 Morigo vs People of the Philippines Case Digest

Morigo vs. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004

Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith.

Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

11Araes vs. Judge Occiano Case Digest

Araes vs. Judge Occiano A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002 Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others.

Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioners right, upon Orobias death, to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment on the complaint. Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence. Issue: Whether or not respondents guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. Ruling: Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

12 NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY Case Digest

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY 259 SCRA 129

FACTS: Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He has submitted evidence in
relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadans wife has been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters that he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the parties. ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction. HELD: Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes presumptiv e death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted the joint affidavit

submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of t he judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
13 GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO,respondentOctober 2, 2001 FACTS:The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987.They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued adecree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australiancitizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. Intheir application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. SinceOctober 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets weredivided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former marriage only in November. On theother hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before theywere married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorcedecree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorceissued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwardedbefore the Supreme Court. ISSUES:1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia. RULING:The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. Inmixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows theformer to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by thealien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, maybe recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore,before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce asa fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic,issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance withthe rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree wasadmitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that itwas not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence,adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are twotypes of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merelysuspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondentprocured.Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrictremarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree a party to a marriage who marries again beforethis decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy. This shows that the divorceobtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to producesufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidencessubmitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the allegedforeign law.Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can notbe declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondents legalcapacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties marriage based on two existing marriage certificates

14 Cario vs Cario Case Digest

Susan Nicdao Cario vs. Susan Yee Cario GR No. 132529 FACTS: SPO4 Santiago CArio married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void; 2. Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage. HELD: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property.
15 ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARDUPTON, respondentsOctober 8, 1985 FACTS:Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Uptonis a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they establishedresidence in the Philippines. They had two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The private responded filedagainst petitioner stating that the petitioners business is a conjugal property of the parties andthat respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved todismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in thedivorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had nocommunity property as of June 11, 1982. ISSUE:Whether or not the private respondent as petitioners husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets? RULING:The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed. The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtaindivorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according totheir national law.From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce inNevada released private respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. Thus,pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He wouldhave no standing to sue in the case as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting hisright over the alleged conjugal property

16 Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera Case Digest

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653 Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper. Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal

action. Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
17 RP V. IYOY21 Sept. 2005 FACTS:After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, tothe care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasusreceived a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded thesaid request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely totheir children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel inCebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might notbe able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippinesseveral times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for thebrain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued tolive with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Felyherself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time theComplaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, andthere was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally allegedin his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishon or to the family, and clearlydemonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Suchincapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of thePhilippines ISSUE:Should the divorce obtained abroad by the Filipino wife be recognized as valid? RULING:Article 26 of the Family Code provides:"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force inthe country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in thiscountry, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38."WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLYCELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THEALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALLLIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurdand unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although thelatter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorceabroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbandscitizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art.26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embracesanother citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still beconsidered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants tothe former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does notexist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential maritalcovenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrentand will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couplegetting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage wascelebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the caseof respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she wasstill a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. Inthe same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time shefiled for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodiedin Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on familyrights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity,

even when she was already living abroad.Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipinospouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

18 Republic vs Orbecido III

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Par 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration but it was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Art 26 of the FC. HELD: In view of the foregoing, the SC states the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorcecapacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his w ifes naturalization he is still barred from remarrying.

20Ninal vs. Bayadog Case Digest

Nial vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122

Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.

Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.

Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.

Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.

In this case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.

The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as husband and wife.

Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

21Manzano vs. Sanchez Case Digest

Manzano vs. Sanchez A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

Facts: Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

Issues:

1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of the respondent falls under the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code.

2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Ruling: For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years and are without legal impediment to marry each other; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

22Republic vs Jose Dayot

Jose was introduced to Felisa in 1986. He later came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi. At the PCH, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about theirrelationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. sala of Felisas house. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, she said she does not know of such. Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of theirmarriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. In her pre-

trial

brief,

Felisa

expounded

that

while

her marriage to

Jose

was

subsisting,

the

latter

contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of theNational Statistics and Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument. The RTC ruled against Jose claiming that his story is impossible and that his action of fraud has already prescribed. It cited Article 87 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not the action to file an action to nullify a marriage due to fraud is subject to prescription. HELD: The OSG avers that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

23Reinel De Castro vs Annabelle De Castro

Reinel and Annabelle met and became sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage license in Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. On 13 Nov 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth, the mother has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice. On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City . In hercomplaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. Reinel denied his marriage with Annabelle claiming that themarriage is void ab initio

because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake. And that he was only forced by Annabelle to marry her to avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy sans marriage may bring her. The trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible. Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child. The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid. HELD: The attacked. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during crossexamination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriagehas no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. SC holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally

24 Republic v. Dagdag Feb. 9, 2001 (G.R. No. 109975),Quisumbing, J. Nature: Petition for a review on certiorari of adecision of the CA. Facts: Erlinda Matias (16) married AvelinoDagdag (20), Sept. 1, 1975 and hadtwo children. A week after thewedding, husband would oftentimesdisappear for months, indulge indrinking sprees, would return homedrunk and force his wife to submit tosexual intercourse with him. If she didnot comply, she was beaten. The lasttime Erlinda saw him was on Oct.1993. She later learned that he wasimprisoned but escaped from jail andwas now a fugitive. A certificate issuedby the Jail Warden on Feb. 14, 1990declared that he was still at-large. July 3, 1990 Erlina filed with the RTCOlangapo City a petition for judicialdeclaration of nullity of marriage onthe ground of psychological incapacityunder Article 36 of the Family Code.Dec. 17, 1990 RTC issued an Ordergiving the investigating prosecutoruntil Jan. 2, 1991 to presentcontroverting evidence. Although hefound that there was no collusion, heintended to intervene in the case toavoid fabrication of evidence.Dec. 27, 1990 RTC rendered adecision declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article36 of the Family Code. Jan. 29, 1991 Investigatingprosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that thedecision was prematurely renderedsince he was given till January 2, 1991to present controverting evidence. The OSG likewise filed a motion forreconsideration but the RTC denied itin Order dated Aug. 21, 1991 statingthat the fact that Avelino failed tos upport his family is a violation of essential marriage obligation in Art. 68of the Family Code. The OSG thenappealed to the CA whichconsequently affirmed the decision of the RTC (April 22, 1993). OSGpetitioned for review to the SC. Issues
WON the husband qualifies as beingpsychologically incapacitated on thebasis of the provision in Art. 36 of theFamily Code. Held/Ratio: No. Erlinda failed to comply with theevidentiary requirements 16 : particularlyguideline no. 2 which requires the rootcause of psychological incapacity to bemedically or clinically identified andsufficiently proven by experts, since nopsychiatrist or medical doctor testifiedas to the alleged psychologicalincapacity of her husband.Furthermore, the allegation that herhusband is a fugitive was notsufficiently proven. Petition by OSG is granted. Assailed decision by the CA is reversed and set aside. Notes: The guidelines governing theapplication and interpretation of psychological incapacity do not requirethat a physician examine the person tobe declared psychologicallyincapacitated what is important isthe presence of evidence that canadequately establish the partyspsychological condition.

25 CHI MING TSOI vs. CA and GINA LAO-TSO

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997 FACTS:

Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life. Ginas version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights. In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Chings mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited by her hu sband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husbands private parts nor did he see hers. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings examination was kept confidential up to this time. The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man Chings version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs. RATIO: The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. One of the essential marital oblig ations under the Family Code is to procreate children basedon the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not

any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

26 Santos vs. Ca Case Digest

Santos vs. Ca G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 FACTS: Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal. ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity? RULING: No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. PETITION IS DENIED

27Republic v. CA and Molina Case Digest

Republic v. CA and Molina GR 108763, 13 February 1997

Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her m arriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse. Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage. The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapac ity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of

the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State. The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

28 Brenda Marcos vs Wilson Marcos (G.R. No. 136490)

18

AUG

FACTS: Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos has psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the Court of Appeals ISSUES: 1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. 2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity. HELD: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidencepresented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditionsince qua non for such declaration.Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may haveresorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on hispart. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they areincurable.Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for aperiod of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support,and even left the family home.Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equallyimportant, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychologicalincapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined inMolina.

29 Kenneth Ngo Te vs Rowena Yu Te

Kenneth met Rowena in a Filipino-Chinese gathering on campus. They did not have interest with each other at first but they developed a certain degree of closeness due to the fact that they share the same angst with their families. In 1996, while still in college, Rowena proposed that they should elope. Kenneth initially refused on the ground that he is young and jobless but due to Rowenas persistence Kenneth complied bringing with him P80K. The money soon after disappeared and they found themselves forced to return to their respective home. Subsequently, Rowenas uncle brought the two before a court and had had them be married. After marriage, Kenneth and Rowena stayed with her uncles house where Kenneth was treated like a prisoner. Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home otherwise he will be disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was able to escape and he was hidden from Rowenas family. Kenneth later contacted Rowena urging her to live with his parents instead. Rowena however suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live together separately or just stay with her uncle. Kenneth however was already disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena said that it is better if they live separate lives from then on. Four years later, filed for an annulment of their marriage. Rowena did not file an answer. The City Prosecutor, after investigation, submitted that he cannot determine if there is collusion between the 2 parties hence the need to try the merits of the case. The opinion of an expert was sought wherein the psychologist subsequently ruled that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself. The trial court ruled that the marriage is void upon the ruling of the expert psychologist. The OSG appealed and the CA ruled in favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the psychological incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable (Molina case). The clinicalpsychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. All these were requirements set forth in the Molina case to be followed as guidelines. ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be admitted in lieu of the guidelines established in the landmark case of Molina. HELD: The SC ruled that admittedly, the SC may have inappropriately imposed a set of rigid rules in ascertaining PI. So much so that the subsequent cases after Molina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that there is not much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. The SC however is not abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely reemphasized that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of

petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 such as in the case at bar. The principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to both parties psychological disorder as evidenced by the finding of the expert psychologist. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity. Kenneth cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others. He is too dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the essential marital obligations as well due to her intolerance and impulsiveness.

30 Azcueta vs. Republic (G.R. No. 180668)

Facts: Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta averred that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Marietta complained that despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and always depended on his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It was Rodolfos mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the monthly rental. Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave Marietta money which actually came from Rodolfos mother. When Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told her his parents could support their needs. They had sex only once a month which Marietta never enjoyed. When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not ready for a child. When Marietta asked Rodolfo if they could move to another place, he did not agree and she was forced to leave and see if he would follow her. He did not. Rodolfos first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfos family, corroborated Mariettas testimony that Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and relied on the allowance given by his mother who also paid the rentals for the room the couple lived in. The psychiatrist who examined Marietta testified that she found the latter to be mature, independent, focused, responsible, had a direction and ambition in life, and was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Based on information gathered from Marietta, the same psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people. The psychiatrist explained that the root cause of the disorder was a cross-identification with Rodolfos mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that Rodolfos father, a seaman, wasalways out of the house. She added that the problem began during the early stages of Rodolfos life but manifested

only after his marriage. She stated that the problem was severe, because he would not be able take on the responsibilities of a spouse, and incurable, because it began in early development and had been deeply ingrained in his personality. She, thus,concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons on him. The City Prosecutor found no collusion between the parties. Based on the evidence presented by Marietta, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void ab initio. The Solicitor General appealed the RTCs decision, arguing that the psychiatric report was based solely on the information given by Marietta, and there was no showing that the alleged psychological disorder was present at the start of the marriage or that it was grave, permanent and incurable.The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs decision. Marietta, thus, brought the case to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to justify a declaration that his marriage to Marrieta is void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. Held: Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of his Dependent Personality Disorder. His marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio. Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her husbands psychological incapacity. As held in Marcos vs. Marcos [397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological in capacity. Mariettas testimony was corroborated in material points by Rodolfos close relative, and supported by the psychiatrists testimony linking the manifestations of Rodolfos psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of Mariettas factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by her expert witness. The root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity was alleged in the petition, medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by testimony of an expert witness with more than 40 years experience in the field of psychology and psychological incapacity, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009), (b)y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Rodolfos psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from the start of the marriage, Rodolfos irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. These manifestations of Rodolfos Dependent Personality Disorder mu st have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and a by-product of his upbringing and family life. Furthermore, Rodolfos psychological incapacity had been shown to be grave so as to render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals opinion that Rodolfos requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was a responsible realization since he was unemployed, were dismissed by the High Court for being speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court likewise disagreed with the Court of Appeals finding that Rodolfos irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother could be attributed to immaturity, noting that at the time of his marriage, Rodolfo was almost 29 years old. Also, the expert testimony identified a grave clinical or medical cause for Rodolfos abnormal behavior Dependent Personality Disorder. A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his importantdecisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te vs. Te, supra) One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic matters that spouses face every day; and one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse, is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent Personality Disorder is automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform his/her marital obligations. The court must evaluate the facts, as guided by expert opinion, and carefully examine the type of disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36. Finally, it has been established that Rodolfos condition is incurable, having been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years.

31 Lester Halili vs Chona Halili (G.R. No. 165424)

17

AUG

FACTS: This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010. Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not fake. Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage. Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not, psychological incapacity of the petitioner is a sufficient ground for the nullity of marriage. Whether or not decision of the Regional Trial Court should be reinstated. HELD: Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals. In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder as:
a personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioners mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real.

Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is REINSTATED.

32.LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZWIEGEL, respondentsAugust 19, 1986 FACTS:In an action filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City,herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage withherein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilias previous existing marriage to oneEduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. lilia while admitting the existence of said prior subsistingmarriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the issue agreed upon by bothparties was the status of the first marriage. ISSUE:Whether or not the marriage void or was it merely voidable. RULING:There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committedagainst both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merelyvoidable (Art 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet beenmade, it is clear that when she married respondent she was validly married to her first husband,consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID.There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her husband at the time they married each other, for them such a marriage though void still needsaccording to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposesshe would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage withrespondent Karl Heinz Wiegel), accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would beregarded VOID under the law.

34 Reinel De Castro vs Annabelle De Castro

Reinel and Annabelle met and became sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage license in Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. On 13 Nov 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth, the mother has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice. On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City . In hercomplaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. Reinel denied his marriage with Annabelle claiming that themarriage is void ab initio because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake. And that he was only forced by Annabelle to marry her to avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy sans marriage may bring her. The trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible. Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child. The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

HELD: The attacked.

SC

holds

that

the

trial

court

had

jurisdiction

to

determine

the

validity

of

the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during crossexamination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriagehas no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

35 Carlos vs Sandoval
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilos death, two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him. HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by thehusband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by thehusband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although themarriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application. Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriagevoid. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code,there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the

real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held
that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

36 MALLION vs ALCANTARA FACTS This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.Mallion was married to Alcantara and in 1995, Mallion filed a petition seeking thhenullification of their marriage by reason of psychological incapacity. Due to his failure tosufficiently prove the incapacity, the court denied the petition for nullification. Once again, in1999, he filed a petition for nullification of their marriage now by reason of lack of marriagelicense at the time the marriage was solemnized. Alcantara contested the petition by invoking res judicata and forum shopping. The petition was denied as well as the motion for reconsiderationsubsequently filed. ISSUE Whether or not the issue of marriage invalidity due to lack of marriage license may beraised when the nullification of marriage was also seeked by reason of psychological incapacity. RULING The court ruled in the negative. The concept of res judicata prohibits this. Res judicata isa bar due to prior judgment. In the present case the same relief is sought which is thenullification of marriage now for a different ground. Said issue has already been settled. In fact,in the first petition, Mallion claimed that their marriage was solemnized and celebrated inaccordance with law. This admission prevents him from taking a different stand in the presentcase where he claims otherwise. The court does not favor those who present their claims in pieces on different actions

37 Republic vs. Nolasco, GR No. 94053

Presumptive Death On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondents wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a in a bar in England. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique.

After the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. His efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica. On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monicas disappearance to the Philippine government authorities. The trial court granted Nolascos petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a well -founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, 2 and second, Nolascos attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead. HELD: In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decidion declaring that Parkera presumptive death is reversed, both decisions were nullified and set aside with costs against the respondent. BASIS: Article 1 of the Family Code Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. Note: While the Court understands the need of respondents young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution Article 149 of the Family Code The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.

38 Republic vs CA
Republic vs. CA GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005 FACTS:

Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents house but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-laws house and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife.

ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

HELD:

The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-inlaw about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in RTC.
40 G.R. No. 47101 April 25, 1941 GODOFREDO BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT, defendant-respondent

FACTS Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in September, and got married in Nov 26. On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her. On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin. The Lower court decided in favor of Luida. ISSUE Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage? HELD No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society rests. In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married. Decision: SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant 41 G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960 JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.

FACTS: Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955. ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code. HELD:

Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

42Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio 43 SCRA 177 FACTS: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights. HELD: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant

43
Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo digest ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921 FACTS: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived together as man and wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living separate from her husband. Marianos efforts to induce her to resume marit al relations were all in vain. Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave because of the cruel treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of separation be declared and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other HELD: NO. It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance.

49Valdes vs RTC
Valdes vs. RTC 260 SCRA 221 FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

50 Agapay vs. Palang Case DIgest

Agapay vs. Palang 276 SCRA 341

Facts: Article 87; Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Out their union was born Herminia Palang, respondent. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambales with his brother during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn, not with his wife or child. Miguel had also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good, he refused to live with his wife and child.

When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted his second marriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. As evidenced by deed of sale, both jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee.

To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Cornelia executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.

Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son and then two years later Miguel died. Thereafter, Carlina filed a complaint of concubinage on the previous party. Respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner contended that she had already given her half of the riceland property to their son and that

the house and lot is her sole property having bought with her own money. RTC affirmed in favor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was not by way of sale but was a donation and therefore void. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.
52 Gayon vs Gayon digest GAYON VS. GAYON FACTS: The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex "A" whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later than October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex "B" dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced thereon improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the aforementioned property. In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that Annex "A" to the complaint is fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever executed "any document of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor"; that the complaint is malicious and had embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of counsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least P200.00"; and that being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages. ISSUE : Whether or not the contention of the Mr.Gayon that an earnest effort toward a compromise before the filing of the suit is tenable. HELD: As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides: No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035. It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed or maintained between members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which: Family relations shall include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parent and child; (3) Among other ascendants and their descendants; (4) Among brothers and sisters.

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de Gayon. It is so ordered.

53 Hontiveros vs. RTC Case Digest

Hontiveros vs. RTC G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

Facts: The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson for damages due to uncollected rentals on a land located at Jamindan, Capiz.

Petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private respondents answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint. Private respondents opposed the motion alleging that they had denied petitioners claims and thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only be resolved after trial.

The trial court denied petitioners motion. After an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both parties, pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that the defendants in their answer specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also because the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof, however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegations refer to the amount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. The court dismissed the case and petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their motion was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath that earnest efforts toward compromise were made prior to filing thereof.

Ruling: Petition was granted. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and

children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.

Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

54Tribiana vs. Tribiana

G.R. No. 137359 Facts:thi s i s a peti ti on f or hab ea s c orpu s f i l ed by re sp on dent Lou rde s T r i b i a n a against her husband petitioner Edwin Tribiana. In her petition, respondent claimsthat petitioner left their conjugal home with their daughter and has since deprivedher of lawful custody.Petioner mov ed to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petition f ailed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing as requiredby Article 151 of the family code. The RTC denied edwins motion, hence this petition. Issue: whether or no the f ailure to indicate in her petition f pr habeas corpus that the parties exerted efforts to reach a compromise is a ground for the dismissal of said petition. Held:although respondent failed to allege that she resorted to comp[ro m i s e proceedings bef ore filing the petition, attaching a barangay certification to f ileaction, nonethelss ef f ectively established that parties tried to compromise butwere unsuccessful.I n a d d i t i o n , t h e f a i l u r e o f a p a r t y t o c o m p l y w i t h c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t i s n o t jurisdictional defect.Moreov er, in habeas corpus proceedings inv olving the welf are and custody of achild of tender years, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody. Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving suchchild full protection. G.R. No. 137359 September 13, 2004 EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner,vs.LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondentFACTS: Edwin Tribiana & Lourdes Tribiana are husband and wife. Lourdes filed a petition forhabeas corpus before the Regional Trial Court claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter Khriza Mae 1 year and 4 months old it turned out that it being held by Edwins mother, Rosalina Tribiana.Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes petition on the ground that it failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss that there were prior efforts at a compromise but failed. Lourdes attached the Certification to file Action from theirbarangay. RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring Edwin and his mother to bring Khriza Mae before the RTC. Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari. The CA denied Edwins petition and also the motion for reconsideration. ISSUE:

Whether the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, should have dismissed the petition for habeascorpus on the ground of failure to comply with the condition precedent under art. 151 of Familycode. HELD: The petition is lack of merit, for the habeas corpus on the ground of failure to comply withthe article 151 of Family Code, can not be allowed such to dismiss such with the compliance of art.151 because they are both different in nature. The petition for habeas corpus is a valid groundor contention of the respondent because she was deprived of personal liberty. The art. 151 cannot 38be applied with this present case, if ever it were supposed to be applied, Lourdes validly answer itwith its compliance when she attached the court to file action from their Barangay 55 Andal vs. Macaraig

Andal vs. Macaraig Case Digest

89 Phil 165

Facts: Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad litem, brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines Sur. The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved.

Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. Maria Dueas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal.

Issue: Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.

Ruling: Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano. It is already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. It is also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof.

57 Jison vs. CA Case Digest

Jison vs. CA G.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998

Facts: Monina alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison. At the end of 1945, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of Franciscos daughter. As a result, Monina was born in Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family. Monina further alleged that Francisco gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a CPA and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of Francisco's refusal to expressly recognize her, Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that Francisco support and treat her as such.

Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then. Further, he never recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, Francisco contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint. Issue: Whether or not Monina Jison is the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the latter's own acts and those of his family. Ruling: SC affirmed the decision of CA in recognizing Monina as illegitimate daughter of Francisco. All told, Monina's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open and continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws". Moreover, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

58 Maria Alicia LEUTERIO, petitioner vs.

COURT OF APPEALS & Heirs of Benitio Leuterio, respondents [May 23, 1991]

Facts: Ana Maglanque used to be one of Pablo Leuterios domestic servants & later his mistress. They eventually married on Feb. 25, 1950. June 15, 1950: Pablo died in San Luis, Pampanga leaving behind a large estate consisting of several parcels of land w/c were all left w/Ana who took possession of & administered the estate. Patrocinio Apostol, Pablos niece filed a petition w/CFI Pampanga for her appointment as Ma. Alicia Leuterios guardian (then 16 yrs old) alleged to be the legitimated daughter of Pablo Benito Leuterio, Pablos bro (full blood) filed a petition in the same court praying for his appointment as administrator. He alleged that Pablo died w/o a will & he was survived by Benito & their other siblings as well as the descendants of their siblings. He further claimed that Pablo died a widower & alleged legitimated daughter was w/o basis in fact & law. Ana & Alicia (represented by Patrocinio) opposed. After hearing, Ana was appointed administratrix. Alicias claims: 1. shes the natural daughter of Ana & Pablo since she was conceived at the time when her parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other. 2. she presented sufficient evidence to merit judicial declaration of compulsory recognition of her status as Pablos natural child 3. she was legitimated by her parents marriage 9 yrs after her birth Alicia amended her petition, further claiming that since her birth up to the time of Pablos death, she enjoyed an uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of Pablo & Ana. She presented indubitable writings wherein Pablo allegedly expressly acknowledged her as his daughter. Probate Court: dismissed petition for lack of basis & merit. Evidence presented were incompetent, spurious & unpersuasive. CA: affirmed probate courts decision. Findings: 1. Alicias certificate of record of birth was spurious. 2. It did not give credence to the testimonies of witnesses Gervacio Bagtas & Paula Punzalan (teachers in Alicias school) & Don Sotero Baluyut. 3. Rejected the claim that Alicia has been in possession of the status of natural child before & after her parents marriage. 4. Birth & baptismal certificates and photos dont bear Pablos signature expressing his acknowledgment of Alicia. 5. Alicia was born, reared & raised in Pablos house. Pablo had no child w/previous wife & its normal for him to look upon Alicia as if she were his own daughter. 6. Theres an absolute lack of document/writing such as receipts of payment of school fees in the name of Pablo, signatures in school cards, letter to relatives/friends recognizing Alicia as his daughter despite lapse of 9 yrs fr Alicias birth to his death. ISSUE: WON Alicia is the legitimated daughter of Pablo & Ana. HELD: NO. CA decision affirmed. RATIO: 1. According to Alicias counsel, desired relief is: not voluntary acknowledgment in the sense that the decedent didnt execute a pub document expressly 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. acknowledging Alicia as his natural child because we believe that a public document is one of the evidence of compulsory acknowledgment. Voluntary: acknowledgment of a child by the father. Compulsory: instituted by child against the father to compel dad to acknowledge him as a natural child, tolerated by dad & justified by dads direct acts, does not of itself constitute evidence of acknowledgment that he is so in effect. Evidence to compel dad to acknowledge child. Should be w/in time prescribed by old CC Art. 137. Applicable laws: a. Father of a natural child may recognize it in 2 different ways: by voluntary recognition (CC Art. 131) or by an involuntary recognition enforced by either a civ or criml action (CC Art. 135) b. Voluntary recognition may be made: a) in the record of births, b) by will, c) by any other pub instrument. (CC Art. 131) c. Involuntary recognition may be made by: a)an incontrovertible paper written by parent expressly recognizing his paternity, b) giving child status of a natural child of father justified by direct act of the dad or his family, [CC Art. 135] and c)a criminal action for rape, seduction or abduction [RPC Art. 440, par. 2] Recognition must be precise, express & solemn (Lim v. CA) whether voluntary or compulsory (Baron v. Baron). This being a case of involuntary/compulsory recognition, lower courts held that petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence needed to prove dads involuntary recognition of child. CC Art. 283 provides that recognition may be compelled if child has in his favor any evidence or proof that defendant is his father. CA ruled that its not retroactive whereas

petitioner contends that it is. Its actually immaterial considering that both the Probate Court & the CA rejected in its entirety petitioners evidence as insufficient, unpersuasive & spurious.

63Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda Case Digest

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil. 252 Facts: Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action. Issue: Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile. Ruling: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

66 Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals & Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos (G.R. No. 112019)

18

AUG

FACTS: Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court. ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar. HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party

antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

70Tamargo vs. CA Case Digest

Tamargo vs. CA 209 SCRA 518

Facts: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.

Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant petition.

Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time.

Ruling: SC granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.
71 Gutierrez vs Gutierrez (1931)

Facts: On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attemptingto pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Pias. Thediver of the car is an 18 y/o boy, son of the cars owners. It was found by the trial court that both the boyand the driver of the autobus were negligent by which neither of them were willing to slow up and give theright of way to the other. Plaintiff is the passenger of the bus who as a result of the incident fractured hisright leg to his damage and prejudice. Thus, plaintiff sued the boy, his parents as owners of the car, thebus driver and its owner for damages. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff.Hence, this appeal. Issue: How should civil liability be imposed upon parties in the case at bar? Held: The case is dealing with the civil liability of parties for obligations which arise from fault or negligence.For the boy, it is his father who is liable (based on culpa aquiliana) to the plaintiff because of the followingconditions; first, the car was of general use of the family, second, the boy was authorized or designatedby his f ather to run the car, third, at the time of the collision the car is used f or the purpose not of the childs pleasure but that of the other members of the car owners family members. The theory of the law isthat the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of theowners business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant.For the chauffer and the bus owner (based on culpa contractual), their liability rests upon the contract (thesafety that is assured by the operator upon the passenger) whereas that degree of care expected fromthe chauffer is lacking

1.

72 Elcano vs Hill
El Cano vs HillFacts: Def enda nt Regi nal d Hi l l , a m i n o r , m a r r i e d a t t h e t i m e o f t h e o c c u r r e n c e , k i l l e d A g a p i t o . H e w a s appreh end ed and charged appropriately before CFI. He acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.Thereupon, the parent s of Agapito, filed a complaint for recovery of

damages against the defendant andhis father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing byReginald of the son of the plaintiffs.Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: first, the civil action is barred by the acquittal of Reginald, and; second, the father cannot be held liable for the act of his son because the latter is alreadymarried at the time of the commission, thus, is already emancipated. Issues: W hether or not quasi-delict is restricted to negligence and cannot apply to voluntary acts or omissionsproducing injury ( or felony)?Whether or not a father may be held liable for the act of his emancipated child constituting quasi-delict? Held: No. To repeat the Barredo case, under Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequ ent civil action, not for civil liabilityarising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi - delict or culpa aquiliana although it mentions the word negligence but according to Justice Bocobo it must be construed according to thespirit that giveth lift - rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawm a ker should beobserved in applying the same. Criminal prosecution and civil action are two different things.On the second issue (obsolete), Yes, the father may be held liable. While it is true that marriage of a childem ancipates him from the parental authority of his parents, what matters really is whether or not suchminor is completely emancipated as defined by law. In the case at bar, his emancipation is only partial for as provided by law he can sue and be sued in court with the assistance of his parents, he cannot managehis own properties without the approval of his parents, and third as in the facts, he relies for subsistencefrom his parents.