HowCitizensIntegrateInformationwithoutIdeologicalCues: LocalWeatherandAmericansBeliefsaboutGlobalWarming PatrickJ.Egan AssistantProfessorofPoliticsandPublicPolicy NewYorkUniversity patrick.egan@nyu.edu MeganMullin AssistantProfessorofPoliticalScience TempleUniversity mmullin@temple.

edu preparedfordelivery attheMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociationmeetings,ChicagoIL April2009

 ABSTRACT Muchoftherecentresearchonmasspublicopinionhasfocusedonidentifyinghow messageswithideologicalcuesaffectindividualsattitudesregardingpolitics.Butcitizens alsoreceivepoliticallyrelevantinformationincludingfactsaboutthestateoftheworld andtheirownpersonalexperiencesthatdoesnotcomewithanideologicallabelattached. Whousesthisinformation,andtowhatextent?Itisdifficulttoexplorethesequestions usingobservationaldata,becauseindividualsmaybeexposedtosuchinformationina selectivefashion,andselfreportsofexposuremaynotbereliable.Inthisstudy,weidentify onepieceofinformationthatisdevoidofideologicalcontentandtowhichAmericansare exposedatrandomtheirlocalweatherandshowthatitleadsasignificantshareofthe publictoreassessitsbeliefsabouttheevidenceforglobalwarming.Thiseffectismuch strongerforthelesseducatedandthosewithweakpartisanties,andvirtuallynonexistent forthemosteducatedandmostpartisancitizens.Ourresultssuggestthatwhenpolitically relevantinformationisconveyedwithoutideologicalcues,politicalsophisticationmay prohibittheintegrationofthisinformationintopoliticalbeliefsregardlessofthedirection ofonespredispositions.

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 Inconstructingtheiropinionsaboutpoliticalissues,individualswadethroughaseaof informationthatcomesfromsourcesincludingpoliticalelites,themedia,issueexperts, interpersonalrelationships,andpersonalexperience.Researchontheeffectsofthis informationhasfocusedrecentlyoninformationdeliveredwithideologicalcues,or informationthateliteshavemadeatleastsomeefforttolinktoanideologicalagenda.The prevailingtheoryaboutthesemessagesisthat(1)thosewhoareinterestedinpolitics receivemanymoresuchmessagesthanthosewhoarenot,andthat(2)politically sophisticatedindividualsacceptthesemessagesinaselectivefashionbaseduponwhether thecuesagreewiththeirpersonalideologicalpredispositions,whilethelessinformedare lessconsistentinwhatnewinformationtheyaccept(Zaller1992). Lessexploredisanotherkindofinformationthatispoliticallyrelevantbutdevoidof ideologicalcontent.Eventssuchasterroristattacksandnaturaldisastersfallintothis category,asdostatisticsabouttheeconomyandcrime.Thisclassofinformationcanalso includepersonalexperiences,suchasafamilyschangingeconomiccircumstancesorones interactionwithagovernmentagency.Theseareallfactsthat,inavacuum,arepolitically relevantbutarenotaccompaniedbyideologicalcues.Weknowthatthissortof informationhastremendousimplicationsforpolitics.Consistentlybadeconomicdatacan sinkapresidency.Anaturaldisastercanearnagovernorormayortremendouspublic sympathy.Anegativeexperiencewithpublicschoolscanswayavoterschoiceinlocal governmentelections. Justasisthecasewithideologicalinformation,itissensibleforpoliticalscientiststobe curiousabouthownonideologicalinformationgetsprocessed.Particularly,wemight wonderifintheabsenceofideologicalorpartisancues,politicalsophisticationand personalpredispositionsplaythesamestrongrole.Buttwothreatstoinferencetypically makeitdifficulttoassesshowinformationconveyedwithoutideologicalcuesisintegrated intomassopinionaboutpublicaffairs.First,events,statisticsandpersonalexperiencesare ofteninvokedbyelitesasevidencefortheirargumentsaboutpublicpolicysolutions, leadingmanyindividualstoviewthisinformationthroughanideologicallens.Second, individualsreceiveinformationinanonrandomway.Peoplewhoarewellinformedabout publicaffairsaremorelikelytobeawareofdistanteventsandabstractstatisticsthanthe lessinformed.Andsomeindividualsaremorelikelythanotherstohaveparticular
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politicallyrelevantpersonalexperiences(forexamplelosingajob,orenjoyinganincrease intheirinvestmentportfolio). Inthispaper,weidentifyasourceofnonideologicalinformationthatissubjecttoneitherof theseproblems.TheinformationsourceisfluctuationinlocalU.S.temperatures.Thenon ideologicalmessageitpotentiallyconveysisevidenceforglobalwarming.Thissource avoidsthefirstthreattoinferencebecausethenationsliberalandconservativeeliteshave largelyavoidedinvokingshorttermweatherpatternstobolstertheirargumentsabout climatechange.Moreover,predispositionstowardincumbentpoliticalleadersareunlikely toinfluencecitizensperceptionsofwhetherthetemperatureishotorcold.Itavoidsthe secondthreatbecauseeveryone,fromtheleasttothebestinformedaboutpolitics, personallyexperiencestheweather.Personalexperienceisaugmentedbyweatherreports thataresocompletelyinterspersedacrossallmediaastobevirtuallyinescapable.In essence,localchangesintemperaturerandomlyassignAmericanstoarangeofpositiveand negativemessagesabouttheevidenceforclimatechange. Theexogenousvariationinlocalweatherconditionsallowsustoassesshowpeoplereceive newinformationandintegratethatinformationintotheirbeliefsandpoliticalpreferences. Bymatchinggeocodedsurveydatatolocalweatherrecords,wefindasignificant relationshipbetweenlocalweatherandbeliefsaboutglobalwarming.Foreachthree degreesthatlocaltemperaturerisesabovenormal,Americansbecomeonepercentagepoint morelikelytoagreethatthereissolidevidencethattheearthisgettingwarmer.(The relationshipholdsforlocaltemperaturesthatarebelownormalaswell.)Thesizeofthis effectissubstantial,largerforexamplethantheeffectsassociatedwithrace,age,or education. Weshowthattheeffectoftemperatureonbeliefsisstrikinglyheterogeneous,varyingby race,educationandpartisanship.Localweatheraffectsthosewiththeleasteducation significantlybutthosewiththemosteducationnotatall,anditaffectsthosewholean DemocraticorRepublicanmuchmorethanitaffectspureDemocrats,Republicans,or Independents.1Thesefindingssuggestthatwhenpoliticallyrelevantinformationis

1Asdiscussedlaterinthispaper,individualsidentifiedasIndependentinoursurveydataarelikely

toberesistanttopoliticalinformation. Eganand Mullin 3

conveyedwithoutideologicalcues,politicalsophistication(measuredhereusingthe proxiesofeducationandpartisanship)mayprohibittheintegrationofthisinformationinto politicalbeliefsregardlessofthedirectionofonespredispositions.Theroleof sophisticationherethusdiffersinanimportantwayfromtheoneitplaysregarding informationaccompaniedbyideologicalcues.There,itactsasaselectivefilter.Here,itacts asanoverallblock.Whensurveyrespondentsareaskedabouttheexistenceofglobal warmingandsampletheinformationtheyhaveathand,itisthosewithlesspolitical sophisticationwhoaremostlikelytohaveweatherrelatedconsiderationsatthetopofthe head. Wealsoexaminehowbeliefsabouttheexistenceoftheglobalwarmingprobleminfluence attitudesaboutproblemseriousnessandgovernmentaction.Unsurprisingly,astrong relationshipexistsbetweenbeliefsabouttheproblemandpolicypreferences.Usinglocal weatherconditionsasaninstrumentalvariableforbeliefs,weestimateatwostagemodel toassesswhetherthisrelationshippersistswhenaccountingforthepotentialendogeneity ofbeliefsaboutglobalwarmingsexistence.Althoughlocalweatheristooweakan instrumenttoprovideconclusiveresults,ouranalysissuggeststhatbeliefsdohavean impactonpolicyattitudes. MakingSenseofGlobalWarming

Beliefsaboutexistence.Globalwarmingisacaseinwhichpublicunderstandingand concernabouttheissuelagsbehindopinionsinthescientificcommunity.Since1990,the IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)hasbeenperiodicallyevaluatingthe scientificbasisofclimatechangerisk.Initsfirstreport,thebodyfoundthatglobalmean surfaceairtemperaturehadincreased0.30.6C(0.51.1F)overtheprevious100years (Houghton,Jenkins,andEphraum1990);by2007,itsestimateofthe100yearglobal temperatureincreasehadrisento0.7C,anditconcludedthatwarmingoftheclimate systemisunequivocal(Trenberthetal.2007).TheIPCCcitedevidenceincludingrising airandoceantemperatures,widespreadmeltingoficeandsnow,andrisingglobalsea levels.YetasignificantportionoftheAmericanpublicremainsskepticalaboutthe existenceofglobalwarming.InaMarch2009pollconductedbytheGallupOrganization,

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only53%ofrespondentsagreedthattheeffectsofglobalwarminghadalreadybegunto happen;16%predictedthatglobalwarmingwillneverhaveanyeffects.2 Inadditiontolaggingbehindscientificconsensus,Americansbeliefsabouttheexistenceof globalwarmingareunstable.Thebelieflevelin2009representsaneightpointdropfroma yearearlier,when61%ofrespondentssurveyedbyGallupagreedthatglobalwarming effectshadalreadybegun.3Thisinstabilityinopinionreflectsthelowpublicsalienceofthe climatechangeissueandthesharpdisagreementamongpolicyelitesabouttheproblem andpotentialsolutions.Withinthispoliticalcontextofhighcontestationbutlowvisibility, itisdifficultforcitizenstoaccessfactualinformationthatwillhelpthemformstable opinions.AdherencetojournalisticnormsofbalancedreportingforalongtimeledtheU.S. mediatounderstatethelevelofscientificconsensusabouttheproblemsexistence(Boykoff &Boykoff2004;Zehr2000).Indeed,ina2006nationalsurvey,moreAmericans(45%) believedtherewasalotofdisagreementamongscientistsaboutglobalwarmingthan believedthatmostscientistsagreewithoneanother(34%)(Curry,Ansolabehere& Herzog2007).Regardlessofthemediasculpability,currentlythemediaisnotatrusted sourceforinformationaboutclimatechange.Just29%ofrespondentstotheMarch2009 Galluppollthoughtthatnewscoverageabouttheseriousnessofglobalwarmingisgenerally correct,andmorepeoplebelievethatthemediaexaggeratestheproblem(41%)than underestimatesit(28%). Mostindividuallevelresearchaboutclimatechangeopinionhasfocusedonrisk perceptions(Krosnicketal.2006;Leiserowitz06; Brodyetal.2007;Kellstedt,Zahran& Vedlitz2008)orsupportforgovernmentpoliciesandvoluntaryactiontomitigatethe problem(OConnor,Bord&Fisher1999;OConnoretal.2002;Curry,Ansolabehere& Herzog2007;Lubell,Zahran&Vedlitz2007).Inthefewstudiesthathaveexaminedopinion aboutwhetherglobalwarmingexists,evidencesuggeststhatpeoplesvaluesandpolitical predispositionshaveabiggerimpactthanfactualinformationonjudgmentsaboutthe natureandextentoftheproblem.Age,liberalideology,generalproenvironmentattitudes, andbeingnonreligiouscontributetoexistencebeliefs,whiletheeffectofscientific knowledgeaboutthecausesandconsequencesofclimatechangeisweakandinconsistent

2GallupOrganization,GallupPoll(March58,2009). 3GallupOrganization,GallupPoll(March69,2008).

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(Bord,OConnor&Fisher2000;Kellstedt,Zahran&Vedlitz2008;butseeCurry, Ansolabehere&Herzog2007).Toalargeextent,peoplesperceptionsarelikelytobe guidedbythepolarizeddiscourseofelites,withtheconsequencethatmorepartisanand politicallysophisticatedcitizenswillexpressmoreconsistentbeliefs. Weproposeanadditionalpieceoffactualinformationthatshouldaffectbeliefsabout whethertheearthisgettingwarmer:peoplespersonalexperiencewiththeirlocalweather. Shorttermtemperaturepatternsareacrediblebutlowqualitypieceofinformationfor formingabeliefabouttheexistenceofglobalwarming.Climatechangeincreasesthe probabilityofmilderwintersandmorefrequent,intense,andlonglastingheatwaves. Someofthesechangesalreadyareunderway:globalsurfaceairtemperaturesoverthelast fiftyyearshaverisenalmostaquarterdegreeFahrenheitperdecade,andthetenwarmest yearsonrecordalloccurredwithinthe12yearperiodbetween1997and2008(Trenberth etal.2007;NASA2009).MostoftheUnitedStateshasexperiencedwarmingoverthelast century,andurbanheatislandeffectsamplifythewarmingindenselypopulatedareas. Withoutadoubt,localweatherprovideslittleinformationaboutbroadclimatictrends. Scientistshavereachedtheirjudgmentsaboutglobalwarmingsexistencebasedon evidenceaccumulatedfrommanysourcesandoverlongperiodsoftime.Giventhenatural variabilitythatcharacterizesnormalweather,itisimpossibletoattributeanyspecific weathereventtohumancausedclimatechange.Becauseclimatechangeaffectsthe probabilitythatcertainweathereventswilloccur,however,itwouldberationalforan individualwhohadaccesstonootherfactualknowledgetouselocalweathertoforma judgmentaboutwhethertheearthisgettingwarmer. Localtemperaturevariationprovidesfarlessinformationaboutglobalwarmingthan,say, theunemploymentrateprovidesaboutthestateoftheeconomy.Nonetheless,itoffers someadvantagesoverotherformsoffactualinformationformeasuringtheeffectsof informationonopinionformation.First,politicalelitesandthemediararelyinvokeshort termweathertrendsinmakingtheirargumentsaboutglobalwarming.Asaresult,people experiencetheweatherdirectlyorhearaboutitonthenewswithoutanideologicalframe thattapsexistingpoliticalbeliefs.Conover,Feldman,andKnight(1986,1987)haveshown thatpartisanpoliticalevaluationsinfluencebothretrospectiveevaluationsoftheeconomy andeconomicforecasts;asimilarrelationshipholdsattheaggregatelevel,whereeconomic

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newsandpolicyhavebeenfoundtoaffectpublicperceptionsoftheeconomy(DeBoef& andKellstedt2004).Politicalpredispositionssimilarlyaffectpeoplesperceptionsoftheir ownfinancialstatus.Whenideologicalfactorsinfluencebeliefsaboutfactualinformation,it isdifficulttomeasuretheeffectofinformationonbeliefs.Thesecondadvantageisthat exposuretoweatherismoreconstantacrossindividualsthanexposuretoothertypesof information.Peoplewithhigherlevelsofpoliticalsophisticationlearnmoreaboutthestate oftheeconomy.Incontrast,everyonewhogoesoutsideexperiencestheweather,andnews coverageofweathereventsislessstratifiedbymediaoutletthancoverageofjustaboutany othertypeoffactualinformation. Theproblemsofideologicalframesandselectiveinformationexposuremayexplainthe inconsistentresultsinpreviousworkthathasexaminedinformationeffectsonbeliefsand attitudesaboutglobalwarming.Curry,AnsolabehereandHerzog(2007)foundthatfactual knowledgeaboutclimatechange(measuredasfamiliaritywithmitigationtechnologiesand correctidentificationofsourcesandsinksforcarbondioxide)ispositivelyassociatedwith beliefthatscientistsagreewithoneanotheraboutglobalwarming.Yetitislikelythatthe preexistinginterestandvaluesthatwouldmotivateindividualstoobtaininformationofthis typealsowouldexposethemtoinformationaboutscientificconsensusontheissue. Kellstedt,ZahranandVedlitz(2008)producedthesomewhatcontradictoryfindingthat moreinformedrespondentsshowlessconcernforglobalwarmingandfeellesspersonally responsible.Theyrelyonrespondentsselfreportsabouttheirlevelofinformation, however,whichmayrelatedtopreexistingperceptionsoftheproblem. Intheirresearchonglobalwarmingagendasetting,Krosnicketal.(2006)attemptto capturetheeffectoffactualinformationgainedfrompersonalexperienceonbeliefsabout theexistenceofglobalwarming.Usingevidencefromanationalphonesurvey,theyshow thatrespondentswhoperceivedanincreaseinlocaltemperatureinrecentyearsweremore likelytobelievethatglobalwarmingwouldoccurinthefutureifnothingisdonetostopit. DatafromasurveyofOhioresidentsshowedthatthisrelationshipwasparticularlystrong amongrespondentswithlowlevelsofeducationandhightrustinscientists.Butwithoutan objectivemeasureoftemperatureconditions,theauthorscouldnotruleoutthepossibility thattheirresultswereattributabletoprojection,andthatpeoplewhoalreadybelievethata globalwarmingthreatexistsmayperceiveassociatedchangesinweather.

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Thepresentstudyusesactualshorttermlocalweatherconditionstoassesshowchangesin localtemperatureinfluencereportedopinionabouttheexistenceofclimatechange.We believethatformanypeople,perceptionsabouttheexistenceofthiscomplexproblemare shapedbypoliticalpredispositions,attitudesaboutenvironmentalprotection,andfactual informationaboutscientificopinion.Forsomesubsetofrespondents,however,weexpect thatbeliefsaboutglobalwarmingremainunformed,andrecentweatherbecomesasalient considerationwhenthesepeopleareaskedtoreporttheirbeliefs.Ifthetemperature recentlyhasbeenwarmerthanusual,respondentswithunformedbeliefswillbemore likelytoexpressajudgmentthattheearthisgettingwarmer.Becauseindividualswith higherlevelsofpoliticalsophisticationaremorelikelytoholdstableopinionsaboutissues, wepredictthattherelationshipbetweentemperatureandbeliefsaboutclimatechangewill bestrongestamongpeoplewithloweducationandweakpartisanattachments. Beliefsaboutproblemseriousnessandpolicysolutions.Theexogeneityofweatherto otherfactorsthatshapepublicopinionofferstheadditionalbenefitofprovidingan instrumentthatthenallowsustomeasuretheimpactofexistencebeliefsonperceptionsof theseriousnessoftheglobalwarmingproblemandattitudesaboutpolicysolutions. Althoughknowledgeandconcernabouttheproblemhavebeenrisingovertime,global warmingremainsalowsalienceissue(Bord,Fisher&OConnor1998;Curry,Ansolabehere &Herzog2007;Dunlap1998;Reineretal.2006).Publicsupportforincreasedgovernment efforttosolvetheproblemislimited,evencomparedtootherenvironmentalissues (Konisky,Milyo&Richardson2008).Previousresearchhasdemonstratedthatexistence beliefs,riskperceptions,andpolicyattitudesareinterconnected(Bord,OConnor&Fisher 2000;Curry,Ansolabehere&Herzog2007;Lubell,Zahran&Vedlitz2007;OConnor,Bord& Fisher1999).Withoutagoodinstrumentformeasuringbeliefs,however,itisdifficultto determinewhetherthelowlevelofseriousnessthatAmericansattachtotheclimatechange problemisaconsequenceofskepticismaboutwhethertheearthiswarming. Iflocalweatherconditionshaveasignificantimpactonpeoplesbeliefsabouttheexistence ofglobalwarming,wecanusethevariationinweatherconditionstoestimatethecausal effectofexistencebeliefsonissueattitudes.Indoingso,weassumethatlocalweatherwill notaffectattitudesexceptthroughitsinfluenceonjudgmentsabouttheexistenceofthe problem.Onepreviousstudyhasexaminedtheinfluenceofobjectivelocalconditionson

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climatechangeattitudes.Brodyetal.(2007)geocodedthelocationofrespondentsina 2004surveytomeasuretheeffectofactualclimatechangevulnerabilityonrespondents perceptionsofrisk.Theyfoundthatvulnerabilitytofloods,sealevelrise,andothernatural hazardshadaneffectonriskperceptions,butameasureoflongtermrisingtemperaturein therespondentsregiondidnot.Ourstudyfocusesnotontherelationshipbetweenactual andperceivedrisk,butratheronidentifyinghowpersonalexperienceinfluences perceptionsofaproblemandopinionsabouttheproblemsseriousnessandpotential solutions. Data

Opiniononclimatechange.Americansattitudesaboutclimatechangecomefrompublicly availabledatacollectedinfivenationalsurveyssponsoredbythePewResearchCenterfrom June2006throughApril2008.4Thesurveyswereconductedbytelephonewitha representativenationalsampleofAmericanadultslivinginthecontiguous48states.In eachsurvey,respondentswereaskedthefollowingquestion:Fromwhatyouvereadand heard,istheresolidevidencethattheaveragetemperatureonearthhasbeengetting warmeroverthepastfewdecades,ornot?Americansresponsestothisquestionwere largelyintheaffirmative:onaverageoverthefivesurveys,74%ofrespondentsagreedthat theearthisgettingwarmer.TheshareofAmericansbelievingthatglobalwarmingisreal roseandthenfelloverthecourseofthefivesurveys,withasubstantialspikeoccurring betweenJuneandJuly2006(seeFigure1).ItseemslikelythatthepublicitysurroundingAl GoresfilmAnInconvenientTruth,whichstressesthedangersofglobalwarming,had somethingtodowiththisincrease:asshowninFigure1,thesharpriseinAmericans agreeingthatthereisevidenceofglobalwarmingoccurredjustasthedocumentarys presenceinAmericanmovietheatersreacheditspeak. Localweatherdata.Ourgoalwastomeasuretheshorttermweatherconditionsthat respondentsmightcalltomindwhenaskedwhetherevidencesupportstheexistenceof globalwarming.Thevariableweusedtocapturetheseconditionsisthedeparturefrom

4PewconductedthesurveysinJune,JulyandAugust2006;January2007,andApril2008.

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normaldailylocaltemperature,measuredindegreesFahrenheit,averagedovertheweek priortothedateonwhichtherespondentwasinterviewedbyPew.5Thatis,wecalculated

ddt _week

1 7 tempi normaltempi , 7 i =1

wheretempiistherespondentslocaltemperatureidaysbeforehisorherinterview,and normaltempiisthenormaltemperatureforthatdate. DataonlocalweatherconditionscomefromtheNationalClimaticDataCenter(NCDC),part oftheNationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministrationintheU.S.Departmentof Commerce.TheNCDCcompilesmeteorologicaldataovertimefromweatherstations worldwideinordertoproduceclimaticprofilesoflocationsorregions.Zipcode informationinthePewdatasetallowedustoattachweatherdatatoindividualrespondents. Pewaskedeachrespondenttosupplyhisorherfivedigitzipcode,andalmostalldidso (97.5%).Ofthese,wewereabletomatchnearlyall(95.6%)toaZipCodeTabulationArea (ZCTA),ageographicentitydevelopedbytheU.S.CensusBureautoprovideaspatial representationofU.S.PostalServicezipcodes.6Byoverlayingamapof448U.S.weather stationsontoamaprepresentingZCTAboundaries,weidentifiedtheweatherstation closesttoeachrespondentszipcodeandusedtemperaturedatafromthatstation.The meandistancefromaZCTAtoitsassociatedweatherstationis0.43degreesin latitude/longitude,orapproximately2530miles.7

localtemperatureonthedayofinterview,thedaybeforetheinterview,andthetwoweeksandfour weekspriortointerview.Allproducedsimilar,butweaker,resultsthantheweeklymeasureused here. 6U.S.PostalServicezipcodesareawayofclassifyinglinearfeaturessuchasstreetsegments,address ranges,anddeliverypointstofacilitatemaildelivery.TheCensusBureaucreatedZCTAsforthefirst timeinthe2000Censustoprovideanarealrepresentationofzipcodesandallowcalculationof Censusdataatthezipcodelevel.ThedistinctoriginsanddatatypesofzipcodesandZCTAsresultin somedegreeofspatialmismatch.Asarobustnesscheckforthoserespondentswhosereportedzip codeswewereunabletomatchtotheNCDCdataset,wealsocalculatedthemeandailytemperature readingsforZIP3ZCTAs,alargergeographicunitthatentirelyincorporatesallfivedigitZCTAs beginningwiththethreedigitprefix.Mostoftherespondentswecouldnotmatchtoafivedigitzip code(89.0%)successfullymatchedtoaZIP3ZCTAbasedonthefirstthreedigitsofthezipcodesthey suppliedtoPew.Werepeatedtheanalysesreportedherewithadatasetthatincludedthese respondents.Asexpected,theresultsweresubstantivelysimilarbutnotasstrongduetotheless precisenatureoftheadditionalweatherdata. 7FortheApril2008surveywave,datacomefrom416weatherstations,andthemeandistancetothe nearestweatherstationisaslightlylarger0.44degrees. Eganand Mullin 10

5Werantheanalysesherewithalternateversionsofthisvariable,includingdeparturesfromnormal

Thetemperaturedeparturemeasurecapturesvariationinlocalweatherconditionsboth crosssectionallyandovertime.Figure2tracksthemovementofaheatwaveacrossthe countryduringtheinterviewperiodfortheJanuary2007Pewsurvey.(Temperature departuresareshownforthreedigitZCTAsratherthanzipcodestoimprovevisual interpretation.)Onthefirstdayofinterviewing,theheatwavewaslocatedoverthemiddle andupperMidwest,whilethesoutheasternregionoftheUnitedStatesexperiencedweather colderthannormalforthatdayoftheyear.Overthefollowingdays,theheatwavemoved east,andstatesintheWestandMidwestexperiencedaprolongedcoldsnap. ItispossiblethatrespondentswholiveintheupperMidwest,wheretemperature variabilityishighest,wouldbelessresponsivetoagivenlevelofdeparturefromnormal temperaturethanrespondentswholiveinclimateswithmorepredictableweather patterns.AfivedegreedeparturefromnormalonaJanuarydayshouldbemorenoticeable inArizonathaninMinnesota.Toaccountforpotentialdifferencesinexpectationabout weatherpatterns,wealsocollecteddataonthestandarddeviationinaveragemonthly temperatureovertheperiod19712000.8Dividingtheddt_weekmeasurebythelocal standarddeviationproducedanindicatoroftemperaturedeparturemeasuredinstandard deviations.Alloftheanalysesreportedbelowproducesimilarresultsmeasuring temperatureeitherinrawdegreesorinstandarddeviations. DataforcontrolvariablescomefromthePewsurveys.Intheanalysesthatfollow, respondentswhodidnotsupplyvalidresponsesonalltherelevantvariablesweredropped vialistwisedeletioninparticularanalyses.SeeTableA1intheAppendixformoredetails. Results

LocalweatherseffectonbeliefsthatEarthisgettingwarmer.Figure3displaysthe simplebivariaterelationshipbetweentemperatureandbeliefsabouttheevidenceforglobal warming.Becausethedependentvariableisdichotomous,atypicalscatterplotis inappropriatetodisplaytherelationship.Toconstructthefigure,wedividedthecasesin

8Dataonstandarddeviationintemperaturearenotavailablefromweatherstations.Instead,we useddatafrom344climatedivisions,geographicentitiesdevelopedbytheNCDCthatrepresent areaswithfairlyuniformclimateconditions.WeassignedeachZCTAtotheclimatedivisioninwhich amajorityofitslandarealay.

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ourdatasetinto100percentilesonthebasisoftheddt_weekvariableandcalculatedthe percentageofrespondentsineachpercentilewhoagreedthatthereissolidevidencefor globalwarming.Inthefigure,theweatherpercentilesareplottedonthexaxisandopinion onglobalwarmingisplottedontheyaxis.Tosummarizetherelationship,thefigure displaysthebestlinearfitforthedataalongwithanonparametricsmootherdrawnwith thelowesstechnique(Cleveland1993).9Thefigureshowsaclearandsubstantialbivariate relationshipbetweenthetwovariables:aslocaltemperaturesriseabovenormal,sodoes thepercentageofAmericansbelievingthatglobalwarmingisareality.Thelowess smootherconsistentlytracestheregressionline,indicatingthattherelationshipbetween thetwovariablesisclosetolinear. Americanspoliticalviewsdo,ofcourse,varybyregion(e.g.Gelmanetal.2008).Toruleout aspuriousrelationshipbetweenlocalweatherandopiniononclimatechange,itis necessarytocontrolforvariablesthatarecorrelatedwithbothgeographyandopinion usingmultivariateanalyses.Wedothiswithaseriesoforderedprobitregressionsinwhich respondentsassessmentsoftheevidenceforglobalwarmingarethedependentvariable. Wefirstmodelthesimplebivariaterelationship,thenaddfixedeffectsforwaveofsurvey andstateofresidence,andthenincludestandarddemographic,politicalandothercontrols (fordetails,seeAppendixTableA2).Therelevantfindingsfromtheseanalysesare summarizedinpredictionsdisplayedinTable1,whichshowsthatunderallthree specifications,theestimatedeffectofweatheronbeliefsaboutclimatechangeissignificant andconsistent:ashiftinlocaltemperaturefromthe5thto95thpercentile(thatis,from4.3F belownormalto14.7Fabovenormal)increasestheprobabilitythatAmericansbelieve thereissolidevidenceforglobalwarmingbyaboutsixpercentagepoints. Figure4providesasenseoftherelativesizeoftheeffectsoflocaltemperaturecomparedto othervariablesassociatedwithopiniononclimatechange.Itisagraphinwhichthefirst differenceassociatedwithindividualdemographic,politicalandothervariablesthatis, theceterisparibuschangeinprobabilityofbelievinginglobalwarmingaccompanyinga shiftfromtheminimumtomaximumvalueofthatvariableisrepresentedbyahorizontal
9Excludedfromthedisplayarethreepercentilesthatduetothelumpinessoftheweatherdata includedveryfewcasesandthusyieldedmeansofthoseagreeingthereisevidenceforglobal warmingofzeroand100percent.Theseobservationswereincludedincalculationsofthelinearfit andlowesssmoother.

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bar.(ThepredictionsaregeneratedfromModelIIIinTableA2.)Thefigureshowsthatthe effectoftemperatureissubstantialcomparedtoothervariablestypicallyconsidered importantinshapingAmericansattitudesontheenvironment.Ashiftinlocaltemperature fromthe5thto95thpercentileresultsinopinionchangethatislargerthantheceterisparibus differencesbetweenwhitesandeitherblacksorHispanics,betweenthosebelongingtothe youngestandoldestagegroups,andbetweentheleastandmosteducated.Theeffectof localweatheronbeliefsregardingglobalwarmingisaboutaquarterofthesizeofthatof thetwovariablesthatplaythelargestrolesinshapingattitudesontheenvironment:party identificationandideology. Interactioneffects.Giventhatthestrengthofthepublicsopinionsonclimatechangeand thedepthoftheirunderstandingoftheissuecanvarysubstantially,itispossiblethatthe effectoflocalweathermaybesmallerorlargerfordifferentgroupsofAmericans.We assessthiswithanotherseriesofmodelsinwhichcontrolvariablesareinteractedwith localtemperatureonavariablebyvariablebasis(seeAppendixTableA3).10Thesignsand calculatedstatisticalsignificanceoncoefficientsassociatedwithinteractiontermsin nonlinearmodelssuchasthoseestimatedherecanmisleadaboutthetruesignand magnitudeofinteractioneffects(Ai&Norton2003).Wethereforecalculatethechangein probabilityofeachsubgroupsagreeingthereisevidenceforglobalwarmingassociated witha5thto95thpercentileshiftinlocaltemperature.Thesechangesaredisplayedin Figure5.ThetoppanelofFigure5displaysthosegroupsforwhomtheeffectofweatheris greaterthantheestimatedaveragetreatmenteffectof5.9percentagepoints.Thelower paneldisplaysthegroupsforwhomtheeffectislessthanorequaltoaverage. Thefiguresshowthattheeffectoflocalweatheronassessmentsoftheevidenceforclimate changevariesdramaticallybysubgroup.Blacks,thosewithahighschooleducationorless, andthoseidentifyingasleaningRepublicanorleaningDemocratareallatleastten percentagepointsmorelikelytoagreethatthereissolidevidenceforglobalwarmingafter aspellofparticularlyhotweatherthanafteroneofparticularlycoldweather.Thosewhose opinionsonglobalwarmingareestimatedtobeunmovedbylocalweatherpatterns
10Weestimatedafullmodelwhichincludedallvariablesandtheirinteractionswithtemperature

andfoundlargelysimilarresultstothoseshowninTableA3(notshown).Thehighdegreeof multicollinearityinthismodelcausedsubstantiallossofprecisioninitsestimates,andsoour discussionisbasedontheonthevariablebyvariablemodels. Eganand Mullin 13

(estimatedeffectis.02)includethosewithapostgraduateeducation,Independentsand Republicans,andthoseaged25to34.11 Prevailingtheoryabouttheformationofpublicopinionleadsustobeparticularly interestedinthevaryingeffectsoflocalweatherontheattitudesofthosewithdifferent partyidentificationsandeducationlevels.Toillustratethesedifferences,Figure6plotsthe shareofAmericanspredictedtoagreethereisevidenceforglobalwarmingatdifferentlocal temperaturelevelsaccordingtotheirvaluesonthesetwovariables.ThetoppanelofFigure 6showsthatchangesinlocalweatherdolittletoshifttheopinionsofDemocrats, RepublicansorIndependentsonglobalwarming,whilethosewholeanDemocraticor Republicanareestimatedtoshifttheiropinionsbymorethantenpercentagepoints, holdingallotherfactorsconstant.GiventhatIndependentsareconsideredmostlikelyto acceptnewinformationaboutpolitics(e.g.Zaller1992),itissurprisingthattheyarefound heretobetheleastlikelytoshifttheirpositiononglobalwarminginresponsetothe stimulusoflocalweather.ButitisworthnotingthatinthePewsurveys,respondentsare firstaskedInpoliticstoday,doyouconsideryourselfaRepublican,Democrat,or Independent?ThosewhorespondIndependentorvolunteerthattheyhaveno preference,preferanotherparty,ordontknowarethenasked,Asoftoday,doyoulean moretotheRepublicanPartyormoretotheDemocraticParty?Itisonlythosewhoreach thisquestionandtheninsist(withoutexplicitlybeinggiventheoptiontodoso)thatthey leantowardneitherparty(about12%ofAmericans)whoareconsideredIndependents accordingtothisclassification.12Wesurmisethattheresistancetoacceptapartylabelmay thereforebeassociatedwithaparticularlynonpartisan,butsomewhatsophisticated, orientationtowardpoliticsandpublicaffairs. ThelowerpanelofFigure6showsthatvariationinlocaltemperaturecompletelyshiftsthe directionoftherelationshipbetweeneducationlevelsandbeliefsaboutglobalwarming. Whentemperaturesarecoolerthannormal,thosewithahighschooleducationorlessare theleastlikelyofanyeducationgrouptoagreethereisevidenceforclimatechange.But

11Afutureversionofthispaperwillincludecalculationsofconfidenceintervalsaroundthese

predictedprobabilitiesandtheextenttowhichtheyaresignificantlydifferentfromtheaverage effect. 12MoredetailsaboutquestionwordingandresponsesetsmaybefoundintheAppendix. Eganand Mullin 14

whentemperaturesarehotterthanusual,theleasteducatedbecomethosemostlikelyto agreethatthereisevidenceforclimatechange. Instrumentingbeliefsabouttheevidenceforglobalwarmingtoassesstheireffecton otherattitudes.Pewincludedthreeadditionalquestionsaboutclimatechangeonthefive surveysinourcombineddataset.Respondentswhoagreedthatthereissolidevidencefor globalwarmingwereaskedafollowupquestionaboutwhetherthechangeintheearths temperatureisduetohumanactivityornaturalenvironmentalpatterns.Invarious administrationsofthesurvey,respondentswereaskedadditionalquestionsaboutthe extenttowhichtheyviewedglobalwarmingasaproblem,andwhetherglobalwarming requiresimmediategovernmentaction.13AsshowninFigure7,responsestothese questionsfluctuatedovertimeinthesamepatternasanswerstotheevidenceofglobal warmingquestiondiscussedabove. Thefactthatlocaltemperaturesareanexogenousinfluenceonrespondentsperceptionsof theevidenceforglobalwarmingprovidesauniqueopportunitytoassessthecausal relationshipbetweenindividualbeliefsabouttheexistenceofaproblemandtheirattitudes about(1)howserioustheproblemisand(2)what,ifanything,shouldbedoneaboutit. Drawingcausalinferencesfromanyobservedrelationshipbetweenbeliefsaboutthe existenceofaproblemandthesetwodependentvariablesismadedifficultbythefactthat preexistingvaluesandpoliticalcommitmentsmaybeacauseofallofthesevariables. Ifweassumethatweatheraffectsattitudesabouttheseriousnessoftheglobalwarming problemandabouttheneedforgovernmentactiononlythroughbeliefsabouttheevidence forglobalwarming,wecanuseweatherasaninstrumentforthesebeliefsinestimating theireffectonthesubsequentdependentvariables.WedothisinTable2.Thetoppanel displaysestimationsoftheeffectofbeliefinglobalwarmingsexistenceonrespondents assessmentsoftheseriousnessoftheproblem.Wefirstperformtheanalysisforall respondentsinthedataset,andwefindthatthereisindeedastrongobservedrelationship betweenreportedbeliefsandassessmentsoftheproblemviaordinaryleastsquares(OLS) regression.Becausewethinkthisestimatesuffersfromendogeneitybias,weinstrument

13SeetheAppendixforspecificquestionwording.

Eganand Mullin 15

beliefswithlocalweatherinaninstrumentalvariablesanalysis(IV2SLS).14Wefindthat theweatherinstrumentisquiteweak:theFstatisticassociatedwiththeinstrumentinthe firststageregressionisonly2.71.Accordingtostandardtreatmentsofinstrumental variablesregression,thismeansthatthebiasoftheIVestimatorisnotasignificant improvementoverthatoftheOLSestimator,andthattheprecisionoftheestimateisquite low.15Discountingtheseresults,wemovetoanalysisofasubsetofrespondentswhose beliefsaboutglobalwarmingaremostaffectedbyweather:thosewholeanDemocraticor Republican.Here,weatherisastrongerinstrumentforbeliefs:theFstatisticonthefirst stageregressionsuggeststhattheIVestimateresultsinasubstantialreductionofbias comparedtotheOLSestimate(areductionof11/F,orabout86percent).16The coefficientislargeandintheexpecteddirection,butsoisitsstandarderror,leadingthe resultstobeinconclusive. Asimilarsetofresultsholdsforanalyseswherethedependentvariableisrespondents assessmentofwhetherimmediategovernmentactionisrequiredonglobalwarming(lower panelofTable2).Here,localtemperatureisastrongerinstrumentforbeliefsaboutthe existenceofglobalwarming,particularlyinthesubsetofrespondentswholeanDemocratic orRepublican(wherethefirststageFstatisticequals11.40,producingareductioninbias fromtheOLSestimateofabout91percent).Again,theIVestimatecoefficientisofthe expectedsignand(inthiscase)notfarfromtheOLSestimate.Butbecausetherearefewer observations(Pewaskedthisquestioninonlytwoofthefivesurveysinourdataset),the precisionoftheIVestimateisquitelow. Unfortunately,wecannotdrawstrongconclusionsfromtheinstrumentalvariables estimates.Theanalysesprovidegeneralsupportfortheideathatthosewhosebeliefsabout globalwarmingareexogenouslymanipulatedbylocalweatherpatternsdosubsequently increasetheirassessmentoftheseriousnessoftheproblemandtheiropinionthat governmentactionisneeded.Butasaninstrumentforbeliefsaboutglobalwarming,local weatheristooweaktoprovidedeterminativeresults.
14TheIV2SLSmethodperformsaswellorbetterthanalternativeestimationstrategiesevenwhen

endogenousregressorsanddependentvariablesaredichotomousorlimited(Angrist&Krueger 2001). 15See,e.g.,Cameron&Trevedi2005,103112. 16ThiscalculationisderivedbyStaigerandStock(1997)asameasureofinstrumentstrength. Eganand Mullin 16

Conclusion

Thispaperpresentsresultsthatarebothoftopicalrelevanceandoftheoreticalinterest. Globalclimatechangehasbeencalledoneofthemostimportantpublicpolicychallengesof ourtimeandoneofthegreatestthreatstolifeonEarthasweknowit.Butitisacomplex issueoflowsalienceaboutwhichAmericanshavelittledirectexperienceintheirdaytoday lives.Astheytrytomakesenseofthisdifficultissue,thepublicusesfluctuationsinlocal temperaturetoreassesstheirbeliefsabouttheexistenceofglobalwarming.Acrossa varietyofestimationstrategiesandmodelspecifications,theeffectofweatheronbeliefsis significantandsubstantivelylarge. Wethinkthisisaninterestingandimportantfindinginitself.Butweseizeuponitto exploreamoregeneraltheoreticalquestionabouthowattitudesregardingpublicaffairsare affectedbyinformationthatispoliticallyrelevantbutnonideological.Theeffectsofthis kindofinformationaredifficulttomeasureinanobservationalsetting,becauseAmericans areselectivelyexposedtosuchinformationandtheyareoftensuppliedwithideological cuesregardingtheinformationbyelites.Weclaimthatshorttermvariationinlocal temperaturesprovidesAmericanswithalegitimate(iflowquality)nonideological messageabouttheevidenceforclimatechange.Inthisrespect,localweatherservesasa rareexampleofpoliticallyrelevantinformationthatisneithersubjecttoselectivereception norinvokedbyelitestofurthertheirideologicalagendas. Wefindthatthewaythepublicintegratesthisnonideologicalinformationintobeliefs differssubstantiallyfromhowitprocessesinformationaccompaniedbyexplicitideological cues.Itappearsthatthosewhoaresophisticatedaboutpolitics(hereidentifiedasthose whoaremoreeducatedormoreattachedtothespecificpartisanlabelsofDemocrat, Independent,orRepublican)rejectthisinformationacrosstheboard.Thosewhoareless politicallysophisticated(hereidentifiedasthosewhoarelesseducated,orlean DemocraticandRepublican)acceptthisinformationregardlessofwheretheystandonthe ideologicalspectrum.NotehowthisdiffersfromtheframeworkdevelopedbyJohnZaller thatreliablyexplainshowthepublicprocessesideologicalinformation:there,individual predispositionsandsophisticationinteracttoacceptideologicallyfidelitousinformation andrejecttherest;here,acceptanceofideologyfreeinformationdecreasesinasimple monotonicfashionassophisticationincreases.

Eganand Mullin 17

Ofcourse,oneexampledoesnotatheorymake.Ourclaimabouthowthepublicprocesses nonideologicalpoliticalinformationcanbetestedinotherpolicydomainswithbetter measuresofpoliticalsophistication.Butwebelievethatlocalweatherandattitudesabout globalwarmingprovidearareandvaluableinstanceinwhichwecanexplorehowthiskind ofinformationisprocessedinaquasiexperimentalsetting.

Eganand Mullin 18

Table1.LocalWeathersEffectonAmericansBeliefs abouttheEvidenceforGlobalWarming
source:predictionsgeneratedbyorderedprobitregressions,TableA2(ModelsI,II,andIII)

Model

Estimatedeffectofshiftinlocal temperaturefrom5thto95thpercentile onprobabilityofbelievingthereis evidenceforglobalwarming .059***

Bivariate Fixedeffectsforstateofresidenceandsurvey wave Fixedeffectsandcontrolsforsex,race,age, education,partyidentification,ideologyand frequencyofattendanceofreligiousservices

.062**

.059**

Estimatedquantitiesstatisticallysignificantlydifferentfromzeroat*p<.10;**p<.05;***p<.01. PredictionsandcalculationsofstatisticalsignificancethroughoutthispaperweregeneratedwithSPost software(Long&Freese,2005)inStata10.

Eganand Mullin 19

Table2. BeliefthatthereisEvidenceforGlobalWarmingand AttitudesabouttheSeriousnessoftheProblemandtheNeedforGovernmentAction DV:Seriousnessofglobalwarmingproblem Respondentswholean Allrespondents Democraticor Republican OLS .560 (.014) .38 IV2SLS .831 (.426) 2.71 36.9 5,218 OLS .541 (.029) .36 IV2SLS .307 (.401) .33 7.32 13.7 1,416

x:Beliefthatthereisevidencefor globalwarming R2 FirststageFstatisticforx+ IVestimatebiasas%ofOLSbias++ N

DV:Immediategovtactionrequiredonglobalwarming Respondentswholean Allrespondents Democraticor Republican OLS .366 (.027) .23 IV2SLS .267 (.509) .22 5.87 17.0 2,282 OLS .430 (.058) .21 653 IV2SLS .367 (.390) .21 11.40 8.8

x:Beliefthatthereisevidencefor globalwarming R2 FirststageFstatisticforx+ IVestimatebiasas%ofOLSbias++ N

Allanalysesincludedemographicandpoliticalcontrolvariables,fixedeffectsforwaveofsurveyand stateofresidenceasshowninothermultivariateanalysisthroughoutthispaper,aswellasan intercept(allnotreportedhere).Instrumentforendogenousregressorxisdepartureoflocal temperaturefromnormalinweekpriortosurveyindegreesFahrenheit. +Fstatisticassociatedwiththetestthatthecoefficientonweatherinstrumentinthefirststage regressionisequaltozero. ++Equalto1/F,perStaigerandStock(1997)

Eganand Mullin 20

Figure1.AmericansBeliefsabouttheEvidenceforGlobalWarming andTheatersShowingAnInconvenientTruth,20062008 sources:surveydata:PewResearchCenter;theaters:boxofficemojo.com

600
78.5

80.0

76.5

76.6

400

75.0

71.0

200

69.6

70.0

0 1/06 7/06 1/07 7/07 1/08 7/08

65.0

Eganand Mullin 21

%ofAmericansagreeingthereis "solidevidence"ofearthgettingwarmer

#oftheatersshowing "AnInconvenientTruth"

Figure2.DeparturesfromNormalDailyTemperature(byZCTA), January10,12,and15,2007 sourcefordata:NationalClimateDataCenter

Eganand Mullin 22

Figure3.AmericansBeliefsabouttheEvidenceforGlobalWarming, byDepartureofLocalWeatherfromNormalTemperatureinWeekPriortoSurvey
90 %agreeingthereis"solidevidence" thatEarthisgettingwarmer

80

70

linearfit

60 10

lowess smoother

0 10 20 Departurefromnormaltemperature(degreesF) inrespondent'szipcode,weekpriortosurvey

Eganand Mullin 23

Figure4.EffectsofVariablesonAmericansBeliefsabouttheEvidence forGlobalWarming
source:predictionsgeneratedbyModelIII,TableA2

partyidentification ideology religiosity gender localtemperature Hispanic black education age 0

.014 .013 .01 .059 .053 .075 .092

.217 .207

.05

.1 .15 .2 effectofvariableonassessment oftheevidenceforglobalwarming

Effectsarethedifferencesinpredictedprobabilitiesofagreeingthereisevidenceforglobalwarming accompanyingshiftsinvariablesasfollows:partyidentification:RepublicantoDemocrat;ideology: veryconservativetoveryliberal;religiosity:attendservicesmorethanweeklytoneverattend services;gender:maletofemale;Hispanic:comparedtowhite,notHispanic;black:comparedtowhite, notHispanic;education:HSorlesstopostgraduate;age:1824to65orover.Incalculatingeffects, valuesofallothervariableswereheldattheirmodes(female,white)ormedians(Independent, moderate,somecollege,attendservicesafewtimespermonth,localtemperature2.9Fabovenormal, between4555yearsold).Foradditionaldetails,seeTableA2.

Eganand Mullin 24

Figure5.WeathersEffectonBeliefsabouttheEvidenceforGlobalWarming, bySubgroup a.Groupsforwhomweatherseffectisgreaterthanaverage

Race/Ethnicity:black Party:LeanRepublican Ideology:Liberal Party:LeanDemocratic Education:HSorless Age:1824 Attendservices:never Age:4554 Attendservices:morethanweekly Age:5564 Male Attendservices:seldom Attendservices:fewtimes/year Race/Ethnicity:Hispanic Ideology:VeryConservative Age:65orover Ideology:Conservative Age:3544 Ideology:VeryLiberal 0.197 0.173 0.145 0.145 0.123 0.097 0.096 0.079 0.079 0.078 0.076 0.072 0.070 0.069 0.065 0.065 0.062 0.060 0.060

source:predictionsgeneratedbymodelsinTableA3

.05

.1 .15 .2 effectofweatheronassessment oftheevidenceforglobalwarming

b.Groupsforwhomweatherseffectislessthanorequaltoaverage
Race/Ethnicity:White Attendservices:weekly Education:collegegrad Party:Democratic Ideology:Moderate Attendservices:12x/month Female Education:somecollege Race/Ethnicity:notW,B,orH Age:2534 Party:Republican Party:Independent Education:PostGraduate 0.059 0.058 0.057 0.055 0.055 0.054 0.051 0.040 0.023 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.000

.05 .1 .15 .2 effectofweatheronassessment oftheevidenceforglobalwarming

Effectsarethedifferencesinpredictedprobabilitiesofagreeingthereisevidenceforglobalwarming accompanyingashiftinlocaltemperaturefromthe5thpercentile(4.3Fbelownormal)tothe95th percentile(14.7Fabovenormal).Incalculatingeffects,valuesofallothervariableswereheldattheir modes(female,white)ormedians(Independent,moderate,somecollege,attendservicesafewtimes permonth,between4555yearsold).Foradditionaldetails,seeTableA3.

Eganand Mullin 25

Figure6.PredictedProbabilitiesofAgreeingthereisSolidEvidence forGlobalWarming,byEducation,PartyIDandLocalWeather
source:predictionsgeneratedbymodelsinTableA3
90 predicted%agreeing thereis"solidevidence"forglobalwarming

80
localtemperature comparedtonormal muchhotter muchcooler

70

60 DEM LEANDEM IND PartyID LEANREP REP

82 predicted%agreeing thereis"solidevidence"forglobalwarming

80

78

localtemperature comparedtonormal muchhotter muchcooler

76

74

72 HSorless somecollege collegegrad postgrad

Education
Figuresshowpredictedprobabilitiesofagreeingthereisevidenceforglobalwarmingwhenlocal temperatureismuchhotterthannormal(atthe95thpercentile,or14.7Fabovenormal)andmuch coolerthannormal(atthe5thpercentile,4.3Fbelownormal).Incalculatingprobabilities,valuesofall othervariableswereheldconstantasdescribedinFigure5.

Eganand Mullin 26

Figure7.AdditionalAspectsofAmericanOpiniononGlobalWarming,20062008
source:PewResearchCenter

80

76.9 Beliefthatthere is"solidevidence" 73.9 thatearthisgettingwarmer

79.3

73.1

globalwarmingisa "very"or"somewhatserious" problem

90

60
80 percent

61.2 54.9 49.7 46.8 46.4 46.8

globalwarming "requiresimmediate governmentaction" Earthisgettingwarmer dueto"humanactivity"

percent

40

70

41.0

60
linearfit educ: H.S. or less

20

50

educ: more thanH.S.

5 0 5 10 15 Meandeparturefromnormallocaltemperature(degreesF), weekpriortosurvey

0 7/06 1/07 7/07 1/08 7/08

Eganand Mullin 27

APPENDIX WordingofSurveyQuestions Questionsaboutpartyidentification ASKALL: PARTY InpoliticsTODAY,doyouconsideryourselfaRepublican,Democrat,or Independent? 1 Republican 2 Democrat 3 Independent 4 Nopreference(VOL.) 5 Otherparty(VOL.) 9 Don'tknow/Refused(VOL.) IFANSWERED3,4,5OR9INPARTY,ASK: PARTYLN AsoftodaydoyouleanmoretotheRepublicanPartyormoretothe DemocraticParty? 1 Republican 2 Democrat 9 Other/Don'tknow/Refused(VOL.)

Eganand Mullin 28

Questionsaboutglobalwarming Fromwhatyouvereadandheard,istheresolidevidencethattheaverage temperatureonearthhasbeengettingwarmeroverthepastfewdecades,ornot? 1 Yes 2 No 3 Mixed/someevidence(VOL.) 9 Dontknow/Refused(VOL.) IFYESASK: Doyoubelievethattheearthisgettingwarmer[READANDROTATE]? 1 Mostlybecauseofhumanactivitysuchasburningfossilfuels OR 2 Mostlybecauseofnaturalpatternsintheearthsenvironment 9 (DONOTREADVOL.)Don'tknow/Refused Inyourview,isglobalwarmingaveryseriousproblem,somewhatserious,nottoo serious,ornotaproblem? 1 2 3 4 9 IFSEEGLOBALWARMINGASPROBLEM(RESPONSE=1,2,3),ASK: Doyouthinkglobalwarmingisaproblemthatrequiresimmediate governmentaction,ordontyouthinkitrequiresimmediategovernment action? 1 Yes,itisaproblemthatrequiresimmediategovernmentaction 2 No,dontthinkglobalwarmingrequiresimmediategovernment action 9 Dontknow/refused(VOL.) Veryserious Somewhatserious Nottooserious Notaproblem Dontknow/Refused(VOL.)

Eganand Mullin 29

TableA1. RespondentsinAnalysesasPercentofAllRespondentsinOriginalPewDataset N 8,220 8,010 Percentofcases inoriginaldataset 100.0 97.5

Respondentsinoriginal dataset Respondentswhosupplied fivedigitzipcode Respondentsforwhosezip codesNCDCdatabasehad validweatherdata Respondentssuccessfully matchedtoNCDCdatabase withvalidresponsesonall variablesinanalysis

7,656

93.1

6,726

81.8

Eganand Mullin 30

TableA2.LocalWeathersEffectonBeliefsaboutGlobalWarming
Orderedprobit.DV:Opiniononwhetherthereissolidevidenceforglobalwarming (scoredno=1;mixed/some/DK/ref=2;yes=3)

Variable Departurefromnormallocaltemperature(F),weekpriortosurvey Sex:Female Race/Ethnicity:Black Race/Ethnicity:Hispanic Race/Ethnicity:NotWhite,BlackorHispanic Age:1824 Age:2534 Age:3544 Age:4555 Age:5564 Education:highschooldiplomaorless Education:collegegrad Education:postgrad PartyID:Republican PartyID:leanRepublican PartyID:leanDemocrat PartyID:Democrat Ideology:veryconservative Ideology:conservative Ideology:liberal Ideology:veryliberal Attendservices:never Attendservices:seldom Attendservices:fewtimesperyear Attendservices:weekly Attendservices:morethanweekly Stateandsurveywavefixedeffects 2 PseudoR th th Estimatedeffectof5 to95 percentileshiftintemperatureon probabilityofagreeingthereisevidenceforglobalwarming,holdingall othervariablesconstantattheirmedians

I *** .010 (.003)

II ** .010 (.004)

III ** .010 (.004) *** .218 (.035) .044 (.068) ** .174 (.079) .111 (.083) .030 (.073) .047 (.063) .057 (.054) .021 (.051) .049 (.052) * .071 (.043) .051 (.048) ** .114 (.056) *** .290 (.060) .098 (.069) *** .334 (.070) *** .417 (.061) *** .422 (.067) *** .198 (.041) *** .222 (.061) * .181 (.098) .116 (.071) .103 (.064) .042 (.060) .066 (.054) *** .166 (.063) Yes .086 .059
**

No .001 .059
***

Yes .013 .062

**

N=6,726.Allanalysesincludeestimatesofcutpoints(notshown).Estimatedquantitiessignificantlydifferentfromzero at*p<.10;**p<.05;***p<.01.Mediansofvariablesare:female,between4555yearsold,somecollege,Independent, moderate,attendsservicesafewtimespermonth.Changesinprobabilitiescalculatedforrespondentsurveyedinwave5 (April2008)andlivinginthestatewithmedianlevelofopiniononclimatechange(Michigan).

TableA3.LocalWeathersEffectonBeliefsaboutGlobalWarming,bySubgroup
Orderedprobit.DV:Opiniononwhetherthereissolidevidenceforglobalwarming (scoredno=1;mixed/some/DK/ref=2;yes=3)

gender Variable Departurefromnormallocaltemperature(F), weekpriortosurvey TemperaturexFemale TemperaturexRace/Ethnicity:Black TemperaturexRace/Ethnicity:Hispanic TemperaturexRace/Ethnicity:NotWhite,BlackorHispanic TemperaturexAge:1824 TemperaturexAge:2534 TemperaturexAge:3544 TemperaturexAge:4555 TemperaturexAge:5564 TemperaturexEducation:highschooldiplomaorless TemperaturexEducation:collegegrad TemperaturexEducation:postgrad TemperaturexPartyID:Republican TemperaturexPartyID:leanRepublican TemperaturexPartyID:leanDemocrat TemperaturexPartyID:Democrat TemperaturexIdeology:veryconservative TemperaturexIdeology:conservative TemperaturexIdeology:liberal TemperaturexIdeology:veryliberal TemperaturexAttendservices:never TemperaturexAttendservices:seldom TemperaturexAttendservices:fewtimesperyear TemperaturexAttendservices:weekly TemperaturexAttendservices:morethanweekly 2 PseudoR

race/ ethnicity .009 (.004)

**

age

education

party identification .002 (.009) .001 (.009) * .023 (.012) ** .025 (.012) .009 (.010) .087

ideology

attendanceof religioussvcs .008 (.008) .007 (.012) .002 (.011) .002 (.010) .000 (.009) .003 (.011) .086

.011 (.005) .003 (.006)

**

.009 (.006)

.006 (.006)

.008 (.005)

.021 (.012) .002 (.016) .005 (.015)

.005 (.013) .007 (.011) .001 (.009) .002 (.009) .002 (.009) .013 (.007) .003 (.008) .006 (.009)
*

.001 (.011) .001 (.007) .017 (.011) .002 (.018)

.086 .086 .086 .086

.086

N=6,726.Analysesincludeconstitutivetermsforallcontrolvariables,stateandsurveywavefixedeffects,andestimates ofcutpoints(notshown).Coefficientssignificantlydifferentfromzeroat*p<.10;**p<.05;***p<.01.

Eganand Mullin 32

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