Notes on the First Meditation Descartes attempts to establish a real distinction between mind and body.

Mind: characterized by aboutness and phenomenology: what its like. Substance Dualism. On Substance: S1 can exist independently of S2 S is a bearer of properties, both essential and accidental S can undergo change and remain same substance Properties are onotologically dependent on substances. S not onto dep. on non-essential properties.

Descartes is interested in finding out what he essentially is. There is a distinction between essential and accidental properties. 2nd Meditation seeks to establish that Descartes is essentially a thinking thing. The 6th meditation seeks to establish, among other things, that he (Descartes) is really distinct from his body (and so doesnt have two essential properties, thought and extension, but just thought.) Both the arguments in 2 and 6 rely, at different points on conceivability arguments. We will return to those. X is essentially F iff: necessarily, if x exists, then x has F. 1. An argument Descartes (likely) didnt give: Argument from DOUBT A: 1. I can doubt that my body exists 2. I cannot doubt that I exist C: I am not my body. Sometimes this is called the masked man fallacy: Compare: A 1. I can doubt that my father is standing there 2. I cannot doubt that the masked man is standing there C: Therefore, the masked man is not my father.

What is happening here is a misapplication of Leibnizs Law. (Or, half of it.) The property being used here is is doubted These sorts of intentional or opaque contexts dont allow valid applications of Ls law. (Opaque contexts dont allow substitution of co-referring terms to preserve truth value.) Clearly, this doesnt work: Sam was called Mr. Big because of his size. Sam was called Sweetie by his mother. Therefore, Sam is not Sam. 6th Meditation: Conceivability Arguments. Generally, arguments that move from what is conceivable to what is possible. (Drawing metaphysical conclusions about the world from epistemological premises.) (CP) If it is conceivable that P, then it is possible that P. If I can conceive of a purple cat, there could be a purple cat. (And, importantly for Descartes, non-purpleness is not an essential quality of a cat.) Conceivability Argument 1 1. It is conceivable that my mind exists without my body. 2: It is not conceivable that my body exists without my body So my mind is not my body. 2. So, it is possible that my mind exists without my body. 3. So, my mind is not identical to my body. 4. So, my mind and body are distinct Note, the non-prime version depends on some version of L law.

(Identity of Indiscernibiles.) Intermission: Leibnizs Law. Indiscernibility of Identicals: (x=y) > (Fx<>Fy) Identity of Indiscernibles (Fx<>Fy) > (x=y) The problem is that some times Leibnizs law does not hold. In particular, it cases of opaque context, i.e., where co-referring terms cannot be substituted without a change to truth value, e.g., Masked man fallacy. Some versions of the doubt argument. The argument has a form similar to the following: Lumpl (the clay) could exist even if Goliath (the statue) were destroyed. Goliath couldnt exist if Goliath were destroyed So, Lumpl isnt Goliath. Now, that might actually be a good (sound) argument. But we dont conclude that Goliath isnt a physical object. (There might be two physical objects in occupying the same space.) And, its not clear that it is putting as much weight on CP Similarly, my mind not be able to exist with this body (these arms, legs, etc) but it still might require some body. So, we need something closer to: Conceivability Argument 2 1. It is conceivable that I exist, but fail to be extended. (I can clearly and distinctly see that extension does not belong to my nature) 2. Thus, it is possible that I exist, but fail to be extended. So, I am not essentially extended. So, I do not have a body essentially. 3 (The wax example) (I can clearly and distinctly conceive that the essence of matter is extension) But I am essentially a thinking thing. (pg. 54) (I can clearly and distinctly perceive that thought is essential to mind.)

So, I have a mind essentially. So, it is possible that my mind exists but my body does not. Thus, my mind is not identical to my body. So, my mind is distinct from my body.

Worries: CP in general. 1, in particular. On pg 54 Descartes writes Thus simply by knowing that I exist and seeing at the same time that absolutely nothing else belongs to my nature But is he entitled to that, as opposed to the weaker: simply by knowing that I exists and cannot see that anything else belongs to my nature In general, we need some criteria of when we have a clear and distinct conception. The problem is that no purely subjective criteria is going to work in the context of the doubt, it seems. (Descartes appeals to a non-deceiving god, through a proof that no one thinks succeeds.) Problems for Substance Dualism: Causation how would mind affect body? Ryle & Behaviorism I. II. I. Ryles rejetion of Cartesian Picture: Ghost in the machine. Motivations for Behaviorism. Picture rests on a category mistake a. Placing something that belongs in one ontological (or grammatical category in another. i. Buildings, university ii. Football team, esprit de corps b. Postive Account i. Mental states just are patters of behavior and dispositions to behave. They are nothing over and above the physical behavior. 1. Examples: One might think that to play the piano sensitively or carefully is to play the piano with an accompanying mental state care, or sensitivity

2. But playing the piano sensitively just is to play the piano (move your fingers) in a certain way. 3. Compare the category mistake of thinking that the university is something over and above the collection of buildings. 4. To know that D.C. is the capito