Order Code RL32366

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking

Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6

April 21, 2004

William J. Krouse
Analyst in Social Legislation
Domestic Social Policy Division

Congressional Research Service <» The Library of Congress

Interview! and Adjudications Page 1 of 95

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III. Interviews and Adjudications

A. Introduction

At the heart of the congressional allegations was also the question of whether, for any reason, INS
had watered down the criteria by which it evaluated an applicant for naturalization. In this chapter
we address those concerns and examine the naturalization evaluation process and the standards by
which INS adjudicators evaluated naturalization applications during CUSA.

Contrary to some allegations, the evidence does not indicate that INS purposefully rescinded
eligibility standards during CUSA. However, we found that INS' application of eligibility standards
was already inconsistent—and known to be so—before it launched CUSA, and INS officials did
nothing to improve the known weaknesses before the program began. INS failed to provide its
adjudicative corps with appropriate guidance concerning issues bearing on the determination of
eligibility for naturalization both before and during CUSA. Thus, when INS augmented its
adjudication workforce with hastily trained new officers, and the pressure to complete cases
intensified, these weaknesses became more pronounced. This, in conjunction with INS' failure to
ensure that the officers had the tools they needed to ensure a quality adjudication—like applicant
files and results of criminal history checks, as discussed in subsequent chapters—led to a
processing system during fiscal year 1996 that was deeply flawed.

The flaws in that processing system were all ones that tended to make adjudications more
superficial. Brief training prevented new adjudicators from examining applications in great detail,
even if they had been provided the time to extend the length of naturalization interviews. The lack
of adjudicative guidance concerning more complex issues prevented those issues from being
adequately explored. Since issues in an applicant's background that could potentially lead to
disqualification often could only be revealed as a result of greater exploration, where that
exploration was curtailed the issues would simply not arise. Thus, although not a deliberate goal of
the program, naturalization processing during CUSA was more heavily weighted in favor of
approval, not denial, of applications for naturalization.

We note at the outset that it is impossible to quantify the number of CUSA eligibility determinations
that were affected by the deficiencies we describe in this chapter concerning naturalization
interviews and adjudications. We cannot establish how many applicants who were approved for
naturalization would have been found ineligible had better training, better guidance, and better
tools been available. Although audits can—and have—revealed the extent to which objective
measures like disqualifying criminal histories were ignored,^1 no amount of after-the-fact study can
determine what might have been revealed to a fully trained, supervised adjudicator who had the
opportunity to conduct an interview of sufficient length and depth. Accordingly, we focus on the
degree to which the system that was in place failed to safeguard naturalization integrity, and do
not offer evidence of the exact extent to which particular adjudications was incorrect.

We begin this chapter by describing the interview and adjudication process. We then describe some
of the adjudication practices that existed prior to fiscal year 1996 in order to provide a benchmark
against which to measure the changes that occurred specifically during CUSA.

We then turn to interviews and adjudications during CUSA. We offer a detailed review of INS'
training of the temporary adjudications officers it hired to meet the goals of CUSA. The evidence
shows that the training program was designed to prepare new officers to adjudicate simple, pre-
screened cases in an environment of ample supervision. However, the evidence also shows that

http://www.usdoj .gov/oig/special/0007/interviews.htm 6/10/2004