Você está na página 1de 58

170977266.

doc 2K9

Dartmouth

2AC Afghanistan Good Blocks


***TOPICALITY***................................................................................................................................................. 2 50% T....................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Combat T.................................................................................................................................................................. 4 ***CASE***.............................................................................................................................................................. 5 AT: Squo Solves....................................................................................................................................................... 6 AT: Stability............................................................................................................................................................. 7 AT: Withdrawal Bad................................................................................................................................................ 8 AT: Pakistan Turn.................................................................................................................................................. 10 ***COUNTERPLANS***........................................................................................................................................ 11 Balancing CP.......................................................................................................................................................... 12 Consult NATO........................................................................................................................................................ 14 Consult Japan......................................................................................................................................................... 16 Eradication PIC...................................................................................................................................................... 18 Legalize CP............................................................................................................................................................. 19 Legalize CP Not Popular..................................................................................................................................... 21 Surge CP................................................................................................................................................................. 23 DOD CP.................................................................................................................................................................. 24 ***DISADS***........................................................................................................................................................ 25 Allied Proliferation DA.......................................................................................................................................... 26 Appeasement Terrorism DA............................................................................................................................... 28 Appeasement China DA..................................................................................................................................... 30 Compensation DA (ABL)....................................................................................................................................... 32 Compensation DA (FCS)........................................................................................................................................ 34 CMR DA................................................................................................................................................................. 36 Politics Jobs Bill................................................................................................................................................. 40 Politics Midterms Obama Good (Cap and Trade)..............................................................................................42 Politics - Midterms Obama Bad (SKFTA).............................................................................................................44 Redeployment Afghanistan DA............................................................................................................................. 45 Taliban Negotiation DA......................................................................................................................................... 46 Terrorism DA......................................................................................................................................................... 47 1AR Extension........................................................................................................................................................ 49 ***KRITIKS***...................................................................................................................................................... 50 Security................................................................................................................................................................... 51 Fem IR.................................................................................................................................................................... 55 Terror Talk............................................................................................................................................................. 57

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

***TOPICALITY***

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

50% T
1. We meet: counter-insurgency troops are the driving force behind Afghanistan troop deployment; means its more than 50% of troops thats why Afghanistan is always in the news 2. The neg has no evidence saying were less than 50% of troops dont buy their analytics 3. Counter interpretation Substantially means large in size or importance Cambridge Dictionary of American English 2000 substantial/adj large in size, value or importance. He took a substantial amount of money. They do a substantial portion of
their business by phone

4. Standards A. Predictability dictionary definitions are good because accessible and intuitive B. Contextual definitions are bad their definition proves The military has no contextual definition for substantially the bill your evidence talks about never passed MilitaryDictionary.org 2008, http://www.military-dictionary.org/substantial cp Definition Of: Substantial There is no definition for this term. C. Education broad topic knowledge good key to real world application 5. Brightline theres no brightline for what a substantially increase means key to fairness 6. Default to reasonability good should be good enough there is lit and clash which is key to a good debate 7. T is not a voter you shouldnt vote on potential abuse

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

Combat T
1. We meet: counter-insurgency troops share the same doctrines as non-combatant troops Karsten Friis, 2/2010, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Peacekeeping and Counter-insurgency Two of a Kind? in
International Peacekeeping Vol 17 Issue 1 This article demonstrates that there are more similarities between peacekeeping and counter-insurgency than often recognized. In today's 'war among the people', the counter-insurgent cannot succeed with offensive military capabilities alone and must seek to apply also non-kinetic and defensive methods; whereas the peacekeeper often is forced to apply 'robust' and kinetic means to implement a mandate . As a result, the two concepts seem to be converging and share some commonalities. The article compares the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 'capstone doctrine' and the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual to argue that the two

doctrines share similarities in six areas: (1) a focus on civilian solutions; (2) a need for protection of civilians; (3) international coherence; (4) host-nation ownership; (5) use of intelligence in support of operations; (6) limitations on the use of force. The article suggests areas where the two doctrines could mesh with
each other.

2. Presence includes all deployed troops. MacMillan Dictionary 2010 [Macmillan Publishers Limited, "definition of presence," accessed June 2010 | VP] a. a group of people, especially soldiers or the police, who are in a place for a particular purpose
We intend to maintain a presence in the country until there is peace. military/police presence: There is still a large U.S. military presence in the region.

3. Solves limitsmilitary presence is limited to four topic areas- their interpretation allows vague actions like defending US interests, gaining intelligence, training troops, and improving inter-operability of U.S forces. Intelligence gathering alone makes CIA operations into Pakistan topical. 4. Limits are a pre-requisite to precision- a precise definition is determined by how adequately and clearly it distinguishes between topical and untopical cases. 5. Research burden inevitable- combat troops just becomes a counterplan. Prefer as aff. ground. a. Resolution basis- ignoring combat troops nullifies one third of the resolution because Afghanistan and Iraq are considered theatres of combat b. Combat troops key to solve relations- these are at the core of the topic and key to clash and education over hegemony and the USs role in the world. 6. Reasonability: If we have contextual literature, were reasonably topical. Competing interpretations is designed to arbitrarily exclude the aff, killing topic-specific education 7. T isnt a voter cant vote on potential abuse

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

***CASE***

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

AT: Squo Solves


1. Extend BBC News ev Obama will NOT adhere to the pullout timeline July is just a date to begin a transition phase at best he wants to maintain a hard power approach 2. Immediate Withdrawal Goodtroops are counter-productive and drones are able to do the job Zachary 10/09 G. Pacal Zachary, former senior staff writer for the Wall Street Journal, editor of In These Times, 10/9/2009. [In
These Times, Get Out Now: The Case for an Immediate Withdrawal from Afghanistan]. Yet the case for withdrawing from Afghanistan makes tactical, strategic and moral sense, chiefly because legitimate U.S. security needs can be achieved more effectively through other means. As Bacevich has written, In Afghanistan today, the United States and its allies are using the wrong means to vigorously pursue the wrong mission. If there is a right mission in Afghanistan , it can only be to deny al-Qaeda and its friends the opportunity to attack Americans at home and abroad. After eight years in Afghanistan, U.S. troops (aided by much smaller forces from Britain, Germany, Canada, Italy and other allied countries) havent accomplished this. Yet

targeted attacks by U.S. and allied forces are killing terrorists, highlighting an alternative to ground troops and an Afghan quagmire.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

AT: Stability
1. Nationbuilding in Afghanistan solves instability concerns- their evidence doesnt assume the plan Regehr 2007 [Ernie, Adjunct Prof. Peace and Conflict Studies @ Conrad Grebel U College - U of Waterloo, "It's not really a
matter of hate," Centre for International Governance Innovation, May 9, http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2007/5/its-not-really-matterhate]

Conflicts in which the rights and political/social viability of particular communities are central issues are not evidence of ethnic chauvinism or of hatred for "the other". Such conflicts are reflections of a more fundamental social conflict, borne out of a community's experience of economic inequity, political discrimination, human rights violations, and pressures generated by environmental degradation. Identity conflicts emerge with intensity when a community loses confidence in mainstream political
institutions and processes and, in response to unmet basic needs for social and economic security, resolves to strengthen its collective influence and to struggle for political recognition as a community. In Afghanistan , in other words, achieving relative peace is not a matter of overcoming age-old hatreds; it

is more a matter of addressing communal and regional wariness. The southern Pashtun are of course wary of a Kabul Government that has been constructed in such a way that it is regarded as unable , or at least unlikely, to understand and cater to the needs and interests of all Afghans. You don't defeat that wariness; it has to be dispelled through concrete acts of inclusion and accommodation. Military commanders, Afghan and NATO, make the point, over and over again, that the struggle in
Afghanistan is not ultimately a military struggle, but neither they nor their respective political masters have yet managed the wit or the will to give priority to the non-military struggle.

Behind ethnic or communal or regional conflicts are basic economic, social, and political grievances. Failure to redress them has made group solidarity an increasingly attractive political strategy, throw some religious zeal and easy-to-use and easy-to-get small arms into the mix and the result is persistent social/political chaos and public violence - conditions that can be expected to bestir hatred, but that makes it a symptom not a cause. Does it make a difference that conflict is much more likely to be rooted in distrust than hate? Yes it does - a lot. It means solving conflict doesn't require a change in human nature, just in human institutions. And institutions can be built, and built to function according 2. Their evidence doesnt cite NATO, only the Dutch. And, the Dutch troops are being withdrawal pre-plan it is unlikely that they would change their strategy 3. Withdrawal solves the impact- insurgencies are only fueled by US occupation; once we leave they lose their recruiting base

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

AT: Withdrawal Bad


1. Withdraw now A. NATO is falling apart and Afghanistan troops are the key point in their cohesion B. Warlords are gaining more and more control we need to pull out now to stop them from gaining more power from peasant drug money 2. Original critics of a fast pullout now believe that withdrawing is the best option Dimascio 6/29 Jen Dimascio, Staff writer for Politico, 6/29/2010. Chairman Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) voiced his support for the July 2011 date, arguing it provides an incentive for the Afghans to assume responsibility for their own security. Levin has also been a critic of how fast security forces have been trained and whether enough security forces are positioned in Kandahar, an upcoming offensive Levin considers critical. Within four months of his confirmation, Petraeus
pledged to review the size of the Afghan security forces. I will make my own assessment of the need for any increase, provide that recommendation to the U.S. and NATO chains of command, and continually assess the appropriate size and structure of the ANSF to ensure that we do all possible to enable transition of security tasks to Afghan forces as soon as is possible, he said.

3. Withdrawal goodwithdrawing from Afghanistan allows the US to focus on more important issues Smith 11/09 Lee Smith, Staff writer for the Hudson Institute, Chasing Ghosts, 11/26/2009. Think of it like this: if the Americans are obliged to stay and fight in Afghanistan because if they dont Osama Bin Laden will call them cowards, then where else will Americas enemies draw the battle lines? Yemen? Somalia? Venezuela? Instead of focusing its energies on strategically important venues , like Iran for instance, the US will spread its forces thin and get dragged into battles of someone elses design. If all of the USs enemies were to join together and plot for a year they could not dictate a disinformation campaign as destructive as the one the Americans have forced upon themselves: your enemy is not the Middle Eastern regimes and their regional assets that war against you openly, but is rather bearded men in dark caves who embody radical Islam. Keep chasing ghosts, you infidel dogs, while we fight for real strategic interests,
like oil, ports and states.

4. Immediate withdrawal helps Pakistan to eradicate terrorism Zachary 10/09 G. Pacal Zachary, former senior staff writer for the Wall Street Journal, editor of In These Times, 10/9/2009. [In
These Times, Get Out Now: The Case for an Immediate Withdrawal from Afghanistan]. An end to war in Afghanistanand increased stability as a consequence of peaceful co-existence with the Taliban would benefit Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants are believed to be living in a remote city. Secular political forces in Pakistan, which possesses nuclear weapons, are battling to keep the country out of the hands of religious fundamentalists who already exert profound influence. Anti-American feeling is extraordinarily high

in Pakistan; even secular elites blame Americans for inflaming and exaggerating their domestic problems. The U.S. government, which is currently debating how much to increase financial assistance to Pakistan, would provide more effective help without troops in Afghanistan. 5. Withdraw necessaryUS troops are becoming counter-productive Innocent 9 Malou Innocent, member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies specializing in the Middle East and the
Persian Gulf Region, December 2009. [Cato Institute, Should the United States Withdraw from Afghanistan?] The issue is not whether we can but whether we should. Only recently has the debate moved to this question. Should we remain in Afghanistan? The answer when stacked against our objective of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda is clearly no. Going after al Qaeda does not require a large-scale, long-term military presence for several reasons. First, we must keep in mind that the military is wonderful for killing bad guys with disproportionate firepower, destroying enemy troop formations, or bombing command centers, but not for finding

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

AT: Withdrawal Bad


hidden killers. The scalpel of intelligencesharing and close cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies has done more to round up suspected terrorists than the sledgehammer of military force. Second, whether we withdraw or whether we stay, al Qaeda can twist our choice into a victory . If we withdraw, we appear weak even
though America is responsible for almost half of the world's military spending, can project its power to the most inaccessible corners of the globe, and wields one of the planet's largest nuclear arsenals. But America also looks weak if it remains in the region too long. The military will appear bogged down, the strategy aimless, and, despite our best efforts, military operations will continue to kill Afghan civilians , eroding support for our presence among the population. Third, our policy toward Afghanistan is undermining core U.S. interests in

Pakistan. Drone operations have successfully killed a number of high-value targets and may have seriously degraded al Qaeda's global capabilities . But our policies are also pushing the region's powerful jihadist insurgency over the border into Pakistan. As early as 2007, in response to repeated Pakistani army
incursions, along with a growing number of U.S. missile strikes, an amalgamation of over two dozen tribal-based groups calling themselves "the Taliban" began to emerge in the Pakistani border region. Unfortunately, present U.S. policy is pushing militants deeper into Pakistani cities, strengthening the very jihadist forces we seek to defeat, and pressing this weak but nuclear-armed country in the direction of civil war. Nonetheless, I think perhaps the worst thing we can do is turn our back on this region entirely. That's what we did after nearly a decade of funding the mujahedeen, and we paid for it dearly eight years ago. But there are costs to remaining in the region, not simply

in manpower and resources, but in giving al Qaeda what it wants, pushing the conflict into Pakistan, and looking weak by remaining and possibly accomplishing little. America should scale down its combat
presence, continue open relations and intelligence sharing with all countries in the region, deploy Special Forces for discrete operations against specific targets, and engage in intensive surveillance as it already does today.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

10

AT: Pakistan Turn


1. In the status quo, there will be a coup in Pakistan its try or die for the aff to solve 2. Plan solves only chance for Pakistani instability is spill over from Afghanistan solving Afghan instability solves for Pakistani escalation 2. Immediate withdrawal helps Pakistan to eradicate terrorism Zachary 10/09 G. Pacal Zachary, former senior staff writer for the Wall Street Journal, editor of In These Times, 10/9/2009. [In
These Times, Get Out Now: The Case for an Immediate Withdrawal from Afghanistan]. An end to war in Afghanistanand increased stability as a consequence

of peaceful co-existence with the Talibanwould benefit Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants are believed to be living in a remote city. Secular political forces in Pakistan, which possesses nuclear weapons, are battling to keep the country out of the hands of religious fundamentalists who already exert profound influence. Anti-American feeling is extraordinarily high in Pakistan; even secular elites blame Americans for inflaming and exaggerating their domestic problems. The U.S. government , which is currently debating how much to increase financial assistance to Pakistan , would provide more effective help without troops in Afghanistan.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

10

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

11

***COUNTERPLANS***

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

11

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

12

Balancing CP 1. The un-underlined part of their Page evidence says that the call for a troop surge wouldnt be enough, this contradicts their argument of implying an offshore approach 2. Their card is a generic US occupation bad card; prefer our solvency evidence that is specific to our advantages- they provide no counterplan solvency 3. Perm Do Both- The aff embraces an offshore approach; we withdraw troops to advocate a strategy of mitigated involvement 4. The perm solves best- A reduction in counter-terrorist force posture coupled with a focus on nation-building and offshore balancing curtails Anti-American backlash and facilitates stability.
Pape 2009 [Robert A., Prof. Poli. Sci. @ UChicago, former Prof. Int'l Relations @ Dartmouth, To Beat the Taliban, Fight From
Afar, October 14, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/opinion/15pape.html?_r=1 | VP]

AS President Obama and his national security team confer this week to consider strategies for Afghanistan, one point seems clear: our current military forces cannot win the war . Gen. Stanley
McChrystal, the top American commander there, has asked for 40,000 or more additional United States troops, which many are calling an ambitious new course. In truth, it is not new and it is not bold enough. America will best serve its

interests in Afghanistan and the region by shifting to a new strategy of off-shore balancing, which relies on air and naval power from a distance, while also working with local security forces on the ground. The reason for this becomes clear when one examines the rise of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in recent years. General McChrystals own report explains that American and NATO military forces themselves are a major cause of the deteriorating situation, for two reasons. First, Western forces have become increasingly viewed as foreign occupiers; as the report puts it, over-reliance on firepower and force protection have severely damaged the International Security Assistance Forces legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people. Second, the central government led by Americas chosen leader, Hamid Karzai, is thoroughly corrupt and viewed as illegitimate: Local Afghan communities are unable to hold local officials accountable through either direct elections or judicial processes, especially when those individuals are protected by senior government officials. Unfortunately, these political facts dovetail strongly with developments on the battlefield in the last few years. In 2001, the United States toppled the
Taliban and kicked Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan with just a few thousand of its own troops, primarily through the combination of American air power and local ground forces from the Northern Alliance. Then, for the next several years, the United States and NATO modestly increased their footprint to about 20,000 troops, mainly limiting the mission to guarding Kabul, the capital. Up until 2004, there was little terrorism in Afghanistan and little sense that things were deteriorating. Then, in 2005, the United States and NATO began to systematically extend their military

presence across Afghanistan. The goals were to defeat the tiny insurgency that did exist at the time, eradicate poppys crops and encourage local support for the central government. Western forces were deployed in all major regions, including the Pashtun areas in the south and east, and today have ballooned to more than 100,000 troops. As Western occupation grew , the use of the two most worrisome forms of terrorism in Afghanistan suicide attacks and homemade bombs escalated in parallel. There were no recorded suicide attacks in Afghanistan before 2001. According to data I have collected, in the immediate
aftermath of Americas conquest, the nation experienced only a small number: none in 2002, two in 2003, five in 2004 and nine in 2005. But in 2006, suicide attacks began to increase by an order of magnitude with 97 in 2006, 142 in 2007, 148 in 2008 and more than 60 in the first half of 2009. Moreover, the overwhelming percentage of the

suicide attacks (80 percent) has been against United States and allied troops or their bases rather than

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

12

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

13

Balancing CP
Afghan civilians, and nearly all (95 percent) carried out by Afghans. The pattern for other terrorist attacks is
almost the same. The most deadly involve roadside bombs that detonate on contact or are set off by remote control. Although these weapons were a relatively minor nuisance in the early years of the occupation, with 782 attacks in 2005, their use has shot up since to 1,739 in 2006, nearly 2,000 in 2007 and more than 3,200 last year. Again, these attacks have for the most part been carried out against Western combat forces, not Afghan targets. The picture is clear: the more

Western troops we have sent to Afghanistan, the more the local residents have viewed themselves as under foreign occupation, leading to a rise in suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. (We see this
pattern pretty much any time an outside armed force has tried to pacify a region, from the West Bank to Kashmir to Sri Lanka.) So as General McChrystal looks to change course in Afghanistan, the priority should be not to

send more soldiers but to end the sense of the United States and its allies as foreign occupiers. Our purpose in Afghanistan is to prevent future attacks like 9/11, which requires stopping the rise of a new generation of anti-American terrorists, particularly suicide terrorists, who are super-predators able to kill large numbers of innocent people. What motivates suicide attackers, however, is not the existence of a terrorist sanctuary, but the presence of foreign forces on territory they prize. So its little surprise that Western forces in Afghanistan have provided a key rallying point for the insurgency, playing a central role in the Talibans recruitment campaign and propaganda, which threaten not only our troops there but also our homeland. The presence of our troops also works against the stability of the central government, as it can rely on Western protection rather than work harder for popular support. Fortunately, the United States does not need to station large ground forces in Afghanistan to keep it from being a significant safe haven for Al Qaeda or any other anti-American terrorists. This can be achieved by a strategy that relies on over-the-horizon air, naval and rapidly deployable ground forces, combined with training and equipping local groups to oppose the Taliban. No matter what happens in Afghanistan, the United States is going to maintain a strong air and naval presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean for many years, and these forces are well suited to attacking terrorist leaders and camps in conjunction with local militias just as they did against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in 2001. The United States has a strong history of working with local groups, particularly the Tajiks and Uzbeks of the old Northern Alliance, who would ensure that the Taliban does not recapture Kabul and the northern and western regions of Afghanistan . And should more substantial threats arise, our offshore forces and allies would buy time and protect space for Western ground forces to return. Further, the United States and its allies have made some efforts to lead Pashtun tribal militias in the southern and eastern areas to abandon their support for the Taliban and, if not switch to Americas side, to at least stay neutral. For instance, the largest British gains in the southwest
came from winning the support of Mullah Salam, a former Taliban commander who is the district governor of Musa Qala.

Early this year the United States started what it calls the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program, offering monthly stipends to tribal and local leaders in exchange for their cooperation against the Taliban insurgency. The program is financed at too low a level approximately $20 million a year to compete with alternatives that the Taliban can offer like protection for poppy cultivation that is worth some $3 billion a year. One reason we can expect a strategy of local empowerment to work is that this is precisely how the Taliban is gaining support. As General McChrystals report explains, there is little ideological loyalty between the local Pashtuns and the Taliban, so the terrorists gain local support by capitalizing on vast unemployment by empowering the young and disenfranchised through cash payments, weapons, and prestige. Well have to be more creative and rely on larger economic and political carrots to win over the hearts and minds of the Pashtuns. Changing strategy does not mean that the United States can withdraw all its military power from Afghanistan immediately. As we are now seeing in Iraq, changing to an approach that relies less on ground power and more on working with local actors takes time . But it is the best strategy for Afghanistan. Otherwise we will continue to be seen and mistrusted as an occupying power, and the war will be lost.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

13

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

14

Consult NATO
1. Some NATO countries will say no Hook 08-contributor to the International Studies Review journal (December 2008, Steven, Review: Falling out: The United States in the Global
Community, International Studies Review, Vol. 10 No. 4, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121520292/PDFSTART, BD)

This European discontent is the subject of Giovanna DellOrtos provocative book, The Hidden Hand of the American Dream. Her central argument is that the United States has long been admired by Europeans as an imagined community that is more a concept than a country. Specifically, the United States has been historically

perceived in Europe as a land of plenty of opportunity that beckons people of goodwill everywhere (p. 7). But this exceptionalist view was ruptured on two occasions: during the Spanish American War and during the Bush administrations war on terror. In both cases, she finds, self-serving and aggressive US actions contradicted the governments moralistic rhetoric. As a result, many Europeans were forced to abandon their perception of the United States as a benign hegemon. The disillusion that resulted was short-lived in the first case, as the United States regained its lofty reputation during the world wars. It is too early to tell how long the latest crisis of European confidence will last. 2. Not all NATO countries have to say yes to the plan to solve the NATO advantage what is necessary to solve is a coherent strategy that doesnt mean all will support the plan though 3. Perm: do the plan and consult NATO 4. Perm: do the plan and genuinely consult NATO on an issue of equal or greater importance. Not an opportunity cost of the plan. No reason we cant pass the plan and consult on something else; its most real world 5. Consult Bad a. Steals aff ground aff is liable for all disads to the plan means we should be exclusively entitled to our advantages b. Thousands of countries theres an infinite number of combinations of agencies the neg could chose to consult we cant prep for them all c. Artificially competitive the CP doesnt prove that the plan is a bad idea the net benefit isnt intrinsic to the plan d. Consult is un-educational there is no literature on NATO having say over US policies the aff cant research 6. Justifies perm do the counterplan 7. Delayed action means case is a DA to the CP a. Drug War b. NATO

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

14

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

15

Consult NATO
8. Turn: NATO is overburdened consulting will kill the alliance Kober 09 Research Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Cato Institute graduate of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and received his Ph.D.
from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. (Winter/Spring 09, Stanley, Global Dialogue, NATO: The End of the Permanent Alliance, http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=449, MEF)

As if all these problems were not enough , NATO members now face the worst financial crisis since the alliances inception. Countries that were not meeting NATOs target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence before are certainly not going to meet it in the future. The implications for NATO have been underlined by its operational commander, General John Craddock. Theyre expecting to be asked to do more, he told a press briefing in Washington in January 2009, referring to US allies. I think its going to be harder for them to do it

because of decreasing defense budgets.18 Precisely. NATOs problem has been the enunciation of strategy and the assumption of commitments without any reference to capability . That is what is so unreal
about the discussion of Georgian membership. Imagine that Georgia had been a member of NATO. What could the alliance have done to defend it against the Russian attack? Georgia borders Russia and is far away from the United States and the other NATO members, who have their hands full elsewhere. Even as NATO faces an existential crisis in Afghanistan, there are calls for it to return to the traditional mission of defending its members. Nobody will be asking for a wholesale strategic rethink that reduces Natos commitment to Afghanistan, an anonymous senior NATO official told the Financial Times. But some states may be looking to strike a new balance between Natos current focus on expeditionary operations and the need to defend Nato territory.19 But how will a new balance be

struck? There are only two ways: increasing resources and devoting them to the traditional mission, or redirecting resources from out of area missions to the traditional one. Which will it be? Increasing resources
seems near impossible in these times of financial stringency. But if resources are redirected, what happens to the out of area missions? What, specifically, happens to Afghanistan? Many [NATO members] have defence budgets that are so low, and coalition governments that are so precarious, that they cannot provide the quantity or type of forces needed for this kind of fight, US defence secretary Robert Gates has lamented. 20 That is the situation now. It will not improve if further missions are added. Indeed, it is apparent that NATO is already overburdened.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

15

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

16

Consult Japan
1. Japan will say no-Obama has already pushed for troop increase USA Today 09 [Obama joins Japan PM in call for change.
Afghanistan is a complicating factor in the trip to a rapidly changing Asia reordering itself around China's surging economic and diplomatic clout. Obama's chief goal, the White House has said, is to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region. Aside from Japan, Obama will travel to Singapore, for meetings with Southeast Asian leaders, and then China and South Korea. Many governments are keen to see a revitalized U.S. engagement in part to counterbalance China, and even a newly powerful Beijing says it welcomes a continuing U.S. role in the region. Japan, long billed by Washington as the cornerstone of U.S. Asia policy, is caught up in these shifts. Hatoyama came to power calling for a more equal partnership with Washington and a more positive embrace of China, which will soon supplant Japan as the world's No. 2 economy. In a pre-trip interview with Japan's NHK network, Obama sought to minimize any friction and likened the election of Hatoyama's and his Democratic Party of Japan after nearly 50 years of rule by another party to a "political earthquake." "I think that it is perfectly appropriate for the new government to want to re-examine how to move forward in a new environment," Obama said. "I don't think anybody expects that the U.S.-Japan relationship would be the same now as it was 50 years ago or 30 years ago or 20 years ago." As part of an effort to shift focus away from difficult security issues, Obama and Hatoyama are expected to discuss and issue a statement on climate change, nuclear disarmament and other global issues. Attempts to coax nuclear-armed North Korea which occasionally threatens Japan with fiery rhetoric to return to disarmament negotiations are likely to feature prominently, as is Iran's nuclear program. The stickiest issue in relations the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on the southern island of Okinawa is likely to be glossed over. Hatoyama has suggested moving Futenma off Okinawa while the U.S. wants to move the base to a more remote location on the island, as part of a 2006 agreement on relocating 47,000 American troops in Japan. Trying to relieve some of the

strain on relations, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada agreed earlier this week to form a new committee to resolve the base issue. Tokyo also announced a new $5 billion aid package for Afghanistan, even as it reaffirmed a pledge to end the Indian Ocean refueling mission in January. Obama's visit would likely increase pressure on Japan to come up with a more rounded contribution to the Afghanistan war, Japanese media said. "Counterterrorism in Afghanistan is the most important foreign policy for the Obama administration. The U.S. expects Japan will present an alternative, which will replace Japan's naval refueling mission," said the liberal Asahi Shimbun, which ran a special page Friday that included a profile on Obama and his inauguration speech 2. Perm: do the plan and consult Japan 4. Perm: do the plan and genuinely consult Japan on an issue of equal or greater importance. Not an opportunity cost of the plan. No reason we cant pass the plan and consult on something else; its most real world 5. Consult Bad a. Steals aff ground aff is liable for all disads to the plan means we should be exclusively entitled to our advantages b. Thousands of countries theres an infinite number of combinations of agencies the neg could chose to consult we cant prep for them all c. Artificially competitive the CP doesnt prove that the plan is a bad idea the net benefit isnt intrinsic to the plan d. Consult is un-educational there is no literature on Japan having say over US policies the aff cant research 6. Justifies perm do the counterplan

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

16

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

17

7. Delayed action means case is a DA to the CP a. Drug War b. NATO 8. US threat credibility prevents war over Taiwan Plate 98 (Tom, Prof. Pol. Sci. UCLA, Los Angeles Times, Chinas Dangerous Perception Error, 2-24,
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/feb/24/local/me-22441)

If that's the actual Chinese belief, then the gap between the reality of U.S. military capabilities and China's perception of them is wide. Worse yet, Mulvenon's informed melancholy is shared in Washington. A recent Pentagon study, "Dangerous Chinese Misperceptions," agrees that, despite all the recent military-to-military contacts between Chinese officers and their U.S. counterparts, the true picture of America apparently is still fuzzy. Says the Pentagon report: "China's leadership holds a number of dangerous misconceptions that may well cause serious political friction or even military conflict with the United States. The consequences of China consistently underestimating the military power of potential opponents complicates any effort to deter China." 9. Nuke war. Johnson 1
(Chalmers, Pres. Japan Policy Research Institute, The Nation, Time to Bring the Troops Home (Page 2) 4-26, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20010514/johnson/2) China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US

militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads).
Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep

in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

17

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

18

Eradication PIC
1. Their evidence isnt qualified- its from a blog. Even if we have the same author, ours goes through publication and fact checking. Also, we postdate, suggesting a change in the opinion of the author, prefer our recency 2. Forced eradication counter-narcotics approaches misinterpret the situation and have the causality backward; the counterplan doesnt solve Rubin and Sherman 2008 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, and Jake, Research Asst. @ CIC, Counter-Narcotics to
Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication, February] Both globally and within Afghanistan, the location of narcotics cultivation is the result not the cause of insecurity, as shown by the expansion of poppy cultivation into a destabilized Iraq. The essential condition for

Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan implementing counter-narcotics policy is a state that works.17 Counter- narcotics can succeed only if political efforts establish the basis for policing, law enforcement, and support for development. Unlike military action, policing and law enforcement require the consent of the population. State building includes military action to defeat armed opponents of the project, but in a weak state such as Afghanistan it succeeds only by limiting the scope of state activity and gaining sufficient legitimacy and capacity so that the population consents to the states authority over those areas in which it acts. Winning consent for counter-narcotics requires providing greater licit economy opportunities, and providing security for people to benefit from those opportunities . Scarce
resources for coercion should be reserved for targeting political opponents at the high end of the value chain, rather than farmers and flowers. Winning a counter-insurgency while engaging in counter-narcotics also requires

acknowledging that the transition from a predominantly narcotics-based economy to a licit one will take years. It is not possible to win the consent of communities to state authority while treating their livelihoods as criminal even where alternatives are not yet reliable . Proponents of escalating forced
eradication argue that the government and its international supporters do not have years if the drug economy continues to expand the whole effort will fail. Escalating forced eradication, however, will only make the effort fail more quickly.18 Escalating forced eradication does not integrate counter-narcotics with counter-

insurgency: it makes counter-narcotics a recruiter for the insurgency . What drives rural communities to align
themselves with the Taliban is not illicit drugs, but a program to deprive those communities of their livelihoods before alternatives are available. An internationally supported effort to help Afghan communities gradually to move out of dependence on the drug trade without being stigmatized as criminals during the transition will integrate counter- narcotics with counter-insurgency and peace building. Many of the substitute crops being suggested by the USAID Alternative Livelihoods Program (ALP)

and others, such as saffron, pomegranates, apricots, and roses, which they will not provide income.

have maturation periods of several years during

3. Plan inclusive counterplans are a voting issue a. They moot the 1AC speech time by using our advantages as offense b. They encourage vague plan text writing, this kill education

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

18

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

19

Legalize CP
1. US presence is the root cause of Afghani drug plan is a prerequisite to solving drug wars 2. The counterplan is more controversial than the plan; it will trigger the link to the net benefit 3. International narcotics experts say Afghanistan too unstable for legalization itll make conditions worse Alix Kroeger, Journalist, November 5 2007, BBC News But officials working to stem the opium trade from Afghanistan are appalled. "Poppy is supporting terrorism and drug dealers," says Afghanistan's acting narcotics minister, Khodaidad (who, like many Afghans, has only one name). "The Senlis Council and the European Parliament are supporting insecurity in Afghanistan." Afghanistan's mullahs issued a fatwa (decree), saying people must not grow poppy because it is haram
(forbidden in Islam), he says. Opium is banned under the Afghan constitution, and the government opposes any form of legalisation. Licensing the sale of poppy for medical purposes won't get rid of the demand for illegal opium, warns a British narcotics official in Afghanistan who preferred not to be named. In fact, he believes

it would just create a new cash crop for farmers, meaning that even more opium would be grown . Many farmers grow poppy under duress, he points out. The Afghan police would be hard-pressed to stop drug traffickers from forcing farmers to divert part or all of their crop for heroin. "Afghanistan needs a rule-of-law structure to stop people growing opium," he says. "But if it had a rule-of-law structure, it wouldn't have an opium problem in the first place." A European Commission (EC) document obtained by the BBC argues that buying poppy from farmers could have a perverse effect. "Farmers could see this as an incentive to further expand production. This would not be an appropriate use of resources for the international donor community or the Afghan government." And the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
has serious reservations. "At the moment, in the Afghan context, any proposal should be taken with utmost caution," says Jean-Luc Lemahieu, the head of UNODC's Europe and West and Central Asia desk. The idea of laboratories in the villages is problematic, he says. "Where will the precursor chemicals [needed to convert poppy into opiates] come from, and who will control them?" he asks. "Who would ensure they're not diverted to other frameworks?" The Senlis Council says

there's a shortage of medical opiates on the world market, especially in developing countries, which Afghanistan can fill. But the British narcotics official disputes this. The International Narcotics Control Board, which licenses countries to produce opiates legally, has a two-year surplus, he says. "Developing countries don't have opiates, but they don't have penicillin or aspirin, either," he adds. And he questions the economic benefits the Senlis scheme would bring. The price of legal opiates on the world market is $35 to $40 a kilogram. Illegal opiates fetch nearly three times as much, around $100 a kilo. The EC says "exorbitant subsidies" could be needed to bridge the gap between legal and illegal prices. In the end, the British official says, poppy-for-medicine would undermine the authority of the Afghan government. It would be impossible to justify allowing one village to grow poppy under licence while eradicating the same crop just a few kilometres away . Counter-narcotics experts acknowledge
that similar schemes have worked in other countries which used to have a serious drug problem, such as Pakistan and Thailand. But Afghanistan, they say, just isn't ready. With violence and instability still wracking the country,

they fear that any move to legitimise poppy production could make a bad situation even worse. 4. Perm: do the plan and legalize opium in Afghanistan for the purpose of medical drugs 5. NATO advantage outweighs Afghanistan

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

19

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

20

Legalize CP
6. GAME OVER world of the counterplan still has illegal drug production reproducing our impacts James A. Nathan 2009, Auburb Univeristy in Alabama, Poppy Blues: The Collapse of Poppy Eradication and the Road Ahead in
Afghanistan 1/28/09, Defense And Security Analysis

But a close reading of the Senlis proposals is complicated . Senlis village-based pilot efforts would use a specialized form of opium seed. Senlis appeared to offer yet another crop substitution program by another
name.Village leaders, Senlis suggested would be issued internationally sanctioned licenses to produce their medically specialized opium, a form more suited for codeine than heroin. All the planting and processing would be done in Afghanistan.Afghanistans traditional collective village responsibility, Senlis hoped, would discipline the planting and production. In the end, the product would be sold to the Third World, where pain medications do not

compete with the current licit products. The Senlis plan appears incomplete , and some of the State Department criticisms appear well founded. That is, even if some manufacturer could be found, or even if an Afghan system of village production could be established, and even if the international edifice of multilateral and bilateral agreements with legally produced opium in Turkey and India could be renegotiated, there would still be illegal planting . The StateDepartment argued, perhaps rightly, Afghanistan
would be obligated to purchase opium stocks, resulting in the crops exponential expansion as more farmers take advantage of a guaranteed source of income.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

20

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

21

Legalize CP Not Popular


Overwhelming opposition to legalization of opium Romesh Bhattacharji, South Asian counternarcotics
expert @ CFR, 12/20/07, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15117/bhattacharji.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F122%2Fsociety_and_culture# Why are people so against licensing opium production in Afghanistan, other than the U.S. stance that there is not enough morphine demand? Whats the block here? The money being made out of enforcement. Last year they

spent $700 million on enforcement and the results were nothing. It's a very easy way of funding a contractual system. Thats my way of looking at it. Apart from that, [some think] that enforcement is all, that its the only way to answer the illicit cultivation; whereas, it hasnt succeeded anywhere. There was the thought that in Burma, [drug trafficking] was under control, but this year a report (PDF) says that there has been a tremendous increase in Burma also. You know, this mind-set has to be changed because here, year after year we are seeing dismal failure in eradication and enforcement of narcotic trafficking, yet nothing is happening. They dont want to see anything new, test out new ideas. Massive political interests oppose the plan Scott McPherson, @ Liberty Unbound,
http://libertyunbound.com/archive/2007_01/mcpherson-heroin.html]

[Fight

Terrorism:

Legalize

Heroin,

If opium production were legalized, pharmaceutical companies rather than al Qaeda terrorists would be running the opium show in the Helmand Province, creating booming local economies and raising the living standards
of Afghan peasants. Then Bayer or Dowpharma or Sandoz rather than Osama bin Laden would be profiting from the $11 billion Americans spend on heroin each year. Note that none of those companies currently sells heroin, and terrorists dont manufacture headache tablets, despite the enormous profit potential in both businesses. With the government working alongside international pharmaceutical giants, the agricultural economy would be protected, and very likely expand, offering more jobs to locals. Instead of arresting local officials, spraying poppy fields with dangerous chemicals, and sending Special Forces operatives to kick down doors, a collaborative, mutually beneficial relationship could be developed between poor peasants and the new government in Kabul that would undermine al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. The worst thing that could happen to narcoterrorists is legalization of their trade. Unfortunately, theres no reason to expect a muchneeded radical shift in policy. The United Nations blames heavy rainfall for the spike in opium production;

Karzai blames a lack of support from western governments; Britains opposition Conservative Party blames low troop levels; and the U.S. government blames Karzai. Legalization is the last thing on their minds. Just as there is big money for terrorists in the drug trade, there is big money, power, and prestige for government officials in continuing to fight this unwinnable war on drugs. While they rationalize failures, point fingers, call for more funding, and declare yet another crackdown, the poppies are in full bloom and terrorists are using the profits to plan murders. Plan requires a substantial conflict with the India Lobby Vanda-Felbab Brown, Fellow @ Brookings, 7, [http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/research/felbab-brown200708.pdf]
Assuming that the current official demand is satiated, the only way Afghanistan could sell opium to current customers would be if other suppliers diminished their output. The current large suppliers include Turkey and India for whom the United States guarantees a substantial market under the so-called 80-20 rule (which guarantees that the US buy 80% of opium containing morphine from these two countries), as well as several other countries, including prominently Australia. Turkey and India would of course object to any reduction in demand for their opium. Moreover, if opium licenses were redistributed away from India and Turkey, diversion into the illegal drug trade there may increase. The difficulties of the political renegotiation of current arrangements and deals would be substantial.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

21

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

22

Legalize CP Not Popular


Legalizing now would make Afghanistan worse Vanda-Felbab Brown, Fellow @ Brookings, 7, [http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/research/felbab-brown200708.pdf] However, the current conditions in Afghanistan, including the lack of state presence and the lack of security and
stability in major areas of the country, as well as other legal, political, and economic obstacles in both Afghanistan and the international arena do not easily permit the current implementation of such a large-scale licensing scheme . Many of the obstacles detailed above are not inevitably permanent and could possibly be overcome with systematic and dedicated effort that may well take several years. But under the current conditions, these obstacles

seriously compromise the viability of any licensing scheme other than very limited pilot projects. Such projects may be valuable in generating information about the overall desirability and feasibility of a larger licensing scheme in the future, the unforeseen difficulties to such a scheme, and ways of overcoming them. But such pilot projects would not reduce the level of illicit cultivation . Implementing a licensing scheme on a scale that went beyond very limited pilot projects in the more stable northern part of Afghanistan, while denying license to the Pashtun belt areas plagued by insurgency and eradicating there, would not be desirable . Such selective licensing would thicken the bond between the affected Pashtun population and the Taliban, increasing the insurgency, delegitimizing the central government and NATO, and exacerbating tribal and ethnic tensions.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

22

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

23

Surge CP
1. Literally doesnt solve any part of case A. US Troops are the root cause of terrorism more troops only exacerbates the problems even if more troops can solve some terrorist scenarios, there will be an increase in terrorism and in time, power will shift to the warlords Pakistani coup leads to nuclear war B. NATO countries want a cohesive strategy for Afghanistan and Canada and the Netherlands have already decided to leave we need to pull out now or else NATO will lose all credibility leads to nuclear war 2. Troop surges faillook at the most recent surge, it has made things worse Diehl 6/14 Jackson Diehl, Deputy editorial page editor for the Washington Post, 6/14/2010. What these fragments of news revealed is that three disabilities that have hobbled Obama's surge all along not only remain unfixed but seem to be getting worse. One is the failure of European governments to follow through on pledges to contribute in crucial areas such as training. Gates also said that McChrystal hadn't figured out how to replace Canadian and Dutch combat troops that are withdrawing from Afghanistan this summer. A second is the divergence between U.S. interests and those of Karzai, despite a make-up
session between the two governments last month in Washington. The Afghan leader had reasons to fire the two proAmerican ministers, including their resistance to negotiations with the Taliban. But U.S. sources said he had been gunning for the two men, along with Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak, ever since Washington insisted they be included in his cabinet after his reelection last year. Karzai seems determined to minimize American influence.

3. Afghani civilians can fight for themselves when the U.S. leavesnot necessary for troops to stay Moselle 10/09 Tyler Moselle, former Executive Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights and Foreign Policy, masters in
politics from Harvard, 10/1/2009. [Carr Center for Human Rights, Homeland Security Insight and Analysis, Responsible Withdrawal From Afghanistan p. 2]. Misapplication of the 1990's model. Critics of a troop drawdown argue that this was the same strategy the US pursued in Afghanistan in the early 1990s but they overlook the fact that the Taliban at the time were a young and relatively unknown political movement. Many Afghans have direct, harsh

experience of life under the Taliban and would oppose such a movement from coming back into power unlike the 1990s when many Afghans passively supported the Taliban to bring peace during the civil war. *4. Surge unpopular links to politics just as hard Newsweek 7/4 (7/4/10, " A Timetable for Withdrawal in Afghanistan ", http://www.newsweek-interactive.org/2010/07/03/t-minustwo-years.html?from=rss) Petraeus has immense stature, of course, and after the firing of two commanding generals in a row (Gen. David McKiernan was relieved in early 2009), Obama cant get rid of him without a firestorm. But the general knows that with Afghanistan already the longest war in American history, he has only a small window in which to combine military force with creative diplomacy in a way that yields real improvement on the ground. If he cant do it fast enough , the president will conclude that 100,000 troops actually harm progress by making the U.S. look like occupiers. At which point hell revert to the Biden Plankill Al Qaeda operatives with dronesand forget about Petraeuss theories of counterinsurgency. The country simply cannot afford a trillion-dollar commitment to nation building. The

only way funding will continue much longer is if Republicans take control of Congress this fall. Even then, the war remains unpopular with the public, a point that wont be lost on the GOP (as RNC chair
Michael Steeles antiwar comments last week attest). And Obama is hardly oblivious to the electoral implications. Lets say that Petraeus insists that the July 2011 timeline be pushed back a year, which is quite possible considering the current problems on the ground. That means the de-escalationand the political windfallwill begin around the summer of 2012, just in time for the Democratic National Convention. In other words, Americans should get used to it: we aint staying long.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

23

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

24

DOD CP
1. DOD is still part of the Executive BranchEven if the plan is headed by the DOD, it still is attached to Obama and other areas of the Executive means the CP still drains political capital and the politics DA is triggered 2. The counterplan proves the desirability of plan action vote aff 3. Agencies link to politics Obama gets credit/blame for the statements and policies of other executive departmentsthey're considered an extension of him Cohen & Collier *99 (Jeffrey & Ken, professor of political .science at Fordham University & assistant professor at
the University of Kansas, Presidential Policymaking: An End of Century Assessment ed Shull, P 42)

One of the president's most important sources of political influence may be his ability to structure the agenda. While the literature on presidential agenda setting is not highly developed. 1 there are suggestions that this type of
presidential influence may exceed his often restricted ability lo affect congressional decision making In his study of the agenda-setting process, Kingdon finds that respondents cite the president and his administration as perhaps the most important actor with agenda influence As Kingdon states, there is little doubt that the president

remains a powerful force in agenda setting particularly compared to other action.' 'Moreover, the views of department heads and others associated with the administration are usually thought of as the president's or as having the president's stamp of approval. When thev socak. it is for the administration and the president Thus, the president has many "voices' 4. Infinitely regressivethere are an infinite number of agencies that can be advocated through the federal government, all of which still link to Obama. This counterplan focuses the aff to defend the implementer of the plan, and not the actual policy thats a voter 5. Perm: do the plan and have the DOD withdraw troops from Afghanistan 6. Their Global Security evidence is shit one, the CENTCOM is not the entire DOD means CP flaw and two, the military responsibility that USCENTCOM assumed was for peace keeping engagement planning and program execution these are not counter-insurgent forces the DOD has no jurisdiction 7. DOD badwastes trillions of dollars and is immune from budget cuts proves they shouldnt be given this much say in military deployments Landau 3/8 Saul Landau, Professor Emeritus at California State University, senior fellow at and vice chair of the Institute for
Policy Studies, 3/8/2010. [Institute for Policy Studies, DOD: The Biggest Corporation of All]

Obama also declared as untouchable the Pentagon budget of $1.5 trillion (including hidden costs in other government
branches), which dwarfs the rescue package for the financial oligarchs. Both payouts, however, used the same logic: Congress taking from the have-nots and giving it to the have-mores. Indeed, the economic, political and military potentates depend on the federal budget to transfer taxpayer resources to

This evolving military-industrial complex, a partnership of interlocking government and corporate networks, has used public wealth to enrich itself. The manufacturing part of this complex rarely produces anything people live in,
them. wear, or eat. Despite National Rifle Association claims, armaments do not meet civilian needs. In fact, there exists a dramatic gulf between a healthy economy and a social order based on military spending. During the very period (1998-2008) when the US economys share of global output dropped from 32 to 23%, the Defense budget doubled. (Loren Thompson, QDR Cant Solve Three Biggest Defense Challenges, Lexington Institute, January 28, 2010)

The dramatic admission of this statement of priorities came from Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who admitted publicly that that DOD could not find $2.3 trillion. The money is still missing . (The War on Waste:
The Defense Departments eschewal of economic reality finds its counterpart in its disinterest in accountability.

Defense Department Cannot Account for 25% of Funds $2.3 Trillion, CBS Evening News, January 29, 2002)

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

24

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

25

***DISADS***

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

25

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

26

Allied Proliferation DA
1. Empirically denied European nuclear reductions occurred without triggering your impact Yost 09 (David Yost, Professor at Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in IR; text from USC, International Affairs, Assurance and
US extended deterrence in NATO, 85:4, Wiley InterScience, p. 767-768, published 2009) The remaining US nuclear weapons in Europereduced by more than 97 per cent from the high level reached during the Cold Warhave been regarded as sufficient for assurance and extended deterrence owing in part to the continuing link to US strategic nuclear forces.37 According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, one of the important functions of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe is to provide linkage to the strategic forces that constitute the ultimate deterrent to aggression or coercion. Ever since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the worlds first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to periodic crises of confidence in essence, European doubts about Americas will to defend its allies, given the risk of prompt intercontinental nuclear

retaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated whenever Americans have expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilitiesas during the bomber gap and missile gap controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about ICBM vulnerability in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 2. Only plan solves US forces invite, not deter, enemies and conflict current forces not enough Layne 97 (Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Prof. Naval Postgraduate School, International Security; text taken from From
Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy, 22:1, Summer 1997, p. 108) For example, it is unlikely that the United States would ever bolster the credibility of security guarantees (should they, in fact, be given) to states like Ukraine, the Baltics, or even Taiwan each of which is threatened potentially by a nuclear rival by deploying ground forces as tokens of its resolve. Indeed, assuming NATO expansion goes forward, Washington has taken an ambivalent stance with respect to whether the United States will deploy troops or tactical nuclear weapons or both in Poland (which, because of its proximity to Russia, would be an expanded NATO's most vulnerable member state). At currently projected force levels, moreover, the American presence in Europe and East Asia probably will be too small to make extended deterrence credible in the early twenty-first century; a challenger, with good reason, may question whether the United States has either the capability or the intent to honor its deterrent

commitments. U.S. forward-deployed forces could constitute the worst kind of trip wire one that invites challenges rather than deterring them. 3. No link we are removing the counter-insurgent forces who are eradicating the poppy fields 4. Nuclear weapons not needed for extended deterrence conventional weapons enough Davis et al 09 (Jacquelyn Davis, Ex. VP Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Pres. IFPA and Prof. Intl.
Sec. Studies Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts U. and former DOD Consultant, Charles M. Perry , VP and Dir. Studies IFPA, and James L. Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies IFPA, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis White Paper, Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes", February 2009, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf, p. 7-8) As the Interim Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, previously cited, points out: Our non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon U.S. extended deterrence strategy as one of its pillars. Our military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, underwrite U.S. security guarantees to our allies, without which many of them would feel enormous pressures to create their own nuclear arsenals. So long as the United States maintains adequately strong conventional forces, it does not necessarily need to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the threat of a major conventional attack.

5. Americas allies will not proliferate because they are afraid of prolif Foreign Affairs Committee 9, Foreign Affairs Committee - Fourth Report Global Security: Non-Proliferation, House of
Commons, 7/14/09, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm 17. During the course of our inquiry Barack Obama was sworn in as the 44th US President. There has been widespread

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

26

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

27

expectation that his election will be positive for arms control efforts. Nicholas Sims of the LSE told us that: the coming-in of the new Administration in the United States gives the UK and other NATO countries an enormous, almost unprecedented opportunity to re-engage the United States in a much more wholehearted, reinvigorated multilateralism in this field, as in others.[29] [] Within the Democrat camp, there have been encouraging signs that the US would be much more engaged in multilateral endeavours generally.[30] Bill Rammell, Minister of State at the FCO, was similarly confident: The prospects for disarmament under President Obama are much greater and stronger than

they were under President Bush. How do I adduce that in evidence? You can look, for example, at [Secretary of State] Hillary Clinton's confirmation hearings, when she talked about the importance of rebuilding staffing and financing the relevant bureaus within the State Department. Obama has made it clear that he wants to ratify, and have negotiations on, the fissile material cut-off treaty. All that I see and
hear is very positive and I have belief in President Obama.[31] There is speculation that a change of attitude in the US might lead other states to alter their positions, with Bill Rammell telling us that when he was recently in Beijing "interesting discussions were taking place and there was a desire to know what the intentions of the Obama Administration were."[ 32] However, in relation to treaties, as Mr Rammell pointed out: There is a caveat: in the American system, you have to get those treaties through the Senate as well. I think that with the degree of support that the President has and the political make-up of the Senate at the moment, the grounds for that are optimistic, but it is not as simple as saying that the President decrees and it happens.[33] 18. In early 2009, President Obama appointed Gary Samore, previously of the Council on Foreign Relations, as coordinator for policy on weapons of mass destruction (including non-proliferation), based in the National Security Council.

6. Case outweighs - Plan ensures NATO cohesion thats key to deter nuclear attacks and plan solves Afghan warlord power warlords spill over to Pakistan and begin a coup resulting in civil nuclear war that will escalate

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

27

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

28

Appeasement Terrorism DA
1. Non-uniquetheir Schmitt and Shane evidence is from over a year ago since then, Karzais government has practically collapsed troops arent deterring strikes anymore; they are instigating them when they eradicate the poppy fields 2. Plan solves the impact we are removing the root cause of why terrorists are causing instability Center for Defense Information 2001 [Lessons from history: US Policy towards Afghanistan 1978-2001,
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-history.cfm] In his statements and speeches since Sept. 11, U.S. President George W.

Bush has been careful to distinguish the members of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization and the Taliban, from the people of Afghanistan and Muslims of the world. Still, with military action in Afghanistan expected soon, it is necessary to look hard at Afghanistan's past two decades of turmoil and seek to learn lessons from that past. And while there are many factors leading to the dismal situation of Afghanistan today, it also is the case that missteps in U.S. foreign policy are, in part, to blame. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Russia and the region during the 1980s helped, at least indirectly, nurture the growth of anti-American and fundamentalist forces now controlling Kabul, and indeed, even some of the terrorists now being sought by the United States for the Sept. 11 attacks against New York and Washington . In planning for intervention in Afghanistan
now, the Bush administration must work hard to avoid the mistakes of the past.

3. Appeasement now Obama is destroying US credibility reliance on negotiations with rogues makes US look weak John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, New York Daily News, May 12, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2010/05/12/2010-0512_obama_fiddles_a_rogue_schemes_the_us_strategy_toward_north_korea_leaves_us_in_da.html Why, if North Korea's threat remains grave, have we heard so little about it from the Obama administration? Ironically, Obama's negotiating posture with the North is, so far at least, somewhat less objectionable than that of the Bush administration's last years. Bush's negotiators were, in effect, negotiating with themselves, making unforced concessions to create the illusion of diplomatic progress, while North Korea did little or nothing. By contrast, the Obama team, at least optically, has seemed more prepared to have China make the grease payments necessary to persuade Kim's regime to resume the long-stalled six-party talks. But beneath the optics is a disturbing reality . Obama's underlying strategy remains fixed in the belief that once everyone returns to the bargaining table, progress on denuclearizing North

Korea is still possible. It is a major article of faith, closely linked to Obama's view that negotiations with Iran might actually divert the mullahs from their determined pursuit of nuclear weapons . This makes the United States weaker. Both Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Kim Jong Il fully understand the Obama administration's obsession with the process of negotiations over the substance of actually stopping nuclear weapons programs - and will continue exploiting this insistence on talk essentially for its own sake. 4. Plan solves building relations with Arab states key to solve Kathleen J. McInnis, coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a research associate at CSIS, 2005,
Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East
U.S. relationships in the Middle East, however, have a strikingly different character, more akin to hesitant engagement than to Washingtons well-established partnerships in Asia. A rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism, coupled with growing anti-U.S. sentiment, has strained these tenuous relations . As thenUnder Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton recently stated, Iranian nuclear capabilities would change the perceptions of the military balance in the region and could pose serious challenges to the [United States] in terms of deterrence and de- fense. 3 One such challenge is the prospect of multiple nuclear powers emerging in an already volatile Middle East. The outcome of this scenario depends in part on the capacity and credibility of U.S. strategic capabilities, including the nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, if key nuclear dominos in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt,

decide that U.S.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

28

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

29

Appeasement Terrorism DA security guarantees are insufficient, they may be tempted to acquire their own nuclear weapons. A U.S. extended deterrent policy in the Middle East would lack credibility, not due to a lack of physical capability or presence in the region, but rather as a result of the fragility of U.S. relations with its allies in the region, creat- ing a uniquely dangerous situation. 5. No internal link to global war; its empirically denied Russias failure to commit and withdrawal from Afghanistan did not lead to worldwide aggression or instability 6. Case outweighs Plan ensures NATO cohesion thats key to deter nuclear attacks and plan solves Afghan warlord power warlords spill over to Pakistan and begin a coup resulting in civil nuclear war that will escalate

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

29

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

30

Appeasement China DA
1. No link Afghanistan isnt considered a part of Chinas Asian sphere of influence China wouldnt perceive a US pullout as confrontational 2. The only part of their uniqueness evidence about the US a quote from the editors of the Journal they arent qualified to say what place the US has in foreign policy in China 3. Appeasement now and not impact Obama is destroying US credibility reliance on negotiations with rogues makes US look weak John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, New York Daily News, May 12, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2010/05/12/2010-0512_obama_fiddles_a_rogue_schemes_the_us_strategy_toward_north_korea_leaves_us_in_da.html Why, if North Korea's threat remains grave, have we heard so little about it from the Obama administration? Ironically, Obama's negotiating posture with the North is, so far at least, somewhat less objectionable than that of the Bush administration's last years. Bush's negotiators were, in effect, negotiating with themselves, making unforced concessions to create the illusion of diplomatic progress, while North Korea did little or nothing. By contrast, the Obama team, at least optically, has seemed more prepared to have China make the grease payments necessary to persuade Kim's regime to resume the long-stalled six-party talks. But beneath the optics is a disturbing reality . Obama's underlying strategy remains fixed in the belief that once everyone returns to the bargaining table, progress on denuclearizing North

Korea is still possible. It is a major article of faith, closely linked to Obama's view that negotiations with Iran might actually divert the mullahs from their determined pursuit of nuclear weapons . This makes the United States weaker. Both Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Kim Jong Il fully understand the Obama administration's obsession with the process of negotiations over the substance of actually stopping nuclear weapons programs - and will continue exploiting this insistence on talk essentially for its own sake. 4. No risk of China escalation our economies are too intertwined 5. Their Khalilzad evidence is non-unique since then 9/11 reshaped foreign relations completely USChina relations have drastically become more intertwined in the past 11 years 6. China Paper Tiger- feared for its military and paper economy but China is harmless thanks to WTO Jagdish Bhagwatiis, Council on Foreign Relations and a university professor at Columbia in New York City, 2/19/02
http://www.cfr.org/publication/4351/why_china_is_a_paper_tiger.html?id=4351 Alone among developing nations, China commands attention and awe. The country is feared for its military might. It also alarms the world, and Asia much more, because of its growing economic and trade clout. True, the fabled "China market" has long been a holy grail for foreign investors and exporters. But China's exports are another matter. They inspire as much fear as Japan's did in the 1930s, when an explosion of cheap products like hurricane lanterns and $1 blouses provoked a slew of quantitative restrictions on Japanese exports and led to charges of a looming "yellow peril." China's size and rapid growth have deepened the sense that the People's Republic will inevitably draw market share and direct foreign investment away from its neighbors. According to this line of reasoning, the country's recent entry into the World Trade Organization will only fuel Chinese exports and compound the difficulties of its rivals. The thing about fear, as the Russian proverb goes, is that it has big eyes. These worries are hardly justified, however, if one only looks clearly at them. There are several reasons to be more comfortable about China's rise than the

doomsayers would have us believe. First, China's WTO entry is almost exclusively a matter of improving access to China's markets, not enhancing Chinese access to other markets. True, Beijing will be
better insulated against antidumping actions and the arbitrary imposition of safeguards against its exports. But China has shown no indication that its exporting muscle has ever been inhibited by the threat of such actions. There is no reason, therefore, to believe that Chinese exports will grow by greater leaps and bounds than they would otherwise just because of WTO entry. Remember also that, unless Beijing begins to pile up foreign-exchange

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

30

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

31

Appeasement China DA
reserves, increased exports will imply a matching increase in imports. But what could one possibly export to such a powerhouse, a nation that can seemingly produce everything? Trade develops in numerous ways that we cannot really predict. Take just two examples. As countries move upscale they tend, in a phenomenon that economists call "ladders of comparative advantage," to make room for others below in less sophisticated products. Thus, in the 1970s Japan's economic success prompted it to withdraw from exporting labor-intensive products, which then were taken over by the four tiger economies Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. Chinese exports, thanks to their dramatic growth in the last two decades, are already diversifying. China will make room for countries further down in the pecking order in Africa, the poorer parts of Asia, some of Latin America one can be sure. Many countries also exchange products within the same industry small cars traded for big cars, table fans for ceiling fans. Such intra-industry trade can be expected among Asian countries and China. Often specialization also occurs vertically: booming Chinese car factories will have to import car parts and accessories. Asian economies rarely at a loss when looking for trade opportunities have no reason to despair when contemplating China. At the same time, some countries could benefit from the threat posed by Beijing. Take textile exports. Those from China will likely grow significantly as the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA), which establishes quotas for textile imports, is dismantled by 2005. Inefficient suppliers who for years have been protected by MFA quotas including those on the Indian subcontinent will likely be displaced. That could provide a much-needed wake-up call to India, which has prevented the modernization of its textile industry by protecting small-scale producers.

China's WTO entry will also make it easier for countries to shield themselves from Chinese competition that violates international norms, because they won't have to take on Beijing all by themselves. Japan
found out how unproductive that could be last year, when it slapped restrictions on Chinese mushrooms, leeks and rushes, only to have retaliatory tariffs put on several Japanese exports to China, including cars and cell phones. The beauty of

the WTO membership is that countries can now take such action multilaterally under the rule of law, precluding unilateral retaliatory measures by China. Indeed, Asia and the world can only benefit from China's
WTO entry. The fear that China's legal system is not up to the job of implementing WTO-mandated reforms seems exaggerated, at best, to most scholars. The concern also flies in the face of the pragmatism and willingness to change that the Chinese leadership has displayed in getting this far. WTO membership should instead reinforce the

broadening embrace of the rule of law in China and facilitate a steady expansion of Chinese trade. That is something to be welcomed, not feared. 7. China wont attack Taiwan card is from 98 China has other things to deal with 8. Straightimes evidence doesnt match the internal link warrants it says a US-China war would set East Asia on fire, not if China were to attack Taiwan 9. Case outweighs Plan ensures NATO cohesion thats key to deter nuclear attacks and plan solves Afghan warlord power warlords spill over to Pakistan and begin a coup resulting in civil nuclear war that will escalate

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

31

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

32

Compensation DA (ABL)
1. Non-Unique DOD already reduced ABL budget Robert Gates 4/6/9 [Secretary of Defense, speech
Defense Budget Recommendation Statement http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341] Fourth, in the area of missile defense: We will restructure the program to focus on the rogue state and theater missile threat. We will not increase the number of current ground-based interceptors in Alaska as had been planned. But we will continue to robustly fund continued research and development to improve the capability we already have to defend against longrange rogue missile threats a threat North Koreas missile launch this past weekend reminds us is real. We will cancel

the second airborne laser (ABL) prototype aircraft. We will keep the existing aircraft and shift the program to an R&D effort. The ABL program has significant affordability and technology problems and the programs proposed operational role is highly questionable. We will terminate the Multiple Kill
Vehicle (MKV) program because of its significant technical challenges and the need to take a fresh look at the requirement. Overall, the Missile Defense Agency program will be reduced by $1.4 billion

2. Non-Unique ABL test hasnt changed Gates view Mark Thompson 2/16/10 [ staff writer, Time magazine, Star Wars Boosters Fired Up by Laser Show
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1964310,00.html] It's just that cramming a powerful laser into an airplane doesn't work very well. The goal is to destroy enemy missiles above the clouds at more than 40,000 feet within two minutes of launch, from within 250 miles (400 km). That would require deploying several such planes near enemy launchpads and having at least one fly continuously until the missiles are fired or the crisis eases. Gates wasn't impressed by the scheme. "After more than a decade of research and

development, we have yet to achieve a laser with enough power to knock down a missile ... more than 50 miles from the launchpad thus requiring these huge planes to loiter deep in enemy airspace to have a feasible shot at a direct hit," he noted after he axed the program. "Moreover, the 10 to 20 aircraft needed would cost about $1.5 billion each, plus tens of millions of dollars annually each for maintenance and operations," he added. "The program and operating concept were fatally flawed." 3. Non-Unique Gates has cut contractor budget Robert Gates 4/6/9 [Secretary of Defense,
speech Defense Budget Recommendation Statement http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341] A final recommendation that will have a significant impact on how defense organizations are staffed and operated. Under this budget request, we will reduce the number of support service contractors from our current 39 percent

of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replace them with full-time government employees. Our goal is to hire as many as 13,000 new civil servants in FY10 to replace contractors and up to 30,000 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years. 4. Impact turn- laser technology will save lives James Carafano 11/25/08 (P.h.d colonel, U.S. army (ret.) Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Pentagon Should Battle Pirates and Terrorists with Laser Technology http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/11/Pentagon-Should-Battle-Pirates-and-Terrorists-withLaser-Technology) Directed Energy Weapons, particularly those powered by lasers, have long been the stuff of science fiction . Due to

recent innovations in commercial solid-state lasers and their adaptation to military uses, potential and immediate national security applications for these weapons are apparen t. The Pentagon, however, has been
agonizingly slow in fielding operational prototypes. This must change. There are real-world missions for which laser weapons are needed right now. Additionally, fielding prototypes is essential for developing the appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing these new capabilities. Unless the military gets these new technologies in the field, it is doubtful the full potential of such weapons will ever be realized. Additionally, further delays make it unlikely that a constituency will develop within the military to strongly advocate for developing and fielding directed energy weapons. Pirates off the coast of Somalia, terrorists armed with shoulder-fired heat seeking missiles that

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

32

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

33

Compensation DA (ABL)
can down commercial airliners, and road-side improvised landmines waiting to ambush military and civilian convoys all share something in common: They are threats capable of harassing both governments and the private sector. Additionally, such dangers are not easily countered by conventional military capabilities. At Sea, Terrorists, criminals, and pirates have all used small boats for attacking both military and civilian shipping and to smuggle contraband . In 2000, while docked in
Yemen, the U.S. warship Cole was struck by a small boat laden with explosives. The al-Qaeda-directed operation killed 17 crew members and crippled the ship. Off the coast of Florida, smugglers attempt to run their human cargo to the United States at night in small, fast boats. Often the U.S. Coast Guard, which is charged with stopping these smugglers, has little alternative but to try to shoot out the engines while running at high speed, all the while trying not to injure the human cargo huddled in the belly of the boat. Routinely, pirates venture out into the waters of the Gulf of Aden in similar small craft, capturing commercial ships and selling their cargo while holding the crew and craft for ransom. In the Air. In 2002, terrorists fired two shoulder-fired missiles at a commercial airliner in Kenya . Thankfully, they missed; there were two-hundred passengers on board. In 2003, the U.S. government successfully intercepted an attempted arms sale of a shoulder-fired Igla SA-18 missile, capable of downing commercial aircraft three miles in range and two miles in altitude. These examples demonstrate that malicious actors have an enduring interest in obtaining and using shoulder-fired missiles as terrorist weapons. On the Ground. In Iraq, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), essentially home-

made landmines, were used as the weapon of choice against collation forces. IEDs quickly became one of the major sources of death and injury to both military personnel and innocent civilians. Many of the
tactics and innovations pioneered in Iraq were exported to other theaters. Similar IED attacks, for example, have been used against NATO troops in Afghanistan. All these means were adopted by terrorists and criminals because they are cheap, effective, and difficult to counter with conventional military and law enforcement means. Lasers can be effectively

used to counter the above-documented threats because they: Can use a high-powered beam of energy to disable electrical components or detonate explosives, rendering the attack means (e.g., boat) or the warhead of a missile useless; Come with an almost infinite magazine--as long as the weapons have power, they can be recharged and fired again; Can be aimed effectively using existing target acquisition systems (such as radars and optics like night-vision goggles); and Can be employed with a minimum of risk toward surrounding civilians, buildings, or vehicles (such as aircraft, cars, and ships) These advantages provided by directed-energy weapons are achievable . The Pentagon, however, has been
reluctant to field these weapons because the technology was not suitably mobile and robust enough for use on the battlefield. Lasers, for example, could be attenuated (their power diluted) by dust in the air. But the development of commercial solid-state lasers and improvements in laser optics has largely addressed these issues.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

33

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

34

Compensation DA (FCS)
1. Non-Unique Gates has already Cut FCS budget and contractor budget Robert Gates 4/6/9 [Secretary of Defense, speech Defense Budget
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341]
Sixth, and finally, we will significantly restructure the Armys Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. We will retain and accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out technology enhancements to all combat brigades. However, I have concluded that there are significant unanswered questions concerning the FCS vehicle design strategy. I am also concerned that, despite some adjustments, the FCS vehicles where lower weight, higher fuel efficiency, and greater informational awareness are expected to compensate for less armor do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current vehicle program, developed nine years ago, does not include a role for our recent $25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in todays conflicts. Further, I am troubled by the terms of the current contract, particularly its very unattractive fee structure that gives the government little leverage to promote cost efficiency. Because the vehicle part of the FCS program is currently estimated to cost over $87 billion, I believe we must have more confidence in the program strategy, requirements, and maturity of the technologies before proceeding further. Accordingly, I will recommend that we cancel the vehicle component of the

Recommendation

Statement

current FCS program, re-evaluate the requirements, technology, and approach and then re-launch the Armys vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process. An Army vehicle modernization program designed to meet the needs of the full spectrum of conflict is essential. But because of its size and importance, we must get the acquisition right, even at the cost of delay. A final
recommendation that will have a significant impact on how defense organizations are staffed and operated. Under this budget request, we will reduce the number of support service contractors from our current 39 percent of

the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replace them with full-time government employees. Our goal is to hire as many as 13,000 new civil servants in FY10 to replace contractors and up to 30,000 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years. 2. FCS no longer exists Robert F. Hale 2/10 (Comptroller, DOD, Fiscal http://dcmo.defense.gov/documents/2011BudgetRequestOverviewBook.pdf)
Year 2011 Budget Request

Last year Secretary Gates restructured the Armys Future Combat Systems (FCS). FCS was a core program with spin-outs of mature technologies to the current force. Its replacement Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization is an incremental program focused on improving current forces as quickly as possible. The FY 2011 request for BCT Modernization is $3.2 billion, $2.5 billion for research and
development. It will fund Increased ISR and related capabilities, Better and more robotic capability both air and ground, more responsive precision fires, and better situational awareness and situational understanding of friendly and enemy locations in complex terrain, such as urban environments.

3. Turn - FCS saves lives in Afghanistan and Iraq John Buckley 08 (Colonel and military strategist,

United States Army A complement to FCS http://www.armytimes.com/community/opinion/army_backtalk_modernization_080121) Army equipment must be reset, or rebuilt, because of enormous wear and tear from the war. Thus, to the greatest extent possible, the Army is creating financial efficiencies and upgrading select capabilities through reset. This will save taxpayer dollars while helping to accelerate modernization. Still, FCS will remain the cornerstone of Army modernization. Army Times implicitly questions the wisdom of this strategy, saying, Troops in Iraq began questioning FCS years ago. In fact, soldiers are acutely aware of initial FCS prototype capabilities, which are saving lives in theater. Indeed, there is a strikingly high correlation between the types of capabilities that commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan are requesting and the types of capabilities that are being developed through FCS. For example, there are more than 4,000 robots in Iraq and Afghanistan today, including an early version of the FCS Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle. Soldiers are using the SUGV prototype and other robots to clear caves and bunkers, search buildings, cross minefields and defuse improvised explosive devices. Thats why, during training exercises last February at Fort Bliss, Texas, and White Sands Missile Range, N.M., Army veterans from Iraq and

Afghanistan were enthusiastic about these initial FCS capabilities. As one veteran succinctly put it,

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

34

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

35

Youre going to save lives with these new technologies. Said another soldier-veteran: Right now. Right now.
Getting [these capabilities] out into theater would be beneficial to soldiers [who] are going to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

35

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

36

CMR DA
1. There will be no problem with relations, Petraeus is behind the plan, BUT also cross apply this on the inherency flow, we wont pull out on time. Associated press, 6/30/10, http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/06/30/20100630afghan-petraeus0630.html Gen. David Petraeus left open the possibility of recommending that President Barack Obama delay his plans to start withdrawing troops from Afghanistan next summer if the new commander can't turn around the stalemated war. "There will be an assessment at the end of this year after which undoubtedly we'll make certain tweaks, refinements, perhaps some significant changes ," Petraeus told a Senate panel Tuesday of
the battle plan and the timeline Obama has laid out. The Senate Armed Services Committee quickly approved Petraeus for the job of running the Afghan war, and the full Senate could act as early as today. Obama nominated Petraeus to take over from the disgraced Gen. Stanley McChrystal, fired last week for disparaging remarks about his civilian bosses. Petraeus also told senators that he may change the war's battlefield rules, designed to limit civilian casualties and improve support for the foreign forces fighting the Taliban-led insurgency . Some troops and congressional Republicans complain they handicap U.S. forces. Obama has said troops will begin to leave in July 2011, but that the pace and size of the withdrawal will depend upon conditions. Petraeus did not rule out a significant exodus then, as Vice President Joe Biden favors, but he would not promise one either. Petraeus has previously said that he would recommend putting off any large-scale withdrawal if security conditions in Afghanistan can't sustain it. The general, credited with turning around the Iraq war after the height of sectarian violence there in 2006 , told the Senate panel that Obama wants him to provide unvarnished military advice . He did not paint a rosy picture on Tuesday. "My sense is that the tough fighting will continue; indeed, it may get more intense in the next few months," Petraeus said. "As we take away the enemy's safe havens and reduce the enemy's freedom of action, the insurgents will fight back." Beneath bipartisan rounds of praise for Petraeus lay fault lines over the nearly nine-year war. A make-or-break military push across southern Afghanistan is stuck in neutral, though U.S. officials insist there are signs of progress and reason for hope . "On the Democratic side, there is solid support. But there's also the beginnings of fraying of that support " for the war, committee Chairman Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., said ahead of Tuesday's session. As the number of troop deaths rise, support for the war is dropping in the United States and Europe. June is the deadliest month of the war so far, with the total U.S. deaths above 1,000, and the new British government says it wants its troops out in five years . A careful student of politics, Petraeus gave something to everyone while leaving himself room to maneuver . For Democrats and his White House masters , Petraeus endorsed Obama's revamped war strategy and the plan to begin withdrawing U.S. forces from the unpopular fight next July . The exit plan isn't just a sop to American liberals opposed to the conflict, Petraeus said under questioning from skeptical Republicans. He made clear he is wary of deadlines, but said he values the sense of urgency Obama's timeline conveys . "I'm convinced it was not just for domestic political purposes," he said. "It was for audiences in Kabul, who, again, needed to be reminded that we won't be there forever." For Republicans uneasy about the strict rules of engagement, Petraeus promised a hard examination. In particular, he will look at the way the "tactical directive" is applied. The directive is the guidance given to commanders on when they can rely on heavy firepower such as attack helicopters to protect troops under attack. McChrystal had limited the circumstances under which such bombing could be used . Petraeus said he believes the

rules and the reasoning behind them are basically sound. 2. Non-unique nothing will change in Afghanistan from their Cohen 6/24 evidence If there are military officers worried about the president's decision-making or the current strategy in Afghanistan I can't imagine you're going to be hearing much about it in the pages of the New York Times or Washington Post. 3. Cohen also cites alternate causalities like pay cuts as a reason for reduction, their link is based out of lack of funding, the disad is not intrinsic to the plan

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

36

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

37

CMR DA
4. Civilian-military relations already low for reasons other than Afghanistan Owens 6/13 Mackubin T. Owens, Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, 6/13/2010. [Eurasia
Review: News and Analysis, Civil-Military Relations and the U.S. Strategy Deficit].

the current civil-military framework to provide strategic guidance for integrating the operational level of war and national policy is obscured by the myopic focus of students of civil-military relations on the issue of civilian control. Rectifying this situation requires that both parties to the civil-military bargain adjust the way they do business . On the one hand, the military must recover its voice in strategy-making while realizing that politics permeates the conduct of war and that civilians have a say, not only concerning the goals of the war but also how it is conducted. On the other, civilians must understand that to implement effective policy and strategy requires the proper military instrument . They must also
Unfortunately, the failure of insist that soldiers present their views frankly and forcefully throughout the strategy-making process.

5. Their Kohn evidence is power tagged. The card talks about how the military doesnt like it when politicians overrule something that the military has already made a decision on. It doesnt say anything about the military not liking to work with civilians to create strategies

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

37

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

38

Politics Energy Bill 1. Their disad is non-unique; Utilities-only bill wont pass- lacks the vote Stephen Power, staff writer, 7/1-2010. [Wall Street Journal, Political Insight and Analysis From The Wall Street Journal's Capital
Bureau, p. http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/07/01/bingaman-do-or-die-time-on-energy-bill/]

Bingamans bill doesnt require companies to pay for the right to emit greenhouse gases linked to climate change something Obama insisted on both as a candidate and at a meeting last week with senators, including Bingaman. In the C-SPAN interview, Bingaman said hes willing to support such a measure , targeting emissions from electric utilities, but that hes somewhat dubious that the votes are there to do even that. When you look at the makeup of the Senate today, there are quite a few senators who are going to be resistant to anything that could be labeled as cap and trade , said Bingaman, referring to the idea of setting a cap on
emissions from various industries and requiring companies to hold permits that would let them emit greenhouse gases. Companies could buy and sell the permits, and the government would gradually reduce number, bringing down overall emissions.

2. Utilities-only bill lacks 60 votesGOP opposition. Aaron Wiener, staff writer, 6-30-2010. [Washington Independent, Utilities-Only Cap May Be Last Hope for Carbon-Pricing
Legislation, p. http://washingtonindependent.com/90536/utilities-only-cap-may-be-last-hope-for-carbon-pricing-legislation] Some climate bills have featured a sort of Phase Two, said Marchant Wentworth, deputy legislative director of the Union of Concerned Scientists, where other sectors are phased in four, five, six years down the road. But Wentworth was skeptical that a utilities-only bill would be able to pass a Senate where Republican

opposition to climate legislation has grown increasingly intense.


Is there something unique about a utility-only bill that gets you more support in the Senate than a comprehensive bill? he asked. Can you get to 60 [votes] on utility-only? No.

3. Congressmen vote on their ideology, not finite political capital 4. The plan is popular- strong public support for ending the war soon San Francisco Chronicle, 6/30-10 Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Oakland, joined other House members in calling for President Obama to provide Congress with "a clear commitment and plan to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan" before a vote expected later this week that would provide $58 billion for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The call for a firm stance on a drawdown date in a letter to the president was echoed by the Senate Armed Services Committee Tuesday during
Gen. David Petraeus' confirmation hearing to become the top commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Even though Petraeus left open the possibility of delaying Obama's July 2011 plan to start withdrawing troops, he expressed confidence in the workability of the departure date. "I'm convinced it was not just for domestic political purposes," Petraeus said. "It was for audiences in Kabul, who, again, needed to be reminded that we won't be there forever." The letter signed by Rep. Lee calls for Obama to set firm beginning and end dates for the removal of U.S. troops. "The lack of clarity on when and how the U.S. will end its military commitment

to Afghanistan has created confusion amongst U.S. service members and the public," the statement said. 5. Do the plan and pass the energy bill its not intrinsic to the plan 6. The bill wont solve global warming Ben Geman, staff writer, 6-24-2010. [The Hill, Green groups criticize utility only climate approach,
http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/105247-green-groups-criticize-utility-only-climate-approach]

Top officials with two major environmental groups on Thursday attacked the prospect of limiting greenhouse gas caps to electric utilities , which has been floated as a fallback option for climate change
legislation. The goal is a comprehensive cap ... that cuts pollution from all key sectors, said Gene Karpinski, president of the League of Conservation Voters. Michael Brune, the executive director of the Sierra Club, said it would not provide sufficient emissions reductions. It misses an opportunity to create more clean energy jobs

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

38

170977266.doc 2K9 around the country and improve public health, he added.

Dartmouth

39

7. Their impact has no timeframe, global warming is a slow process that will take decades to have a significant effect 8. Case outweighs Plan ensures NATO cohesion thats key to deter nuclear attacks and plan solves Afghan warlord power warlords spill over to Pakistan and begin a coup resulting in civil nuclear war that could escalate

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

39

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

40

Politics Jobs Bill


1. Case outweighs Plan ensures NATO cohesion thats key to deter nuclear attacks and plan solves Afghan warlord power warlords spill over to Pakistan and begin a coup resulting in civil nuclear war that could escalate 2. Jobs bill wont pass - Dems not on board. Jake Sherman, staff writer, 7-3-2010. [Politico, Dems in a jam as economy slows, http://fredericksburg.com/News/Web/politico?
p_id=2342] President Barack Obama and the Democrats head into the summer campaign season with the economy slowing, unemployment flirting with double-digits and few options for a quick fix. Obamas economic stimulus plan is winding down, right when Democrats need it most. And a big new jobs bill? Forget it. House Democrats had to battle this week just to pass a bill to prevent teachers from being laid off, over the objections of 15 mostly conservative House Democrats and even Obama, who threatened a veto over how the House planned to pay for it.

3. Winners win - Strong support for ending the war soon- the plan increases Obamas political capital and passes the bill San Francisco Chronicle, 6-30-10 Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Oakland, joined other House members in calling for President Obama to provide Congress with "a clear commitment and plan to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan" before a vote expected later this week that would provide $58 billion for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The call for a firm stance on a drawdown date in a letter to the president was echoed by the Senate Armed Services Committee Tuesday during Gen. David Petraeus' confirmation hearing to become the top commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Even though Petraeus left open the possibility of delaying Obama's July 2011 plan to start withdrawing troops, he expressed confidence in the workability of the departure date. "I'm convinced it was not just for domestic political purposes," Petraeus said. "It was for audiences in Kabul, who, again, needed to be reminded that we won't be there forever." The letter signed by Rep. Lee calls for Obama to set firm beginning and end dates for the removal of U.S. troops. "The lack of clarity on when and how the U.S. will end its military commitment to Afghanistan has created confusion amongst U.S. service members and the public," the statement said. 4. Dyer is a hack he had his works banned from the Jerusalem Post and was forced to publish independently, this evidence must be discounted, that takes out their link 5. Congressmen dont vote in terms of political capital they vote on ideology 6. No risk of a double-dip recession
Business Week 7/2 (Rebecca Christie, Carol Massar, 7/2/10, " White House's Romer Sees No Sign of a Double-Dip Recession ", http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-02/white-house-s-romer-sees-no-sign-of-a-double-diprecession.html) July 2 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. economy doesn't show signs that it will relapse into another recession , said Christina Romer, President Barack Obama's chief economist. We certainly do not see any sign of that in the data, said Romer, who chairs the White House's Council of Economic Advisers, in an interview on Bloomberg Television today. We're anticipating moderate growth. The U.S. economy lost 125,000 workers in June while adding 83,000 private-sector jobs, according to Labor Department data released earlier today. Private employers hired fewer workers than forecast, and overall payrolls fell because of a drop in federal census workers. It's not good enough but it is very much in the direction of slow steady expansion, Romer said. She said Obama would keep plugging away to encourage Congress to approve extended unemployment benefits and aid for small business and local governments.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

40

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

41

7. The disad isnt intrinsic to the plan means that we can pass jobs bill and do the plan 8. The economy is resilient-multiple reasons. Reuters, November 26, 2007 (Illegal immigrants
not U.S. http://www.reuters.com/article/healthNews/idUSN2640739320071126, JMP) health care burden: study, 11/26/2007,

We hear discouraging and pessimistic comments about the economy every day, and many people are afraid
of how long the current recession will last. Michigan just got more bad news as its economic forecasters predicted that the unemployment rate will average 11.3 percent in 2009 and the state's budget will overspend revenues by $1.6 billion. But

within the economic slowdown, there is actually plenty of good news if you take the time to look for it. First, there are areas of the country that are actually doing quite well. As of November, the jobless rate was at or
below 4 percent in four states and below 5 percent in 10 states, including states ranging from New Hampshire to Oklahoma to Hawaii. Wyoming's jobless rate is only 3.2 percent, and it actually experienced employment growth over the last year, along with five other states. And just as there are some states that continue to prosper , there are some industries that continue to experience positive job growth. For example, employment in the natural resources and mining industries increased by 8.7 percent over the year, and private-sector education and health services added 439,000 jobs over the same period, a growth rate of almost 3 percent. But even those net job figures give us only part of the bigger employment picture. While the overall economy lost 2.9 million jobs from December 2007 to December 2008 (following five years of solid job growth that created almost 8 million jobs), there was also a huge amount of healthy job

turnover in 2008. According to government data, there were 7.1 million new jobs created in the first quarter of 2008 (the most recent period available), but also 7.4 million jobs lost. Despite a net job loss, the fact that there were so many jobs created in just the first three months of 2008 is an encouraging sign that new opportunities in the dynamic U.S. economy, even during a recession . Going back to 1990, there has
been an average quarterly job loss of 5.7 percent of total jobs, but an average growth in new jobs of 7.6 percent, and we'll likely return to a period of positive, net job growth again in 2009 or 2010. Second, retail prices for many consumer

products have declined significantly, allowing Americans to stretch their dollars further and save billions. For example, retail gasoline peaked in July 2008 at $4.12 per gallon, but then decreased substantially to the
current average price of $1.81, translating into annual saving for consumers and business of more than $350 billion. There have been industry trends and improved technologies over a long period that have helped consumers save money computers cost 88 percent less now than they did a decade ago and the same holds for televisions (78 percent less), cameras (63 percent less), cell phone service (30 percent less), clothes (10 percent less) and even new cars (8 percent less). The combination of falling home prices and record-low mortgage rates has pushed the National Association of Realtors' home affordability index to record highs in recent months. Mortgage rates are at near-historic lows, currently only 5.12 percent for a 30-year fixed rate mortgage - lower than any time since the 1960s. While the lingering troubles in the

real estate market have resulted in a large number of foreclosures, even this problem is largely regional. According to RealtyTrac, more than half (53 percent) of all November foreclosures were concentrated in only
four states California, Florida, Nevada and Arizona. Without those four states, foreclosures in the other states actually declined in November from October, and were up by only slightly from the same month in 2007 . There certainly are

serious problems facing the economy, but these should be considered as temporary setbacks for the world's largest and strongest economy. Economic conditions are not uniformly bad and opportunities still exist in
many states, and in many industries and sectors. Instead of arbitrary pump-priming from Washington, policies should reflect that the U.S. economy is both incredibly resilient and highly dynamic and, absent government meddling, the marketplace will correct and become even stronger on the other end of this slowdown.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

41

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

42

Politics Midterms Obama Good (Cap and Trade)


1. Non-unique: Republicans win in the Midterms now- polls prove Caitlin Huey-Burns. GOP Has Edge in Voter Enthusiasm. U.S. News and World Report (Politics and Policy). 6-30- 2010.
http://politics.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/06/30/gop-has-edge-in-voter-enthusiasm.html A series of recent polls show anti-incumbency sentiments are at a record high

and Republicans are more enthusiastic than ever about voting in the midterm elections when compared to Democrats . The results suggest it could be a favorable election year for the GOP . A recent Gallup poll shows 60 percent of those surveyed said most members of Congress should not be reelected. Frank Newport, editor in chief of the Gallup Poll, says that percentage "is the highest in our history." When asked to explain why, 29 percent of those surveyed said
lawmakers are "not doing a good job." According to the poll, 15 percent cited a need for fresh faces in office and another 15 percent were concerned that lawmakers were not representing their interests. Many cited general worries about partisanship and congressional self-interest. Another Gallup poll shows Republicans leading Democrats in voter enthusiasm

by 28 percentage points. Newport says Republicans "have had more fervor" about voting in recent midterms, except for in 2006 when Democrats gained control of Congress. But this is the largest enthusiasm gap between the parties the poll has found since first asking the question in 1994, the year Republicans historically
took over the House.

2. No link: pulling out of Afghanistan not considered weak foreign policy its what all the NATO countries want to do 3. Link turn: withdraw from Afghanistan is a win for Democrats Agence France Presse 7-1-2010. [US lawmakers
pass http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hrIVooBldlIZuML9BBGBLKt1MiKw] Afghan war funding,

Lawmakers approved the monies -- including funds necessary to Obama's plan to deploy another 30,000 troops to turn the faltering campaign around -- only after giving voice to a growing chorus of Democratic calls for a withdrawal. Democrats backing the war, allied with the president's Republican foes, turned aside three amendments that posed stiff challenges to
Obama's strategy. The House struck down one measure to cut all military spending from the bill by a 376-25 margin, and killing another to restrict the money to pay for a withdrawal of US forces by a 321-100 margin. n a 260-162 vote, they also defeated a Democratic amendment aimed at requiring Obama, who has set a July 2011 deadline for starting a US withdrawal, to set a complete timetable for that process. Democrats accounted for the lion's share of the yes votes in each case. But the fate of the bill was still clouded after Democrats attached more than 15 billion dollars in jobs and education

The House changes meant the Senate, which approved the administration's request for the vastly unpopular Afghan war in May, would have to take up the measure the week of July 12 after the week-long July 4 recess. The amendments reflected growing US public pessimism about the war , by some measures now the longest in US history, ahead of key November mid-term elections.
programs in a 239-182 that defied a presidential veto threat over cuts designed to pay for the measure.

4. Cant solve warming- other countries like China and India are part of the problem, no evidence of modeling 5. Cap and trade wont solve warming- doesnt low temperatures, and other countries are key The Foundry, 7/21/09 (A Bakers Dozen of Reasons to Oppose Cap and Trade, The Foundry, July
http://blog.heritage.org/2009/07/21/a-bakers-dozen-of-reasons-to-oppose-cap-and-trade/)

21st 2009,

Theres no environmental benefit. Even the flawed and significantly biased cost estimates of $140 per year or $170 per year arent worth the alleged benefits since the bill would lower temperatures by only hundredths of a degree in 2050 and no more than two-tenths of a degree at the end of the century. The fact that EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson confirmed the bill would do nothing for global temperatures without commitment from large emitters like India and China following suit, as well as Greenpeaces adamant opposition due to all the corporate handouts in the
10.)

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

42

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

43

bill should be telling signs that the environmental benefits are nonexistent. 6. Case outweighs: Plan ensures NATO cohesion thats key to deter nuclear attacks and plan solves Afghan warlord power warlords spill over to Pakistan and begin a coup resulting in civil nuclear war that could escalate

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

43

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

44

Politics - Midterms Obama Bad (SKFTA)


1. Non-unique: Dems winning now- polls prove Nate Silver. Senate Forecast: After Primaries, Picture Slightly Improved for Dems. 6-28-2010.
http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/06/senate-forecast-after-primaries-picture.html Locally, Democrats helped themselves in the primaries. Democratic fortunes

were improved by the primaries in Nevada and Pennsylvania, California, North Carolina, and Kentucky , and worsened probably only in
Arkansas (and South Carolina, which they had almost no chance of winning anyway.) This accounts for most of the movement in the rankings. Whereas, as of our last update, or simulations were projecting an average of 54.0 Democratic and 46.0 Republican seats, we now show 55.2 Democrats, 44.2 Republicans , and 0.6 Charlie Crists.

2. No link: Withdraw is seen as weak foreign policy and will hurt Democrats FLY 1 28 10 Executive Director - Foreign Policy Initiative & Research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations Jamie M.
Fly, Does Obama Have a Foreign Policy?, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/does-obama-have-foreign-policy

While it is understandable that given the state of the economy and lingering recession, most Americans are perhaps more focused on their job security than about what is happening in Kabul, Tehran, or Pyongyang, it is troubling that this president does not seem to have a clear agenda on these issues other than a retro-80s approach to twenty-first century challenges. If the Christmas Day bomber, growing concern about Yemen, instability in Iran, continued

2010 will be just as consequential for U.S. foreign policy as any year in recent memory with the exception of 2001. President Obama came into office with a foreign policy agenda that was essentially limited to expressing concern about nuclear weapons and showing the world that he was not George W. Bush. He has now done the latter through speech after speech in Istanbul, Accra, Cairo, to cite just a few of the exotic venues. Despite focusing on the former with his reset
uncertainty about nuclear Pakistan, and the difficult months (and years) ahead in Afghanistan are any indication, of the U.S.-Russian relationship, the foreign policy challenges he faced during 2009 were largely thrust upon him by events. Despite several courageous decisions as commander in chief, he was clearly uncomfortable (witness the Afghanistan Strategy Review) with the issue set he was forced to focus on

In this very political White House, foreign policy is viewed through the lens of mid-term elections in 2010 and the presidents reelection in 2012, just like any other issue. Thus, it is important for Team Obama to act tough on security and kill terrorists (preferably using classified means), but most other foreign policy issues become time consuming obstacles to the pursuit of a robust domestic agenda. This is foreign policy as a political tactic, not as a grand strategy or a coherent formulation of Americas global interests (with the exception of a headlong rush for disarmament). Despite the challenges the country faces on the domestic front, it would behoove the president in 2010 to do what he failed to do last night -- speak more frequently to the American people about what is at stake overseas and what his vision is for keeping Americans safe and advancing U.S. interests around the world. Otherwise, he risks being nothing more than a reactionary president doing little more than what is required to avoid the wrath of the electorate. He runs the risk of becoming an inconsequential commander in chief in very consequential times.
during year one.

3. No internal link from jobs to the economy: Jobs arent key, the unemployment rate has been steadily declining but the economy has not improved- there is not a clear inverse relationship between the two. 4.SKFTA not key to job creation: the NYT evidence is power tagged- it only indicates that SKFTA creates jobs, not that it is key to the economy 5. Mead is empirically denied the economy has been bad for years and no impact 6. Case outweighs Plan ensures NATO cohesion thats key to deter nuclear attacks and plan solves Afghan warlord power warlords spill over to Pakistan and begin a coup resulting in civil nuclear war that could escalate

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

44

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

45

Redeployment Afghanistan DA
1. They have no evidence saying that pulling out of Afghanistan after 2011 is uniquely bad their Martinez evidence says the only reason why 2011 is relevant is so that Obama can send a signal to the Afghanistan government to stabilize 2. The aff withdraws troops, if not before, then within, this 2011 timeline means that the aff solves Afghanistan instability and their terminal impact of an Indo-Pakistani war its an advantage to the plan

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

45

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

46

Taliban Negotiation DA
1. Negotiations are only possible after withdrawal NPR 6/29 [Should The U.S. Try To Negotiate With The Taliban? an interview with Melissa Block, CEO of New America Foundation]
Mr. COLL: I think the United States is still ambivalent about the idea of high-level negotiations . For now, policy is united in the view that any such talks are not to be undertaken this year, but could only be pursued next year, perhaps if military momentum were to change. Hamid Karzai, the president of Afghanistan, has a different view, though. He has already been in touch with elements of the Taliban leadership in Pakistan, trying to tease out what such talks might entail. So, things are in motion. And I'm not sure that the United States is going to be able to control all the aspects of this part of the negotiation. BLOCK: It's interesting because we did hear from CIA Director Leon Panetta this weekend. He says they've seen no evidence that the Taliban are truly interested in reconciliation, that they would surrender their arms, denounce al-Qaeda, truly try to become a part of society. Says no evidence of that. Mr. COLL: Well, there are a lot of hard lines being publicly declared by both sides. The United States says we're not going to think about talking to you until you renounce al-Qaeda. And Director Panetta's right . No significant Taliban leader has come out in public to renounce al-Qaeda. For their part, the Taliban say, we're not talking to you until you get out of Afghanistan. Well, that's not happening anytime soon. And so, there has been this sort of call and response stalemate at the level of publicly declared intentions. Behind the scenes things are a little more supple. And yet, the question is, are there militarily significant Taliban leaders who really would lay down their arms, accept the Karzai government as legitimate and join a peaceful political process? There have been some Taliban leaders over the last four or five years who have done that. Not insignificant - former Taliban ministers and core commanders, but there are not many, and their defections have not changed the balance of the war.

2. Negotiations cant solve and reasonable talks are impossible; only nation building will be effective in solving regional stability Thomas H. Johnson, Director of the Program for Culture & Conflict Studies, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 4/20/ 09 Six Experts
on Negotiating with the Taliban http://www.cfr.org/publication/18893/six_experts_on_negotiating_with_the_taliban.html An ongoing dialogue with the Taliban should be part of our counterinsurgency strategy, but such a venture is fraught with danger. Since 2006, various partners of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan have pursued a dialogue with regional Taliban figures as well as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. None of these efforts have borne fruit. It's been difficult to identify who can in fact speak for the Taliban insurgent leadership. While these talks proceeded, the insurgency has become more violent and casualty rates have soared for the ISAF. Not everyone believes in dialogue . The outside powers such as ISAF members the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Norway like the idea; regional powers such as Iran, India, and Russia oppose it. Historically, Pashtuns (who constitute the core Taliban constituency) have negotiated only when they perceive themselves in a position of strength. If their public statements are to be believed, the Taliban today think they are in a position of strength. Taliban spokesman Qari Yousuf Ahmadi recently stated: "We struggle for almighty Allah and we are sure we are winning." Those that support

dialogue and negotiations believe that talks can split the insurgency between "moderates" and the extremist global jihadists. I am frankly unsure of who the moderate Taliban are. The structure of the
Taliban is complex. The organizational structures at the local, provincial, regional, and national levels are not all necessarily tied together in a unified hierarchy and the political leaders (the Quetta shura, Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda) remain outside of Afghanistan.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

46

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

47

Terrorism DA
1. Plan is a perquisite the only reason there is mass amount of terrorism is because the US is there if we get out and stop eradicating the opium fields, Afghani farmers will stop submitting to the warlords, and they will lose power 2. Terrorism will decrease with troop withdrawalmany terrorists will feel the war is over Farrall 11/09 Leah Farrall, Staff writer for The Australian Newspaper,
11/12/2009 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/al-qaida-prefers-us-to-stick-around/story-e6frg6zo-1225796639320 While calling for jihad to liberate occupied Muslim lands is a potent radicalisation tool, it only yields substantive benefits when there is such a conflict at hand. Before September 11, 2001, most volunteers at al-Qa'ida's camps in Afghanistan wanted training for armed jihad. Al-Qa'ida had problems with attrition of its members and trainees who left its camps to seek armed jihad elsewhere, usually in Chechnya. This was one of the

driving reasons behind Osama bin Laden's decision to attack the US with the specific aim of inciting it to invade Afghanistan. For bin Laden, this created a new, exploitable jihad. Since the US invaded Afghanistan and then Iraq, al-Qa'ida has become the pre-eminent group fighting a self-declared jihad against an occupying force. These invasions allowed al-Qa'ida to exploit allegations that the US was intent on occupying Muslim lands. A withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan would undoubtedly hand alQa'ida and the Taliban a propaganda victory. However, a victory would deny al-Qa'ida its most potent source of power, influence, funding and recruits -- the armed jihad. Without a jihad to fight, al-Qa'ida would be left with only its franchises -- all of which are involved in deeply unpopular confrontations with government regimes in the Islamic world . Their indiscriminate acts of violence as well as hostility towards other Muslims not sharing their views have badly damaged al-Qa'ida's brand. This has driven al-Qa'ida to refocus on Afghanistan because jihad against an occupying force attracts a level of support and legitimacy that attacking Muslim governments does not. It provides additional justification for al-Qa'ida and those supporting it to continue striking US targets. 3. Taliban will not take overAfghans will fight for a Government that brings peace, not the Taliban Moselle 10/09 Tyler Moselle, former Executive Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights and Foreign Policy, masters in
politics from Harvard, 10/1/2009. [Carr Center for Human Rights, Homeland Security Insight and Analysis, Responsible Withdrawal From Afghanistan p. 2]. Misapplication of the 1990's model. Critics of a troop drawdown argue that this was the same strategy the US pursued in Afghanistan in the early 1990s but they overlook the fact that the Taliban at the time were a young and relatively unknown political movement. Many Afghans have direct, harsh

experience of life under the Taliban and would oppose such a movement from coming back into power unlike the 1990s when many Afghans passively supported the Taliban to bring peace during the civil war. 4. U.S. presence in Afghanistan not key to deterring terrorist nuclear capabilitiestheir Thielmann evidence talks about US intelligence and drone attacks being key to keeping nukes away from terrorists, not the US being in Afghanistan 5. US doesnt need ground troops in Afghanistandrones are an effective alternative to finding and killing terrorists if a problem were to excalate Haider 6/1 Zeeshan Haider, Staff writer for Reuters, 6/1/2010. Al Qaeda's third-in-command, whose role spanned from operations to fundraising, is believed to have been killed last month in a U.S. missile strike in Pakistan, dealing a serious blow to the embattled group. Sheikh Sa'id al-Masri, also known as Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, was believed to be killed along with members of his

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

47

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

48

family in a strike by a pilotless CIA-operated drone attack. Al Qaeda confirmed his death in a statement on a Islamist website earlier on Monday. "We have strong reason to believe ... that al-Masri was killed recently in Pakistan's tribal areas," a U.S. official in Washington said on condition of anonymity. "In terms of counterterrorism, this would be a big victory." A Pakistani security official said Yazid was most probably killed in a missile strike in North Waziristan on the night of May 21. "We had a report at the time that one Arab was killed in that strike with some of his family members and I think it was probably him," said the official, who declined to be named. The attack targeted a house owned by a tribesman some 25 km (15 miles) west of Miranshah, the main town in North Waziristan, a stronghold of al Qaeda and Taliban militants that borders Afghanistan. Intelligence officials at the time said six militants were killed but residents said 12 people, including four women and two children, were killed. Six women and two children were wounded and treated at a hospital in Miranshah, residents said. "He was known as Mustafa in the area. His wife was killed in the strike," a resident of the village where attack took place said on condition of anonymity. The U.S.-based SITE Intelligence Group, which monitors Islamist websites, said earlier on Monday that al-Qaeda announced al-Masri's death in an Internet posting. In addition to al-Masri, the announcement stated that his wife, three of his daughters, his granddaughter and other men, women and children were killed, according to SITE. The CIA has stepped up the pace of unmanned aerial

drone attacks, targeting not only high-level al Qaeda and Taliban targets but largely unknown foot soldiers as well. A U.S. official said al-Masri was widely seen as al Qaeda's No. 3 figure and its main conduit to leader Osama bin Laden. As al Qaeda's chief operating officer, he had a hand in everything from finances to operational planning, the official said. Analysts say his death will be a major loss for al Qaeda but there would be no weakling of the group's fighting resolve. " Definitely it will have an impact because it was their important figure, it's a big loss for them but there appears to be a generational change taking place in
al Qaeda where new ones are replacing old ones," said Rahimullah Yusufzai, a newspaper editor and expert on militant affairs. "Al Qaeda's capacity to operate and strike has been badly damaged because of their losses in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq but we have not yet seen any weakening of their commitment." A senior intelligence official in Islamabad said al Qaeda's No. 3 position was "the most dangerous" rank in the group. Five other al Qaeda leaders considered third-in-command have been killed or captured since the September 11 , 2001 attacks on the United States, but al-Masri may be the most difficult to replace. "They're not getting enough people of the right caliber that they require as they were getting earlier ," the intelligence official said, crediting pressure from the drone strikes, Pakistani military actions in the tribal areas and steppedup intelligence actions in the rest of Pakistan. Yazid served as al Qaeda's leader in Afghanistan and as well as al Qaeda's "chief financial officer," according to the U.S. 9-11 commission. As chief financier, he was responsible for disbursing al Qaeda funds, making him one of the most trusted and important leaders of the group. He was a founding member of Ayman al Zawahiri's branch of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, one of the original groups that merged to form al Qaeda. Following the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981, al-Masri was implicated in the killing along with Zawahiri and others, and they spent time in jail together. He also served as a top propagandist for al Qaeda and the Taliban. In March, U.S. officials said a drone strike in Pakistan killed a key al Qaeda planner.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

48

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

49

1AR Extension
More ev on withdrawing solves: Withdrawal of ground troops key to ending terrorismterrorists thrive on the U.S. occupation Moselle 10/09 Tyler Moselle, former Executive Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights and Foreign Policy, masters in
politics from Harvard, 10/1/2009. [Carr Center for Human Rights, Homeland Security Insight and Analysis, Responsible Withdrawal From Afghanistan p. 2].

Only Afghans themselves can create a political solution to the problems in their country: the best the US and foreign powers can do is to provide minimal - yet sustained - support to aid this long and difficult process. Ironically, a troop surge actually increases the likelihood of causing Americans to become cynical
about the prospects of aiding Afghanistan because few results will emerge in a short time span following troop increases. Once Americans become cynical about such efforts, it is likely citizens will demand a total withdrawal, arguably the worst possible unintended consequence of such a policy. Moreover, an increased number of troops feed the

propaganda machine of the Taliban and al Qaeda affiliates who claim they are killing infidels and rebelling against a foreign occupation. Extend 2AC 3 Citing the situation in Afghanistan during the 1990s is flawedthe Taliban was a party that brought peace to Afghanistan and ended a civil war. Afghanis will do the same and fight for a party that promotes peace, thats Moselle 9.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

49

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

50

***KRITIKS***

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

50

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

51

Security
1. Framework: neg must run a competitive policy option or the status quo that competes with the aff on an impact level A. Predictability cant predict all K literature impact level ensures 2AR impact comparison that doesnt moot the 1AC B. Fairness and Education key to clash impacts are the affs greatest offense and impacts to kritiks can never be solved if the aff cant respond to them 2. Case outweighs: Status quo counternarcotics policies are turning Afghani farmers to be at the disposal of the warlords and angering NATO countries we need to pull out now to let Afghanistan stabilize itself 3. Removing troops solve: the aff challenges US colonialist tendencies post plan, the US is no longer incharge of Afghanistan they can re-build their own nation and engage in self determination 4. Turn: the aff isnt racist; there is a REAL impact to instability in Afghanistan material realities exist and must be engaged, the alternative forfeits the possibilities of the status quo for inaction and genocide 5. Turn: the neg presents generalized depictions of the aff removing counter-insurgent troops is not what the Campbell evidence describes, we fundamentally actualize the worldview their alternative reccomends 6. Perm: do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative Critique Alone is not adequate to alter the current security environment Political Action is Necessary to Promote Emancipation Over Security and engage policymakers Pinar Bilgin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent Univ, 5 [Regional Security in The Middle East, p. 60-1] Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to securit y, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective, self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselve s. They should be compounded by other forms of practice (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities as emancipatory practices (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice
relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997: 114) writes: T hinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is thinking about doing .... Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice: it is important for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to rethink security in both theory and practice.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

51

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

52

7. Perms accesses ethically responsible politics purely theoretical kritik is Insufficient - we need As If stories to offset the worst international violence the alt can create Michael Williams, Professor of International Politics at the University of WalesAberystwyth, 5 [The Realist Tradition and the
Limits of International Relations, p. 165-7] Moreover, the links between skeptical realism and prevalent postmodern themes go more deeply than this, particularly as they apply to attempts by post-structural thinking to reopen questions of responsibility and ethics.8 In part, the goals of post-structural approaches can be usefully characterized, to borrow Stephen White's illuminating contrast, as expressions of 'responsibility to otherness' which question and challenge modernist equations of responsibility with a 'responsibility to act'. A responsibility to otherness seeks to reveal and open the constitutive processes and claims of subjects and subjectivities that a foundational modernism has effaced in its narrow identification of responsibility with a 'responsibility to act'.81 Deconstruction can from this perspective be seen as a principled stance unwilling to succumb to modernist essentialism which in the name of responsibility assumes and reifies subjects and structures, obscures forms of power and violence which are constitutive of them, and at the same time forecloses a consideration of alternative possibilities and practices. Yet it is my claim that the wilful Realist tradition does not lack an understanding of the contingency of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness. On the contrary, its

strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a willfully liberal vision. The construction of a realm of objectivity and calculations is not just a consequence of a need to act - the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It is a form of responsibility to otherness, an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability precisely by - at least initially - reducing the self and the other to a structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability. It is, in short, a
strategy of limitation: a willful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited - both epistemically and politically in the name of a politics of toleration : a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterized as one of mondus vivendi. If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a nonor apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to skeptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. The issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumanns incisive questions concerning postmodern construction of identity, action and responsibility. As Neumann points out, the insight that identities are inescapably contingent and relationally constructed, and even the claim that identities are indebted to otherness, do not in themselves provide a foundation for practice, particularly in situations where identities are sediment and conflictually defined. In these cases, deconstruction alone will not suffice

unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice (and not just philosophical practice) the essential dynamics it confronts. Here, a responsibility to act must go beyond deconstruction to consider viable alternatives and counter-practices. To take this critique seriously is not necessarily to be subject yet again to the straightforward blackmail of the Enlightenment and a narrow modernist vision of responsibility.
While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to otherness for fear that an essential stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such situations demand also an evaluation of the structures (of identity and

institutions) that might viably be mobilised in order to offset the worst implications of violently exclusionary identities. It requires, as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of compelling 'as if' stories around which counter-subjectivities and political practices can coalesce. Willful Realism, 1 submit, arises out of an
appreciation of these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such 'stories' within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success, and to what extent might they he limits upon their own aspirations toward responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dichotomies.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

52

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

53

8. Security means human emancipation not mere survival - providing safety create opportunities for flourishing Ken Booth, Prof. of IR @ Wales, 5 [Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 22]
The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to that extent their life choices and chances are taken away; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats - whether these are the lack of food for ones children or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security creates life possibilities. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in peoples lives. This allows for individual and collective human becoming - the capacity to have some choice about living differently - consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusions follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming, As an instrumental value, security is sought because it frees people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security - and security is always relative - gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to chose to be or become, other than merely survival as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

53

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

54

If you have time: 10. The Affs immament critique of current nuclear doctrine is more effective than their imaginary Archimedean position Richard Wyn Jones, Prof. of International Politics @ Aberystywyth, 99 [Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, p. 77]
The work of the first generation of critical theorists does not offer much specific guidance in the task of outlining what emancipation might mean in practice. but the preceding discussion of their work suggests three points that those attempting to overcome this failing should bear in mind. First, and most obviously, visions of concrete utopias must be consistent with whatever deeper notions of the grounding of emancipatory potential are deployed. Thus, for example, if the possibility of emancipation is grounded in the economic realm, then, logically, depictions of a more emancipated order cannot simply concentrate on (narrowly defined) political institutions. Second, descriptions-indeed, prescriptions-of a more emancipated order must focus on realizable utopias. Critical theorists must not lose sight of the fact that the coherence of their project is dependent on their utilization of the critical potential of immanence. If they succumb

to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present-a tendency that Marx and Engels argued was characteristic of "utopian socialists" such as Robert Owen (Marx and Engels 1948: 44-46)- then critical theorists have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically. After all, to justify a utopia that is not already present in some fonn within the prevailing order
requires the existence of an Archimedean point according to whose standards this utopia might be envisioned-a possibility rejected by critical theorists. Thus immanent critique (understood in broad terms) remains a vital part of the melatheoretical armory of critical theory. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that a vision of an

emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be politically efficacious. Unless anchored in a realistic assessment of actually existing possibilities, emancipatory ideas are hardly likely to convince their target audience (whoever they might be) that progressive change is not only desirable but also plausible and achievable, and therefore worth the effort or risk of trying to secure. Thus, for both epistemological and purely instrumental reasons, concrete utopias must be based on practices that have some basis in preexisting behavior.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

54

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

55

Fem IR
1. Framework: neg must run a competitive policy option or the status quo that competes with the aff on an impact level A. Predictability cant predict all K literature impact level ensures 2AR impact comparison that doesnt moot the 1AC B. Fairness and Education key to clash impacts are the affs greatest offense and impacts to kritiks can never be solved if the aff cant respond to them 2. No link to the K force the neg to prove the link to the drive for military security critiqued by Kronsell in our evidence 3. Perm do the plan and all non mutually exclusive parts of the alt Both the public/private concept and the everyday concept have been important for feminists. Brigitte Bargetz, 2009. [Reconciling the Irreconcilable, The Politics of the Everyday: A Feminist Revision of the Public/Private
Frame, http://www.iwm.at/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=130&Itemid=125-There] The public/private frame and the concept of the everyday share some common ground when taking into account their critique of androcentric science. Feminists have drawn on both concepts in order to reveal different (disciplinary) exclusions: of women as scientists, of womens experiences, of questions of sex and gender relations, of patriarchy, etc. Moreover, both concepts are confronted with gendered and sexualized denigrations . Associating women with either the sphere of the private or the sphere of the everyday, they are often regarded as being naturally subordinated to the public sphere of male transcendence.

4. Kritikal theory must incorporate problem solving approaches Jeroen Gunning, Lecturer in International Politics @ Univ. of Wales, 7 [Government and Opposition 42.3, A Case for Critical
Terrorism Studies? p. Blackwell-synergy] The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a critical field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means combining critical and problem-solving approaches, it does not fulfil its emancipatory potential.94 One of the temptations of critical approaches is to remain mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and policy relevance.Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers and terrorists and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of political structures. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of immanent critique that has historically underpinned the critical project and which, in Booth's words, involves the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, this means building with one's feet firmly on the ground, not constructing castles in the air and asking what it means for real people in real places .96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a critical approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete a lternatives. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a coherent response to many of the central problems of political life, and in particular to the place of violence in political life. Even while deessentializing and deconstructing claims about security, it must concern itself with hows ecurity is to be redefined, and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many critical scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with traditional scholars, the role of expert adviser is more often than not filled by traditional

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

55

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

56

Fem IR
policy makers are insufficiently challenged to question the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques . A notable exception is the readiness of European Union
scholars.99 The result is that
officials to enlist the services of both traditional and critical scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But

Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term terrorism or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one
this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the critical turn implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator). It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the terrorism field, to maximize both the field's rigour and its policy relevance. Whether a critically constituted terrorism studies will attract the fragmented voices from outside the field depends largely on how broadly the term critical is defined. Those who assume critical to mean Critical Theory or poststructuralist may not feel comfortable identifying with it if they do not themselves subscribe to such a narrowly defined critical approach. Rather, to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow Williams and Krause's approach to critical security studies, which they define simply as bringing together many perspectives that have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline.101 This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the (normative) expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework, the origins of this framework, their methodologies and dichotomies; and that they historicize both the state and terrorism, and consider the security and context of all, which implies among other things an attempt at empathy and cross-cultural understanding.102 Anything more normative would limit the ability of such a field to create a genuinely interdisciplinary, nonpartisan and innovative framework, and exclude valuable insights borne of a broadly critical approach, such as those from conflict resolution studies who, despite working within a traditional framework, offer important insights by moving beyond a narrow military understanding of security to a

a poststructuralist has no greater claim to be part of this critical field than a realist who looks beyond the state at the interaction between
broader understanding of human security and placing violence in its wider social context.103 Thus,

the violent group and their wider social constituency.104

5. Alt doesnt solve case- Dont let them advocate our plan. Either the representations they criticize are inherent to out aff, or the perm solves 6. Also, we read specific ev that only a pullout will solve our harms. Even if the root cause is based in gender rhetoric, the harms will be indefinitely replicated if we allow our troops to stay 7. Justifies perm: do the plan and all non-exclusive parts of the alternative. Doing both allows for solving the harms outlined while recognizing and rejecting the security discourse. There will inevitably be security rhetoric, so one additional instance wont preclude the possibility of the alt 8. Alt cause - Gender is not the root cause of all war Cockburn 10, Cynthia Department of Sociology, The City University London, UK b Centre for the Study of Women and Gender,
University of Warwick, UK (2010) 'Gender Relations as Causal in Militarization and War', International Feminist Journal of Politics, 12: 2, 139 157

war-fighting between two armies is only the tip of the iceberg , as it were, of an underlying, less immediate, set of institutions and relationships that can be understood as systemic. The author most often credited for the term war system is Betty Reardon. In her text Sexism and the War System she employs the term to refer to society in its entirety, our competitive social order, which is based on authoritarian principles, assumes unequal value among and between human beings, and is held in place by coercive force (Reardon 1996: 10) While this accurately describes many modern societies , the womens organizations I have studied, in so far as I have come to understand their analysis, do not in the main share Betty Reardons reduction of this social order to nothing other than a gender order. Few, I believe, would follow her in a belief that patriarchy . . . invented and maintains war to hold in place the social order it spawned (Reardon 1996: 12). Looking at war from close quarters these women activists see all too clearly that other forces are at work in addition to gender.
Second,

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

56

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

57

Terror Talk
1. Framework: neg must run a competitive policy option or the status quo that competes with the aff on an impact level A. Predictability cant predict all K literature impact level ensures 2AR impact comparison that doesnt moot the 1AC B. Fairness and Education key to clash impacts are the affs greatest offense and impacts to kritiks can never be solved if the aff cant respond to them 2. No link- we dont use the discourse the 1AC presents specific scenarios of specific militant groups like Al Qaeda and other warlords we dont generalize all Afghanis as terrorists 3. Obama is eliminating the rhetoric now- he is removing terms like Islamic Radicalism from American policy (Matt Apuzzo, 4/7/10, Associated Press- Huffington Post, Obama Tries To Change Terrorism Rhteoric, Remove Terms Like
Islamic Radicalism from National Security, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/07/obama-terrorism-rhetoric_n_528104.html)

Less talk about "Islamic radicalism" and a lot more about doing business. In the year since President Barack Obama pledged a new beginning in the relationship with the Muslim world, the White House has begun to change the U.S. focus. Terrorism still dominates U.S. security concerns, but the White House believes it doesn't have to dominate the conversation. Since Obama's speech in Cairo last year, the White
House has tried to talk more about health care, science and education. It's a strategy based on the belief that the prior administration viewed the world through the lens of terrorism. And when it talked to Muslim nations, it was all about winning the war of ideas. "You take a country where the overwhelming majority are not going to become terrorists, and you go in and say, 'We're building you a hospital so you don't become terrorists.' That doesn't make much sense," says National Security Council staff member Pradeep Ramamurthy. Ramamurthy runs the administration's Global Engagement Directorate, a four-person team that Obama launched last May with little fanfare and a vague mission to use diplomacy and outreach "in pursuit of a host of national security objectives." Since then, the division has not only helped change the vocabulary of fighting terrorism but has shaped the way the country invests in Muslim businesses, studies global warming, supports scientific research and combats polio. Also, Obama advisers who are rewriting a document spelling

out the country's national security strategy plan to leave out references to "Islamic radicalism," counterterrorism officials said. They spoke on condition of anonymity because the document is still being written and
is weeks away from release. Currently, the document declares: "The struggle against militant Islamic radicalism is the great ideological conflict of the early years of the 21st century." Ramamurthy's team is reaching out in a variety of ways. Before diplomats go abroad, they hear from him or his deputy, Jenny Urizar. When officials from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration returned from Indonesia, the NSC got a rundown about research opportunities on global warming. Ramamurthy maintains a database of interviews conducted by 50 U.S. embassies worldwide. And business leaders from more than 40 countries head to Washington this month for an "entrepreneurship summit" for Muslim businesses. "Do you want to think about the U.S. as the nation that fights terrorism or the nation you want to do business with?" Ramamurthy said. Story continues below Many international Muslim leaders have cheered the new

tone, not just for its symbolism but because it makes it politically easier for them to cooperate with the U.S. "It's also a clear indication of President Obama's substantial understanding of the intricacies of Muslim politics," Jordanian lawmaker Hamada Faraaneh said. 4. The alt doesnt solve for the impact- allowing for everyone to articulate their view is not sufficient for a role-playing, and it is irrelevant to discuss feelings because they simply do not matter

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

57

170977266.doc 2K9

Dartmouth

58

Terror Talk
5. Perm do the aff and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alt - Critique Alone is not adequate to alter the current security environment Political Action is Necessary to Promote Emancipation Over Security Pinar Bilgin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent Univ, 5 [Regional Security in The Middle East, p. 60-1] Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to securit y, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective, self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselve s. They should be compounded by other forms of practice (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities as emancipatory practices (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice
relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997: 114) writes: T hinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is thinking about doing .... Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice: it is important for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to rethink security in both theory and practice.

6. Security means human emancipation not mere survival - providing safety create opportunities for flourishing Ken Booth, Prof. of IR @ Wales, 5 [Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 22]
The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to that extent their life choices and chances are taken away; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats - whether these are the lack of food for ones children or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security creates life possibilities. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in peoples lives. This allows for individual and collective human becoming - the capacity to have some choice about living differently - consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusions follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming, As an instrumental value, security is sought because it frees people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security - and security is always relative - gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to chose to be or become, other than merely survival as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

58