9 6 13 0204 62337 NVD Stamped 13 CV 474 RCJ WGC 664 Pages IFP MTN Proposed Complaint Coughlin V Wal-Mart, Reno Sparks Indian Colony, RSIC Opt

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 1 of 664
AO 240 (Rev. 01/09) Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Short Form)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
District
of Nevada
__________
District
of __________
Zachary Barker Coughlin
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff
v.
wAL=MART; RENO SPARKS INDIAN COLONY ET AL..

Defendant
Civil Action No.
APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS

(Short Form)
I am a plaintiff or petitioner in this case and declare that I am unable to pay the costs of these proceedings and
that I am entitled to the relief requested.
In support of this application, I answer the following questions under penalty of perjury:
1. If incarcerated. I am being held at: I have been incarcer. twenty times since 8/20/11, but not currently .
If employed there, or have an account in the institution, I have attached to this document a statement certified by the
appropriate institutional officer showing all receipts, expenditures, and balances during the last six months for any
institutional account in my name. I am also submitting a similar statement from any other institution where I was
incarcerated during the last six months.
2. If not incarcerated. If I am employed, my employers name and address are:
I am arguably self employed. Nearly every waking hour is spent in the defense of either my formal disciplinary
matter or the various criminal prosecutions against me. My license to practice law in Nevada is temporarily
suspended, license before the USPTO is not suspended, but I have never filed anything therein, focusing on 62337.
My take-home pay or wages are: $
0.00
per (specify pay period)
week.
3. Other Income. In the past 12 months, I have received income from the following sources (check all that apply):
u Yes
u Yes
u Yes
u Yes
u Yes
Yes
u
Coughlin was awarded $200 a month in food stamps for the next six
(a) Business, profession, or other self-employment

(b) Rent payments, interest, or dividends
(c) Pension, annuity, or life insurance payments
(d) Disability, or workers compensation payments
(e) Gifts, or inheritances
(f) Any other sources
u No
u No
u No
u No
u No
u No
months as of 8/28/13.
If you answered Yes to any question above, describe below or on separate pages each source of money and
state the amount that you received and what you expect to receive in the future.
My mother has been paying my rent since approximately November 2012..it was $75 a months for three months, then
increased to $150 a month. She has paid my car insurance as well. My father has filled up my gas tank on numerous
occasions. Both have given me nominal amounts of spending money once in awhile ($20-60 here and there,
approximately one a month or so, my mother since November 2012, my father since about April 2012), besides that I
have been eating food from local food pantries, and just generally hardly have more than $5.00 to my name, my bank
account is overdrawn. I have applied for foodstamps a couple times but missed both appointments, but am pursuing
reapplying.

AO 240 (Rev. 01/09) Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Short Form)
4. Amount of money that I have in cash or in a checking or savings account:
0.00 .
5. Any automobile, real estate, stock, bond, security, trust, jewelry, art work, or other financial instrument or
thing of value that I own, including any item of value held in someone elses name (describe the property and its approximate
value):
1996 Honda Accord with 120,000 miles on it, in very poor condition, appears as though someone might have have
been living out of it at various points over the last ten or so years. Worth probably $500, if that. I do not own any real
estate, stocks, bond, security.
6. Any housing, transportation, utilities, or loan payments, or other regular monthly expenses (describe and provide
the amount of the monthly expense):
Car insurance through USAA, but my mother has been paying that.
7. Names (or, if under 18, initials only) of all persons who are dependent on me for support, my relationship
with each person, and how much I contribute to their support:
none.
8. Any debts or financial obligations (describe the amounts owed and to whom they are payable):
student loans of approximately $70K, just went to the ER for a kidney stone, probably have been sent to collections for
that...no longer have cell phone, T-Mobile probably feels I owe them some money, I owe at least one friend some
money for bailing me out of jail on one or more of the twenty occasions since the initial arrest of 8/20/11.
Declaration: I declare under penalty of perjury that the above information is true and understand that a false
statement may result in a dismissal of my claims.
and again on 9/6/13.
Date:
08/20/2013
/s/ Zach Coughlin

Applicants signature

Printed name
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.

1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
NV Bar #9473 (temporarily suspended)
USPTO Atty Regist #53,905 not suspended
fax and tele is same: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

Plaintiff
CASE NO.:
v.
WAL-MART, THOMAS FRONTINO,
individually and in his capacity as an
employee of WAL-MART; RENO
SPARKS INDIAN COLONY AND ITS
TRIBAL POLICE DEPARTMENT; RSIC
OFFICERS KAMERON CRAWFORD
AND DONNIE BRAUNWORTH,
individually and in their capacity as RSIC
Tribal Police Officers; WAL-MART
MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS 1-99
(including Assistant Store Manager JOHN
ELLIS and STORE MANAGER BRIAN
BAIN; RENO CITY ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE AND RCA DEPUTY
PROSECUTOR PAMELA ROBERTS,
ESQ.; RENO MUNICIPAL COURT
JUDGE KENNETH RAY HOWARD;
RENO MUNICIPAL COURT; RMC
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER PAM
LONGONI; WASHOE COUNTY
COMMUNICATIONS; WASHOE
COUNTY JAIL; WASHOE COUNTY
VARIOUS TORTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO
42 U.S.C. 1983
- 1/9 -
Complaint
JURY TRIAL DEMAND RESPECTFULLY MADE
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SHERIFF'S OFFICE; WASHOE COUNTY

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURY
NATURE OF CASE
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Coughlin respectfully submits this Proposed Complaint with the caveat that
it needs work. Coughlin takes seriously the need, or even duty to makes
meritorious claims and present them in a competent fashion, though Coughlin has
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never previously worked in a 1983 or tort setting. Coughlin has diligently sought
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to prosecute this action since the 9/9/11 wrongful arrest, but has encountered a
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multitude of obstacles, many involving judicial, prosecutorial and law enforcement
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misconduct as detailed more fully at the following:
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/166188428/9-6-13-ITERATION-12-14-12-0204-62337-
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wordpad-version-begin-bookmarking-and-endnotes-FOFCOL-interlineatting-just-
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cited-protions-and-8-23-12-Complaints
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Coughlin is working diligently to draft a Complaint that complies with all

duties placed on him, whether as a suspended attorney apparently still subject to an
application of at least some of the Rules of Professional Conduct, or merely as a
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litigant.
The crux of Coughlin's claims (or basis for whatever the appropriate claims
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may be) is laid out in Coughlins' filings before the Nevada Supreme Court in
60838, 61462, and 62337 (please see attached). Nevada law bars warrantless
misdemeanor arrests for alleged conduct outside an officer's presence between 7
- 2/9 -
Complaint
http://www.scribd.com/doc/166212350/8-13-13-996-Pages-Bates-Stamped-Ex-2-Ocrfor-60838-62337-ROA-From-RMC-in-22176-to-2JDC-for-CR12-2064-and-Everything-Filed-inAppeal-Through-3-27-12-P
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a.m., and 7 p.m. Under NRS 171.136, in addition to barring tribal police officers
from making misdemeanor arrests at all. The Reno City Attorney's office
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knowingly put on lies by RSIC Officers Crawford, Braunworth, and Wal-Mart's
Thomas Frontino via prosecutor Pamela Roberts. RMC Judge Kenneth Ray
Howard willfully violated the Sixth Amendment (not to mention the spirit, at the
very least, of Pengilly, and McCormack) in denying per se indigent (under the 2008
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Indigent Defense Order) Coughlin his Sixth Amendment right to counsel,

especially where Howard then summarily incarcerated then practicing attorney
Coughlin for civil contempt (NRS 22.030) for three days at the conclusion of the
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11/30/11 Trial.
Coughlin apologizes if it is plainly decided law that collateral estoppel
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applies to bar any wrongful or false arrest claims, however, Coughlin has been
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spread to thin up to this point, and unable to secure counsel (he has not tried much
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in that regard, having been so under siege) to discern such matters beyond finding
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the following:http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1437&context=fac_articles
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B. False Arrest Actions and Prior Convictions The Sixth Circuit's

tendency to apply preclusion principles without regard to the law of the
forum state was manifested again in Walker v. Schaeffer' 16 in which the
court applied issue preclusion to nolo contendre pleas and guilty findings
to estop section 1983 plaintiffs from asserting that police officers acted
without probable cause in arresting and imprisoning them. In deciding
Walker, the Sixth Circuit paid lip service to Migra and the borrowing
principles that govern preclusion issues. Although the court found that
Ohio law treated guilty findings as constituting an absolute defense in a
- 3/9 -
Complaint

http://www.scribd.com/doc/166212349/12-23-11-Ocr-for-60838-62337-ROA-in-2064-0204Appeal-of-RMC-11-CR-22176-CR11-2064-2617055-Appeal-From-Municipal-s-Court-Digitized-352Page-Version-o
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false arrest action," 7 it also concluded that federal law barred false arrest
claims in such circumstances. In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit
explicitly relied on Cameron v. Fogarty"' in which the Second Circuit
denied any reliance on preclusion principles in applying the common law
rule that precluded actions for false arrest or malicious prosecution by
criminal defendants who were subsequently convicted of the underlying
offenses. Although the Walker court somehow characterized this defense
as a "qualified immunity," the Sixth Circuit really borrowed the common
law principle "that where law enforcement officers have made an arrest,
the resulting conviction is a defense to a section 1983 (115. See Marrese v.
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 383 (1985).
In Migra, Justice White addressed his argument for a policy in which
federal courts could give state court judgments greater preclusive effect to
Congress, because he saw any other position foreclosed by prior Supreme
court decisions. See 465 U.S. At 88 (White, J., Concurring). 116. 854 F.2D
138 (6th Cir. 1988). 117. The court relied on the rarely cited fifty year old
intermediate appellate court decision, see Ryan v. Conover, 59 Ohio App.
361, 18 N.E.2D 277 (1938), and a legal encyclopedia. See 45 Ouxo
JuR.3D False Imprisonment 10 (1983) ("A guilty finding in a criminal
proceeding, whether by trial or plea, constitutes an absolute defense to an
action for false arrest or false imprisonment."). Id. At 165. 118. 806 F.2D
380 (2d Cir. 1986), Cert. Denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987).) Action asserting
that the arrest was made without probable cause.'""
119 Neither the Second nor the Sixth Circuits, however, explained how
this common law requirement found its way into the section 1983 cause of
action, 120 and, most disturbingly, the Walker Court did not address or
even acknowledge its own earlier rejection of this limitation on the scope
of section 1983.121 Therefore, even though Walker can be explained by
the court's reliance on Ohio law, the broad language in Walker may be the
basis for subsequent decisions in other states limiting the scope of section
1983 without regard to state preclusion law. (119. 854 F.2D at 143
(quoting Cameron, 806 F.2D at 388-89). 120. See infra notes 152-56 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the use of common law principles to
define 1983 claims. Nor did the Second or Sixth Circuits even
acknowledge Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983), In which the
Supreme Court applied state preclusion principles to permit a 1983
damage action for an illegal search after a guilty plea. 121. In Mulligan v.
Schlachter, 389 F.2D 231 (6th Cir. 1968) (Per curiam), the Sixth Circuit
refused to dismiss a 1983 false arrest complaint because the plaintiff was
later convicted. Although the court ultimately dismissed the case on statute
of limitations grounds, it first ruled that a criminal conviction did not
mandate dismissal, stating that "the simple fact of an unreversed state
- 4/9 -
Complaint
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court conviction cannot by itself require dismissal [of a civil rights

action]." Id. At 233. Accord Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2D 1442, 1448 n.8
(5Th Cir. 1984); Greer v. Turner, 603 F.2D 521, 522 (5th Cir. 1979);
Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2D 1249, 1254 (1st Cir. 1974). Cf. Singleton v.
Perry, 45 Cal.2D 489, 492, 289 P.2D 794, 798 (1955) (conviction does not
prevent suit for false arrest under state law). 122. See Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 525-27 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19
(1982).)
A. JURISDICTION
1. This Complaint alleges a violation of Coughlin's civil rights, fraud, conspiracy,
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defamation of character, negligence , false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious

prosecution, etc.
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Coughlin currently resides at 1471 E. 9th St., Reno, NV 89512. Such rights
wereviolated by the actions of the below named individuals which were directed
against Plaintiff at the Reno-Sparks Indian Colony Wal-Mart located at 2425 E. 2nd
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St. Reno, NV 89512 on 9/9/11, and within the Reno Municipal Court and Washoe
County Jail.
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All defendants named above are believe to reside in Washoe County

Nevada, though Wal-Mart's principal place of business is believed to be in
Arkansas.
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7) Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1343 (a)(3) and 42 U.S.C.

1983 and perhaps 28 USC Sec 1331 (diversity given Wal-Mart's Arkansas roots
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and more than $75K amount in controversy, though the Federal Question presented
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by the Fourth Amendment violations attendant to the search incident to an unlawful

- 5/9 -
Complaint
arrest and the deprivation of Coughlin's Sixth Amendment rights by RMC Judge
Howard might also provide a basis for bringing suit in federal court.
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This is an action for relief in damages, injunctive relief (Washoe County

Communications Center is threatening to fail to retain copies of the dispatch
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recordings upon the upcoming two year anniversary of the arrest), and for
attorneys fees and costs which is brought on behalf of the Plaintiff identified
hereinabove who was assaulted, battered, and subjected to excessive force under
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the color of governmental authority resulting in 42 U.S.C. 1983 Violation of
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Plaintiffs constitutional rights guaranteed to him by the United States of America
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and the State of Nevada to wit: violation of Fourth Amendment rights and tortious
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act of battery on Plaintiff.
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Coughlin realizes this Complaint needs a great deal of work. The result of
being wrongfully arrested nineteen more times since the 8/20/11 arrest at issue in
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this Complaint has impeded Coughlin's ability to secure appropriate counsel and
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pursue this matter:
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JURISDICTION
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2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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1343 In that these claims arise under the federal civil rights statues, 28 U.S.C.
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1331 In that a federal question exists and 28 U.S.C. 1367 Which confers
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supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for relief set forth in this Complaint.
- 6/9 -
Complaint
This court also has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 In that
the action seeks to redress the deprivation under color of state law, of rights,
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privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States or by an
act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens and to recover damages or to
secure equitable or other relief under an act of Congress providing for the
protection of civil rights.
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3. Venue is proper in this, the northern District of Nevada because the defendant is
subject to personal jurisdiction here and the claims arose here COMES NOW,
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Plaintiff above named, for the time being self representing, ZACHARY BARKER
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COUGHLIN, Esq., and for cause of action against Defendants, and each of them,
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alleges, avers, and complains as follows:
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4. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was, and is a resident of Washoe County,
State of Nevada.
5. At all times material hereto, Defendant CITY OF RENO was, and is a political
subdivision of the State of Nevada and is brought forth in this action out of its
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conspiracy with the RSIC to violate NRS 171.1255. All other defendants are
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believed to be residents of the City of Reno, and Washoe County.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays for judgment against Defendants,

and each of them as follows:
a.General damages in excess of $10,000;
- 7/9 -
Complaint
b. Special damages for medical and incidental expenses, past and future,
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according to proof at trial;
c. Special damages for lost income, past and future, according to proof at
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trial;
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d. For an award of attorney fees, costs, expenses and interest as allowed by

law;
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e. For an award of injunctive relief (requiring the Washoe County

Communication Center to retain and provide to Coughlin a copy of all dispatch
recordings, logs, etc. in any way connected to the arrest of 9/9/11 and any of the
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subsequent recordings, logs, that ensued between the present and 8/20/11 in any
way connected to Coughlin...etc.;
f. For such other and further relief as to the Court seems proper in the
premises.
DATED this 9/6/13
/s/ Zachary Barker Coughlin
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, Esq.
Pro Per Attorney for Plaintiff
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- 8/9 -
Complaint
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of the law offices of
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, Esq., 1471 E. 9TH ST, Reno, Nevada 89512,
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and that on this date, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by:
_____ Depositing for mailing, in a sealed envelope, U.S. Postage prepaid, at Reno,
Nevada.
_____ Reno/Carson Messenger Service.
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_____ Personal Delivery.
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_____ Facsimile.
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__ __ E-Filing
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addressed as follows:Contact
Reno-Sparks Indian Colony Tribal Police
1995 East Second Street
Reno , Nevada 89502
775-785-8776
775-785-9163 (fax)
775-323-COPS (2677) dispatch
775-322-4900 Secret Witness
lcooley@rsic.org (Email address)
Larry Cooley, Chief of Police
Thomas Frontino and Wal-Mart:
2425 E 2nd St Reno, NV 89502
(775) 359-8200
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/s/Employee of Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq.,
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- 9/9 -
Complaint
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ZACH COUGHLIN
NV BAR 9473 SUSPENDED SEE 60838
1471 E. 9TH ST.
RENO NV 89512
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR COUNTY OF WASHOE STATE OF NEVADA
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN,
appellant
v.
matt merliss,
respondent
cv11-03628
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MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DECLARATION IN

SUPPORT THEREOF TO SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR REHEARING OF
THIS COURT'S ORDER OF 5/25/13, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE NRCP 59
OR 60 OR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF SUCH
Petitioner, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, representing himself.,
respectfully submits this
Given NRS 40.400 makes NRAP applicable here, and the fact that some of this
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Court's decision seem to be made in an exercise of its original jurisdiction (ie,

NRS 40.385's dictate to pursue a stay, at least to the commercial tenancy aspect of
Coughlin's lease, with the district court pursuant to NRAP 8...) and therefore,
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would seem to make NRCP applicable (thus the Rule 59, 60, DCR 13(7) WDCR
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12, etc. Motions), whereas other aspects of this Court's Order are arguably made in
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an exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, in which case NRAP 40's Petition for
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Rehearing, etc. woudl be indicated:

- 1/173 -MOTION
However, tenants' involuntary departure from the premises by eviction does not
render such an appeal moot. [FN14] D.C.Joyner v. Jonathan Woodner Co., 479
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A.2d 308 (D.C. 1984).

The 7/25/13 Order in CV11-03628 by 2JDC Judge Stiglich reads: "CV11-03628
D8 On May 30,2013, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed Appellant ZACHARY
BARKER COUGHLIN's (Coughlin) appeal from a district court order denying
his emergency motion for a temporary restraining order or injunction and
awarding attorney's fees. (NOTE: here, Judge Stiglich adopts Richard G.Hill,
Esq.'s approach of leaving out the fact that Coughlin's 12/30/11 Motion was a NRS
40.385 Motion for Stay (the sort of stay that is not a matter of a District Court
Judge's discretion as to whether or not to grant where Coughlin plunked down the
statutorily set $250.00 on no less than four occasions in the Reno Justice Court
10/17/11, 10/25/11, 12/13/11, 12/22/11 in Rev2011-063341) ((See Case No. 61383
(May 30, 2013).) The Nevada Supreme Court also dismissed all of Coughlin's
appeals from any other order or determination arising from the district court's
review of this matter, which includes all district court orders entered in this case
after that order was entered. (See id.) (NOTE: Actually, that Order in 61383 of
5/28/13 reads: "For the same reasons, to the extent that appellant seeks to
appeal from any other order or determination arising from the district court's
appellate review of the justice court matter, this court likewise lacks
jurisdiction to consider any such appeals."...the problem with that logic, however,
is that NRS 40.385 (the version put into effect on 10/1/11, which incorporates
NRAP 8) imbues the district court with original jurisdiction to that portion of
Coughlin's tenancy which was utilized as a commercial tenancy, and Klein makes
quite clear that the Nevada Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction where the
district court must embrace such an exercise of appellate jurisdiction (just what is
meant by "arising in" and "arising from the district court's appellate review"
necessarily would connote some decision, premised upon an exercise of its original
jurisdiction, by the justice court, and clearly, the legislature chose not to create any
such jurisdiction in the justice courts in NRS 40.385 as to commercial tenants upon
enacting the new version of NRS 40.385)
Because this matter has been fully adjudicated, (NOTE: actually, there are
still several outstanding motions in CV11-03628, and the 5/28/13 Order in 61383
does not change that or obviate the district court's duty to embrace its jurisdiction
therein, as to, say, Coughlin's 4/7/12 Motion to Alter or Amend the 3/30/12 Order
- 2/173 -MOTION
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denying his appeal (which applied all sorts of appellate principles applying only to
plenary matters to that appeal of a summary eviction, then, which, despite NRS
40.400 making NRAP 38 applicable, in consideration of the admission in Judge
Flanagan's 8/28/12 Order that he had not previously sanctioned Coughlin in that
matter, means the 6/25/12 Order awarding attorney fees was an application of DCR
13(3), given Judge Flanagan's apparent indication that he did not view a preemptive
opposition to a motion for attorney's fees (if Coughlin's 1/14/12 Opposition to
Motion for Attorney's Fee is characterized thusly) as operative)...regardless, NRS
7.085 and NRS 69.050 definitely do not apply in light of NRS 40.400, which makes
NRAP applicable to appeals of summary eviction orders; also outstanding, and very
much not moot is Coughlin's 6/10/12 NRCP 60(b) motion, and his motion of
7/10/13, and that of 9/15/12) all of Coughlin's outstanding motions pending in
this case are DENIED as moot, including his Emergency Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis. This case is closed. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this 25th day
of July, 2013. /s/ Lidia S. Stiglich District Judge""
Judge Stiglich's 7/25/12 Order in CV11-03628 (which especially curious in
its timing considering the failure, yet again, by 2JDC filing office staff to file in (in
violation of WDCR 18 and NRCP 5(e), Whitman, Donoho, Barnes, et al)
Coughlin's 7/22/13 submission of a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, etc.:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/157166359/7-29-13-0204-2JDC-Clerk-Wise-Tips-OffJudge-Stiglich-Results-in-7-25-13-Order-in-CV11-03628-2025-03628-7-22-13Mandamus-IFP-Etc-Letter-2JDC-Clerk-Wise) references the 5/28/13 Order
Dismissing Appeal in 61383, which reads:
"ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL This is an appeal from district court
orders denying an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order or
injunction and awarding attorney fees (NOTE: the Nevada Supreme Court, too,
apparently, does not countenance the fact that Couglin's 12/30/11 filing in CV1103628 implicates a mandatory stay under NRS 40.385) in a landlord-tenant matter.
Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Patrick Flanagan, Judge. Appellant
moved the district court for a temporary restraining order or injunction in an
appeal from a justice court order in a landlord tenant dispute. Following the denial
of that motion, appellant appealed to this court. Subsequently, the district court
entered an order awarding attorney fees to respondent and appellant also appealed
from that order. The district court has final appellate jurisdiction in all cases
arising in justice courts. Nev. Const. art. 6, 6; see also Waugh v. Casazza, 85
Nev. 520, 521, 458 P.2d 359, 360 (1969). Although NRAP 3A(b)(3) authorizes an
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appeal from an order refusing to grant an injunction, and NRAP 3A(b)(8)

authorizes an appeal from a post-judgment order awarding attorney fees, see
Winston Prods. Co., Inc. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 525, 134 P.3d 726, 731 (2006)
(recognizing that an order awarding attorney fees and costs is substantively
appealable as a special order after final judgment), because the orders challenged
(NOTE: actually, the RJC refused to rule on Coughlin's NRS 40.385 Motion for
Stay, as such, the 2JDC's 1/11/12 Order, which failed to grant the stay where doing
so is not up to the district court's discretion, was an exercise of the district court's
original jurisdiction, especially as to that portion of the premises Coughlin utilized
as a commercial tenancy) in this case arose from the district court's exercise of
appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a justice court decision, the district
court's orders were ostensibly rendered final and are not appealable to this
court. For the same reasons, to the extent that appellant seeks to appeal from
any other order or determination arising from the district court's appellate
review of the justice court matter, this court likewise lacks jurisdiction to
consider any such appeals. Accordingly, as we lack jurisdiction over this appeal,
we ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.fn1 (lRespondent's April 26, 2013, motion
seeking to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction on other grounds and his April
26, 2013, motion to strike are denied as moot. To the extent that respondent seeks
attorney fees based on the motion to dismiss this appeal, that request is denied. We
further deny as moot any other requests for relief pending in this matter.) /s/
Gibbons, J., Douglas, J., Saitta, J."
VERIFICATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
MADE AND SIGNED IN STATE OF NEVADA, COUNTY OF WASHOE
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, being first duly sworn, according to law,
upon oath deposes and says: That he is the Respondent (or whatever designation is fitting)
in the above-captioned matter; that he has read the foregoing document herein filed and
knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as to
those matters therein stated on information and belief, and as to those matters he believes
to be true. Further, that I have authorized ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ., to
make the foregoing application for relief.
DATED this 8/1/13 /s/ Zachary Barker Coughlin,
Zachary Barker Coughlin,

Appellant
3 is not moot at all. Coughlin could still receive tremendous benefit from it, even
beyond the consideration of the collateral consequences in 62337 and 61901 and
the spectre of the $42K attorney fee award at issue in 61383 (where such was never
a "case" arising the the justice court, necessarily, as it was premised upon an
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application of nrs 69.050, which relates to atty fee awards for appeals of
JUDGMENT by justice courts, and it would be consitutionally violative to subject
coughlin to such with no right to review therof of any sort (ie, such was necessarily
not a decision by the justice court, ie, the atty fees for the work done just on appeal,
and therefore could not be said to have "arisen" in the justice court.
hatley 231 se 2d 633, 634-35. in re ak 628 se 2d 753, 755.
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as to Waugh alleged bar, see Zamarripa 747 p.2d 1386 nevada case provides
exception allowing this Court to consider appeal in this matter, and Waugh's reliand
on "must not be tried anew and citioation to njcrpc 72-75 is distinguished from
Anvui's "de novo" review2 standard per Mackie 329 p.2d 448, as such RJC not an
'inferiro tribuanl' as de novo review precludes such an interpretiation and the
3/30/12 and and 8/21/12 8/28/12 orders in cv11-03628 rule on constitutional and
validity of nrs 40.253(5)-(6) and nrs 40.385.
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further,the RJC "proceeding" appealed is not a "case" and was not one "arising in"
as the RJC lack jurisdiciton to even hold the 10/25/11 "Trial" therein given the lack
of a complaint being filed or 20 days accorded to file an answe rper njcrcp rule 109
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pluas waugh is called in to doubt by kjb 2jdc 103 nev 473

This court's three Justice Panel's 5/28/13 Order indicates Article 6 Sec 6 is an
issue, but I have some thoughts on that...or maybe a Mandamus Petition would be
better route to go.
judge flangan's 5/29/13 order in cv11-03628 struck Coughlin's 5/20/13 emergency
amended notice of appeal and Coughlin's arrest in by the rjc bailiff's of 5/23/13
prevented his filign the motion/notice/surreply he intended to that night...
dist ct has no pwoer to strike notice of appeal lils 414 f.2d 612 plus paul v
armstrong may allow for cert 1 nev 82 further waugh relies on a repealed statute in
nrs 40.410, also, where merliss did not himself hold title to the property, but rather,
his living trust, art 6 sec 8 may retlate to the title issues making the RJC
inappropriate forum thus not 'arising in" 29 nev 181 also, Coughlins' 12/30/11
motion in cv11-03628 whas
A MOTION FOR STAY PER NRS 40.385,
WHICH KEEPS GETTING MISCHARACTERIZED AS ONLY A MOTION FOR
TRO. AND RJC'S REFSUAL TO RULE ON SUCH NRS 40.385 MOTION
(KEPT SAYIGN MUST ASK DIST CT FOR STAY AND CHANGES TO NRS
40.385 CIRCA 10/1/11, MAY OR MAY NOT APPLY, IF THEY DO NRAP 8
NECSSARILY IMPLIES SUCH A MOTION NO 'ARISING IN ' RJC AND
SHOUDL THEREFORE NOT FACE AN ART 6 SEC 6 BAR.
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rough sketch as to why Waugh doesn't apply...see 6 10 13 filing in CV11-03628 for

idea of what Petition for Rehearing may be focused on...NRS 40.386 is not
discretionary, I don't think...plus Waugh was an appeal of a plenary UD action, not
an appeal of a de novo review by the Dist Ct of an Justice Court decision..
Also, wherre Dist Ct basis its decision on second prong of NRCP 56(c) (ie, genuine
issue of fact part) wherre NRS 40.253 limits jurisdiction to, essential, the "no legal
defense" second prong of NRCP 56(c) (Anvui says summary eviction appeal are
review based on the standard applied to review of summary judgment, as "they are
analogous", but clearly, under NRS 40.253(6), they aren't identical, as "no legal
defense" is all that is contained therein, nothing about "genuine issue of material
fact", which is what Flanagan hung his hat on in denying appeal.
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I think exception to nev const article 6 sec 6 bar involves where dist court exceeds
jurisdiction or fails to embrace jurisdiction (the failure by flanagan to grant a stay
under NRS 40.385 where such is not discretionary (ie, plunk down $250, you get
your stay, period) is a failure to embrace his jurisdiction, and basing the denial of
my appeal on the "genuine issue" prong of nrcp 56(c) when Nrs 40.253(6) clearly
does not contain such a standard, exceeds jurisdiction, furhter, the 6/25/12 award of
attorney's fees based on nrs 69.050 exceeds jurisdiction in that such statute only
applies to judgments, which necessarily stem from civil actions, ie, plenary trials,
not summary evictions...so, more exceeding jurisdiction exception to article 6 sec 6
bar.
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Coughlin certainly does not feel that his appeal in 61383 (or CV11-03628) is
"moot", as an Order by the either the District Court or Nevada Supreme Court
undoing that ordered in CV11-03628 of (especially where such a refusal to
exercise its jurisdiction to enter the non-discretionary, automatic stay required
under NRS 40.385 pursuant to Coughlin's 12/30/12 Motion for Stay (see pages 1213, and 18 therein, as its so much more than a Motion for TRO, though NRCP 62
does provide for an automatic 10 day stay as to Orders such as that of , which begs
the question as to how it was appropriate for Hill to insist on throwing away the
personalty he had removed from the former home law office (the 12/30/12 Motion
in CV11-03628 was not directed solely to enjoining the 12/21/11 Order in Rev11001708, a closer reading than that done by Hill or Baker will reveal the NRS
40.385 Motion for Stay therein), 3/30/12 (especially where such an order exceeded
the 2JDC's jurisdiction
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Consider, speaking of the idea that 61383 is "moot", the collateral

consequences to Coughlin of the various Orders appeal from in CV11-03628
remaining in place (beyond the fact that Hill and or Merliss now has a "judgment"
for $42,065 in attorney's fees against Coughlin for the appeal of a summary
eviction, with particularly emphasis on the salience of the conviction in 61901 and
associated testimony by Hill vis a vis that criminal trespass conviction and
Coughlin's alleged lack of competency, and or "conduct" or "candor" (whether to
the tribunal, for which there is an RPC, 3.3, that requires such, or, apparently to
some non-existenct RPC that the OBC's King believes require candor to opposing
counsel (actually, its RPC 3.4, requiring "fairness", rather than "candor") in 62337:
The 12/14/12 Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law now on appeal in 62337
(despite the fact that that the title of that 12/14/12 FOFCOL fails to categorize or
identify such as a "decision" sufficient to invoked SCR 105(3)'s docketing of such
or implementation of a briefing schedule or transmission of any ROA (ironic given
Hill and Echeverria's criticism that the title of Coughlins' file bare little relation to
that addressed therein).That 12/14/12 FOFCOL includes the following:
"19. State Bar Counsel called attorney Richard Hill to testify at the hearing of this
matter: Mr. Hill has been a member in good standing with the State Bar of Nevada
for 33 years. See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P
36, L 22 P 37 L 4. Mr. Hill was retained by Dr. Merliss to assist Dr. Merliss in a
landlord tenant dispute with his tenant Coughlin. See Transcript of Proceedings
of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 37, L14 -20. (HEARING - Vol. I, (Page
37:14 to 37:20) Q And how did you first come into contact with Mr. Coughlin? A
Well, I was hired by a Dr. Matthew Merliss. My office was to remove a tenant from
a home at 121 River Rock in Reno. Dr. Merliss had going back and forth with Mr.
Coughlin for several months. Mr. Coughlin had not paid any rent for, at that point I
believe it was --)
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(NOTE: actually, it was Hill's associate Casey D. Baker, Esq. who worked the
case, so why it is that Hill was an appropriate witness to testify to all sorts of
matters in a case that he had not appeared in (either 1708 or 03628 up until
approximately August 2012 (where that appeal was docketed in the 2JDC on
12/21/11, and by Hill's appearing in Baker's place upon Baker absconding to
Kentucky at a time, August 2011 when 99% of the work in 1708 and 03628 had
already been done by Baker, briefing was over, the appeal was denied and
oppositions to post-judgment motions had been filed by Baker) is not clear:
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 38:20 to 38:23) "Q And did you end up
representing Dr. Merliss inan eviction action?
A My office did. I assigned
the case to my associate at the time, Casey Baker.")
The FOFCOL continues on misrepresenting Hill's actual participation in
1708 and 03628: "Mr. Hill represented Dr. Merliss in Reno Justice Court and
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Washoe County District Court and two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court in
the matters involving Dr. Merliss and Coughlin. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 13 -24. Mr. Hill has also reviewed filings
in of a case in which Coughlin is involved with Washoe Legal Services. See
Transcript of Proceedings Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 25 P 40, L 3.
(HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 39:13 to 40:3) Q "Could you describe to the panel in a
chronological manner some of the events that you have personal knowledge of that
exhibited this behavior that formed your opinion? MR. COUGHLIN: Objection.
Relevancy. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE WITNESS (Hill): I've read
(NOTE: Hill's Declaration in support of the Motion for Attorney's Fees that Baker
made first in his 2/24/12 Answering Brief (violating DCR 13 where Baker made
such a motion for fees again on 4/19/12) attests only to reading everything Baker
filed, but regardless, there is a difference between Hill as a witness asserting that he
had personal knowledge of whether or not Coughlin displayed candor to the
tribunal or anyone else, or fairness to opposing counsel or overall competency had
Hill actually appeared in or worked the cases during the time frames of the alleged
events or misconduct to which he testifies to (asserting first hand knowledge
thereof as to such events or conduct) and Hill merely perusing the file after the fact)
virtually everything that Mr. Coughlin has filed, not only in the Department 7
eviction case, and before that the Reno Justice Court's eviction case. He's now got
-- had two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court in that case, and I've read virtually
everything that he's done. I've also followed the filings that he's had in his dealings
with Washoe Legal Services. And I've followed the filings that he had in the
supreme court discipline matters."
20.
In the eviction proceeding between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin, Mr.
Hill's firm obtained an eviction order allowing Coughlin one week to vacate the
premises. (NOTE: here the FOFCOL mischaracterizes what that 10/27/11 Order in
1708 actually said, where it reads: ""That the sheriff/constable of Reno Township,
or one of their duly authorized agents be, and hereby is, directed to remove each
and every person found upon and within the rental unit" ...the difference is clear
and order "allowing Couglin one week to vacate" sounds more like a trespass
warning than one that indicates the WCSO is "directed to remove each and every
person found upon and within the rental unit") Ultimately, Coughlin failed to
comply with the eviction order and was convicted of criminal trespass. See
Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 41, L 18 -P 44, L 12.
21.
On behalf of his client Dr. Merliss, Mr. Hill sought and obtained an
order in favor of Dr. Merliss and against Coughlin awarding Dr. Merliss attorney's
fees in the amount of $42,065.50. Washoe District Court Judge Patrick Flanagan
entered the order on June 25, 2012. See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 47, L 3-7. -See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 3, L 10-11. The motion
seeking attorney's fees was based on Coughlin's conduct in the defense of the
eviction matter, which conduct was characterized as frivolous and vexatious and
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presumably so found by Judge Flanagan. See Hearing Exhibit P 2, L 8-13; P 3, L 411.

22.
Based on Mr. Hill's experience and background, his review of the
pleadings in the litigation between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin and his review of the
pleadings in Coughlin's litigation with Washoe Legal Services, Mr. Hill is of the
opinion that Coughlin is not competent to practice law. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 1 -12.
23.
Based on Mr. Hill's experience in litigating with Coughlin, Coughlin
was not truthful with either counsel or the court. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 53, L 6 -16. Mr. Hill felt that Coughlin's filings
were abusive, at one point calling Mr. Hill's associate a lichen. Coughlin has
accused Mr. Hill of bribing the Reno Police Department to have Coughlin arrested.
Mr. Hill's staff is terrorized by Coughlin. See Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P
54, L 4 -15."
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 40:11 to 41:4) Hill: "In the appeal -- we had recovered a
$42,000 attorney's fee award against Mr. Coughlin for handling just his appeal of
the eviction. He would file these documents that would have a caption on it that
would indicate that it was a motion under Rule 59, for example. (NOTE:
compare to 12/14/12 FOFCOL not including characterizing in title identifying such
as a "decision" sufficient to implicate SCR 105(3)) And you would get into it, and
there would be no mention in the body of Rule 59, there would be no analysis of
Rule 59, but we would have to run down all of the little issues that he would raise
on the off chance that if you don't respond to one, the district court judge is going to
find something that he thinks is important, and the client ends up having an adverse
result. $42,000 on a no-cause 30-day eviction, and that's just for the appeal of it, is
absolutely astronomical. But that should tell you -- I have provided Mr. King
with a copy of Judge Flanagan's orders in which he sets forth the reasons for
such an extraordinary award, being Mr. Coughlin's behavior, and the quality of the
work that he was filing."
Hill demonstrates his own RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 violations where he falsely
characterizes the "reasons" Judge Flanagan provides for entering the attorney fee
award of 6/25/12 in CV11-03628 (FHE 2): "HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 40:25 to
41:4) I have provided Mr. King with a copy of Judge Flanagan's orders in which
he sets forth the reasons for such an extraordinary award, being Mr. Coughlin's
behavior, and the quality of the work that he was filing."
Actually, as Hill and King (see King's inclusion of such 8/28/12 Order in his
8/30/12 email to Coughlin) well know, Judge Flanagan's 8/21/12 and 8/28/12
Orders in 03628 clearly contradict Hill's assessment that Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12
Order in 03628 "sets for the the reasons for asuch and extraordinary award,
being Mr. Coughlin's behavior, and the qualiity of the work that he was
filing...". Rather, Judge Flanagan's 8/28/12 Order in 03628 makes clear:
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"...Coughlin's Motions here attempts to re-litigate substantive issues this Court

has already decided, or frivolous claims this Court has previously
ignored...Accordingly, Coughlin's Motion to Alter or Amend Order, or Pled in
Alternatid [sic] Motion to Set Aside Attorney Fee Award and Motion for Order
Shortening Time and Notice of Appeal of Atly [sic] Fee Award of 6/25/12 and
NRCP 60(b)(4) Motion to Set Aside Attorney's Fees are DENIED."
Panel Chair John Echeverria, Esq.'s FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW of 12/14/12 in SBN v. Zachary Barker Coughlin, NG12-0204, NG12-0434, and
NG12-0435 reads:
"THIS MATTER came before a designated Formal Hearing Panel of the Northern
Nevada Disciplinary Board (the "Panel") for hearing on Wednesday, November 14, 2012.
The Panel consisted of John P. Echeverria, Esq., Chairman; Lay-Member Karen Pearl,
Stephen Kent, Esq., Clark V. Vellis, Esq., and Michael K. Johnson, Esq .. The State Bar of
Nevada (the "State Bar") appeared and was represented by Deputy Bar Counsel, Patrick O.
King, Esq.. The Respondent, Zachary Barker Coughlin, Nevada State Bar No. 9473 (the
"Respondent" or "Coughlin") appeared in propria persona.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon the pleadings filed, the documentary evidence admitted as Hearing
Exhibits 1 through 16, and the testimonial evidence of the Honorable Judge Bruce
Beesley, Richard Hill, Esq., Paul EIcano, Esq., the Honorable Judge Dorothy Nash
Holmes, Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq. and Mary Barker presented at the hearing of these
proceedings, the Panel makes findings of facts as
follows:
1.
Coughlin is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada. At
all relevant times prior to and at the time of the filing of the Complaint in this matter, the
Respondent's principle office, as filed with the State Bar of Nevada in accordance with
the Rule of Professional conduct ("RPC") 79(1)(a), was Post Office Box 3961, Reno,
NV 89505. See Hearing Exhibit 1 at 0001, lines 7-10 (State Bar of Nevada vs. Zachary B.
Coughlin, Esq., Case No: NG12-0204, NG12-0435, NG12-0434, Complaint at P1 (filed
August 23, 2012). (NOTE: such citation yields only: "ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ.,
Bar No. 9473 Respondent. PLEASE TAKE notice that pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
("SCR") 105(2) a").
(NOTE: Coughlin denied by Verified Answer and or Response all the allegations
in the Complaint, as such, it is impermissible for the FOFCOL to rely on or cite to the
Complaint (as Coughlin denied each and every charge the FOFCOL's citation to the
Complaint as "evidence" is error. Hutchens, 74 SW 3d 976. (and arguably the same goes
for citing to fugitive documents where no right to confront the "accuser" were utilized and
or offered into evidence, especially where the Complaint failed to attached , see FHEs 2, 3,
10, 11)
2.
Coughlin was admitted as a member of the State Bar of Nevada on March
25, 2005. See Hearing Exhibit 1 at 0001, lines 7-8 (State Bar of Nevada vs. Zachary B.
Coughlin, Esq., Case No: NG12-0204, NG12-0435, NG12-0434, Complaint at P1 (filed
August 23, 2012). ("ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ., Bar No. 9473).
3.
On September 9, 2011, Coughlin shoplifted a candy bar and cough drops
from a Wal-Mart store with an approximate value of fourteen dollars ($14.00). On
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November 30, 2011, Municipal Court Judge Kenneth R. Howard found Coughlin guilty of
the offense of Petit Larceny, a violation of RMC 8.10.040. Coughlin appealed the
judgment of conviction. On March 15, 2012, the Honorable District Court Judge Steven P.
Elliott affirmed the judgment of conviction on appeal. See Hearing Exhibit 1 at 0002,
5, lines 11-15; (State Bar of Nevada vs. Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq., Case No: NG12-0204,
NG12-0435, NG12-0434, Complaint at P2 (filed August 23, 2012).
4.
Coughlin's conduct during the trial of the petit larceny case on November
30, 2011, in which Coughlin appeared in propria persona, was so disruptive that Judge
Howard found Coughlin in direct contempt of court and sentenced him to jail that same
day to be released on December 3, 2011 at 8:00 PM. Judge Howard specifically found
Coughlin's conduct to be disorderly and was either contemptuous or behavior insolent
toward the judge in that Coughlin refused:
"... to obey directives of the Judge, continuing lines of inquiry after being
advised by the Court to refrain from doing so; demeaning the Court with
statements such as "WOW" in response to court rulings; laughing
during testimony and further questioning the court and its authority."
See Hearing Exhibit 11 ORDER FOR SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF contempt
COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE OF THE COURT,
November 30, 2011.
(NOTE: Such FHE 11 lacks a Certificate of Service page, and this is done on
purpose, as the RMC refused to provide such OPSC to Coughlin upon his being
released from jail (Coughlin called the RMC and spoke with RMC Judicial
Assistant for Judge Howard, Veronica Lopez the Monday following his release
from jail on 12/3/11), and such was not provided to Coughlin at jail or upon his
release, and attempts to obtain such after from the RMC, and specifically Veronica
Lopez were rudely rebuffed. Also, such was made in absentia of both Coughlin
and the prosecutor, and as such, the deadline to appeal it has not even started to
run, given no notice of Entry of Order for such Order has been filed and served.
Further, lines 16-17 of page 1 of such OSPC reveals the extent to which such Order
failed to find any such behavior (lines 26-28 and the colon after the word
conduct between lines 26-27, and the failure of the RMC to check such blank,
combined with the check on the blank on line 19 where behavior, rather than
conduct is referenced, takes such out of the purview of any admissible evidence
of a RPC 3.5 violation.
Additionally, the entirety of such 11/30/11 (apparently the RMC can obtain a
file stmape for Orders submitted after 4:30 pm, but not attorneys or litigants?)
OPSC is violative of McCormack and the Sixth Amendment where Judge Howard's
10/27/11 Order denied Coughlin court appointed counsel and failed to rule that
jail time was not a possibility. Aigersinger.
Attorney's conduct in continuing to cross-examine police officer after judge
had ruled that police log was not admissible was not contempt where attorney
claimed that he was trying to impeach witnesses' memory, not lay foundation for
admission of log, so that his conduct could not be said to be willful. United States
v Giovanelli, (1990, CA2 NY) 897 F2d 1227. Resort to summary disposition of
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criminal contempt proceeding under Rule 42(a), Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, is permissible only when express requirements of rule are met and when
there is compelling reason for immediate remedy or when time is of essence. Thus,
attorney's conviction for criminal contempt in pursuing line of questioning
forbidden by court would be reversed, since record showed that there was no
compelling need for immediate remedy provided by Rule 42(a), Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and that trial court, by its own actions, did not consider time to
be of essence; trial court should have observed "normal" procedure" of notice and
hearing, provided by Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. U.S. v.
Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236, 12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 124 (7th Cir. 1982). See United
States v Turner, (1987, CA11 Ala) 812 F2d 1552, 14. (page 29 of Coughlin's
6/18/12 Motion for Leave in 60838, the matter within which King's SCR 111
Petition resides, a document which, along with other filings by Coughlin in the
NSCT, were attached as exhibits (usually on a disc, but not always) to a multitude
of the documents Coughlin submitted for filing with the SBN's Clerk of Court in
NG12-0204, etc.
(see, also, the transcription Coughlin provided therein between pages 35-85,
which clearly reveal the patent lack of due process attendant to that trial (denial of
Sixth Amendment (as to both the petty larceny trial and the trial on the summary
contempt finding made ten minutes into the petty larceny trial (the failure to
immediately render a summary contempt order with Houston (see, also, the 2012
Marshall case, especially where Judge Howard is clearly punishing Coughlin for
behavior occurring outside the immediate presence of the court, whether or not
his 11/30/11 OPSC admits to that or not, which includes Coughlin's rancorous
interactions with Marshal Menzel at the 10/10/11 arraignment (the hold of which
violated NRS 178.405 in light of the then pending 9/7/11 Order for Competency
evaluation of which the RMC was made aware, in writing in), similar interactions
with RMC filing office counter clerks and supervisors incident to their refusal to
allow Coughlin to access even the Arrest Report and Declaration of Probable
Cause until after the 10/10/11 arraignment, etc), and Coughlin's 11/28/11 Motion to
specificity brings McCormack into play, and the possibility of jail time for such
contempt required the appointment of counsel as well), failure to apply the
exclusionary rule to evidence (despite Coughlin having a receipt proving he
purchased the very Duract Cough Melts found in his pocket) where both NRS
171.1255 and NRS 171.136 were violated, therefore making such arrests and
searches incident thereto illegal arrests requiring application of the exclusionary
rule), prosecutorial misconduct ( Deputy Reno City Attorney Pamela Roberts,
Esq., put on testimony she knew to be lies given the very video provided to her by
Walmart and or RSIC Police clearly show Coughlin providing his driver's license
to Officer Crawford), witness misconduct (numerous instances of perjury by both
Walmart's Frontino and Officer Kameron Crawford), and a to per se indigent under
2008 Indigent Defense Order, abuse of contempt power, violation of Pengilly and
McCormack, failure to grant a continuance where excuplatory evidence was being
wrongfully withheld by and opposing counsel whom had burglarized Coughlin's
former home law office with both the WCSO and RPD (Russell v. Kalian, NRS
40.253(5), Mayes v. UVI), and denial of a continuance to Coughlin (despite one
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being agreed to in writing by RCA Roberts) is particularly suspect given the

failure, then, to accord Coughlin's right to a speedy trial (which he did not waive)
where Coughlin, whom bailed out on 9/10/11 was not afforded a trial within 45
days as an out of custody defenant, and where the RSIC refused to release to
Coughlin even the Arrest Report and Probable Cause Sheet until after the 10/10/11
arraignment, wherein RMC Judge W. Gardner refused to reveal to Coughlin, then a
licensed practicing attorney, the names of the four possible court appointed defense
counsel sufficient for Coughlin to perform a conflict check prior to agreeing to
such confidential information being released to whichever allegedly randomly
assigned court appointed counsel would get such (and it may be law of the case that
Coughlin's right to such counsel was recognized at such time, making Judge
Howard's subsequent October 27th, 2011 denial of Aigersinger and the Sixth
Amendment even more suspect).
Also from such 6/18/12 Motion in 60838 at pages 29-30: "With respect to
matters which may bring into doubt the validity of the conviction in the trial court
judgment in RMC 11 CR 26800: In the appeal to the District Court in CR11-2064,
Judge Elliot utilized a civil statute in excusing the RMC from its failure to forward
to the District Court a copy of the transcript of the audio recording of the trial and
to forward such to the District Court within ten days of the filing of the notice of
Appeal. Further, Coughlin made numerous attempts to order such a transcript and
was thwarted in his attempts to do so by the RMC's express dictate that only the
RMC's transcriptionist of choice, Pam Dongoni, would be permitted to perfrom the
transcribing duties, and Ms. Dongoni hung up the phone on Coughlin and refused
to provide information related to where and in what method of payment Coughlin
could pay for the transcript and assure its production. Further, the RMC refused to
timely provide Coughlin a copy of the audio recording of the trial until well after
the deadline for filing tolling motions or a notice of Appeal had passed, and
further, the RMC failed to notate in the certified docket (which is not available to
litigants during these matters, and attempts by Coughlin to so obtain such a docket
has resulted in the City of Reno Marshals threatening Coughlin and forcing him to
leave the courthouse and writing disengenous letters to Bar Counsel."
Also served on Bar Counsel and amongst those materials that the SBN
wrongfully failed to transmit with the ROA, andt he Panel wrongfully failed to
consider (especially given the SBN's fraudulent assertions that it was copying all
five Panel members with the entirety of every one of the documents Coughlin
submitted for filing, including the discs attached thereto as exhibits) was the
entirety of the ROA transmitted by the RMC to the 2JDC from 11 CR 22176 and
the entirety of that in the record in the appeal thereof in CR11-2064 (in addition to
all of Coughlin's correspondence with the RCA and RMC regarding such matter,
and the materials that the RMC fraudulently failed to include within the ROA),
amongst such materials:
Coughlin's 11/2/11 Motion for Reconsideration of RMC Judge Howard's
10/27/11 Order Denying Motion for Appointment of Counsel, at page 1 thereof:
Trevino v. State 555 SW 2d 750 Formerly 110k641 2(4), 11Ok641.2 Tex.Crim
App.,1977 Criminal defendants In misdemeanor cases are entitled to counsel if
there exists a possibility that imprisonment may be imposed Judge Gardner refused
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to tell the undersigned the last names of the four attorneys who might be appointed
counsel. Accused has a right to know that, Its important to check qualifications and
experience. Further, Judge Gardner touted their abilities by mentioning some, or
all, of them were former prosecutors. The NFL doesn't hire to many offensive
coordinators, to coach defense. I feel the same about criminal defense. The arrest
did not occur in the presence of the police officer. There was no consent to
search. Officer made statements conditioning whether arrest would be made
upon whether consent to search was given, there are other impermissible acts...
Additionally, while page 1 contains a certification by RMC Filing Officer
Supervisor (whom regularly refuses to file documents even in criminal matters
based on unwritten legibility rules she applies), there is no indication such
certified copy contained the 01682 bates stamp apparently later applied by
King. Such FHE11 should be excluded from the admissible evidence based on
such prejudicial inclusion by King of such bates stamping, especially where King
subsequently argued that Coughlin should be prevented from having the entirety of
such 11/7/12 production by the SBN of a 3,200 page SCR 105(2)(c) consolation
prize:
11/14/12 HEARING (Page 302:6 to 302:12) MR. COUGHLIN: Sorry, your
Honor. There was just one other thing I was hoping to offer into evidence. It will
only take a second to ask to do it. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is that? MR.
COUGHLIN: I would like to -- but the file. And then the subpoena that I tried to
get the sheriff here and --- Vol. I, (Page 304:18 to 304:23) MR. COUGHLIN: I
would ask that I would be allowed to be a little bit more specific. Mr. King got me
a big box of stuff. I'm only seeking to put in -- and it was broken up into about
four different things, each one kind of had a cardboard thing and a rubber band
holding it together." HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 304:25 to 305:1) And it's Bates
stamped." HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 305:6 to 306:17) This is not just the
pleadings. There's some stuff in here I never even saw before, like an affidavit by
Laura Peters that speaks to things like the service of the complaint. It's filed. I'm
wondering why didn't I get a copy of it if it has a file stamp on it? That's kind of
strange. So I do think -- I would ask that I be able to admit this into evidence.
MR. KING: I don't know what that is. And I object to it at this stage, proffering a
bunch of papers that haven't been discussed, haven't been admitted, no
foundation laid. Just to say they are going to go up to the supreme court, it doesn't
make sense. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I tend to agree. These are all -- the pleadings
themselves, as we now understand it, are going to go -- would be part of the record
the supreme court reviews. What you're offering appears to be a stack of
documents three inches thick that I have no idea what's in there. MR.
COUGHLIN: May I -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: We don't have time. I would really
like to afford you an opportunity to address the issue that I asked. So I'm going to
sustain the objection. I'm not going to permit those exhibits to be entered into at
this stage. You had all day in which to do that, and identify specific pieces and
proffer specific pieces. Instead you chose to spend a great deal of time attempting
to get in videotapes and transcripts. So I'm going to overrule that objection to the
extent these are factual documents. To the extent there are pleadings in there that
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are part of the official record, they are going to go up. It's now a quarter to 5:00.
You've heard the questions that the panel is interested in having addressed in the
final arguments. Mr. King. MR. KING: Thank you very much.
Whether or not 2JDC Judges L. Gardner, Flanagan, or Elliott took any NCJC
Canon 2, Rule 2.15 appropriate action by contacting the SBN (appropriate
authority) about Coughlin is completely relevant to Coughlin's defensive
collateral estoppel claims, in addition to thoroughly undermining King's offensive
collateral estoppel claims, and, arguably, revealing King's fraudulent Bomer
worthy approach here.
Also, the extent to which King flat out admits he manipulates the record is an
embarrassment to this Court and the Bar: HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 304:1 to
304:7) MR. KING: In other words, everything Mr. Coughlin sent, oftentimes with
these multiple captions where he's sending them to many people, he might caption
as a pleading, it doesn't make it a pleading. It has to be something that was sent
to us, filed in, and that would be a pleading. And if there was such a thing as file
stamped with the supreme court, it will go up. Sounds very similar to King
allegedly he does not control the Clerk of Court during the 9/25/12 interaction
with Coughlin detailed in Coughlin's Motion for Order to Show Cause (served on
the SBN and submitted for filing with the SBN Clerk of Court on 10/1/12 in
60838, and submitted at that time in NG12-0204 as well, though apparently never
filed stamped by the SBN, yet ruled on in the Panel Chair's 10/31/12 Order, which
indicates such was filed in on 10/16/12, which absolutely entitles Coughlin, even
more than Clerk Peters 9/11/12 assertions respecting the permissibility of Coughlin
filing (and therefore serving on Bar Counsel) by facsimile).
5.
On June 7, 2012 the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada upon petition of
Bar Counse pursuant to SCR 111, ordered Coughlin temporarily suspended from the
practice of law in Nevada. The Order futher directed that the matter be referrred to the
Appropriate disciplinary board, as mandated by SCR 111 (8), with directions for the board
to institute a formal hearing "before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be
determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed." In the Matter of Discipline
of ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, Esq., Bar No. 9473, No. 60838, June 7, 2012.
6.
On November 15, 2011 Coughlin was arrested and charged with three
violations of the Reno Municipal Code. The charges of Failure to Provide Evidence of
Security or Insurance (a violation of RMC 6.06.555(a)) and Failure to Provide Vehicle
Registration (a violation of RMC 6.06.560(a)) were dismissed at arraignment. On
February 27, 2012 a trial was held in Reno Municipal Court before the Honorable Judge
Dorothy Nash Holmes on the remaining charge of a Right of Way Stop Sign violation at
an intersection (a violation of RMC 6.06.170(a)). Coughlin again appeared in propria
persona. The trial commenced at 3 p.m. and was concluded by the Court at 4:30 p.m.,
without a verdict, after the court held Coughlin in criminal contempt of court for his
behavior and activities committed during the course of the trial and in the presence of the
Court. See Hearing Exhibit 4. ORDER FINDING THE DEFENDANT IN contempt OF
COURT AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS.
7.
Judge Nash Holmes ordered Coughlin into custody on February 27, 2012
and to be incarcerated at the Washoe County Regional Detention Facility for the term of
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five (5) days. Alternatively Coughlin could pay a fine of $500. The Court's sentence was
based on its detailed
findings regarding Coughlin's conduct in his own defense.
"The court finds that defendant's contemptuous conduct
consisted of his rude, sarcastic, inappropriate, insubordinate,
disrespectful, antagonistic, deceitful, disruptive, argumentative
and childish behavior during trial, all of which appeared to be
done to vex and annoy the court, the witness, and the opposing
party, and to disrupt the trial process. The court finds that the
following occurred, and constitute contempt: 1) defendant's
mimelike, clownish antics of making faces at the court; sagging
down into his seat and hanging his head; looking behind himself
and inside his coat as if searching for a better way to ask a
question; rolling his eyes; and mimicking others words; 2)
defendant's incessant arguing with the court, talking over the
court, and interrupting the court; 3) defendant's repeatedly
restating matters after being told by the court to "move on" or "ask
the next question;" 4) defendant's repeatedly injecting allegations
of bribery, perjury, and police retaliation into the matter after the
court instructed him not to, and directed him to limit himself to
issues pertaining to the facts of the "Boulevard Stop;" 5)
defendant's repeatedly trying to insert" Richard Hill" into his
questions and statements when such person was not relevant to the
proceeding and the defendant had been ordered to stop discussing
that; 6) defendant's disregarding the rules of evidence and court
procedure by continually posing improper questions after being
directed by the court to properly phrase his questions 7)
defendant's continually accusing the court of denying him the right
or ability to ask questions and telling the court to "give me a list of
questions you want me to ask;" 8) defendant's suggesting that the
court "tell me what would make you happy;" 9) defendant's lying
to the court in response to direct questions posed by the court with
regard to his recording the proceedings; and 10) defendant's
failing and refusing to properly examine the witness, despite
numerous admonitions by the court to stop repeating questions,
misstating answers, injecting irrelevant material, arguing with the
witness and mischaracterizing the testimony."
See Hearing Exhibit ORDER FINDING THE DEFENDANT IN contempt OF COURT
AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS.
8.
The trial of the matter was continued to March 12, 2012. Coughlin failed
to appear and failed to contact the court to explain or excuse his absence. However, after
serving the five-day contempt of Court sanction and after being released from custody,
Coughlin fax-filed a 224-page document entitled "notice of Appeal of Summary contempt
Order; Motion to Return Personal Property Confiscated by Reno Municipal Courts and Its
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Marshalls; Motion for New Trial and to Alter or Amend Summary contempt Order." See
Hearing Exhibit 5, ORDER, P 2, lines 1-6.
(NOTE: Contempt of court in the form of filing a false pleading did not constitute
a contempt committed in the "immediate presence and view of the court" as such term was
used in a statute authorizing summary punishment for such a contempt. Ex parte Collins,
329 Mich. 192, 45 N.W.2d 31 (1950).
As to failing to appear, one there does not appear to be anything in the record
(not that the RMC would let Coughlin view it) to suggest Coughlin was noticed in writing
with respect to the date and time of such 3/12/12 continuation of the traffic citation trial
suspended on 2/27/12 by Judge Nash Holmes summarily incarcerating then practicing
attorney Coughlin. Further, the enormity of the disturbance to Coughlin's life and law
practice occasion by such summary incarceration dictated taking a bit more seriously
the avoidance of prejudice to client's matters than the federal case a municipal court
judge and her crooked, thuggish marshal were trying to make of a simple traffic citation
trial.
During that period of time, such client's fires needing addressing were numerous.
For instance, there was pressing concerns in the Keller case (NVB 10-05104), the Gessin
adversary proceedings (NVB 11-05077 and 11-05078), Eastman (2JDC CV11-00820), the
UIFSA and custody case for Harris (FV05- and FV11-), custody case for Bell (FV1104628), foreclosure defense for the Carpteniers (CV08- ), the matter of an Coughlin's own
Reply Brief coming due while in the summary eviction from his former law office
involving as opposing counsel the very same Richard G. Hill, Esq., whom attempted to
have Coughlin served (despite Caplow and his being an e-filer) the 2/8/12 Order to Show
Cause in the appeal of that summary eviction (such Order to Show Cause hearing was
resolved in Coughlin's favor in Judge Flanagan's 3/27/12 Order, which King was
provided), by the same WCSO Deputy Machen whom burglarized Coughlins' former
home law office on 11/1/11 with Hill's associate Baker (and Machen again burglarized one
of Coughlin's rentals on 6/28/12 while purportedly attempting to conduct a lockout
without the passing of 24 hours from the tenant's receipt of any such summary removal
order in Rev2012-001048...at which point Deputy Machen also arrested Coughlin in
RCR2012-67980, a case which the RJC and WCDA let drag on for nearly a year in a
transparent attempt to leverage such (which they always intended to dismiss given the
enormity of the problems associated with the 6/14/12 5 Day Notice allegedly posted (but
not mailed, much less with a USPS Certificate of Mailing) listing, pursuant to NRS
40.253(3)(b)(3) Sparks Justice Court as the court which Coughlin must file his Tenant's
Answer/Affidavit...where Coughlin timely submitted such Tenant's Answer for filing with
the Sparks Justice Court and a request to proceed in forma pauperis to which the Sparks
Justice Court clerks committed misconduct in failing to file in or otherwise apprise
Coughlin of any deficiencies incident thereto, and then to set such matter for hearing, but
rather, the SJC simply forwarded Coughlin's 6/26/12 Tenant's Answer (which was a
Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction) to the Reno Justice Court in a fax at 11:05 am
on 6/28/12 (which the RJC has subsequently removed from the file in the matter which is
opened, Rev2012-001048 upon Nevada Court Services submitting a landlord's affidavit
(which was deficient anyways, and which indicated it had rented Coughlin a dwelling
unit or apartment only to then indicate Coughlin had somehow breached the rental
agreement that such affidavit referenced as attached thereto, but which was not, and is still
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not attached thereto in the RJC file in that matter (also excised from the RJC file in that
matter is the 6/26/12 email to the RJC and its then Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil, Liz
Stuchell of the WCSO Civil Division (Machen's supervisor), a member of the Reno PD,
and the RJC's general email address...which is odd considering, clearly, such email was, at
one point, part of such file, on the left hand side thereof, under the docket.
For instance, with Gessin, for whom Coughlin filed an Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment on 3/19/12 (just 4 days after being burglarized by the WCSO and
Gayle Kern, Esq., on 3/15/12 incident to the too early summary lockout) there is now a
decision detailing such time period from the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of
the Ninth Circuit: NV-11-05078.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/bap/2013/03/05/Gessin%20%20Memo%20121330.pdf On February 21, 2012, Taitano filed her MSJ based on the state court
judgment, the arbitrators findings of fraud and the doctrine of issue preclusion. On
March 19, 2012, attorney Zach Coughlin, filed a late opposition11 on debtors behalf.
The opposition, of which we have taken judicial notice, covered a number of grounds.
First, it addressed the role of Coughlin, who apparently was listed as the attorney of
record in the adversary, but who was actually ghost writing debtors pleadings. (NOTE:
this is rather interesting, given Richard G. Hill, Esq., purportedly emailed the SBN an
unsigned grievance against Coughlin making such baseless and negligent ghost
writing accusations, which Coughlin so thoroughly eviscerated to the SBN that such was
not even an accusation in the SBN's 8/23/12 Complaint (and, really, the purported email,
unsigned grievance by Hill, whom astoundingly is on the NNDB Panel (which says just
about all one ever need know about such Panel) was apparently so completely
defenestrated by Coughlin that the SBN was too embarrassed by it to even seek to admit it
into evidence, despite the failure to do so kind of undermining the attempt to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that Coughlin somehow violated RPC 8.1, so much so,
that the SBN and Panel were reduced to making some lame arguments that Coughlin's
receiving a letter from King, which King purports to have sent on February 14th, 2012
(and which King's complaint falsely asserts King or the SBN ever emailed to Coughlin),
but which Coughlin, due to issues stemming from Gayle Kern, Esq.'s chicanery, that of her
associat
Coughlin sought to withdraw. Next, the opposition contained points and
authorities under which numerous cases addressing breach of fiduciary duty under
523(a)(4) were cited with little analysis or discussion. Third, debtor requested the
bankruptcy court vacate the state court judgment based on his counsels failure to
zealously advocate debtors position during the arbitration hearing, contending this was
excusable neglect under Civil Rule 60(b) (incorporated by Rule 9024). Fourth, debtor
asserted that the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction because he ruled on real property
matters. Fifth and last, debtor requested the judgment be vacated because of newly
discovered evidence.12 (footnotes: 11 The actual title of the document was Motion for
Extension of Time to File Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment for
Dischargeability; or, Plead in the Alternative, Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. We take judicial notice of debtors
opposition to Taitanos summary judgment and his supplement with attached exhibits
which were docketed and imaged by the Bankruptcy Court in this case. Atwood v. Chase
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Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 12
This evidence consisted of numerous affidavits of individuals who worked with Christina
Ho, debtors ex-girlfriend and the mother of his son. Hos co-workers declared that Ho
had entered into a conspiracy with Taitano and Rissone to defraud debtor and ruin him
financially. It does not appear that these affidavits were filed in the arbitration proceeding
nor is there any indication that debtor moved to vacate the judgment in the state court with
this newly discovered evidence.) On May 4, 2012, the bankruptcy court heard the MSJ,
but the transcript reflects that no substantive arguments were made with respect to the
motion. The bankruptcy court stated on the record that it would grant the MSJ based on
the preclusive effect of the state court judgment. The court requested Taitanos counsel to
file certified copies of the state court judgment and record and took the matter under
submission. On June 8, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered an order granting Taitanos
MSJ on the grounds that the state court arbitrators award established every element under
523(a)(2) and thus the doctrine of issue preclusion prevented debtor from relitigating
those elements in the bankruptcy court. Debtor timely appealed....III. ISSUE Whether the
bankruptcy court erred in deciding that the state court judgment was nondischargeable
under 523(a)(2) based on the doctrine of issue preclusion.
9.
Judge Nash Holmes observed that the pleading filed by Coughlin failed to
address most of the topics listed in the caption. Rather, she observed, the document
contained rambling references to Coughlin's personal life, his father's football career in
college; dozens of pages of string citations taken from the internet and other unrelated
references. Judge Nash Holmes found the pleading to be disjointed and incoherent and a
"pathetic demonstration of what might once have been legal and academic prowess that
appears to now be greatly damaged." See Hearing Exhibit 5, ORDER, P2, lines 9-15; P2,
lines 16-20.
10.
Judge Nash Holmes also found that Coughlin, after being released from
custody following the February 27, 2012 contempt of Court incarceration, filed other
nonsensical pleadings including a 218 page document:
"...purported to be yet another motion in this case entitled "Motion to
Return Cell Phones; Motion to Set Aside Summary contempt Order;
and notice of Appeal of Summary contempt Order." With scant
discussion of, or relevance to, the above captioned matter, said
document mostly argues against Judge Howard in a Department 4 case
and again contains more than 200 pages of string legal citations; lyrics
to rocks (sic) songs; Mr. Coughlin's personal family history; discussion
of an eviction case and another contempt case; disjointed legal
citations and other nonsensical matters that have no apparent relevance
to his traffic citation case.
11. After observing that Coughlin's conduct had been inappropriate, bizarre,
dishonest, irrational and disruptive, Judge Nash Holmes concluded, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Coughlin had committed numerous acts of attorney misconduct,
including, but not limited to, violating Rules of Professional conduct 8.4(c), 8.4(d), 3.3(a),
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3.1, 3.2, 3.4(c), 1.3 and 1.1. See Hearing Exhibit 5, ORDER, P,3, lines 25-26; P4, lines 523.
12. Judge Nash Holmes also concluded that Coughlin violated Nevada Supreme
Court Rule 229, section 2(b), as amended by ADKT 449 on August 1, 2011 by
surreptitiously recording the traffic court proceedings without advance permission and
lying to the court when questioned regarding the matter by denying that he had done so.
See Hearing Exhibits, ORDER, P,4, lines 24-28.
13. Judge Nash Holmes ordered, among other orders, that the traffic court matter
be continued and all proceedings relating to the traffic court matter be tolled pending
referral of the matter to the State Bar of Nevada. See Hearing Exhibit 5, ORDER, P,4,
lines 7- 18,
14. On March 14, 2012, Judge Nash Holmes referred the matter of Coughlin to
State Bar Counsel David Clark and suggested the matter had some urgency. See Hearing
Exhibit 8, Letter dated March 14, 2012 from Reno Municipal Court Judge Dorothy Nash
Holmes to Office of State Bar Counsel, Nevada State Bar.
15. Judge Holmes testified at the hearing of this disciplinary matter that one of the
purposes of her March 14, 2012 Order was to provide the panel to hear this matter with
clear and convincing evidence, based on her experience and background as an attorney,
prosecutor and judge that Coughlin had violated numerous provisions of the Nevada Rules
of Professional conduct. See
Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 137, L 22 -P 138, L 9.
16.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Bruce Beesley was called to testify at the hearing
of this matter. During the time frame 2011 to 2012, Coughlin appeared before Judge
Beesley two or three times as an attorney representing clients in a bankruptcy matter. On
one occasion Coughlin appeared wearing a T-shirt and a tie and no jacket. See Transcript
of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 10, L 10-16. Coughlin had filed a
pleading in the bankruptcy matter, on behalf of his client. Judge Beesley testified that the
pleading was "lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just sort of rambled through a great deal
of irrelevant stuff." See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P
10, L 24 -P 11, L 1. On other occasions, although Coughlin appeared polite and intelligent,
his pleadings and arguments didn't make any sense. See Transcript of Proceedings of
Wednesday, November 14,2012, P 11, L2-7
17.
Judge Beesley became concerned, wrote a letter to the State Bar explaining
his experience with Coughlin and indicated that he did not believe Coughlin, in his current
state, was able to adequately represent his clients. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012,P 13, L 24 -P 14, L 7.
18.
In Judge Beesley's opinion, Coughlin is not competent to practice law. See
Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14,2012,PIS, L 11 -15.
19.
State Bar Counsel called attorney Richard Hill to testify at the hearing of
this matter: Mr. Hill has been a member in good standing with the State Bar of Nevada for
33 years. See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 36, L 22 P
37 L 4. Mr. Hill was retained by Dr. Merliss to assist Dr. Merliss in a landlord tenant
dispute with his tenant Coughlin. See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 37, L14 -20. Mr. Hill represented Dr. Merliss in Reno Justice Court
and Washoe County District Court and two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court in the
matters involving Dr. Merliss and Coughlin. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
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November 14, 2012, P 39, L 13 -24. Mr. Hill has also reviewed filings in of a case in
which Coughlin is involved with Washoe Legal Services. See Transcript of Proceedings
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 25 P 40, L 3.
20.
In the eviction proceeding between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin, Mr. Hill's
firm obtained an eviction order allowing Coughlin one week to vacate the premises.
Ultimately, Coughlin failed to comply with the eviction order and was convicted of
criminal trespass. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 41, L 18
-P 44, L 12.
(HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 41:17 to 44:12) BY MR. KING: Q Did you
end up getting an eviction order removing Mr. Coughlin from Dr. Merliss's
home? A (Richard G. Hill, Esq.) We did. Q Subsequent to the eviction order,
was Mr. Coughlin removed from the home? A I'm sorry. There was an order
issued in court that gave Mr. Coughlin a week to vacate. I believe it was
November 1 that my wife, my associate -- and my associate, went to the home
with the sheriff and conducted a lockout. The front door locks were changed.
The back door locks were changed. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Objection what? MR. COUGHLIN: Hearsay.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Hearsay? Overruled. THE WITNESS: And the whole
thing was videotaped. The next day I went to the home to videotape the place to
preserve what was there to prevent any arguments later, because by that point
in time we knew what we were dealing with. I get there, and the front door is
locked, but almost all the windows are closed but unlocked, and the back door is
unlocked. And I, of course, go through, lock everything, make sure the place is
secure, videotaped it. And I went back and read my wife and my associate the
riot act, and they both said no, the doors were locked. Okay. I go back the next
day, same thing. Back door's unlocked, windows are unlocked. This continues
for the next two weeks. Mr. Coughlin is sending out e-mails to us but will not,
apparently, read the e-mails we're sending to him saying we have to get your
stuff out of here. No response. Two weeks after the eviction on a Sunday Dr.
Merliss comes to town and says, I want to see the house. I meet him about
10:30, 11:00 o'clock on a Sunday morning at the house. We go in. Back door is
open. There's food wrappers on the counter that've been there that weren't
there the last time I was in. Windows are open again, and it's a very
exacerbating situation. And he says, I want to check the basement. I didn't
know there was a basement in the house. There's things piled in the
stairwell to get down into the basement, tool kits, and heavy stuff. We get it
out of the way. We get down there. And I can see when he pushes on the
door, and he turns to me, and he says, "It's barricaded," from the inside. It
wasn't locked, it was barricaded. We know what's going on. So we call the
police. The police come over. They try to get Zach out of the basement,
whoever was in there at that point. The police bang on the door, "Come on
out, Zach. Police. You have to go." No response. They turned to us and say,
we're going to leave. (NOTE: does that not sort of vitiate any subsequent
finding of probable cause to arrest where the police clearly do not feel
justified in pursuing such alleged illegal activity?) Wait a minute. I'm the
owner. You have the authority to break the door down. "We don't do
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that." So Dr. Merliss goes down to the bottom of the stairs. Dr. Merliss
kicks the door open, and the police officer sticks his head around the corner
and pulls his gun out, and here's Mr. Coughlin down there. Mr. Coughlin
voluntarily came upstairs with his dog and was placed under arrest. After he
left, we went downstairs. Mr. Coughlin had a dwelling set up. He had water.
He had food. He had a hot plate, a microwave, had his computer set up
down there. He had the dog. There was dog food, dog poop. He had a bed
and his computer system set up down there. He was arrested and was
subsequently convicted of criminal trespass)
21.
On behalf of his client Dr. Merliss, Mr. Hill sought and obtained an order
in favor of Dr. Merliss and against Coughlin awarding Dr. Merliss attorney's fees in the
amount of $42,065.50. Washoe District Court Judge Patrick Flanagan entered the order
on June 25, 2012. (NOTE: this use of the term sanction is noticeably absent from this
finding and the following excerpt from the transcript cited to, further, despite such
excerpt being only two lines long, it does manage to reveal that Judge Flanagan's Order
granted Merliss's motion for attorney's fees...which, when one considers that Merliss's
4/19/12 filing was titled ) See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14,
2012, P 47, L 3-7.
(HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 47:3 to 47:7) Q In this order did Judge
Flanagan accept that by granting the full amount of fees requested? If you read
the last sentence of Page 3. A (Richard G. Hill, Esq.) Yes. "Accordingly,
Merliss's motion for attorney's fees is granted in the sum of $42,065.50.)
(NOTE: Well, so what? Since when do NRS 69.050 prevailing
party attorney fee awards warrant a summary disbarment proceeding?
Have some respect for yourself, SBN, NNDB. As far as this finding is
concerned, and the excerpt of the transcript it cites to, such award of
attorney's fees may well have been nothing more than an award of the
prevailing party attorney's fees of appeal from a justice court civil
action pursuant to NRS 69.050, where a judgment is involved, that
Hill's associate, Casey D. Baker, Esq., cited to as providing a basis for
such a fee award (never mind that NRS 40.400 makes NRAP controlling,
meaning only NRAP 38 would provide such a basis for any fee award,
and Breliant limits the adjucatory boundaries, right (though he failed to
cite to any such authority for such proposition, that was the gist of Baker's
argument that Coughlin's failing to specifically cite to NRS 40.385 in any
filing (Baker's 1/3/12 Opposition to Coughlin's 12/30/11 NRS 40.385
citing Motion to Stay incorrectly asserts that Coughlin first cited to NRS
40.385 in Coughlin's 12/5/11 filing in the justice court when, actually,
Coughlin's 11/23/11 filings expressly cites to NRS 40.386 and Coughlin's
10/15/11 written correspondence with Baker excerpts the following from
the Landlord Tenant Handbook distributed by the AOC: The
drawbacks to summary eviction are: 1. You cannot get a money judgment
as part of your action; 3. The tenant may be able to file an appeal, and
remain in the unit until the appeal is heard by posting a bond with the
court that may be cheaper than that required in the formal eviction
process.....
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Further, it is worth noting that Hill's own associate, Baker's 4/19/12

Motion for Attorney's Fees lies where it reads: 2. Coughlin filed his
first notice of appeal in the eviction case on November 3, 2011, two

days after he was properly and lawfully locked out ofthe property.
ROA, Vol. III, pp. 229-233 given the fact that Baker, Hill, and the
landlord Merliss actually burglarized Coughlin's former home law
office, so, uh, its rather a stretch to taunt NRAP 38 by asserting that
Coughlin was properly and lawfully locked out of the property. )
See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 3, L 10-11. (Accordingly, Merliss's Motion for
Attorney's Fees is GRANTED in the sum of $42,065.50.)
(NOTE: Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12 Order in 03628 (FHE2) reads: ORDER
CV11-03628 7 Currently before this Court is Respondent MATT MERLISS' s
("Merliss") Motion for Attorney's Fees filed on April 19, 2012. In the absence of
any opposition from Appellant ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN ("Coughlin"),
Merliss submitted this matter for decision on May 9, 2012. However, on June 9,
2012, Coughlin filed a Supplement to Opposition to Motion for Attorney's Fees. In
response, Merliss filed a Reply to Supplement to Opposition to Motion for
Attorney's Fees on June 14, 2012, and submitted the matter-again-that same day.
Merliss requests this Court to award attorney's fees in the amount of $42,065.50
against Coughlin in the underlying summary eviction matter pursuant to NRS
69.050 and NRS 7.085 Merliss and his counsel aver these fees are reasonable,
particularly given Coughlin' "deliberate[] ... pattern of abusive, vexatious, and most
importantly, expensive behavior in both this appeal and in the case below [in Reno
Justice Court]." (Mot. at p. 2) (Original emphasis. Merliss avers Coughlin's
litigation strategy "was simply to keep the fight going" and "require substantial
additional work by Merliss' counsel, far beyond anything in a 'normal' eviction.'
(Mot. at p. 3.) Merliss asserts this additional work was necessary because he "could
not risk the court accepting some random citation in Coughlin's papers and entering
an adverse ruling because [he] had not opposed it." (Mot. at p. 5.) Further, Merliss's
counsel, Richard G. Hill, alleges these fees "do not include substantial amount of
editing and other activities performed by [Mr. Hill] in this case." (Mot. a p. 6; Mot.
Ex. 4.) Merliss contends "[i]t is hard to imagine a more appropriate case than this in
which to award the maximum amount justified by the substantial evidence before
the court.' (Mot. at p. 6.) Merliss goes even further and states:
As proven above and below, the frivolity and vexatiousness of
Coughlin's maintenance and extension of this matter has been so
beyond reason, and so outrageous, and the nexus of his behavior to
the fees incurred by Merliss so direct and indisputable, that nothing
less than a full award of those fees should even be considered by the
court. To not impose the full measure of the harm Coughlin has
caused would reward and encourage his vexatiousness in this and
other cases. There needs to be a day of reckoning for Coughlin's
antics.
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(Mot. at p. 8.)
Nevada law provides for "a reasonable attorney fee to be fixed and allowed
by the district court for all services rendered in behalf of the prevailing party" on
appeal from justice court. NEV. REV. STAT. 69.050. In addition, NRS 7.085
requires the district court to order an attorney personally to pay reasonable
attorney's fees incurred as a result of the filing, maintaining or defending of civil
action where "such action or defense is not well-grounded in fact or is not
warranted by existing law ...." NEV. REV. STAT. 7.085(1)(a). The same applies
to attorney who has "[u ]nreasonably and vexatiously extended a civil action. "
NEV. REV. STAT. 7.085(1)(b).
If grounds exist to award attorney's fees, Nevada courts follow the lodestar
analysis. Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corp., 121 Nev. 837, 864, 124 P.3d
530, 549 (2005) ("The lodestar approach involves multiplying the number of hours
reasonably spent on the case by reasonable hourly rate.") (Quotations and citations
omitted.) In determining the reasonablenes of the fee award, the district court
should consider the following four factors: (1) the advocates' qualities; (2) the
character of the work; (3) the work performed; and (4) the result obtained. See,
Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969)
(citation omitted); Barney v. Mt. Rose Heating & Air Conditioning, 124 Nev. 821,
829, 192 P.3d 730, 73 (2008) (per curiam) (applying the Brunzell factors).
After reviewing Merliss's moving papers-including the detailed and
thorough summary of fees and his counsels' accompanying Declarations-and after
considering all of the parties' arguments, this Court concludes Merliss's attorney's
fees request is authorized by Nevada law. This Court also has considered the
factors set forth in Brunzell, supra. After analyzing those factors, and given the
unique features of this case, this Court concludes Merliss's fee request is
reasonable.
Accordingly, Merliss's Motion for Attorney's Fees is GRANTED in the sum of
$42,065.50. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this 25th day of June, 2012. /s/ Patrick
Flanagan District Judge)
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The motion seeking attorney's fees was based on Coughlin's conduct in the
defense of the eviction matter, which conduct was characterized as frivolous and
vexatious and presumably so found by Judge Flanagan. See Hearing Exhibit P 2, L 8-13;
P 3, L 4-11.
22.
Based on Mr. Hill's experience and background, his review of the
pleadings in the litigation between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin and his review of the
pleadings in Coughlin's litigation with Washoe Legal Services, Mr. Hill is of the opinion
that Coughlin is not competent to practice law. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 39, L 1 -12.
23.
Based on Mr. Hill's experience in litigating with Coughlin, Coughlin was
not truthful with either counsel or the court. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 53, L 6 -16. Mr. Hill felt that Coughlin's filings were abusive, at
one point calling Mr. Hill's associate a lichen. Coughlin has accused Mr. Hill of bribing
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the Reno Police Department to have Coughlin arrested. Mr. Hill's staff is terrorized by
Coughlin. See Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 54, L 4 -15.
24.
State Bar Counsel called attorney Paul Elcano to testify at the hearing of
this matter. Mr. Elcano is the executive director of Washoe Legal Services that provides
legal services to indigents. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P
88, L 25 -P 89, L 14. Coughlin was employed by Washoe Legal Services from August 29,
2007 to May 11, 2009. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 93,
L 17 -20. Mr. EJcano became aware of an order entered by Judge Gardner on April 10,
2009 in the matter of Joshi v Joshi and, as a result, reviewed the taped transcript of the
hearing. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14,2012, P 94, L 22 -P 95, L 6.
25.
Judge Gardner's order in the Joshi matter indicated that Coughlin had
conducted no discovery in the case and failed to present any documentary evidence at
the trial of the matter on behalf of his client Mrs. Joshi. See Hearing Exhibit P 12, L 4
-6. After commenting on various negative aspects of Coughlin's representation of his client
Mrs. Joshi, (See Hearing Exhibit P 12, L 9 -P 13, L 40) Judge Gardner specifically held:
"The most troubling aspect of this case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic
and disrespectful presentation at trial; Mr. Coughlin's inability to
understand a balance sheet; his failure to conduct discovery; and his lack
of knowledge with regard to the rules of evidence and trial procedure. All
of this was compounded with a continuously antagonistic presentation of
the case that resulted in a shift from a fairly simple divorce case to a
contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive amount of time. "
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See Hearing Exhibit P 13, L 5 -10

26. Judge Gardner sanctioned Coughlin personally and awarded attorney's fees to
Mr. Joshi in the amount of $934 to be paid personally by Coughlin within 30 days of the
order. See Hearing Exhibit P 13, L 14 -17
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Uh, no. Actually, Judge L. Gardner has never sanctioned Coughlin. There is not
sanctions order of any legally operative effect in existence that so holds. What is
sanctionable is King and Judge Nash Holmes presenting such (and perhaps Judge L.
Gardner and her brother RMC Judge W. Gardner for giving such to Judge Nash Holmes,
though, clearly, Judge W. Gardner expressed surprise to hear that such FHE3 that he
received from his sister and passed around to his fellow RMC Judges had been provided to
the SBN by Judge Nash Holmes (echoing the lack of permission to speak on his behalf
that RMC Judge Dilworth expressed disatisfaction with respect to during the trial incident
to the wrongful RPD arrest of 7/3/12 in RMC 12 CR 12420). Whether Judge W. Gardner
was negligent in providing such inoperative FHE3 to Judge Nash Holmes is a matter for
Mr. Sarnowski, and perhaps the courts, given judicial immunity is not quite such an
impenetrable defense when it comes to courts of limited jurisdiction...See, Glazier.
2JDC Judge L. Gardner's 2/25/09 Order reads: "ORDER RE PRETRIAL

PROCEDURE This matter is set for trial on March 12, 2009 at 1:30 p.m. Good
cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, if a party intends to offer more
than ten trial exhibits, the proposed exhibits must be bound, tabbed and indexed.
Plaintiff's exhibits will be marked in alphabetical sequence and Defendant's
exhibits will be marked in numerical sequence. Each party shall submit two
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copies of the proposed exhibits to the Court and one copy to the opposing
counsel. Counsel shall contact Martha Casique-Andrews at 775-325-6779 to
schedule a time with the Clerk to organize and mark exhibits. For trials set for one
full day or more, counsel shall meet with the Court Clerk no later than 3:00 p.m. on
the Friday prior to trial to mark the trial exhibits. For trials which are scheduled for
less than one full day, exhibits shall be marked immediately prior to the convening
for trial, and counsel shall arrive at least 15 minutes before the scheduled time of
trial. Prior to meeting with the Court Clerk, counsel shall meet and discuss the
admissibility of proposed exhibits. At the time of marking the exhibits with the
Clerk, the Clerk shall be told which Exhibits may be admitted without objection. At
the opening of trial, counsel shall inform the Court which exhibits are being
admitted without objection. Each party must file with the Court a trial statement,
financial declaration and UCCJA declaration. Courtesy copies of the trial statement
shall be hand-delivered to opposing counsel and Judge Gardner's chambers by no
later than 5:00 p.m. five (5) days prior to trial. Failure to timely deliver these
documents may result in sanctions against the offending party as set forth in NRCP
37. If the financial circumstances of a party have changed substantially since the
filing of the most recent financial declaration, that party is to file an updated
financial declaration at the same time as filing the trial statement. Dated this ..ay of
February, 2009. /s/ Linda M. Gardner"
2JDC Judge L. Gardner's 7/15/09 Order reads: " ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART; ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE
IN PART On April 13, 2009, the Court entered an Order After Trial specifying its
findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the divorce trial that took place
March 12 and March 17, 2009. On May 12, 2009, a Notice of Appeal was filed by
Zachary Coughlin, Esq., specifying he was appealing the Order After Trial entered
April 13, 2009. On May 13, 2009, a Motion to Strike was filed by John P.
Springgate, Esq., alleging the Notice of Appeal filed on May 12, 2009, was
untimely filed pursuant to NRAP 3A. Specifically, Mr. Springgate argued there
was no final judgment entered in this matter yet as the Order After Trial had not
been memorialized into a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and
Decree of Divorce1. (fn1 A Decree of Divorce was entered in this case on June 19,
2009.) On May 27, 2009, a Request for Submission was filed by Mr. Springgate.
On June 8, 2009, Mr. Coughlin opposed the motion and argued it was not clear
whether the Order After Trial was a final order, and "[i]t certainly is not worth
risking the deadline for filing an appeal. . . Opposition 2:13-2:14. On June 8, 2009,
a Request for Submission was filed by Mr. Coughlin.
Upon review of the pleadings and papers filed herein, the Court finds and
Orders as follows. Insofar as Mr. Coughlin is appealing the award of attorney's
fees, the Court finds the Order After Trial entered April 13, 2009, was a final order
from which Mr. Coughlin may appeal as the Court did not intend the award of
attorney's fees to be included in the Decree of Divorce. Accordingly, Mr.
Springgate's Motion to Strike is denied with respect to the appealability of the
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Order After Trial as it pertains to the award of attorney's fees. With regard to appeal
of the issues pertaining to the Joshi marriage/divorce, the Court finds the Order
After Trial was not a final order from which Mr. Coughlin may appeal as the Court
intended all issues pertaining to the Joshi marriage/divorce to be separate and
apart from the award of attorney's fees. (NOTE: then, certainly, it made little
sense to mix the two in one 4/13/09 Order After Trial, but regardless, the 6/19/09
final Decree of Divorce (especially when view with the knowledge that
Springgate's 5/21/09 Proposed Decree contained an attorney's fees award provision,
and where the 7/22/09 Accordingly, Mr. Springgate's Motion to Strike is granted
with respect to the appealability of the issues pertaining solely to the Joshi divorce.
GOOD CAUSE APPEARINGI IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 15, 2009 /s/
Linda M. Gardner District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an
employee of the Second Judicial District Court, and that on the j fry day of July,
2009, I deposited for mailing, first class postage pre-paid, at Reno, Nevada, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document addressed to: Document: Order
Denying Motion to Strike in Part; Order Granting Motion to Strike in Part Zachary
Coughlin, Esq. 945 W. 12th Street Reno, NV 89503 I hereby certify that on the 15
day of July, 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court
system which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following: John
Springgate, Esq. Marc Ashley, Esq. /s/ Stephenie Broome Administrative Assistant
- Dept. 14" (NOTE: there is an inconsistent approach taken by the 2JDC,
Springgate, and WLS in only serving certain selected filings or orders in DV0801168 on Coughlin upon his being terminated by WLS.
Springgate's letter to Coughlin supports the Consent Decree argument, to
whatever extent any fees were even still part of any operative Order or Decree
given Springgate's Proposed Decree of 5/21/09 contained a section expressly
providing for such fees, where the Final Decree 2JDC Judge L. Gardner entered on
6/19/09 (which nobody served on Coughlin, conveniently) contained all of
Springgate's Proposed Decree save the paragraph 6 therein providing for an award
of attorney's fees. Further, Judge L. Gardner's Order of 7/15/09 further supports
the position that there was no longer any attorney fees award, as a sanction or
otherwise (likely due to a recognition of the legitimacy of Coughlin's argument
with respect to Springgate having failed to comply with NRCP 11's 21 day safe
harbor provision (incorporated into NRS 7.085 by the express language of such
statute) in addition to the fact that the 4/13/09 Order After Trial relied upon a
position that alimony was not indicated, and, therefore, Coughlin had litigated
vexatiously, where the Final Decree ultimately entered did, in fact, award alimony
to Coughlin's former client. Further support for this position resides where WLS
and Springgate arguably entered into a Consent Decree even further vitiating any
finding that attorney's fees were awarded. Springgate's letter to Coguhlin of
12/8/09 reads:
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December 8, 2009 VIA EMAIL Zachary Coughlin, Esq. 731 Foreset Street
Reno, NY 89509
Dear Zach: I have received the Supreme Court's Order
Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus. Accordingly, you still owe me fees from
the Second Judicial District Court matter, and are in contempt for not paying them.
My offer to make a token donation to Casa de Vida or, alternatively, the Food
Bank of Northern Nevada, remains in effect. They need the help and I would be
happy to put this case behind me. Please advise as to your intentions. Very truly
yours, JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ."
The 7/22/09 filing in DV08-01168 reads: STIPULATION TO AMEND
DECREE OF DIVORCE COME NOW the parties hereto, ASHWIN JOSHI,
Plaintiff, by and through his counsel of record, JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ., and
BHARTI JOSHI, by and through her counsel of record, MARC ASHLEY, ESQ., of
Washoe Legal Services, and hereby stipulate and agree to an Order Amending the
Decree of Divorce in the following regards: In response to Ms. Joshi's motion, the
Court amended the proposed Findings of Fact to include a finding of ONE
DOLLAR ($1.00) per year alimony for Ms. Joshi. However, the Decree, as
amended by the Court, did not include a term. The parties had originally
agreed or suggested a term of five (5) years and they therefore stipulate and
agree that this Stipulation and Order thereon shall amend the Decree of
Divorce to include ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) alimony for five (5) years in favor of
Ms. Joshi. DATED: 7/20/09 /s/ John Springgate, Esq., /s/ Marc Ashley, Esq."
27. Based on the order and Coughlin's conduct in the Joshi matter, Coughlin was
terminated by Washoe Legal Services. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November
14, 2012, P 110, L7-8 28, In Mr. Elcano's opinion, Coughlin is not competent to practice
law. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 94, L 3 -8.
29. State Bar Counsel called Coughlin to testify at the hearing of the matter.
Coughlin was questioned with regard to a letter dated February 14, 2012 from Assistant
Bar Counsel King to Coughlin in which Bar Counsel forwarded to Coughlin
correspondence received from Richard G. Hill. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 163, L 13 -P 164, L 23. See Hearing Exhibit 6. Coughlin's
response, dated March 9, 2012, asked for additional time in which to respond. See Hearing
Exhibit 7. No evidence was presented that Coughlin substantively responded to Bar
Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012 prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
Coughlin failed to directly respond to Bar Counsel's questions inquiring if Coughlin ever
subsequently responded to Bar Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012. See Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 169, L 13 -P 172, L 16.
30.
Coughlin also failed to directly respond to questioning regarding
whether or not he had substantively responded, prior to the filing of the Complaint in
this matter, to a letter forwarded to him from Bar Counsel regarding the letter received
by the Nevada State Bar from Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes and dated March 14, 2012.
See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 174, L 13 -P 180, L 4. See
Hearing Exhibit 8. (NOTE: there is nothing in the record to support the finding that
Coughlin received such letter from Bar Counsel, in fact, Coughlin testified to Bar
Counsel's chicanery in that regard, and certainly King should not be allowed to testify to
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sending Coughlin some letter that King refused to even seek have admitted into evidence,
especially where King successfully moved, on an ex parte basis, to quash Coughlin's
subpoenas on King and SBN Clerk of Court Peters, not to mention RPC 3.7, etc..
Further, there is nothing in the record to indicate when Coughlin first saw such
3/14/12 grievance letter that RMC Judge Nash Holmes sent to the SBN, not Coughlin
(King's constant trumpeting of the bates stamps that he had affixed to the box of 3,200
pages delivered to Coughlin four judicial days before the hearing (in flagrant violation of
all of SCR 105(2)(c) references the bates stamps found on the Hearing Exhibit 8...and
where King admits such letter did not have any such bates stamping on it to begin with, its
inappropriate for King to have successfully had admitted such version with King's 11/7/12
production of 3,200 pages worth of bates stamped SCR 105(2)(c) materials (none of which
include any Canon 2, Rule 2.15 letters from the Judges whose orders King offered as
evidence of Coughlin's professional misconduct, such as Hearing Exhibit 2's Judge
Flanagan Order of 6/25/12 in the appeal of the summary eviction from Coughlin's former
home law office that Richard G. Hill, Esq., burglarized while managing to get Coughlin
wrongfully convicted of criminal trespass (see 61901) by Hill's lying to, and with, the
Reno Police Department). Some clear and convincing evidence of when Coughlin
received or viewed such letter would be pretty important to support the Panel's finding
that Coughlin failed to directly respond to questioning regarding whether or not he
had substantively responded, prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter, to a
letter forwarded to him from Bar Counsel directly respond to questioning regarding
whether or not he had substantively responded, prior to the filing of the Complaint in
this matter, to a letter forwarded to him from Bar Counsel where when and prior to
the filing of the Complaint take on similar importance to the fact that there is no evidence
that Bar Counsel even forwarded Coughlin such letter to begin with (boy was the Panel
Chair mad that Coughlin could not honestly testify on behalf of the State Bar as to when,
if ever, he received such letter from the SBN...it would have helped so very, very much
alleviate all the messy issues that would be associated with putting the 3/16/12 letter from
King to Coughlin (notice the SBN did not present any copy of any such letter with some
Certificate of Mailing slip to prove Coughlin ever received it, and Coughlin testified
extensively, and offered a great deal of proof as to the fact that he was not regularly
receiving his mail when such letter was sent, including offering copies of numerous
envelopes (several sent to Coughlin's by the RMC even) that Coughlin only received much
later, after senders notified him of such being returned to them, or after the USPS finally
releasing such to Coughlin, replete with, in many instances, several of the small yellow
stickers indicating a variety of reroutings and recipient temporarily unavailable
messages incident to the domestic violence and mailbox tampering/lease
disputes/wrongful summary eviction by Gayle Kern, Esq. (whom also had Coughlin's
former home law officer burglarized with the help of the WCSO, just an hour before the
very 3/15/12 hearing in NVB 10-05104 that Judge Beesley testified about)
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 174:13 to 180:4) "BY MR. KING: Q Do you
recognize that letter that's been identified as Exhibit 8 that purports to be
written to Mr. David Clark, Office of Bar Counsel, from Judge Dorothy
Nash Holmes? A It is the one that has a received March 14th date on it?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: It's the one that's marked Exhibit 8. BY MR. KING: Q
The one I just handed you. Did you see that letter? A I don't see it marked
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Exhibit 8. It's not marked. Q It's marked up here, Mr. Coughlin. A That's
why I was asking for clarification. March 14th. Q The question is: Do you
recognize that letter? A Yes, sir. Q And -- A This is the letter where she
alleges a competency issue, and then goes on to say, but I'm still trying to
hold a trial, I'm trying to get this trial set right away, in violation of NRS
178.405 which states you stay proceedings when you feel a defendant has
a competency issue. You don't plunge right ahead. That letter, yeah, I
recognize it. MR. KING: I'm going to ask that Exhibit No. 8 be admitted.
This is the letter that Judge Holmes sent to the Office of Bar Counsel that she
testified about during her testimony. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Any objection,
Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: I don't think so. Well, relevancy. And I
don't believe this is pled in the complaint. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.
(Exhibit 8 admitted.) BY MR. KING: Q Mr. Coughlin, you received that
because Bar counsel forwarded it to you; is that correct? A I don't remember
how I received this. I imagine it would -- I don't think a stranger sent it to me.
I don't know. Q Did you respond to the allegations to Bar counsel, the
allegations made in the letter by Judge Holmes, and the accompanying
documents; did you respond to that investigation? A Actually, I'm trying to
remember -- did I get this letter attached to like an SCR 117 petition? Can
you help me out? Did I get it soon after -- I think you were kind of coy about
this, actually, Pat. Right? You kind of -- you were kind of coy about having
it. You didn't just get this letter, and then I don't think you mailed it to me on
March 14th. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the question is did you
reply to it? THE WITNESS: I don't know -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry.
The question is: Was it forwarded to you? THE WITNESS: That's what I was
expounding upon. I'm trying to remember when did I first get this letter.
Because this is like a gut punch if you've devoted your life to becoming an
attorney. And, in fact, I didn't get her March 28th letter -- I mean her March
28th order that was entered. I didn't even get that until I saw it attached to an
SCR 117 disability petition in case number 60975. I guess I kind of figured
she just wasn't going to make an order, you know. And she mailed this one,
the one for February 28th, she mailed it to the old River Rock address where I
was evicted from, despite the fact it appeared, at least a couple other
departments in her court had a more recent address for me. And then I have -if I had been noticed on this -- I have a lot of these letters. I meticulously kept
the envelopes. I kept the change of addresses. I think I might have sent Pat
these with the yellow -- I had a lot of the yellow stickers on my letters, you
know, where they were like -- and the court, the court had these too. The muni
court. And I had a big ordeal with the post office incident to they didn't want
to give me a key to the mailbox. This eviction, the evil work that you
sanctioned, Pat, that I mentioned earlier, it has a fallout necessarily. In my
opinion -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, excuse me. Do you remember
the question? THE WITNESS: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What was the
question? THE WITNESS: Did I receive this. MR. ECHEVERRIA: And the
answer? THE WITNESS: I'm working my way through it mentally as to how
I got this. MR. KING: If I'm not mistaken, we're past that. You said you did
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receive it. He doesn't recall how. And my follow-up question was: Did you
respond to the allegations by Judge Holmes that are contained in that letter,
and by the accompanying documents? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, if
you could focus on answering that question, that would be helpful to the
panel. THE WITNESS: One, this letter is not to me. I would like to read it.
Again, that's where the notice part of due process is key, you know. If I was
noticed on the idea that I didn't respond to this -- and I'll enter my objection. I
would like to see where in the complaint it says Mr. Coughlin failed to
respond or cooperate with Bar counsel. It might. I'd just like to be sure. Where
does it say where -- was I noticed the import of today was going to include,
the relevant inquiry today that I have been put on notice for, was going to
include the idea that I didn't appropriately respond to this? So if I go to the
complaint, I'm just wondering where in the complaint might I be put on
notice that I would be expected to know when I got this today, and respond
intelligently in that regard. (Exhibit 9 marked.) MR. KING: Mr. Chairman,
may I move on? MR. ECHEVERRIA: You may. THE WITNESS: May I
answer as best as I can remember then? MR. ECHEVERRIA: If you will
answer the question, it would be helpful. But these rambling discourses are
not helpful. THE WITNESS: They're not winning any points on notice and
due process? MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is a preliminary investigation. Bar
rules require attorneys to cooperate with the preliminary investigation. As I
understand, Mr. King is trying to establish whether or not you did so. That's
an issue that I believe is relevant to the determination of the degree of
punishment, if any, that should flow to you as a result of your conduct. So,
Mr. King, move on, please. MR. KING: Thank you. THE WITNESS: Your
Honor, can I just quickly attempt to more thoroughly address that issue? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I think you've been afforded adequate opportunity to do so.
How you choose to respond is up to you."
FHE 8, Judge Holmes' 3/14/12 grievance against Coughlin addressed to
the SBN only (to what, and upon whose request was Coughlin supposed
to "provide some information" per RPC 8.1 as to NG12-0434, much
less NG12-0435? Further, the portion of the transcript Echeverria cites
to in no way supports the finding Echeverria made, it fails to even
establish that the SBN ever asked Coughlin to responde, much less
"provide some required information" not subject to RPC 1.6, to the
SBN in response to Judge Holmes FHE 8 letter) and hand delivered to
the SBN along with a box of materials reads:
...This letter constitutes a formal complaint of attorney misconduct
and/or disability against Zachary Barker Coughlin. The accompanying
box of materials demonstrates some of the problems with the practice
of this attorney being experienced by myself and the other three
judges in Reno Municipal Court. My two most recent Orders in what
should be a simple traffic citation case are self-explanatory and are
included, together with copies of massive documents Mr. Coughlin
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has faxfiled to our court in this case. Audio recordings of two of my

hearings in this matter are also included. He failed to appear for the
second one this past Monday.
I have another traffic case pending trial with him that was re-assigned
to me based on our Department 1 judge being out for surgery. We
have multiple addresses for Mr. Coughlin and can't seem to locate him
between cases very easily. We are setting that case for trial and
attempting to serve him at the most recent address we have (1422 E.
9th St. #2 Reno NV 89512), although I heard today he may be
living in his vehicle somewhere. We do have an address for his
mother, however, as she recently posted part of a fine for him.
Judge Ken Howard, Department 4, had a case on Mr. Coughlin late
last year that is now on appeal to the Second Judicial District Court.
Judge Bill Gardner, Department 2, also has a matter currently
pending in his court with Mr. Coughlin as the defendant. I have
enclosed some copies of documents from those matters, in
chronological order, simply because they appear to demonstrate that
he is quickly decompensating in his mental status. Our staff also
made you some audio tapes of Coughlin in the matters in Departments
2 and 4 so you can hear for yourself how this attorney acts in court.
You can see his behavior in my traffic citation case does not appear to
be an isolated incident.
It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter
pending on this attorney. My Judicial Assistant was contacted by
the Washoe Public Defender in February when I had Mr.
Coughlin jailed for contempt of Court and they stated that they
represent him in a Gross misdemeanor matter in RJC. I have no
other information on that.
You will have the full cooperation of myself, the other judges, and
the staff of Reno Municipal Court in your pursuit of this matter. Mr.
Coughlin has positioned himself as a vexatious litigant in our court,
antagonizing the staff and even our pro temp judges on the most
simple traffic and misdemeanor matters. I do think this is a case of
some urgency, and I apologize for taking two days to get this
package to you; our IT person was ill and could not make the copies
of the audios of Mr. Coughlin's hearings until today, and I felt it was
important that the audios be included in the materials to be considered
by the State Bar. On February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he
was actively practicing law and had appointments with clients. I
do not know if that was true, but if so, he could be causing serious
harm to the practice of law in Northern Nevada and could be
jeopardizing someone's freedom or property interests."
(NOTE: no matter how hard he may try, Coughlin could likely never
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be jeopardizing someone's freedom or property interests as regularly

and thoroughly as does Judge Nash Holmes, especially where she
damaged such very interests of Coughlin's clients upon denying a
stay of any sort to a then practicing attorney (something that is pretty
much verboten in American jurisprudence) (immune from arrest while
going to, attending, or leaving court, and Coughlin maintained such at
the time, and therefore did not waive any such right, meaning, even
had Judge Nash Holmes and her crew of Marshals managed to
conduct a lawful search incident to arrest of Coughlins' smart phone,
micro sd card, cell phone, and electric shaver, rather than the unlawful
confiscation of such a day later after those items had already been
booked into Coughlin's property (such items were returned to
Coughlin with all the data thereon erased, and WCSO Deputy Hodge
admitted to Coughlin on March 19th, 2012 that the Washoe County
Jail had released to the RMC Marshals such items already booked
into Coughlin's personal property on 2/28/12, and that such were
still in the possession of the RMC on 3/19/12)
In a ridiculous attempt to assert some impropriety on Coughlin's part,
like that done by Judge Nash Holmes in her 3/13/12 Order Striking
Fugitive Document that King was too embarrassed by to admit in its
entirety into the record, but which is mistakenly included the
Certificate of Mailing thereto along with the partial purported filing
by Coughlin admitted as FHE9 (R1784-1786) where R1786 is the
RMC's Certificate of Service that King mistakenly forgot to excise
from FHE9, (which does indicate that such Order was faxed to the
jail, but certainly does not indicate anything about the jail providing
such to Coughlin, and Coughlin has never been provided any Order
from any court by any jail, ever) though King did manage to
fraudulently excise page 1 of 3 of the 3/7/12 filing by Coughlin (the
page that would have come right before the Affidavit found at
R1784), a page which clearly indicates Coughlin is an attorney (to
whatever ridiculous extent the RMC and King are alleging they were
not already aware that Coughlin was an attorney, including where
Coughlin's plea for a stay of the 5 day incarceration order on 2/27/12
included (as King's own stupid pleadings have recounted, duh) the
prejudice to Coughlin's client upon Judge Nash Holmes going against
the overwhelming majority viewpoint in american jurisprudence
essentially requring a Judge refrain from summarily incarcerating an
attorney for contempt (R1782-83, especailly R1783, which makes all
the more fraudulent what King presented on the very next page of the
ROA, where he clearly violated PRC 3.3, 3.4, and 3.8 in removing the
first page of the 3/7/12 filing by Coughlin in 26800, along with the
3/13/12 Order Striking Fugitive Document by Judge Holmes' (the
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Order to which the Certificate of Service found on page 1786 goes to)
that attached said filing of 3/7/12 by Coughlin (which further conceals
the extent to which the RMC attempted to prevent Coughlin from
accessing the recording of that 2/27/12 trial in 26800, as Coughlin
also filed a Records Request on the form the RMC hold out for such
purposes, directed towards obtaining the audio transcript of all
hearings in that matter, including that of 2/27/12, which the RMC
refused to respond to...which is why Coughlin had to stealthily have
his momma go obtain to the audio transcript from the RMC, in
addition to the versions which King and the SBN finally provided
Coughlin in late June 2012, which King, curiously, alleges to be not
certified and apparently lacking in foundation and probably not all
that truthful, apparently (if that's so, then why isn't someone
investigating the RMC for providing altered audio transcripts to
the SBN?).
31.
On March 7, 2012 Coughlin caused to be filed an "Affidavit of Poverty in
Support of Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis." See Hearing Exhibit 9. In his Affidavit,
Coughlin represented that he was self-employed as a "Jack of all Trades." See Hearing
Exhibit 9. The Affidavit does not identify Mr. Coughlin as a lawyer or identity any
income from the practice of law. See Hearing Exhibit 9.
(NOTE: why not see FHE8 too, especially the sentence in Holmes letter addressed
only to the SBN which reads: " On February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he was
actively practicing law and had appointments with clients").
32. The record also indicates that Coughlin had also filed a motion on November
14, 2011 to proceed In Forma Pauperis in case number 11 CR 22176 pending in the Reno
Municipal Court before Judge Kenneth R. Howard. See Hearing Exhibit 10, P 2, L 19-23.
(Mr. Coughlin is a licensed attorney-at-law who implied during trial that his
incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his clients. Yet, Mr. Coughlin, in
his "affidavit of poverty" does not indicate any income from his practice of law. Of
note, Mr. Coughlin posted cash bail during the litigation of the instant matter.)
(Also, the "Ruling" of the municipal court was affirmed on appeal in CR11-
2064, with the Order pointing out a failure to cite to pages in the record supporting
the arguments in the Brief. Permission to file by email was granted to Coughlin
therein by RMC Filing Officer Supervisor Ballard (see attached exampled of
Supervisor Ballard file stamping a subpoena that was submitted via email only.
Such permission to file be email was withdraw at the earliest, on 12/19/11
(constructive notice to Coughlin thereof). However, the Record on Appeal in
CR11-2064 fails to contain the clear, one page per page emailed filings, rather, in
some instances, completely illegible 4 page per page versions were submitted
(despite express indications to the RMC filing office that the email version ought be
included in the ROA).
"Fwd: Attached Image? Donna Ballard (BallardD@reno.gov)Add to
contacts11/29/11 To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com From:
Donna Ballard
(BallardD@reno.gov) You moved this message to its current location. Sent: Tue
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11/29/11 4:47 PM To:

zachcoughlin@hotmail.com Outlook Active View 1
attachment (44.0 KB) 0661_001.pdf Download Download as zip Thank you. I am
taking it up to the Department now. Donna -----Original Message----- From:
"MUNI CT 1st Floor Clerks" <canon@reno.gov> To: "DONNA"
<ballardd@reno.gov> Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 17:42:28 -0800 Subject: Attached
Image Donna Ballard Senior Court Specialist Reno Municipal Court 1 South Sierra
Street Reno, Nevada 89501 (775)334-3101
IFP/ FINANCIAL INQUIRY APPLICATION From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Sent: Wed 12/14/11 12:22 AM To: ballardd@reno.gov;
renomunirecords@reno.gov 2 attachments Coughlin IFP and Financial Inquiry
Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 26405 2I.pdf (381.9 KB), Coughlin IFP and
Financial Inquiry Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 22176 2I.pdf (372.0 KB) Zach
Coughlin, Esq. 817 N. Virginia St. #2 Reno, NV 89501 tel: 775 229-6737 fax: 949 667
7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473")
(NOTE: Coughlin request judicial notice be taken of the error in the date
assigned to such In Forma Pauperis motion, incorrectly identified as filed on 11/14/11,
when, clearly, from the copy thereof attached as Exhibit 6 to NNDB Chairman Susich's
5/31/12 SCR 117 Petition in 60975, such was actually filed after the trial in such matter of
11/30/11, wherein Coughlin pleaded for a stay, citing concern for his client's affairs, to no
avail. Susich, like King, takes the fraudulent callow approach in his Exhibit 6 to excising
page 1 of 3 from Coughlin's 3 page 12/14/12 Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and
Affidavit of Poverty In Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Paupers (see, page 2
marking at the bottom of the page on the first page of such Exhibit 6. Such
clownsmanship by Susich and King must not stand, its an embarrassment to the Bar
and the Nevada Supreme Court, and the State of Nevada as a whole) Judge Howard's
Order denying Coughlin's motion specifically noted that Coughlin's "affidavit of poverty"
did not identify any income from the practice of law yet Coughlin had implied to the
court when sentenced to incarceration for contempt that his incarceration would adversely
affect his clients.
(NOTE: how terribly difficult it is for a RMC former prosecutor turned judge to
imagine that any attorney not a prosecutor or former prosecutor turned RMC defender
could possibly yield any benefit to any client, or to admit, in any way, the importance of
attorneys to the judicial system) See Hearing Exhibit 10, P 2, L 19 -23. (NOTE: too bad
King's Complaint did not identify some alleged failure to identify any income from the
practice of law basis for arguing some professional misconduct, but, rather, fraudulently
asserted 17. Respondent filed Affidavits of Poverty in Support of his Motion to Proceed
Informa Pauperis, wherein he fails to disclose that he is a licensed attorney and instead
under Employment and Self-Employment he identifies himself as a "Jack of All Trades".
18. Despite a claim of poverty in the above mentioned affidavits, Respondent told the
Court that his incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his clients.
The RMC initially approved, in writing, Coughlin's submitting filings via
email (subsequently, without any prior notice, the RMC fraudulently failed to included
such filings submitted via email in the ROA for the very petty larceny conviction resulting
in Coughlins' current temporary suspension, which is an abominably embarrassing
miscarriage of justice, in CR11-2064), and Coughlin's submission on 12/14/12 clearly
defeats the vague at best accusations made with respect to any Motions to Proceed In
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Forma Pauperis or Affidavits connected thereto (whether pled in King's Complaint or only
added later by the Panel in a desperate attempt to shore up its insipied 12/14/12 FOFCOL):
33. Although Coughlin claims to suffer the impairment of attention deficit
disorder, for which he is prescribed medication and which medication he took on the day
of his hearing, he does not feel he needs any additional help. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 199, L 13 -P 204, L 9.
34. On August 23, 2012, the State Bar of Nevada filed its Complaint in this matter
and served it upon Respondent Coughlin by Certified Mail to his address then registered
with the State Bar of Nevada. See Docket. Complaint.
35. Not having received a response to the Complaint, on October 9, 2012 the State
Bar of Nevada filed and served on Respondent Coughlin, by certified mail, a "notice of
Intent to Proceed on a Default Basis." The notice attached an additional copy of the
Complaint and indicated that unless a responsive pleading to the Complaint was received
by the State Bar by October 24, 2012, the matter would proceed on a default basis. See
Docket, notice of Intent to Proceed on a Default Basis.
36. On October 31, 2012 Panel Chair Echeverria issued the Panel's Order denying
Coughlin's "Motion to Dismiss" filed October 16, 2012; Denying Coughlin's "Motion for
Order to Show Cause Regarding Improper Attempt by Bar Counsel and, Possibly, NNDB
to Delay and Obstruct Hearing Required by Courts (sic) June 7, 2012 Order in Case No.
60838 and Coughlin's SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in Case 61426 filed October 2, 2012;
Granting (NOTE: if you say so) Coughlin's Motion to Review and Inspect Bar Records
filed October 16, 2012 and Denying Coughlin's Motion to Bifurcate Hearing and
Motion to Dismiss for (sic) Complaint (sic) Failure to Sufficiently State the Charges
with Specificity and Support and for Utter Failure of Bar Counsel to Perform
Reasonable Investigation." See Order Dated October 31, 2012. In that Order, Chairman
Echeverria further ordered that the Formal Hearing would proceed on a default basis
unless Coughlin filed a Verified Answer to the Complaint by November 9, 2012. See
Order Dated October 31, 2012, P 2, L 7-10.
(NOTE: SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters "Certificate Of Service"
for King's file stamped 10/24/12 Opposition to Coughlin's Motion to
Bifurcate, Motion to Dismiss reads: "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The
undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Bifurcate Hearing, Motion to
Dismiss was deposited in the United States Mai l at Reno, Nevada,
postage fully pre-paid thereon fo r certified and fi rst class mail addressed
to the fo llowing: Zachary B. Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno NV 89505
DATED this 24th day of October, 2012. /s/ Laura Peters, An Employee
Of The State Bar Of Nevada" However, The USPS Track & Confrim
Indicates That, Even Where Peters Certificate Of Mailing Lacks The
Mikohn "to Go Out That Day" Language, Peters Certificate Of Mailing Is
Untrue Where Such Did Not Even Go Out The Next Day 10/25/11, But
Was Only Picked Up By The Usps On 10/26/12, Prejudicing Coughlin's
Ability To File A Reply Thereto, Especially Where Panel Chair
Echeverria, Curiously (even Though The Panel Had Only Been
Designated The Previous Date, 10/30/12 By Nndb Chair Susich) Entered
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An Order On 10/31/11 Denying Coughlin's Motions To Bifurcate,

Dismiss, And For An Order To Show Cause. The Usps Track & Confrim
For Such 10/24/12 File Stamped Sbn King Opposition To Coughlin's
Motion To Birfurcate, Motion To Dismiss Reveals: "your Label Number
Service Status Of Your Item Date & Time Location Features
70102780000354295526 Notice Lef T October 27, 2012, 4:03 Pm Reno,
Nv 89512 Certified Mail Arrival At Unit October 27, 2012, 6:39 Am
Reno, Nv 89506 Processed Through Usps Sort Facility October 27, 2012,
4:50 Am Reno, Nv 89510 Depart Usps Sort Facility October 27, 2012
Reno, Nv 89510 Processed Through Usps Sort Facility October 26, 2012,
10:15 Pm Reno, Nv 89510" And, really, such is not all that surprising
considering King's own signature on that Opposition indicates such was
"Respectfully submitted on this 25 day of October, 2012 STATE BAR OF
NEVADA DAVID A. CLARK, BAR COUNSEL By: /s/ Patrick O. King,
Assistant Bar Counsel".)
Further, beyond the fact that both King and SBN Clerk of Court
Laura Peters denied Coughlin's verbal and written requests to so inspect
the materials to which Coughlin had a right to do so under SCR 105(2)(c)
on several occasions between the 8/23/12 filing of the Complaint and up
to within three days of the hearing, if King's 10/25/12 signed (but file
stamped 10/24/12, and USPS Track & Confirm proven to have been
deposited for mailing on 10/26/12) Oppoistion to Motion to Bifurcate and
Motion to Dismiss was being truthful where King purported to have no
objection to Coughlin so inspecting the file (...the State Bar of Nevada
responds as follows: Zachary Coughlin may inspect the evidence

that the State Bar has pertaining to his discipline matters up to
three (3) days prior to the hearing, pursuant to SCR 105(2)(c).
Coughlin has been sent, via both certified and first class mail, a
Notice of Hearing which was accompanied by a Designation of
Witnesses and Summary of Evidence prepared by bar counsel
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule. To the extent that Coughlin wants
to review the disciplinary files pertaining to his case, Bar Counsel
has no objection.), then why would the Panel Chair's Order of
10/31/12 order something other than such (indicating, obviously, more
ex parte communications between Echeverria and the SBN, not hard to
believe considering their offices are within as stone's throw of each
other. Echeverria should, perhaps, just stick to defending drunken multimillionaire rapist quarterbacks and get out of the judging game).
Echeverria's 10/31/12 Order remixed SCR 105(2)(c) (and, also,
makes some very telling, and interesting findings regarding what
Coughlin filed and when Coughlin filed such filings when considering
the manner in which Coughlin submitting such submission for filing, and
the extent to which the SBN failed to place a file stamp on Coughlin's
Motion for Order to Show Cause, in addition to failing to file stamp in, or
even recognize, the 9/17/12 Motion to Dismiss (with a 9 page letter to
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NNDB Chair Susich and the SBN's King that Echeverria would later
reference in the hearing in his mistaken assertion that Coughlin did not
want to bifurcate the SCR 105 formal hearing from the hearing
required by the Nevada Supreme Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838 and SCR
111(8) that the SBN excised completely from the 2/13/13 ROA in 62337)
as to Coughlin's right to inspect, up to within three days of the hearing
the permitted materials, and, in going against what King himself indicated
(in an obvious bit of trickeration and misdirection given the ex parte
communications between Echeverria and the SBN, resulting in such
10/31/12 Order ruling otherwise), where such 10/31/12 Order reads: The
Formal Hearing in these matters is scheduled to take place on Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, beginning at 9:00 at the Northern Nevada Bar
Center, 9456 Double R. Blvd., Suite B, Reno, Nevada 89521. Several
motions have been filed and are pending. The Formal Hearing Panel
Chair has had an opportunity to review and consider the following
motions and responsive pleadings (NOTE: King only filed one
Opposition, and, regardless, pleadings entail only an Answer and a
Complaint or similar (such as a Demurrer, a Motion to Dismiss, a Motion
for More Definite Statement, etc), not Oppositions, so Echeverria's
subsequent conclusion of law that the allegation in King's Complaint
could be take as admitted as a matter of default in view of his
finding that Coughlin failed to file a responsive pleading is seriously
undone): Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:.. 1. Motion to Dismiss
prepared September 16, 2012, and filed October 16, 2012, is DENIED.
2. Motion for Order to Show Cause Regarding Improper Attempt by
Bar Counsel and, Possibly, NNDB to Delay and Obstruct Hearing
Required by Courts June 7th, 2012 Order in Case No. 60838 and
Coughlin's SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in Case 61426 prepared October 2,
2012, and filed October 16, 2012, is DENIED. 3. Motion to Review and
Inspect Bar Records; Motion to Bifurcate Hearing; Motion to Dismiss
for Complaint [sic] Failure to Sufficiently State the Charges with
Specificity and Support and for Utter Failure of Bar Counsel to Perform
Reasonable Investigation prepared October 15, 2012, and filed October
16, 2012, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Office
of Bar Counsel will arrange for copies of the file to be delivered to Mr.
Coughlin at the address that he has provided to the State Bar at the
earliest opportunity."
(NOTE: the earliest opporunity turned out to take another seven
days, meaning such were only delivered to Coughlin four judicial days
before the formal disciplinary hearing.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 6:20 to 7:6) MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. King? MR. KING: As the record reflects, Mr. Coughlin was
served a copy of the complaint to the address that he is mandated to
provide to the State Bar. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't believe that's correct.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please don't interrupt, Mr. Coughlin. Go ahead.
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MR. KING: Subsequently, Mr. Coughlin filed, immediately after we

mailed the complaint via certified and regular mail, Mr. Coughlin filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 302:13 to 304:15) MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I believe that all the pleadings that have been filed
would be part of the panel's record that would go to the supreme court.
MR. KING: Anything that's been marked as an exhibit and identified and
accepted into evidence by the panel will be part of the record. And the
entire transcript of the proceedings. No other documents at this time,
anything that hasn't been proffered as evidence will be not admitted. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Do the pleadings go up or just that which is offered into
evidence and accepted? MR. KING: To the extent that the complaint will
certainly go up, everything that's in this packet will go up. Anything that
you had marked and accepted as evidence will be sent up on the record,
along with the entire transcript. But to have other documents just
compiled, it won't help the record, it will make it more confusing. The
supreme court has better things to do. MR. VELLIS: Pleadings filed, they
don't go automatically, the whole case file doesn't go, just whatever is
entered here? MR. KING: Correct. My pleadings, for instance, as you can
see by the Bates stamp numbers are thousands of pages of nonsensical emails and disparaging e-mails. I didn't think that that would add to this
day or help the supreme court. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I think the
confusion, at least I have, is whether or not the pleadings themselves,
whatever file, whatever Mr. Coughlin has filed, a motion for whatever
reason, are those part of the record that go up on appeal? In civil
litigation, with which I'm only familiar, that does become part of the
record if so designated. MR. KING: If the orders go up, pleadings that are
not admitted do not go up. MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, if I can just
interject -- MR. KING: In other words, everything Mr. Coughlin sent,
oftentimes with these multiple captions where he's sending them to many
people, he might caption as a pleading, it doesn't make it a pleading. It has
to be something that was sent to us, filed in, and that would be a pleading.
And if there was such a thing as file stamped with the supreme court, it
will go up. MR. VELLIS: That is my question. It doesn't have to be
necessarily be brought up here, but if it was submitted and file stamped as
being submitted, then it's part of the record that goes up, whether it was
mentioned here or not? MR. KING: Correct. That would be my
understanding. Only if it was properly filed, timely filed, stamped in by
the court.
Its no wonder the went with an Alphabetical List of Documents
in the ROA it filed on 2/13/12 (after the ROA it filed on 12/24/12 was
stricken on account of it being such a trife bit of codswallop) where such
Alphabetical List of Documents (as opposed to, say, a Docket, arranged
in chronological order) does indicate that several of Coughlin's
submissions were just plain not file stamped by the SBN (though
purportedly included, at least in part (of course the discs attached as
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exhibits thereto and the massive bates stamped pdfs found thereon and
transcripts of hearing the SBN felt were of no ulility, and, therefore, not
included amongst that transmitted, though Coughlin filed a Motion in
62337 for such to be so transmitted....BUT, TO BE CLEAR, AND THIS
IS IMPORTANT: there are several of Coughlin's filings that just plain
were not included at all in any way in the ROA, including the very
10/31/12 )
62337 INDEX LIST OF DOCUMENTS BY PAGE NUMBER
1-28 Complaint and First Designation of Hearing Panel Members 8/23/12
29-32 Notice of Intent to Proceed on a Default Bases 10/9/12
33-37 Notice of Formal Hearing; Desig, of Witn., Summ. of Evidence
10/12/12
38-39 Affidavit of Laura Peters, Custodian of Records 10/9/12
40-43 Motion to Dismiss 10/15/12 (missing 9 page fax to OBC/NNDB of
9/12/12 Exh)
43:1-10Missing Exhibit 1, 9 page fax to OBC/NNDB of 9/12/12
44-106 Mtn Order Show Cause, Amend. Mtn Dismiss (NF, subm.
9/17/12, 10/15/12)
107-152 Motion to Review, Inspect, Bifurcate, Supplem. Dismiss
10/16/12
153-156 Opp. to Respt.'s Mtn to Bifurcate Hearing, Motion to Dismiss
10/24/12
157-158 Order Appointing Formal Hearing Panel 10/30/12
159-162 Coughlin's Designation of Witnesses and Summary of Evidence
10/31/12
163-165 Order 10/31/12
165:1166-176 Mtn to Quash Subp. Directed to RMC Judges and Court Staff
11/2/12
177-195 Ex Parte Mtn to Quash Subp. Duces Tecums, Subpoenas to
Compel Test. 11/3/12
196-197 Supplemental Designation of Witnesses 11/7/12
198-200 Order 11/7/12
201-204 Notice of Non-Service of Intent to Take Default of Approx.
Oct.9, 2012 11/8/12
205-216 Supplem.Rspdt.Desig.Witn./Summ. Evid., Notice Obj.,
Reply.Opp.Bifur, 11/8/12
217-297 Well Would You Mtn Set Aside, Alter, Amend Order, Opp. Mtn
Quash 11/8/12
298-350 Emerg. Ex Parte Mtn to Dismiss, For More Definite Stmt, Good
Cause 11/13/12
351-352 Order 11/16/12
353-714 Motion for New Trial, Notice of Hill and Baker's Malfeasance
11/30/12
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715-718Amended Supple. to Respondent's Emergency Motion to Set

Aside 11/30/12
719-736Notice of RMC's Failure File Coughlin's Timely Notice of Appeal
(NF, 11/16/12)
737-790Post-Hearing Brief, Mtn Disqualify/Mistrial, Transcript Req,
Recons Order Quashing, Bifurc, , Rule 103(7) Challenge for Cause (NF,
submitted 11/16/12)
791-796 Declaration of Zachary Barker Coughlin (NF, subm. 12/7/12)
797-1347 Motion for Mistrial (Whopper Chocked 10/9/12 Affd. Peters)
(NF, subm. 12/3/12)
1348-1371 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 12/14/12
1372 Certificate of Service by Mail of Record On Appeal 2/13/13
1373-1698 Transcript of Hearing held 11/14/12, No Response on SCR
119 until 12/18/12
1699-1922 Formal Hearing Exhibits 1-16 11/14/12, No Response SCR
119 until 12/18/12
SBN King's 10/24/12 (well, it was file stamped that day, apparently,
at least) Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Bifurcate Hearing,
Motion to Dismiss reads: "Respondent, Zachary Coughlin
("Coughlin") filed a motion asking to review and inspect bar records;
Motion to Bifurcate Hearing and Motion to Dismiss. (NOTE: here,
King reveals the extent to which he later forces SBN Clerk of Court
Peters to remove from the record the file stamped copy of the Motion
for Order to Show Cause that she previously placed in the record on
copied the NNDB Panel Chair Echeverria on, as Echeverria admits to
in his 10/31/12 Order...its understandable why King would want such
filing by Coughlin, essentially stricken (in a real under the table sort
of way, naturally) as such filing by Coughlin completely destroys any
assertion by the SBN or the NNDB Panel that Coughlin was served
the Complaint, and also brings into view all the messy issues
associated with Clerk of Court/Investigator/Paralegal/SBN Custodian
of Records Laura Peters wearing so very many different hats in this
formal disciplinary hearing setting) Patrick King, Assistant Bar
Counsel, on behalf of the State Bar of Nevada responds as follows:
Zachary Coughlin may inspect the evidence that the State Bar has
pertaining to his discipline matters up to three (3) days prior to the
hearing, pursuant to SCR 105(2)(c). Coughlin has been sent, via both
certified and first class mail, a Notice of Hearing which was
accompanied by a Designation of Witnesses and Summary of
Evidence prepared by bar counsel pursuant to Supreme Court Rule.
To the extent that Coughlin wants to review the disciplinary files
pertaining to his case, Bar Counsel has no objection. Coughlin's
Motions to Bifurcate and to Dismiss must be denied as totally
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lacking in merit. Consistent with other pleading filed by Coughlin, the

instant motion is twenty-seven (27) pages long including over one
hundred (100) pages of attached documents. Together the motions
lacks merit and must be denied. The Complaint in this matter is
sufficiently clear and specific as to inform Coughlin of the charges
against him and the underlying conduct supporting the charges.
The Complaint includes two criminal convictions (NOTE: such sort
of undermines the NNDB Panel's findings and conclusion
premised upon the view that Coughlin sustained two criminal
contempt convictions, no?) and a Court Order finding that by clear
and convincing evidence Coughlin violated numerous rules of
professional conduct. See SCR 105(2). (NOTE: funny, no mention of
FHE2, Judge Flanagan's attorney's fee sanction (well,
presumably, right? No mention of 2JDC Judge L. Gardner's stale,
laches ridden Order being asserted as a basis for charging Coughlin
with violations of numerous rules of professional conduct)
Coughlin had twenty (20) days to file a verified answer to the
Complaint. Instead, Coughlin attempted to avoid service and now
argues that the Complaint be bifurcated and or dismissed. Coughlin
has been temporarily suspended by the Nevada Supreme Court as a
result of a SCR 111 petition filed after appeal of a misdemeanor
conviction. The Court referred the matter to a disciplinary panel of
the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. The pending formal
Complaint filed by the State Bar of Nevada was not based exclusively
on the SCR 111 petition, but primarily from grievances filed with the
Office of Bar Counsel.
Coughlin is misapplying the Court Order resulting from a SCR 111
petition. The Supreme Court said, regarding the criminal conviction,
that the only thing to be decided is the discipline or penalty that
should be imposed. The Court's position on this is consistent with the
fact that Coughlin was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and
therefore the State Bar need not prove that Coughlin committed the
crimes. Coughlin would like that interpretation to mean that that State
Bar may not bring multiple disciplinary charges against Coughlin in
the Complaint.
Clearly, Coughlin's interpretation is wrong. The
Supreme Court in the same Order found that Coughlin is suspended
pending a disciplinary hearing. (NOTE: the phrase formal
disciplinary hearing as found in SCR 105, is absent King's
restatement of the 6/8/12 Order in 60838). Coughlin's Motion to
Dismiss, while largely unintelligible, is based on Coughlin's
assertions that Bar Counsel failed to conduct an adequate
investigation. See Motion page 16 ll 10- 12 where Coughlin argues as
follows:
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So Coughlin has been and continued to tell King about the

ridiculousness of the conviction and dismissal of the appeal in the
criminal trespass matter, and King gets all spooked about his utter
failure to investigate, and tries to jam through an SCR 111 filing
while on the phone with Coughlin. Motion page 16 ll 10-12.
This matter has been investigated. The Supreme Court in response
to the first SCR 111 Petition suspended Coughlin pending disciplinary
hearing. Coughlin has not filed an Answer to the Complaint.
Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Bifurcate should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of October, 2012.
STATE BAR OF NEVADA DAVID A. CLARK, BAR COUNSEL
By: /s/ Patrick O. King Assistant Bar Counsel Nevada Bar No. 5035
9456 Double R. Blvd. , Ste. B Reno, NV 89521
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies
that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Opposition to
Respondent's Motion to Bifurcate Hearing, Motion to Dismiss was
deposited in the United States Mail at Reno, Nevada, postage fully
pre-paid thereon for certified and first class mail addressed to the
following: Zachary B. Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno NV 89505
DATED this 24th day of October, 2012. Laura Peters, an employee of
the ,State Bar of Nevada"
(NOTE: Just what does King mean by this matter? Such is especially
inscrutable where King indicates, above, that he need not investigate anything,
apparently, with respect to the two criminal convictions and Court Order which
found by clear and convincing evidence this or that completely beyond the
jurisdiction any municipal court judge of a limited jurisdiciton court has,
particularly where such Order is premised almost entirely on alleged conduct
outside the immediate presence of the court (Chief Marshal Justin Roper
admitted to Coughlin during a conversation with Coughlin that neither Marshal
Harley, nor any other RMC Marshal, entered the restroom during the one restroom
break in such 2/27/12 trial while Coughlin was using such restroom (bringing to
mind the question of just how Judge Nash Holmes could possibly testify as she did,
truthfully (HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 141:2 to 141:13) THE WITNESS: When the
marshals came back from the restroom, they told me that Mr. Coughlin had, in fact,
been recording the proceedings because he had disassembled a device and left parts
of it in the bathroom. Or left -- disassembled parts of it, and then they discovered
parts of it. In any case, when he was taken into custody and held in contempt of
court at the jail, he had physically two recording devices on him, a cell phone -either two cell phones or a cell phone and some other recording device. I assumed
that was pieces of which he was messing with in the bathroom.)
(NOTE: Where King writes grievances filed with is sort of stretching it,
King, no, where NG12-0435 (the 2JDC Judge L. Gardner grievance that King
was forced to admit, ultimately was filed by the SBN, (ie, defensive collateral
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estoppel bar to King's attempts to character such as conclusive evidence, or even

clear and convincing evidence of any violations of the rules of professional
conduct, particularly where King's Complaint limited the use of such order to only
that which is quoted therein, where the Panel's FOFCOL cited to protions thereof
not so quoted in King's Complaint, where King failed to even do the whole Mirchstyle incorporate by reference and attach a copy of such Order to the Complaint
(wanna bet there is a reason why King failed to do so beyond his just being
inordinately lazy? Like, such Order fails to find Coughlin in contempt, and is
premised upon the view that Coughlin's allegations (NRCP 11 by way of NRS
7.085 involves allegations, right, William L. Terry, Esq., not the arguments
addressed in RPC 3.3's meritorious claims rule) were not based in fact or law
where, ultimately, as admitted to in her 6/19/09 Final Decree of Divorce, 2JDC
Judge L. Gardner (only after her Order gave WLS's Elcano a pretext to fire
Coughlin) had to admit that some alimony, in fact, was appropriate (ie, hard to
argue Coughlin vexatiously extended a proceeding by failing to buy Springgate
and Judge L. Gardner's hard sell of Srpinggate's settlement proposal wherein
Coughlin's client was to waive any claim for alimony in exchange for some illusory
agreement that Springgate's client would be reponsible for the inflated medical
debt, and third party unsecured credit card debt for which Springgate's client was
the sole signatory (Coughlin provided the SBN all his filings in 53833 and 54844,
which well detail the whole domestic duty has priority over third party debt basis
in fact and law that should have prevented the ridiculous sanction by 2JDC
Judge Gardner (especially where Coughlin referenced his ALR article research
findings on point, where such is the majority viewpoint in American jurisprudence).
(See 60302, 60317) Coughlin actually just grew tired of the double standard
Elcano subjected Coughlin to daily at WLS (Sternlicht can behave in as
outrageously offensive and caustic manner as she please...Coughlin needs to follow
a dress code, whip up a Petition to challenge the Board of Equalization's ruling that
non-profit WLS must pay its for profit landlord's property taxes in the days
preceding the very trial from which 2JDC Judge L. Gardner's FHE3 Order stems,
etc., and the minute Coughlin voices any annoyance with not being given the raise
promised upon his being employed at WLS for one years time (where Coughlin had
been employed 18 months by that point), WLS, rather than address the reasons
behind WLS President Kathleen Breckenridge ordering and obtaining a copy of the
FV09-00886 TPO hearing wherein Coughlin, representing a, gasp, male victim of
domestic violence (see 60302, 60317 for details on Sternlicht declaring to an
assembly of dv victims (that included two men) at a clinic that men cannot be
victims of domestic violence for an idea of why WLS would prefere to jump on
the pretextual Judge L. Gardner's 4/13/09 Order After Trial entitles us to fire youtrain, instead of address WLS Breckenridge's obtaining a copy of the recording (as
noted in the docket in such case) of the 3/12/09 TPO hearing prior to the entry of
such FHE3 Order by 2JDC Judge Gardner (the docket notates that Breckenridge,
apparently in response to Complaints by the same CAAW run 2JDC TPO office,
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that Coughlin sued in 60317, obtained a copy of such TPO hearing wherein
Coughlin represented a male victim of domestic violence whom was beaten with an
alarm clock swung repeatedly from its cord, on 4/10/09, compared to the 4/13/09
entry date of Judge L. Gardner's FHE3 Order After Trial).
And, actually, hey, 3/12/09, that's the same day as the first day
of trial in the DV08-01168 divorce trial wherein John Springsnake,
er, John Springgate, Esq., himself violated procedural rules in
failing to have his more than ten exhibits indexed, bound, and
tabbed, and provide a copy of such to Coughlin, prior to the trial
(as required by Judge L. Gardner's 2/25/09 Pre-Trial Order), in
addition to failing to abide by NRCP 11's requirement that a filing
ready 21 day safe harbor motion be served on Couglin prior to
Springgate moving for NRS 7.085 sanctions (which Springgate did,
in his closing arguments, during the second day of the divorce trial
in DV08-01168, which occurred on 3/17/09, (ie, two judicial days
apart were the two trial dates in that divorce case, contrary to WLS
Elcano sworn testimony and his not in the heat of battle
commentary in his termination letter to Coughlin of 5/7/09
(HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 112:1 to 112:8) And one of the things
that was relevant there is that this hearing took place in two sections;
I want to say they were a week or ten days apart. And the conduct
and the criticisms of the conduct by the judge in the first hearing,
Mr. Coughlin came back and behaved exactly the same way in the
second hearing, he had not heeded anything the judge had told
him...),where such three year old Order was provided to him by
RMC Judge Nash Holmes upon her receiving it from RMC
Administrative Judge W. Gardner, whom admitted to Coughlin,
finally, during RMC Judge W. Gardner refused to recuse himself
from the criminal trespass trail stemming from Hill's burglary of
Coughlins' former home law office and Hill's concomitant false
statements to a police officer to effect a wrongful arrest (see 61901),
failed to disclose 2JDC Judge L. Garnder is his sister despite
prompting on during a 2/2/12 hearing in that criminal trespass case,
violated NRS 178.405 on during the 4/10/12 trial and hearing he
held, wherein, finally, after serious prompting, he disclosed his that
2JDC Judge L. Gardner is his sister, though he did indicate that it
was the first time I have hear of that upon being informed that
RMC Judge Nash Holmes had passed the very Order by his sister
that RMC Judge Gardner admitted to taking from his sister and
distributing to his fellow RMC Judges, on to the SBN), King was
forced to admit (and Clerk of Court/Investigator Peters shady and
sneaky commentary during a 10/15/12 conversation with Coughlin
is absolutely hysterical in this regard, as is King's during the 3/26/12
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in person meeting with Coughlin, the 7/10/12 in person meeting

with Coughlin, the 8/13/12 in person meeting with Coughlin and Bar
Counsel David Clark, and the conversation between King and
Coughlin in June 2012, and 10/12/12 and 10/15/12...if only there
was a verbatim transcript of such conversations...would that not be
interesting, right?)
37. Again on November 7, 20 12, Chairman Echeverria, in an Order Granting the
State Bar's Motion to Quash certain Subpoenas reminded Coughlin that unless a Verified
Answer to the Complaint was filed by 5:00 p.m. on November 9,20 12 the panel would
proceed on a default basis. See Pleadings Docket Order Dated November 7, 2012, P 2, L
8 -13.
38. Following a lengthy attempt to determine whether or not Coughlin believed he
had filed a timely verified answer or response to the State Bar's Complaint, Coughlin
attempted, at the hearing of the matter, to transform a pleading previously filed in the
Reno Municipal Court into a "New Verified Response (sic) Pre-Hearing Motion to
Dismiss/Summary Judgment, Memorandum of Law (See Hearing Exhibit 14) and to
transform an "Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss ... " previously dated November 12,
2012 and altered at the hearing to reflect a date of November 14, 2012 into a "Declaration
and Verified Response." See Hearing Exhibits 15 and 16. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14,2012, P 244, L 16 -P 270, L II.
39. During the course of the hearing of this matter Coughlin continued to
demonstrate a pattern of conduct similar to, if not identical to, conduct in other forums
for which he had repeatedly been sanctioned. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14,2012. Pleadings in this matter filed by Coughlin were exceedingly lengthy,
demonstrated a lack of focus and understanding of the issues involved, were rambling and
incoherent and contained discussion of irrelevant issues. See, e.g Hearing Exhibits 14, 15,
16. See also, Pleadings Docket Motion for Order to Show Cause ... " dated October
2,2012; "Motion to Review and Inspect Bar Records ... " Filed October 16, 2012; Pleading
entitled "Well Would You Look at That ... " dated November 7,2012; "Emergency Ex
Parte Motion To Dismiss or Quash ... " Filed November 13,2012.
40. Coughlin's conduct at the hearing included conduct not reflected in the
transcript of
the proceedings by way of facial gestures, body language, voice intonation and volume.
See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 181, L 19-P 182, L 1.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Panel hereby issues the following
Conclusions of Law:
(A) The Panel was designated by the northern Nevada Disciplinary Board Chair to
adjudicate the Complaint filed by the State Bar of Nevada against Zachary B. Coughlin,
Case Nos. NG12-0204, NG12-0435 and NG12-0434 and to determine the extent of the
discipline to be imposed pursuant to the Nevada Supreme Court Order of Temporary
Suspension and Referral to Disciplinary Board entered in Case No. 60838, In the Matter of
Discipline of Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq., Bar No. 9473, entered June 7, 2012.
(B) The Panel has jurisdiction over the Respondent and the subject matter of
these proceedings. See Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 99.
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(C) Venue in this matter is properly with the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board
and in
the County of Washoe, State of Nevada. Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 105.
(D) Coughlin received notice and a copy of the Complaint, notice of his right to
respond, as well as notice of the evidence and witnesses upon which the State Bar
intended to rely at a formal hearing. notice of the formal hearing was served on Coughlin.
Coughlin appeared in the matter, filed numerous motions, appeared at the hearing of the
matter, cross-examined witnesses and testified on behalf of the State Bar and on his own
behalf. Accordingly, the State Bar complied with the procedural requirements of SCR 105.
(E) Coughlin was afforded ample opportunity to prepare a verified answer or
response to the allegations of the Complaint and failed to timely do so. See Findings of
Fact 34, 35 and 36. Accordingly, the matter could proceed on a default basis and the
allegations of the Complaint deemed admitted. SCR 105(2) Notwithstanding the fact that
the matter could have been decided on a default basis, the Panel permitted the State Bar
and Coughlin to present evidence.
(F) Submitted to the panel for decision are the following issues:
(1) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 1.1 (Competence).
(2) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 1.2 (Diligence). (NOTE:
actually, RPC 1.2 is Scope of Representation and Allocation of
Authority Between Client and Lawyer, and RPC 1.3 is
Diligence.
(3) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and
Contentions)
(4) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.3 (Candor to the Tribunal).
(5) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing
Party and Counsel)
(6) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum
of the Tribunal)
(7) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.5A (Relations with Opposing
Counsel)
(8) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements
to Others)
(9) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 4.4 (Respect for the Rights of
Third Persons)
(10) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 8.1 (Disciplinary Matters)
(11) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 8.2 (Judicial and Legal
Officials)
(12) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 8.4 (Misconduct)
(13) The extent of the discipline to be imposed pursuant to SCR
111 as a result of
Coughlin's conviction of the "serious" crime of Petit Larceny.
(G) The State Bar must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Coughlin
violated RPC 1.1,'
1.2,3.1, 3.3, 3.4,3.5,4.1,4.4, 5A (sic),8.1,8.2,and 8.4. See Nev Sup. Ct. R. 105(2)(e); In re
Stuhff, 108 Nev. at 633-634, 837 P.2d at 856; Gentile v State Bar, 106 Nev. 60, 62, 787
P.2d 386,387 (1990).
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Competence
(H) RPC 1.1 states "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
(I) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin lacks the
competency to represent clients, including himself.
(J) First, the record demonstrates severe criticism by the trial court in the handling
of the Joshi matter, including Coughlin's lack of understanding of a balance sheet, his
failure to conduct discovery, his lack of knowledge of the rules of evidence and trial
procedure. Supra' 25
(K) Second, Judge Beesley testified that the pleadings filed by Coughlin on behalf
of his client in a bankruptcy case were "lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just sort of
rambled through a great deal of irrelevant stuff." Judge Beesley also testified that
Coughlin's pleadings and arguments on behalf of his client "didn't make any sense." Supra
' 16 Judge Beesley became concerned enough about Coughlin's competency as a lawyer
that he contacted the State Bar. Supra' 17
(L) Third, Judge Nash Holmes questioned Coughlin's competency as a lawyer and
in her Order finding Coughlin in contempt of Court noted that Coughlin disregarded the
rules of evidence, continually imposed improper questions, failed to properly examine
witnesses, repeatedly asked the question, misstated answers, injected irrelevant material,
argued with witnesses and mischaracterized testimony. Supra 7 (NOTE: Where the
punishment for contempt is limited to a fine or imprisonment, an attorney may not be
disbarred as a punishment for contempt of court. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 513.)
(M) Fourth, Judge Nash Holmes found that Coughlin's pleadings failed to address
topics listed 'in the caption, contained rambling references to Coughlin's personal life and
other irrelevant material, were overly lengthy, disjointed and incoherent. Supra' 9 & 10
(N) Fifth, the State Bar called two judges and two practicing attorneys (Elcano is
not listed as an "active attorney" at www.nvbar.org, nor has he been for over 5 years), each
with significant experience with Coughlin and each of whom rendered an expert opinion
regarding Coughlin's competency as a lawyer. Judge Beesley testified that in his opinion,
Coughlin was not competent to practice law. Supra 18. Judge Nash Holmes testified that
in her opinion, Coughlin violated numerous Rules of Professional conduct including his
lack of competency to practice law. Supra 15. Attorney Richard Hill also testified that in
his opinion Coughlin is not competent to practice law. Supra 22 Attorney Paul Elcano,
who once supervised Coughlin as a lawyer and ultimately terminated him from Washoe
Legal Services, also testified that, in his opinion, Coughlin is not competent to practice
law. Supra 28
(O) Sixth, the record establishes that Coughlin offered no expert opinion or evidence as
to his competency.
Diligence
(P) RPC 1.2 states "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client." The record is less clear as to whether or not Coughlin violated
RPC 1.2 on more than on occasion.
(R) Judge Howard, in the Joshi case, certainly found that Coughlin failed to
conduct discovery on behalf of his client in that matter. Supra 25
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(S) The record and Pleading Docket in this case establish that Coughlin failed to
provide a verified responsive pleading even in the defense of his own disciplinary
action. Supra 38
(T) The record and Pleading Docket in this case establish that Coughlin habitually
files numerous, untimely and repetitive motions.
Meritorious Claims and Contentions
(U) RPC 3.1 in pertinent part states "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in .law and fact
for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."
(V) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin continuously
and repetitively files irrelevant pleadings. pleadings unrelated to the issue at hand and
continuously and repetitively injects irrelevant matters into proceedings.
(W) Judge Nash Holmes found, for example, that Coughlin repeatedly injected
allegations of bribery, perjury and police retaliation in a simple traffic case involving the
failure to stop at a stop sign. Supra 7 She also found that Coughlin repeatedly injected
attorney Richard Hill into questions and statements when Mr. Hill was in no way involved
in the traffic citation trial. Supra 7 She also found that pleadings filed subsequent to
Coughlin's incarceration were lengthy (more than 200 pages) contained scant discussion
of, or relevance to, the matter and contained irrelevant discussion of facts unrelated to the
proceedings at hand. Supra. 10
(X) The record establishes that in the Merliss eviction action, Coughlin's conduct
was so vexatious and frivolous as to result in substantial sanction of attorney's fees. Supra
21 See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 2, L 8 -13; P3, L 4 -11.
(Y) The Pleading Docket in this matter establishes also that Coughlin's filings,
even in his own defense of the disciplinary matter, inject lengthy, irrelevant facts and legal
issues into this proceeding.
Candor to the Tribunal
(Z) RPC 3.3(a)(1) states "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (m)ake a false statement
of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement .of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer."
(AA) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin violated RPC
3.3(a)(l) when he lied to Judge Nash Holmes as to whether or not he was surreptitiously
and without permission to record the proceeding. Supra 7 Of note, Coughlin did not
deny that he had lied to Judge Nash Holmes. Instead, his cross examination of Judge Nash
Holmes focused on how she had learned of the true facts. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 139, L
(BB) Attorney Richard Hill testified that based on his experience in litigating with
Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthful with either counsel or the Court. Supra Paragraph 23.
(CC) The record also establishes that Coughlin was less than candid with the Court
in two separate applications to proceed in forma pauperis, when he failed to disclose his
true occupation as an attorney and instead indicated he was self-employed as a "Jack of all
Trades" failed to identify any income from the practice of law after having represented to
the court that his incarceration would adversely affect his clients. Supra 31 & 32
Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
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(DD) RPC 3.4(c) states "A lawyer shall not: (k)nowingly disobey an obligation
under the
rules of a tribunal except for an op en refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists."
(EE) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has a clear and
continuing pattern of knowingly ignoring and disobeying instructions from the Court.
(FF) In his Order of contempt, Judge Howard found that Coughlin refused to obey
directives of the Judge and continued lines of questioning after being instructed to refrain
from doing so. Supra 4
(GG) Judge Nash Holmes, in her Order of contempt, found that Coughlin
incessantly argued with the Court, interrupted the Court, repeatedly restated matters after
having been admonished to refrain from doing so, disregarded directives to ask properly
phrased questions and disobeyed nwnerous admonitions by the court to stop repeating
questions, misstating answers, injecting irrelevant material, arguing with the witness and
mischaracterizing testimony. Supra 7 tribunal."
repeatedly conducts himself in a manner that is disruptive of the tribunal while in the
courtroom.
(HH) The transcript of the hearing in this matter clearly demonstrates that
Coughlin repeatedly and incessantly interrupts witnesses, counsel, Panel members and
Panel Chairman and refuses to heed admonitions to refrain from doing so. See generally of
Wednesday, November 14, 2012.
Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal
(II) RPC 3.5(d) states "A lawyer shall not engage in conduct intended to disrupt a
tribunal.
(JJ) The disruption must have occurred in the courtroom. One cannot disrupt a
tribunal with conduct outside of the courtroom. In re Michael Stuhff, 108 Nev. 629,
837P.2d 853 (1992)
(KK) The record overwhelmingly, clearly and convincingly establishes that
Coughlin repeatedly conducts himself in a manner that is disruptive of the tribunal while
in the courtroom.
(LL) The various orders of contempt or imposing sanctions issued by Judges
Kenneth Gardner, Linda Gardner, Dorothy Nash Holmes and Patrick Flanagan each
describe a similar pattern of conduct and behavior that is intentionally disruptive of
the tribunal. Supra 4, 7, 10, 21 and 25
(4. Coughlin's conduct during the trial of the petit larceny case on November 30,
2011, in which Coughlin appeared in propria persona, was so disruptive that Judge
Howard found Coughlin in direct contempt of court and sentenced him to jail that
same day to be released on December 3, 2011 at 8:00 PM. Judge Howard specifically
found Coughlin's conduct to be disorderly and was either contemptuous or
behavior insolent toward the judge in that Coughlin refused:
"... to obey directives of the Judge, continuing lines of inquiry after being advised by
the Court to refrain from doing so; demeaning the Court with statements such as
"WOW" in response to court rulings; laughing during testimony and further
questioning the court and its authority."
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See Hearing Exhibit 11 ORDER FOR SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF contempt

COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE OF THE COURT,
November 30, 2011.
(NOTE: do not believe Exhibit 11 was even admitted into evidence, but regardless,
Howard's Order for Summary Punishment (which has never included a Certificate of
Service attached to it, not in NNDB Board Chair Susich's use of it as Exhibit 6 to his
5/31/12 retreated of Hill's associate Baker and King's machinations in the SCR 117
60975 Petition, not in King's attaching one version of it (with a different certification
by RMC Filing Officer Supervisor Donna Ballard) within what King purported to be
a true and accurate copy of his Complaint (but which included a far more legible copy
of Judge Holmes' 3/12/12 Order (like the version thereof that became FHE5) and that
attachments to it, and not in FHE11, the same 11/30/11 OPSC by RMC Judge
Howard..non e of which have a Certificate of Service (notice no harping on how the
appeal turned out by the Panel Chair for either of the criminal conviction for
contempt...indeed, where RCA Roberts was not even present for the additional three
minutes on the record occurring at 8:30 p.m., when Judge Howard had Coughlin
brought back into the court room in handcuffs, such was rendered in absentia and the
deadline to appeal such therefore (and Howard attempted to convince Coughlin he had
not right to appeal such contempt order, whilst specifically informing Coughlin of his
right to appeal the petty larceny conviction) does not even run until the RMC or RCA
finally files a Notice of Entry of Order, etc. (the use of the term ruling by Judge
Elliott in FHE12 now makes more sense) failed to check the box in that form order that
King needed to be checked to have any chance of the offensive collateral estoppel he is
seeking to apply here, which results in the defensive variety of such controlling...not to
mention the fraudulent misrepresentation of whether Coughlin had any right to appeal,
the fact that the RMC failed to ever serve Coughlin a notice of Entry of Order for that
OSPOC, made in absentia of either or both Coughlin and RCA Pamela Roberts, Esq.
(whom everybody can thank for turning our legal community into as big a rock fight in
the street as she could)).
7.
Judge Nash Holmes ordered Coughlin into custody on February 27, 2012
and to be incarcerated at the Washoe County Regional Detention Facility for the term
of five (5) days. Alternatively Coughlin could pay a fine of $500. The Court's sentence
was based on its detailed findings regarding Coughlin's conduct in his own defense.
"The court finds that defendant's contemptuous conduct consisted of his
rude, sarcastic, inappropriate, insubordinate, disrespectful, antagonistic,
deceitful, disruptive, argumentative and childish behavior during trial, all of
which appeared to be done to vex and annoy the court, the witness, and the
opposing party, and to disrupt the trial process. The court finds that the
following occurred, and constitute contempt: 1) defendant's mimelike,
clownish antics of making faces at the court; sagging down into his seat and
hanging his head; looking behind himself and inside his coat as if searching for
a better way to ask a question; rolling his eyes; and mimicking others words; 2)
defendant's incessant arguing with the court, talking over the court, and
interrupting the court; 3) defendant's repeatedly restating matters after being
told by the court to "move on" or "ask the next question;" 4) defendant's
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repeatedly injecting allegations of bribery, perjury, and police retaliation into

the matter after the court instructed him not to, and directed him to limit
himself to issues pertaining to the facts of the "Boulevard Stop;" 5) defendant's
repeatedly trying to insert" Richard Hill" into his questions and statements
when such person was not relevant to the proceeding and the defendant had
been ordered to stop discussing that; 6) defendant's disregarding the rules of
evidence and court procedure by continually posing improper questions after
being directed by the court to properly phrase his questions 7) defendant's
continually accusing the court of denying him the right or ability to ask
questions and telling the court to "give me a list of questions you want me to
ask;" 8) defendant's suggesting that the court "tell me what would make you
happy;" 9) defendant's lying to the court in response to direct questions posed
by the court with regard to his recording the proceedings; and 10) defendant's
failing and refusing to properly examine the witness, despite numerous
admonitions by the court to stop repeating questions, misstating answers,
injecting irrelevant material, arguing with the witness and mischaracterizing the
testimony."
See Hearing Exhibit 4 ORDER FINDING THE DEFENDANT IN contempt OF
COURT AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS. (NOTE: King failed to attach FHE 4 to
his Complaint.)
10.
Judge Nash Holmes also found that Coughlin, after being released from
custody following the February 27, 2012 contempt of Court incarceration, filed
other nonsensical pleadings including a 218 page document:
"...purported to be yet another motion in this case entitled "Motion to
Return Cell Phones; Motion to Set Aside Summary contempt Order; and
notice of Appeal of Summary contempt Order." With scant discussion of,
or relevance to, the above captioned matter, said document mostly argues
against Judge Howard in a Department 4 case and again contains more than
200 pages of string legal citations; lyrics to rocks (sic) songs; Mr. Coughlin's
personal family history; discussion of an eviction case and another
contempt case; disjointed legal citations and other nonsensical matters that
have no apparent relevance to his traffic citation case. (NOTE: King's
Complaint faile to notice plead any of the above, much less incorporate it by
reference or even attach it as an exhibit: "14. In the case of City of Reno vs.
Zachary Barker Coughlin, Case No. 11 TR 26800 21, a trial was held on a
traffic citation issued to Respondent. The matter was called at approximately
3:00 p.m. and concluded without a verdict at about 4:30 p.m. after the court
held Respondent in criminal contempt of court for his behavior and
activities committed in the direct presence of the court during trial."
21.
On behalf of his client Dr. Merliss, Mr. Hill sought and obtained an order in
favor of Dr. Merliss and against Coughlin awarding Dr. Merliss attorney's fees in
the amount of $42,065.50. Washoe District Court Judge Patrick Flanagan entered
the order on June 25, 2012. See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 47, L 3-7. -See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 3, L 10-11. The motion
seeking attorney's fees was based on Coughlin's conduct in the defense of the
eviction matter, which conduct was characterized as frivolous and vexatious and
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presumably so found by Judge Flanagan. See Hearing Exhibit P 2, L 8-13; P 3, L 411.

25.
Judge Gardner's order in the Joshi matter indicated that Coughlin had
conducted no discovery in the case and failed to present any documentary
evidence at the trial of the matter on behalf of his client Mrs. Joshi. See Hearing
Exhibit P 12, L 4 -6.
After commenting on various negative aspects of Coughlin's representation of his
client Mrs. Joshi, (See Hearing Exhibit P 12, L 9 -P 13, L 40) (
Judge Gardner specifically held:
"The most troubling aspect of this case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic and
disrespectful presentation at trial; Mr. Coughlin's inability to understand a balance
sheet; his failure to conduct discovery; and his lack of knowledge with regard to the
rules of evidence and trial procedure. All of this was compounded with a
continuously antagonistic presentation of the case that resulted in a shift from a
fairly simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive amount
of time. "
See Hearing Exhibit 3, P 13, L 5 -10:
("At trial. Mr. Springgate stated that Mr. Coughlin had conducted no
discovery in this case. In addition, Mr. Coughlin failed to present one
documentary piece of evidence at triall on behall of Ma. Joshi's claims. Mr.
Coughlin argued incessantly with the Court throughout trial and made
sarcastic, derogatory remarks to the Court, Mr. Springgote, and Mr. Joshi
throughout trial. The Court notes that there were well overr 40 objections
during four (4) hours of trial. Mr. Sprlnggate's objections were well-founded
and continuously sustained except in one instance").
(NOTE: King failed to attach Gardner's 4/13/09 Order After Trial (FHE3)
and failed to incorporate it by reference either, in his Complaint, and the
above excerpt was not amongst the portion of such Order King did quote in
his Compliant)
(NOTE: just as Coughlin was not a party for purposes of appealing any
part of the Order After Trial (or anything else in the case) that was not
superseded by the 6/19/09 Final Decree, so to is Coughlin not in privity
with his former client, Ms. Joshi, or a party sufficient to provide an
offensive collateral estoppel bar for the SBN obviating its burden to prove,
by clear and convicing evidence, any alleged professional misconduct is
alleges is proven by doing nothing more than citing to a mere small portion
of such superseded FHE3 (failing to incorporate by reference such order or
to even attach such to the Complaint, not to mention failing to produce a
certified copy, which made especially dubious Chair Echeverria's allowing
WLS's Elcano to provide foundations for or authenticate that produced by
King in FHE3 where Echeverria refused to provide such treatment to
Coughlin and his mother's attempts to authenticate and or provide
foundation for the audio recordings (one purchase directly from the RMC by
Coughlin's mother, one provided to Coughlin by the SBN, whom purported
such to be a true and correct copy of the audio transcripts provided to it by
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the RMC) for both the 2/27/12 and 3/12/12 trail dates resulting in,
respectively, FHE4, and FHE5).
Judge Linda Gardner's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Decree of Divorce (FOFCOLDOD) in DV08-01168 of 6/19/09 held:
2JDC Judge Gardner's 6/19/09 final Decree of Divorce excised only from
Springgate's 5/21/09 Proposed Decree the attorney's fees award detailed in
paragraph six of Springgate's Proposed Decree, (the language Judge L. Gardner
excised therefrom read: 6. ATTORNEY'S FEES: The Court has the discretion to
award attorney's fees in a divorce action, pursuant to NRS 125.150(3), and Love v.
Love, 114 Nev. 572, 959 P.2d 523 (1998). There is further authority for fees
pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(B), and NRS 7.085. Based on the above and foregoing,
former counsel for the Defendant is ordered to pay attorney's fees in the amount
of $934.00 within thirty (30) days of this Order and Decree.).
Instead, Judge L. Gardner's 6/19/09 final Decree of Divorce operated to
amend and or supersede her 4/13/09 Order After Trial (the 11/14/12 formal
disciplinary hearings NG12-0435, FHE3) to not contain vacate any such attorney
fee award (and all the language the SBN King's quoted therefrom in his 4/13/09
Complaint) where such final Decree reads: "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Decree of Divorce ...9. The Court adopts, as Findings of Fact, each and
every Conclusion of Law below, which by this reference are expressly incorporated
herein. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
4. COMMUNITY PROPERTY/DEBT.
B) Mr. Joshi's Vehicle: The 2005 Chevrolet Blazer shall be
considered as Plaintiff's sole and separate property and Plaintiff shall be
responsible for the debt remaining thereon. Since the car is worth about
$10,910.00 and there is $15,009.75 due and owing on the vehicle, Mr. Joshi's
assumption of this asset is to be considered as an undertaking of community debt of
approximately $4,100.00.
C) Ms. Joshi's car shall be considered as her sole and separate
property and she shall be responsible for any debt remaining thereon. Since no
evidence was presented to the Court as to the value of the auto, either positive or
negative, there is no value for this community asset.
D) Son's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and will
not be divided among the community.
E) Daughter's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and
will not be divided among the community. (NOTE: Coughlin elicted testimony
from Mrs. Joshi with respect to Mrs. Joshi being liable or cosigning for the
daughters vehicle, which arguably is supportive of the alimony claim)...
J) General Credit Card Debt: There is general debt of
approximately $15,650.00 which has been expended for community purposes. Mr.
Joshi has agreed to be responsible for this debt and the same shall be considered as
his sole and separate responsibility. ...
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L) Medical Debt: There is a debt due to St. Mary's Hospital for

$6,735.00 and a debt to REMSA for $500.00. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be
responsible for these debts and the same shall be considered as his sole and separate
responsibility. ...
N) General Community Debt: There was no evidence to establish
community debt. Mr. Joshi agreed to take the remaining community debt in his
name that is outstanding and the debt shall be his sole and separate responsibility. It
should be noted that Mr. Joshi has likely incurred an unequal distribution of the
community debt of the parties and the Court finds his testimony to be a compelling
reason for making an unequal distribution ofthe community debt.
5. Spousal Support: The Court has found that Mr. Joshi is 51 and Ms. Joshi
is 46; the parties earn roughly equivalent amounts; the parties have been
married 21 years but Ms. Joshi has always been employed during that time; Ms.
Joshi has a college degree; both parties are able to work; and after consideration of
the net income, deduction of taxes, and the amount paid in community debt by Mr.
Joshi, an award of alimony in the amount of one dollar ($1.00) shall be awarded
to Ms. Joshi pursuant to NRS 125.150, Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355, 929 P.2d
196, and Shydler v. Shydler, 194 Nev. 192, 196, 954 P.2d 37, 39 (1988).... IT IS
SO ORDERED."
The only other difference between Springgate's Proposed Decree and the
final Decree of Divorce Judge L. Gardner entered is found in paragraph 5: 5.
SPOUSAL SUPPORT: The Court has found that Mr. Joshi is 51 and Ms. Joshi is
46 and the parties earn roughly equivalent amounts and that, after consideration of
net income, deduction of taxes, including the amount paid on paying off
community debt, as set forth above, and in light of the fact the parties have been
married for twenty-one (21) years and Ms. Joshi has always been employed
during that time, inclusive of the fact that she obtained a college degree prior to
marriage, both parties being healthy and able to work, the Court does not believe
that Ms. Joshi is entitled to an award of alimony, pursuant to NRS 125.15(1)(A),
Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355, 929 P.2d 196 (1996), and Shydler v. Shydler, 194
Nev. 192, 196, 954 P.2d 37, 39 (1988).
Witness the alterations to Springgate's Proposed Decree above in the final
Decree of Divorce Judge L. Gardner ultimately entered: 5. Spousal Support: The
Court has found that Mr. Joshi is 51 and Ms. Joshi is 46; the parties earn roughly
equivalent amounts; the parties have been married 21 years but Ms. Joshi has
always been employed during that time; Ms. Joshi has a college degree; both parties
are able to work; and after consideration of the net income, deduction of taxes, and
the amount paid in community debt by Mr. Joshi, an award of alimony in the
amount of one dollar ($1.00) shall be awarded to Ms. Joshi pursuant to NRS
125.150, Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355,929 P.2d 196, and Shydler v. Shydler, 194
Nev. 192, 196,954 P.2d 37, 39 (1988)
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However, Judge L. Gardner's final Decree of Divorce would up

highlighting the fact that Coughlin did, in fact, put on evidence supportive of
an alimony claim, the fact that the parties had been married 21 years, (where, at
least under the Tonopah formula is over twice the ten years rule of thumb so
commonly predictive in family court of whether there will be an award of at least
some, or rehabilitative alimony, especially where there are children of the marriage.
Judge L. Gardner's final Decree of Divorce altered the language in Springgate's
Proposed Decree in a manner which accentuates such fact (which Coughlin
argument during trial and direct examination of his client, Ms. Joshi, established, in
Coughlin's making argument for an award of alimony that was, in fact, based in fact
and law (in addition to Coughlin's insightful invocation of an ALR article providing
support for the position that Springgate's proposed settlement was largely a chimera
were a domestic duty is accorded greater protection under the law than unsecured
third party credit card debt (J) General Credit Card Debt: There is general debt of
approximately $15,650.00 which has been expended for community purposes. Mr.
Joshi has agreed to be responsible for this debt and the same shall be considered as
his sole and separate responsibility. (and where Mr. Joshi's have a selection of
credit cards in his name only, and for which only he had the Duluth Model
power and control (how do you like that, CAAW? TWS? CIS?) to monitor or
incur charges under, and for which there was no documentary evidence (where
FHE3 originally criticized Coughlin for putting on only testimonial evidence to
support the claim for alimony...which is similar to FHE3 alleging Coughlin
conducted no discovery (which was not litigated, and where WLS and Elcano
completely obstructed Coughlin's ability to disprove such, including refusing to
allow Coughlin to access his former coughlinz@washoelegalservices.org email
account or MS Outlook files) especially where Coughlin is not in privity with Ms.
Joshi) where Springgate's retort to Coughlin's inquiring as to just what discovery
Springgate himself conducted was met with the specious response that I did my
discovery in the 16.1 (see Springgate email to Coughlin to support the blanket
assertion that such J. General Credit Card Debt (which Judge L. Gardner stops
short of finding to be community debt (especially where her final Decree
specifically indicates there was no evidence to establish community debt;
where such decision only underscores the legitimacy of the arguments Coughlin
made during the trial respecting the attenuated chances any such unsecured
third party credit card creditors, especially where such general credit card
debt was divided amongst a number of cards such that no one account was
sufficiently large to expect an extensive litigation proving some doctrine of
the necessaries basis for holding Mrs. Joshi personally liable for the credit
card accounts for which her husband was the sole signatory sufficient to
justify Coughlin joining Judge Gardner and Springgate's immediately-beforethe-trial-Settlement Conference (apparently, according to Springgate, a
CMC counts as a second settlement conference) hard sell to his client, Mrs.
Joshi seeking her approval, essentially, foregoing her right to appeal any
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adverse decision by Judge Gardner, especially as to her alimony claim (Mrs.

Joshi was adamant at the time, that even a Siragusa, jurisdictional reservation was
not satisfactory, and that she needed some actual, liquid, alimony...(see 54844,
53833... shut up and don't listen to your attorney were said).
It is very interesting to compare the dates and individual listed in the various
Certificates of Services in the Joshi matter post Coughlin's suspension from WLS
on 4/20/09 (the day after his written complaint to Elcano of a hostile work
environment and other issues) incident to Judge L. Gardners work in FHE3,
particularly with respect to the final Decree of Divorce and the impact thereof as to
the Order After Trial presented at the formal disciplinary hearing as FHE3.
REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION It is hereby requested that the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce being filed concurrently herewith
be submitted to the Court for decision. Additionally, counsel for Defendant has
reviewed the decree and approved it as conforming with the Court's Order.
DATED this 1L day of May, 2009. /s/ John P. Springgate, Esq. CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby celiifYthat I am an employee of THE
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN SPRING GATE, and that on this date I personally
served at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the within FOR fully addressed to: Marc
Ashley, Esq. Washoe Legal Services 299 S. Arlington Avenue Reno, NV 89501 X
for mailing by first class mail, postage prepaid Dated this 21st day of May, 2009.
/s/ Linda A. Knowlden".
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com] Sent: Thursday,
May 28, 2009 10:46 AM To: Marc Ashley; Deborah Pringle; Caryn Sternlicht
Subject: FW: WDCR 9 Proposed Final Decree, RE: discovery requests Dear
Washoe Legal Services, Please see my concerns in the emails below. The proposed
Decree submitted by Mr. Springgate presents real problems for Ms. Joshi.
Specifically the debt distribution is in no way referred to as being characterized as
in lieu of alimony or given any similar treatment. There is a wealth of authority,
some of which I have provided and some of which is contained in my emails to Mr.
Springgate during the pre-trial phase of the Joshi litigation that spells out why this
is disadvantageous to Ms. Joshi. Bankruptcy law specifically 532a(15) could
potentially see Mr. Joshi, upon the requisite showing, be discharged of the debt
distributed in the decree and not forced to pay alimony. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin,
Esq. (NOTE: thereafter Coughlin included his email to Springgate: WDCR 9
Proposed Final Decree, RE: discovery requests? From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Sent:
Sun 5/24/09 7:19 PM To:
springgatelaw@sbcglobal.net Hi Jon, Have you submitted a Final Decree or
Findings of Fact yet? Will you be providing me a copy. Apparently, I am not able
to access efile for this case, so I assume that means you could not serve me such a
document via efile. Do you intend to assert that I am not entitled to a copy of the
proposed order, pursuant to WDCR 9? If I am, I have 5 days to object to it, etc...I
know we previously discussed language for bankruptcy concerns in our
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settlement discussion, but I feel it is important for the final order to specify what
is for what so that any 523-a-15 or 523-a-5 issues do not become problematic;
granted she is WLS's client...However, to the extent that the Final Decree spells
out the sanctions, I believe I am entitled to 5 days to review any proposed Final
Decree prior to your submitting it. ...Can you respond to my earlier question, see
below, regarding whether you ever sent any discovery requests to Ms. Joshi?
Sincerely, Zach Coughlin....
RE: WDCR 9 Proposed Final Decree, RE: discovery requests? From:
Marc Ashley (mashley@washoelegalservices.org) Sent:
Thu 6/04/09
3:19 PM To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com; Deborah Pringle
(dpringle@washoelegalservices.org); Caryn Sternlicht
(csternlicht@washoelegalservices.org) Zach, Sorry for the delay in getting back to
you on this. Ive been out of the office and this is my first day back. When
summarizing the evidence in her order, the judge did mention that Mr. Joshi
suggested that maintenance be kept open for 5 years as protection against his
default on the debts he was ordered to pay. However, when she got to that portion
of her order concerning maintenance, she specifically denied maintenance after
reviewing relevant factors such as the parties relative ages, earning capacities and
state of their health. Springgate recalls discussing the award of $1 per year
maintenance for 5 years so it could be revised to account for any default on his
clients part and also has said that he thought the provision was going to be part of
the order. However, he feels that the clause cannot be included in light of the
judges plain statement that maintenance is denied (I would assume also because it
doesnt benefit his client), so the final decree was submitted as originally
proposed. We have filed a motion to amend it on the basis of mistake or
inadvertence. Marc Ashley Staff Attorney Washoe Legal Services 299 S. Arlington
Ave. (NOTE: WLS's Ashley failed to provide Coughlin any copy of the Motion to
Amend he references in his email, and the Certificate of Service on such Motion to
Amend of 5/27/09 by WLS's Ashley does not list Coughlin amongst those to whom
it was mailed)
WLS's Ashley's 5/27/09 Motion to Correct Proposed Decree somewhat
incorporated the legal analysis Couglhin email to WLS on 5/26/09, where such
reads: MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant/Counterclaimant, by her attorneys, Washoe Legal Services by Marc
Ashley, objects to the form of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decree of Divorce and moves that it be corrected because key provisions have been
omitted through mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, as more fully set forth
in the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities. ...DATED this 26th day of
May, 2009. /S/ Marc Ashley, Esq., Washoe Legal Services.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES NRCP Rule 60
allows a Court to relieve a party from the terms of a final judgment, order or other
proceeding on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect.
Defendant in this case contends that the final decree was to have contained
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certain provisions to protect her in case Plaintiff fails to pay the indebtedness
he has been ordered to pay. These debts are in Defendant's name and they will
be asserted against her if he does not pay or files bankruptcy. Specifically, in
its Order After Trial, page 6 lines 18-20, the Court notes that ''to protect Ms.
Joshi in the event Mr. Joshi filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Joshi suggested that the
court maintain jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support for five years." It
was Defendant's understanding that this was to be done through an award of
maintenance of One Dollar ($1.00) Per year for five years. If Plaintiff ceased
paying the debts, she would then be able to request maintenance to offset the
added payments.
In discussing the form of the decree with Plaintiff's attorney, he was
likewise of this understanding and maintained that the $1.00 Per year
language would be in the final decree. However, in preparing the final papers
he noticed that the court denied maintenance altogether at page 11, lines 1718, so did not include the expected language. Accordingly, Defendant moves
the court to amend the order to include an award of maintenance in the amount
of One Dollar ($1.00) Per year for five years, so Defendant will have recourse to
protect her credit if Plaintiff defaults on the debts in her name. The debt on the
car which is titled in Plaintiff's name and their daughter is also in Defendant's
personal name. Defendant was of the understanding that Plaintiff was also to retitle the car in the name of Defendant and their daughter, and Defendant moves
for amendment of the order to accomplish this. Dated this 26th day of May,
2009. /S/ Marc Ashley, Esq.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby
certify that I am an employee of Washoe Legal Services, and that on th.. Day of
May, 2009, I served the foregoing: MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED
DECREE by depositing with the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, at
Reno, Nevada, a true and correct copy of the within document addressed to: Law
Offices of John P. Springgate, Esq. 203 South Arlington Avenue Reno, NV
89501 /s/ Deborah Pringle, CP An employee of Washoe Legal Services
So, where Springgate, the 2JDC, and WLS did not see fit to include
Coughlin on numerous Certificates of Service (or, indeed serve him such
documents, never mind WLS utterly failing to defend Coughlin, support him in
having the 4/13/09 Order After Trial vacated, or allow him access to his email to
Mrs. Joshi and others (including WLS employees whom Coughlin would need
obtain checks from to send out discovery, etc., or those that prove Coughlin did in
fact extensively research the issues involved in that case prior to taking the
positions he took at trial), and the 2JDC removed Coughlin from the list of
individuals able to access such case on eFlex, unless Coughlin paid an $88 real
party in interest first appearance fee (which WLS refused to pay on Coughlin's
behalf), and Coughlin was not allowed to appeal the Order After Trial in that he
is not considered a party (or in privity, really per Albany v. Arcata) it would
hardly be just to absolve the SBN of its duty to investigate such grievance (the
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SBN was provided all the filings in DV08-01168 by Coughlin, in addition to all of
those on file in 53833 and 54844 (as were all the members of the Panel) beyond
simple taking such FHE3 from Judge Nash Holmes in her box of materials she
collected and submitted along with FHE8, her 3/14/12 grievance letter to the SBN
and monkeying with the date received stamp the SBN affixed thereon to (as if
such really throws one off a whole lot) indicate such was received 3/15/12 with
the 5 in 15 going through many, uh, changes, over the months and through the
various iterations thereof. Further, both SBN Clerk of Court Peters, and King made
statements and writing despite WDCR 9 requiring that Springgate had to have
served on any parties to the action and affected by the judgment (so, Coughlin's
not being a party entitles the Court, Springgate, and WLS to let Coughlin
continue to litigate an appeal and then a Petition for Writ all the while being
unaware that 2JDC Judge Gardner had entered an Order on 6/19/09 which vitiated
completely the 4/13/09 attorney fee sanction.
It is entirely clear why Judge L. Gardner, Springgate, and WLS did not want
Coughlin to be aware of the 6/19/09 Decree, specifically to the extent that the
changes from the Order After Trial to the final Decree completely undermine
WLS's rationale proffered for firing Coughlin, which rested entirely, (sole reason
according to Elcano) upon Judge L. Gardner's since 4/13/09 Order After Trial,
where Elcano, on behalf of WLS (see 60302, 60317) made the decision to terminate
Coughlin employment, announcing such to Coughlin on 5/7/09, making the 6/19/09
date of entry of the final Decree of Divorce incredibly convenient for all involved
except Coughlin...just so long as Coughlin does not become aware of the entry of
such final Decree on 6/19/09, and so long as he is not aware of the extent to which
the changes between the two completely vacate the sanctions, and, in doing so,
eviscerate WLS's rationale for terminating Coughlin.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com To: springgatelaw@sbcglobal.net
Subject: discovery requests Date: Mon, 18 May 2009 09:43:17 -0700 Hi John, Do
you have any record of sending any discovery requests to Bharti Joshi? If so, could
you indicate what they were and when and provide a copy? Sincerely, Zach
Coughlin, Esq.
Re: WDCR 9 Proposed Final Decree, RE: discovery requests From: John
Springgate (springgatelaw@sbcglobal.net) . Sent: Tue 5/26/09 5:14 PM To:
zachcoughlin@hotmail.com 1 attachment 20090526171158758.pdf (345.0 KB) 1.
The proposed order was filed May 21. I have attached a copy via pdf. I kept it very
sparse on the sanctions. 2. The bankruptcy concerns are not your issue, she is not
your client. 3. I did my discovery in the 16.1.
Coughlin's conduct therein, is made all the more understandable given the
complaints to Elcano by then named Tahoe Women's Services upon Coughlin
failing to satisfy advocate Cecilia Gonzalez's standard as to just how much he
should have exorted his then client Paula Haubl to proceed at the extension hearing
for the order of protection she obtained against her husband, where Mrs. Haubl was
extremely conflicted in that regard, and where Haubl actually spoke with and wrote
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to Elcano praising Coughlin's representation of her incident to Elcano conducting

an investigation in response to TWS's written complaint against Coughlin, which
Elcano refused to provide to Coughlin).
Such brings to mind the question, then how was Springgate's use of
discovery, presentation of various forms of evidence (testimonial, documentary,
or otherwise) sufficient to avoid a sanction, not to mention his knowledge of
procedural rules and rules of evidence where Springgate, not Coughlin violated
Judge L. Gardner's Pre-Trial order respecting the requirement to provide Coughlin
a copy of the more than ten exhibits that Springgate offered, prior to trial in a
form that is bound, tabbed, and indexed (ironically, Springgate's violation of such
procedural order (Judge Gardner's FHE3 takes Coughlin to task where he objected
to such then failed to cite to a specific rule, despite there being no specific rule,
but rather, such being law of the case incident to the Pre-Trial Order that Coughlin,
not Springgate, complied with).
Indeed, Judge L. Gardner's Order of 7/15/09 further explained: Insofar
as ... the award of attorney's fees,...the Court did not intend the award of
attorney's fees to be included in the Decree of Divorce....On May 13, 2009, a
Motion to Strike was filed by John P. Springgate, Esq., alleging ... there was no
final judgment entered in this matter yet as the Order After Trial had not been
memorialized into a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and
Decree of Divorce.
Given that, the stipulation to an Amended Decree between Springgate and
WLS on 7/22/09, and Judge L. Gardner entering an Order adopting such on
7/23/09, along with Judge L. Gardner excising from Springgate's Proposed Decree
the attorney fee award included therein.
Of course 2JDC Judge L. Gardner is annoyed with WLS's Elcano (like many
people) incident to his taking her Order After Trial and using it for that which it
was never intended. Regardless, Springgate's invocation of NRS 18.010(2)(b) is
more than misguided, and clearly fails to support any view that the FHE3, 4/13/09
Order After Trial by 2JDC Judge L. Gardner is till at all operative (which it is not,
clearly), especially where such was premised upon an original order that did not
provide for alimony where the final Decree of Divroce indeed did so award
alimony:
102k194.44 k. Bad Faith or Meritless Litigation. Most Cited Cases
Defendant did not bring or maintain counterclaims without reasonable ground, as
would support statutory award of attorney fees to plaintiffs in their action for
breach of contract; defendant was successful in his counterclaim for breach of
contract, as reflected in supplemental judgment allowing him an offset against
plaintiffs' judgment for loans that one plaintiff did not repay to defendant, and
while defendant was not successful on his other counterclaims, he presented some
evidence and testimony to factually and legally support them. West's NRSA
18.010(2)(b). Halls v. Phillips Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3838487 (Nev. 2010). In light
of our decision to reverse in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in
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favor of respondents, we conclude that any award of attorney fees and costs under
NRC 18.010(2)(b) is premature, and thus, the award must be reversed. Kahn, 121
Nev. at 479-80, 117 P.3d at 238 (reversing an entire fee award made under NRS 18.
010(2)(b) when a summary judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part on
appeal). Nev.,2010. Edwards v. National Credit Adjusters, LLC Slip Copy, 2010
WL 3838693 (Nev.)
Further, had no alimony award ultimately been entered, Springgate's client
would have arguably obtained a recovery exceeding $20,000, therefore taking such
out of the purview of NRS 18.010(2)(b).
But really, basically what happened was Coughlin filed his docketing
statement in 53833 with the attachment thereto, and 2JDC Judge L. Gardner
decided she did not need any of that, and that this was Springgate's and
Elcano/WLS's problem now, and she undid her 4/13/09 sanctions Order by entering
(MM) The transcript of the proceedings in this matter reveal a continuation of a
similar pattern of conduct by Coughlin despite his having been sanctioned twice with an
adverse award of attorney's fees and twice by incarceration. See generally of Wednesday,
November 14, 2012. (NOTE: no, not good enough Echeverria to go "See generally", see,
getting specific. Further, the FHE 2 Order awarding attorney's fees failed to specify such
as being against Coughlin in his role as his own attorney, versus against Coughlin as the
litigant incident to Flanagan's void application of a "prevailing party" attorney fees statute
that only applies to plenary judgments anyways (NRS 69.050).
Relations with Opposing Counsel
(NN) RPC 3.5A states "When a lawyer knows or reasonably should know the identity of a
lawyer representing an opposing party, he or she should not take advantage of the lawyer
by causing any default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the
opposing lawyer's intention to proceed."
(OO) Although the State Bar pled a violation of RPC 3.5A in its Complaint, no evidence
was presented that Coughlin ever violated the rule. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the
State Bar failed to meet its burden of proof on this issue as an evidentiary matter but finds
that as a matter of default the violation may be deemed admitted.
Truthfulness in Statements to Others
(PP) RPC 4.1 (a) states "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly: (a) (m)ake a false statement of material fact or law to a third person."
(QQ) Although the evidence established that Coughlin knowingly made false statements to
Court and Counsel (See (AA), (BB) and (CC no evidence was presented that
Coughlin knowingly made false statements of material fact or law to a third person.
Accordingly, the Panel finds that the State Bar failed to meet its burden of proof on this
issue as an evidentiary matter but fmds that as a matter of default the violation may be
deemed admitted. (this is a nonsense argument, especially where the Panel and SBN pat
themselves on the back for, allegedly, providing sufficient due process to
Coughlin/fulfilling SCR 105...its one or the other...but the Panel doesn't get to purport that
Coughlin defaulte where it is also trumpeting the feats of due process it enabled....).
Respect for the Rights of Third Persons
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(RR) RPC 4.4(a) states '"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person... "
(uh...like Hill's allegations of finding a "crack pipe and a bag of weed" or a "vial of
something" and "a large quantity of pills"? Actually, even that would not fit squarely
under the RPC 4.4(a) heading becuase Coughlin was a party therein, not a third
person...and that same rationale applies to the landlord Merliss...and the Panel fails to cite
to anybody else whom would qualify as a third person to whom Coughlin has somehow
subjected to a violation of RPC 4.4(a), and such would certainly not apply to the Reno
Police Department Officer Chris Carter, Jr. and Sargent Marcia Lopez whom assisted Hill
and landlord Merliss in burglarizing Coughlin's former home law office that day based on
a FOFCOLOSE that, on it's face, failed to contain the summary order for removal of the
tenant within 24 hours of receipt of the order language required by NRS 40.253(5)(a).
Regardless, there was never any valid lockout done by the WCSO's Office where its only
attempt to do so was done without complying with the requirement that the WCSO knows
full well attaches to each and every summary eviction in Nevada (that, at the very least,
the sheriff posts the summary eviction lockout order to the tenant's door and allows 24
judicial hours to pass prior to conducting such lockout) =, no matter which county such
occurs in, not matter how codependent and sick a relationship the local judiciary has with
law enforcement, no matter how little regard the Judges of Reno and Washoe County have
for the statutes the legislature passes in reducing the will of the people of Nevada to black
letter law).
(SS) The record establishes clearly and convincingly that in the Merliss eviction
action, Coughlin conducted himself in a manner that was abusive, vexatious and for
purposes of delay. The matter was a simple eviction action (apparently all evictions are
simple in Nevada, huh?) that apparently lasted through several proceedings at the
Municipal Court level, an appeal to the District Court and two appeals to the Nevada
Supreme Court and which also resulted in Coughlin's conviction for criminal trespass.
Supra 19 and 20
Coughlin's conduct in the proceedings was so egregious that Judge Flanagan
ordered Coughlin to pay (NOTE: notice such is not referred to as a sanction and does
not specify whether Coughlin the litigant or Coughlin acting as his own attorney was the
capacity in which such order was issued...but regardless...such is irrelevant beyond
establishing the defensive collateral estoppel bar to all the various RPC's the SBN and
Panel keep trotting out with such order in an attempt to skip straight past even
establishing any such violation by way of meeting a burden of proof via the introduction
of actual evidence (rather than hearsay via an interested party dressed up as expert
testimony) (Hill, Judge Nash Holmes, Elcano)) Dr. Merliss $42,065.50, an amount that is
still unpaid. Supra 21
(TT) The record also establishes that Coughlin habitually prolongs proceedings
unnecessarily; files lengthy, irrelevant, nonsensical pleadings requiring court, staff
and counsel to spend unnecessary effort in evaluating and/or responding to the
pleadings. Supra 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 21, 23, 25, 27, 39 and 40 (NOTE: neither
court, staff, nor counsel are third parties to which and analysis of RPC 4.4(a)
flows. Whose competency is being questioned, again?
Disciplinary Matters
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(UU) RPC 8.1(b) provides, in pertinent part, " ... a lawyer ... in connection with a
disciplinary shall not: (b) ... knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for
information from an admissions or disciplinary authority...
(VV) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin knowingly
failed to respond to the State Bar's request for information in the disciplinary
proceeding and failed to timely file a required verified responsive answer or pleading
to the Complaint.
(WW) First, Coughlin asked for an extension of time to respond to the letter of
February 14, 2012 regarding the Richard Hill Complaint then failed to respond at
all. Supra 29.
Coughlin was questioned with regard to a letter dated February 14, 2012 from
Assistant Bar Counsel King to Coughlin in which Bar Counsel forwarded to
Coughlin correspondence received from Richard G. Hill. See Transcript of
Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 163, L 13 -P 164, L 23. See Hearing
Exhibit 6. Coughlin's response, dated March 9, 2012, asked for additional time in
which to respond. See Hearing Exhibit 7. No evidence was presented that
Coughlin substantively responded to Bar Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012
prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter. Coughlin failed to directly
respond to Bar Counsel's questions inquiring if Coughlin ever subsequently
responded to Bar Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012. See Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 169, L 13 -P 172, L 16.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 163:13 to 164:23) "BY MR. KING: Q Mr. Coughlin,
I'm handing you what's been identified as Exhibit No. 6. Would you please tell me
if you received that letter from me? A Is this the letter in its entirety? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: The question is: Did you receive that from Mr. King? THE
WITNESS: This letter, he said? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know what it is. All
I know is it's Exhibit 6, and the question is, did you receive Exhibit 6 from Mr.
King? THE WITNESS: No, that wasn't the question. He said did you receive this
letter. And I need to know -- BY MR. KING: Q The next question may be about
attachments. But the question is: Did you get this letter? A I need to know what is
entailed in the term "a letter." Q This document that I handed you. Did you
receive this document either alone or as part of a package? Did you receive this
document Bates stamped 02983? A Without the Bates stamp? Q I believe it did
not have the Bates stamp when it was sent to you. A Yes. I think so. I'm not sure. I
think I received something longer. Maybe that's the attachments you're referring to.
Q So is that a yes? A Actually, I might have ultimately received this. But I recall
there being an issue. I was a victim of domestic violence during this time, and my
mail was being -- there was some issues with it. So I think ultimately I did receive
this, Mr. King. But maybe this isn't going to your question. You didn't ask me
when. So yeah, I think I received this one."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 169:13 to 172:16) Q My question is: Did you
send a subsequent letter or explanation to the State Bar? In other words,
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you're asking for additional time. Did you ever send -- A What you do is evil,
Pat. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. THE WITNESS: What you do is evil.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I have cautioned you about interrupting on
numerous occasions. But apparently a pattern of behavior has been the subject
of at least three court orders that we have seen so far. And I would ask you to, in
your best interests, to attempt to resist yourself, allow the question to be
completed, and then make whatever objection you wish. The question directly to
you, and if it's not direct enough, let me ask it. Did you ever specifically
respond to the letter of February 14th, 2012, Exhibit 6? THE WITNESS: I
responded to it. Specifically. I'm not sure exactly what that means. I believe I
cooperated with Bar counsel. I don't have a thousand pages of stuff. (NOTE: the
transcript contains an error there in that Couglin actually said: I know I
provided the Bar thousands of pages of stuff and...videos, audios transcripts,
etc.. This is confirmed by King's own admission in the transcript and only
further underscores the extent to which Echeverria conducted the hearing like a
total fraudster working overtime to get over his agenda). Videos. Audio. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: The question is: On February 14th you were sent substantial,
apparently, correspondence from Richard Hill alleging professional
misconduct. You were asked to make a specific response within ten days. It
appears that you did not do so, unless you have some evidence to the contrary -THE WITNESS: I didn't get this letter. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry. I
continue to talk while you're trying to interrupt. My question is: Did you ever
respond specifically, prior to the institution of the complaint, to Mr. Hill's
comments and reporting to the State Bar? Did you ever address those issues
raised by Mr. Hill prior to the filing of the complaint? THE WITNESS: Maybe
it would help if I had the Mr. Hill attachment. I believe I did. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: When did you do that? THE WITNESS: There's a multitude
of instances where I wrote or responded or communicated with Mr. King.
(Exhibit 8 marked.) MR. ECHEVERRIA: When was the first time? THE
WITNESS: Well, probably this time in asking for more time, because I didn't
get this letter very soon after it was sent. I rented a room off Craigslist. And
there was some ill will that built up, the people I rented it from. And I didn't get
this letter -- basically I think I got it this day, and I threw this together. I was
obviously very upset to see that the State Bar had wanted to hear from me, and
given me ten days. I think, obviously, it had already passed by this point. So
right when I got that letter -- and I think if I had been noticed on this, I would
have given you the envelope that shows that there was some -- like the post
office wouldn't let me -- I forget exactly what happened. But I think I gave Pat
this stuff -- MR. KING: With the chair's permission, I'll move on. THE
WITNESS: -- legitimate reasons why I didn't get this that evince a lack of
culpability on my part. But that's consistent with what Pat does. He puts on stuff
he knows is baseless. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. King. Mr.
Coughlin, I don't believe you answered the question. It was a direct question.
When did you first respond substantively to Mr. Hill's complaints? I have not
heard an answer. The response -- THE WITNESS: Yeah. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Excuse me. Your response is argumentative. Mr. King, go ahead with your next
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question. MR. KING: Thank you. THE WITNESS: I can answer it. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, there's not a question pending. THE WITNESS:
But it sounded like you said I didn't answer the last question. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That was my observation.
(XX) Second, Coughlin failed to respond to a subsequent letter from the State Bar
regarding the Complaint filed with the Bar by Judge Nash Holmes. Supra 30
(YY) Third, Coughlin ignored SCR 105(2) when he failed to timely file a verified
response or answer to the Complaint, despite several warnings to do so. Supra 34, 35,
36, 37, 38 Coughlin compounded this violation when he attempted, during the course of
the hearing in this matter, to transform a pleading previously filed in Reno Municipal
Court into a "New Verified Response (sic) Pre-Hearing Motion to Dismiss/Summary
Judgment, Memorandum of Law by crossing out the original caption and handwriting the
"new" caption. Supra 38.
Coughlin also attempted, during the hearing, to transform a pleading he had filed
the day before the hearing entitled "Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss ... " by
handwriting the words "Declaration and Verified Response ... " onto the caption of the
pleading. Supra 38
(ZZ) The conduct described herein not only demonstrates a lack of cooperation
with the State Bar, but a lack of competency as well.
Judicial and Legal Officials
(AAA) RPC 8.2(a) states "A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer
knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the
qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer. ..
(BBB) During the course of the hearing, Coughlin accused Judge Nash Holmes of
lying during her testimony. Coughlin has expressed similar views concerning Judge Nash
Holmes in various pleadings filed in this proceeding as well as others. Coughlin has also
uttered other derogatory remarks about various judges with whom he has interacted.
(CCC) The State Bar presented scant evidence on this issue and no evidence from
which the panel could conclude that the expressions were knowingly false as opposed to
an expression of opinion. While the conduct displayed is, in the view of the Panel
reprehensible, the Panel concludes that the State Bar failed to meet its burden of proof on
the issue as an evidentiary matter but finds that as a matter of default the violation may be
deemed admitted.
Misconduct
(DDD) RPC 8.4 provides (in pertinent parts):
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to :
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional conduct...
(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(EEE) The Pleadings, Hearing Exhibits and Transcript of these proceedings
overwhelmingly, clearly and convincingly establish a repeated, unrelenting and obstinate
pattern of misconduct by Respondent Coughlin evincing numerous and repeated
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violations of several provisions of RPC 8.4 (NOTE: this conclusion lacks any specificity
whatsoever) in violation of RPC 8.4(a). (So, would that not be something not noticed or
plead in the Complaint, and therefore, only appropriate in some future disciplinary
hearing, if any? Otherwise, is that not transmogrifying what is required to be a plenary
hearing into one of a summary nature?).
(FFF) Coughlin was convicted of petit larceny on November 30, 2011, a violation
of RPC 8.4(b). Such violation is sufficient alone to trigger application of SCR 111. The
Nevada Supreme Court referred the matter to the appropriate disciplinary panel for a
determination of the extent of punishment that should follow from the conviction. Supra
para. 5
(NOTE: the USPTO has indicated that it does not view Coughlin's petty larceny
conviction, given the totality of the circumstances therein, to be a serious crime.
Further, certainly not every conviction for petty larceny is violative of RPC 8.4. For
instance, if one stole a loaf of bread from a isolated small town grocery to see that a small
child avoided dying of starvation where exigent circumstances required doing so, would
that really be an criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, ... etc.?)
(GGG) The record also establishes that Coughlin was convicted of criminal
trespass in the prolonged eviction proceedings involving Dr. Merliss, a violation of RPC
8.4(b). Supra 20.
(NOTE: King's SCR 111(4) Petition in 61901 provides a defensive collateral
estoppel bar or party opponent admission that the dubious criminal trespass conviction
reported therein somehow supports an attempt to permanently disbar Coughlin in 62337:
3. As evidenced by the documentation submitted herein, Respondent has been convicted
of a crime which triggers the reporting requirements of Bar Counsel under SCR
111(4). Further, King's failure to file any such SCR 111 Petition (whether one under (4)
or (6)) for the alleged crimes the 12/14/12 FOFCOL characterizes the criminal
contempt convictions to be provides a further defensive collateral estoppel bar.
As evidenced by the documentation submitted herein, Respondent has been

convicted of a crime which triggered the reporting requirements of Bar Counsel
under SCR 111(4). In addition, 111(7) and)(8), state that upon receipt of a petition
demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a serious crime, the Court
shall enter an order suspending the attorney, pending the final disposition of a
disciplinary proceeding, in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent
of the discipline to be imposed.
Indeed, compare the language King used in his SCR 111(4) Petition in
61901 for the criminal trespass conviction with that he employe in 60838 in the
petty larceny conviction: As evidenced by the documentation submitted herein,
Mr. Coughlin has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime under the Nevada
Revised Statutes. However, that conviction was for "theft." The following
language, as set forth in SCR 111(6), dictates that Respondent's crime
constitutes a serious crime:
Definition of "serious crime." The term "serious crime" means (1) a felony
and (2) any crime less than a felony a necessary element of which is, as determined
by the statutory or common-law definition of the crime, improper conduct as an
attorney, interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,
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misrepresentation, fraud, willful failure to file an income tax return, deceit, bribery,
extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or a conspiracy or solicitation of
another to commit a "serious crime." [Emphasis added.]
CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, Bar Counsel respectfully brings this
matter to the Court's attention and requests that the Court enter an Order
temporarily suspending Respondent from the practice of law and referring this
matter to the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board for further disciplinary
proceedings, in accordance with SCR 111(7) and (8).
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 327:2 to 327:6) (Coughlin): Well, it could
consider the trespass thing certain, right? But Bar counsel filed an SCR 111.4
petition recently. What does that mean? It means Bar counsel themselves
admit that that was not a serious crime, a serious offense as elucidated under
SCR 111.6 As such, the Panel clearly erred where it concluded that the criminal
trespass conviction in 61901 is a violation of RPC 8.4(b), as the decision not to
bring a SCR 111(6) Petition by bar counsel and the decision not to take any of the
steps set out in SCR 111(7)-(9) by the Nevada Supreme Court establishes that such
criminal conviction is one for which there is not a necessary element...as
determined by the statutory or common-law definition of the crime, that involves
improper conduct as an attorney, interference with the administration of justice,
false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, willful failure to file an income tax
return, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or a
conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit a "serious crime. As such, the
Panel is barred from concluding that such criminal trespass conviction is, in any
way, and instance where Coughlin could be said to (b) Commit a criminal act that
17
other respects.)
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reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in

(HHH) The Complaint in this matter alleges that Coughlin has been arrested and is
awaiting trial on a larceny charge involving a cell phone and on a charge of abusing 911
emergency procedures. However, no evidence was presented on these charges but as a
matter of default the allegations may be deemed admitted and would constitute additional
violations of RPC 8.4(b).
(JJJ) The record, as described at length above, establishes several violations of
RPC 8.4(c).
See (AA), (BB), (CC), (AAA), (BBB) and (CCC).
(KKK) The entire record in this matter is replete with instances demonstrating
that Coughlin's conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice. (NOTE: here
Echeverria is just not content to have gutted every bit of due process required of this
hearing, and instead wants to glom on some summary disciplinary order on top of all his
crimes against jurisprudence) Coughlin has been repeatedly sanctioned monetarily and by
way of incarceration for his conduct, has repeatedly filed lengthy, irrelevant and
nonsensical pleadings requiring staffs, courts and counsel to expend needless and
unnecessary time in responding to such pleadings, has repeatedly disrupted proceedings
and failed to follow instructions and admonitions of the courts. The record establishes that
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the pattern of conduct continues despite the severe sanctions administered and continues
up to and during the disciplinary process and hearing of this matter.
(NOTE: the instances that Panel finds support such conclusions are plainly not
sanctions (FHE2 never was a sanction, FHE3 was superseded by the Final Decree, which
excised and superseded such sanction and ultimately awarded the very alimony FHE3
purported Coughlin to have litigated vexatiously for seeking for his client):
B. Amendment and Correction 3. Procedure and Relief Topic Summary References
Correlation Table s 388. Operation and effect, in general West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Judgment k 330 West's Key Number Digest, Judgment k 331
Generally, an amendment or correction of a judgment gives the judgment the same effect
as though the defects necessitating the amendment had never existed. Since the
amendment of a judgment is merely perfected evidence of what existed from the time the
judgment was pronounced,[1] as between the parties, the amendment or correction relates
back to the original judgment and becomes a part of it, and gives the judgment the same
effect as though the defects or mistakes had never existed.[2] However, it usually does not
make a new judgment or confer any new or additional rights,[3] although any substantive
modification of a judgment constitutes an opening of the judgment,[4] and a change
materially affecting a judgment and the rights of the parties against whom it is rendered
and involving the exercise of judicial discretion does amount to a new judgment.[5]
Generally, an amendment leaves the original judgment effective and unimpaired.[ 6]
Where the court strikes part of a judgment, the remaining portion stands, so that the court
need not enter a new judgment with the stricken part omitted.[7] An order amending a
clerical error in a judgment does not supersede the judgment or incorporate it into the
order, and the clerk's act in correcting the judgment pursuant to that order is ministerial
and does not affect the materiality or finality of the judgment or order.[8] An amendment
or correction of a judgment is binding on those parties who were afforded an opportunity
to be heard,[9] but an amendment or modification changing the rights of the parties fixed
by a former judgment is not binding on a party in interest who was not afforded such an
opportunity.[10] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Any change in a judgment made
during the trial court's plenary power is treated as a modified or reformed judgment that
implicitly vacates and supersedes the prior judgment, unless the record indicates a contrary
intent. SLT Dealer Group, Ltd. v. AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc., 336 S.W.3d 822
(Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2011). [END OF SUPPLEMENT]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [FN1] Okla.-Gaines v.
Gaines, 1944 OK 142, 194 Okla. 343, 151 P.2d 393 (1944). [FN2] Ark.-T.J. Moss Tie Co.
v. Miller, 169 Ark. 657, 276 S.W. 586 (1925). Conn.-Coxe v. Coxe, 2 Conn. App. 543,
481 A.2d 86 (1984). Ill.-First Bank of Oak Park v. Rezek, 179 Ill. App. 3d 956, 128 Ill.
Dec. 806, 535 N.E.2d 20 (1st Dist. 1989). Okla.-Gaines v. Gaines, 1944 OK 142, 194
Okla. 343, 151 P.2d 393 (1944). As to amendments nunc pro tunc, see s 389. [FN3] Cal.McConville v. Superior Court within and for Los Angeles County, 78 Cal. App. 203, 248
P. 553 (2d Dist. 1926). Okla.-Mason v. Slonecker, 1923 OK 695, 92 Okla. 227, 219 P. 357
(1923). [FN4] Conn.-Commissioner of Transp. v. Rocky Mountain, LLC, 277 Conn. 696,
894 A.2d 259 (2006). As to the effect of opening a judgment, see s 470. [FN5] Cal.McConville v. Superior Court within and for Los Angeles County, 78 Cal. App. 203, 248
P. 553 (2d Dist. 1926). [FN6] Cal.-McConville v. Superior Court within and for Los
Angeles County, 78 Cal. App. 203, 248 P. 553 (2d Dist. 1926). [FN7] Ind.-Elliott v.
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Gardner, 113 Ind. App. 47, 46 N.E.2d 702 (1943). [FN8] Cal.-McConville v. Superior
Court within and for Los Angeles County, 78 Cal. App. 203, 248 P. 553 (2d Dist. 1926).
[FN9] Iowa-Samek v. Taylor, 203 Iowa 1064, 213 N.W. 801 (1927). Pa.-Altoona Trust
Co. v. Fockler, 311 Pa. 426, 165 A. 740 (1933). [FN10] N.Y.-Emmet v. Runyon, 139 A.D.
310, 123 N.Y.S. 1026 (2d Dep't 1910). Westlaw. (c) 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. CJS JUDGMENTS s 388
Consent judgment may supersede pleadings Ill.-City of Marseilles v. Radke, 287
Ill. App. 3d 757, 223 Ill. Dec. 181, 679 N.E.2d 125 (3d Dist. 1997).
In fact, John Springgate, Esq., agreed to a Consent Decree in the )
(NOTE: tellingly, the Panel fails to identify either contempt order as a criminal
conviction in this RPC 8.4(b) context, which is counter the characterizations of such the
Panel makes elsewhere. Given this admission by the Panel that such contempts orders are
not convictions of crimes, the SCR 111(5) approach falls apart, and the SBN is stuck
with meeting a clear and convincing evidence burden of proof that it completely failed to
even attempt to meet. At this point, the SBN probably wishes the transcripts and or audio
recordings it has sought so desperately to exclude (where Coughlin fully wanted to pick
them apart, conduct much more extension cross-examinations of everyone involved, and
all those whom he subpoenaed, and fully expose their systemic, fraudulent, reprehensible
misconduct (particularly that of the City of Reno Marshals), Judge Howard, Judge Nash
Holmes, Judge W. Gardner, etc., etc. The RJC and 2JDC decided not to join the party
King threw, and for good reason. The RMC either was not smart enough to do that, or had
to deal with the rash, imprudent, acts of judicial conduct that it had already committed to
record (60838 (abuse of the contempt power, misconduct in willfully violating Canon 1
Rule 1.1 in failing to abide by the Indigent Defense Order), 61901 (failure to recuse where
either per se required, or overwhelmingly indicated, violations of NRS 178.405,
ridiculously biased approach throughout the case (not right to confront the arresting officer
even), the RMC's Lisa Gardner trashing the timely notice of appeal Coughlin filed on
6/28/12, and, like in the case resulting in 60838, the RMC willingly and knowningly
countenance a multitude of instances of misconduct by City of Reno prosecutors and the
contract based court appointed defense counsel the RMC or City of Reno employs), and
Judge Nash Holmes' hysterical offensive, etc.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 130:4 to 130:25) (Exhibit 4 marked.) BY MR. KING: Q
I'm holding in my hand an order that was signed by you dated the 28th of February, 2012,
in the matter of 11 TR, which I assume stands for traffic, 26800 21. And it's an order
finding the defendant in contempt of court and imposing sanctions. Do you recall
executing such an order? A Yes, I did. I wrote it myself, and I signed it, and I found him
in contempt, in direct contempt during the proceeding, and right after that did the order. Q
I'm reading from Page 3 of your order, which is the final page that has your signature on it
before the service, certificate of service. But in that final paragraph it says, "The court
finds that the defendant's actions were intentional and done in utter disregard and contempt
for the court, and in the presence of the court, for purposes of disrupting and delaying the
proceedings and dishonoring the rule of law and this court, and constitute the
misdemeanor of criminal contempt, a violation of NRS 22.010. Good cause appearing
therefore, the following sanctions are imposed." HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 147:12 to
147:21) Q Is it proper for you to call something summary criminal contempt when you
cite to a civil contempt statute? A I don't know what is proper in your book, Mr.
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Coughlin. I know that the behavior that I saw, I know that I held you in contempt, I held a
precise -- you committed direct contempt in front of me in my court -- Q Criminal
contempt or civil contempt? A -- I held you in contempt on the spot, and then I went and
wrote the order.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 148:8 to 151:1) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge, did
your order characterize it as misdemeanor criminal contempt? A I do not have my order
in front of me, so you can consult my order. I believe it was misdemeanor contempt. I
believe it was criminal, direct criminal contempt. MR. COUGHLIN: I'll note on Page 3 at
line 14 it says, Misdemeanor of criminal contempt, a violation of NRS 22.010. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Which order are you referring to, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN:
February 28th order. Page 3, line 14. MR. KING: I think it's Exhibit No. 4. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Okay. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge, is NRS 22.010 a civil contempt
statute? MR. KING: Objection. THE WITNESS: Mr. Coughlin, you can consult the
statutes. I don't have my books right in front of me. NRS identifies in Chapter 22
contempt. And the Reno Municipal Code has sections relating that or incorporating those
sections into the Reno Municipal Code. Either way, what you did in front of me was direct
contempt, and I held you in direct contempt, and you went to jail for five days because of
it. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Is it permissible for a judge to call a civil contempt statute a
criminal contempt statute, vis-a-vis -- this is 22.010, a civil contempt statute. And the law
in Nevada does have NRS 199 -- I believe it's 240 -- which is the criminal contempt
statute. Is it permissible for you to cite to a -- easier to meet civil contempt statute, and
then recharacterize it as criminal contempt? MR. KING: Objection. THE WITNESS: Mr.
Coughlin, I'm not going to argue the law with you. You have the statutes there. You can
consult them yourself. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q On Page 3 at line 4, sub .9 -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Which exhibit, sir? MR. COUGHLIN: Exhibit 4, your Honor. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q You wrote, defendant lying to the court in response to direct questions
posed by the court. What were the lies in your vague order that lacks any specificity to
support a summary contempt finding, what were those lies that you failed to elucidate in
your order? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, that question is argumentative. Do you
want to rephrase it? MR. COUGHLIN: Sure. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q What were you
referring to when you wrote, "Defendant lying to the court in response to direct
questions"? A Well, it would be explained in the order there. I don't remember everything
at this time because I don't have it in front of me. But I do believe that you lied about or
misrepresented that you were not recording, because I believe you probably were. I don't
know. I believe you probably were. At the same time there were things that you and the
prosecutor were arguing about with regard to discovery. And she disagreed with you and
said you were lying to her about that. And there were other items that you went back and
forth about that appeared to me that you were not totally honest about...."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 151:7 to 153:15) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q When you
say, alternately you were probably lying. And then you put in your order, "I find by clear
and convincing evidence that he lied," is that ambiguous there? How do you reconcile
that? A How do I reconcile what? Q The fact that your order says you find by clear and
convincing evidence? A Because that's what I wrote. I did find by clear and convincing
evidence. I found by absolutely convincing evidence that you were behaving improperly in
court, as you are now, apparently. Q You're saying you found by clear and convincing
evidence that a licensed attorney lied to the court. And then you characterize that as
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probably, well, I kind of think he was. I think he was, because I know some unattributed
hearsay that I'm going to base it on. I'm going to get the order I think is wrong about the
bathroom break. I'm not going to have a marshal sign an affidavit. Then I'm going to remix
a criminal contempt statute with a summary contempt statute and pick and choose and
make it as retaliatory as I possibly can. Isn't that a fair characterization of your approach as
a judge? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Judge, you don't need to answer that question. That was
way out of line, and extremely argumentative. THE WITNESS: Thank you. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Do you want to ask a legitimate question, Mr. Coughlin? BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q What basis do you have to assert in your order that defendant lying to
the court in response to direct questions posed by the court with regard to his recording the
proceedings? A The opinion is self-explanatory. I do not have it in front of me, Mr.
Coughlin. You have access to the tapes and the opinion. And I stand by what I wrote, and I
stand by the proceedings that day. Q But it's kind of hard to pick inconsistencies in your
testimony today and those materials when you refuse to testify now, isn't it? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Argumentative, Mr. Coughlin. You are not assisting yourself here. MR.
COUGHLIN: I'm asking her. It's a question. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. MR.
COUGHLIN: Is that not true that she is subverting the legal process by refusing to testify
instead of saying, well, read the order and read -- listen to the recording, and therefore she
is not subjecting herself to putting forth any further inconsistencies. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, the time for argument is later, not now. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. So I'm
objecting. It's nonresponsive. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q What was your basis -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That objection is overruled."
NOTE: Judge Nash Holmes' assertion that she right after that (summarily finding
Coughlin in contempt at 4:00 pm on 2/27/12) did the order is not quite accurate, is it,
where FHE 4 is file stamped 2/28/12, with 3:47 p.m. Indicated as the time of filing.
Houston and the body of summary contempt jurisprudence place a high burden on entering
such orders nearly immediately after summarily incarcerating one (ie, Judge Nash Holmes
does not get twenty four hours to have her Marshals go down to the Washoe County Jail
and pull some strings and get Coughlin's personal property (the smart phone and micro sd
card of a practicing attorney, and his cell phone) released to them (which both the RMC
and WCSO have since lied about in attempting to cover such up, but, darn it, Deputy
Hodge told the truth to Coughlin on 3/19/12, and people are just going to have to deal with
that, and someone needs to explain the erasing of all the data on those items prior to their
being returned to Coughlin (causing massive damages to Coughlin's life and practice), and
the extent to which such being done has prejudiced Coughlin's ability to defend himself
(can't exactly offer into evidence the micro sd card or smart phone to prove that Coughlin
did not, in any way, lie to Judge Nash Holmes in response to her enormously inappropriate
sua sponte interrogation of him immediately after the one restroom break on that trial date,
and, contrary to Echeverria's fraudulent attempts to find that Coughlin failed to deny such
accusations, Coughlin most certainly did, in fact, he has denied each and every accusation
made in King's piffle ridden Complaint.
The fact that Echeverria and the SBN have clumsily sought to make disappear the
filings Coughlin submitted on 10/31/12, 11/9/12), 1/3/13, 1/17/13, and others only further
underscores the extent to which all involved, except for Coughlin, in this disciplinary
matter are enormously immoral, corrupt, and, in many ways, rather inept. Laughable is
weasel Clark Vellis talking himself out of his guity conscience stemming from being such
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a willing participant in the gang bang King and Echeverria put on on 11/14/12, where he
obviously relies on some attenuated and vague conception that a busy Nevada Supreme
Court will catch anything important that he might have missed in the filings included in
that which would be transmitted with the ROA (where Kent missed such because he
admitted not to looking at things, and not caring to, then he and King got caught lying
about whether the SBN had provided copies to each Panel member of the discs Coughlin
attached as exhibits to his various filings, and Vellis, laughably, swallows down King's
nonsensical explanation of just what will be included in the ROA, and just how such
determination are come to)
The Extent of the to be imposed pursuant to SCR 111 As a Result of
Conviction of the "Serious" Crime of Petit Larceny.
(LLL) The matter of the referral from the Supreme Court was considered in
conjunction with the allegations in the Complaint filed by the State Bar. While the
conviction at issue in the Supreme Court Order of June 7, 2012 may not alone warrant the
discipline recommended in this Panel's recommendations, taken as a whole and in
conjunction with the numerous and repeated other violations of the Rules of Professional
conduct, warrant, in this Panel's view, the discipline recommended herein.
(NOTE: actually, not one second of the eight hour plus hearing was at all devoted
to that which the 6/7/12 Order in 60838 ordered in referring the matter to a disciplinary
panel. King put on not one shred of evidence, or argument even, respecting the nature
and extent of the punishment appropriate for such conviction. Further, Panel Chair
Echeverria continually obstructed Coughlin's right, under SCR 123 and Laub, etc. to
compare his case to others (like the very same Stephen R. Harris, Esq., that Judge Beesley
testified so glowingly about during Mr. Harris disciplinary hearing (which was given more
time (and Grundy got to file a 54 page brief therein) despite Mr. Harris only being charge
with two RPC violations, ones to which he admitted to, even, plus, Mr. Harris was
provided with the 30 days written notice by the Panel, after the Panel was chose, rather
than, as occurred in this matter, the SBN's King slapping together a notice and a laughably
skint DowSoE, then having Laura Peters lie in her Certificate of Mailing respecting when
it was mailed, then hold a formal disciplinary hearing six judicial days after the Order
appointing the Panel was even constructively noticed to Coughlin (especially hard to
address those matters SBN President Flaherty spoke to in his 2/25/13/ Petition in ADKT
0482 or get a SCR 103(6), etc. conference or addres SCR 110(4) issues where NNDB
Susich refuses to communicate with Coughlin in any manner, as was also the case with
Echeverria, on top of the SBN providing all the misdirection and lies it could muster.
Further, by kitchen sink-ing it, here, the Panel fails to do that which the Court
ordered it to do, where it does not specify the nature and extent of the punishment for
the conviction in 60838, but rather lumps everything together in a ridiculously
overwrought, and, frankly, enormously fraudulent recommendation).
DECISION AND RECOMMENDATION
In assessing the fonn of discipline to recommend, the Panel has accounted for a
number of aggravating and mitigating factors that must be considered. The Panel finds that
the State Bar has shown by clear and convincing evidence the presence of at least eight of
the eleven aggravating circumstances to be considered in accordance with the provisions
of SCR 102.5(1).
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First, while there have been no fonnal prior disciplinary proceedings by the State
Bar, the record establishes that Coughlin has been disciplined by way of sanctions on at
least four prior occasions.
Second, the record reflects, at least with respect to the Merliss matter and the two
criminal trials, that the pattern of conduct was for selfish reasons: to preserve an unlawful
tenancy and to delay and prolong criminal convictions.
Third, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that the pattern of
misconduct is consistent (NOTE: too bad King failed to notice plead pattern on
continuing misconduct in his Complaint) and includes, without limitation: the disruption
of the proceedings; the refusal to heed the directions and admonitions of the court; the
injection of irrelevant material and matters; the filing of lengthy, irrelevant and
nonsensical pleadings; the willingness to lie to court and counsel and the inability to
understand and follow the rules of evidence and procedure.
Fourth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has
committed multiple violations of the Rules of Professional conduct, as more fully
discussed above.
Fifth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin engaged in a
bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process by failing to file the pleading required by
SCR 105(2) and instead filing several lengthy, irrelevant and nonsensical pleadings,
mostly pleadings filed in other matters, and refiled in the disciplinary action under a
similar but different caption. In some instances, Coughlin simply crossed out the case
name and hand wrote the names of the parties in the disciplinary proceeding.
Sixth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has refused to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct despite having been sanctioned on at
least four prior occasions.
Seventh, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has shown a
complete indifference to making restitution and has so far ignored orders to do so.
Eighth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that some of Coughlin's
misconduct involves illegal conduct that evinces fraud and dishonesty. For example, he
was convicted of one instance of petit larceny and is awaiting trial on a second.
The Panel finds few potentially mitigating factors to be present. While the Panel
finds that there is a lack of prior public discipline by the State Bar, the Panel notes that
Coughlin has been publicly criticized in the Joshi matter, has been heavily sanctioned with
an adverse award of substantial attorney's fees in the Merliss matter, and has been
incarcerated at least twice for criminal contempt of court. Although there has been an
absence of prior public discipline by the State Bar, there have been multiple instances of
judicial censure and sanction.
Although Coughlin suggested at the hearing that he may have personal or
emotional problems or a mental disability, he denied that he needed further help.
Furthermore, no medical evidence was presented regarding the potential impact of a
mental disability, no evidence that the disability was the cause of the misconduct, no
evidence of recovery by rehabilitation and no evidence that a recovery has arrested the
misconduct and that a recurrence is unlikely to occur.
These potentially mitigating factors are weak at best and do not excuse the well
established numerous and repeated violations of the Rules of Professional conduct and do
not outweigh the aggravating circumstances established overwhelmingly by the State Bar.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The Panel recommends that the Respondent be ordered:
(1) Irrevocably disbarred by the Supreme Court. While irrevocable disbarment is
clearly the harshest form of discipline, the unusual circumstances here, compounded by
the repetitive nature of the misconduct prior . to and even during the disciplinary process
and hearing, clearly warrant the level of punishment recommended.
(2) That his temporary suspension be continued pending final resolution of this
matter.
(3) Within three (3) days of the effective date of disbarment, to demonstrate to Bar
that he has placed all his Nevada clients with other counsel, otherwise concluded the
representation, or with the assistance of Bar Counsel thereafter attempted to expeditiously
aid any
remaining client in finding new counsel.
(4) To pay the costs associated with these proceedings pursuant to SCR 120. "
10
INDEX OF HEARING EXHIBITS (SBN 'S 1 TO 13) Coughin's 14-15 Chair's 16
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1 -Index of Documents Selected for Hearing Packet by SBN's Pat King in attempt
to skirt his lie that he lacked a certified copy of every Order attached to filings
contained therein and containing numerous fraudulent Proofs of Service by the SBN
page 333
- p. 336 5 pages of what King purports RPC excerpts (1.2, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.5A, 4.1,
4.4, 8.1, 8.2, 8.4)
- p. 341 8/23/12 Complaint SBN v. Coughlin:
-Exhibit 1: 11/30/11 RMC Judge Howard Judgment of Conviction and Court Order in
22176 candy bar 3/15/12 Judge Elliott Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC in appeal
CR11-2064
-Exhibit 2: 11/30/11 RMC Judge Howard Order for Summary Punishment of contempt
Committed in View and Presence of the Court in 11 CR 22176
-Exhibit 3: 3/12/12 RMC Judge Nash Holmes Order of 3/14/12 with "clear and
convincing" language.
2 -Attorney Fees Order of $42,050 by Judge Flanagan in CV11-03628 6/28/12 pursuant
to 4/19/12 Motion for Attorney's Fees by Richard G. HIll, Esq., within appeal of summary
eviction in RJC rev2011-001708 by Judge Sferrazza page 387
3 -Order After Trial by Judge Linda Gardner of 4/10/09 in DV08-01168 that WLS
cited as the sole reason for firing Coughlin from domestic violence attorney position page
392
4 -contempt Order 2 28 12 Judge Holmes 26800 Order Finding Defendant in contempt
and Imposing Sanctions, page 407
5 -Order attached to Complaint 3 12 12 Judge Holmes attached to Complaint Order
26800 fed clear and convincing burden for RPC standard by SBN page 412
6 -Letter dated February 14, 2012 to Mr. Coughlin from Mr. King 2 14 12 partial
letter from SBN King excised Hill's 1 14 12 ng12-0204 grievance, so no notice of it, not
pled page 419
7 -Two-page letter dated March 9, 2011 from Mr. Coughlin to State Bar Coughlin's 3
9 12 fax to SBN regarding delayed receipt of 2 14 12 letter from King re Hill's grievance
page 421
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8 -Two page letter dated March 14, 2012 from Judge Holmes to SBN Northern Office
3 14 12 complaint against Coughlin to SBN North page 424
9 -Affidavit of Poverty 3 7 12 Affidavit of Poverty lacking caption or certification by
RMC D3 page 427
10-Order in Case 11 CR 22176 RMC Judge Howard 12 15 11 Order denying IFP for
Transcript Preparation and New Trial and Recusal page 431
11- Order for Summary Punishment RMC Judge Howard 11 30 11 Order for Summary
contempt incident to defense of 60838 conviction page 543
12-Order Affirming Ruling of RMC Judge Elliott 3 15 12 Order Affirming RMC Judge
Howard's conviction in candy bar petty larceny CR11-2064 page 439
13-Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal Judge Elliott 8 27 12
CR12-1262 Order Dismissing Appeal of trespass Conviction by Judge William Gardner
in RMC 11 CR 26405 page 444
14-New Verified Response Coughlin 11 14 12 New Verified Response after Chair
Echeverria's threatening misstatements of the law re default page 448
15-Declaration Verified Response with two DVD discs Coughlin's 11 15 12 Declaration
and Verified Response page 509
16-Emergency Ex Parte Motion Chair Echeverria's 11 14 12 incomplete and secretive
exhibit entered sua sponte, in his attempt to one up Judge Nash Holmes as to
transmogrifying a plenary formal disciplinary hearing into a summary
contempt/disciplinary hearing, where no copy of Exhibit 16 was presented to Coughlin at
the time Exhibit 16's admission, and copy incomplete lacking discs page 543 and where
that which is represented in Exhibit 16 is an incomplete copy of the filing itself (an "edit",
Bar Counsel King might say, if Coughlin was seeking it's admission, where the Exhibits
that were attached to what Exhibit 16 purports to be, are not present (because neither the
SBN nor the Panel Chair (and Panel Member Kent indicated he wouldn't care to review
any materials on an attachments in cd/dvd form ever submitted by Coughlin anyways)
seem to be able to burn a cd/dvd very easily, much less review the materials collected
therein and presented by Coughlin in various filings),
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8/23/12 SBN V. Z. COUGHLIN SCR 105 COMPLAINT, NG12-0204, 0434, 0435:

"PLEASE TAKE notice that pursuant to Supreme Court Rule ("SCR)105(2) a
VERIFIED RESPONSE OR ANSWER to this Complaint must be filed with the Office of
Bar Counsel, State Bar of Nevada, 9456 Double R Boulevard, Ste. B, Reno, Nevada,
89521, within twenty (20) days of service of this Complaint. Procedure regarding service
is addressed in SCR 109. Complainant, State Bar of Nevada ("State Bar"), by and through
its Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick O. King, is informed and believes as follows:
Zachery Coughlin ("Respondent"), Bar number 9473, is a member of the State Bar
of Nevada admitted on March 25, 2005. Respondent's date of birth is September 27, 1976.
The address that Respondent has on file with the State Bar of Nevada, in accordance with
Rule of Professional conduct ("RPC") 79(1 )(a) is Post Office Box 3961, Reno NV 89505.
Respondent engaged in acts of misconduct warranting the imposition of professional
discipline. The State Bar alleges as follows:
1. Multiple grievances were received by the Office of Bar Counsel between the
period of January 14 and March 15, 2012, concerning Respondent. Due to the serious
allegations of misconduct, grievance files were opened and an investigation was initiated
by Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King.
2. Respondent was advised of the grievances via U.S. mail, e-mail and by a brief
meeting with Mr. King at the State Bar Office in Reno. Respondent did not cooperate with
the investigation and rather than respond to the grievances as requested, Respondent sent
non-responsive and disparaging e-mails.
3. Respondent has not made a request to be placed on disability status, nor has he
acknowledged that he may have mental infirmity, illness, or addiction.
4. The investigation of the grievances against Respondent shows a serious pattern
of misconduct.
5. On September 9, 2011, Respondent shoplifted a candy bar and cough drops a
Wal-Mart store with an approximate value of fourteen dollars ($14.00). On November 30,
2011, Municipal Court Judge Kenneth R. Howard found Respondent guilty of the offense
Petit Larceny, a violation of RMC 8.10.040. Respondent appealed the judgment of The
judgment of conviction was affirmed on appeal. See Exhibit 1.
6. During the trial Respondent's conduct was so disruptive that Judge Howard
Respondent in direct contempt of Court and sentenced him to serve three (3) days in See
Exhibit 2.
7. On August 20, 2011, Respondent was arrested on a second larceny charge for
stealing a cell phone. Those charges are currently pending in Reno Justice Court.
8. Respondent was again arrested on January 13, 2012, for allegedly abusing 911
services, a gross misdemeanor.
9. On February 21. 2012. Respondent filed a document entitled, notice of
Appearance Entry of Plea of Not guilty , Waiver of Arraignment, Motion to Dismiss, etc.
in one of his pending criminal matters, Case No. RCR-2012 065630, City of Reno v.
Zachary Coughlin. The document clearly shows Respondent's unprofessional, disruptive
conduct, and lack of respect for the court and opposing counsel.
10. Respondent was arrested on November 13, 2011 by Reno Police Department
and charged with trespassing, a misdemeanor, for which he was later convicted.
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11. The circumstances leading to the above-mentioned arrest are as follows: at an

hearing Justice of the Peace Peter Sferrazza ordered that Respondent vacate the home he
was renting effective November 1, 2011. After the locks were changed and the notice was
posted on the front door the owner, Dr. Merliss, discovered that someone had broken into
the home and was barricaded in the basement. The Reno Police tried to coax whoever was
in the basement to open the door. Dr. Merliss was forced to kick open the door where the
Reno Police found Respondent. Respondent had broken into the home and living in the
basement. Respondent was arrested for criminal trespass and was subsequently convicted
of that charge.
12. Respondent, representing himself as co-counsel, filed a 36-page motion to
dismiss on March 5, 2012. The motion was denied by Judge William Gardner and was
determined to be without merit. The motion, on its face, demonstrates that Respondent
lacks competence to practice law.
13. Once Respondent was evicted, an order was obtained to remove his belongings
from the home. Respondent interfered with the contractor who was hired to remove
Respondent's personal belongings. The police were called and after talking with
Respondent they recommended that he find something else to do. Respondent refused to
their advice and was subsequently arrested by the Reno police.
14. In the case of City of Reno vs. Zachary Barker Coughlin, Case No. 11 TR
26800 21, a trial was held on a traffic citation issued to Respondent. The matter was called
at approximately 3:00 p.m. and concluded without a verdict at about 4:30 p.m. after the
court held Respondent in criminal contempt of court for his behavior and activities
committed in the direct presence of the court during trial.
15. In a March 12, 2012 Order, Municipal Court Judge Dorothy Nash Homes
found by "clear and convincing evidence" that Mr. Coughlin committed numerous acts of
attorney misconduct. See Exhibit 3. Judge Holmes explained in her Order that after
Respondent served his five-day contempt of court sanction imposed by the court on
February 27, 2012, Respondent fax-filed to the court a 224-page document. Judge Holmes
found that the document contained rambling references to his personal life and was
incoherent.
16. In her Order, Judge Homes found by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent violated Rule of Professional conduct ("RPC") 1.1 (Competence), RPC 1.3
(Diligence), RPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), RPC 3.2 (Expediting
Litigation), RPC 3.3(a) (Candor toward the Tribunal), RPC 3A(e) (Fairness to Opposing
Party and Counsel). RPC 8.4 (c) (Engaging in Dishonesty. Fraud. Deceit or
Misrepresentation) and RPC 8.4(d) Engage in conduct that is Prejudicial to the
Administration of Justice).
17. Respondent filed Affidavits of Poverty in Support of his Motion to Proceed
Informa Pauperis, wherein he fails to disclose that he is a licensed attorney and instead
under Employment and Self-Employment he identifies himself as a "Jack of All Trades".
18. Despite a claim of poverty in the above mentioned affidavits, Respondent told
the Court that his incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his clients.
19. On March 22, 2012, Respondent appeared at the Reno Municipal Court
wearing (smiley face) flannel pajamas. Respondent became argumentative and Marshals
were called to were called to ask him to leave.
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25. On April 10, 2009, District Judge Linda Gardner of the Second Judicial District
Court executed an "Order After Trial," in case No. DV08-01168. In that case, Respondent
represented the Defendant/Counter Claimant. In her Order Judge Gardner explained
Respondent's inappropriate behavior in part as follows: The most troubling aspect of this
case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic and disrespectful presentation at trial; Mr.
Coughlin's inability to understand a balance sheet; his failure to conduct discovery and his
lack of knowledge with regard to the rules of evidence and trial procedure. All of this was
compounded with a continuously antagonistic presentation of the case that resulted in a
shift from a fairly simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive
amount of time.
27. In light of the forgoing Respondent violated RPC 1.1 (Competence); RPC 1.2
(Diligence); RPC 3. 1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions): RPC 3.3 (Candor to the
Tribunal): RPC 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel); RPC 3.S (Impartiality and
Decorum of the Tribunal); RPC 4. 1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others): RPC 4.4
(Respect for the Rights of Third Persons); RPC SA (Relations with Opposing Counsel);
RPC 8.1 (Disciplinary Matters); RPC 8.2 (Judicial and Legal Officials); and RPC 8.4
(Misconduct).
WHEREFORE, Complainant prays as follows:
1. That a hearing be held pursuant to Nevada Supreme Court Rule 105:
2. That Respondent be assessed the costs of the disciplinary proceeding pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 120(1); and
3.That pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 102, such disciplinary action be taken by
Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board against Respondent as may be deemed appropriate
the circumstances."
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INDEX TO EXHIBITS 8/23/12 Complaint SBN v. Coughlin, NG12-0204, NG12-0434, NG120435:
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1. Exhibit 1: -11/30/11 RMC Judge Howard Judgment of Conviction and Court Order in
22176 candy bar; -3/15/12 Judge Elliott Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC in appeal
CR11-2064
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2. Exhibit 2: 11/30/11 RMC Judge Howard Order for Summary Punishment of contempt
Committed in View and Presence of the Court in 11 CR 22176
3. Exhibit 3: 3/12/12 RMC Judge Nash Holmes Order of 3/12/12 with "clear and
convincing" language.
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Time to add some more Richard G. Hill, Esq. chestnuts to the lie pile, especially
considering Hill's testimony under oath at Coughlin's 11/14/12 Disciplinary
Hearing and the follow sworn testimony by Hill from the 6/18/12 Trial, viewed in
conjunction with the statements Hill made to the RPD Officer Chris Carter and
Sargent Marcia Lopez just prior to and at the time of the 11/13/11 custodial arrest
of Coughlin at his former home law office for trespassing:
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THE COURT: When Mr. Hill is here to ask some questions that I think you've
explored the possibilities, and I don't know what else you can offer the Court in
terms of this case via cross-examination. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
I'll wrap this up quickly. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mr. Hill, at any time on that day,
November 13th, did the owner of the premises warn the arrestee to leave the
property? A I think the message was communicated. Q Via what medium? A The
fact that you were handcuffed and arrested. Didn't you get the picture? Q Okay,
prior to the handcuffing and the arresting, did anybody say, "You need to leave the
premises?" A I didn't hear that. Q Nobody said that? A I did not hear that, sir. Q
Did you say it? A No. Q Did Dr. Merliss? A Not that I heard. Q Did the police? A
No, not that I heard. Q So, nobody that you heard of warned the person arrested
for trespassing? Page -110 (see transcript of 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial in RMC
11 CR 26405.
Now, compare Hill's sworn testimony of 6/18/12 in RMC 11 CR 26405 with his
sworn testimony at Coughlin's formal disciplinary hearing, and it becomes clear
that Hill finally figure out that an essential element of a criminal trespass conviction
under RMC 8.10.010 is a failure to leave by one after being warned to do so...so,
magically, at the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing in NG12-0204 (see 61901
and 62337) Hill managed to "remember" such a warning...well, sort of...not
initially, then he couldn't keep straight whether the Police identified themselves or
not, whether three minutes intervened before some such "order" to "come out,
Zach", or whether there was just some vague "coaxing".
However, the Nevada Supreme Court's Order of 7/24/13 in 60838 may say
otherwise, where it reads:
Hill's associate Baker's 4/19/12 Motion for Attorney's Fees in 03628, reads:
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES Respondent, MATT MERLISS, by
and through his counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, LTD., and CASEY D. BAKER,
ESQ. moves the court, pursuant to NRS 69.050 and NRS 7.085, for an award of
attorney's fees. This motion is based on the above-referenced statutes, the record
on appeal ("ROA"), the points and authorities below, and all papers and pleadings
on file herein. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
1. This is an appeal from a summary eviction entered in the Reno Justice
Court ("RJC"). Reference is made to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order for Summary Eviction entered by the RJC on October 27, 2012 for the facts
of the underlying eviction. ROA, Vol. II, pp. 75-80.
2. Coughlin filed his first notice of appeal in the eviction case on November
3, 2011, two days after he was properly and lawfully locked out oft he property.
ROA, Vol. III, pp. 229-233. Coughlin inexplicably filed an additional notice of
appeal on November 23, 2011. ROA, Vol. III, P.5.
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3. Since filing his first notice of appeal, Coughlin has deliberately engaged
in a pattern of abusive, vexatious, and most importantly, expensive behavior in both
this appeal and in the case below. Coughlin continued to file motions and other
documents, and engage in other inappropriate and time-consuming behavior in the
RJC, both before and after the first ROA was finally sent up to this court, some
seven weeks after the first notice of appeal was filed. The court is asked to take
judicial notice, pursuant to NRS 47.130, that the RJC sent up a supplement to the
ROA on January 4, 2012, which consisted of 21 additional items.
(NOTE: Actually, as evinced by the RJC's Supplement filed in the 2JDC on
4/1/13, which did actually contain those 21 additional items (though, still,
curiously, failed to contain three of Coughlin's filing on 12/22/11 speaking to his
right to a stay pursuant to NRS 40.385, including the fact that Coughlin deposited
the required $250, not once, but twice (on 12/13/11 and, again, on 12/22/11). Also
troubling is the fact that, even in such 4/1/13 Supplemental, which contained filings
between 12/19/11 and 1/4/12, the RJC failed to file stamp Coughlin's timely Notice
of Appeal of 12/26/11 appeal Judge Sferrazza horrific 12/21/11 Order Resolving
Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, which may be the most abominable
eviction order ever entered in the Western States...such failure to originally transmit
Coughlin's 12/26/11 Notice of Appeal, in addition to failing to file stampe it, for
whatever reason, is of concern too where footnote 5 on page 5 of Judge Flanagan's
3/30/12 Order Denying Coughlin's appeal purports to justify Judge Flanagan's
failure to adjudicate the portion thereof appeal such 12/21/11 Order Resolving
Coughlins' 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, where Judge
Flanagan, strangely, indicates that Coughlin's alleged failure to identify any
procedural error in the RJC's setting of the hearing somehow absolves Judge
Flanagan of his duty to adjudicate Coughlin's appeal of such 12/21/11 Order, which
was appealed for a multitude of reasons, not all of which even related to the RJC's
failure to abide by NRS 40.253(7)-(8), which, regardless, was indeed one of the
procedural errors in the RJC's setting of the hearing that Coughlin identified.
What Flangan's Order reads like at footnote 5, on page 5 of such 3/30/12 Order is,
some might say, watch this, I am a judge and if I make a finding, poof, there goes
any liability my friends at the RJC may face as a result of violating Nevada law
requiring such hearing be held within ten days of your filing such Motion to
Contest Personal Propert Lien...have fun with that collateral bar, buddy... which is
not the most judicial of looks for Judge Flanagan to be donning.)
NRS 40.253(7)-(8) required the RJC to hold such hearing within 10 days of
Coughlin's 11/16/11 filing...instead, Richard G. Hill, Esq., in his 11/21/11 written
correspondence to Coughlin committed professional misconduct in implying an
improper ability to influence a tribunal (and implication which, apparently, turned
out to be prescient, as Hill indeed was able to legislate away such hold the hearing
on Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien within 10 days of its
11/16/11 filing, on account that Hill, allegedly was to be traveling on vacation for
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the six weeks following the original 11/22/11 hearing date which Hill and Baker
simply failed to show up to, (where Hill indicated Coughlin would not get a
hearing until after Hill returned from his vacation six weeks later.
Hill was not even the attorney of record in that matter, which brings the
utility of his testifying to matters involved in the justice court proceeding in 1708
into question (especially where the SBN's allegedly filed its 10/12/12 DowSoE and
therein limited those matters to which Hill would be allowed to testify to pursuant
to SCR 105(2)(c), where such designation of witnesses and summary of evidence
required included with such Notice of Hearing (which must be provided by the
Hearing Panel (ie, not by Asst. Bar Counsel King weeks before such Hearing
Panel is even chosen by the Board Chair...with such misconduct by King being
more clearly put in relief upon a review of SBN President Flaherty's 2/25/13
Petition in ADKT No. 0484 in the Matt of the Amendment to SCR 103, SCR 105,
SCR 105.5....
Regarding Appointment of Disciplinary Hearing Panel Members filing with
the Nevada Supreme Court. SBN Presdent Flaherty's assertions therein strongly
indict the misconduct committed by Asst. Bar Counsel King and Clerk of Court
Laura Peters, where such reads: Board Chairs also hear all preliminary motions on
a case until the appointment of a Hearing Panel, at which time the Hearing Panel
Chair (panel Chair) hears such motions. (NOTE: such may be the practice, but it
goes against express text of SCR 110(4), which provides that it is the Chair of the
Disciplinary Board not the Chair of the Hearing Panel, whom rules on motions to
quash subpoenas (they tend to be extremely important, such as in Coughlin's case,
where a multitude of essential issue involved therein required to use of subpoenas
to adequately litigate (such as addressing the insufficiency of service of process of
the Complaint issue wherein Clerk of Court Peters made express indications to
Coughlin with respect to the practices and policies and SCR 105(4) rules of
procedure adopted by the NNDB (after receiving approval from the SBN Board of
Governors...though both NDB Chair Susich and Panel Chair Echeverria, and the
SBN as a whole, refuse to provide Coughlin with any actual written, published such
rule of procedure so adopted...) vis a vis whether Peters mailing via Certified
Mailing on 8/23/12 the Complaint at issue in 62337 would be asserted, per SCR
109 as effecting service of the Complaint should such Certified Mailing not yield
the return of a signed by the Respondent Return Receipt Request card (SBN
Clerk of Court Peters own 10/9/11 Affidavit of Laura Peters (which the SBN never
served on Coughlin until including such within 3,200 pages of materials the SBN
only had delivered to Coughlin some four judicial days before the 11/14/12 formal
hearing (an SCR 105(2)(c) violation compounded by the SBN refusal to allow
Coughlin to inspect up to three days before the hearing where such violation
is particularly unethical given the SBN's fraudulent failure to disclose (never mind
promptly disclose) the summary...of the evidence against the attorney...together
with a brief stament of the facts to which each will testify... with respect to any of
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the witnesses, really, but particularly with respect to the two witnesses whom were
only designated as such one judicial day prior to the 11/14/12 formal hearing,
where, as was the case with all the witnesses, the SBN completely failed to provide
anything in the way of satisfying its obligation under SCR 105(2)(c) to give
Coughlin a summary...of the evidence against the attorney much less a brief
statement of the facts to which each witness will testify where witnesses or
evidence, other than for impeachment, which became known to bar counsel
thereafter, and which bar counsel intends to use at the hearing, shall be promptly
disclosed to the attorney...
(NOTE: The which became known to bar counsel thereafter bit was
allegedly the case with respect to witnesses NVB Judge Beesley and WLS's Elcano,
despite Beesley himself testifying that he contacted the SBN via letter about
six weeks after the 3/15/12 hearing in the NVB wherein Coughlin appeared less
than an hour after being burglarized by Gayle Kern, Esq., and the WCSO, in direct
violation of RJC Judge Schroeder's wrongfully issued anyway summary eviction
Lockout Order of that morning) (11/14/12 HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 24:10 to
24:13).
Such failure to promptly disclose witnesses Beesley and Elcano is
particularly prejudicial where the Panel Chair refused to for good cause
shown,...allow additional time, not to exceed 90 days, to conduct the hearing.
So, where SCR 105(2)(c) requires the Hearing Panel provide Coughlin at
least 30 day's written notice of the hearing, 62337 saw such Hearing Panel not
even being chosen and constructively noticed to the NRCP 6(e) made applicable
via SCR 119(3) until six judicial days prior to the 11/14/12 formal disciplinar
hearing where NNDB Board Chair Susich's 10/30/12 Order designating the
Hearing Panel and Panel Chair was allegedly (though not sufficiently indicated
pursuant to Mikohn where Clerk of Court Peters Certificate of Mailing of such
Order fails to indicate such was placed in the mail to be picked up for mailing to
go out that day) placed in the SBN's outgoing mail box (before or after the mail
was picked up for that day is not clear) on that day, 10/30/12.
Now, consider that, in the context of SBN President Flaherty's 2/25/12
Petition in ADKT 0484, where such reads:
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Also, HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 180:13 to 180:22) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.

King, you cited in one of your pleadings a request that all issues pending before you be
heard at one hearing. There was a letter you sent to the state Bar that you quote in one of
your pleadings. THE WITNESS (COUGHLIN): I requested that? MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Yes, sir. THE WITNESS: You haven't read my pleadings. My whole point was
bifurcating, how ridiculous it is to glom all these together. I'm so glad you just said that on
the record.
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King's SCR 111(4) Petition in 61901 provides a defensive collateral estoppel bar or
party opponent admission that the dubious criminal trespass conviction reported therein
somehow supports an attempt to permanently disbar Coughlin in 62337: 3. As evidenced
by the documentation submitted herein, Respondent has been convicted of a crime which
triggers the reporting requirements of Bar Counsel under SCR 111(4). Further,
King's failure to file any such SCR 111 Petition (whether one under (4) or (6)) for the
alleged crimes the 12/14/12 FOFCOL characterizes the criminal contempt convictions
to be provides a further defensive collateral estoppel bar.
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As there was not motion to dismiss pending in the precursor non-payment

summary eviction proceeding brough in Rev2011-001492, the landlord (and justice court
Judge Sferrazza ) should have been collaterally estopped from ordering any NRS
118A.355(5) rent escrow deposit, and also from finding that, rather than evicting Coughlin
in retaliation for engaging in various protected activities under NRS 118A.510, that the
lanldord utlized a no-cause summary eviction proceeding to evict Coughlin for nonpayment of rent).
Plaintiff retains right to dismiss complaint voluntarily while motion to dismiss is
pending. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 12(b), 41(a). Gallen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and
For County of Clark, 1996, 911 P.2d 858, 112 Nev. 209.
It was completely inappropriate for 2JDC Judge Elliott to dismiss Coughlin's suit
in CV11-01896 against WLS and the same CAAW whose Executive Board Judge Elliott
sat on on a NRCP 12(b)(4) insufficiency of service of process basis, where such does not
even get to the merits of the case (and was not dismissed on the pleadings but on the
sufficiency of either the service or the process), only to then award attorney's fees.
Conclusiveness of adjudication: Dismissal of case for plaintiff's failure to state
claim upon which relief can be granted constituted adjudication on merits so as to
render matters raised res judicata where plaintiff on appeal from judgment of dismissal did
not assign as error abuse of discretion of court in not granting leave to amend, did not
thereafter seek any leave to amend its complaint and order of dismissal had been made
with prejudice as to each defendant. NRCP 12(b) and (1-7), 41(b), 56. Zalk-Josephs Co. v.
Wells Cargo, Inc., 1965, 400 P.2d 621, 81 Nev. 163. Judgment 654
In assessing motion to dismiss on pleadings, trial court assumes that underlying
facts support allegations of claim, but in assessing motion for attorney fees, trial court
must determine whether plaintiff had reasonable grounds for its claims, which analysis
depends on actual circumstances of case rather than hypothetical set of facts favoring
plaintiff. N.R.S. 18.010, subd. 2(b); Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 12(b)(5). Bergmann v. Boyce,
1993, 856 P.2d 560, 109 Nev. 670.
Where the 12/14/12 FOFCOL purports to find that Coughlin still has not filed a
verified answer or response, Coughlin cannot be said to have waived all the detailed an
intricate basis for dismissing the SBN's Complaint that are not more readily apparent to
him, which is good, considering that the SBN still has not served Coughlin the Complaint
in the matter now on appeal in 62337:
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Waiver of defenses: Before a defendant files a responsive pleading such as an

answer, that defendant may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency
of process, and/or insufficiency of service of process, and such a defense is not waived by
being joined with one or more other defenses. Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 2000, 6 P.3d 982, 116 Nev. 650.
Now, just like how 2JDC Judge Elliott dismissed Coughlin's case in CV11-01896
against the very Elcano and the WLS for which he is the Exec. Director, so to must this
Court (via a Writ, or otherwise) or the Panel dismiss the SBN's Complaint for failing to
effect service of process within the 120 days allowable under NRCP 4, by way of SCR
119(3). Fair's fair. See 60317.
A defendant may raise its defenses, including those relating to jurisdiction and
service, in a responsive pleading; objections to personal jurisdiction, process, or service of
process are waived, however, if not made in a timely motion or not included in a
responsive pleading such as an answer. Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
To avoid waiver of a defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency
of process, or insufficiency of service of process, the defendant should raise its defenses
either in an answer or pre-answer motion. Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
Alleged tortfeasor's appearance, after its motion to quash service of process for
lack of personal jurisdiction was denied, would not amount to a waiver of its challenge to
the district court's jurisdiction. Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of
Clark, 2000, 6 P.3d 982, 116 Nev. 650.
Defense of insufficiency of service of process was waived by defendant's

responsive pleading filed in aid of its motion to set aside default judgment. NRCP
12(b). Phillips v. Incline Manor Ass'n, 1975, 530 P.2d 1207, 91 Nev. 69.
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which shall...give the attorney at least 30 days' written notice of its time and
place where the notice shall be accompanied by a summary prepared by bar
counsel of the evidence against the attorney, and the names of the witnesses
bar counsel intends to call for other than impeachment, together with a brief
statement of the facts to which each will testify, all of which may be inspected
up to 3 days prior to the hearing (which the USPS Track & Confirm proves was
not even picked up for mailing by the USPS until 10/16/12, and not even delivered
to Coughlin's mail box until 10/22/12 (seemingly owing to the delay's incident to
Coughlin's SCR 79 address being changed upon the Reno Police Departments
Sargent Olive Miller and Alan AJ Weaver continuing with their 42 USC 1983,
Soldal v. Cook County rampage that RJC Judge Scott Pearson so thoroughly
endorsed in Rev2012-078432 at the 10/2/12 hearing on Coughlin's Verified
Complaint for illegal lockout; where Coughlin submitted his Official USPS Change
of Address on 10/5/12 to the downtown Reno Postal Station personally)
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As
though Coughlin did (though he was not granted a default like the one
Gayle Kern, Esq., obtained on 3/15/12 (at 8:33 a.m., for a summary eviction
proceeding based on Kern's pursuit of a no cause summary eviction that was set for
8:30 a.m., where Kern smirked at Coughlin as she was walking out of the
courtroom while he was walking in (NV Energy and Kern's conspiring to refuse to
allow Coughlin electricity for an entire week in his former home law officer at
1422 E. 9th St. #2 put some limitations on Coughlin's alarm clock navigation, as did
RMC Judge Nash Holme's five day summary incarceration of Coughlin's between
2/27/12 and 3/2/12 (and the concomitant $300 bill from the towing/impound yard
where Coughlin and his mother, Mary Barker had to retrieve Coughlin's 1996
Honda Accord with 115k miles on it (a gift in 2002 from his beloved grandmother
Ruth Hugh Mom Barker, whose tradition of activism he carries on...also,
Coughlin, with a ton of help from his mother, managed to get his CLE done and bar
dues paid by the 3/1/12 deadline as well...) and her, not incident to arrest, and
without any written order or warrant, confiscating from where such had already
been booked into Coughlin's personal property at the Washoe County Jail, then
practicing attorney Coughlin's smart phone, a separate micro sd data card
(apparently the in Rev2012-000374 against Coughlin incident to her very own RPC
3.5A violation (RPC 3.5A Relations With Opposing Counsel: When a lawyer
knows or reasonably should know the identity of a lawyer representing an
opposing party, he or she should not take advantage of the lawyer by causing any
default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing
lawyer's intention to proceed.) where Kern, via Coughlin serving on her his
3/7/12 Tenant's Answer therein, identifying himself as his own attorney in the
matter, was well aware that she was taking a default (though NRS 40.253(6)
does not allow for such taking a default where Coughlin had filed a detailed
Motion/Tenant's Answer of 3/8/12), as Kern was still plenty able to test the
truthfulness and sufficiency of the affidavit to a more full extent than Coughlin
would have been able to so test Kern's or her client's landlord's affidavit, given
such had not even been filed by the time Kern was walking out of RJC Judge
Schroeder's courtroom at 8:35 a.m. (the audio record reveals Kern did not file such
affidavit in open court...which would have violated NRS 40.253(6) anyways, but
Judge Sferrazza let Hill's client do that, so...), smirking at Coughlin while he
walked in, where the landlord's unlawful detainer affidavit on file in that matter
bares a time/date stamping of 8:39 a.m., 8/15/12 and a signature that is more of an
initialing lacking anything in the way of an indication as to whom such signature
belongs...and regardless, such 3/15/12 unlawful detainer affidavit (funny, a
voice mail to Coughlin has been all the RJC ever needed previously to set a hearing
in a landlord tenant matter involving Coughlin (an email worked in a criminal
matter for the 11/13/12 hearing in RCR2011-063341, even)).
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I can't because I don't have a credit card and my pacer account is past due. I need
the audio of my hearings before the NVB Judge Beesley. these are available for $2.60
each online. it only takes 2 minutes to sign up.
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SCR 105(2)(c) requires the State Bar to notify respondent Coughlin of potential
witness, in writing, 30 days before the hearing. The SBN only notified me that Judge
Beesley would testify 1 judicial day before the hearing (same with Beesley's 1977
classmate at McGeorge School of Law, Washoe Legal Services Paul Elcano, whom joined
both of their 1977 McGeorge School of Law classmate Reno Municipal Court Judge
Dorothy Nash Holmes as three of the four witnesses at Coughlin's formal disciplinary
hearing on 11/14/12. Somehow the SBN was able to quash Coughlin's subpoenas on
Judges (like the 2JDC's Flanagan, Elliott, RMC's W. Gardner, K. Howard, etc, apparently
based on some argument that one may not query judges about their thought processes,
only for the SBN to then call Judge Nash Holmes and query her about her though
processes in an attempt to apply some offensive collateral estoppel or claim preclusion to
her 2/28/12 and 3/12/12 Orders in a "simple traffic citation" case in RMC 11 TR 26800
where she found Coughlin in contempt for, amongst other things,
The only cases Coughlin had in the Federal Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Nevada (NVB) (and the first three bankruptcy cases Coughlin ever worked on) necessarily
would be those Judge Beesley testified to, however, vaguely and devoid of any specifics
whatsoever (but its not like his testimony was pointed to as a basis for taking away,
permanently, the property right under the Fourteenth Amendment that Coughlin and his
parents worked so hard for over decades and decades...oh wait...strike that, as the 12/14/12
Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law by NNDB Panel Chair John Echeverria ("you
haven't lived in Nevada long enough" said Judge Beesley upon the SBN King's butchering
the pronunciation of Echeverria's last name, on the record of the 11/14/12 formal
disciplinary hearing) :
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 9:8 to 9:15) MR. KING: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Beesley, the panel consists of John Echeverria -- I'm not pronouncing the name
-- but there's five panel members. JUDGE BEESLEY: John Echeverria. You have not
spent enough time in Nevada. MR. KING: That is correct. Thank you for that.
Those NVB cases are: NVB 10-05104, Cadle Company v. Keller; NVB 11-05078
Allison Taitano Moore v. John Gessin; and NVB 11-05077 Stacey Rissone v. John Gessin
(all Adversary Proceedings); NVB11-05078 was appealed and decided on 3/4/13:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/bap/2013/03/05/Gessin%20%20Memo%20121330.pdf
While Asst Bar Counsel King was too embarrassed by the purported emailed
grievance against Coughlin Richard G. Hill, Esq., sent to the SBN to offer such into
evidence (which really ought be detrimental to the SBN's attempt to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the allegation in its 8/23/12 Complaint that Coughlin violated
RPC 8.1, but this was a specially chosen Panel, with a very special Panel Chair, so, no,
King's failing to put into evidence whatever it was Coughlin was supposed to respond to
(ie, some written complaint with specific allegations made by somebody, like, say,
Richard G. Hill, Esq.) really did not get in the way of the Panel finding a violation by
Coughlin of RPC 8.1 (failing to cooperate with disciplinary authorities pursuant to a
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lawful demand for information (though the SBN did not subpoena Coughlin, and though
Coughlin, where Rules of Professional Conduct were repeatedly applied against him as to
his own self representation (even Judge Nash Holmes findings that Coughlin violated
duties to himself were given the ol' offensive collateral estoppel treatment by the Panel),
Coughlin certainly should be able to assert attorney-client privilege as to any demand for
information...but regardless, Coughlin responded to all of the allegations in King's
Complaint, denying each and every last one made in that insipid four and a half page, typo
ridden slapdash, unethical, tacky bit of jibberish, which, as to RPC 8.1, alleged:
1. Multiple grievances were received by the Office of Bar Counsel between the
period of January 14 and March 15, 2012, concerning Respondent. Due to the serious
allegations of misconduct, grievance files were opened and an investigation was initiated
by Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King.
2. Respondent was advised of the grievances via U.S. mail, e-mail and by a brief
meeting with Mr. King at the State Bar Office in Reno. Respondent did not cooperate with
the investigation and rather than respond to the grievances as requested, Respondent sent
non-responsive and disparaging e-mails.
King's Complaint reveals serious misconduct where it indicates Multiple
grievances were received by the SBN between 1/14/12 and 3/15/12, especially where
Coughlin's cross-examination of Judge Beesley (which Chair Echeverria seemed to have a
real hard time finding the relevance in) managed to nail down the date any purported letter
from Judge Beesley to the Bar regarding Coughlin was sent by Beesley to the SBN (no
testimony that such letter was a grievance or evidence of such, and, typically, the SBN
failed to even produce such purported letter by Judge Beesley regarding Coughlin to
Coughlin, even where Beesley was a witness at the formal hearing).
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 10:6 to 11:15) BRUCE BEESLEY Having been first
duly sworn, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KING: Q Judge
Beesley, can you explain to the panel your knowledge in this relevant time frame 20112012 regarding Mr. Coughlin and his conduct in your court? A Mr. Coughlin appeared
in my court a couple of times, at least two or three times. The first time I recall him
coming to my court he came in, he was wearing, I think, a T-shirt and a tie, and no jacket.
And he indicated that he had been evicted from his residence or his office, indicating it
was not because of not paying the rent, and that that was why he wasn't what I would
consider appropriately dressed. I apologize. I don't have my letter in front of me. But my
recollection is that he had filed a pleading on behalf of his client in regard to some aspect
of a bankruptcy case, and that the pleading was lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just
sort of rambled through a great deal of irrelevant stuff.
I had him a couple other times in my court and had the same experience, that -he was dressed appropriately the other times I had him there, and he was very polite and
appeared to be a very intelligent man. But his pleadings didn't make any sense. His
arguments didn't make any sense. And I became concerned that he was suffering from
alcohol or drug abuse or had some sort of mental issues which were preventing him from
being able to represent his client. I talked to -- I made some inquiries of the court and State
Bar if there was anything -- the federal court first, if there was anything that I had
authority to do to try and get Mr. Coughlin some help and learned that I could not.
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 13:4 to 14:7) THE WITNESS (BEESLEY): I'm not
quite sure where I was in my testimony, but based on the discussions I had, and the
information I got from other people, it became apparent to me that there wasn't a program
that was going to -- MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Foundation. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
King? MR. KING: The testimony is clear. He's explaining the actions he took relative to
Mr. Coughlin's conduct, which is the purpose. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. MR.
COUGHLIN: He was specifying -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR.
COUGHLIN: -- no foundation for what he was asserting. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, I've overruled your objection. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed, Judge. BY MR. KING: Q I apologize, your Honor, for
the interruption. But you were just about to testify as to what action you took with respect
to the information you learned. A What I did was I wrote a letter to the State Bar
explaining what had occurred with Mr. Coughlin, indicating, I believe, that I thought that
in his current state he was not able to represent his clients adequately, and that the State
Bar should look into it. I think that was the extent of what I did in summary.
(ie, Judge Beesley did what 2JDC Judges Elliott, Flanagan, and L. Gardner, and
RMC Judges Howard and W. Gardner did not do (RMC Judge Dilworth indicated to
Coughlin on the record in a 12/5/12 trail in RMC 12 CR 12420 that Judge Nash
Holmes had indicated the SBN would have the full cooperation of...the other RMC
Judges where she had no such authority or permission to make any such statement,
and that, combined with Nash Holmes' allusions to problems Coughlin gave even our pro
tempore judges when Coughlin never appeared before any, is beyond troubling,
especially when considering all the lying attendant to her disassembled a recording
device and hid a piece of it in the bathroom narrative, whether the lying is hers or the
RMC Marshals, or a group effort, is really not that important where, at the very least, her
egregious negligence (at best) as to the truth (not to mention her using probably and
by clear and convincing evidence so interchangeably when (not just during the 11/14/12
formal hearing, but on the audio record of the 3/12/12 hearing wherein she rendered one
Order, only to whip it into more offensive collateral estoppel hoping worthy shape the
following day upon reducing such to writing, in her transparent attempt to transmogrify a
simple traffic citation trial into some Bloody Mary worthy summary disbarment
proceeding), clearly, there is a rather salient difference that one would hope one holding
judicial office might readily grasp) and unimaginable arrogance is beyond worrisome) ,
that being, take some Canon 2, Rule 2.15 appropriate action where he felt such prudent.
Obviously, defensive collateral estoppel (oh no, Pat King might have to do some actual
work beyond attaching orders from judges, which, by the way, King was too lazy to even
manage to do, or even incorporate by reference Mirch-style with respect to FHE 2, 3,
4,applies to defeat the various allegation by King and findings or conclusions by the Panel
that any orders by 2JDC Judges
One important hearing to obtain for $2.40 electronically off of Pacer.gov would
probably be the one on 3/15/12 that Judge Beesley testified to at Coughlin's formal
disciplinary hearing, where Coughlin had been burglarized by the Washoe County
Sheriff's Office (along with Gayle Kern, Esq.'s associates) just an hour before the hearing
(they refuse to post an eviction order and wait 24 hours like the law requires under NRS
40.253(5)(a), and where every other county in Nevada manages to so comply.
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 20:13 to 21:4) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge

Beesley, what in particular did you notice about my work product -- when did you first
contact Mr. King about me? A When did I first contact who? Q Mr. King. Bar counsel
for the State Bar. A I don't know that I ever contacted Mr. King. I sent a letter to the
State Bar. I think it was probably addressed to Mr. Clark, but I'm not positive. Q So I'm
sorry for that, your Honor. I do recall you saying you sent a letter now. Did you ever speak
with Bar counsel Patrick King with regard to me? A The only time I recall speaking to
him was a few weeks ago or a few days -- probably a few weeks ago when he asked me
if I would be able to testify at this hearing.
Where King only constructively noticed Coughlin of Judge Beesley's anticipated
testimony one judicial day before the formal hearing, its hard to decide which is more
troublesome: that King may have failed to so notice Coughlin via supplement to his SCR
105(2)(c) Designation of Witnesses, Summary of Evidence for a few weeks or that
King's witness Beesley can not seem to remember whom he addressed his letter to at the
SBN, not even one specific with respect to any of the cases or filings by Coughlin or court
appearances to which he testified to having such strong feelings about (sufficient to take
Rule 2.15 action, even, perhaps), or whether it was a few weeks ago or a few days that
Judge Beesley spoke to King and King asked Beesley if he would be able to testify at this
hearing. And Judge Beesley became concerned that Coughlin was suffering from
alcohol or drug abuse or had some sort of mental issues? HEARING - Vol. I, (Page
11:7 to 11:10).
The SBN violated SCR 123(3) by contacting Coughlin's then client, a former
WCSO Deputy named Peter Eastman (CV11-00820, whom has some Canon 2, Rule 2.15,
RPC 8.3 things to say about RJC Judge Sferrazza that LCL's Coe Swobe ought be made
aware of, and whom alleged to Coughlin that his friends in the courthouse informed him
that Judge Sferrazza is out to get you, which makes troubling Judge Sferrazzas quashing
Coughlin's subpoenas on 11/19/12 based upon some non-existent requirement in Nevada
law to pay witness fees in criminal misdemeanor trials (never mind the fact that Sferrazza
clearly waived any such imaginary requirement anyway during the 10/22/12 hearing:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ajOqx4xFCK4 at the 49:40 mark Judge Sferrazza rules:
I am allowing you to subpoena them without advancing the fees, I may at a later point
order that you pay those fees, but in the meantime, I will allow you to subpoena witnesses
without advancing those fees...at a later point in time I will determine your financial
ability to pay witness fees Further, at the 52:10 mark Judge Sferrazza denies Coughlin's
motion to be provided the sealed portions of the record in that matter which bare on the
Marsden and Stankewitz issues that Coughlin was required to argue and preserve prior to
any appeal...also, at the 11:25 a.m., WCPD Jim Leslie contradicts his own statements on
the record on 8/29/12 (where he indicated that in misdemeanors, Coughlin must make his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and preserve them in the trial court.)
Particularly troubling in RCR2011-063341 and revealing the extent to which Judge
Sferrazza's bias has impermissibly tainted the entirety of this disciplinary matter (given his
presiding over the initial summary eviction in Rev2011-001708 involving Hill and the
intial arrest of 8/20/11 in RCR2011-063341, and his rejection of the plea deal Coughlin
and the WCDA's Office voluntarily agreed to at the 8/27/12 hearing therein) is illustrated
by the following vis a vis his failing to hold subpoened witness Nicole Watson in
contempt and failing to grant a continuance upon her failure to appear at the 11/19/12 trial,
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in addition to the flagrantly inconsistent rulings by Sferrazza where teh WCDA is

permitted to put forward all the hearsay it pleases when it comes to explaining why the
officer took the steps he did next, while, in the following excerpt, Judge Sferrazza can
hardly imagine how the fact that Nicole Watson was captured on tape admitting that a still
unidentified man picked up a phone off the concrete ground next to the Truckee River in a
skate plaza and announced to those dispersed throughout the plaza that he would throw the
phone in the river if someone did not claim it immediately:
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, Your Honor. I'll call Mr. Nathaniel Zarate.
THE COURT: Okay. Come up and be sworn and then if you'll spell your first
and last name for the record. I believe you testified before. So, Mr. Young
will have the right to object if it's something which has already been testified
to before. Raise your right hand. (The witness was sworn.) THE COURT:
Would you state and we spell your first and last names. THE WITNESS:
Nathaniel Zarate, N-A-T-H-A-N-I-E-L. Last name Zarate, Z-A-R-A-T-E.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes,
sir, Your Honor. NATHANIEL ZARATE, called as a witness, having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: DIRECT
EXAMINATION BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Good afternoon, Mr. Zarate.
Thank you for being here today, sir. I am going to ask you, do you recall on
the night in question, August 20th, 2011, someone you 197 might have
referred to earlier as the man with the six pack holding the iPhone while
offering it up to people in the park? MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, objection.
Hearsay. It's the truest definition of hearsay as I objected to already.
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, if I could quickly offer a counter to that.
THE COURT: Well, you can just ask him the question if recalls some -- you
said that you testified to earlier. You asked him to recite testimony from a
prior proceeding. You can ask him the question, if he saw someone hold up
the phone. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did you see -- did someone hold up a
phone that night? A Yes. Q He offered up to the people in the park? MR.
YOUNG: Your Honor, again, I object to that, hearsay. THE COURT: I'm
going to overrule that because it was asked before and answered by this
witness I believe. If not, it was answered by the officer, one or the other 198
BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q You may answer that, sir. THE COURT: because I
heard that testimony and I have no way of knowing it except for that. BY
MR. COUGHLIN: Mr. Zarate, will you answer that, please. Yes. There was a
man holding up a phone. Q A Q Did the man say something to the affect that
somebody claim the phone or I'll throw it in the river? MR. YOUNG: Your
Honor, I object to that. I know for a fact that it's not been introduced into
evidence . THE COURT: MR. YOUNG: All right. And again there's no -- I
have not heard an exception to the hearsay rule provided by Mr. Coughlin, I
think it is clearly hearsay.
MR. COUGHLIN: And Your Honor, may I just offer a hearsay objection?
Exception. THE COURT: What's the hearsay exception? MR. COUGHLIN: I
would say I believe that then existing mental or emotional or physical
condition would apply as would present sense impression. THE COURT: I'm
going to overrule the objection. Go ahead. 199 BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q A Q
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You may answer, sir. To which question? Did somebody hold the phone up
and (indiscernible) in the river if somebody doesn't claim (Indiscernible)? A I
don't remember that man specifically saying I'm going to throw the phone in
the river. that? Q A Q Anything like that? I don't remember him saying
anything like that. Do you recall Nicole Watson admitting to hearing MR.
YOUNG: THE COURT: Your Honor, again That is sustained. This witness
can answer what hearsay is. MR. YOUNG: THE COURT: MR. YOUNG:
Mr. Coughlin knows what hearsay is. What? Mr. Coughlin knows what
hearsay is. Throughout the entire day, he's attempted to elicit almost nothing
but hearsay. THE COURT: That's fine. But that prior question, the one that he
answered I think is an exception but this one is not and it is double hearsay on
top of that, sir. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, Your Honor. It's not 200 offered to
proof the truth of the matter asserted. THE COURT: Well, I don't care. I've
sustained it. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Do you
recall seeing me with some cameras and recording equipment about a week
after the arrest MR. YOUNG: THE COURT: Objection, relevance. What's the
relevance? MR. COUGHLIN: One, I believe it goes to the exculpatory
material and it's been said that someone -- if Mr. Zarate heard me ask that
question and heard someone admit to hearing a man say he's going to throw it
in the river THE COURT: I sustain the objection.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. Can I ask Mr. Zarate to authenticate a recording
that was made with him present in which his voice is on? THE COURT: You
may. MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I would -- if this is a video taken a week
after the incident -- THE COURT: Oh, a week after? MR. YOUNG: Which
he was just referring to, I would object to that. THE COURT: Then I sustain
the objection. If it 201 was contemporaneous with the incident, then I'll allow
it. MR. COUGHLIN: Well, it was a week after the incident and -- THE
COURT: So the objection is sustained. It's not relevant to this charge today,
sir. MR. COUGHLIN: So if the individual had percipient knowledge of the
events of the night of the arrest a week later our videotape describing the
arrest, that's not relevant for the event involved? THE COURT: The arrest is
not the issue. It's whether or not you stole the cell phone. MR. COUGHLIN:
Well, the action incident to the arrest or resulting in the arrest if they are
testifying -- not go testifying but commenting a week later on videotape
knowing they are being recorded as to what actions were involved in the
arrest, what precipitated what, that's not relevant? THE COURT: Sir, tell me
specifically you can make an offer of proof, a brief one, as to what is
allegedly on this video that deals with the arrest on the night of the incident.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. And I'll just note quickly, I reviewed the tape of
the October 22nd hearing date and at the 48 minute mark of the second file on
that you note that I'll be afforded the right to waive the 202 witness fees for
subpoenas and therein I would suggest that my properly serving Nicole
Watson incident NRS 174.345
THE COURT: Well, I see that is a proper service but it's not one she has
to obey because it's by mail. So if she doesn't get it, and if she doesn't sign for
it, then it's not evidence that she was served. It may comply with the
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technicality of the statute but it doesn't give me the power to order,

(Indiscernible) or to issue an warrant for her nonappearance. MR.
COUGHLIN: I do believe it provides a basis for a continuance. THE
COURT: No, sir, not unless you made a proper motion based on that.
MR. COUGHLIN: I'm making that now, sir. THE COURT: It's denied.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. Well, as to your prompting me to issue an offer of
proof, this recording, and I have a video of it and an audio of it swell -- might
remember Mr. Templeton (indiscernible) it will show Mr. Zarate standing
next to Ms. Watson when Ms. Watson admits to hearing the man with the 6pack holding the iPhone and threatening to throw it in the river if somebody
didn't claim it immediately. MR. YOUNG: How Mr. Coughlin does not see
that 203 as hearsay, Your Honor -- THE COURT: All right. MR.
COUGHLIN: And I think it's THE COURT: You are saying that Ms. Watson
said that on the video? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, with Mr. Zarate there.
Further I think it's relevant to the extent that Mr. Zarate then clearly appears
to dissuade her from further contradicting what he allegedly told the police
that night and I believe there is indicating a motive on his part to cover up the
extent to which his misstatements to the police resulted in my arrest.
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to sustain the objection. Go ahead. MR.
COUGHLIN: Your Honor, I would note for the record I do believe I
complied with the statute with respect THE COURT: I believe you complied
except that you did not provide for the witness fee. But you indicated that I
waived it which I still haven't seen or heard. But even if I had, the evidence is
that she's no longer here. So I don't know what MR. COUGHLIN: Well, she
wasn't here today, is that-- THE COURT: No, she's no longer in this
204 .----...... community. MR. COUGHLIN: She is. I confirmed that she's a
student at McQueen High School. THE COURT: According to the testimony
earlier today, there is testimony that she's no longer. MR. COUGHLIN: Mr.
Lichty, I recall him saying he wasn't aware of -- he hadn't talked to her in a
year. THE COURT: And he also indicated that he believed that she had
moved. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't recall that. I believe he indicated to me that
no THE COURT: Okay. Let me look at the -- actually I don't have one for her
but I assume you have a certificate for her. Do you have it with you? MR.
COUGHLIN: I provided it to the Court, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well,
the one that I have did not show it. MR. COUGHLIN: Would it be all right,
Your Honor, if I reviewed THE COURT: Well, it doesn't matter right now. I
am ruling that what she would have testified to would have been hearsay and
also probably not relevant to whether or not it was a theft. I know your
argument somehow this was found property but what some third party 205
did or didn't do is not going to be at issue in this case when we finish it.
MR. COUGHLIN: So if the phone was going to be in the river but for
someone's intervention, that's not bearing on the fact whether or not,
comparing someone's walking up
THE COURT: If somebody said that, I don't know, No . 1, that they did
because it hearsay as objected to by Mr . Young. So I'm sustaining his
objection as to hearsay. But even if it wasn't hearsay, the bottom line is I
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don't know, No . 1, if the person would have done that or not. I don't know
how they came into possession of the cell phone and, thirdly, you did claim
the phone from that person, according to what I heard. MR. COUGHLIN:
But if you had heard all the things from me, then you would then perhaps
reconsider allowing this excited utterance or (indiscernible). THE COURT:
No, I ruled. Okay. I'll allow you to argue it. All right. You can argue anything
you want but the bottom line is the evidence will be what I decide on and that
is not evidence that the hearsay testimony of someone who's not here and
even if they were here, it would be still be hearsay . MR. COUGHLIN: Yes,
sir, Your Honor. And if it's not going to offer to prove the matter asserted
but 206 rather to demonstrate a bias or motive on this witness' part to
shush anybody who is suggesting something that is counter to what he
told the police in which affected a wrongful arrest. THE COURT: Still
sustained. I think it's at best marginally relevant by some tangential issue
to this case which is whether or not -- and I told you this three times -whether or not you did willfully and unlawfully steal, take and carry away
the personal property of another. That's one count. The other count is
whether on or about the 20th day of August, you did willfully and unlawful
possess or withheld stolen goods. All right. You can make any argument you
want. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. If I could just quickly -- this isn't the right
time -- but if he could quickly indicate, Your Honor, respectfully, I believe it
goes to the willfulness aspect of -- and the aspect of another. If something
is going to be in the river, I think, one, it arguably no -- THE COURT: You
can, you're done. I've already ruled on it twice now. MR. COUGHLIN:
Perhaps it's just my inexperience, Your Honor All right. THE COURT:
Perhaps it is. But the bottom line 207 is I have ruled and you can proceed.
MR. COUGHLIN: Granted, but isn't there a negative THE COURT: I'm not
getting through to you. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry, Your Honor, but THE
COURT: I've denied -- I've sustained the objection and denied your request
for a continuance to bring in this witness. MR. COUGHLIN: the record why
-- All right. Go ahead . And I'm not able to preserve for THE COURT: You
already have preserved for the record. I think it's quite apparent. I understand
what your argument is... 208
However, Judge Sferrazza himself made a completely inconsistent ruling
while WCPD Jim Leslie was still representing Coughlin:
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Page
123:6 to 123:24) BY MR. LESLIE: Q So the other guy picked up the
iPhone and said, "Does it belong to anybody," or words to that effect? A
Yes, sir. Q Did that guy also say something to the effect of he was going
to throw it in the river or anything like that? MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I
object on the grounds that it's hearsay. THE COURT: On the grounds of
what? MR. YOUNG: Hearsay. MR. LESLIE: Well, your Honor -- THE
COURT: I don't think it's offered for the truth of the matter. So I'm going
to overrule the objection. BY MR. LESLIE: Q So did he say anything
along those lines? A I did not hear him say that.
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Compare, also, such to Judge Sferrazza's approach during the 8/27/11

hearing on the Motion to Suppress (the entirety of which WCDA Young was
allowed to copy and paste into the trial that followed, despite his many
arguments that certain testimony and questions was permissible in that is was
only occurring within the hearing on the Motion to Supress):
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Pages
24:23 to 26:17) A So then Mr. Coughlin was left with the other officers
who were on scene. I made contact with the victim. Q (WCDA Z. Young)
Do you recall the victim's name? A (Witness RPD Officer Nicholas Duralde)
I recall his last name. Q What was that? A Zarate. Q Okay. A I
asked him what occurred. In summary, he told me that his phone had been
taken. MR. LESLIE: Objection, hearsay. MR. YOUNG: It's not hearsay
because it goes to the effect with respect to this motion to suppress. THE
COURT: I'll overrule this objection, it's not admitted for the purposes of
the truth of the matter. MR. LESLIE: Well, your Honor, I would also object
based on relevance. We're attacking the pat-down. This is not germane to the
pat-down. This is investigation so it's not relevant. THE COURT: So you're
objecting that there was a pat-down? MR. LESLIE: We're attacking, in our
Motion to Suppress, the validity of the pat-down search. This testimony now
about his discussions with witnesses is part of his broader investigation which
is not relevant to whether or not he was justified in patting down Mr.
Coughlin at an earlier stage. THE COURT: Well, I agree with that. So a patdown -- inaudible, if I understand this correctly. MR. LESLIE: I've stated my
objection. MR. YOUNG: Your Honor the motion to suppress also attacks the
plain field doctrine talking about this reaching into the phone. This goes
directly to that part of the motion to suppress. THE COURT: Reaching in for
the phone, I mean it wasn't part of the pat-down, wasn't it? MR. YOUNG:
Well, that's what I'm attempting to show to the court through testimony. THE
COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection because I'm not clear I
understand the facts of this case. MR. YOUNG: Sure.
Further, the State offered double hearsay successfully: PARTIAL
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Pages 28:3 to 29:10) Q
Okay. When speaking with Mr. Goble, what was it that Mr. Goble advised
you? A He advised me that his phone had been taken. A friend had seen it
be taken and pointed the person out who had the phone to him. Q All
right. A He had confronted the subject that he identified as Mr. Coughlin
and asked for his phone back. He was told by Mr. Coughlin that he didn't
have a phone. So he called the phone and when he dialed his phone number,
he saw the phone screen -- MR. LESLIE: I again object on hearsay. THE
COURT: It's overruled again. MR. LESLIE: I won't keep doing it every
time, but I just want to be clear. THE COURT: I think it goes to the
officer's P C possibly for the arrest or whatever happened. MR. YOUNG:
Yes, sir. MR. LESLIE: Why don't I state it this way, may I have a
continuing objection in the Motion to Suppress to the officer testifying to
what witnesses told him? MR. YOUNG: That's fine. THE COURT:
Absolutely. MR. LESLIE: Thank you, your Honor, then I don't have to
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interrupt every time. THE COURT: Maybe at some point, the objection
would be sustained so that's my only concern but at this point, I'm going to
overrule the objection because I don't believe it's offered for the truth of the
testimony.
However, when WCDA Young wants witness Zarate to testify as to what
the still unidentified man whom picked up the phone off the concrete ground
said in a loud voice heard throughout the skate plaze, its not hearsay?:
101:13 to 102:2) Q (WCDA Young) So what happened? A (Witness
Zarate) From then, I see one man. I don't know who this man was. He was
carrying a sixpack of beer. He walked up to my friend's hat, Cory Goble's hat.
He saw that and he waved it around and said, "Oh, is this anybody's," because
I assume that he was going to claim it for himself. Then we saw Cory -- my
friends and I saw Cory, wearing that hat. So we said, "Oh yes, that's Cory's
hat." Then he saw the phone with what -- we got the hat back and then we
saw the phone on the ground or he saw the phone on the ground, and he was
doing the same thing waving it around to see if anyone was going to claim
it.
Further, WCDA Z. Young suborned witness Nathaniel K. Zarate's
perjury where he proffered the following testimony despite Coughlin
providing a video taped admission by Zarate that such was not true, and that
he did not personally eye witness Coughlin receive such phone from the
unidentified man:
102:12 to 103:15) Q Okay. Go ahead. A From then, I saw -- that's when
Mr. Coughlin approached the man with the phone. The man with the sixpack, he said, "Oh, is this anybody's phone," and that's when the person who
was trying to take the hat and claim the hat -- Q And just to be clear, do
you see the first man in the courtroom today? A No. He's not here. Q
Okay. Do you know who that guy is? A No. Q Okay. You were saying?
A From then, I witnessed Mr. Coughlin look at the phone and then since
the first man gave the hat back to us, I assumed he was asking if it was his
phone and then Mr. Coughlin claimed it was his phone. I saw him take it
from him and then Mr. Coughlin was on his bike. Then we weren't sure
whose phone it was, at the time. So we called my other friend to see if it was
his phone, but he answered his phone so we weren't sure whose phone it was
at first. Then we -- since the phone was right next to Cory's hat, we went up
and asked Cory if that might have been his phone and that's when we started
to put two and two together.
In the investigatory video and audio recordings taken by Coughlin, which
he declares under penalty of perjury he has not altered in any way, Robert
Dawson and Nate Zarate admit that they believe the "man with the six-pack"
gave Coughlin the phone based upon the circumstantial evidence that they
personally eye-witnessed Coughlin go up to the man with the six-pack shortly
after he held it aloft, offered it up, and after the man threatened to throw it in
the river if someone did not claim it immediately (Nicole Watson admits
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hearing the "man with the six- (page 3 of 293 of Coughlin's 10/18/12 and
11/15/12 Motion for Mistrial in 63341) pack" say this, whereupon, in
VIDEO0099, Zarate is seen and heard attempting to dissuade her from saying
anything further with regard to the material facts as she witnessed them,
particularly where they depart from the version Zarate has provided to the
RPD and or in his witness statement). Dawson and Zarate both admit in the
videos taken by Coughlin that they did not personally eyewitness the man
with the six-pack give Coughlin the phone, but rather made that inference
upon questioning that man and determining that he no longer had the phone
after Coughlin finished interacting with him. Zarate states something in
VIDEO0099 to the effect that he knew Coughlin had the phone because the
man with the six-pack no longer had the phone upon their questioning him.
However, in his trial testimony Zarate indicates, in response to a direct
question from Judge Sferrazza, that he did, in fact, "personally eye-witness"
Coughlin be given the phone by the man
In one of the subsequent investigatory videos that Coughlin filmed Nicole
Watson blurts out in response to one of Coughlin's questions that yes, she did
in fact here the man who picked up the phone threatened to throw the phone
in the River if someone did not claim it immediately. At that point in the
video filled by Coughlin Zarate can be seen attempting to quiet Nicole
Watson down and then later pulling her aside and seemingly dissuading her
from testifying or submitting further to an interview with Coughlin. It is clear
that Zarate sought to obstruct justice (in the videos Coughlin filmed and
provided to both the WCPD and WCDA's Offices, including "VIDEO0099"
(length: 5:15) (and Zarates's sworn testimony at trial is contradicted by 184/293 - MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW
statements of the form and 26 second mark video 0099 wherein rather than
asserting that he personally eye witnessed Coughlin received the phone from
"the man with the six-pack", but instead Zarate indicated that he saw the man
hold the phone aloft and heard him offer it up and then Zarate stated on that
investigatory video Coughlin filmed upon his release from jail: at 4:05 mark
of "VIDEO0099 watson we saw you take a phone from a man" (length:
5:15)
Also, WCDA Z. Young suborned the perjury of RPD Officer Nicholas
Duralde with respect to his fraudulent assertion that his receipt of a report
from dispatch of a possible fight was factored into this reasonable suspicion
and probable cause analysis:
(from the Motion for Mistrial Coughlin served on the WCDA's Office and
submitted for filing on 10/18/12 (well in advance of the 11/19/12 trial date, at
which Coughlin was not permitted to cross-examine arresting Officer
Duralde) and where, by 10/18/12, Coughlin had still not been provided the
ECOMM recordings of verbal communications between the RPD and
ECOMM's dispatchers (one of whom is the arresting officer's wife, Jessica
Duralde, where the RPD Detective wrongfully arresting an overcharging
Coughlin on 3/8/13 (SBN's fraudulent TPO/EPO violation allegations) ,
Detective Yturbide, also has an ECOMM dispatcher wife, Jodi Ytrubide), and
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where the disc finally provided by RCA Skau following the ridiculously
scheduled, fraudulently noticed 11/13/12 Emergency Hearing still failed to
included all the 911 calls/ and communications between RPD and ECOMM
required by both Coughlin's subpoena and his public records request (ie, such
hearing was scheduled the day before Coughlin's 11/14/12 formal disciplinary
hearing...we get it Sferrazza, you really hate Coughlin, are really pulling out
every last stop you can to torpedo not only the summary eviction from his
former home law office, but also convict on both counts in the iphone petty
larceny/receiving stolen property case, on top of severely prejudicing his
defense in the formal disciplinary matter which you purposefully schedule a
trail in 63341 as close to as possible and permitted two emergency hearings
immediately before (11/8/12 and 11/13/12) wherein you quashed all of
Coughlin's subpoenas, some might say) on various Motions to Quash
Coughlin's subpoenas (which Skau fraudulently asserted to Coughlin he had
been given authority to serve Coughlin notice thereof via email)
(What follows is DDA Young's barrage of attempts to mislead the court,
and, basically lie...as Young continually tries to get across that the first
dispatch report was about "a possible fight", rather than a "CK FOR LARC
OF ACELL PHONE JUST", on multiple occassions. 1:55:45 pm state of a
few questions Your Honor Mr. Leslie asked you or do you recall Mr. Leslie
asking you that once dispatch advised of am update that it was a potential
larceny he asked something along the lines of...would that alleviate any
concern for threats or violence ...weapons... And I know I am misstating his
exact words but it was something along those lines you recall the question?
(There Young misleads the Court and shows a lack of candor, again, to the
tribunal in suggesting, based upon some imaginary "possible fight" dispatch
report, that there was, therefore, some fear of threats or violence that such an
update, downgrading the situation to a a mere larceny, would necessarily
"alleviate". Duralde yes state and are called by written your response was
could be Duralde I don't recall the exact response but many times we put
information from dispatch that inaccurate or mixed as police officers we have
to keep our guard up for whatever might be there when we arrived for safety
1:56:47 pm state and in this case the larceny was additional information that
you receiving from the first report Duralde yes - 185/293 - MOTION FOR
MISTRIAL AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW (Actually....there he goes
again...Young and Duralde continue attempting to purport that the report of a
larceny was not the first part of the first report, period...but rather some
"additional information" in some, necessarily, subsequent update. (Curiously,
Duralde's narrative and his November 28, 2011 narrative does not mention
this alleged initial report by dispatch the State so perseverates on in fact that
narrative begins thusly: "On August 20, 2011 at approximately 2327 hours I
was dispatched along with Reno PD Officer R. ROSA to the plaza at on a
report of a larceny of a cell phone at that location. Dispatch relayed
information that the victim had set his phone down and that he was now
calling the phone and it was lighting up in the suspect's pocket. The suspect
was described as a white male adult, 35 years of age, 6'02", 210 Ibs, wearing
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a red Chicago hat and a white or yellow shirt and plaid shorts. Dispatch also
relayed that the suspect was still on scene" And, in fact, the dispatch logs do
not reveal any notation of "a possible fight". Actually, this "possible fight"
garbage seems more and more to be professional misconduct on DDA Young
and Duralde's part, as there is no indication in any of the contemporaneous
records or statements by Duralde that he was under the impression there was
any "possible fight", though both Duralde and Young have misled the Court
in that regard, and, not surprisingly, who else, Leslie has joined in on the act,
mentioning a "possible fight" several times, despite the record, as far as what
Officer Duradle was made aware of upon arriving on scene then immediately
handcuffing Coughlin shortly after Coughlin broached the topic of
constitutional rights. Further, DDA Young continually refers to the dispatch
report of "a larceny" being "additional information" or an "update from the
first report", when, in fact, the first report's first message is "CK FOR LARC
OF CELL PHONE"...so again DDY Young and Duralde are playin' fast and
loose with the facts. Rather, the first entry at 11:23:36 pm indicates:
"TEXT:ICE RINK AREA - CK FOR LARC OF CELL PHONE JUST SUSP OS - LOUD VERBAL DISTR". Sure, a "loud verbal distrubance"...but,
all this about "possible fight" appears to be nothing more than DDA Young's
creation in an attempt to shore up an exigency/safety analysis for his pat
down rationale. That is sanctionable conduct. Further, the next update in the
dispatch log, from 11:25:20 pm still fails to mention any "possible fight", but
rather reads: "STILL LOUD DISTR - RP LEFT HIS CELL PHONE ON
POST AND CALLED THE CELL PHONE AND ITS LIGHTING UP IN
SUSPS POCKET.". YOung and Duralde really need to explain their attempts
to mislead the Court and lack of candor to the tribunal to the extent that they
purported the phrase possible five to be up bit of information included in the
dispatch communications rather than their interpretation of of something that
may be incident to a loud disturbance where dispatch only reports a loud
disturbance particularly one of a "VERBAL" variety. 11:25:47 pm marks the
time of another dispatch text (apparently sent to the officer's in their vehicles,
not that Leslie would ask anything like that): "SUPP TEXT:RP WAS
SCREAMING AT SUSP AND LINE DISCONNECTED." The fact that the
dispatcher described the call as"RP (reporting party, ie, Goble) SCREAMING
AT SUSP" is telling and would strongly suggest that Duralde would have had
more reason to pat down Goble or his compatriates than Coughlin, and it is
possible Goble was in his vehicle or otherwise aware of this dispatch report
(Leslie failed to ask any questions about how and when these officers were
apprised of information by dispatch, including whether they were so even
after arriving on the scene, but the video Coughlin took of the arrest clearly
contains the sounds of dispatch radios, though, curiously, the smart phone in
Coughlin's right front shorts pocket displays no "sound of the iPhone
vibrating" such as what Duralde and DDA Young pin most of the "probable
cause" in their case on. Lastly, there is strong evidence to suggest Duralde
never received the information from dispatch (prior to arriving on the scene
and conducting the pat down, cursory "investigation" and arrest of Coughlin)
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that was contained in the dispatch text from 11:27:11 pm: TEXT:RP (Goble)
CALLING BACK ON 911 ADV'ING SOMEONE JUST HIT A "MINOR" RP (reporting party) JUST SAID "THERE IS A COP THERE WAIVE HIM
DOWN". Duralde appears on the sidewalk near the Center Street Bridge in
the video Couglin took of the arrest at approximately 11:27:55 pm, and, that,
in combination with an utter paucity of mentions by the State or Duralde
respecting the "socked a minor" ruse, indicates Duralde was not even privy to
any dispatch information in that regard, and, of course, if it was, in fact
Duralde (who testified he was "first to arrive on the scene" (and, as is
customary, took the lead on the investigation), the bit in the dispatch log that
"RP JUST SAID "THERE IS A COPY THERE WAIVE HIM DOWN" is
likely referring to Duralde. Further, Duralde's laconic, relaxed tone and
approach upon arriving on scene further belies the lack of sincerity in the
State's "possible fight" message, which, it seems clear, dispatch never made
(not that the DA, the RPD, or Emergency Dispatch Services has supplied any
tapes thereof, contrary to Goodnights duly made request therefor.
NNDB Panel Chair Echeverria is the only Panel member to sign his 12/14/12
FOFCOL, which made the following Findings of Fact:
Coughlin was questioned with regard to a letter dated February 14, 2012 from Assistant
Bar Counsel King to Coughlin in which Bar Counsel forwarded to Coughlin
correspondence received from Richard G. Hill. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 163, L 13 -P 164, L 23. See Hearing Exhibit 6. Coughlin's
response, dated March 9, 2012, asked for additional time in which to respond. See Hearing
Exhibit 7. No evidence was presented that Coughlin substantively responded to Bar
Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012 prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
Coughlin failed to directly respond to Bar Counsel's questions inquiring if Coughlin ever
subsequently responded to Bar Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012. See Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 169, L 13 -P 172, L 16.
30.
Coughlin also failed to directly respond to questioning regarding whether
or not he had substantively responded, prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter, to
a letter forwarded to him from Bar Counsel regarding the letter received by the Nevada
State Bar from Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes and dated March 14, 2012. See Transcript of
Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 174, L 13 -P 180, L 4. See Hearing Exhibit 8.
31.
On March 7, 2012 Coughlin caused to be filed an "Affidavit of Poverty in
Support of Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis." See Hearing Exhibit 9. In his Affidavit,
Coughlin represented that he was self-employed as a "Jack of all Trades." See Hearing
Exhibit 9. The Affidavit does not identify Mr. Coughlin as a lawyer or identity any income
from the practice of law. See Hearing Exhibit 9.
32. The record also indicates that Coughlin had also filed a motion on November
14, 2011 to proceed In Forma Pauperis in case number 11CR 22176 pending in the Reno
Municipal Court before Judge Kenneth R. Howard. See Hearing Exhibit 10. Judge
Howard's Order denying Coughlin's motion specifically noted that Coughlin's "affidavit of
poverty" did not identify any income from the practice of law yet Coughlin had implied to
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the court when sentenced to incarceration for contempt that his incarceration would
adversely affect his clients. See Hearing Exhibit 10, P 2, L 19 -23.
Chair Echeverria's FOFCOL then made the following Conclusions of Law:
Competence
(H) RPC 1.1 states "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
(I) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin lacks the
competency to represent clients, including himself.
(J) First, the record demonstrates severe criticism by the trial court in the handling
of the Joshi matter, including Coughlin's lack of understanding of a balance sheet, his
failure to conduct discovery, his lack of knowledge of the rules of evidence and trial
procedure. Supra' 25
(K) Second, Judge Beesley testified that the pleadings filed by Coughlin on behalf
of his client in a bankruptcy case were "lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just sort of
rambled through a great deal of irrelevant stuff." Judge Beesley also testified that
Coughlin's pleadings and arguments on behalf of his client "didn't make any sense." Supra
' 16 Judge Beesley became concerned enough about Coughlin's competency as a lawyer
that he contacted the State Bar. Supra' 17
(L) Third, Judge Nash Holmes questioned Coughlin's competency as a lawyer and
in her Order finding Coughlin in Contempt of Court noted that Coughlin disregarded the
rules of evidence, continually imposed improper questions, failed to properly examine
witnesses, repeatedly asked the question, misstated answers, injected irrelevant material,
argued with witnesses and mischaracterized testimony. Supra' 7
(M) Fourth, Judge Nash Holmes found that Coughlin's pleadings failed to address
topics listed 'in the caption, contained rambling references to Coughlin's personal life and
other irrelevant material, were overly lengthy, disjointed and incoherent. Supra' 9 & 10
(N) Fifth, the State Bar called two judges and two practicing attorneys (Elcano is
not listed as an "active attorney" at www.nvbar.org, nor has he been for over 5 years), each
with significant experience with Coughlin and each of whom rendered an expert opinion
regarding Coughlin's competency as a lawyer. Judge Beesley testified that in his opinion,
Coughlin was not competent to practice law. Supra 18. Judge Nash Holmes testified that
in her opinion, Coughlin violated numerous Rules of Professional Conduct including his
lack of competency to practice law. Supra 15. Attorney Richard Hill also testified that in
his opinion Coughlin is not competent to practice law. Supra 22 Attorney Paul Elcano,
who once supervised Coughlin as a lawyer and ultimately terminated him from Washoe
Legal Services, also testified that, in his opinion, Coughlin is not competent to practice
law. Supra 28
(O) Sixth, the record establishes that Coughlin offered no expert opinion or evidence as
to his competency.
Diligence
(P) RPC 1.2 states "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client." The record is less clear as to whether or not Coughlin violated
RPC 1.2 on more than on occasion.
(R) Judge Howard, in the Joshi case, certainly found that Coughlin failed to
conduct discovery on behalf of his client in that matter. Supra 25
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(S) The record and Pleading Docket in this case establish that Coughlin failed to
provide a verified responsive pleading even in the defense of his own disciplinary
action. Supra 38
(T) The record and Pleading Docket in this case establish that Coughlin habitually
files numerous, untimely and repetitive motions...
Meritorious Claims and Contentions
(U) RPC 3.1 in pertinent part states "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in .law and fact
for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."
(V) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin continuously
and repetitively files irrelevant pleadings. pleadings unrelated to the issue at hand and
continuously and repetitively injects irrelevant matters into proceedings.
(W) Judge Nash Holmes found, for example, that Coughlin repeatedly injected
allegations of bribery, perjury and police retaliation in a simple traffic case involving the
failure to stop at a stop sign. Supra 7 She also found that Coughlin repeatedly injected
attorney Richard Hill into questions and statements when Mr. Hill was in no way involved
in the traffic citation trial. Supra 7 She also found that pleadings filed subsequent to
Coughlin's incarceration were lengthy (more than 200 pages) contained scant discussion
of, or relevance to, the matter and contained irrelevant discussion of facts unrelated to the
proceedings at hand. Supra. 10
(X) The record establishes that in the Merliss eviction action, Coughlin's conduct
was so vexatious and frivolous as to result in substantial sanction of attorney's fees. Supra
21 See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 2, L 8 -13; P3, L 4 -11.
(Y) The Pleading Docket in this matter establishes also that Coughlin's filings,
even in his own defense of the disciplinary matter, inject lengthy, irrelevant facts and legal
issues into this proceeding...
Candor to the Tribunal
(Z) RPC 3.3(a)(1) states "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (m)ake a false statement
of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement .of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer."
(AA) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin violated RPC
3.3(a)(l) when he lied to Judge Nash Holmes as to whether or not he was surreptitiously
and without permission to record the proceeding. Supra 7 Of note, Coughlin did not
deny that he had lied to Judge Nash Holmes. Instead, his cross examination of Judge Nash
Holmes focused on how she had learned of the true facts. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 139, L
(BB) Attorney Richard Hill testified that based on his experience in litigating with
Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthful with either counsel or the Court. Supra Paragraph 23.
(CC) The record also establishes that Coughlin was less than candid with the Court
in two separate applications to proceed in forma pauperis, when he failed to disclose his
true occupation as an attorney and instead indicated he was self-employed as a "Jack of all
Trades" failed to identify any income from the practice of law after having represented to
the court that his incarceration would adversely affect his clients. Supra 31 & 32...
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Chair Echeverria insisted upon finishing the hearing in one day's time, no matter
what, not even if the Reno Justice Court failed to comply with Coughlin's subpoena, which
former RJC Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil on 8/2/13, finally indicated to Coughlin at
her new position as a filing counter clerk at the Sparks Justice Court, that RJC Judge
Clifton had instructed her not to respond to Coughlin's SCR 110 subpoena (some might
say those who are not big enough team players get shipped to the Sparks Justice Court, to
be replaced by those whom are. Christine Erickson is the new Chief Civil Clerk at Reno
Justice Court). On that note Coughlin was unable to move to quash the subpoena on
Judge Beesley that Pat King never filed or notified Coughlin of in any way (Coughlin
managed to spy a copy of the waiver of service that Judge Beesley faxed to the SBN only
over the lunch during Coughln's 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing, where such was
discarded in a far corner of the room for no apparent reason). Pat King, of course, was
able to get his 11/2/12 Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Quash Coughlin's Subpoenas
granted, however, in the Chair's 11/7/12 Order.)
Coughlin was not permitted to call Judge Beesley as a witness in his case in chief
because Judge Beesley's schedule did not permit for such a level of due process be
afforded to Coughlin where he was only available, by telephone (which made it fairly
difficult to refresh his memory with anything like, say, handing him or otherwise
providing him with any of the filings by Coughlin that Judge Beesley had the vaguest of
recollections of, including Coughlin's filing of 3/30/12 filing in Cadle Co. v. Keller (NVB
10-05104) wherein Coughlin detailed the extensive prejudice to both his client's John
Gessin (NVB 11-05077, 11-05078, and that 3/19/12 Opposition by Coughlin does not
seem too bad viewed through the prism of circumstance yielded through knowing about
the 2/27/12 summary contempt incarceration (no stay of any sort for a practicing attorney,
said Judge Nash Holmes...strange that Coughlin's subsequent 3/7/12 Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis and Affidavit In Support Thereof would be offered (well, pages 2 and 3 of
that three page filing...after all, page 1 thereof did clearly identify Coughlin as an attorney,
with Esq. after his name, and his Nevada Bar number above the caption)to support an
allegation that Coughlin committed professional misconduct by filing an Affidavit in
Support of his Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis that failed to disclose that he was an
attorney (Coughlin's pleading for a stay on 2/27/12 to Judge Nash Holmes and arguing that
the failure to grant a stay of any sort would necessarily prejudice his client's cases, like
those before NVB Judge Beesley, of Gessin and Keller would sort of disclose the fact that
Coughlin was a practicing attorney and kind of undermine such allegation in King's
8/23/12 Complaint, no? King's Complaint alleged) and allegation and Robert Keller
stemming from RMC Judge Nash Holme's having Coughlin's smartphone, cell phone,
micro sd card, and electric shaver, taken out of Coughlin's personal property, into which it
was booked on 2/27/12 at 5:15 p.m., and given to the Reno Municipal Court Marshals
(whom should have been held in contempt for failing to respond to the subpoena that
Coughlin's mother served on them on 11/6/12, but NNDB Chairman Susich could not be
bothered with complying with SCR 111(3)-(4), so.... just like Judge Nash Holmes failed to
abide by NRS 22.030(2)-(3) in failing to follow the requirement that any alleged
contemptuous conduct not occurring within the "immediate view and presence" of the
court be supported by an sworn affidavit under NRS 22.030(2) (Judge Nash Holmes also
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struck Coughlin's request for audio of the 2/27/12 hearing from the record, as well as his
notice of appeal.
Further, the SBN attempted to (and succeeded) in have Coughlin convicted of
professional misconduct incident to an allegation that he failed to disclose that he was an
attorney in his 3/7/12 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit (Declaration
works under Buckwalter, but since so many judges choose to violated NCJC Canon 1,
Rule 1.1, and strike such filings by indigents when they cannot afford a notary's signature,
Coughlin as forced to utilize an older in forma pauperis affidavit). Preposterously
fraudulent was the SBN's King's admitting as an exhibit only a portion of Judge Nash
Holmes' reprehensible 3/13/12 Order wherein she struck from the record such Motion to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit in Support Thereof (which sought to waive the
$35 fee Coughlin's mother ultimately had to pay in sneakily seeking a copy of such
proceeding (which is a part of the public record) from the RMC after the RMC repeatedly
refused to provide such to Coughlin, even where he attempted to pay for it, and the SBN
refused to provide such to Coughlin until 6/27/12, some three and a half months after the
SBN initially indicated it would provide such to Coughlin (which makes the SBN's
allegation that Coughlin failed to respond to some alleged letter to Coughlin from the
SBN seeking a response to "grievances" from Judges Nash Holmes, and, apparently,
some unnamed other (the SBN, due to its own fraudulent approach, was unable to admit
into evidence the purported 3/16/12 letter it wrote to Coughlin wherein King allegedly
requested a response (though such lacks any within ten days language like that in
FHE 7;, and where King put on no argument that Coughlin violated RPC 8.1 with respect
to any grievance other then Hill's (which King failed to put into evidence, completely
undermining his attempt to establish such by clear and convincing evidence) with the
dicey terrain King found himself on upon Coughlin exposing King's fraudulent attempt to
avoid the strong defensive collateral estoppel arguments provided to Coughlin by Judge L.
Gardner deciding not to take any Canon 2, Rule 2.15 appropriate action by contacting an
appropriate authority like the SBN (see the former Canon 3(D)(2)) by initially indicating
that the SBN had received a grievance from Judge L. Gardner, when, in fact, the SBN was
forced to admit (along with Judge Nash Holme) that Nash Holmes herself included FHE3,
Judge L. Gardner's ancient three year old FHE3 (which King knew or should have known
from the materials Coughlin provided him had been vacated by virtue of the superseding
final Decree of Divorce, especially given the attendant Proposed Decree and alteration by
Judge L. Gardner to the very sections therein involving subject matter originally purported
to support some such sanction)...
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 154:3 to 154:25) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did you
or anyone with the Reno Municipal Court transmit or otherwise deliver Judge Linda
Gardner's order for sanctions to the State Bar of Nevada? A (JUDGE NASH
HOLMES) I'm sorry. I didn't hear all that. Did I what? You'll have to repeat the question.
Q Did you or anybody with your court, the Reno Municipal Court, transmit or
otherwise deliver Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 order sanctioning me to the State
Bar of Nevada? A I'm sorry. Deliver to whom? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The State Bar,
Judge. THE WITNESS: Oh. After -- let me explain quickly. My trial was my first
experience in exposure to Mr. Coughlin. After everything happened, and I held him in
contempt, then Judge Gardner told me that his sister, Judge Gardner, has a life
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experience with Mr. Coughlin, and he provided me a copy of her opinion from a couple
years earlier. And that may have been in the package I forwarded to the court.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 155:4 to 157:2) MR. COUGHLIN: Can I ask one
more question about the pending -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin -- MR.
COUGHLIN: -- competency evaluation or -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR.
COUGHLIN: -- with the trial? It's a good question. MR. ECHEVERRIA: It's an
interruptive question, and it's improper conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: You're not going to
let her (NOTE: her being RMC Judge Nash Holmes) answer that, huh? You are not
going to make her answer that? ... MR. COUGHLIN: She held a trial with a pending
competency evaluation in violation of law. ... I just got it on the record. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Thank you, Judge. We appreciate you taking your time into the lunch
hour. THE WITNESS: Thank you. I'll hang up now. MR. KING: Thank you, Judge. ...
MR. COUGHLIN: I'd like to call Judge Nash Holmes in my case in chief and ask her
why she persists in holding trial if she was aware of a pending competency order. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You had the opportunity to ask her those questions. MR. COUGHLIN:
No, I didn't. You just refused it to me. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No, I gave you -- MR.
COUGHLIN: You did another basis for an impartiality finding. ... You're not letting
me ask any question that would tend to implicate impropriety on the part of a judge.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: You can characterize the rulings as you wish. I have made the
rulings.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 83:19 to 84:16) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you intend to
call him on direct in your case in chief? MR. COUGHLIN: I might. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Hill, would you mind being on telephone standby? And, Mr. Coughlin, if you intend
to call him, I want a half-hour notice. THE WITNESS: That will be today? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Yes. Are you available this afternoon? THE WITNESS: I will cancel
whatever I have to make myself available for the panel. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Do you want me to come back out here or do you want me to be
available telephonically? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I just want you to be available by a phone
call, because I'm not sure Mr. Coughlin has committed that he, in fact, will call you this
afternoon. But he's asked us not to release you from the subpoena. I'm asking Mr.
Coughlin to give us at least a half-hour notice if you intend to call Mr. Hill in your
case.
However, despite Chair Echeverria's indication that if Coughlin provided a halfhour notice of his intent to call back witnesses (with, for some reason, Judge Beesley's
busy schedule making him off limits), Coughlin was not permitted to call witnesses such
as Elcano, Nash Holmes, and Hill back for a direct examination during his case in chief
(allegedly lengthy objections therein did not result in Coughlin being given more time,
in contrast to the approach Chair Echeverria took during King's presentation of his case in
chief: HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 54:18 to 54:22) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I'm
going to afford you extra time also for cross-examination. Part of it, the length of the
direct, was due to lengthy objections, and I have to take that into consideration. So please
proceed, and I will give you additional time.
Such giving additional time to King for his direct examination of Hill proved
unduly prejudicial to Coughlin's case where so much of what the Panel cites to as
supportive of the various findings and or conclusions respecting the alleged misconduct
issued from such direct examination of Hill after the passing of the fifteen minutes per
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witness dictated contained in Chair Echeverria's 11/7/12 Order (never mind that such
Order also required both sides to make offers of proof for all they sought to introduce
into evidence where King was never once grilled for an offer of proof and nearly
everything Coughlin sought to introduce was put through the offer of proof parallel
universe in which Chair Echeverria likely believes he is somehow a just and honorable
human, which, clearly, he is not)
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 83:7 to 83:17) MR. ECHEVERRIA: As soon as we
release Mr. Hill, we'll take a break. MR. COUGHLIN: And I can't call him on direct?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Pardon me? MR. COUGHLIN: I can't call him -- do I have
direct? Do I have a case in chief? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sure. MR. COUGHLIN: So
he's not released from the subpoena. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you not want him
released? MR. COUGHLIN: No
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 236:1 to 236:5) MR. COUGHLIN: I would like to
give you the 30-minute notice that I would like to cross-examine Judge Nash Holmes and
Richard Hill or call them in my case in chief, rather. I'll do that now. I note that I have a
time of 2:55.
And with respect to the audio transcripts for the petty larceny trial incident to
60838 (from which the FHE11 11/30/11 Order Punishing Summary Contempt also stems),
and both the 2/28/12 and 3/12/12 audio trancripts of the hearings from which FHE4,5 are
drawn: HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 224:21 to 224:25) MR. COUGHLIN: Can I call Pat
King and say, Pat, were you provided these copies of the audio? Everything is a copy,
okay, it's not -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: What's the offer of proof? What are you intending
to prove?
However, given the 2/28/12 Order involves an allegation of direct or summary
contempt implicating NRS 22.030, and where such (and the most inflammatory
accusation therein, clearly, was the charge that Coughlin lied to Judge Nash Holmes
with respect to some alleged activities by Coughlin in the restroom (ie, clearly outside the
immediate view and presence of the court, and therefore NRS 22.030(2)-(3) (see
McCormack) now require Judge Nash Holmes, where Coughlin is and has objected to her
presiding over any trial of the contempt, in addition to Coughlin filing NRS 1.230 and
Canon 3(E) Motions to Disqualify Judge Nash Holmes (who will need to comply with
NRS 1.235 and answer, by affidavit, within 5 days, Coughlin's allegations as to just where
she went for an hour between starting the cases on her stacked docket at 1:30 p.m.,
clearing the courtroom of every last person and case to leave Coughlin's for last (but she
only heard about Judge W. Gardner's sister's life experience after she found Coughlin in
contempt? Right), and just what the Washoe County Public Defender's office
communicated to her or any of her functionaries in any way related to its then client
Coughlin, as to whom WCPD Biray Dogan (the one whom violated NRS 178.397 in
failing to appear at Coughlin's 2/14/12 arraignment on the gross misdemeanor misuse of
911 emergency communications referenced in King's Complaint, from which King also
drew upon Coughlin's 2/21/12 filing responsive to Dogan's misconduct (8. Respondent
was again arrested on January 13, 2012, for allegedly abusing 911 services, a gross
misdemeanor. ...9. On February 21. 2012. Respondent filed a document entitled, Notice of
Appearance Entry of Plea of Not guilty, Waiver of Arraignment, Motion to Dismiss, etc. in
one of his pending criminal matters, Case No. RCR-2012 065630 (NOTE: the only gross
misdemeanor case or charge Coughlin has faced, ever, and, therefore, the exact case
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Judge Nash Holmes referenced in her 3/14/12 letter to the SBN, (FHE8 reads: It is my
understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending on this attorney.
My Judicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public Defender in February
when I had Mr. Coughlin jailed for Contempt of Court and they stated that they
represent him in a Gross Misdemeanor matter in RJC. I have no other information
on that.), City of Reno v. Zachary Coughlin. The document clearly shows Respondent's
unprofessional, disruptive conduct, and lack of respect for the court and opposing
counsel.)
Judge Nash Holmes and Judge Clifton of the RJC, along with RMC Judge W.
Gardner and Judge Howard, and RJC Judges Schroeder and Sferrazza (especially
troublesome is the menacing behavior by RJC Bailiff Reyes and Sexton during the
12/20/11 Hearing on Coughlin's 11/17/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien and
Judge Sferrazza's unhinged performance therein, and the unbelievably coercive setting
such courtroom took on (clearly Judge Nash Holmes has been receiving reports of the
tiresome and tireless glowering mixed with gossiping mixed with busy bodying and rights
trampling continually demonstrated by RJC Bailiff Reyes (apparently looking to score
some points and just enjoy being domineering and inappropriate) (note, SCR 229 applies
to reporters not litigants, and not to attorneys, and why are these courts and their bailiffs
and marshals so spooked that litigants and or their attorney might be recording the
proceedings? It likely is not just motivated by wanting to get that $35 for a copy of the
disc...but more out of a desire to avoid the kind of oversight and accountability that is
inevitable in an age where vast numbers of even ordinary people walk into courtrooms
with smart phones equipped with enough technology to bring levels of Sunshine Senator
Grassley could have never imagined...and the old school brown nose bullying bailiff
approach by those like RJC Bailiff's Reyes and Sexton needs to be put out to pasture
immediately, as does the abuse of the contempt power demonstrated by Judges Sferrazza,
Nash Holmes, Howard, Elliott, etc.)
(Coughlin's 11/14/12 FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING IN 62337 - Vol. I,
(Page 140:9 to 140:19) THE WITNESS: Mr. Coughlin asked for a bathroom break. I
originally said I would not give the break. And then I said that I would, but he had to leave
all his materials in the courtroom. And I said that because I suspected that he was taperecording the court proceedings without my permission, and without asking permission
first. Because he's apparently been known to do that. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection,
hearsay. Lack of foundation. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.
The 12/20/11 hearing in RJC Rev2011-001708 before Judge Sferrazza, finally
held, on Coughlin's 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, beyond being an
enormously disturbing recording, touches on many of the key issues in 62337, including
the extent to which the 10/27/11 FOFCOL lacks the within 24 hours language
presenting a jurisdictional prerequisite to such order even being valid, and displaying the
extent to which Judge Sferrazza and most of the RJC have been carrying out summary
evictions in Washoe County in a ridiculous manner that is violative of Nevada law. Even
RJC civil clerks have indicated to Coughlin in the past that these evictions are carried out
ridiculously fast. Also, Coughlin goes into the jurisdictional bar presented by NRS
40.254(2) where the summary procedures of NRS 40.253 are not available against one
using property for commercial purposes unless the non-payment of rent is alleged, which
Baker make clear, it was not (in fact, the precursor non-payment of rent case in Rev2011- 107/173 -MOTION
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001049 not only provides a defense to the no-cause eviction in Rev2011-001708 pursuant
to NRS 118A.510(e), but also a collateral bar to any assertion that Coughlin owed any rent
(which should have also operated to prevent any requirement under NRS 118A.355(5) that
Coughlin must deposit $2,275 in rent escrow in order to assert his retaliatory eviction
defense to the no-cause summary eviction). It is hard to understand what could be
motivating these judges to approach this area of the law in the manner in which they do,
where they permit, and sometimes even seem to encourage, the WCSO to race over to a
tenant's home and or business almost immediately after the hearing and not post the
summary removal order and wait 24 hours, but just dive right in to conducting the lockout.
Its horrific, as is the display by RJC Bailiff Reyes, Chief Bailiff Sexton, Judge Sferrazza,
and Richard G. Hill, Esq., here:
Part one of 12/20/11 hearing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HkAvvUvv7kA
Rather amusing to hear the judge litigating, er, establishing for the record some alleged
spurious and false statement with the court respecting why Coughlin did not get the
hearing required by NRS 40.253(8) within 10 days as required by Nevada law.
Part two of 12/20/11 hearing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QkTf_a_cLOY
(see RJC Bailiff Reyes accosting Coughlin at 2:37 pm and Reyes and Sexton misconduct
at 2:41:20 p.m., and then at 2:53:30 witness Richard G. Hill, Esq., with the same Bailiff
Reyes whom on 11/28/11 growled at a seated Coughlin that he would take him to jail and
or put my foot up your ass, and the same Chieff Bailiff Sexton whom on 11/22/11
interfered with Coughlin's attempts to post a supersedeas bond in making menacing
commentary in the filing office to Coughlin about Coughlin's ass as where Hill remarks
to Sexton and Reyes, all three of whom are within 10 feet of Coughlin, I'd like to put
something up Coughlin's ass to, to which Coughlin reported to Judge Sferrazza, along
with the put my foot up your ass threats of Reyes and those of Sexton, at which point
Judge Sferrazza indicated he himself would threaten Coughlin.
Oddly, upon Coughlin pointing out the masturbatory gesture Richard G. Hill, Esq.,
was making in respone to Coughlin elucidating the extent to which the abusive litigation
tactics Hill and his associate, Casey D. Baker, Esq., engaged incident to their preposterous
personal property lien over the client's files of the opposing counsel in the summary
eviction from such counsel's former home law office. At the 3:32:00 p.m., Coughlin spells
out the tremendously big liability Hill and Baker may face for prejudicing Coughlin's
respresentation of middle class people in foreclosure defense cases wherein Coughlin
was trying to save them from losing there homes...at which point Judge Sferrazza engages
in an tremendously inappropriate screaming fit at 3:33:25 p.m. (the type of judicial
misconduct that only encourages the rampant misconduct the RJC Bailiff's Reyes, Medina,
Chief Bailiff Sexton, Ramsey, and Heibert have been engaging in (flat out refusing to
accept documents for filing, refusing to allow Coughlin access to review even files in
cases where his liberty is at stake, or exigent landlord tenant matters...) , for no apparent
reason of any legitimacy, but rather to indicate the extent to which Coughlin has just
pointed out the tremendously suspect approach taken not just by Hill and Baker, but by the
RJC its self in not granting Coughlin a default upon his showing up to the 11/22/11
hearing that Judge Sferrazza called a witness for the purpose of proving the RJC provided
such hearing within 10 days of Coughlin's 11/16/11f filing of a Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien (of course, when such inquiry began to reveal the extent to which a
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default was indicated where Hill and Baker failed to show up, Judge Sferrazza
immediately lost intrest in making a record of anything related thereto).
Further, between approximately
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 139:9 to 146:14) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge
Nash Holmes, what did your marshals tell you about a bathroom break? A I'm sorry.
What marshals when? Q Well, the ones you reference on the audio from the March 12th
hearing? A Well, again, which -- my marshals. Could you be more specific, please, in
your question? Q How much have they told you about the hearing -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted the judge. She asked you a question. Do
you want to be specific as to a particular conversation? BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Yeah.
There was one bathroom break in the hearing. What were you told during the bathroom
break by either a marshal or the city attorney? MR. ECHEVERRIA: With respect to any
particular issue, Mr. Coughlin? BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q No. Just anything. Anything
connected to me? MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's what I'm asking. Is it involving you, sir?
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: All right. THE WITNESS: Mr. Coughlin
asked for a bathroom break. I originally said I would not give the break. And then I said
that I would, but he had to leave all his materials in the courtroom. And I said that because
I suspected that he was tape-recording the court proceedings without my permission, and
without asking permission first. Because he's apparently been known to do that. MR.
COUGHLIN: Objection, hearsay. Lack of foundation. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: So I required one of my marshals to accompany him to the restroom.
MR. COUGHLIN: She just gets to say a bunch of hearsay? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, she is responding to your question. Go ahead, Judge. THE WITNESS: When
the marshals came back from the restroom, they told me that Mr. Coughlin had, in fact,
been recording the proceedings because he had disassembled a device and left parts of it in
the bathroom. Or left -- disassembled parts of it, and then they discovered parts of it. In
any case, when he was taken into custody and held in contempt of court at the jail, he had
physically two recording devices on him, a cell phone -- either two cell phones or a cell
phone and some other recording device. I assumed that was pieces of which he was
messing with in the bathroom. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Which marshal told you that? A
I'm sorry? I can't hear that. Q Which marshal -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin,
you don't need to yell. THE WITNESS: It was Marshal Harley that told me that, Joel
Harley, H-a-r-l-e-y. He said when they went in and checked the bathroom after Mr.
Coughlin left, and he had found evidence that he had disassembled some object or
something in there. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q What evidence, and what object? A I just
described it as some sort of a recording device. Whether it was a cell phone and he took
the SIM card out or whatever it was, I wasn't sure. But I had asked you, Mr. Coughlin,
point blank in court if you were recording, and you told me no. And then you asked
immediately to go to the bathroom, and I said no. And then you begged and squirmed and
said you had to relieve yourself, and I had to let you go to the bathroom. And then when
you did that, you went into the bathroom -- BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Really? A Took
apart and disassembled a recording device. Q Really? Would audio show that, Judge?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. I've asked you repeatedly to please not interrupt
people. MR. COUGHLIN: I thought she was done. MR. ECHEVERRIA: It was clear she
wasn't when you were interrupting her. MR. COUGHLIN: All right. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You will cease that conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. MR.
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ECHEVERRIA: You've asked a question of the judge. She answered it. Do you have a
question? BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge, was there one bathroom break during the
trial? A I'm sorry. The crowd has recessed here, and let me move across the hallway,
because I can't hear anything right now, there's a big crowd. Q Don't worry. Just my law
license, Judge. No biggie. Was there one bathroom break? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, I for one do not appreciate your side comments. I think you should focus
seriously on the issues to be addressed here. The judge simply asked for accommodation
so she could hear. MR. COUGHLIN: I only have so much time, your Honor. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I know. Quit wasting it. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Was there one
bathroom break during the trial? A There was one bathroom break. Q Have you
reviewed the audio of that trial? A I'm sorry, I can't hear you again. Say it again. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Did you review the audio of the trial? THE WITNESS: I have not
reviewed them recently, no. I did at the time. I did when I entered my contempt order and
sent my package to the discipline board. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Why does the audio of
the trial indicate that you did not ask any questions about recording until after the one
bathroom break? A I'm not sure that's the case. I don't know. Q That is the case. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin -- BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Yet you testified today that
Mr. Coughlin asked to use the bathroom right after I asked him about recording. How do
you explain that? A I don't know the sequence of events. I don't recall -- Q You just said
you -- A I listened to the audio at the time when things happened. And when you came
back from the bathroom, either way I determined from -- I concluded that you were most
likely recording without my permission. Q Earlier your testimony was that you asked Mr.
Coughlin if he was recording, and he got real squirmy and asked to use the bathroom. Is
that correct? A Yes. Q Now are you remixing that testimony? A No. Q You just said,
I don't know the sequence of events. A Well, I don't recall the sequence of events. I know
that I asked you if you were recording. You denied you were. I asked you a couple times if
you were recording, if you had gotten permission to record, what you were doing. And at
some point it was determined that you most likely were. Q You know there is an audio of
these things you're testifying to, right, that we can like compare to what you're saying;
right, Judge? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, please exhibit a civilized tone. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q You're aware there's an audio? A Yes, there's an audio. I have not -- Q
That we can compare -- A -- I'm giving you my best recollection at this time. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you're trying my patience with your continuing
interruptions. That's not evincing the conduct of a competent lawyer. You should wait
until the witness finishes before interrupting her. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead. Ask your next question. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q So the
marshals said Mr. Coughlin left some disassembled part of a recording device in the
bathroom, and they retrieved it from there; is that correct? A I don't recall the exact
words. The impression I got from what the marshal said is that you had gone into the
bathroom, disassembled some sort of recording device, and they went in the bathroom
after you and checked that and determined that. That's my recollection of the events.
However, that's the downside to the SBN's King and Peters in lying about whom
filed which grievance (the SBN initially attempted to play it off like Judge L. Gardner (the
RMC Judge W. Gardner's sister), out of the blue, three years after the fact, took some
Canon 2 Rule 2.15 "appropriate action" and submitted a grievance with the April 13, 2009
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Order After Trial she entered that Judges Beesley and Nash Holmes' 1977 McGeorge
School of Law classmate Washoe Legal Services Exec. Director Paul Elcano claimed was
the "sole reason" for Coughlin's firing (which resulted in NSCT cases 60317) from
Washoe Legal Services, where he worked as a domestic violence attorney in a legal aid
setting. Its hard to tell what embodies what ails Nevada legal circles more, an attorney
being now temporarily suspended over a year for a candy bar he did not steal, where the
petty larceny trial included so many patent due process deprivations (no counsel appointed
to an indigent applying for such whom had been wrongfully evicted, burglarized by
opposing counsel and the Sheriff under the guise of conducting a summary eviction
lockout (11/1/11, even where the RJC continued to retain over ten times the amount of
Coughlin's money required for the mandatory, non-discretionary stay Coughlin filed for
under NRS 40.385 (the RJC failed to return the $2,275 in rent escrow Judge Sferrazza
fraudulently insisted, under an inapplicable NRS 118A.355(5) approach in a no-cause
summary eviction where NRS 118A.360 more than handled any of the rent Sferrazza felt
was owed, where, again, it was a no-cause summary eviction being litigated?), then
burglarized again by the Reno police (beyond the void/staleness/prematurity/not ripeness
of the eviction order vis a vis the 24 hour lockout per Russell v. Kalian, Mayes v. UVI,
Coughlin's 11/3/11 Motion for Stay under the disability provision in NRS 40.251(4)
provided Coughlin an additional five days from the notice of entry of a still yet to be made
order denying it (Judge Sferrazza was too busy awarding attorney's fees where none are
permitted whilst alleging he had been divested of jurisdiction as to anything Coughlin
sought (like the NRS 40.385 stay request further enunciated at the 11/7/11 hearing) to
enter any actual order addressing such 11/3/11 NRS 40.251(4) Motion for Stay by
Coughlin...) ...its never a civil matter when Richard G. Hill, Esq., comes a calling, huh,
RPD?) , whom wrongfully arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass (a jail stay with
concomitant outlay of cash for bail between 11/13/11 and 11/15/11)
As to 60317, the appeal of case where 2JDC Judge Elliott (whom failed to disclose
that he was on WLS's co-defendant CAAW's Exec. Board, then failed to recuse himself,
which any judge who reads this is now required to report pursuant to Canon 2, Rule 2.15,
to the NCJD (not to mention 2JDC Judge Elliott's misconduct revealed in the attached
transcript of the hearing on the curiously timed 2/27/12 Order for Competency Evaluation
by RJC Judge Clifton (apparently, the 2/21/12 filing in RCR2012-065630 by Coughlin
that King referenced in his Complaint (9. On February 21. 2012. Respondent filed a
document entitled, Notice of Appearance Entry of Plea of Not guilty , Waiver of
Arraignment, Motion to Dismiss, etc. in one of his pending criminal matters, Case No.
RCR-2012 065630, City of Reno v. Zachary Coughlin. The document clearly shows
Respondent's unprofessional, disruptive conduct, and lack of respect for the court and
opposing counsel.) was not sufficiently punished by the RJC upon its judicial secretary
Lori Townsend voluntarily providing the SBN in her 4/11/12 email to King, with dockets
and that filing (with offers to provide more), where such Coughlin filing pointed out the
fact that Coughlin's WCPD, Biray Dogan, Esq., (King swiftly sent Coughlin a letter in
response to his grievance against Dogan indicating King would not investigate such
matter), whom had agreed to enter a not guilty plea for Coughlin at the 2/14/12
arraignment that Dogan failed to appear at (a violation of NRS 178.397 by Dogan where
the charge was a gross misdemeanor) when Coughlin and his then attorney of record
Dogan discussed the case on 2/8/12 (Upon Coughlin writing and calling Dogan to see if a
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mandatory status conference date had been provided at the arraignment, and Dogan
revealing he failed to appear at such, Dogan rebuffed Coughlin's imploring him to take
some immediate action to ameliorate such failure to appear by Dogan, sufficient to avoid a
warrant being issued for Coughlin's arrest, to which Dogan refused to take any such
action, and incorrectly (again, NRS 178.397 and all) insisted that, despite his then being
listed as attorney of record, he had no obligation to attend such arraignment (the RJC
subsequently listed such 2/14/12 arraignment date as vacated, covering up for Dogan's
own RPC inquiries worthy failure to appear and concomitant refusal to ameliorate such (a
true Jim Leslie, Esq., protege is Dogan), and, instead, apparently filed a grievance with the
SBN, in addition to its judicial secretary sending King her 4/10/12 letter and Coughlin's
2/21/12 filing pointing out such NRS 178.397 violation by Dogan) (that is apparently, as
at the 1/4/13 TPO extension hearing in RCP2012-000607 King alleged, while violating
RPC 3.7, that he had received a grievance from a justice court judge...though none was
ever provided to Coughlin...) ...wherein Judge Elliott (whom also dismissed all of
Coughlin's criminal conviction appeals based on the most suspect of rationale in CR112064 and CR12-1262) managed to dismiss Coughlin's lawsuit against WLS, before even
getting to the merits of Coughlin's Complaint (only to to then award attorney's fees to
Coughlin's opponent purportedly based upon some assessment of the merits of
Coughlin's Complaint), based on the most inventive (see the whole "judges failing to
recognize Buckwalter's holding that Declarations in Lieu of Affidavits (especially those on
the 2JDC's own Proof of Service of Process forms held out to the public which prompt for
a "Declaration") theme above for any idea of why Coughlin's lawsuit was dismissed for
alleged "insufficient service of process") approach to finding service of process
insufficient, which included a finding that the copy of the Complaint and Summons that
Coughlin had served were too blurry or illegible... the irony in the SBN King's Complaint
attaching a very blurry copy of Judge Nash Holmes 3/12/12 Order (formal hearing exhibit
5 at the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing resulting in a NNDB Panel recommendation
that Coughlin be permanently disbarred in Nevada) purporting to copy and paste the
entirety of the Rules of Professional Conduct in her intemperate carpet bombing of
"findings" by, coincidentally, the "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof
standard that the SBN had fed her just that day) is not lost where Judge Elliott's various
orders dismissing Coughlin's lawsuit against Elcano and the WLS he is Exec. Director for
was premises upon a finding that such copies of the Complaint and Summons therein
Coughlin had served were not legible. The SBN's King apparently fearing similar such
legibility issues incident to the laughably slapdash/illegible/askew photocopy of Judge
Nash Holmes' 3/12/12 Order (FHE 5) that he attached to his 8/23/12 Complaint, went to
fraudulent lengths to ameliorate such legibility issues by simply replacing the illegible
pages from his 8/23/12 Complaint (reproduced in the packet in FHE1) with cleaner,
more legible copies thereof (thereby holding out such reproduction of his 8/23/12
Complaint in FHE1 as a true and correct copy thereof, when, actually, it was a doctored up
more legible copy thereof with respect to the illegible Judge Nash Holmes Order King
attached thereto. Again, Bomer worthy.
Speaking of 60317 and 60302, WLS's Elcano's daughter, Tyler Elcano was
recently hired by the same Washoe County District Attorney's Office that managed to
score a hat trick of vindictive wrongful prosecutions of Coughlin in one calendar year,
with more on the way, incident to the RJC Bailiff Reyes attacking Coughlin on 5/23/13 in
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the courthouse and throwing him over a bench in retaliation for Coughlin seeking copies
of documents in the public record that the RJC wishes he would just forget about (like the
2/5/13 audio recordings in RCR2011-063341 and RCR2012-065630 wherein RJC Judges
Pearson and Clifton, along with WCDA Zach Young violated NRS 178.405 (a regular
occurrence in the RMC and RJC) and the mandatory stay of "all proceedings in all
departments" required incident to Judge Pearson's Order for Competency Evaluation that
morning at 8:45 a.m....which begat an impermissible extra-judicial communication
between former WCDA criminal prosecutors turned RJC Judges Pearson and Clifton
(detailed in CR13-0552 in Coughlin's short-lived 4/2/13 Petition for Writ wherein
Coughlin detailed such NRS 178.405 violation in an attempt to get the 2JDC to order the
RJC not to hold the 4/2/13 trial before Judge Clifton in RCR2012065630: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VxrqMs6XU-o )
and
Gessin
11-05077 and 11-05078 (one is Taitano Moore v Gessin, the other is Rissone v. Gessin)
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11/14/12 SBN V. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN (62337) FORMAL

DISCIPLINARY HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 3:12 to 3:23)
STATE BAR EXHIBITS
MARKED ADMITTED
1 - Index of Documents
32 35
2 - Attorney Fees Order
45 48
3 - Order After Trial
87 114 (2JDC Judge L. Gardner's 4/13/09 Order)
4 - Contempt Order
129 132 (RMC Judge Nash Holmes 2/28/12 Order)
5 - Order attached to complaint
132 137 (RMC Judge Nash Holmes 3/12/12
Order)
6 - Letter dated February 14, 2012 to
Mr. Coughlin from Mr. King
159 165
7 - Two-page letter dated March 9, 2011
from Mr. Coughlin to State Bar 165 169
8 - Two page letter dated March 14, 2012
(RMC Judge Nash Holmes letter to SBN
(where's the SBN's purported letter to Coughlin attaching such and requesting a response?
Not in evidence, that's for sure, as it reveals to much about the fraudulent Bomer worthy
conduct of Asst. Bar Counsel King and Clerk of Court Laura Peters)
from Judge Holmes to Mr. Clark
171 175
9 - Affidavit of Poverty
179 187 (pages 2 and 3 of Coughlin's 3 page 3/7/12
Motion to Proceed IFP and Affidavit in Support Thereof, and the Certificate of Service to
the RMC Judge Nash Holmes
10- Order in Case 11CR 22176
187 188
11- Order for Summary Punishment
191 193
12- Order Affirming Rules
197
13- Order Granting Respondent's Motion
to Dismiss Appeal
197
14- New Verified Response
262
15- Redacted and Verified Response with
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two DVD discs

264
16- Emergency Ex Parte Motion
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268
Now, while the RMC and Judge Nash Holmes claimed to have so much
trouble tracking down Coughlin, Coughlin's various filings in the RMC, which
the RMC Judges admit to discussing in their several meetings wherein an approach
to Coughlin was developed (like, say, Coughlin's 2/21/12 Motion for New Trial in
RMC 11 CR 22176 (see 60838), or the 1/9/12 submission to the RMC by Coughlin
in the other case before Judge Nash Holmes, RMC 11 CR 00696 (the 1/12/12
custodial arrest of Coughlin for jaywalking outside the same former home law
office that the same Richard G. Hill, Esq., that Judge Nash Holmes found Coughlin
in contempt for seeking to interject the name of where such person had no
relevance to the proceedings of 2/27/12 (the simple traffic citation trial for the
three tickets Coughlin was given by RPD Sargent Tarter minutes after Tarter
directed Coughlin to leave Hill's Officer at 652 Forest St., where Coughlin had
ventured to retrieve from Hill Coughlin's wallet, keys, client's files, smartphone,
hard drives, etc., that Hill had arguably stolen from Coughlin incident to Hill's
office's burlaries of Coughlin's law office (and all the Sierra Glass professional
misconduct incident to Hill going through Coughlin's confidential client's files (Hill
had to walk a pretty fine line while testifying at Coughlin's criminal trespass trial on
6/18/12 before 2JDC Judge L. Gardner (see the 11/14/12 formal hearing exhibit 3,
which the SBN King originally attempted to play off as having been received from
2JDC Judge L. Gardner herself (because, otherwise, any failure by 2JDC Judge L.
Gardner to report any such alleged misconduct by Coughlin to the SBN would yield
to Coughlin an offensive collateral estoppel argument that such decision by Judge
L. Gardner not to take any such Canon 2, Rule 2.15 (the old Canon 3(D)(e)
addressed in Mirch).
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Dear Reno Direct, and Reno Police Department, and RPD Internal Affairs,
IAConcerns@reno.gov
askrpd@reno.gov.
I am being attacked by the County and City, please help.
Theres a smorgasbord of things detailed at the following:
http://www.youtube.com/user/25teddyjames
http://www.youtube.com/user/NevadaGadfly
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and in the Nevada Supreme Court cases 61901, 62337, 61383, 60838, 62104,
63342, etc. much of which is available on the Courts site and or scribd.com
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The WCSO refuses to follow Nevada law, and instead systematically burglarizes
tenants, which the RMC, RJC, and 2JDC, and SBN, some might say, all
countenance
Here's how the Clark County Assistant Manager approached a similar situation:
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/crime-courts/victim-family-court-gropingincident-files-federal-lawsuit
The Reno City Attorney's Office is bringing two cases to trial on 8/28/13 against
Coughlin alleging violations of a fraudulent Workplace Harassment Protection
Order obtained against Coughlin by the State Bar of Nevada, prosecuted by Chief
Criminal Deputy City Attorney Wong in 13 CR 3913, 3914, where the RMC filing
office continues its criminal misconduct in refusing to accept documents Coughlin
submits for filing (Judge Dilworth indicates he is not aware of any outstanding
motions...indicating that even when Coughlin obtains a filing stamp on a motion he
has submitted, the RMC filing office is continuing on with its past criminal
misconduct.
The Reno Police Department burglarized Coughlin's former home law office on
11/13/11, then retaliated against Coughlin for submitting written complaints by
harassing him continually and arresting him six times, and the wife of RPD Officer
Nicholas Duralde and RPD Detective Yturbide are both ECOMM 911 dispatchers,
with Coughlin's written complaint of the wrongful arrest of 8/20/11, misconduct,
and perjury at trial in RCR2011-063341 by Duralde resulting in the wrongful
11/13/11 (custodial arrest for criminal trespass in RMC 11 CR
26405: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eh2xyc-9cg0 where the RPD and
opposing counsel in the summary eviction from Coughlin's former home law office
case in Rev2011-001708 were actually burglarizing Coughlin's rental (see Russell
v. Kalian, 414 A.2d 462 (R.I., Apr 28, 1980), and Mayes v. UVI Holding, LLC
(301 A.D.2d 409 [1st Dept 2003])):
Mayes v. UVI: It is law of the case that no application for a new warrant
was ever made in connection with the second judgment of possession. The record
contains no documentation with respect to the warrant of eviction actually executed
by the Marshal. A secretary for the law firm testified that she thought she had
mailed a copy of the stipulation vacating the first judgment and warrant of eviction
to the Marshal. However, no copy of an accompanying cover letter has been
produced, which the witness testified would have been included as a matter of the
firm's general procedure. Nor could the witness state when the stipulation
might have been sent to the Marshal. Significantly, the record does contain a
cover letter dated August 23, 1996, directed to the Marshal from the law firm,
which enclosed the judgment of possession. The cover letter bears the anonymous
handwritten notation, good warrant 8/26/96. It is not clear what the law firm
was attempting to accomplish by means of this correspondence.
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Whether plaintiffs' eviction on an invalid warrant was deliberate or inadvertent,

there is no question that neither the landlord nor its attorneys can evade
responsibility for the wrongful eviction. Generally, a landlord is not responsible
for the manner in which an officer executes a valid process duly issued *** the
officer only becomes his agent where the process is irregular, unauthorized or void
(Ide v. Finn, 196 App.Div. 304, 314-315, 187 N.Y.S. 202; see also, Campbell v.
Maslin, 91 A.D.2d 559, 560, 457 N.Y.S.2d 40, affd. 59 N.Y.2d 722, 463 N.Y.S.2d
440, 450 N.E.2d 246 for reasons stated below). Civil Court has ruled that plaintiff
tenant was wrongfully evicted from her apartment based upon a void warrant. On
a previous appeal in the instant action, this Court held that the landlord was
afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of its wrongdoing in Civil
Court and is collaterally estopped to dispute its liability (268 A.D.2d 209, 700
N.Y.S.2d 682). Moreover, as lessor, the landlord is liable to its tenant for any
contract damages plaintiff sustained as a result of the breach of her lease.
It is a principle of long standing that conduct of litigation is the prerogative of
counsel. As stated in Hallock v. State, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510,
474 N.E.2d 1178, From the nature of the attorney-client relationship itself, an
attorney derives authority to manage the conduct of litigation on behalf of a client,
including the authority to make certain procedural or tactical decisions (see Code of
Professional Responsibility, EC-7-7; Gorham v. Gale, 7 Cow 739, 744; Gaillard v.
Smart, 6 Cow 385, 388). It is counsel's responsibility to maintain control over
the proceedings; to this end, counsel is chargeable with the misuse of process by
agents employed to further the course of litigation, even if liability is only vicarious
(see, Kleeman v. Rheingold, 81 N.Y.2d 270, 276, 598 N.Y.S.2d 149, 614 N.E.2d
712)....
As between the law firm and the Marshal, the firm, as the entity in control of
the litigation, had superior knowledge of its course (see, Bevona v. Judson Realty,
213 A.D.2d 349, 350, 624 N.Y.S.2d 416). Thus, the firm bore the responsibility to
keep the Marshal informed concerning the status of a warrant that appeared
valid on its face (see, Chelsea Marina v. Scoralick, 94 A.D.2d 189, 193, 463
N.Y.S.2d 489 [failure to advise Sheriff of temporary restraining order]), and any
misapprehension necessarily implicates a lapse by counsel (supra, at 195, 463
N.Y.S.2d 489). ...
(NOTE: while such authority is more applicable to the summary eviction by
Hill's firm, given it prepared the proposed FOFCOLOSE utlized as a lockout order,
where such curiously contained nearly every other term lifted verbatim from the
various statutes involved (save, of course, an elegant misstatement of NRS
118A.510(e) inserted by Hill's associate Casey D. Baker, Esq., done to get around
to thorny collateral estoppel problems vis a vis any allegedly owing rent presented
by Hill's firm initially bringing a summary eviction proceeding based on nonpayment of rent in a prior proceeding filed 9/6/11 in Rev2011-001492, only to
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abandon such course (with all the attendant collateral estoppel consequences
associated therewith, arguably) and, instead, pursue what it felt was the path of
least resistance in maintaining a subsequent summary eviction proceeding in
Rev2011-001708 based on a no-cause landlord's affidavit pursuant to NRS
40.254(2), fraudulently alleging that the lease had expired where the term of the
lease was misstated by Baker and lanldord Merliss as being for 12 months when
the lease, plainly, on its face, reads that such term is for not less than 12 months
and where both Baker and Merliss's unlawful detainer affidavits (should one
allow Merliss' testimony midway through the trial to satisfy that required under
NRS 40.253(6) to be filed before the justice court shall hold a hearing) swore that
the landlord's claim for relief was authorized by law where, plainly, the landlord
had no such no-cause termination right upon a reading of paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 of
the lease, and where, given the fraudulent misstatement as to the lease having
expired upon the passing of 12 months on 3/1/11, the subsequent purported
8/22/11 30 Day Notice to Vacate was of no legal consequence given it wrongly
concluded that the lease had already expired, and, therefore, failed to operate to
terminate such lease, even had the landlord possessed any such right to do so
under a no cause, holdover tenant basis (which, again, the landlord did not have any
such right under the lease).
Witness where Baker's proposed FOFCOLOSE (which Judge Sferrazza
signed with on one minor alteration) elegantly glosses away from Nevada law
pursuant to NRS 118A.510(e), where such reads:
The transcript of the 10/25/11 proceeding reveals such further: Landlord
(Baker): Your Honor moving down the statute to subsection e the tenant has
instituted or defended against judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration
in which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of this
chapter respecting habitability of dwelling units. That cannot be. He notices the
first no cause termination notice to vacate exhibit B was served on August 22,
2011 Mr. Coughlin did not institute or defendant any proceeding on any
habitability issues until after those notices were provided. Dr. Merliss can't
retaliate for something that is going to happen in the future that has not happened
yet Mr. Coughlin cannot proceed under that statute to the extent Mr. Coughlin is
complaining about this mold business first of all the may e-mail in Exhibit 8 does
not qualify in or satisfied the statutes regarding notice to a landlord about a
habitability issues and Dr. Merliss drove this point home when he testified that he
didn't understand what Mr. Coughlin was asking for I mean if you look through
these e-mails what Mr. Coughlin does is he identifies something he claims is some
sort of problem and then he tries to bargain some money off of the rent for he has
not produced to mean he does not say in then they e-mail this is my notice to you
under NRS 118A.355 I am going to withhold this rent unless you fix this he just
says we've got this issue he is later come for the court and he has (NOTE: why
would Coughlin reference NRS 118A.355 when he proceeded, to any extent the
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landlord's written acquiesence of 6/2/11 makes such approach even necessary,

under NRS 118A.360?)... ...
Judge: well I tend to agree that under subsection e, sorry of 118A.510 one he he
has to have instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding
based on habitability...
(NOTE: Judge Sferrazza presided over the prior non-payment summary
eviction proceeding filed on 9/6/11 in Rev2011-001492, where NJCRCP RULE
102.FILING OF SUMMARY EVICTION CASES becomes relevant to an
analysis of bring or threaten to bring an action for possession and instituted or
defended against a judicial...proceeding language in NRS 118A.510(e), where
Rule 102 reads: A summary eviction case shall be deemed filed with a justice
court upon the timely filing of an affidavit by a tenant and the payment of the
required filing fee by the tenant or upon the filing of an affidavit by the landlord
with an application for an order of summary eviction, together with the payment
of the required filing fee by the landlord.... Baker's argument that NRS
118A.510(e) is not satisfied where notes that the first no cause termination
notice to vacate exhibit B was served on August 22, 2011. Mr. Coughlin did not
institute or defendand any proceeding on any habitability issues until after
those notices were provided is premised upon Baker's hope that his allegedly
having a notice to vacate served on August 22, 2011 where the Tenant's Answer
of 9/6/11, pursuant to NV JCRCP Rule 102 manes such summary eviction case
shall be deemed filed with a justice court upon the timely filing of an affidavit by
a tenant.... The phrase instituted or defended against like relates to the point at
which a summary eviction case shall be deemed filed with a justice court,
which, in Rev2011-001708, would be 9/7/11 upon the timely filing of an
affidavit by a tenant, Coughlin. So, regardless of if the landlord's allegedly
serving a 30 Day No Cause Termination Notice to Vacate on 8/22/11 suffices as
threaten(ing) to bring and action for possession, such hardly operates to foreclose
a determination that Merliss then, subsequently, in retaliation did, in fact bring
an action for possession in retaliation (via Coughlin's filing of a second Tenant's
Answer or Affidavit on 10/6/11 in the no-cause summary eviction proceeding, as,
certainly, without more, the landlord's allegedly serving a 30 Day Termination
Notice to Vacate on 8/22/11 would not operate to bring an action for possession,
as, indeed, a requisite to doing so would be the service of the 5 Day No Cause
Notice of Unlawful Detainer, in addition to the landlord then, should the tenant fail
to file a Tenant's Answer, pursuant to NV JCRCP 102 filing...an affidavit by the
landlord with an application for an order of summary eviction, together with the
payment of the required filing fee by the landlord.) for Coughlin's, by filing a
Tenant's Answer on 9/7/11 in the non-payment summary eviction proceeding,
institut(ing) or defend(ing) against the prior non-payment summary eviction
proceeding in )
...which that is different than complaining about habitability which he can
interests through a separate lawsuit
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Plaintiff: yes
Judge: so I simply Simply complaining about habitability issues does not
satisfy the retaliatory conduct provision (NOTE: actually, it does under NRS
118A.510(b) if the landlord evicted the tenant in retaliation for simply
complaining about habitability (ie, its only in NRS 118A.510(e) that the tenant
need show they instituted or defended against a judicial proceeding...arguing
habitability, to which the landlord then in retaliation evicted them).
Plaintiff: that is exactly right Your Honor and in any event Mr. Coughlin has not
shown as is his burden to do that any of his complaints were in good faith under
that statute or that Dr. Merliss acted in a retaliatory fashion Dr. Merliss said I
didn't evict you because of these things you didn't pay your rent we tried to help
you you would let us that's not retaliation. Your Honor he's, Mr. Coughlin, is
attempting to make logical leaps between him threatening to sue for retaliation
and Dr. Merliss is hiring our office that that is you know per se retaliatory well
what are you supposed to do when you're tenant threatens to sue you? You gotta get
a lawyer..."
Also, with respect to the failure of the 9/27/11 Notice to contain the
jurisdictional predicate enacted by the legislature in 2009 ("NRS 40.253(3)(b)
(2):"That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful
detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of
the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order; and), the
10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE fails to to contain such language, and where the legislature
requires landlord's to place it in the 5 Day UD Notice, the failure to include in the
10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE any language whatsoever "directing the sheriff to remove
the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order..." makes such order void as
well.
Despite Baker's proposed FOFCOL being remarkably faithful to most
every other verbatim passage of NRS chapters 118A.510 and 40.251, 40.280,
40.253, and 40.254, the little bit about "24 hours" needing to elapse from the
time of the Sheriff's posting, at the very least (tenant's receipt could involved
a Brahams or Zammarippa analysis similar to receipt of suspension of one's
drivers license scenarios, or the 90 days to file suit from the receipt of the EEOC's
right to sue letter line of cases) such order to Coughlin's door (at least
according to the Order in Anvui) Baker carefully excised, (as he also did with
respect to several of the finer aspects of NRS 118A.510(b)-(g)) which is too bad
for him, his firm, the Sheriff (thought the Sheriff, per the Mayes v. UVI decision,
can sue the law firm now), and the landlord, given Russell v. Kalian and its ilkage
(see Coughlin's correspondence with the NNDB and SBN's OBC specifically citing
to such line of cases vis a vis the fact that it was actually Hill and Merliss, the
WCSO, and RPD doing the trespassing, not Coughlin. Proper notice to quit has
also been described as a jurisdictional necessity. HUD/Willow Street
Apartments v. Gonzalez, 68 Conn. App. 638, 792 A.2d 165 (2002); Cincinnati
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Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Morgan, 155 Ohio App. 3d 189, 2003-Ohio-5671, 800
N.E.2d 64 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 2003), appeal allowed, 101 Ohio St. 3d
1487, 2004-Ohio-1293, 805 N.E.2d 538 (2004) and judgment rev'd on other
grounds, 104 Ohio St. 3d 445, 2004-Ohio-6554, 820 N.E.2d 315 (2004). ).
The 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE Baker managed to get the justice court's
Sferrazza to sign read: "That the sheriff... be, and hereby is, directed to remove
each and every person found upon the rental unit at 121 River Rock, Reno,
Washoe County, Nevada, by no earlier than October 31, 2011 at 5 pm." Now,
Judge Sferrazza did intineate "no later than" in place of "no earlier than", but, the
real problem is that NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2) is what it is. The legislature works hard
on this stuff, and makes these laws for good reason, and they are not to be
selectively applied and gerrymandered to Judge Sferrazza's heart's content, for
whatever reason it is he so chose to here. As he did with respect to the "USPS
Certificate of Mailing" requirement in NRS 40.280(3)(b) (at the very least such
subsection required the 9/27/11 to "be served" by mailing it (whether NRS
40.280(3)(c)'s requirement that "before an order to remove a tenant is issued"..."the
landlord shall file...a proof of service" of the 9/27/11 notice, which "must consist
of" one of the three options set forth in subs. (a)-(c) therein may be read to require
that the "other process server" must provide an "endorsement" "stating the time and
manner of service", with such "service" (as defined in NRS 40.280(1)(a)-(c))
carrying a requirement that the "mailing" (which is absolutely required per the
record on its face in the instant matter) be represented by a simple indication in the
"proof of service" required by NRS 40.280(3) that such was mailed, or whether a
USPS Certificate of Mailing is also required, even where such posting was
purportedly done, as here, by a "licensed process server" is unclear.
What is very, very clear is that, at the very least, the landlord was required to
mail a copy of that 9/27/11 notice to Coughlin, and that Coughlin preserved his
objection to the landlord's failure to do so, and that such is not waivable by
Coughlin or the justice court. While a deficiency in a proof of service, per NRCP 4
may not normally render service that actual did comply with the requirements
therein invalid, where a statutory dictate is involved, such as in NRS 40.280(1)(a),
which provides that an order "shall not issue" until compliant proof of service is
filed by the landlord, and subsequent assertion that Merliss would now make that
(in contrast to MROA 655, where NCS's prepaid postage/stamped Pitney Bowes
envelope addressed to Coughlin was attached to that 8/22/11 Notice (found
attached as Exhibit 1 in "Exhibit D", Merliss's deficient "Unlawful Detainer
Affidavit"), no such envelope (and certainly not and USPS Certificate of Mailing)
is evidence by the record as to the 9/27/11 5 Day Notice found at MROA 662 (Exh.
2 to Exh D.), which consists of Baker's "Certificate of Service" indicating he
"personally handed at the hearing in the above reference matter" such 9/27/11
notice, but then completely fails to indicate any mailing thereof was done. Even if
Baker's violation of courthouse sanctuary rule/atty defendant immunity from
service while attending court was overlooked, NRS 40.280(3)(a) is still quite clear
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in requiring the signature of a witness thereto (in addition to the attestation of the
server) and the tenant acknowleding such service) as such Baker's Certificate of
Service at MROS 662 needs more to comply. Which requires an analysis of the
"Certificate of Service" at MROA 640 by the "licensed process server for NCS, and
a determination as to whether such satisifies NRS 40.280(3)(c)'s:"The
endorsement of a sheriff, constable or other process server stating the time and
manner of service." There would seemingly be an argument that such is compliant,
where it not for the fact that the court indicated an "envelope" (like that associated
with the 8/22/11 Notice at MROA 655).
As such, the collective landlord's affidavit presented by Baker's 10/19/11
Declaration Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2), Merliss's unlawful detainer affidavit
only admitted as an exhibit midway through the 10/25/11 trial/proceeding, and
Merliss's testimony to supplement such all are fraudulent where they assert the
notices were served in accord with NRS 40.280 when they plainly failed on the
USPS Certificate of Mailing requirement as to both the 8/22/11 and 9/27/11
notices, particularly where the 9/27/11 notice's proof of attempted service failed to
even include the photocopy of the envelope with postage that Judge Sferrazza
indicated he had allowed, in the case of a licensed process server to suffice for
the requirement to file a USPS Certificate of Mailing under NRS 40.280(3)(c), in
addition to the fact that there is really no indication, under Mikohn, that even NCS's
Durden placed to go out for mailing that day any copy of such notice in the
mailbox, and certainly, Baker's 9/27/11 Certficate of Service completely fails to
indicate any mailing at all took place.
Generally,Litigants, their attorneys, and witnesses are immune from service
of process while attending court. Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76
L. Ed. 720 (1932); Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192
(1916); Moreo v. Regan, 140 A.D.2d 313, 527 N.Y.S.2d 547 (2d Dep't 1988);
Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. District Court of Fourteenth Judicial Dist. In and
For Tulsa County, 1980 OK 3, 605 P.2d 1323 (Okla. 1980). AMJUR PROCESS
21.
The 10/27/11 proposed FOFCOLOSE Baker was able to get Judge Sferrazza
to briefly sign on to (until his 11/7/11 rendition of an order amending such at the
hearing on that date) read: 10.3 Coughlin failed to present any evidence that
prior to being served with the referenced termination and eviction notices,
Coughlin had "instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative
proceeding or arbitration in which [he] raised an issue of compliance with the
requirements of [NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of dwelling units"
as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e). (NOTE: here Baker attempts to
mischaracterize the language of the statute to get around the fact that Couglin, by
defending against the non-payment summary eviction proceeding following the 5
Day Non-Payment Notice of Unlawful Detainer purportedly served on Couglhin on
8/22/11, in RJC Rev11-1708, and therein arguing habitability issues, did, thereby,
invoke the protections of NRS 118A.510(1)(e), as, only thereafter did Merliss
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bring...an action for possession in 1708. While Baker attempts to argue that
Couglin need have instituted or defended against a judicial...proceeding prior
to being served with the referenced termination and eviction notices the
statute simply does not say that. Now, Baker can argue that his client did not
thereafter bring and action for possession (and, given the unique nature of
Nevada's approach, it is not entirely clear at which point one can be said to bring
an action...is it upon serving a 5 Day Notice of Unlawful Detainer? Did the
landlord bring an action upon his purportedly terminating Coughlin's month to
month tenancy on 8/22/11? Hard to imagine that qualifies (particularly where
such Notice of 8/22/11 is deficient in that is incorrectly asserts that Coughlin's lease
had expired, where, clearly, such is not the case upon a close review of
Paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 of the 2/24/10 Standard Rental Agreement).
A close review of the FOFCOLOSE, particularly Findings of Fact 1-8 reveal
something curious....Baker's provided to Judge Sferrazza a proposed FOFCOLOSE
that does not actually make any indication as to the key inquiry with respect to the
NRS 118A.510(e) analysis vis a vis just when one can be said to bring an action
for possession or have instituted or defended against a judicial ... proceeding. It
is likely that Nevada law will view the landlord to be said to bring an action for
possession either upon the service of the 9/27/11 5 Day No Cause Notice of
Unlawful Detainer, or, upon Couglin's filing his Tenant's Answer in response
thereto on 10/6/11, and the landlord thereafter communicating some intention to the
Court to follow through with a hearing, and (or, perhaps, upon nothing more than
the Tenant filing a Tenant's Affidavit...that is, the landlord need not do anything
further thereafter to be said to have brought (bring) and action for possession).
However, Baker's attempt to characterize the mere service of some 30 Day Notice
to Vacate as the bring(ing) of an action for possession is simply unsupportable,
in light of the fact that there is no legally operative effect to Baker's doing so absent
his then serving a 5 Day Notice of Unlawful Detainer, at which point, should tenant
Coughlin have failed to file a Tenan'ts Answer within 5 days thereof, Merliss would
be able to obtain a lockout Order from the court.
The thing is, Couglin argued that his Litigation Demand Letters to Merliss
between May-September of 2011 suffice to meet the instituted or defended
against requirement (and there are instances of such letters from Coughlin to the
landlord that predate even a finding that the service of the 30 Day Notice to Vacate
of 8/22/11). Indeed, how is Baker's service upon Couglin of a 30 Day Notice to
Vacate bring(ing) an action for possession if Coughlin's litigation demand
letters are not instituting or defending against a judicial proceeding where
habitability an issue (and Coughlin's Litigation Demand Letters specifically invoke
habitability issues and warn Merliss against any anticipated retaliatory conduct by
the landlord.
Further, the NRS 118A.510 inquiry is not limited to a comparison of the
mere temporal relation between the landlord's bring(ing) or threatening to bring
an action for possession and the tenant's instituting or defending against (NOTE:
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and such is especially not limited to a strict race to see whether the landlord
allegedly served on 8/22/11 a 30 Day Termination Notice to Vacate prior to the
tenant instituting or defending against the no-cause proceeding by filing a
Tenant's Answer on 10/6/11 where the Tenant had filed a Tenant's Answer on
9/7/11 in the precursor non-payment summary eviction proceeding in Rev2011001492).
Paullin v. Sutton, 102 Nev. 421, 724 P.2d 749 (1986). (NOTE:
Paullin was a civil action where the former tenant brought a claim for wrongful
eviction, as such, it was a plenary civil action, not a summary eviction
proceeding...so the standard of review applicable thereto is a sterner one to meet in
order to overturn such judgment (S & D first contends that the evidence does
not support a finding of retaliatory eviction. In considering such a claim, this court
must assume that the jury believed all the evidence favorable to the prevailing party
and drew all reasonable inferences in her favor. The verdict of the jury will be
overturned only if there is no substantial evidence to support it. E.g., General
Motors v. Reagle, 102 Nev. 8, 714 P.2d 176 (1986).). Incidentally, that same
supported by substantial evidence standard is the one 2JDC Judge Flanagan
applied to uphold the justice court's ruling...which is clear error, and arguably
Mandamus worthy in that such ruling was made in excess of the district court's
jurisdiction.
52B CJS LANDLORD 1576: C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings;
Summary Proceedings 7. Appellate Review 1576. Standard of review , Landlord
and Tenant 291(18), 315(1), 315(3) A decision of the trial court in a summary
dispossession proceeding may be reviewed for abuse of discretion, but under some
statutes, a de novo review is conducted. The reviewing court will give weight to the
opinion of the trial court[1] and will not disturb an exercise of discretion by the trial
court in the absence of an abuse of the court's discretion.[2] The appellate court will
indulge in reasonable presumptions in support of the findings of the trial court on
conflicting evidence[3] and in support of the judgment appealed from.[4] Under
some statutes, however, dispossession proceedings are triable de novo on appeal.[5]
Where there is a trial de novo, the appellate court should consider the facts of the
case[6] and render a proper judgment.[7] Whether the unlawful detainer notice
requirement is calculated in accordance with the timing provisions of the civil rules
is a matter of statutory interpretation to be reviewed de novo.[8] An order granting
a summary eviction under a lease providing for periodic rent reserved by the
month, or any shorter period, should be reviewed on appeal based upon the
standard of review for an order granting summary judgment, which is de novo
review, because such proceedings are analogous.[9] [FN1] N.Y.Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 43 Misc. 2d 639, 251 N.Y.S.2d 693 (App. Term 1964).
[FN2] Cal.Whipple v. Haberle, 223 Cal. App. 2d 477, 36 Cal. Rptr. 9 (5th Dist.
1963). Reviewing decision regarding issuance of a protective order D.C.Graham
v. Lanier Associates, 19 A.3d 361 (D.C. 2011). Plenary review of sufficiency of
notice to quit Conn.Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 973 A.2d 1229
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(2009). [FN3] Ala.Hyde v. Isbell, 254 Ala. 373, 48 So. 2d 465 (1950). Ill.
Woodson v. Benson, 330 Ill. App. 248, 70 N.E.2d 742 (1st Dist. 1947). [FN4] Ill.
Mitchell v. Tyler, 332 Ill. App. 577, 76 N.E.2d 237 (1st Dist. 1947). Mass.
Staples v. Collins, 321 Mass. 449, 73 N.E.2d 729 (1947). [FN5] Ala.Hyde v.
Isbell, 254 Ala. 373, 48 So. 2d 465 (1950). Mo.Conley v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d 385
(Mo. Ct. App. 1952). [FN6] Ariz.Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64 Ariz.
199, 167 P.2d 394 (1946). [FN7] Ariz.Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64
Ariz. 199, 167 P.2d 394 (1946). Mo.Conley v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1952). [FN8] Wash.Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash. 2d 365, 173 P.3d
228 (2007). [FN9] Nev.Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 163
P.3d 405 (2007). CJS LANDLORD 1576
However, the landlord's attorney, Baker, adopted the same fraudulent
approach to restating the law in a way that conveniently, and uncolorably,
mistakenly indicates a different standard (RPC 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 violations, much?)
than that which is really controlling (similar to Baker's conveniently leaving out of
the 10/27/11 proposed FOFCOLOSE the within 24 hours of receipt by the
tenant (note: the actual language in the statute merely implies it is the tenant's
receipt of such summary order for removal of the tenant, rather than, as the
RJC and apparently the WCSO (in contravention of the view and approach taken by
every other county in Nevada) purport to believe, such receipt being that of the
order by the Sheriff (though, tellingly, former RJC Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil
recently admitted to Coughlin that RJC Judge (not even Chief Judge at the time on
October 30th, 2012...) Clifton instructed her not to answer Coughlin's subpoena on
her, RJC Court Administrator Steve Tuttle, and the RJC Custodian of Records,
which sought, amongst other items, the fax log to indicate just when the RJC faxed
either or both the 10/25/11 Eviction Order and Decision and the 10/27/11
FOFCOLOSE to the WCSO (with the importance being that, should Nevada law be
what Stancil and the RJC and WCSO have been purporting it to be, ie, that NRS
40.253(5)(a) requires of the Sheriff to perform such summary eviction lockouts
within 24 hours of the Sheriff's receipt of such summary order for removal of
the tenant that any failure to so conduct such lockouts (and this is detailed in the
very 3/5/12 Motion to Dismiss in the criminal trespass prosecution against
Coughlin in RMC 11 CR 26405 (see the SCR 111 Petition in 61901 that operates as
a defensive collateral bar to King and the Panel now purporting that such is a
serious offense sufficient to buttress numerous violations of the rules of
professional conduct: (from the 12/14/12 FOFCOL now on appeal in 62337:
In the 10/27/11 proposed FOFCOLOE Baker submitted, which Judge
Sferrazza signed, Baker artfully omitted the required within 24 hours of receipt
language required by NRS 40.253(5)(a), and replacing it with, initially no later
than 5:00 p.m., October 31st, 2011 (which Judge Sferrazza caught before signing
the FOFCOLOSE, changing such to no earlier than 5:00 p.m. in a telling example
of the manner in which Baker fraudulentl approaches litigation, in addition to
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Baker's remixing what Judge Sferrazza actually indicated in his order as rendered
with respect to the $2,275.00 in some half baked NRS 118A.355(5) rent escrow
deposit required of Coughlin in a no cause summary eviction proceeding).
Judge: alright I am prepared to rule and I do first of all I do want to say I
acknowledge the defendant's argument with respect to rule 44 And Justice Court in
Las Vegas and I have been unable to find a similar rule with respect to Reno justice
court so my decision with respect to the escrow money will be separate from this
but I do find number one that the landlord met its burden of proof with respect to
unlawful detainer that the exhibits and the testimony submitted to the court
specifically exhibit B the tenant was notified of the no cause termination in a timely
manner and with proper service exhibit C the tenant was notified five day notice of
unlawful detainer and compliance with the statute and with proper service and
therefore the defendant was an unlawful detainer effective as of the date of the
beginning of these proceedings which was on artists I'm sorry well certainly by
October 10 when the landlord's affidavit was filed but certainly today without
question further I have sitters the tenant's arguments with respect to it retaliation
specifically under 118A.510 with respect to subsection a although the tenant has
complained about violations of building housing or hope code I do not find there is
any evidence that he made said complaint to a government agency charged with
responsibility for enforcement of that code second with respect to this subsection be
although defendant did present evidence today of destruction of carpet and alleged
that it was a crime under NRS 206.330 205.270 206.040 there is no evidence that
said complaint cited a specific statute to the landlord but rather a general complaint
about the structure of this carpet and therefore I find it that subsection of the statute
was not satisfied as will him and I further find that even if it was even if the
landlord knew what you're trying to say the landlord did not retaliate against you
for that the landlord eviction was based on nonpayment of rent not your
complaining of your destruction of carpet and I also at the prior court proceeding I
made findings with respect to the damages and those damages in total were $2725
and that was the outside number and so I found that you owed at least $2275 even
giving you the benefit of all the doubts and today there was evidence presented that
the stairs were only $75 I gave you $1250 for the stairs credit there was an e-mail
presented today that indicated that it's all you are asking for was $75...and then with
respect to the noxious weeds first of all I find that that is not a habitability issue
second of all I find that under the lease you were required to maintain the lawn and
third this is under subsection a you didn't make a complaint the governmental
agency and there is no evidence that you did with respect to the noxious weeds the
mold insulation I do find that that could be a habitability issue clearly could be
whoever again under 118A.510 subsection to make it retaliatory it has to be have
been presented either in action suit. By you or defendant against you against by you
and the judicial administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised
the issue of compliance with the requirements of habitability and sense you didn't
raise this issue until after the landlord had in fact file the complaint I find that that
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did not violate the habitability statute did not violate the retaliatory eviction statute
for all those reasons I find that the defense of retaliation does not meet the
requirements of chapter 40 specifically one second here, specifically, 40.253
subsections 6
The Court determines that there is not a legal defense to the
alleged unlawful detainer and therefore the court grants the eviction. With respect
to the money in escrow, the court finds that that money is owing to the landlord;
however, I am not going to order that today since the defendant has made argument
that the court does not have enough, in fact, a proper rule with respect to escrow as
similar to Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44, and, therefore, since the tenant still has
the ability to appeal in this matter I will give him 10 days to file a proper appeal
which is the statutory time frame, and if he does so, that money will be used to
satisfy his appeal bond in this matter. If he does not do so, then at that time a
proper motion can be made by plaintiff's counsel, on this matter. The eviction will
be effective October 31 at 5 PM.
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The proposed FOFCOLOSE Baker was able to get Judge Sferrazza to sign
on 10/27/11 read: 10.3. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that prior to
being served with the referenced termination and eviction notices, Coughlin
had "instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or
arbitration in which [he] raised an issue of compliance with the requirements
of [NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of dwelling units" as required
by NRS 118A.510(1)(e). (NOTE: that last little bit, as required by NRS
118A.510(1)(e) is a possible RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 violation by Baker where he
presented his proposed FOFCOLOSE containing such a misstatement of the
text of NSR 118A.510(1)(e)).
Compare that to what the statute actually states, verbatim: NRS 118A.510
Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant prohibited; remedies;
exceptions.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the landlord may not, in
retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy,... or bring or
threaten to bring an action for possession if:..(e) The tenant has instituted or
defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the
tenant raised an issue of habitability...
Baker's 2/24/12 Answering Brief in that appeal of the summary eviction in
1708 read: III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[A]n order granting summary
eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal based upon the
standard for review of an order granting summary judgment under NRCP 56
because these proceedings are analogous.,,8 Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC,
123 Nev. 212, 215,163 P.3d 405 (2007). "To successfully defend against a
summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must transcend the
pleadings and, by affidavit or other admissible evidence, introduce specific
facts that show a genuine issue of material fact. 9 Torrealba v. Kesmitis, 124
Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
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'"A case appealed must not be tried a new."10 NJCRCP 76A. Further, "a
[lower court's] findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly
erroneous and are not based on substantial evidence."11 Gibellini v. Klindt, 110
Nev. 1201, 1204, 885 P.2d 540 (1994) (emphasis added). "The notice of appeal
shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment,
order or part thereof appealed from ...,,12 NJCRCP 72(c). "Only those parts of the
judgment which are included in the notice of appeal will be considered by the
appellate Court.,,13 Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332, 335, 353 P.2d
458 (1960).
The eviction apparently resulted from a series of disputes between Sutton
and the manager
of the Las Vegas Manor Apartments, Robert Paullin. In March of 1983, Paullin
received a
memo from his supervisor directing him to inspect all storage areas and make sure
they were
cleaned out. Paullin testified that he went to the storage shed near Sutton's
apartment, discovered
that none of his keys fit the lock, and instructed a handyman to break the lock. At
that
time, Sutton came out and informed Paullin that the items in the storage shed
belonged to her.
Sutton claimed that use of the shed had been part of her lease when she first moved
into the
building in 1964 (NOTE: such is similar to Coughlin asserting his rights under
paragraph 22, 23, and 28 of the lease, especially with regard to the proportionate
reduction of rent resulting from the landscapers (from any cause) damaging the
property and Coughlin's personalty)...On April 22, 1983, Paullin delivered a letter
to Sutton instructing her **750 to (1) bring her apartment into a clean and sanitary
condition
within ten days FN1; (2) vacate and clean the storage unit within thirty days; (3)
immediately
remove from her window a sign which read, Please inquire at the office about
names
and addresses. Thank you. FN2 ; *423 and (4) put current license plates on her
car, inflate
the tires, and bring it into operable condition within ten days, or it would be towed
away at her
expense.FN3 Paullin testified that, upon receiving this letter, Sutton stated that she
was not
going to do a damn thing. Paullin spoke to his supervisor later that day concerning
the problems
with Mrs. Sutton, following up the call with a letter detailing the problems he was
having
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with her. His supervisor instructed Paullin to serve a notice to quit upon Sutton.
This decision
was made within four days of the April 22 demand served upon Sutton. The notice
was
served May 2. At that time, Sutton had not removed the sign or the items in the
storage shed,
and had not repaired or removed the automobile. She vacated the premises on June
2, 1983,
and brought this action against S & D Management Inc. (S & D), the owners of the
apartments,
and against Robert Paullin. S & D appeals from a jury verdict awarding Sutton
$12,000
in compensatory and $88,000 in punitive damages.
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Tenant's Rights and Remedies Against Retaliatory Eviction by Landlord, 45

AMJUR POF 3d 375 (2011); 99 Am. Jur. Trials 289, Retaliatory Eviction Claims
(2011).
B Retaliatory Eviction with Respect to Particular Kinds of Leases
7 Fixed-term leases
C Retaliation for Particular Conduct by Tenant
9 Complaint of housing code violation or unfit condition of premises
10 Exercise of other legal rights
D Proof and Effect of Retaliatory Eviction
12 Tenant's burden of proof; rebuttable presumption of retaliation
12.5 Proof of intent; mixed motives; pretext
E Landlord's Defense of Retaliatory Eviction Claim
14 Rebutting evidence or presumption of retaliatory eviction, generally
15 Tenant's complaints made after notice to quit
16 Tenant's complaints not related to habitability of leased
premises
19 Effect of tenant's failure to pay rent or renew lease
III Model Discovery
23 Defendant tenant's interrogatories to plaintiff landlord
24 Tenant's request for production of documents
24.5 Other discovery considerations
IV Elements of Proof
25 Proof of landlord's retaliatory eviction of tenant; checklist
V Proof of Landlord's Retaliatory Eviction of Tenant For Reporting
Housing Code Violations
A Testimony of Tenant
26 Rental of premises
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27 Landlord's violation of housing code

28 Tenant's complaint to landlord of unsatisfactory condition of premises
31 Service of notice to quit
32 Landlord's refusal to state reason for eviction
33 Absence of good cause for eviction
Judge Sferrazza, in his order as rendered at the conclusion of the 10/25/11
summary eviction proceeding and or during the 11/7/11 Hearing ruled that he was
finding that the landlord evicted Coughlin for non-payment of rent. Such is
reversible error where the court was foreclosed from making such a finding given
the defensive collateral estoppel bar presented by such (especially where it was
actually litigated) in the prescursor non-payment summary eviction case, in
addition to the landlord's failure to plead that any rent was owing in Rev2011001708, the subsequent no-cause summary eviction.
Presumptions and burden of proof 3,8-11,13[b],14[a],16:
Particular Circumstances Affecting Application of Retaliatory Eviction
Remedy or Defense
8 Notice of eviction following report within short period of time
10[a] Tenant fails to pay rent or renew leaseRetaliatory eviction
established or supportable
11[a] Tenant's report follows evictionRetaliatory eviction established
or supportable
16 Other or unspecified considerations
Many statutes prohibiting a landlord from evicting a tenant out of retaliation
for the tenant's reporting of the landlord's violation of law include a rebuttable
presumption against the landlord once certain facts are established. The burden of
proof is then shifted to the landlord to rebut that presumption. In one case, a tenant
created a rebuttable presumption by establishing that an eviction proceeding was
initiated against her after she made a report to code enforcement authorities that her
furnace was not in good working condition. The burden of proof was shifted to the
landlord, who failed to rebut the presumption that the eviction proceeding was
brought in retaliation. Cornell V Dimmick (1973) 73 Misc 2d 384, 342 Nys2d 275.
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The 10/27/11 FOFCOL was changed by Judge Sferrazza's 11/7/11 Amended

Order, especially where the 10/27/11 FOFCOL reads:
10.2. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he
"complained in good faith to the landlord or a law enforcement agency
of a violation of [NRS Chapter 118A] or of a specific statute that
imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(b).
10.3. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that prior to being
served with the referenced termination and eviction notices, Coughlin
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had "instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding

or arbitration in which [he] raised an issue of compliance with the
requirements of [NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of
dwelling units" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e). (NOTE: that last little
bit, as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e) is a possible RPC 3.1, 3.3, and
3.4 violation by Baker where he presented his proposed FOFCOLOSE
containing such a misstatement of the text of NSR 118A.510(1)(e)).
Landlord Merliss violated NRS 118A.510 in retaliating against Coughlin.
NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant
prohibited; remedies; exceptions.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the landlord may not, in
retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy,... or bring or
threaten to bring an action for possession if:..(e) The tenant has instituted or
defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the
tenant raised an issue of habitability...
Actually, Dr. Merliss evicted Coughlin in retaliation for Coughlin
asserting his rights pursuant to Merliss's own 6/2/11 written agreement to the setoffs for fixing issues as detailed therein, in addition to, to whatever extent such is
even necessary, the rent deductions provided for in the lease where for any
reason the premises are rendered untenatable (such as Merliss's landscapers
wreaking havoc thereupon on May 23rd, 2011, of which Coughlin complain to
Merliss in writing, including about the criminal law violations referenced in NRS
118A.510(b)), and the NRS 118A.510(b) violation of this Chapter attendant to
Merliss bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession upon Coughlin
asserting his rights to a NRS 118A.360 fix and deduct approach upon Merliss
failing to address Coughlin numerous such notices within the allotted 14 days, in
addition to Merliss immediately hiring an attorney and referring Coughlin to such
upon Coughlin asserting his rights to 48 hours notice, pursuant to the lease, prior to
any entry by the landlord or his agents, as detailed in the written exchange between
Merliss and Coughlin on 8/16/11. Not such great logical leaps, really.
So, as to the holding in Mayes, while the WCSO Civil Division ought have a
hard time keeping a straight face in alleging it need rely on the 10/27/11
FOFCOLOSE to know whether or not Nevada law requiring, at the very lease, the
posting of such summary eviction 24 hour lockout order and the passing of 24
hours prior to such lockout being carried out, Hill's associate Baker provides the
WCSO with a good argument that Hill's office bares a higher degree of culpability
where such 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE fails to include the required within 24 hours
language mandated by NRS 40.253(5).
Furthermore, the Marshal, as an officer of the court, is entitled to rely on
the presumption of regularity (see, CPLR 4520), which has long been accorded to
the conduct of the affairs of her office (see, Burkhard v. Smith, 19 Misc. 31, 42
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N.Y.S. 638 [1896]), and defendant law firm has failed to make a prima facie
showing to overcome the presumption by demonstrating that she knowingly or
negligently executed an invalid warrant (cf., De Zego v. Bruhn, 67 N.Y.2d 875,
877, 501 N.Y.S.2d 801, 492 N.E.2d 1217). Nor do plaintiffs suggest that the
outcome should be otherwise. They state that counsel, in the person of Jacob
Goodman, admitted his office instructed the Marshal to execute a warrant that he
himself had agreed to vacate, and that led to a major screw-up. The law firm
defendants are therefore responsible as a matter of law for the illegal eviction.
As to the Washoe County Sheriff's Office's (and the RPD) burglaries on
Coughlin (at least 4).(2) Initially, Kalian and Pari contend that the clerk of the Sixth
Division District Court acted contrary to the provisions of G.L.1956 (1969
Reenactment) s 9-25-21 in entering the return date of June 13, 1977, upon the
execution for possession of Elsie's apartment. Since the execution was issued on
May 23, 1977, it was valid for twenty days. According to Kalian and Pari, this
alleged error would render the execution irregular but not void because the statute
affords a successful plaintiff a three-month period during which the execution can
be served. This argument is not persuasive, for the execution's twenty-day return
date is clearly sanctioned by s 9-25-21, which requires that (e)very execution
issued by any district court shall, unless otherwise specifically provided therein, be
returnable three (3) months after the date thereof, and be returned to the district
court which issued it. (Emphasis added.) This language indicates that, in the
absence of a date specified on the execution, the date of return is to be three months
after issuance. June 13, 1977, was the date inserted on the execution in question;
thus, Kalian and Pari could not lawfully act on the execution after this date. It may
be that the execution in question was issued as the result of the summary procedure
set forth in s 34-18-9(a), where the ground for the ejectment is nonpayment of rent.
In the event judgment is issued for the landlord, this statute specifically requires
that the execution shall be issued only to the sheriff. If the sheriff or his deputy does
not execute the mandates of the execution within twenty days of its issuance, the
sheriff must appear before the justice of the court issuing the execution on the
day following this twenty-day period to show cause why the court's mandate was
not carried out. .... If Kalian and Pari were dissatisfied with the execution, they
could have returned to the District Court and sought the issuance of an alias
execution. Instead, they chose to evict Elsie under an invalid execution, thereby
subjecting themselves to liability for trespass. Russell v. Kalian, 414 A.2d 462
(R.I., Apr 28, 1980). 17 Causes of Action 809, Cause of Action Against Landlord
for Conversion of Personal Property in Possession of Tenant (2012) HN: 2,3
(A.2d).
RMC Judge Howard abused the contempt power in summarily sentencing an
attorney actively engaged in representing clients to three days in jail while also
violating the Sixth Amendment (refusing to appoint counsel in violation of
Aigersinger where Coughlin's 10/26/11 application for such met the per se
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indigency standards established by the 2008 Indigent Defense Order) in

countenancing a violation of both NRS 171.136, and NRS 171.1255 (Reno Sparks
Indian Colony Police routinely make misdemeanor arrests at the Indian Colony
Walmart despite Nevada law forbidding such misdemeanor arrests by "tribal police,
so just as the WCSO has potentially vast liability for the systemic burglaries its
deputies conduct in failing to accord the passing of 24 hours from, at the very least,
posting a 24 hour summary eviction lockout order on a tenant's door, so to does the
RMC, RCA, and City of Reno where the RCA continually offers "evidence"
obtained via searches incident to unlawful misdemeanor arrests by tribal police)
that RCA prosecutor Pamela Robert was fully aware of when she suborned the
perjury of RSIC Officer Kameron Crawford and Walmart's Thomas Frontino in
RMC 11 CR 22716 (see NSCT 60838): http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=JEn3phdRVgI
Further, Judge Howard violated the following as well, especially where
asserted basis for the three day summary incarceration were plainly pretextual and
he was punishing Coughlin for his 11/29/11 Motion For Sanctions against RCA
Pamela Roberts, Esq., and an interaction with RMC Marshal Menzel, and filing
office staff occurring outside the court's presence, where Coughlin (also, in
violation of NRS 1.230, 1.235) moved for Judge Howard to recuse himself form the
contempt trial: Statute providing that in all cases of contempt arising without
immediate view and presence of court, judge of court in whose contempt defendant
is alleged to be, shall not preside at such trial over objection of defendant, is
constitutional. N.C.L.1929, 8943. McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in
and for Humboldt County, 1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318.
1/12/12 (RMC 12 CR 00696) a shameful custodial arrest for jaywalking
outside Coughlin's former home law office Sifre ordered RPD Officer's Leedy and
Look to make, where all officers violated the law in failing to inform Coughlin he
was being arrested, then again in failing to indicate why he was being arrested):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7vlEI1fJJWc ,
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1/14/12 (RPD Sargent Sifre ordered his second custodial arrest of Coughlin
in 48 hours, working with ECOMM dispatchers (where RPD Officer Duralde's
wife, Jessica is an ECOMM dispatcher) in the joint vindictive misconduct
displayed therein, where Sifre was also caught on tape indicating a level of
complicity with the Reno Justice Court in that regard), and in retaliation for
Coughlin obtaining a confession from RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez just the day
before, on 1/13/12 regarding the misconduct by she and RPD Officer Chris Carter,
Jr. in burglarizing Coughlin's former home law office incident to the wrongful
11/13/11 wrongful arrest of Coughlin for criminal
trespass: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VcVDVjFK64g
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The City of Reno Marshals Harley, Coppa, etc. got in on the act on 2/27/12
in lying to Judge Nash Holmes in 11 TR 26800 (integral to the fraudulent attempt
to permanently disbar Coughlin in 62337) incident to the 5 day summary
incarceration Coughlin ws subjected to where NRS 22.030(2) was violated.
The City of Reno Marshals have lied in a fraudulent attempt to have an
attorney disbarred incident to RMC 11 TR 26800 (a "simple traffic citation" trial
stemming from the three traffic tickets RPD Sargent John Tarter issued Coughlin
outside the law office of opposing counsel in the summary eviction from Coughlin's
former home law office in Rev2011-001708, Richard G. Hill, Esq., shortly after
Sargnet Tarter directed Coughlin to leave (which Coughlin did) where Coughlin
appeared as Hill's law office seeking the return of his wallet, smartphone, hard
drives, client's files, state issued identification, and client's files incident to Hill and
RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez and Officer Chris Carter, Jr. burglarizing Coughlin's
former home law office on 11/13/11.
The State Bar of Nevada seeks to mischaracterize such summary contempt
Order of 2/28/12 as "criminal contempt" in hopes of taking advantage of SCR
111(5), though Asst Bar Counsel has failed to file any SCR 111 petition reporting
any such "criminal conviction" presenting a defensive collateral estoppel bar of
Coughlin's own in that regard, beyond the fact that Judge Nash Holmes cited to a
plenary civil contempt statute anyways in her 2/28/12 Order. The best way to
distinguish civil from criminal contempt is to examine the penalty sought or
imposed. If the defendant holds the keys to the jail and can purge himself from
the contempt finding by committing an affirmative act (such as Coughlin's paying
the $500 Judge Nash Holmes ordered as an alterantive to incarceration on 2/27/12),
the contempt is civil in nature. An example of such civil contempt punishment is a
judges ruling that a defendant shall be incarcerated until he brings current his
support arrearage. If the defendant brings his arrearage current, he may be released.
In this situation, the defendant has an opportunity to purge himself of the civil
contempt. Conversely, if the defendants punishment is unmodifiable by action
from the defendant, then the contempt is criminal. An examples of such criminal
contempt would be a fixed unconditional jail sentences. Richmond Black Police
Officers Assn v. City of Richmond, 548 F. 2d 123 (4th Cir. 1977); Steelworkers v.
Newport News, 220 Va. 547 (1979); and Mine Workers v.Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821
(1994). Coughlin's summary five day incarceration, however, was conditional,
with Judge Nash Holmes admitting that she ruled that Coughlin could, in the
alterantive, pay a $500 fine and avoid such incarceration.
Sanction for civil contempt is characterized by court's desire to compensate
contemnor's adversary for injuries which result from noncompliance; however,
award to opposing party is limited to that party's actual loss. State, Dept. of Indus.
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Relations, Div. of Indus. Ins. Regulation v. Albanese, 1996, 919 P.2d 1067, 112
Nev. 851.Contempt 74 Contempt 75
In the case of Kessler v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 14, 441 S.E.2d 223
(1994), the court of appeals set forth the test for distinguishing civil from criminal
contempt. In that case, the trial court found the defendant in civil contempt for his
willful failure to pay child support as ordered. The trial court then sentenced the
defendant to eleven months in jail without any provision allowing the defendant to
purge himself of such contempt by payment of all or a portion of his support
arrearages. On appeal, the court ruled that the contempt was criminal not civil since
there was no opportunity for the defendant to purge himself of the contempt. 9
Order requiring Indian tribe to post $10,000 bond if it violated injunctions in
contempt order was a civil contempt order rather than a criminal contempt order; ?
condition was designed to coerce tribe's compliance. In re Determination of
Relative Rights of Claimants and Appropriators of Waters of Humboldt River
Stream System and Tributaries, 2002, 59 P.3d 1226, 118 Nev. 901. Since a civil
contempt sanction is designed to coerce the contemnor into complying with a court
order, it must be conditional or intermediate, i.e., it must end if the contemnor
complies; ?in contrast, a criminal contempt sanction is intended to punish the
contemnor for disobeying a court order and, thus, must be determinate or
unconditional. Warner v. Second Judicial Dist. Court In and For County of
Washoe, 1995, 906 P.2d 707, 111 Nev. 1379. Part of judgment for contempt,
directing imprisonment in county jail until fine imposed is paid, held invalid.
Comp.Laws 1929, 8950, 8951. State v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in and for
Humboldt County, 1931, 1 P.2d 105, 53 Nev. 343. A witness was asked a number
of questions, all being addressed to the same point, which he refused to answer. The
court found him guilty of a separate contempt for every question that he refused to
answer. Held, that he was guilty of but one contempt, and the court had jurisdiction
to impose but one sentence. Maxwell v. Rives, 1876, 11 Nev. 213. A witness was
asked a number of questions, all being addressed to the same point, which he
refused to answer. The court found him guilty of a separate contempt for every
question that he refused to answer. Held, that he was guilty of but one contempt,
and the court had jurisdiction to impose but one sentence. Maxwell v. Rives, 1876,
11 Nev. 213. (Judge Nash Holmes took two turns at the plate in adjuciatory
Coughlin's alleged contemptuous conduct in both her 2/28/12 and 3/12/12 Order in
11 TR 26800).
Presence of court: Though a grand jury is an adjunct of the court, it is not
such part thereof as, under Comp. Laws, 3556, authorizing summary punishment
for a contempt in the immediate presence of the court, permits the judge to
summarily punish offenders for any act before the grand jury, without proceeding
on affidavit and citing the offender to show cause why he should not be punished.
Ex parte Hedden, 1907, 90 P. 737, 29 Nev. 352, 13 Am.Ann.Cas. 1173. Contempt 6
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Affidavits: Order to show cause complaining of alleged contemptuous

conduct of wife and her attorney in recording property settlement agreement with
county recorder's office after district court had ordered all records in the matter to
be sealed should have been accompanied by affidavit, as complained of conduct
was not committed in immediate view and presence of court or judge in chambers.
N.R.S. 22.030, subd. 2. Awad v. Wright, 1990, 794 P.2d 713, 106 Nev. 407.
Where suit was begun in 1907 to establish water rights of various
appropriators on river system, and decree was entered in 1919, changes in
ownership were understandable, and contempt petition for violation of decree
containing information and belief verification of allegations setting forth history
of suit and rights granted to each of parties thereto, was sufficient. N.C.L.1929,
8943. McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in and for Humboldt County,
1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318.
An affidavit that defendants had continued to enlarge a ditch across
plaintiff's ranch in violation of an injunction held sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
the court to proceed against them for contempt, under Rev. Laws 1912, 5396, as
amended by St. 1913, c. 94, requiring that the affidavit present the facts
constituting the contempt, though tested by an original proceeding in prohibition
rather than on certiorari, in which there is no chance to amend the affidavit;
lack of jurisdiction being the only ground on which either writ will issue. State
v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 1922, 211 P. 105, 46 Nev. 410.
To give jurisdiction of a proceeding for contempt, a substantial and general
statement in the affidavit is sufficient. Strait v. Williams, 1884, 4 P. 1083, 18 Nev.
43.
Judge: In case of contempt arising outside view of court, judge should have
recused herself in response to peremptory challenge. N.R.S. 22.030, subd. 3.
Awad v. Wright, 1990, 794 P.2d 713, 106 Nev. 407. Judges 51(4)
Counsel's failure to appear for scheduled hearing before the Supreme Court,
conduct occurring within immediate view and presence of the court, was a direct
rather than a indirect, contempt; hence, the Supreme Court was not disqualified
from presiding over the contempt proceedings. N.R.S. 22.030, subd. 3. Gipson v.
State, 1986, 714 P.2d 1007, 102 Nev. 61. (
NOTE: the holding in Stuhff, that
for conduct to disrupt a tribunal such must occur in a courtroom arguably brings
the utility of Gipson into doubt).
Order of court - In general: For purposes of statute governing summary
contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence, which
requires court to enter an order, while a trial court's oral contempt order is
immediately enforceable, a written order including the statute's required elements
must be promptly entered. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County
of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 52
Order of court Sufficiency: Appropriate remedy for attorney who had been
found in direct contempt of court in divorce proceeding in which he represented wife,
where contempt order had been found to be insufficient by Supreme Court, in that it did
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not contain a sufficient statement concerning what conduct was held to be contemptuous,
was to permit trial court to enter amended order, given that Supreme Court's opinion
addressed issue of first impression and announced standard for contents of written
contempt order. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark,
2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 66(8)

A written summary contempt order, issued pursuant to statute governing
summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence,
must set forth specific facts concerning the conduct found to be contemptuous.
Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d
1269, 122 Nev. 544.
Written summary contempt order finding attorney for wife in divorce proceeding
in direct contempt of court failed to indicate what particular comments by attorney were
held to be contemptuous, and, thus, order was insufficient, under statute governing
summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence.
1269, 122 Nev. 544.
Sufficiency, order of court: Appropriate remedy for attorney who had been
found in direct contempt of court in divorce proceeding in which he represented wife,
where contempt order had been found to be insufficient by Supreme Court, in that it did
not contain a sufficient statement concerning what conduct was held to be
contemptuous, was to permit trial court to enter amended order, given that Supreme
Court's opinion addressed issue of first impression and announced standard for
contents of written contempt order. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 66(8)
A written summary contempt order, issued pursuant to statute governing
summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence,
must set forth specific facts concerning the conduct found to be contemptuous.
1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 52
Written summary contempt order finding attorney for wife in divorce
proceeding in direct contempt of court failed to indicate what particular comments
by attorney were held to be contemptuous, and, thus, order was insufficient,
under statute governing summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt
committed in judge's presence. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 52
Both the 11/30/11 Order Punishing Summary Contempt by RMC Judge
Howard and the 2/28/12 Order summarily punishing direct contempt by Coughlin
via citing to a plenary civil contempt statute are violative of all the precedent
presented in Houston.
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The RPD continued its misconduct incident to the summary eviction in

Rev2012-001048, with Officer Alan Weaver, Sargent Brian Dye, Sargent Oliver
Miller, and Lt. Kevin Brown all actively involved in violating Soldal v. Cook
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County and committing other 42 USC 1983 violations, including those in

connection with the 7/3/12 arrest in RMC 12 CR 12420.
On 1/16/13 RMC Judge W. Garnder (whom failed to reveal during the 2/2/12
hearing in the criminal trespass prosecution in RMC 11 CR 26405 that his sisters is
2JDC Judge L. Gardner (see NSCT cases 54844, 53833, 60302, 60317, 62337)
Also, see Nevada Supreme Court cases 61901, 62337, 61383, 60838, 62104,
63342, etc. much of which is available on the Courts site and or scribd.com
The WCSO refuses to follow Nevada law, and instead systematically burglarizes
tenants, which the RMC, RJC, and 2JDC, and SBN, some might say, all
countenance
Here's how the Clark County Assistant Manager approached a similar situation:
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/crime-courts/victim-family-court-gropingincident-files-federal-lawsuit
Sincerely,
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NVB Judge Beesley's testimony at Coughlin's 11/14/12 FORMAL

DISCIPLINARY HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 4:2 to 32:20) RENO, NEVADA;
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14TH, 2012; 9:00 A.M. -oOo- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: This is the date set for the disciplinary hearing en re Zachary B.
Coughlin. The time is now 8:56. The hearing was originally noticed for 9:00
o'clock. Last week on November 7th the panel met by telephone conference, and
given some issues to be dealt with we issued an order requiring the hearing to start
at 8:45. It is now 8:56. Mr. Coughlin is not present. We have information that he
did phone the State Bar office and said that he would be late. The reason we're
proceeding in the absence of Mr. Coughlin is that one of the witnesses, Judge
Beesley, is in Las Vegas and can only testify between 9:00 and 9:30, and so we're
commencing the hearing in the absence of Mr. Coughlin, despite his absence,
because the hearing was noticed to commence at 8:45. With that, does any panel
member have any other comments before we proceed with the testimony of Judge
Beesley? Mr. King? MR. KING: Could I ask the chairman for the record to
introduce the panel members in attendance, and then I will -- MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Panel members for this hearing are Mr. Steve Kent, Mr. Clark Vellis, Mr. Michael
Johnson, and Karen Pearl. And I'm the chairman, John Echeverria. MR. KING: My
name is Patrick King on behalf of the State Bar of Nevada. With the chairman's
permission, I would like to take a witness. The honorable federal Judge Bruce
Beesley, has information that I think the panel will find relevant to Mr. Coughlin's
hearing, and I would ask permission to call him at this time. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Has Mr. Coughlin been notified that Judge Beesley is an expected witness? MR.
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KING: Yes, he has. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you. MR. KING: In candor, Mr.
Coughlin has sent via e-mail many, many pages, and I'm not exaggerating when I
say hundreds of pages of e-mails. And in many of those e-mails he's protested my
calling any witnesses, proceeding with the hearing, and specifically protested
against having any judges not physically present testify by phone. I had noticed that
these people would be testifying via phone, which is why he's aware of that. And I
would ask that the chair allow any judge to testify by phone. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Unless any panel member has an objection, that's so ordered. MR. KING: Thank
you. I will now try to reach Judge Beesley. (Placing call to Judge Beesley.) MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Let the record reflect that it's now 9:02, and Mr. Coughlin has
joined the hearing. Mr. Coughlin, we're waiting to connect with Judge Beesley who
is the first scheduled witness to appear between 9:00 and 9:30. MR. COUGHLIN:
I object to him appearing. He wasn't noticed until far too close in time -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I didn't hear. Can you speak louder? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir.
I don't believe he was appropriately noticed of the hearing, this hearing. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King? MR. KING: As the record reflects, Mr. Coughlin was
served a copy of the complaint to the address that he is mandated to provide to the
State Bar. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't believe that's correct. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Please don't interrupt, Mr. Coughlin. Go ahead. MR. KING: Subsequently, Mr.
Coughlin filed, immediately after we mailed the complaint via certified and regular
mail, Mr. Coughlin filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I
think his argument here is that he wasn't notified that Judge Beesley would be a
potential witness. MR. KING: We sent a supplemental notice to Mr. Coughlin that
we intended to call Judge Beesley. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry. If I can just
interject quickly. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: -before the proceeding -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please don't interrupt. MR. COUGHLIN: May I
record the proceedings? MR. KING: I'm handing, with the chairman's permission,
a copy of the supplemental notice. In addition, as I indicated, the purpose of calling
Mr. Beesley is to assist the panel to understand Mr. Coughlin's conduct in his court,
and also as a potential rebuttal witness. Unfortunately, Judge Beesley is in Las
Vegas and is only available between 9:00 and 9:30. So what I would ask the panel
to do is to allow, as an offer of proof, allow Judge Beesley to testify. And then if
the panel subsequently determines for some reason that it's not appropriate, rebuttal
testimony -- MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry. I need to enter, this is a special -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: -- I need to submit that for the
record. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please don't interrupt. MR. COUGHLIN: I need to
submit that for the record. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You'll get your opportunity. MR.
KING: Judge Beesley, my name is Patrick King. I represent the State Bar of
Nevada in a disciplinary hearing involving Zach Coughlin. Did you understand that
that was the matter in which you were going to testify to this morning? JUDGE
BEESLEY: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Just a second, Mr. King. Let me state on
the record that because of the time constraints, I'm going to rule that we can take
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the testimony of Judge Beesley, subject to Mr. Coughlin's later objection. He does
have an objection. Given the time constraints, he has not had an opportunity to put
on the record his objection. I'd like to take the testimony of Judge Beesley, and then
listen to Mr. Coughlin's objection. MR. COUGHLIN: I did file a -- MR. KING:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge Beesley, the panel consists of John Echeverria -I'm not pronouncing the name -- but there's five panel members. JUDGE
BEESLEY: John Echeverria. You have not spent enough time in Nevada. MR.
KING: That is correct. Thank you for that. Across from me is sitting Mr. Coughlin,
Zachary Coughlin. And in the room also is a court reporter. There's no one else in
the room other than some court security. So what I'm going to ask you, Judge
Beesley, if you could explain to the panel your knowledge of Mr. Coughlin relative
to the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct related to -- MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection. Relevancy. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. King. We probably
should administer the oath to Judge Beesley. MR. KING: Judge Beesley, the court
reporter will administer you the oath. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm going to object on
relevancy grounds. BRUCE BEESLEY Having been first duly sworn, testified as
follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KING: Q Judge Beesley, can you
explain to the panel your knowledge in this relevant time frame 2011-2012
regarding Mr. Coughlin and his conduct in your court? A Mr. Coughlin appeared
in my court a couple of times, at least two or three times. The first time I recall him
coming to my court he came in, he was wearing, I think, a T-shirt and a tie, and no
jacket. And he indicated that he had been evicted from his residence or his office,
indicating it was not because of not paying the rent, and that that was why he wasn't
what I would consider appropriately dressed. I apologize. I don't have my letter in
front of me. But my recollection is that he had filed a pleading on behalf of his
client in regard to some aspect of a bankruptcy case, and that the pleading was
lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just sort of rambled through a great deal of
irrelevant stuff. I had him a couple other times in my court and had the same
experience, that -- he was dressed appropriately the other times I had him there, and
he was very polite and appeared to be a very intelligent man. But his pleadings
didn't make any sense. His arguments didn't make any sense. And I became
concerned that he was suffering from alcohol or drug abuse or had some sort of
mental issues which were preventing him from being able to represent his client. I
talked to -- I made some inquiries of the court and State Bar if there was anything -the federal court first, if there was anything that I had authority to do to try and get
Mr. Coughlin some help and learned that I could not. I then talked to, I think I
talked to Coe Swobe, who is Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers -- MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection. Relevancy. This wasn't noticed either or -- no -- or mentioned in the
DOSEAL, which you didn't serve appropriately, and you're violating SCR 102 -1052(c). MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE WITNESS: I talked to Mr. Swobe
who indicated that the State Bar did have some services available, and that he had
been in contact with Mr. Coughlin. That's really all he told me. And it became
apparent to me that over a period of a couple months at least and I also learned of
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some other odd behavior in some of the courts with judges that I knew. MR.
COUGHLIN: Objection. Hearsay. THE WITNESS: But based on -- MR.
COUGHLIN: Objection. Can I get a ruling on my objection before you continue
testifying? MR. KING: I'm going to ask the chairman to direct Mr. Coughlin not to
shout or make speaking objections. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to do that. You
can do it -- I appreciate being able to be heard, but we can do it at a lower level, Mr.
Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: You didn't seem to hear me. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Madam Reporter, would you please read back the answer to which Mr. Coughlin
was objecting. (Record read by the reporter.) MR. ECHEVERRIA: The objection
is hearsay. Mr. King? MR. KING: The judge was just about to testify as to the
action he took based on the information he received, and that is the purpose of the
information is to show why he took the action he did. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Overruled. MR. KING: Thank you, Judge. THE WITNESS: I'm not quite sure
where I was in my testimony, but based on the discussions I had, and the
information I got from other people, it became apparent to me that there wasn't a
program that was going to -- MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Foundation. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King? MR. KING: The testimony is clear. He's explaining
the actions he took relative to Mr. Coughlin's conduct, which is the purpose.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. MR. COUGHLIN: He was specifying -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: -- no foundation for what he
was asserting. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I've overruled your objection.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed, Judge. BY MR.
KING: Q I apologize, your Honor, for the interruption. But you were just about to
testify as to what action you took with respect to the information you learned. A
What I did was I wrote a letter to the State Bar explaining what had occurred with
Mr. Coughlin, indicating, I believe, that I thought that in his current state he was
not able to represent his clients adequately, and that the State Bar should look into
it. I think that was the extent of what I did in summary. BY MR. KING: Q Based
on your actual personal knowledge of Mr. Coughlin, would you believe that he has
violated Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct? MR. COUGHLIN: Objection.
Calls for an expert opinion. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Overruled. MR.
COUGHLIN: I said objection, Pat. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. Settle
down. You do not need to yell in this proceeding. BY MR. KING: Q Would you
be of the opinion -- MR. COUGHLIN: I said objection, Pat. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Can we get a ruling from the judge? Can we
have some due process here, Pat? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, do not raise
your voice again in this proceeding. MR. COUGHLIN: If this is a proceeding, it
needs to be handled like a proceeding according to the rules of evidence. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That's true. And that's what we're doing. MR. COUGHLIN: No,
it's not. MR. ECHEVERRIA: And I'm going to overrule your objection. Please
proceed. BY MR. KING: Q Have you formed an opinion, your Honor, as to
whether or not Mr. Coughlin is competent to practice law? A Yes. Q And what is
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that opinion? A I don't believe he is, unfortunately. MR. KING: Thank you very
much. I have no further questions. I really appreciate your time. The panel in these
settings may ask you questions or they may have questions for you, as well as, I
suspect, Mr. Coughlin. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, do you have any
cross-examination? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY
MR. COUGHLIN: Q Good morning, Judge Beesley, your Honor. A Morning. Q
I'm sorry to hear you feel that way about me, sir, but I would like to ask you a few
questions. A Certainly. Q I would bet that your statements are made out of
concern. A They are. Q So I appreciate that, sir. And I don't mean for my
reactions this morning to indicate anything other than a complete and utter lack -- a
complete and utter respect for you, sir. A I don't take it any other way. Q Thank
you, sir. But it's out of a profound respect for the law and due process that I'm
acting the way I am. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a question, Mr. Coughlin?
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, I do. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did you have Karen Sabo
as a member of your firm at one point? A Yes, I did. Q Can you describe any
connection between myself and Karen Sabo that you might be aware of? A I'm not
aware of any. MR. KING: Objection. Relevance. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The
relevance, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: I couldn't hear the judge, sir. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I'm asking you the relevance of that question. MR. COUGHLIN:
But to the extent that the judge's speaker is right next to Mr. King, I believe it's
affording him an impermissible advantage. I couldn't hear what the judge just said.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Doesn't matter. You asked a question about was Judge
Beesley aware of any relationship between you and this lady. MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes. Just for -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Wait a minute. Mr. King objected on
relevance. Your proffer of relevancy? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, sir, if I can just
preserve for the record. You said that if Mr. King is obtaining an impermissible
advantage it doesn't matter to you. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I didn't say that. MR.
COUGHLIN: That's what I heard. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please address the issue
at hand. What is the relevancy of your relationship with this former lawyer and Mr.
Beesley's law firm? You're pausing on that -- MR. COUGHLIN: Because this is a
respected federal judge, sir. But I am suing Ms. Sabo's organization right now. MR.
KING: I would object on the ground that it goes beyond the scope of direct. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: The relevancy of that? MR. COUGHLIN: His objection is
relevant. My response, with all due respect to the Honorable Judge Beesley, it goes
somewhat to witness bias. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the issue is very
narrow. The question is what is the relevancy of your relationship with this Ms.
Sabo? How is that relevant to the issues in this proceeding? MR. COUGHLIN: I
believe it bears on Judge Beesley's testimony. I don't know quite the extent to
which -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Objection sustained. MR. KING: For the record,
the judge did answer. And for Mr. Coughlin's benefit, he said he was not aware of
any such relationship. Did I mischaracterize your testimony, your Honor? THE
WITNESS: That's what I said. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Next question, please. MR.
COUGHLIN: Can I clarify? He wasn't aware of any such relationship meaning?
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MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, please address another issue. MR.

COUGHLIN: A basis for conflict. Yes, sir. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge
Beesley, did you testify on behalf of Stephen R. Harris recently? MR. KING:
Objection. Relevance. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The relevance, Mr. Coughlin? MR.
COUGHLIN: I didn't hear Judge Beesley again. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That
doesn't matter. MR. COUGHLIN: It doesn't matter that Pat can hear him, but I
can't hear him? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. I can't hear the judge either, because you
interrupted him. MR. COUGHLIN: Just now? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes. There's
an objection as to relevancy as to whether or not what relevancy -- MR.
COUGHLIN: I objected. I didn't interrupt him. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I asked you
to explain the relevancy. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I'm trying to remember the
question. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The question was did he testify on behalf of Mr.
Harris. The relevance of that issue in this proceeding? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I
think it provides a basis for me comparing Judge Beesley's response to me being
evicted to his response to Mr. Harris's issues. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled -I'm sorry, sustained. Next question, please. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge
Beesley, what in particular did you notice about my work product -- when did you
first contact Mr. King about me? A When did I first contact who? Q Mr. King.
Bar counsel for the State Bar. A I don't know that I ever contacted Mr. King. I sent
a letter to the State Bar. I think it was probably addressed to Mr. Clark, but I'm not
positive. Q So I'm sorry for that, your Honor. I do recall you saying you sent a
letter now. Did you ever speak with Bar counsel Patrick King with regard to me? A
The only time I recall speaking to him was a few weeks ago or a few days -probably a few weeks ago when he asked me if I would be able to testify at this
hearing. Q Are you aware of any extent to which Mr. King has violated SCR 121's
confidentiality dictates by contacting my clients prior to any SCR 11 petition? A
Hold on one second. Go ahead. I'm sorry. Am I aware that Mr. King violated a
particular statute? In what manner? Q Whether or not he violated one? A No,
I'm not, one way or the other. Q Do you have knowledge of there being a motive
for Mr. King to all of a sudden seek to bring you into this forum in that he has been
subject to an accusation setting forth a basis for this proceeding that relies primarily
upon some contention that you or -- I believe you yourself, your Honor, because
you're the only bankruptcy judge I appeared before -- but Mr. King telling his boss
and, apparently, at least one of my clients prior to my being suspended or even the
petition being filed, that your court had issued an order preventing me from
practicing there? A I have no idea what Mr. King may or may not have said to
anybody. But I do not recall issuing an order that said you couldn't practice there. Q
So can I take that to mean you haven't issued any such order? A I don't think so. I
sign probably 150 orders every day. So I don't remember all of them. I think
certainly I would have remembered a case not allowing you to practice there. But if
I did, it would have been because I was concerned that you weren't able to represent
your clients adequately, and they were being hurt. But I don't know that I did that.
Q What review did you undertake of my work product and filings in your court to
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come to your opinions? A I looked through two or three pleadings that you had
filed in, I think you had one or perhaps two cases, and read them. And I observed
you arguing in court. Q When specifically? A I don't recall. Q Was your
testimony earlier today that the first time you recall being aware of me was when I
appeared at the March 15th hearing in Cado Company v. Keller at 2:30 P.M.
shortly after being evicted at gunpoint by the Washoe County Sheriffs -- A I
actually think you had appeared in front of me one time before that. But that was
my first strong recollection of you appearing in front of me. Q And it was that
brief interaction whereupon you formed your opinion that I wasn't fit to practice? A
No. I thought it was odd, but I do understand that people have adversity in their
lives sometimes, which happens -- Q You took it to be adversity rather than
misconduct by the sheriff? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted the
witness. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Judge. THE
WITNESS: And I believe that you had filed some pleading in that case. And I went
to the pleadings, and they frankly didn't make any sense. And I think you
subsequently filed pleadings in other cases which also didn't make any sense,
and I became concerned. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q At what point did you -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. Coughlin. Quit interrupting the witness. MR.
COUGHLIN: I thought he was done, sir. I'm sorry. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go
ahead, Judge. THE WITNESS: I became concerned, and I undertook further
inquiry with Mr. Swobe following that. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, I
would like to narrow it down. When did you first contact the State Bar about me? A
I don't recall. I actually contacted Coe Swobe who works for the State Bar, but is
independent of them in most ways. Q When did you first contact Mr. Swobe? A I
think it was perhaps a month or six weeks after my first recollection of you
appearing, my first recollection of you appearing in front of me after you had been
evicted. Q You would be referring to the T-shirt and tie incident? A Yes. Q
With a suit jacket on though? A Yeah. And your apology was satisfactory,
although I thought your appearance was odd. Q Do you recall a hearing prior to
that in that same Cado Company v. Keller wherein Cado sought to amend their
adversary proceeding charges, and there was maybe a five- to ten-minute hearing
on that incident to which I submitted about a 15-page motion addressing the salient
points of law in that setting? A I cannot place it in the context of that case. But I
do remember you submitting a motion describing some points of law on something,
and I didn't think that that was competent work, frankly. Q You're referring to
which motion? A I don't know. I don't have any motion in front of me. Q So you
have a fairly strong opinion on it, yet you don't recall any specifics. Would that be
an accurate assessment of your testimony? A What I recall is that your appearance
in court was odd, and your pleadings were not truly comprehensible, and that and
further inquires made me concerned that you were having some difficulties that
prevented you from serving your client appropriately. Q Did you find any of my
work competent? A I don't believe I did. Q Not a single filing? MR. KING:
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Objection. Argumentative. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. BY MR.

COUGHLIN: Q Sir, are you aware I was ranked 10th in my law school class, and
a National Merit finalist? MR. KING: Objection. Beyond the scope of direct. MR.
COUGHLIN: He testified as to my competency and my credibility as a lawyer and
a professional. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Your question had to do with what time
frame? MR. COUGHLIN: It has to do with my capabilities. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
In law school? MR. COUGHLIN: In life. MR. ECHEVERRIA: But you asked
about a specific event. Did that occur in law school? MR. COUGHLIN: What
event? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The merit scholar thing. MR. COUGHLIN: No.
That's a standardized test. The top half of one percent of all high school juniors are
selected as national merit finalists. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You're inquiring about a
high school test? MR. COUGHLIN: I'm inquiring about the judge's representation
that he hasn't found one filing of mine competent. And the reason I'm going into
that is I believe it goes to this judge's credibility, frankly. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Sustained. Next question, please. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, I'd like to
narrow down some of these assessments you've made vis-a-vis when they occurred.
A Unless you can show me the document, I don't think I can help you with that. Q
But you've testified pretty definitively here today. So wouldn't that indicate some
negligence on your behalf in that regard? MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, do you
have any specific points of law or issues with which you can elucidate why you
question my competency to practice in your court? MR. KING: Objection. Asked
and answered. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Do you
recall any of my work product in Cado and Company? A Not specifically, no. I
remember a fairly lengthy brief that you filed which, I think, was that case, that I
thought was rambling, addressing points of law which weren't relevant. I think had
some discussions of historical matters and some discussions of perhaps
constitutional law, but it wasn't really relevant to the matter that was in front of me.
MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, if you could be mindful of the fact that the judge has a
hearing he needs to attend, and advise Mr. Coughlin that he needs to be judicious in
his questions. MR. ECHEVERRIA: We have issued an order, Mr. Coughlin, that
limits the examination of witnesses on each side to 15 minutes. You have slightly
exceeded 15 minutes. If you have a few more questions to rapidly wrap this up. BY
MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, on Cado Company, wouldn't it indicate a fairly
high level of skill, particularly for one who hadn't been practicing in a bankruptcy
setting for very long at all for, one, to deduce that in that case Cado had issues with
respect to the fact that they had not renewed a dormant foreign judgment in that
under the Texas statute at issue, given the fact that the judgment was over ten years
old, and within the two years under the statute within which they had to take some
act to revive a dormant judgment, they failed to do so. Wouldn't the fact that I
pointed that out in a brief, and specifically cited to relevant legal research with
respect to what particular acts would qualify as reviving a dormant judgment in that
respect, wouldn't that indicate some level of competency? A I did not ever say that
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I did not think you are highly intelligent. I think you are. But intelligence and legal
competence are not the same thing. I think you have a significant lack of ability to
focus on the issues at hand, but you're very smart. Q If I pointed out, which I
believe I did in that case, that Cado, by having a vice president file an affidavit
seeking to register a foreign judgment, that their doing so violated NRCP 11, in that
a corporation such as Cado is not entitled to appear pro se, to wit through a vice
president who is not an attorney, wouldn't that evince some level of capability as an
attorney sufficient to avoid having a federal judge respond to Mr. King's imploring
him to badmouth me at a hearing? MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. MR. KING: Thank you. MR. COUGHLIN: I
appreciable your time, your Honor. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Anything further, Mr.
King? MR. KING: No. Any questions of the panel? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Any
questions of the panel? Thank you, Judge Beesley. MR. KING: Appreciate your
time this morning. Thank you very much. MR. ECHEVERRIA: We took that
testimony under consideration of your objection. Let's hear your objection, Mr.
Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. Well, I believe Judge Beesley was
identified in a supplement to Mr. King's, I'll call it a DowSoE, and I hope the panel
will know what I mean, designation of witness's summary of evidence. I've
shortened it in my filings. Which, incidently, SCR 1052(c) is one of the few
procedural rules in the supreme court rules designed to afford attorneys or
suspended attorneys, such as myself, some due process. That rule requires that the
DowSoE be served in the same manner in which the complaint is served upon the
respondent by the panel with at least 30 days notice, or at least 30 days prior to the
hearing. This panel wasn't even empaneled until, I believe the order was October
30th. Mr. King purports to have sent the DowSoE himself rather than in some
separation in accord with the rule, but he sent it himself. On October 12th he filed
material suggesting that he sent a certified mail October 12th, and in that way it's
completely violative of the rules. Completely. And Steve Harris, who the judge
testified to, who was -- he admitted to misappropriating 800K. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Harris is not the subject matter of this hearing. You are. MR.
COUGHLIN: He got David Grundy. And he got his DowSoE sent by the panel.
And he got his full 30 days. And I sent that forward -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm
not concerned with Mr. Harris. Did you get notice that Judge Beesley would be
testifying? MR. COUGHLIN: Maybe -- I would like to check my records, but like
a couple days before this hearing. A couple days. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Was that a
supplemental designation? MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Is that
permitted? MR. COUGHLIN: I think it is permitted, perhaps if something comes
up out of the blue that's really bearing, but Mr. King's known about this for quite
some time. And, in fact, I've filed a complaint with, I believe I included this in my
complaint with State Bar president Lardon -- I hope I'm saying that correctly -under SCR, I want to say 104(3) in that I believe upon information and belief that
Mr. King contacted one of my clients or maybe one of my clients contacted him in
early May -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm focusing on your objection to the testimony
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of Judge Beesley. Do you claim any prejudice because of that? MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is that prejudice? MR. COUGHLIN: Lack of
notice. MR. ECHEVERRIA: How does the lack of notice lead to prejudice? You
seem to be very familiar with cases that appeared -- in which you appeared in front
of Judge Beesley. MR. COUGHLIN: I wasn't. I wasn't as sharp on that Cado stuff,
because I didn't think I needed to be this morning, and I could have been a lot
sharper on that. I really could have. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to overrule the
objection. I think the notice was sent. Mr. Coughlin was aware that Judge Beesley
would be testifying, and unless the panel has any objection to Judge Beesley, would
accept that testimony. Next witness, Mr. King.
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"ORDER DENYING MOTIONS On June 7, 2012, we issued an order

temporarily suspending attorney Zachary B. Coughlin from the practice of law and
referring him for disciplinary proceedings, based on his conviction of petit
larceny/theft.1 (fn1 lWe note that our order was based solely on Coughlin's
conviction. It was not based on any alleged failure to report the conviction or on the
SCR 117 petition subsequently filed by bar counsel.) Coughlin has since filed
motions entitled: (1) Motion for Leave to File Opposition to Suspension and
Opposition to Petition of Bar Counsel for Temporary Suspension from the Practice
of Law Pursuant to SCR 111 and Request for Extension of Time to Supplement
Opposition (hereafter, Motion for Leave to File Opposition); (2) Motion for Leave
to Supplement or Amend Emergency Motion to Alter or Amend, or Set Aside
Temporary Suspension and Notice of Supreme Court Clerk's Failure to Timely File
Opposition to Bar Counsel's Petition for Temporary Suspension (hereafter Motion
for Leave to Supplement); (3) Motion for Leave to File Opposition to SCR 117
Petition (hereafter, SCR 117 Motion); and (4) Motion for Order to Show Cause
Regarding Improper Attempt by Bar Counsel and, Possibly, NNDB to Delay and
Obstruct Hearing Required by Court's June 7th, 2012, Order in Case 60838 and
Coughlin's SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in Case 61426 (hereafter, Motion for Order to
Show Cause).
With regard to all the motions, we note that none of them
comply with the rules of appellate procedure pertaining to motions. NRAP 27.
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Further, we have disregarded factual assertions in the motions which are not
supported by references to the record or which are outside the record. Carson
Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981).
To the extent the motions attempt to relitigate the conviction underlying the
instant matter or other legal problems Coughlin faces, this SCR 111
proceeding is not the proper forum for doing so. We therefore do not address
such claims. With regard to the Motion for Leave to File Opposition filed June 11,
2012, we elect to treat it as a motion to set aside the suspension pursuant to SCR
111(7). We are unconvinced by Coughlin's arguments that good cause exists to
set aside our order, however, and therefore deny the motion.2 (fn2 2To the extent
these arguments can be construed as claims that mitigating circumstances exist,
such contentions are more properly addressed in the context of the disciplinary
proceedings. SCR 102.5(2).)
With regard to the Motion for Leave to Supplement filed June 18, 2012, we
note that Coughlin was properly advised to seek leave of court in writing;
moreover, he was not prejudiced by any alleged failure to timely file his
opposition, because he succeeded in filing an opposition and we have
considered it on the merits. Despite Coughlin's attempts to elaborate on claims
made in his previous motion that good cause exists to set aside our order, we
remain unconvinced. We therefore deny the motion.
With regard to the SCR 117 motion filed June 18, 2012, it is identical to the
Motion for Leave to Supplement filed that same day. It is therefore likewise
denied.3 (fn3 To the extent it challenges the SCR 117 petition filed in Docket No.
60975, such claims are more properly addressed in the context of that proceeding.)"
Finally, with regard to the Motion for Order to Show Cause filed
October 5, 2012, such claims are more properly addressed in the context of the
petition for a writ of mandamus filed in Docket No. 62104. We note, however,
that the language in our June 7, 2012, order stating that "the sole issue to be
determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed" does not limit the
hearing panel from considering other disciplinary matters. Rather, it limits the
hearing panel from making a contrary factual finding that no crime was
committed. SCR 111(5). We therefore deny the motion. It is so ORDERED. /s/
Pickering, C.J., Hardesty, J., Saitta, J."
While SCR 111(5) holds: "5. Certified document conclusive. A certified
copy of proof of a conviction is conclusive evidence of the commission of the
crime stated in it in any disciplinary proceeding instituted against an attorney based
on the conviction", the NNDB Panel completely overextended such rule to an
absurd degree, refusing to allow Coughlin to put on any mitigation evidence, even,
as to the conviction in 60838 or even any evidence offerred for any number of other
legitimate purposes (including, pursuant to Claiborne and, by analogy, SCR 114, to
demonstrate that the conviction from which 60838 springs, and the the denial of
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Coughlin's appeal were so patently devoid of due process as to render such

convictions devoid of the quality necessary to apply SCR 111(5) therto).
Additionally, Couglin would really prefer that the Court did not "with regard to the
Motion for Leave to File Opposition filed June 11, 2012, we elect to treat it as a
motion to set aside the suspension pursuant to SCR 111(7)."
This is particularly true where such 6/11/12 Motion is over a year old now
(as is the temporary suspension, which really comes across as ridiculous when
considering the Las Vegas attorney convicted of someting along the lines of
attempted statutory seduction of a fifteen year old only received a six month
temporary suspension and the attorney whom admitted to misappropriateing
$750,000 from clients received no temporary suspension and only a three month
suspension, ultimately, especially where Coughlin's ability to put forward a more
compelling SCR 111(7) good cause showing for why his temporary suspension
should be set aside has been unduly compromised by a raft of misconduct by judges
(on no less than three occassions was Coughlin summarily incarcerated while
representing clients, where all three judges (RMC's Howard and Nash Holmes and
2JDC's Elliott) refused to grant any stay of such summary incarceration whatsoever
to avoid prejudice to Coughlin's client's affairs and Coughlin's practice) and local
law enforcement (Coughlin has been burglarized on no less than four occassions by
local law enforcement in connection with the practice of the Washoe County
Sheriff's Office incident to effecting lockouts in summary eviction in violation of
NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1),(5)(a), where the WCSO simply refuses to comply with the
statutory requirement, that every other county in Nevada appears to comply with,
that the sheriff (or contsable) must wait at least "24 hours" from the tenant's
"receipt" of a summary eviction or "lockout order" before effectuating such a
lockout (the WCSO simply posts the summary eviction lockout order to a tenant's
door and burglarizes the tenant's rental in one fell swoop, somehow convincing
itself it is just and in compliance with Nevada law to draw their guns, on some
occasions, fail to identify themselves prior to entering, then do a protective sweep
(often while having the tenant handcuffed or "detained", whereupon the tenant is
given five minutes or so to grab those items deemed really necessary, before they
are ordered to leave the premises under threat of arrest for criminal trespass by the
WCSO. In Coughlin's case in Rev2012-000374, this occurred a matter of four
hours after the 3/15/12 summary eviction hearing resulted in a Lockout Order by
RJC Judge Schroeder (whom endorsed such misconduct by the Sheriff in his
subsequent jurisprudence in that case, incredibly, not to mention repeating himself
again in Rev2012-001048 (in both cases the jurisdictional prerequisites required
under Davidsohn were absent (in Rev2012-000374, the landlord failed to file an
affidavit prior to the summary eviction hearing, and the "unlawful detainer
affidavit" eventually filed failed to include nearly all of that required by either NRS
40.254(2) or NRS 40.253(5) (the confusion as to which applies relating to Gayle
Kern, Esq. apparently switching up her basis for moving for such a summary
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eviction upon reading Coughlin's 3/8/12 filign therein where Coughlin pointed out
that his pleading a tenancy that uses the premises, at least in part, for commercial
purposes precluded a no cause summary eviction...the only problem for Kern and
her client being that the 30 Day No Cause Termination Notice and 5 Day Unlawful
Detainer Notice failed to alleged non-payment of rent (as did, really, her 3/15/12
"unlawful detainer affidavit"; in Rev2012-001048, the 5 Day UD Notice failed to
contain an of that required by NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1)-(3) (such actually listed the
wrong court to file the Tenant's Affidavit in, and Coughlin's submitting for filing
just such a Tenant's Affidavit in the court listed as the forum in which to file it in
the 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice failed to register with the RJC), then the
"landlord's affidavit" alleged a "dwelling unit or apartment" was rented to
Coughlin, despite the "landlord's agent" alleging that a summary eviction for
"breach of lease" should issue based upon an allegation that Coughlin utilized such
unit as a "dwelling unit or apartment")
Scribd AmJur 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law B. Disciplinary
Proceedings
2. Discipline as a Judicial Function
33. What courts have disciplinary power
However, a court's authority in the discipline of attorneys practicing before it
is limited to the jurisdictional boundaries of that court and cannot extend to other
courts beyond that boundary.[FN4] Unless restricted by the constitution or a statute,
a court of general jurisdiction has inherent power to suspend or disbar an attorney
who is found guilty of conduct unbecoming the standard of propriety that should be
maintained by members of the legal profession.[FN5] Courts of special or limited
jurisdiction have no power to disbar an attorney unless that power has been
expressly conferred on them.[FN8] [FN4] In re Moseley, 643 S.E.2d 190 (Va.
2007). - [FN5] Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L. Ed. 552 (1883).
[FN8] Appeal of A Juvenile, 61 Ohio App. 2d 235, 15 Ohio Op. 3d 400, 401
N.E.2d 937 (11th Dist. Lake County 1978). 34. Preliminary general investigation by bar
4. Grounds for Discipline
b. Misconduct as an Attorney
(1). In General
44. Generally
(2). In Relation to Court or Judge
50. Disrespectful, abusive conduct
51. Criticism of judicial acts
52. Contempt
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d. Nonprofessional Misconduct
(1). In General
82. Generally
83. Alcohol or drug abuse
(2). Conviction or Commission of Crime
86. Generally
91. Other crimes and offenses
Use, in attorney or physician disciplinary proceeding, of evidence obtained by
wrongful police action, 20 A.L.R.4th 546 (60838 violation of NRS 171.136)
92. Effect of appeal or probation
93. Effect of pardon
94. Conviction in another jurisdiction
96. Effect of acquittal, dismissal, or nolle prosequi
5. Defenses to Disciplinary Action
98. Mental or emotional illness
99. Entrapment
100. Other defenses
6. Procedure
101. Nature of proceeding
102. Who may institute proceeding
103. Limitations and laches
104. Right to jury
105. Due process requirements; notice and opportunity to be heard
106. --Presumption of innocence
107. Failure to answer
108. Discovery
109. Right to subpoena witnesses
110. Evidence; admissibility
A foreign jurisdiction's adjudication of guilt will be accepted as conclusive
proof of guilt of the misconduct charged unless the attorney demonstrates why the
foreign judgment is not valid. The Florida Bar v. Friedman, 646 So. 2d 188 (Fla.
1994).
"This March 22, 1960, at Chambers in Cookeville, Tennessee.
[1] [2] [3] The record sustains the Special Chancellors decree and it is affirmed.
However, there are two legal propositions in connection with this appeal which we
should like to discuss briefly. The first is, that it is not the rule that an opinion of a
chancellor, or of this Court, or a decree thereon, any more than a judgment of the
Circuit Court in a civil matter as distinguished from one criminal in nature, in a suit
not brought to disbar an attorney, has *147 the effect of estopping a lawyer in a
subsequent disbarment proceeding so as to prevent the introduction of any proof
therein contrary to the opinion and decree. The rule is that records,that is
pleadings and proof in cases in which an attorney appeared either as an attorney or
as a partycan be offered in evidence to the extent they are relevant to the issue of
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fitness to practice, but that such records and judgments are not res judicata and do
not necessarily work an estoppel in a subsequent disbarment suit.
The law on this subject is best discussed in the case of In re Santosuosso, 318 Mass.
489, 62 N.E.2d 105, 107, 161 A.L.R. 892. In that case which was an inquiry into
certain alleged misconduct of Santosuosso, an attorney, upon a petition of the Bar
Association of the City of Boston, the petitioner offered in evidence the entire
printed record in the files of the clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in a civil case in equity in which Santosuosso had
been a defendant, and the findings and order in the case. Santosuosso objected that
the evidence was not admissible under the doctrine of res adjudicata and also that
apart from the doctrine of res adjudicata, the statements made by a judge in his
findings and decree were not admissible as evidence. In holding that the paramount
considerations supporting proceedings to investigate the worthiness of members of
the bar to practice law could not be defeated by the application of strict rules of
evidence governing the trial of adversary proceedings between parties, and that the
necessity for the preservation of the integrity of the courts and the safety of the
public rises above strictly technical rules of evidence that govern such adversary
proceedings between parties, the court said:
*148 We are of opinion that the evidence contained in the record offered by
counsel designated by the court to conduct the proceeding, that is, the evidence
adduced at the hearing in the Superior Court of the equity suit in question, at which
the respondent, a party thereto, was present and represented by counsel, testified
and had full opportunity to present and examine witnesses and to cross-examine
those called by the plaintiff, is admissible in the present inquiry. See State ex rel.
Nebraska State Bar Assn v. Gudmundsen, [145] Neb. [324], 16 N.W.2d 474. We
reach this conclusion without dependence upon such cases as Selling v. Radford,
243 U.S. 46, 37 S.Ct. 377, 61 L.Ed. 585, Ann.Cas.1917D, 569, and Matter of
Ulmer, 268 Mass. 373, 167 N.E. 749, in each of which a judgment of disbarment in
another judisdiction was held to settle the issue that the attorney in question was
unfit to practice. We are unwilling to attach such conclusive effect to a judgment at
law or a final decree in equity, based upon alleged corrupt conduct on the part of a
defendant attorney, where the judgment or final decree entered rests upon findings
that the attorney has been guilty of corrupt conduct. * * * we are of opinion that the
evidence in the proceeding in equity in question is admissible in an inquiry such as
the present, and like any other evidence is to be given such weight as the single
justice shall deem proper, when considered together with all other evidence that the
respondent may produce **571 at the hearing, in the course of which he must be
heard with full opportunity to present all relevant evidence that he may wish to
adduce.
*149 The foregoing view finds support in such cases as In re Lacy, 234 Mo.App.
71, 112 S.W.2d 594; In re Pate, 232 Mo.App. 478, 119 S.W.2d 11; State ex rel.
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Nebraska State Bar Assn v. Gudmundsen, 145 Neb. 324, 16 N.W.2d 474; Werner
v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 611, 150 P.2d 892, and Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor, 60
Conn. 11, 22 A. 441, 13 L.R.A. 767. See also Matter of Becker, 229 App.Div. 62,
6566, 241 N.Y.S. 369; Id., 255 N.Y. [223] 233, 174 N.E. 461; Wigmore on
Evidence, 3d ed. 4(7). In the Gudmundsen Case the court, after stating that there
had been some doubt as to the admission of evidence such as that offered in the
present proceeding, said: It is thought, however, that this question should no longer
remain in doubt. It is therefore the holding of this court that the finding in a civil
action that an attorney at law has been guilty of conduct justifying disbarment is not
conclusive on the same question when presented for determination in an action for
disbarment; that notwithstanding the finding in the civil action the culpability of the
attorney must be established in the disbarment action by a clear preponderance of
the evidence. For this purpose the evidence taken at the trial of the civil action and
all other competent evidence is admissible (page 476 of 16 N.W.2d).
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Other cases holding, in general, to this same effect are: In re Berkeley, 174
App.Div. 205, 160 N.Y.S. 1093; In re Bailey, 31 Ariz. 407, 254 P. 481; Fairfield
County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 22 A. 441; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 67 A.
497; State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association v. Gudmundsen, 145 Neb. 324,
16 N.W.2d 474; Metropolitan Street R. Co. v. Oppenheim, 58 App.Div. 510, 69
N.Y.S. 524.
*150 State v. Bomer, 179 Tenn. 67, 162 S.W.2d 515, supports this view. This was a
proceeding against Bomer for his disbarment on the ground he had instituted prior
disbarment proceedings in Chancery Court against two attorneys for no just reason
and without any probable cause, being actuated by motives of personal hatred and
ill will, and had thus abused the courts process as a means of carrying out his
desire for personal vengeance. Upon Bomers objection to the introduction of the
decrees of the Chancery Court in the suits which he had filed against the two
attorneys (which decrees recited the suits were without merit), our Supreme Court
said that such decrees could be received in evidence, not as conclusive proof of the
charges against Bomer, but only as evidence in the case, to show the result of the
prior trials, and in that case the recitation in the decrees that the suits were without
merit, was not taken as foreclosing that issue to Bomer and other proof in regard
thereto was offered by him and heard.
[4] [5] The second proposition upon which we should like to comment is with
respect to the application of the doctrine of laches to this case. The doctrine of
laches may be applicable in a disbarment proceeding and the Special Chancellor
could very well have predicated his opinion and decree in good part thereon. The
incident out of which this disbarment proceeding arose occurred in 1950. It was
fully investigated by the Chattanooga Bar Association in that year with the result
that that Association recommended that no disciplinary action be taken against
Berke. The petitioner had immediate notice of the incident and caused investigation
to be made of it. However, no court action was taken against Berke until the
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commencement of these proceedings in 1959, nine years after *151 the incident.
We think such long delay, unexplained as it is in this record, coupled with proof
that witnesses have died or otherwise have become unavailable, constitutes laches
(Gibsons Suits in Chancery, 5th Ed. 81) and was a ground for **572 dismissal
of the petition. In 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client, 25b, it is stated Staleness in a
charge against an attorney may prevent its being considered, because an
unreasonable delay in the presentation of a charge of misconduct may make it
impossible for an attorney to procure the witnesses or the testimony which would
have been available at an earlier time to meet such charge. That is the condition
here. The gravity of the charges demanded that they be examined fully at the first
opportunity. That this was not done does not appear to have been the fault of Berke,
who offered to appear before the petitioner and submit to an investigation. Nor,
does it appear the delay has been to his benefit but rather, strongly, to his detriment.
Moreover, it appears that in the nine year period Berke has not transgressed against
the ethics or the morals of the legal profession, but to the contrary sustains a good
reputation as a lawyer. In such case, the doctrine of laches was applicable."
Tennessee Bar Assn v. Berke, 48 Tenn.App. 140 (1960) 344 S.W.2d 567
Also, see, In re McCarty, --- A.3d ---- , Vt. S.W.2d ; Attorneys at law: delay
in prosecution of disciplinary proceeding as defense or mitigating circumstance, 93
A.L.R.3d 1057 (especially as to NG12-0435's three and a half year old Order After
Trial that was vitiated by a subsequently entered Final Decree anyways...permitted
the equitable defense of laches to bar an attorney disciplinary action, Tenn. Bar
Assn v. Berke, 344 S.W. 2d 567, 571-72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960), where the vast
majority of courts leave the ultimate question of whether laches is available in legal
malpractice unaddressed. See In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1113-14 (Del.
2007); In re Johnson, 2004 MT 6, 20-21, 84 P.3d 637 (2004); In re Siegel, 708
N.E.2d 869, 871-872 (Ind. 1999); Ching v. State Bar of Nevada, 895 P.2d 646, 64849 (Nev. 1995); In re Wade, 814 P.2d 753, 764 (Ariz. 1991); Harris v. State Bar of
Cal, 800 P.2d 906, 910, (Cal. 1990). Courts have found similarly in other
professional disciplinary proceedings, such as physician disciplinary actions.
"In State v. Bomer, 179 Tenn. 67, 162 S.W.2d 515 (1942), the grounds of
disbarment were unjustified and malicious prosecution of disbarment suits against
two other lawyers. (Pat King would be playing the Bomer role in this movie) The
fact of the filing, manner of prosecution and disposition of the prior disbarment
actions were proven by the records in said cases. The following is found in the
Bomer opinion: In determining the question of malice, it is proper for the Court to
consider the entire record, including *648 the bill and answer, as well as attending
circumstances. * * * * * * This proceeding is in no sense a review of the decrees
rendered in the **302 Boyd and Gerber cases. The question for consideration in
the instant case is, whether or not the charges made in these cases were false and
malicious, made without investigation and without probable cause. 179 Tenn. at 79,
162 S.W.2d at 521. In Tennessee Bar Association v. Berke, 48 Tenn.App. 140,
344 S.W.2d 567 (1960) we find: Complainant predicates its cause wholly upon
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two decrees rendered against the defendant, (1) the opinion of the Chancery Court
of Knox County, Tennessee, wherein the defendant was found guilty of gross
negligence in exchanging Nine Thousand Nine Hundred and No/100 ($9,900.00)
Dollars of new money for old, the new money having been stolen from DobynsTaylor Hardwere Company, located at Kingsport, Tennessee, and (2) the opinion of
the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Division, rendered on November 28,
1958, wherein that Court affirmed the judgment of the Chancellor in the Knox
County Chancery cause, but further held that the defendant, Harry Berke, had been
paid a substantial fee as a remuneration for his part in a conspiracy to conceal the
identity of the money, which opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals became
incontestable on or about the 8th day of April, 1959, when the Supreme Court of
Tennessee denied the writ of certiorari. 48 Tenn.App. at 142, 344 S.W.2d at 568. *
* * *649 The rule is that records,that is pleadings and proof in cases in which an
attorney appeared either as an attorney or as a partycan be offered in evidence to
the extent they are relevant to the issue of fitness to practice, but that such records
and judgments are not res judicata and do not necessarily work an estoppel in a
subsequent disbarment suit. 48 Tenn.App. at 147, 344 S.W.2d at 570. Referring to
State v. Bomer, the Court further said: * * * Upon Bomers objection to the
introduction of the decrees of the Chancery Court in the suits which he had filed
against the two attorneys (which decrees recited the suits were without merit), our
Supreme Court said that such decrees could be received in evidence, Not as
conclusive proof of the charges against Bomer, but only as evidence in the case, to
show the result of the prior trials, and in that case the recitation in the decrees that
the suits were without merit, was not taken as foreclosing that issue to Bomer and
other proof in regard thereto was offered by him and heard. 48 Tenn.App. at 150,
344 S.W.2d at 571. In Tennessee Bar Association v. Freemon, 50 Tenn.App. 567,
362 S.W.2d 828 (1961) this Court held inadmissible the testimony in a former case
to which the accused attorney was not a party, and said: To sustain the action of the
Chancellor in admitting the testimony of Mrs. Spinks as evidence in this case the
Bar Association relies most strongly upon the leading case of Re Santosuosso, 318
Mass. 489, 62 N.E.2d 105, 161 A.L.R. 892. That case involved an inquiry into the
professional conduct of Attorney *650 Santosuosso. As the opinion points out, it
was not a truly adversary proceeding but an information asking not for disbarment
or other disciplinary action but rather for such action as the court might deem
proper. But, we think, A more acute distinction lies in the fact that the evidence
admitted was contained in the transcript of evidence in a Case to which
Santosuosso was a party, in which he appeared in person and by counsel and cross
examined the witnesses against him and in which there was an adjudication of
misconduct personal to him from which he could, if he chose, appeal. **303
(emphasis supplied) 50 Tenn.App. at 572, 362 S.W.2d at 831. It thus appears that
there was a finding in the former case that the attorney had been guilty of conduct
justifying the disbarment. There was no such finding in the present case. 50
Tenn.App. at 573, 362 S.W.2d at 831. In Schoolfield v. Tennessee Bar
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Association, 209 Tenn. 304, 309, 353 S.W.2d 401 (1962) the Supreme Court
affirmed a disbarment decree and said: In the trial court the complainants relied
upon the record of the impeachment proceedings in the State Senate * * *. (p.
306," Berke v. Chattanooga Bar Assn, 58 Tenn.App. 636 (1968) 436 S.W.2d
296.
Evidence that would otherwise be hearsay may be admitted if not offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. fn5 Although a referee may not go behind a
conviction to determine the attorney's guilt of an ethical violation, a referee may
consider evidence concerning the circumstances behind a conviction in determining
the recommended discipline.[FN7] Where a disciplinary proceeding is based on
acts disclosed in the record of a civil action in which the attorney was a party, the
record of the other cause is admissible in the disciplinary proceeding.[FN8]
Nontestimonial evidence from other civil proceedings to which an attorney was a
party are admissible in a disciplinary proceeding against the attorney where the
factual issues in the underlying proceeding and the disciplinary proceeding are
essentially identical.[FN9] A foreign jurisdiction's adjudication of guilt will be
accepted as conclusive proof of guilt of the misconduct charged unless the attorney
demonstrates why the foreign judgment is not valid.[FN10] A statement made
during a disciplinary proceeding enjoys an absolute privilege against a civil action
based thereon as long as the statement is relevant and material to the proceeding.
[FN11]
[FN7] The Florida Bar v. Cohen, 908 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2005). - [FN8] In re
Disciplinary Action Against Perry, 494 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1992). - [FN9]
Rosenthal v. State Bar, 43 Cal. 3d 612, 238 Cal. Rptr. 377, 738 P.2d 723 (1987). [FN10] The Florida Bar v. Friedman, 646 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1994). - [FN11] Hecht v.
Levin, 66 Ohio St. 3d 458, 1993-Ohio-110, 613 N.E.2d 585 (1993).
Certain documents produced in the course of investigation of respondent
attorney, including a trust account ledger for client's account and a statement for
client's checking account, did not constitute hearsay in attorney disciplinary matter;
attorney provided the documents in response to a subpoena, such that the
documents were presumably what the attorney represented as his own work and
records, and because attorney prepared and submitted the documents, he arguably
manifested a belief in the validity of the documents. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(d)(2).
In re Crews, 698 S.E.2d 785 (S.C. 2010). (NOTE: reversible error for Echeverria to
rule that Coughlin could not authenticate or provide foundation for the various
audio and video recordings he sought to introduce into evidence.
In attorney disciplinary proceeding; relevant, testimony presented may
involve where attorney's counsel was able to attack the opposing counsel in a
former matter testifying as a witness as the disciplinary hearing's credibility and
establish any potential bias or prejudice other attorney may have had against
attorney. In re White, 378 S.C. 333, 663 S.E.2d 21 (2008), reinstatement granted,
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380 S.C. 200, 669 S.E.2d 588 (2008). Hearing officer in attorney disciplinary
proceeding could omit portions of expert testimony on standard of care and was not
required to give any weight to the testimony that was admitted; one expert was
judge who had been retired for twenty-four years, another expert improperly
referred to rules of lawyer discipline as only general guidelines, no expert had
specialty in ethics, and attorney failed to show that any expert was more
knowledgeable that hearing officer. Burtch, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against,
162 Wash. 2d 873, 175 P.3d 1070 (2008).
Attorney's decision to call his own character and reputation witness at the
beginning of disciplinary hearing opened the door on the subject of his character;
thus, allowing later witnesses to testify concerning attorney's reputation as a lawyer
and his reputation for honesty was rebuttal testimony after attorney's own character
witness testified. Burtch, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against, 162 Wash. 2d 873,
175 P.3d 1070 (2008). -
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"HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 213:25 to 229:13) MR. COUGHLIN: I'm going to put
on some evidence right now. This is the audio from the trial, Judge Nash Holmes'
deal. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a copy for us? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, I
do. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a transcript? MR. COUGHLIN: The audio
transcript? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know what you are offering, so I would
like to see a transcript. MR. COUGHLIN: The official audio from the muni court.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is it exactly that you're proffering here? MR.
COUGHLIN: It's a court of record. They record the proceedings. And it's the audio
from that proceeding. Pat King has it. I got it from Pat King. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Which proceeding is this? MR. COUGHLIN: The traffic case that she testified to
today where she said, I asked you if you were recording, and then you got all
sneaky, and then you wanted to go to the bathroom. And I want to show this and
show whether or not the going to the bathroom occurred before the sua sponte
interrogation about the recording, and we'll see how truthful Judge Nash Holmes
will be. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a transcript of that proceeding? MR.
COUGHLIN: The problem is I appealed it. And under the law she is supposed to
order the transcript whether I pay a down payment or not, but they keep breaking
the law in the muni court. They just flat out break the law. Some people might say
it helps their bottom line not to prepare the transcript, even though the law says
they have to. MR. ECHEVERRIA: My question is, do you have a transcript? MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: May I see it, please? MR. COUGHLIN:
No. It's an audio transcript. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a transcribed
transcript? MR. COUGHLIN: You mean like a typed out? Some of this stuff I
typed out. If you had read the stuff I submitted to you, you would see I typed some
of it out myself. MR. ECHEVERRIA: So it's not a certified transcript? MR.
COUGHLIN: The only certified one I have, I believe, is that Richard Hill trespass
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case. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Well, what is it exactly that you're offering now? MR.
COUGHLIN: The audio from the trial. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't want it just
played into evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: You let him just read stuff into evidence
from an order. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No, it was after it was admitted into evidence.
MR. COUGHLIN: All right. I would like to admit into evidence the DVDs that I
gave you, that I attached. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I have three or four DVDs. Can
you be specific? MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. The one attached as exhibit, I believe
it's Exhibit 4 to the ex parte motion. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't have an Exhibit
4. MR. COUGHLIN: But I also was told that you consented -- is it not the case
that you consented to electronic service to some extent? MR. COUGHLIN: I did
not consent to that. MR. COUGHLIN: Then how did you rule on a motion if -MR. ECHEVERRIA: The motion was written, presented to me, and I ruled. MR.
COUGHLIN: How did you get the motion? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The State Bar
provided it to me. MR. COUGHLIN: Oh. So did the State Bar provide all the
DVDs I gave them? MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's their function, Mr. Coughlin.
MR. COUGHLIN: Did they provide the DVDs I gave them? MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No. MR. COUGHLIN: They didn't? I thought that was their function. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: No. If you have evidence to present, identify it. Let's be specific.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. The DVDs. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's not specific, sir.
MR. COUGHLIN: It's the file on the DVDs that is 11 TR 26800R -- I only have a
limited time. Can I play this? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know anything about it.
MR. COUGHLIN: It has my name on the file, and it's on the DVDs attached. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That does not lay a foundation. MR. COUGHLIN: It's the
official court audio from the muni court case that Judge Nash Holmes testified to.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Lay the foundation. You object to documents that have a
certification by the county clerk or the city clerk. MR. COUGHLIN: Mr. King
gave me this. He gave it to me as part of the leftovers from his screening panel,
which he still won't tell me who was on the screening panel. It's the court of record
audio recording by the muni court of that. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have that
on a separate DVD or disk or whatever? MR. COUGHLIN: I gave it to Mr. King.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: As a separate document? MR. KING: Actually, it's not. It's
not, Mr. Chairman. I encouraged Mr. Coughlin to go to the municipal court and
purchase or acquire, however it's done appropriately, official records -- MR.
COUGHLIN: And I did. Actually, my mom did. MR. KING: Mr. Coughlin said, I
can't get them. They won't give them to me. MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah, they
wouldn't. MR. KING: I said that's not my responsibility. You get them. And I
contacted the court myself just to find out, and they said all he needed to do is come
in, fill out a short form, and he can acquire them. MR. COUGHLIN: Which was a
total lie. MR. KING: So that's what they told us. So I explained to Mr. Coughlin
that I don't have the official version. I have copies which are, in essence, copies of
copies. The reason I object to any use of audio records -- MR. COUGHLIN: I was
wrong, Mr. King. I'm sorry. My mom actually bought an official version, just to cut
to the chase. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. Can you tell me how many times
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I need to remind you not to interrupt? At what point do you get it? MR.
COUGHLIN: Sir, I just thought it would be helpful to the court, given the limited
time we have here today to make sure the court is aware I might have misspoke
earlier when I said -- I did get a copy from Mr. King -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Can
you answer my question, sir, and quit interrupting? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King. MR. KING: Thank you. The reason I object so
strongly to these recordings is a transcript you can look at, you can fill in the
blanks, if you want to read on either side of something to put it in proper context,
you can. And that's why a court requires a written transcript. I was punished to sit
through the recordings of all these proceedings as part of my job as Bar counsel
doing an investigation. They go on for hours. And in the case of this particular
matter more than one day. So to suggest that anything is going to be proved by
having Mr. Coughlin pull out excerpts and have you listen to it where there is no
ability to put it in proper context, no ability to see the entire record, I think is highly
prejudicial, and no doubt would confuse the matter as opposed to assisting the
matter. Dorothy Nash Holmes' order as she said it speaks for itself. Those were her
findings. That's when she testified that this is what I believe took place with regard
to the audio transcript. But that wasn't the sole reason for her contempt order, and
he was convicted. So him wanting to burden us by having you listen to an excerpt
of a video recording I think is highly inappropriate. Plus, Mr. Coughlin has
demonstrated an ability to post matters to YouTube, to do editing, and we have no
way to know whether or not, in fact, these have been edited. I have listened to a
couple of excerpts from him regarding an arrest, and it is my opinion that they were
extremely altered. So for those reasons, either an official transcript be produced of
which he's had plenty of time to acquire one, or they not be admitted for that
purpose. Thank you. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to require you to lay a
foundation for whatever it is you proffer. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I provided to
this court and the Bar true and accurate copies of the official audio transcripts. And
in some instances the pleadings have gone in typed out things. In one instance for at
least probably 80 percent of the summary eviction I took advantage of a free trial.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm focusing on what you're proffering now. MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is a transcript of the trial for
your traffic citation? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The one
that Judge Holmes issued an order finding you in contempt? MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Did you appeal it? MR. COUGHLIN: I tried to. She
wouldn't let me. MR. ECHEVERRIA: And it's a final order? MR. COUGHLIN: I
did the research on that, but she is saying -- I don't know what she is saying. But
she is not letting me appeal it. MR. ECHEVERRIA: We know what she said in her
order. So I'm not going to entertain an inquiry into the conduct of the trial on your
traffic citation itself. That issue has been litigated. And if you are offering portions
of that transcript without a foundation, without a witness here to tell us that what
you are about to play is an official part of the transcript, without an official written
transcript that is easily obtained, I'm going to sustain the objection. MR.
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COUGHLIN: Did he have a witness to say the order was such and such? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Yes. It's called a certification. MR. COUGHLIN: He got orders
that weren't certified into the record today. Mr. Elcano -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: He
laid a separate foundation for them. I'm giving you an opportunity to lay a
foundation for what you are about to play. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I'm not going to take it on your word. MR. COUGHLIN: Why
not? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Because the law requires a foundation to be laid.
Independent. MR. COUGHLIN: Independent of what I can lay for it? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Right. I want something from the court that says this is an official
transcript. MR. COUGHLIN: My objection, I believe I am able to lay a
foundation. I'll testify under oath this is an official copy of the audio transcript in
that case. MR. ECHEVERRIA: But you don't know that. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes,
I do know that. My mom had to go pay for it because they would not give it to me
for months. They wouldn't let me buy one. Pat King played his little game and
wouldn't give it to
me. He wouldn't give me any of the screening panel things, because he's so
dishonest. It's disgusting. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, from my view one
of the rules of professional conduct is to treat opponents with respect. MR.
COUGHLIN: I agree. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm not sure that comment you just
made is respectful. So let's proceed. If you're about to play some audio, I'm not
going to permit it without an adequate foundation being laid. So move on. MR.
COUGHLIN: Can I -- without an adequate foundation being laid. And I can't say
it's the audio my mom had to pay for, 35 bucks, to get from the court? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: No. Your mother is not here. If you want to call her, we'll listen to
what she has to say. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't have a phone. I can call her? MR.
VELLIS: Can he use this one? MR. COUGHLIN: Should I get up and dial? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Pardon me? MR. COUGHLIN: Should I approach the phone and
dial? MR. ECHEVERRIA: However you think you need to lay a foundation. MR.
COUGHLIN: Mr. King, he can't lay the foundation? He was provided these by the
muni court. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is your case, sir. MR. COUGHLIN: Can I
call Pat King and say, Pat, were you provided these copies of the audio? Everything
is a copy, okay, it's not -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: What's the offer of proof? What
are you intending to prove? MR. COUGHLIN: To show she is so reckless. To
show a lot of things. But one, this idea that a conviction is completely dispositive,
he cited no authority for that. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the supreme
court issued an order in your case that says with respect to, in essence, a conviction,
that the sole issue to be determined here is the nature and extent of the punishment.
MR. COUGHLIN: But that's the candy bar thing. You guys made a hearing about
30 other things. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry. I kept talking while -- MR.
COUGHLIN: You were done talking, and I responded. You keep trying to bait me,
and you keep trying to make a record of that, and it's dishonest the extent to which
you do that. You stop talking, and I respond. I didn't talk over you that time. And I
resent the fact that you keep appearing to want to do that. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
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The supreme court, as I read its order, tells this panel that the only issue to be
determined with respect to a conviction is the nature and extent of the punishment,
if any. So if you have testimony on that issue with respect to any conviction, or
order holding you in contempt, please present it. MR. COUGHLIN: Not under
Claiborne. Claiborne says a conviction is not the end of the inquiry. That in fact,
the panel and the Bar have a duty to look beyond the conviction. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: We have a specific order in your case with respect to what the
issues to be determined in this proceeding are with respect to a conviction. So do
you wish to offer evidence as to the nature and extent of punishment, if any, that
should be rendered by this panel? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. And I -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. So I'll play that audio
with your permission. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sustaining the objection because it
lacks foundation. MR. COUGHLIN: Then I'll call my mom. May I approach to
call my mom? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sure. (Telephone call being placed.) MR.
COUGHLIN: Mom, it's Zach. MRS. BARKER: Yeah. MR. COUGHLIN: Listen,
you're on the record right now, okay? The panel can hear you. Are you there?
MRS. BARKER: I'm having trouble hearing you. But anyway -- I'm in a store. Go
ahead. MR. COUGHLIN: You're being listened to right now and recorded. Okay?
MRS. BARKER: I understand that. MR. COUGHLIN: I need to ask you -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Let's put her under oath. Would you swear the witness in, please.
(The oath was administered telephonically to the witness.) MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Would you tell us your full name and address, please. MRS. BARKER: Mary
Eleanor Barker. 94 -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Spell your last name. MRS. BARKER:
B-a-r-k-e-r. MR. ECHEVERRIA: And your address, please. THE WITNESS: 945
West 12th Street. MR. ECHEVERRIA: West what street? MRS. BARKER: 12th.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: South? MRS. BARKER: 12th. Reno, Nevada 89503. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Thank you, Ms. Barker. Mr. Coughlin, you may proceed. MRS.
BARKER: No, it's Barker. MARY BARKER having been first duly sworn,
testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mom,
did you have to buy an audio of the trial with that Judge Nash Holmes? A Did I
have to buy an audio? Q Yeah. Did you buy a copy of the proceeding? A Yes. Q
Did you give it to me? A Oh, God. I think so. I did several things. I paid $100 for
something -- no, that was something else. Q Right. You paid a hundred dollars for
bail, and she wouldn't let me out, but she kept the money anyway? A Yes. And the
man that I gave the money to told me that you would be released within several
hours, and you weren't. Q They did the old switcheroo, right? A I'm sorry? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I would appreciate it if you would refrain from
interrupting even your own mother. THE WITNESS: Especially his own mother.
MR. COUGHLIN: Is that good enough? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q Mom, was it an official copy? A I don't know. Q Did you go to
the court and say I want a copy of the proceeding, and you paid the money they
asked you to pay? A I don't know that it was official or not. But I requested a
copy, yes. I would assume it would be official. I was requesting it in the
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courthouse. Q And you filled out whatever form it was they made you fill out, and
paid whatever money it was they wanted right? A Yes."
"HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 215:24 to 217:19) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Well, what is
it exactly that you're offering now? MR. COUGHLIN: The audio from the trial.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't want it just played into evidence. MR. COUGHLIN:
You let him just read stuff into evidence from an order. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No,
it was after it was admitted into evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: All right. I would
like to admit into evidence the DVDs that I gave you, that I attached. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I have three or four DVDs. Can you be specific? MR.
COUGHLIN: Yeah. The one attached as exhibit, I believe it's Exhibit 4 to the ex
parte motion. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't have an Exhibit 4. MR. COUGHLIN:
But I also was told that you consented -- is it not the case that you consented to
electronic service to some extent? MR. COUGHLIN: I did not consent to that. MR.
COUGHLIN: Then how did you rule on a motion if -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: The
motion was written, presented to me, and I ruled. MR. COUGHLIN: How did you
get the motion? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The State Bar provided it to me. MR.
COUGHLIN: Oh. So did the State Bar provide all the DVDs I gave them? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That's their function, Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Did they
provide the DVDs I gave them? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. MR. COUGHLIN:
They didn't? I thought that was their function. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. If you
have evidence to present, identify it. Let's be specific. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. The
DVDs. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's not specific, sir. MR. COUGHLIN: It's the
file on the DVDs that is 11 TR 26800R -- I only have a limited time. Can I play
this? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know anything about it."
Hardly anything that came out of the Panel Chair's mouth was true on
11/14/12: HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 215:24 to 216:7) "MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Well, what is it exactly that you're offering now? MR. COUGHLIN: The audio
from the trial. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't want it just played into evidence. MR.
COUGHLIN: You let him just read stuff into evidence from an order. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: No, it was after it was admitted into evidence..."
"HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 45:5 to 47:15) BY MR. KING: Q Mr. Hill, do
you recognize that document? A This is the attorney's fees order from Judge
Flanagan. MR. COUGHLIN: I object, your Honor. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Wait a
minute, Mr. Coughlin. Wait. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
There's a question, Mr. King? MR. KING: Yes. I asked Mr. Hill if this was the
order that he was testifying about regarding the judge ordering of sanctions of
$40,000 in attorney's fees. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have an objection to that
question, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, sir, I thought he was putting it
into evidence. So I probably was too early to object. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's
why you interrupted too early? MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. I'm sorry. MR.
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ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Hill. THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. This is the award regarding
attorney's fees in accordance with NRS 69, I believe it's 050. There is also an order
granting us approximately $2500 in costs. BY MR. KING: Q In this particular
order at Page 2, is this the order signed by Judge Flanagan? A Yes, sir. Q What
date did Judge Flanagan sign this order? A This is dated June 25th, 2012, and it
bears a file stamp of the same date. Q Could you read the paragraph regarding
"Merliss goes even further and states." Could you read that paragraph on Page 2. A
Beginning at line 4? Q Line 9 on Page 2. A Okay. "Merliss goes even further and
states: As proven above and below, the frivolity and vexatiousness of Coughlin's
maintenance and extension of this matter has been so beyond reason, and so
outrageous, and the nexus of his behavior to the fees incurred by Merliss so direct
and indisputable, that nothing less than a full award of those fees should even be
considered by the court. To not impose the full measure of the harm Coughlin has
caused would reward and encourage his vexatiousness in this and other cases.
There needs to be a day of reckoning for Coughlin's antics." Q In this order did
Judge Flanagan accept that by granting the full amount of fees requested? If you
read the last sentence of Page 3. A Yes. "Accordingly, Merliss's motion for
attorney's fees is granted in the sum of $42,065.50. Q Do you have personal
knowledge of whether or not, as the attorney for Dr. Merliss, whether or not that
award has been paid by Mr. Coughlin? A It has not. MR. KING: Mr. Chairman,
we have provided you with certified copies of each of these orders. I would move
that Exhibit No. 1 be admitted pursuant to the NRS statute 52 --"
111. --Sufficiency; standard of proof
Attorney and Client 53(2)
An attorney has no less rights than any other party, and as such, his or her
discipline must be based upon more than speculation.[FN1] Perhaps it is owing to
the relatively skint due process afforded to attorney respondent and the dint of
availability of discovery (particularly where King cheats the system and Coughlin
only gets one tenth of the time to "inspect" the evidence and witness lists and other
items provided in SCR 105(2),(2)(c) that the Panel and King, under SCR 119,
should be held in contempt for failing to accord Coughlin) that the standard of
proof required in Nevada disciplinary matters is comparatively high to that in other
states. The courts have used different expressions to indicate the degree or
quantum of proof necessary to justify disbarment or suspension of an attorney.
Courts have held: that a convincing preponderance,[FN2] a clear preponderance,
[FN3] or fair preponderance of the evidence is sufficient;[FN4] that competent,
substantial evidence is required;[FN5] that the evidence is full, clear, and
convincing;[FN6] that substantial, clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence is
needed;[FN7] or that clear and convincing evidence is essential.[FN8]
Because evidence that was not presented to the bar is virtually impossible
to evaluate in the absence of cross-examination, the supreme court will
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generally not consider it.[FN10] It would be inordinately unfair to allow King

to purposefully fail to timely supplement his DOWSOE (especially as to the
testimony of Beesley and Elcano and the entry of FHE2, an Order by Judge
Flanagan where nothing in the 8/23/12 Compliant in any way notice-pleads
Coughlin that such would be included in any allegation or was otherwise at
issue. Further, the Panel Chair was obviously either clueless to the concepts
of notice and notice-pleading, or, more likely, just fraudulently ran roughshod
over them in a more than willful manner.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 72:23 to 75:5) "MR. KING: Mr.
Chairman, if I could respond by pointing out the fact that the order from
Judge Flanagan, which has been admitted, suggests that that was -- that those
fees were generated because of Mr. Coughlin's vexatious conduct. And that
the fees were reasonable and were awarded against Mr. Coughlin, not one
cent of which has been paid. So I think any suggestion to the contrary is
irrelevant, because Judge Flanagan's order is to be accepted by the panel.
MR. COUGHLIN: ...I don't know that's actually pled in your complaint,
Mr. King, or included amongst one of the three grievances. ... Am I here
today on Judge Flanagan's sanction? Is he a grievant and accorded a case
number too? ... MR. ECHEVERRIA: I believe you're here today to
measure all of your conduct as a practicing lawyer. ... MR. COUGHLIN:
So we're not here today based on what's been noticed? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: We're not here today to relitigate orders that have been filed
that you have appealed, and that you have lost. MR. COUGHLIN: ... I'm
asking what is it limited to? Because it sounds like from what you just said
it's not limited. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't intend to impose any limits on
you in terms of what you attempt to proffer as evidence. I will rule on what
you proffer as evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm saying what he's limited to,
your Honor. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The issue here, sir, as I understand the
supreme court's order with respect to your conviction of theft, and the issues
here with respect to the other grievances that have been filed against you are
to the extent as to what, if any, should be the punishment that you should
sustain as a result of your conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: Yet this is entered into
evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is what? MR. COUGHLIN: This order
has been entered into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Exhibit 2 has. MR.
COUGHLIN: But it's not pled in any complaint. Judge Flanagan's not a
grievant. I wasn't noticed that that was the purpose of this hearing to some
extent today. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were noticed that the issue of your
conviction of trespass was an issue, that your handling of that case was an
issue, and it's relevant as to that." (NOTE: Panel Chair Echeverria time and
time again reverts to non-sequitur as his trusty workhorse when confronted by
Coughlin with the appalling lack of due process his Panel presents, something
he mixes up with only the occasional outright lie (confronted with the
quandry presented by the rules that require these hearings be limited to what
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is notice-pled, Echeverria reaches for the ol' "not here today to relitigate
orders" regardless of the fact that such order was neither notice-pled (not even
identified in the DOWSOE or any supplemental, as Hill's testimony is limited
therein to that occurring in 1708, not the appeal in 03628, to say nothing of
the fact that King purposefully eliminated all reference to Hill or that
summary eviction appeal in his 8/23/12 Complaint, choosing also to avoid
seeking admission of any written grievance by Hill (its like that Seinfeld
where Jerry takes his less than attractive girlfriend to the Chinese restaurant
way across town to avoid the embarrassment of being seen with her);
confonted again as to the notion that such hearing is limited to that which is
notice-pled, Echeverria lamely responds that he does not "intend to impose
any limits on you" rather than address Coughlin's contentions as to the limits
imposed on bar counsel's presentation of his case, then, where Coughlin
persists, Echeverria shows he is a real five tool player, and attempts to make
some nice broken field running by riffing on his ridiculously fraudulent
assertion that the "supreme court's order with respect to your convict of theft"
somehow provides a basis for finding Coughlin guilty of all that alleged in
any of the grievances (including imaginary ones that were not notice-pled)
and insisting Coughlin just bend over and skip straight to the "big mea culpa"
mitigation, mitigation dancey dance, finally Echeverria, who just will not let
it go, asserts that the Complaints referencing the trespass conviction (any
allegation that such is a SCR 111(6) "serious" offense is undone by King's
SCR 111(4) Petition reporting such "crime" in 61901, so...), stating: "You
were noticed that the issue of your conviction of trespass was an issue, that
your handling of that case was an issue, and it's relevant as to that". The
only problem is that where Echeverria wants to assert Coughlin's "handling of
that case" involved the appeal (appeals have their own case numbers, and just
because Baker and Hill billed some hours in the justice court does not make
there moving for an award of fees based upon NRS 69.050 acceptable) of the
summary eviction proceeding that Hill's associate handled (making Hill's
testimony, rather than Baker's rather dubious as to relevancy and or best
evidence notions) rather then the criminal trespass case (that case? Which
case? Whichever one the witch trial needs the most, apparently, rather
than whichever one lazy, entitled, assist. bar counsel with no training in his
first week on the job Pat King manage to notice-plead).
However, quite clearly, that statutory remedy provided by NRS
40.253, and Anvui, not to mention CG Wallace, make quite clear that the "de
novo review" in the appeal "case" (03628) that Flangan's Order is found
within, involves not, in an analysis of Coughlin's "handling" of it (beyond the
fact that such "case" was in no way notice-pled), anything to do with any
criminal trespass prosecution or conviction. Hill's client is free to file a
lawsuit for damages incident to the criminal trespass (though, he should
probably not given he was actually himself participating in a burglary, in
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addition to lying to and with the police and Hill to accomplish a fraudulent
arrest), and King was free to notice-pled any such "handling" of that "case" in
his Complaint, much less his DOWSOE, but, darn it, he just did not manage
to, so, no, Chair Echeverria, its not appropriate to make Flanagan's Order
(FHE2) King's lead-off hitter in a Rickey Henderson star of the show kind of
way...
This, in addition to the fact that the SBN and far too many of the
judges in Reno and Washoe County are insipidly allowing this situation to
turn into an embarrassing rock fight in the street/dumpster grease fire of epic
proportions (apparently not to help Hill purchase his twenty-fourth Porsche,
but rather, to indulge base vindictiveness), that, like some Russian egg, peels
away layer after layer of misconduct and the incestuous relationship between
bailiffs (Medina, Reyes, Chief Bailiff Sexton, Ramsey, and Heibert, they of
the ripping up Coughlin's filings/throwing them away/making up new
wrinkles to the dubious at best "Administrative Order" requiring Coughlin to
conduct all business with the RJC through its abusive, unprofessional bailiffs,
such as "only one filing per day", or "only fifteen minutes a day to review any
and all files" (that is when the bailiffs aren't bizarrely indicating that "all your
eviction files are in Carson" or providing some other misdirection non-sense,
such as citing to JCRRT 10 in relation to "landlord tenant matters' or criminal
cases)), marshals (Coppa, Thompson, Harley, Menzel), sheriffs (Durbin,
Canizzaro, Stuchell, Machen), police officers (Sifre, Look, Leedy, K. Brown,
Duralde, Rosa, Crawford, Braunworth, Weaver, Dye, O. Miller, Schaur),
DAS Officers (Ramos, Wickman, C. Brown), bar counsel, Clerk of Court of
the SBN, juni courthouse security detail (A. Perez, M. Greene), and judge
after judge (Sferrazza, Flanagan, Elliott, Sattler, Schroeder, Clifton, Pearson,
Nash Holmes, L. Gardner, W. Gardner, Howard) process server companies
(Nevada Court Services, Jeff Chandler, Wray, Durden) and property
managers (Sue King, Jared Scalise, Western Nevada Managment) cum
unauthorized practitioners of landlord law, and the Hill, Baker, Kern,
(Loomis, Puentes, Sotelo, Dogan, Leslie, Lindsay collective of Washington
Generals court appointed defenders), (Skau, Christensen, Hazlett-Stevens,
Wong, Roberts, Ormaas, Drake, Sooudi, Young, Stege purveyors of
prosecutorial misconduct), Elcano, Springgate, and other Goya-esqe
archetypes of the Northern Nevada legal landscape, with the only silver lining
being that Coughlin more than paid Elcano back for hiring him on at Washoe
Legal Services by single handedly doing more for tenant's rights than the
WLS's Marc Ashleys of the world would even come close to were they to
continue collecting a paycheck for two hundred years (exposing the state
sponsored burglaries by the Washoe County Sheriff's Office, and the
complete indifference to jurisdictional prerequisites (at least as far as they
benefit tenants) demonstrated by the RJC as a whole), not to mention bring
light to an epidemic of unprofessional, abusive, bullying, and fraudulent
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behavior by RMC Marshals and RJC Bailiffs, and some court staff (C.
Erickson, R. Baker, C. Wood, L. Matheus):
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 73:23 to 75:5) "MR. COUGHLIN: So
we're not here today based on what's been noticed? MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We're not here today to relitigate orders that have been filed that you have
appealed, and that you have lost. MR. COUGHLIN: ...I'm asking what is it
limited to? Because it sounds like from what you just said it's not limited.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't intend to impose any limits on you in terms of
what you attempt to proffer as evidence. I will rule on what you proffer as
evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm saying what he's limited to, your Honor.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The issue here, sir, as I understand the supreme
court's order with respect to your conviction of theft, and the issues here
with respect to the other grievances that have been filed against you are to
the extent as to what, if any, should be the punishment that you should
sustain as a result of your conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: Yet this is entered
into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is what? MR. COUGHLIN: This
order has been entered into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Exhibit 2 has.
MR. COUGHLIN: But it's not pled in any complaint. Judge Flanagan's
not a grievant. I wasn't noticed that that was the purpose of this hearing
to some extent today. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were noticed that the
issue of your conviction of trespass was an issue, that your handling of that
case was an issue, and it's relevant as to that."
Special judge did not abuse his discretion, in disbarment proceedings, in
excluding exhibits evidencing attorney's pattern of writing checks on trust account
to pay for personal obligations, to extent such exhibits were generated outside time
span covered by disbarment complaint, especially given that attorney was not
afforded prior notice of such exhibits and pleadings were not amended to reflect
such exhibits. Ligon v. Dunklin, 368 Ark. 443, 247 S.W.3d 498 (2007).
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Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing,

and satisfactory evidence; the touchstone of the clear and convincing standard is
that the evidence must establish that the truth of the facts asserted is highly
probable. In re Swanson, 288 Kan. 185, 200 P.3d 1205 (2009).
Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence. In re Nelson, 288 Kan. 179, 200 P.3d 1262 (2009).
satisfactory evidence. In re Crow, 285 Kan. 1110, 179 P.3d 1093 (2008).
satisfactory evidence, in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. In re Bishop, 285
Kan. 1097, 179 P.3d 1096 (2008).
satisfactory evidence. In re Trester, 285 Kan. 404, 172 P.3d 31 (2007).
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- 166/173 -MOTION
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In an attorney disciplinary proceeding in which the lawyer does not answer

the formal charges, (Coughlin absolutely did answer all of the charges, denying
guilt as to each an every one, and its especially pathetic where King and Peters
had to attempt to excise Coughlin's filings of 10/30/11 and 11/9/11 from the
ROA, amongst others) if the legal conclusion the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel (ODC) seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily
apparent from deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be
submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted
factual allegations. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 19, Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement
Rule, 11(E)(3), 8 LSAR.S. In re Hackett, 42 So. 3d 972 (La. 2010).
Clear and convincing evidence did not support referee's finding that
attorney violated disciplinary rule prohibiting a lawyer from failing to
communicate with client or failing to diligently work on her case; record was
almost entirely silent on issues. State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of
Nebraska Supreme Court v. Wintroub, 277 Neb. 787, 765 N.W.2d 482 (2009).
In disciplinary proceedings against attorney, documents disbarring attorney in
Colorado for conversion of client's trust fund were prima facie evidence that he
committed the acts described therein, and thus attorney had the burden of proving
that the findings forming the basis of the Colorado disbarment were not supported
by the evidence or that the findings were not sufficient grounds for discipline in
Oklahoma. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Rymer, 2008 OK 50, 187 P.3d 725
(Okla. 2008).
[FN1] Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Craft, 208 S.W.3d 245 (Ky. 2006). -[FN2] Iowa
Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Joy, 728 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa 2007). [FN3] In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, 160 Wash. 2d 317, 157 P.3d
859 (2007). - [FN4] Matter of Capoccia, 59 N.Y.2d 549, 466 N.Y.S.2d 268, 453
N.E.2d 497 (1983). - [FN5] The Florida Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.
2006). - [FN6] In re Disciplinary Action Against Nelson, 733 N.W.2d 458 (Minn.
2007). - [FN7] In re Comfort, 159 P.3d 1011 (Kan. 2007). - [FN8] In re Pharr, 950
So. 2d 636 (La. 2007); State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of Nebraska Supreme
Court v. Petersen, 272 Neb. 975, 725 N.W.2d 845 (2007). - [FN9] Maddy v. First
Dist. Committee of Virginia State Bar, 205 Va. 652, 139 S.E.2d 56 (1964). [FN10] Baca v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 3d 294, 276 Cal. Rptr. 169, 801 P.2d 412 (1990).
- [FN11] The Florida Bar v. Roberts, 626 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1993). - [FN12] Connor
v. State Bar, 50 Cal. 3d 1047, 269 Cal. Rptr. 742, 791 P.2d 312 (1990). - [FN13]
Rosenthal v. Justices of the Supreme Court of California, 910 F.2d 561 (9th Cir.
1990).
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112. Protection against self-incrimination

113. Judgment and award of costs; enforcement
Where, however, the bar takes an excessively broad approach to a
disciplinary proceeding and fails to abandon counts against the attorney which
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could not be proved, each party should bear its own costs even though the
proceeding results in the disbarment of the attorney.[FN5] If the state bar fails to
prove allegations by clear and convincing evidence, costs should not be assessed
against the attorney in a disciplinary proceeding.[FN6] [FN5] The Florida Bar v.
McCain, 361 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1978). - [FN6] State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v.
Albert, 2007 OK 31, 2007 WL 1417160 (Okla. 2007).
Pat King failed to seek costs until after Coughlin concluded his closing
argument, and for that reason alone, and in addition to the favorable comparision to
footnotes 5 and 6 above, costs should not be awarded to the SBN, but Coughlin
should be awarded costs of $50,000, plus both a NRS 7.085 and NRAP 38 attorney
fee award (and Coughlin, unlike Springgate, Hill, or Baker, did comply with the 21
day safe harbor procedural requirement):
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 330:16 to 331:20) "I thank you for your time
today. MR. KING: I have no further argument as the panel chair directed, but I do
have something I need to put on the record. If the panel chooses not to disbar Mr.
Coughlin, but instead afford him some opportunity through reinstatement,
regardless, he should be held responsible for paying the costs of the investigation of
these proceedings. They shouldn't fall on the other members of the Bar to pay. And
I believe it would be appropriate since you heard evidence on the issue of the court
order that he pay Dr. Merliss's fees. That any reinstatement, if you don't disbar him
permanently, would be he would be required to follow that court order to pay those
fees. Thank you. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Anything further? I'm going to propose,
because it's getting late, I would like to circulate an e-mail to the panel members
tomorrow to arrange a date when we can either get together in person and/or on the
phone and discuss the situation. We have 30 days, I believe, in which to issue a
written opinion. I would like to set up a meeting sometime within the next week
where we can all discuss this issue and come up with a ruling, and then I'll offer a
tentative ruling, then I'll offer to write the opinion and circulate it for approval or
disapproval. At this time is the hearing will stand adjourned, and I will circulate an
e-mail tomorrow. (Proceedings concluded at 5:30 P.M.)"
Also, it just ridiculous for King to be cheerleading for Hill's client to get
paid above all else.
114. Review
7. Reinstatement of Disbarred Attorney
115. Generally; procedure
116. Considerations affecting right to reinstatement
117. Burden of showing present good character
118. Review
Attorney and Client 56 As a general rule, because a referee in an attorney
disciplinary proceeding is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses,
[FN1] the court will not second-guess a referee's recommended discipline as long
as that discipline is authorized under the state standards for imposing lawyer
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sanctions and has a reasonable basis in existing case law.[FN2] When reviewing a
referee's recommended attorney discipline, the court's scope of review is broader
than that afforded to the referee's findings of fact because the court has the ultimate
responsibility to determine the appropriate sanction.[FN3] However, since the court
has exclusive authority and wide latitude in determining disciplinary sanctions over
lawyers,[FN4] a referee's recommendation for discipline receives less deference by
the court than a referee's guilt finding.[FN5] Thus, although a referee's
recommendation in an attorney disciplinary proceeding is persuasive, the court does
not grant it the same deference as it does to guilt recommendations, because the
ultimate responsibility for determining the appropriate sanction rests with the court.
[FN6] It has been stated elsewhere that the court may impose whatever sanction it
deems appropriate, regardless of the referee's recommendation, since the court does
not accord the referee's recommendation as to appropriate attorney discipline great
weight or consider it conclusive, and that the court is entitled to impose discipline
more or less severe than the discipline recommended by the referee.[FN7]
Similarly, another court has stated that recommendations of a bar association board
of governors are advisory in nature, and the court makes an independent review of
the record and findings of fact.[FN8] It has also been stated that, although the court
generally accords great weight to a review department's recommendation, its
findings and recommendations are merely advisory.[FN9] Although the attorney
sanctions for professional misconduct standards are not binding on the court, they
promote the consistent and uniform application of disciplinary measures, and the
court will not reject a recommendation arising from application of the standards
unless it has grave doubts as to the propriety of the recommended discipline.[FN10]
The ultimate decision regarding attorney discipline rests with the court, which has
not hesitated to impose a harsher sanction than that recommended by the review
department, and when the facts have warranted doing so, the court has even
rejected a recommendation of suspension and disbarred the attorney.[FN11] While
the court's scope of review over disciplinary recommendations of a referee is
broader than that afforded to the referee's findings of fact, the referee's
recommendation of discipline is nevertheless afforded a presumption of correctness
unless the recommendation is clearly erroneous or not supported by the evidence.
[FN12] Unlike a referee's factual findings in an attorney disciplinary proceeding,
which are entitled to deference from the court, a referee's order granting summary
relief in an attorney disciplinary proceeding is reviewed de novo by the court.
[FN13 Where neither party filed a petition for review of the hearing officer's
findings in the attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court would accept
and adopt those findings but would reserve final judgment as to misconduct and
disciplinary sanction. In re Powell, 893 N.E.2d 729 (Ind. 2008). Generally, the
Supreme Court will not second-guess a referee's recommended attorney discipline
as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The Florida Bar v. Glueck, 985 So. 2d 1052 (Fla.
2008). Factual findings by the hearing judge in attorney disciplinary proceeding
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will not be interfered with by Court of Appeals if they are founded on clear and
convincing evidence. Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland v. Pawlak, 408 Md.
288, 969 A.2d 311 (2009). A unanimous decision of state bar association
disciplinary board will be upheld in the absence of a clear reason for departure.
Burtch, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against, 162 Wash. 2d 873, 175 P.3d 1070
(2008). Evidentiary rulings made by the hearing officer in an attorney disciplinary
proceeding will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Burtch, In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against, 162 Wash. 2d 873, 175 P.3d 1070 (2008). The hearing
officer's denials of motions for mistrial are reviewed for an abuse of discretion in
attorney disciplinary proceeding. Burtch, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against,
162 Wash. 2d 873, 175 P.3d 1070 (2008). A de novo standard applies to a review
of the adjudicatory record made before the Lawyer Disciplinary Board as to
questions of law, questions of application of the law to the facts, and questions of
appropriate sanctions. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Cavendish, 700 S.E.2d 779 (W.
Va. 2010). The Florida Bar v. Senton, 882 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2004). - [FN2] The
Florida Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 2006). - Absent a showing that a
referee's findings in an attorney disciplinary proceeding are clearly erroneous or
lacking in evidentiary support, the court is precluded from reweighing the evidence
and substituting its judgment for that of the referee. The Florida Bar v. Senton, 882
So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2004). - [FN3] The Florida Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.
2006). - [FN4] In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109 (Del. 2007). - [FN5] The Florida
Bar v. Feige, 937 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2006). - [FN6] The Florida Bar v. Cohen, 908
So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2005). - [FN7] In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery,
2007 WI 1, 298 Wis. 2d 289, 725 N.W.2d 613 (2007). - [FN8] Kentucky Bar Ass'n
v. Craft, 208 S.W.3d 245 (Ky. 2006). - [FN9] In re Silverton, 36 Cal. 4th 81, 29
Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 113 P.3d 556 (2005). - [FN10] In re Silverton, 36 Cal. 4th 81, 29
Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 113 P.3d 556 (2005). - [FN11] In re Silverton, 36 Cal. 4th 81, 29
Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 113 P.3d 556 (2005). - [FN12] The Florida Bar v. Barcus, 697
So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1997). - [FN13] The Florida Bar v. Gold, 937 So. 2d 652 (Fla.
2006). I AM INDIGENT, I SWEAR.
, I declare this is true under penalty of perjury pursuant to nrs 53.045:
Dated this 8/12/13
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/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed electronically

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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Appellant
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Proof of Service:
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On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to all registered efilers, and to those whom are not I placed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the usps mail on this date:
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State Bar of Nevada's Patrick O. King and David Clark.
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Richard G. Hill, Esq.

Casey Baker, Esq.
Richard G. Hill, CHTD.
Attorneys for Respondent Merliss
652 Forrest St.
Reno, NV 89509
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DATED THIS: Dated thi 7/15/13
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/s/ Zach Coughlin
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Zach Coughlin
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Appellant
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INDEX TO EXHIBITS:
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1. Exhibit 1: various relevant materials.
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- 173/173 -MOTION
Electronically Filed
Jun 18 2012 09:24 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
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In Re Matter of:
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
)
)
)
) Supreme Court No: 60838
)
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUPPLEMENT OR AMEND EMERGENCY MOTION TO ALTER

OR AMEND, OR SET ASIDE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION AND NOTICE OF SUPREME

COURT CLERK'S FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE OPPOSITION TO BAR COUNSEL'S PETITION

FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION

COMES NOW, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ., and files the above named
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document and moves this Court for the relief requested herein. This filing is further based upon the
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papers and pleadings on file herein and in the case in the trail court and the appeal in the District
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Court and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted herewith and any oral argument this
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Court may desire. Alternatively, Coughlin requests that the Court set aside his temporary suspension
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pursuant to SCR 111(7) and refuse to countenance the SCR 117 Petition as well. By way of the
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showing of good cause Coughlin attempts to set forth herein. Beyond any mitigating factors, the
good cause is this: for the law to work, there needs to be environment where bullying opposing
- 1/95 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND EMERGENCY MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR SET ASIDE

TEMPORARY SUSPENSION AND NOTICE OF SUPREME COURT CLERK'S FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE

OPPOSITION TO BAR COUNSEL'S PETITION FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION and SCR 117 Petition

Docket 60838 Document 2012-18962
counsel still have to earn their victories, rather than leverage committees, clubs, forces, and enforcers
to put points on the board for them through innuendo, nanny-stating, abuse of process, etc., etc. This
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case is a lot more important than me. I know I am an insignificant cog in this sphere, but what is at
stake here is the perception and the reality as to whether a cliquish tyranny overrides the principles
upon which the black ink in this Court's opinions flow.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The undersigned (Coughlin) submitted to the Supreme Court of Nevada's electronic filing system
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an Opposition to Bar Counsel's petition on or about May 24th, 2012, as an original matter given the
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online system would not allow filings in the case itself (60838). The Clerk's Office refused to file,
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mark as received, or, apparently, in any way make the Justices of this Court away of the Opposition.
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Only after the undersigned reputation has been sullied by news outlets far and wide (an article
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appeared in papers in at least three different cities, separated by the vast expanse of our state) did the
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Clerk's Office allow Coughlin to file something in an attempt to tell his side of the story here and
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avoid the prejudice that would be done his child custody, foreclosure defense, bankruptcy, and other
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other clients should Coughlin's law license be suspended, even temporarily.
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NRCP RULE 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS....NRCP
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5(e), Filing With the Court Defined: The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as
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required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except that the judge
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may permit the papers to be filed with the judge, in which event the judge shall note thereon the filing
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date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk. A court may by local rule permit papers to
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be filed, signed or verified by electronic means that are consistent with technical standards, if any,
that the Judicial Conference of the United States establishes. A paper signed by electronic means in



compliance with the local rule constitutes a written paper presented for the purpose of applying these
rules. The clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose solely
because it is not presented in proper form as required by these rules or any local rules or practices.
NRCP 5(e).
Further, NRCP 5(e) holds that: "(e).. The clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any
paper presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form as required by these
rules or any local rules or practices."
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With regard to the WDC filing office/ eFlex staff refusing to file papers submitted for filing,
please consider:
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Sullivan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and For County of Clark, 904 P.2d 1039, 111 Nev.
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1367 (Nev., 1995): This proper person petition for a writ of mandamus seeks an order from this
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court directing the Eighth Judicial District Court to file petitioner's application to proceed in forma
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pauperis and his civil complaint. 1 On July 25, 1995, we ordered the state to file an answer to this
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petition. The state's answer was filed on August 11, 1995. 2 Documentation submitted by petitioner to
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this court establishes that petitioner submitted to the clerk of the district court for filing an application
to proceed in forma pauperis and a civil complaint on May 15, 1995. Although the application for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis was in proper form and was sworn to under penalty of perjury, the
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clerk of the district court did not file that application. 3 The failure to file the application was in
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violation of the clear statutory mandate that such an application be filed. NRS 12.015(1) provides that
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"[a]ny person ... may file an affidavit [seeking leave to proceed without payment of fees]." Further,
we have repeatedly instructed the clerk of the Eighth Judicial District Court that such documents must
be filed. See Bowman v. District Court, 102 Nev. 474, 728 P.2d 433 (1986) (clerk has a ministerial



duty to accept and file documents if those documents are in proper form; clerk must not exercise any

judicial discretion); Barnes v. District Court, 103 Nev. 679, 748 P.2d 483 (1987) (prisoner's right of

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access to court cannot be denied on basis of indigency); Huebner v. State, 107 Nev. 328, 810 P.2d

1209 (1991) (clerk must create an accurate record of all pleadings submitted for filing, whether or not

the documents are actually filed); Whitman v. Whitman, 108 Nev. 949, 840 P.2d 1232 (1992) (clerk

has no authority to return documents submitted for filing; instead, clerk must stamp documents that

cannot be immediately filed "received," and must maintain such documents in the record of the case);

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Donoho v. District Court, 108 Nev. 1027, 842 P.2d 731 (1992) (the clerk of the district court has a

duty to file documents and to keep an accurate record of the proceedings before the court); Grey v.

Grey, 111 Nev. 388, 892 P.2d 595 (1995) (clerk of district court admonished for failure to keep

accurate record of documents submitted for filing).

Petitioner alleges that the district court has refused to file his application and has returned it
with directions to provide more information regarding employment. Indeed, petitioner has attached to
his petition for a writ in this court his original application as it was returned to him. Attached to the
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top of the document is a "post-it" note with the handwritten notation: "application denied incomplete
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info-employment currently." 4 The state informs us that the note was written by "the chief judge." In
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addition, petitioner alleges, and the allegation is apparently true, that along with his "denied"
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application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, his civil complaint was returned to him unfiled.
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Finally, petitioner alleges, and has attached documentation to support the allegation, that judges' law
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clerks often return to prisoners unfiled motions along with letters purporting to rule on the legal
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sufficiency of those motions. The state argues in its answer to this petition that "petitioner's
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application ... was denied on the basis that the address of the Petitioner which was later given to the
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Court by Petitioner ... did not appear to be a jail and that such information was contrary to the
28



information shown in the application which stated that the Petitioner was in prison. The 'out of jail'

address suggested an ability of the Petitioner to be employed." This vague reference to an "out of jail"

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address is not explained in the documents before this court. Nevertheless, the state's assertion that

petitioner's application was denied is incorrect. The handwritten notation on petitioner's unfiled

application clearly does not constitute a proper judicial disposition of that application. Further, the

action of the clerk of the district court in returning petitioner's application and civil complaint to him

unfiled is in direct violation of this court's instructions to the clerk of the district court in Whitman v.

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Whitman, 108 Nev. 949, 840 P.2d 1232 (1992). This court has several times confirmed the absolute

obligation of the district courts to file documents submitted to them and to preserve the right of

citizens to access to the courts, whether indigent or not. Barnes v. District Court, 103 Nev. 679, 748

P.2d 483 (1987); Huebner v. State, 107 Nev. 328, 810 P.2d 1209 (1991).
Indeed, in Donoho v. District Court, 108 Nev. 1027, 842 P.2d 731 (1992), a case directly

analogous to this case, we held that the clerk of the district court violated the rights of an indigent

party when she neglected to file a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion for

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relief from a default judgment. Specifically, we stated: "[T]he clerk [of the district court] had an

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absolute duty to file the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and to clearly stamp the date of

20
receipt of the other documents on the documents. Further, the clerk had a duty to keep an accurate

21
record of the case pending before the district court." Id. at 1029, 842 P.2d at 733 (citation omitted;

22
emphasis added). Thus, petitioner's application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis must be filed.

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If, on subsequent review of the application, the district court determines that petitioner has not shown

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he is indigent, the district court may order petitioner to provide further information or may deny the

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application in an appropriately filed written order. If, on the other hand, the district court grants the

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application, the district court must then proceed to require the filing of petitioner's other documents

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and to consider them in due course. Donoho, 108 Nev. at 1030, 842 P.2d at 733. Of course, for statute

of limitations purposes, the complaint would have to be considered filed on the date of actual receipt

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by the clerk of the district court. To continue the analysis, with respect to petitioner's civil complaint

which he is attempting to file concurrently, the district court clerk had an absolute obligation to stamp

the document "received" and to record the date on which the document was in fact received at the

courthouse. See Huebner v. State, 107 Nev. 328, 810 P.2d 1209 (1991). This the clerk of the district

court did. However, the clerk then had a duty to maintain a copy of the received document in the

10
11
12
record of the case, whether or not the document is ever filed. Whitman v. Whitman, 108 Nev. 949,

840 P.2d 1232 (1992).
This, the clerk neglected to do. While Huebner dealt with the timeliness of a notice of appeal,

13
the rationale compelling this court's ruling in Huebner, that all documents must be marked received

14
and dated, applies with equal force to a party's submission of a complaint. "The legal rights of the

15
parties to litigation, whether acting in proper person or through counsel, often turn on the date of

16
receipt by the clerk of the district court of documents and pleadings." Huebner, 107 Nev. at 330, 810

17
18
P.2d at 1211. Although the clerk of the district court stamped the notice of appeal "received" on

19
December 30, 1991, the clerk did not file the notice of appeal. Instead, the clerk of the district court

20
returned appellant's notice of appeal to appellant because it was not accompanied by a filing fee and,

21
although the notice was accompanied by a motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis,

22
appellant's affidavit in support of that motion was apparently not signed. Consequently, there is no

23
24
record of the submission of appellant's timely notice of appeal. We note that the clerk of the district

25
court filed appellant's motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis on the date of receipt,

26
December 30, 1991, and that the district court eventually granted that motion. We have previously

27
stated that "it is extremely important that the clerk of the district court keep an accurate record of the

28



date of receipt of every document submitted to the clerk, regardless of whether the document is in the

appropriate form. Indeed, it is a gross dereliction of duty for the clerk of the district court to neglect

5
6
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12
this ministerial duty." Huebner v. State, 107 Nev. 328, 330, 810 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1991) (footnote

omitted). In this case, the clerk of the district court has failed to keep any record of the date of receipt

of appellant's notice of appeal; instead, the clerk stamped the document "received" and returned it to

appellant. The clerk of the district court had no authority to take such action.

Although the clerk of the district court had no duty to file appellant's notice of appeal before

appellant paid the requisite filing fee or was relieved of the duty to pay the filing fee by order of the

district court, see NRS 19.013(2), the clerk had a duty to receive the document and to keep an

accurate record of the case pending before the district court. Particularly in this case it was essential

13
that the notice of appeal be retained in the record, because we have held that a notice of appeal is

14
effective on the date of receipt by the district court clerk. See Huebner v. State, [108 Nev. 952] 107

15
Nev. 328, 810 P.2d 1209 (1991). Rather than returning the notice of appeal to appellant, the clerk of

16
the district court should have retained the notice of appeal in the record, and should have informed

17
18
appellant by letter of any perceived deficiencies in the document. 4 Appellant could then have taken

19
whatever action was appropriate to pursue his appeal. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that

20
appellant timely submitted to the clerk of the district court a notice of appeal from an appealable order

21
of the district court, and that appellant's timely notice of appeal is not contained in the record due to

22
the inappropriate action of the district court clerk. Accordingly, we grant appellant's petition for

23
24
rehearing, and we proceed to address the merits of this appeal. Id. At 1232-1234. See, also, Barnes v.

25
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State of Nev., In and For Clark County, 748 P.2d 483, 103 Nev. 679

26
(Nev., 1987). Footnote 3 in In Re Noel Gage seems to suggest (and that is an unpublished opinion,

27
and so, hopefully it is not a violation to mention it hear, rather than cite to it under SCR 123...) an

28



Opposition may be allowable. It would be nice to get a chance to give my side before 10 different
news outlets tell the tawdry tale of the attorney who allegedly shoplifted a candy bar and some cough
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6
drops. None of them called me for a quote. Newspapers and television outlets aren't the only ones
with a voice anymore, though: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VGChf8l3eKo
2. In the trial court matter in Reno Municpal Court, Wal-Mart associate, Thomas Frontino,
testified that the accused ate the chocolate bar (and that personally eyewitnessed Coughlin take it off
the shelf in the candy isle) while the accused was shopping for and paid for $83.82 of other sundries.
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11
However, the UPC of the chocolate bar from the receipt in question shows it was an ice cream bar,
meaning it wouldn't have been in the candy isle, but rather the refrigerated/frozen food isle. Thus,
12
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable to that criminal case appears not to have been met
13
where, amazingly, the multimillion dollar establishment, Wal-Mart, with literally hundreds of
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17
cameras placed strategically throughout the store, claimed in the trial court that no video footage
exists or ever existed of any of the events testified to at trial beyond the 2 videos propounded of the
interactions between the accused and Wal-Mart loss prevention staff and Reno Sparks Indian Colony
18
police in a 5 by 8 by 12 interrogation room utilized by Wal-Mart. Oddly, the video from the
19
interrogation room show the RSIC Officers being handed a CD or DVD by the Wal-Mart loss
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21
prevention associate upon their exiting the interrogation room. So, the only evidence being the
alleged eye witness testimony of the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate, his credibility undermined
22
23
by the fact that he testified, under oath, that he personally saw the accused select the chocolate bar
24
from the candy isle, then consume it while walking throughout the store shopping. Again, the UPC
25
from the wrapper of the chocolate bar item allegedly stolen clearly reveals that the UPC belongs to a
26
refrigerated item, an ice cream bar, therefore undermining the Wal-Mart associates claim to have
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witnessed the accused select it from the shelf in the candy isle, which is not refrigerated. See Exhibit
1.
3. Further, the only other piece of allegedly incriminating evidence was the fruit of an
impermissible search. RSIC Officer Kameron Crawford testified that he only made an arrest, and
therefore conducted a search incident to arrest in light of the accused's alleged refusal to provide his
driver's license. However, the two videos of the detention and search in the Wal-Mart interrogation
room clearly reveal the accused providing that same RSIC officer his driver's license and the Officer
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11
radioing in the driver's license number to run a routine check, and the arrest report clearly contains the
driver's license number of the accused and other information culled from the RSIC officer's review of
12
the driver's license. Further, the partial contents of a cough melt package was found in the accused
13
pockets. However, the receipt for the $83.82 worth of groceries and sundries the accused purchased
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immediately prior to the arrest bares andentry with the exact same UPC of the cough melts found in
the accused's pocket.
17
4. Then, the Wal-Mart witness admitted, under oath while testifying, that he could not hear whether
18
or not the accused told the cashier ringing up the some $83.82 worth of items purchased whether the
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accused had or had consumed a certain a quantity of the Duract Cough Melts while shopping. The
Wal-Mart loss prevention associate further testified that it was a common and accepted practice at
Wal-Mart for shoppers to inform cashiers of the number or quantity of a certain item they were
23
purchasing rather than have the cashier ring up each of the duplicative items one by one. Further, the
24
Wal-Mart and Indian Colony Officer testified that on the receipt for the items the accused did pay for,
25
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the UPC of the type of cough medication melts they say the accused stole did not appear, however, a
review of that receipt clearly shows that that UPC for cough melts is an entry on that receipt. Also,
amazingly, the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate testified that he could glean, from 30 yards away,



each and every item the cashier rung up for me and that those items did not include such a box of the
cough medication melts. However, the accused showed in court and in exhibits that the receipt for the
5
6
items the accused purchased did have one item with the same UPC as the exact type of cough
medication melts. So the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate admitted neither he nor anyone at WalMart could say that they could hear whether the accused told the cashier a quantity to ring up for the
cough medication melt box with the same UPC as the ones Wal-Mart alleges were stolen or
consumed while shopping.... Further, the Indian Colony Officer testified that he only arrested the
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12
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accused and conducted a search incident to arrest because the accused didn't provide the accused's
driver's license to him. However, the video of the Wal-Mart interrogation room interview clearly
shows the accused giving the officer the accused's driver's license and him radioing it in to his
dispatch and him taking down the driver's license number and other information off of it.
5. Lastly, the undersigned reported the conviction in the trial court, while an appeal was
pending in District Court to Bar Counsel. The undersigned reported the conviction to Bar Counsel on
his own and, as far as the undersigned knew at the time, prior to Bar Counsel being aware of the
18
conviction. Further, depending upon how the length of time between the rendition or notice of entry
19
of the conviction and when the undersigned reported the conviction to Bar Counsel is measure, the
20
21
undersigned arguably timely complied with the within 30 days dictate of SCR 111 (only introduced
in 2007, and perhaps somewhat difficult to find given that the Rules of Professional Conduct might
22
23
seem a more apt place to look for such a reporting requirement...), and if not, then the undersigned
24
was only a few days beyond the within 30 days requirement, all while filing an appeal and litigating
25
a contentious summary eviction from the undersigned former home law office.
26
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6. At Trial, at 2:52:25 pm, in the audio transcript submitted into evidence by Coughlin in the
Record on Appeal (ROA) in the form of a cd of the audio recording, Frontino testified under oath as
follows with regard to what he and Coughlin discussed upon Frontino instructing Coughlin to go with
him back to the asset protection interrogation room:
City Attorney Pam Roberts: What specific information did you ask of Mr. Coughlin?

Thomas Frontino: Identification, his name birth date, social security number.

5 City Attorney Pam Roberts: And did he provide any of that information to you?

Thomas Frontino: No, he did not.

6
City Attorney Pam Roberts: Based upon his unwillingness to provide that information did you take

any further action?

7
Thomas Frontino: Yes, we called the police, the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Tribal Police

8
Department. They usually arrive within ten minutes, I believe my statement reflects it was less than

that.

4
10
However, it was not long before Frontino contradicted that testimony, becoming
uncomfortable with Coughlin's line of questioning.
11
12
7. Here is an attempt at making a transcript, since the RMC chose not to prepare one and forward it
13
on to the District Court in the Appeal (CR11-2064) as required under Nevada law, within 10 days of
14
the filing of a notice of appeal. Judge Elliot managed to excuse that by citing to a civil statute, but he
15
also applied NRCP 6(e) for the computation of time in a criminal appeal for the purposes of
16
17
calculating the deadline to file a notice of appeal, so it was kind of a wash.
18
19
LEGAL ARGUMENT
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NRS 171.1255 Arrest by officer or agent of Bureau of Indian Affairs or police officer
employed by Indian tribe.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, an officer or agent of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs or a person employed as a police officer by an Indian tribe may make an arrest in obedience
to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) For a public offense committed or attempted in the officer or agents presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor, although not in the
26
officer or agents presence.
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(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the officer or agent has
reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.



5
6
(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony or gross
misdemeanor by the person arrested.
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a named or described
person for a public offense, and the officer or agent has reasonable cause to believe that the person
arrested is the person so named or described.
(f) When the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a battery upon that persons spouse and the peace officer finds evidence of bodily harm
to the spouse.
2. Such an officer or agent may make an arrest pursuant to subsection 1 only:
(a) Within the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony for an offense committed on
8
that reservation or colony; or
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12
(b) Outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony if the officer or agent is in
fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably believed by the officer or agent to have committed a
felony within the boundaries of the reservation or colony or has committed, or attempted to commit,
any criminal offense within those boundaries in the presence of the officer or agent.
For the purposes of this subsection, fresh pursuit has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS
171.156.
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14
15
16
17
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21
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NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made:...

2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m.,
except:
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the
public and:
(1) There is a warrant of arrest against the person; and
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer
to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an
arrest immediately after the offense is committed;
Sec. 8.10.040. - Petit larceny.
It is unlawful for any person to take or carry away the property of another with the intent to
deprive the owner of his property therein, in any value less than $250.00, and for his conviction
24
therefor, he shall be fined in an amount not more than $1,000.00 and/or be incarcerated not more
25 than six months. In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution.
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The arrest in this matter fails on every element of NRS 171.126(2)(b)-(d). Further, while it
is quite questionable to infer evidence of guilt based upon the fruit of an impermissilble search of



Coughlin's pockets (which allegedly revealed one half of the contents of one package of Duract
Cough Melts (6 melts in a foil sheet), especially where Coughlin had just paid for (and the receipt
5
6
for $83.82 confirms this) a package of the exact product allegedly consumed, the Duract Cough
Melts (UPC 073221630093). This is particularly true where there was not evidence in the record or
testimony offered that the contents of Coughlin's shopping bag from the $83.82 worth of items paid
for, did or did not include an opened and or half full package of those very Duract Cough Melts).
To the extent that RMC Judge Howard refused to let Coughlin testify on his own behalf at trial,
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such an utter paucity of evidence to support the allegations, combined with the myriad instances
where the testimony of Wal-Mart's Frontino and that of RSIC Police Officers Crawford and
Braunworth, is particularly troubling, especially to the extent that the City of Reno and the Reno
13
Municipal Court arguably have a vested interest in limiting the costs associated with providing
14
defense counsel to indigent parties (Coughlin was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
15
under Argersinger, where, as here, even the possibility of jail time exists- and Coughlin served 3
16
days in jail in connection with this trial court matter City Attorney Pam Roberts: Argersinger v.
17
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Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)) and collecting the fines associated with convictions. This first offense
19
allegation of shoplifting, for some $14.00 of merchandise, resulted in a $400 fine and 3 days in jail,
20
all with no Sixth Amendment defense counsel costs attendant to the prosecution.
21
It would be false to say the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate Thomas Frontino made an
22
23
arrest himself, and especially dubious to assert that Frontio met the requirement of . There was no
24
allegation of that at the trial. The RSIC Officers Crawford and Braunsworth made the arrest, as
25
such, NRS 171.126 is inapplicable. Even if it were applicable, Wal-Mart's Frontino's testimony was
26
so rife with unsupported, contradictory, and disengenous statements as to vitiate any support for
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any allegation that Frontino was entitled to arrest Coughlin, under NRS 171.126(1) for a public



offense committed or attempted in the person's presence.(he personally witnessed Coughlin take
a refrigerated ice cream bar off the shelf in the candy isle and consume it was shopping for other
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items? Frontino could see (he admitted he could not hear what was said between Coughlin and the
Wal-Mart cashier, whom Wal-Mart feigned an inability to locate or determine the identify of) every
item rung up by the cashier and off the top of his head know that none of those items bore a UPC
with the same number as the Duract Cough Melts Frontino alleged Coughlin consumed while
shopping?...Further, Frontino's testimony about how he personally witnessed Coughlin consume
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12
the cough drops while shopping is inconsistent with his testimony that Wal-Mart policy did not
permit Frontino to follow Coughlin into the restroom at Wal-Mart and that, therefore, Frontino lack
a basis for making further attempts to investigate any suspicion he had with respect to the Duract
13
Cough Melts, therefore leaving Wal-Mart and Frontino to hinge their hopes of leveraging the RSIC
14
Police to conduct an unlawful search of Coughlin. To the extent that Frontino admitted neither he
15
or anyone Wal-Mart may have sought to testify at trial could hear what was said between Coughlin
16
and the cashier, Frontino's vantage point does not meet the in the person's presence standard
17
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19
required by NRS 171.126(1), though Frontino still signed the Criminal Complaint swearing that he
had such a basis for making his allegations.
20
NRS 171.126(1) : Arrest by private person. A private person may arrest anotheCity Attorney Pam
21
Roberts: 1. For a public offense committed or attempted in the persons presence.
22
23
RSIC Officer Crawford's written report demonstrates a profound lack of appreciation for the
24
probable cause requirement, while at the same time, displaying a cunning, and crafty approach to
25
spinning the nexus between probable cause, detaining a suspects, citizen's arrest, fourth amendment
26
exceptions, and NRS 171.123.
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In his written report (included in the attached Exhibit 2, a
collection of the discovery propounded by the City of Reno, finally, well over one month after the



arrest and after Coughlin had made numerous attempts to get a copy of such materials, from, and in
person and by writing, the RSIC Police force (meeting with Sargent Avansino and being refused
5
6
such documentation), the Reno Municipal Court, the City of Reno City Attorney's Office-on
approximately September 15th, 2011 Coughlin spoke with Deputy City Attorney Christopher
Hazlett-Stevens and inquired as to the availability of such witness statements, police reports, or any
other materials from Wal-Mart, the RSIC, or anyone else and was told by Hazlett-Stevens that the
City Attorney's Office had not and would not receive such materials until after the arraignment in
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12
this matter, which was set for some 30 days after the arrest (September 9th, 2011 to October 10th,
2012)...Coughlin pleaded with Hazlett-Stevens to just double check and ask everyone else in the
office if any such discovery or documentation had been provided to the City Attorney's Office and
13
Hazlett-Stevens indicated he would, and thereafter confirmed to Coughlin that no such items had
14
been received, and further, that Coughlin had not right to them prior to the arraignment, in any
15
event, either from the City Attorney's Office, the RMC, or the RSIC Police Department. However,
16
the fax headers and dates on the discovery later provided by the City Attorney's Office certainly
17
18
seems to indicate that such materials were faxed to the City Attorney's Office by the RSIC Police
19
Department on September 13th, 2011, however, the page numbers and page counts would seem to
20
indicate some materials were not propounded).
21
In his Arrest Report and Declaration of Probable Cause from September 9th, 2011, RSIC
22
23
Officer Crawford writes:On 9/9/11 at about 21:21 hours I responded to 2425 E. 2nd St., Reno, NV
24
89502 for a Petit Larceny. Upon my arrival I met with Asset Protection Associate Thomas
25
Frontino, whom made a citizens arrest for Petit Larceny. Frontino was in possession of the stolen
26
items. Frontino's testimony at trial, however, clearly indicated he had only asked Coughlin to meet
27
28
with him, not that Frontino had immediately made a citizen's arrest right after the commission



of the alleged crime. Further, if Frontino had made such a citizen's arrest and was in possession
of the stolen items, then why did it take five minutes of interrogation by the RSIC Officers and a
5
6
pat down before the technical point of arrest by Crawford, and why did Crawford need to explain
his decision to arrest, and conduct a search incident to arrest, and basis for probable cause finding to
do so, upon some alleged failure by Coughlin to provide his driver's license? The discovery
propounded a month later still did not have any Magistrate or Judicial Officer's signature approving
the probable cause finding, despite the 48 hour requirement that such be issued.
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However, in his Incident Report, made a day later, RSIC Officer Crawford writes:
On 9/9120 11 at approximately 2 121 hours, Officer Braunworth and I were
dispatched to 2425 East Second Street Reno, NY 89502 for a report of a petit
larceny. Upon our arrival we met with WaI-Mart Asset Protection Associate
Thomas Frontino who stated, he observed a white male adult, identified as
Zachary Coughlin, walking through the store opening various items and
discarding them in the garbage can. Frontino stated, he also observed
Coughlin eat a candy bar while walking through the store. Coughlin passed all
points of sale inside of Wal-Mart and exited. Coughlin was then detained by
Frontino for petit larceny. Please refer to Frontino's Statement for further
infonnation. Officer Braunworth asked Coughlin if he had any weapons on his
person and Coughlin stated, he did not. I asked Coughlin if I could have
permission to search his person for weapons. Coughlin gave me consent, but
stated do not go into my pockets. l searched the outer clothing of Coughlin and
found no weapons on him. I then proceeded to ask Coughlin questions pertaining
to issuing him a citation for petit larceny.
Coughlin however, refused to answer my questions relating to a citation and
became uncooperative. Coughlin was then placed under arrest for petit larceny. I
began my search incident to arrest on Coughlin and found cough drops still
wrapped in his pockets. Frontino was able to confirm they were the same cough
drops that came from the opened cough drop boxes from inside the store that were
unpaid for. At approximately 2200 hours, I transported Coughlin to the Washoe
County Detention Facility and booked him for Reno Municipal Code 8.10.040
petit larceny. At approximately 2122 hours, I cleared the incident with no further
incident
26
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28



5
6
Officer Crawford testified at trial that Coughlin refused to provide his driver's license,
however, this Incident Report merely mentions Coughlin allegedly refusing to answer my
questions pertaining to issuing a citation? Why the remix come trial time? Could it be thata
suspect's allegedly failing to provide an Officer a response to his querry of whom do you work for
does not quite justify the older I had to arrest him under NRS 171.123 because I couldn't be sure of
his identify approach, especially where the Officer was given the suspect's driver's license, and ran
a NCIS check on it by calling his dispatch, wrote the driver's license number down on his
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12
contemporaneous Arrest Report and Declaration of Probable Cause, and where the Officer is clearly
seen being handed the driver's license by Coughlin in the Wal-Mart interrogation room video? Any
why is it that no other video exists to support any of Wal-Mart and Frontino's allegation of
13
Coughlin consuming this or that or opening this or that, or throwing this or that away. If this had
14
been a slip and fall case you can bet Wal-Mart would have videos from more angles than a replay of
15
a great catch in the Super Bowl, with their stores having literally hundreds of those ceiling mounted
16
camers evenly dispersed throught the store and clearly visible to all. Oh, and, suprise, surprise,
17
18
there is no audio on either of the Interrogation Room videos provided by Wal-Mart, despite their
19
loss prevention associates carrying around recording devices throughout the entire incident, and the
20
RSIC failed to provide any such recordings as well and indicated none exist.
21
How exactly was Frontino able to confirm they were the same cough drops that came from
22
23
the opened cough drop boxes from inside the store? Did these cough drops' have a serial number
24
attached to them? Maybe the inference is that these cough drops were of the type one would find
25
in a box with the UPC that appears on both receipts in Exhibit 1 (the receipt for $14.72 containing
26
the entries for the items allegedly consumed while shopping for any paying for the entries on the
27
28
receipt for $83.82), however, at trial, testimony was the unsupportable and disengenous position



that Frontino knew they were the exact cough drops that were formerly in the boxes that Frontino
had gathered, and not from the box of the same Duract Cough Melts (again, bearing the same UPC)
that appeared on Coughlin's $83.82 receipt.
Lacking any real probable cause to arrest, especially for the alleged misdemeanor not
committed in the Officer's presence, after 7 p.m., (see, below, NRS 171.124(1)(a))), RSIC Officer
Crawford, a trainee being overseen by Officer Braunworth, who could barely remember his own
name on the witness stand at trial, was left to the dubious at best allegation that he had to make an
10
11
arrest because Coughlin failed to provide his driver's license( this assertion was dubious at best, and
fraudulent police misconduct done under color of state law best, considering this occurred at a retail
12
property owned by the same entity, the Reno Sparks Indian Colony, that owns and runs the RSIC
13
police force, and which partners with and rents to land on which this Wal-Mart sits, to its business
14
15
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17
partner, Wal-Mart, considering that the interrogation room videos propounde by the City of Reno
itself, and filmed by Wal-Mart clearly show Officer Crawfor being handed Coughlin's driver's
license by Coughlin and Crawford's written report has, in Crawford's own handwriting, the exact
18
driver's license number belonging to Coughlin on the suspects information portion of the report,
19
in addition to other information taken directdly off of the driver's license Coughlin provided to
20
21
Crawford). Further, Coughlin's attempts to obtain the dispatch calls and records and any 911 calls
made by Wal-Mart, where met with contradictory responses and obfuscation. Nonetheless, upon
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23
information and belief, such records would show what the interrogation room video shows, ie,
24
Officer Crawford using his radio to call into dispatch and run a check for priors on Coughlin
25
utilizing Coughlin's drivers license number. Indeed, the NCIS reports and records likely are
26
required to show when such a report was run and by whom, and Officer Crawford's subsequent
27
28
mincing assertion on the witness stand that the Washoe County Jail provided him Coughlin's



driver's license number is not only counter to privacy laws and Washoe County Jail policy and
procedure, it is also blatantly false and a pathetic attempt to game the system under color of state
5
6
law. To the extent that City of Reno Deputy Prosecutor Pamela Roberts, Esq., was in possession of
these interrogation room videos and continue to facilitate Officer Crawford's apparent perjury, or, at
least, glaring mis-rememberance, it should mitigate any anger or retaliation made against
Coughlin for attachign as an exhibit to a pretrial motion the various law reviews related to
prosecutorial misconduct that former prosecutor, RMC Judge Howard, seemed to find so offensive
and offputting.
10
11
A minute by minute chronology reveals that the $83.82 receipt was issued at 21:14 on
12
September 9th, 2011. The $14.74 receipt that Wal-Mart created to support its valuation of the items
13
allegedly consumed while shopping but not paid for was created some ten minutes later at 21:24
14
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17
(military time, 24 hour clock). The RSIC Police Officers Cameron Crawford and The time
stamping on the two Interrogation Room videos provided by Wal-Mart indicate the interrogation
ran from 21:17 to 21:39. Coughlin provided RSIC Officer Crawford his driver's license at
18
approximately 21:23 (the 6 minute 49 second mark of the Interrogation Room video). Crawfords
19
Incident Report indicates he transported Coughlin at 22:00 to the Washoe County Jail. The
20
21
Interrogation Room videos made by Wal-Mart (the one's where Frontino is seen high fiving a WalMart cohort, and seen giving the RSIC officers a cd/dvd, despite the fact that later on both Wal-
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23
Mart's Frontino and the RSIC Officers Crawford and Braunworth testified that other than the two
24
Interrogation Room videos, no other videos were provided to the RSIC PD, nor was any other
25
relevant action caught on video from that night. Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino's Supplemental
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Witness Statement Form is dated September 9th, 2011 with a time of 22:13 and lists his Residence
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Address as 2425 E. Second St., Reno 89502, which is the address given for the Wal-Mart as well,
in violation of the Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation.
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Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino, Loss Prevention Associate's Supplemental Witness Statement

Form of September 9th, 2011, with a time completed handwritten in as 22:13 (10:13 p.m.) reads:
On 09/0912011 at about 8:45 PM I noticed a male customer who I had

previous encounters with who we had followed for suspicious activities in

the past. As I followed him around the store he made his way back and

forth across the store. He selected various items such as candy and cough

medicine and some various other food items. He opened two packages of

cough drops and concealed the contents inside his pockets. He then threw

the packaging to the cough drops in two different garbage cans in the

store. One in the candy aisle and one in the soda aisle.
He also selected a chocolate bar which he proceeded to open and eat

throughout the store. When he was finished shopping he went to register

17 and paid for the rest of the merchandise that he had selected. He did

not however make any attempt to pay for the chocolate bar and cough

drops he had selected. He concealed the wrapper to the candy in the cart

and covered it with sanitizer wipes. He then exited the facility via the

grocery doors.
Once completely outside the facility, I approached him with Stanley

Cunningham and identified myself as Wal-mart asset protection and

informed him that I needed him to reenter the facility so that we would be

able to complete our investigation. He was compliant at this time and

followed us to the office. At this time became non compliant. The police

arrived on scene and took over the investigation. When asked by the

officers if he would consent to a pat down he complied. Also after he was

placed under arrest by the officer his belongings were emptied from his

pants pockets and we were also able to recover some of the cough drops

that he had concealed on his person. He then became very non-compliant

with the officers questioning. He was arrested and removed from our

facility. He was also tresspased at this time from all Wal-Mart facilities.

Video evidence will also be compiled.

NRS 171.124(1)(a)):Arrest by peace officer or officer of Drug Enforcement

Administration.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 and NRS 33.070 and 33.320, a

peace officer or an officer of the Drug Enforcement Administration designated by
the Attorney General of the United States for that purpose may make an arrest in
obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:



(a) For a public offense committed or attempted in the officers presence.
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NRS 171.123 Temporary detention by peace officer of person suspected of

criminal behavior or of violating conditions of parole or probation: Limitations.
1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters

under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is

committing or is about to commit a crime.
3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain

the persons identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the persons

presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself or herself, but
may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.
NRS 171.1231 Arrest if probable cause appears. At any time after the onset
of the detention pursuant to NRS 171.123, the person so detained shall be arrested
if probable cause for an arrest appears. If, after inquiry into the circumstances
which prompted the detention, no probable cause for arrest appears, such person
shall be released.
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NRS 171.123 Temporary detention by peace officer of person suspected of criminal behavior
or of violating conditions of parole or probation: Limitations.
1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is
about to commit a crime.
2. Any peace officer may detain any person the officer encounters under circumstances
which reasonably indicate that the person has violated or is violating the conditions of the
persons parole or probation.
3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain the persons
identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the persons presence abroad. Any
person so detained shall identify himself or herself, but may not be compelled to answer any
other inquiry of any peace officer.
4. A person must not be detained longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the
purposes of this section, and in no event longer than 60 minutes. The detention must not
extend beyond the place or the immediate vicinity of the place where the detention was first
effected, unless the person is arrested.
(Added to NRS by 1969, 535; A 1973, 597; 1975, 1200; 1987, 1172; 1995, 2068)
NRS 171.1231 Arrest if probable cause appears. At any time after the onset of the
detention pursuant to NRS 171.123, the person so detained shall be arrested if probable cause



for an arrest appears. If, after inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the detention, no
probable cause for arrest appears, such person shall be released.
Wal-Mart's Frontino's sworn Criminal Complaint, however, fails to make any indication of
just how he knew or why he believed Coughlin violated RMC 8.10.040. To the extent that Frontino
writes, in his own hand, that the items taken or carried away (despite Frontino, if not the various
news outlets covering this case, actually testifying that he watched Coughlin consume the chocolate
bar while shopping) included a chocolate bar when the UPC of the receipt for the allegedly stolen
items, provided by Wal-Mart, actually reveals that UPC to belong to a Magnum Double Caramel Ice
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Cream Bar, the Complaint fails to pled with the sort of specificity necessar to sustain a prosecution,
much less the temporary suspension of one's law license. Attorney's conduct in continuing to cross-
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examine police officer after judge had ruled that police log was not admissible was not contempt
13
where attorney claimed that he was trying to impeach witnesses' memory, not lay foundation for
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admission of log, so that his conduct could not be said to be willful. United States v Giovanelli (1990,
CA2 NY) 897 F2d 1227. Resort to summary disposition of criminal contempt proceeding under Rule
42(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is permissible only when express requirements of rule are
18
met and when there is compelling reason for immediate remedy or when time is of essence. Thus,
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attorney's conviction for criminal contempt in pursuing line of questioning forbidden by court would
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be reversed, since record showed that there was no compelling need for immediate remedy provided
by Rule 42(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that trial court, by its own actions, did not
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consider time to be of essence; trial court should have observed "normal" procedure" of notice and
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hearing, provided by Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. U.S. v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d
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236, 12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 124 (7th Cir. 1982). See United States v Turner (1987, CA11 Ala) 812
26
F2d 1552, 14.
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NRS 171.102 Complaint defined; oath or declaration required. The

complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the public
offense charged. It must be made upon:
1. Oath before a magistrate or a notary public; or
2. Declaration which is made subject to the penalty for perjury.
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In his testimony during the November 30th, 2011 trial, Thomas Frontino apparently
realized that he needed to say something to the effect that he personally witnessed Coughlin
consuming the cough drops in the store. So, Thomas Frontino testified, under oath, the he
personally witness Coughlin consuming the cough drops throughout the store (He opened two
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packages of cough drops and concealed the contents inside his pockets...). However, in his
Supplemental Witness Statement Form, Frontino does not say that. There is no mention of seeing
Coughlin consume any cough drops throughout the store. In fact, at trial, Frontino slipped up and had
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to admit that official Wal-Mart policy prevented him from following Coughlin into the restroom
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while he was shopping, which was unfortunate, according to Frontino, because he wanted to see if
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Coughlin did anything with the cough drops in the restroom, but could not. At trial, Frontino decided
it would just be more expeditious and accomplish his goals quicker to say that he personally eye
witnessed Coughlin consuming the cough drops while shopping.
Frontino then goes on to indicate that Coughlin also selected a chocolate bar which he
proceeded to open and eat throughout the store. At trial Frontino took great care to make clear that
he personally eye witnessed Coughlin select that exact chocolate bar from the candy isle.
Frontino was nonplussed when, on cross examination, it was pointed out to him that the UPC for the
25
chocolate bar from the candy isle was actually the UPC for an ice cream bar from the
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refrigerated/frozen food isle.
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Frontino then indicates that Coughlin did not however make any attempt to pay for the
chocolate bar and cough drops he had selected. However, at Trial, Frontino had to admit that he was
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too far away from Coughlin and the cashier to hear whether or not Coughlin made any attempt to pay
for either the chocolate bar or the cough drops. Frontino was sure to attest, under oath, at trial,
that he was absolutely sure and completely able to tell from his vantage point some approximately 30
yards from register 17 where Coughlin paid for the items he selected while shopping to ascertain that
none of the items the cashier rang up had the same UPC as, say, the cough drops. However, Exhibit 1
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clearly shows that Frontino was, wrong about that given that both the receipt for $14.72 and the
receipt for $83.82 have an entry for the same Duract Cough Melt cough drops (containing 12
lozenges (2 separate foil sheet with 6 lozenges on each sheet) with 30 mg Dextromethophan HBr
(DXM) in them.
Wal-Mart's Frontino then writes that He concealed the wrapper to the candy in the cart and
covered it with sanitizer wipes. However, Frontino then testified that there was absolutely no video
evidence supporting that accusation, despite the fact that the areas around cashiers are typically
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subject to particularly high video scrutiny. Frontino testified that he review the video from all
cameras wherein Coughlin appeared in the store that day and that nothing was captured on video.
Frontino cannot be said to have made an arrest immediately after the alleged infraction
occurred where, in his Supplemental Witness Statement he writes: informed him that I needed him
to reenter the facility so that we would be able to complete our investigation. He was compliant at this
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time and followed us to the office. At this time became non compliant. The police arrived on scene
and took over the investigation.
Frontino's written statement is noticeably devoid of any assertions concerning the questioning
by the RSIC Officers and the probable cause analysis and inquiry attendant thereto. Frontino
's written Statement concludes by noting that video evidence will also be compiled. Indeed, in the
Interrogation Room video Frontino is seen handing a cv/dvd to the RSIC Officers.
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With respect to these Duract Cough Melt cough drops... So, each package would contain
360mg of DXM, which, if ingested rapidly would give one's brain the dissociative effects attendant to
drinking an entire large bottle of cough syrup, however, given the fact that such Duract Cough Melts
are a candy like lozenge that literally dissolves in second, the method of delivery of such a high
dosage of DXM could potentially result in severe incapacitation and or mental impairment, of a
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dissociative nature, quite rapidly, so much so, that this sort of item was pulled from the shelves
several years ago when Zicam originally manufacture and distributed them. DXM is used in clincial
trials to treat patients with conditions ranging from fibromyalgia to PTSD, and is included in the class
13
of medications known as dissociatives that Campral is in as well. Campral (acamprosate) is a
14
medication prescribed to alcoholics that is intended to lessen or curb the phenomenon of craving
15
associated with alcoholism. Acamprosate is thought to stabilize the chemical balance in the brain that
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would otherwise be disrupted by alcoholism, possibly by antagonizing glutamatergic N-methyl-D-
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aspartate receptors and agonizing gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) type A receptors. Williams,
19
SH. (2005). "Medications for treating alcohol dependence". American Family Physician 72 (9):
20
17751780. PMID 16300039. http://www.aafp.org/afp/20051101/1775.html.
21
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dextromethorphan
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(Dextromethorphan has also found other uses in medicine, ranging from pain relief to psychological
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applications....DXM is also used recreationally. When exceeding label-specified maximum dosages,
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dextromethorphan acts as a dissociative hallucinogen. Its mechanism of action is via multiple effects,
26
including actions as a nonselective serotonin reuptake inhibitor[3] and a sigma-1 receptor[4][5]
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agonist and the action of its major metabolite dextrorphan as an NMDA receptor antagonist,
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producing effects similar to those of the controlled substances ketamine and phencyclidine (PCP),[6]
as well as the active metabolite 3-methoxymorphinan, which produces local anesthetic effects in rats
5
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with a potency above dextrorphan but below dextromethorphan itself. Hou, C; Tzeng, J; Chen, Y;
Lin, C; Lin, M; Tu, C; Wang, J (2006). "Dextromethorphan, 3-methoxymorphinan, and dextrorphan
have local anaesthetic effect on sciatic nerve blockade in rats". European Journal of Pharmacology
544 (1-3): 106. DOI:10.1016/j.ejphar.2006.06.013. PMID 16844109...Uncompetitive NMDA
receptor (PCP site) antagonist...During the 1960s and 1970s, dextromethorphan became available in
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an over-the-counter tablet form by the brand name Romilar. In 1973, Romilar was taken off the
shelves after a burst in sales because of frequent misuse, and was replaced by cough syrup in an
attempt to cut down on abuse. See, White, William. "The DXM Experience".
http://www.erowid.org/chemicals/dxm/faq/dxm_experience.shtml. Retrieved December 21,
14
2010; AJ Giannini. Drugs of Abuse--Second Edition. Los Angeles, Practice Management Information
15
Corp, 1997.) See, also: http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/d/feature/i/1500/c/28282/ Jamero, D.
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The emerging role of NMDA Antagonists in Pain Management. US Pharmacist. 2011. Jobson
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Publishing. Posted to Medscape.com on 6/22/2011.

Coughlin has provided the State Bar of Nevada's Bar Counsel (though Mr.Susich and Mr.
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King's recent SCR 117 petition do not seem to acknowledge that, and further misstate a number of
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very material facts, like this suddenly new allegation that the locks to Coughlin's former law office
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were broken when Coughlin was arrested for criminal trespass in the quasi basement under the house,
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a basement which never had any locks....but in the SCR 117 King and Susich make it sound like the
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locks to the interior of the former home law office had been broken into, which has never been
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alleged previously or supported by any factual allegations or specifics), and his father, Dr. Timothy
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D. Coughlin, MD, (a family practitioner based in Reno, NV, with a practice emphasis on addiction
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medicine and a former President of the Nevada Health Professionals Assistance Foundation and past
President of the Nevada Academy of Family Physicians, and various impaired physician's diversion
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programs) with a complete certified prescription history dating back to late 2007 which shows that
Coughlin did not fill his Buproprion/anti-depressant prescription both in April 2009 (when Coughlin,
a former domestic violence unit attorney for legal aid non-profit Washoe Legal Services, and WLS
parted ways) and that Coughlin stopped filling his Buproprion prescription in August 2011, and that
subsequently Coughlin was twice charged with petit larceny within a period of 19 days (first on
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August 20th, 2011 by the Reno Police Department, for which Coughlin spent roughly 7 days in jail
awaiting a release on his own recognizance) and against in the matter underpinning this filing, the
arrest at Wal-Mart on September 9th, 2011. Coughlin's domestic partner of four and half years and he
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parted ways sometime in June 2011 and Coughlin became aware of several months rent allegedly
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being own their neurosurgeon landlord, Dr. Matthew J. Merliss, MD, sometime in mid-August.
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While in jail incident to the August 20th, 2011 arrest (for, essentially, possession of lost or
mislaid iPhone as petit larceny, a matter for which Coughlin asserts his innocence and for which a
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video fo the arrest and exculpatory evidence has been available all year on youtube.com) Coughlin
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was served with a No Cause Summary Eviction Notice for his former home law office. NRS 40.253
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explicitly forbids utilizing summary eviction proceedings against commercial tenants unless the non-
21
payment of rent is alleged and a Non-Payment of Rent Eviction Notice is served. Landlord Merliss,
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and his attorney's Richard Hill, Esq., and Casey Baker, Esq., decided to proceed with a No Cause
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eviction Notice rather than be required to litigate the habitability issues for which a paper trail exists
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and for which Merliss failed to address issues related to apropriately served 14 day notice to cure
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habitability issues complaints and other matters.
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Coughlin has attended Lawyer's Concerned for Lawyers since early 2003 and is active in the
recovery community, though there has been some difficulty in straddling the line between the old
school hard line AA'ers and those in the psychiatric community who recognize the danger in say, not
treating adult ADHD with anything other than a 12 step program, and instead facing the risk of self
medicating via abusing substances not necessarily indicated as appropriate treatment modalities and
outside the setting of a trained professional such as Coughlin's current psychiatrist, Dr. Suat Yasar,
whom took over Coughlin's treatment from Dr. Mujahid Rasul, whom passed away in September
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2010, and whom Coughlin has made aware of his various arrests and difficulties this year and whom
takes an active role in seeing that Coughlin continues progressing his recovery from what has
admittedly been a disappointing and regrettable year.
Coughlin regularly receives treatment from Dr. Suat Yasser and has resumed the treatment
14
modalities that were yielding efficacious results prior to the unexpected money troubles that resulted
15
in Coughlin not being able to afford either of his medications beginning in early August 2011.
16
Coughlin, at that time, did make several inquiries with Nevada Adult Mental Health (NAMHS) but
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one of the medications Coughlin takes was not one for which NAMHS would be able to provide
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anything in the way of financial help given budget constraints, and the other medication was not so
20
expensive such that it seemed all that worthwhile to go through a somewhat invasive and privacy
21
threatening intake process at NAMHS rather than to attempt to continue to pay out of pocket for that
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medication (which incidentally and inexplicable, tripled in price shortly thereafter despite our sagging
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economy and its long off patent statuts).

Coughlin maintains his innocence with respect to the August 20th, 2011 petit larceny charge
26
(iPhone found on ground by man, man threatens to throw a phone he picked up in the river if
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someone doesn't claim it right away, Coughlin thereafter attacked by a gang of skateboarders
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claiming the iPhone to be theirs), and will shortly face trial in that matter, given the intransigence
displayed by the District Attorney's Office and the Mental Health Court vis a vis some of the issue
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explicated above and despite the fact that the iPhone's owner, a Cory Goble, 24, of Reno, NV,
recently battered Coughlin with a lit cigarette in a parking lot where Goble had accosted Coughlin,
unexpectedly, and despite the fact that a multitude of video evidence exists tending to indicate that
Goble and his associates lied on numerous occasions to 911 operators and the police in order to have
Coughlin arrested where, quite arguably, Coughlin did not commit a crime. While spending 7 days in
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jail beginning August 19th, 2011, and returning home to an impermissible summary eviction from his
former home law office (a commercial tenancy explicitly allowed under the Lease Agreement in
question) may have created a set of circumstances making it tempting to shoplift food or necessaries
13
from Wal-Mart, Coughlin maintains that he is not guilty of the alleged petit larceny from Wal-Mart
14
and is currently pursuing an appeal of the matter with the Nevada Supreme Court in case number
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60630.
16
With respect to matters which may bring into doubt the validity of the conviction in the trial
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court judgment in RMC 11 CR 26800: In the appeal to the District Court in CR11-2064, Judge Elliot
19
utilized a civil statute in excusing the RMC from its failure to forward to the District Court a copy of
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the transcript of the audio recording of the trial and to forward such to the District Court within ten
21
days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Further, Coughlin made numerous attempts to order such a
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transcript and was thwarted in his attempts to do so by the RMC's express dictate that only the RMC's
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transcriptionist of choice, Pam Dongoni, would be permitted to perfrom the transcribing duties, and
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Ms. Dongoni hung up the phone on Coughlin and refused to provide information related to where and
26
in what method of payment Coughlin could pay for the transcript and assure its production. Further,
27
the RMC refused to timely provide Coughlin a copy of the audio recording of the trial until well after
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the deadline for filing tolling motions or a Notice of Appeal had passed, and further, the RMC failed
to notate in the certified docket (which is not available to litigants during these matters, and attempts
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by Coughlin to so obtain such a docket has resulted in the City of Reno Marshals threatening
Coughlin and forcing him to leave the courthouse and writing disengenous letters to Bar Counsel.
The RMC Marshals were also involved in a scenario wherein Coughlin's smartphone was booked
into evidence for 37 days (and returned with all the data previously on it wiped clean, with the
interim seeing various contradictory statements regarding the chain of custody of the phone and data
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thereon between the RMC, WCSO, and City of Reno Marshals, and Washoe County District
Attorney's Office) incident to a five day incarceration of Coughlin, stemming from a summary
contempt committed in the presence of the Court in a traffic violation Trial, 11 TR 26800 (3 moving
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violations were issued to Coughlin upon Coughlin being told by the Reno PD to leave the office of
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opposing counsel in the eviction from his former law office (Richard G. Hill, Esq., opposing counsel
15
to Bar Counsel King recently in the Milsner v Carstarphen decision of this Court issued in March
16
2012, and whom filed a grievance with Bar Counsel in a letter to King dated February 14th, 2012
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wherein Hill details an arrest of Coughlin that had not proceeded to trial, much less a conviction for
19
which Coughlin would be required to report under SCR 111, and in which Hill makes baseless
20
accusations of ghostwriting by Coughlin for one for whom Coughlin was listed as attorney of
21
record. Further, the recent, and extremely prejudicial and inaccurate confidential SCR 117 Disability
22
Petition by Bar Counsel and or Mr. Susich is seemingly largely cribbed from Hill's Motion for
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Attorney's Fees incident to the appeal of the summary eviction from Coughlin's former home law
25
office (a wrong site surgery of the courtroom variety Hill litigated on behalf of his Californian
26
Beverly Hills neurosurgeon client, wherein Hill proceeded with a summary eviction against a
27
commercial tenant where the non-payment of rent was not alleged nor was any eviction notice
28



provided other than a No Cause Eviction Notice). In that Motion for Attorney's Fees, Hill somehow
attempts to at once claim Coughlin's filings in the appeal in CV11-03628 were at once so baseless as
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to be sanctionable, yet, also, at the same time, apparently well founded enough to require Hill to run
up some $43,000 in attorney's fees charged to Merliss (for the period of time following the November
3, 2011 filing of a Notice of Appeal of the Order of Summary Eviction in RJC 2011-001708), on top
of the $20,000 in attorney's fees Hill and Baker sought to recover (mistakenly citing to an attorney's
fees in a landlord tenant context statute related only to situations where a tenant was manufacturing
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controlled substances at the rental, rather than admitting that NRS 69.030 forbid Hill and Baker from
getting attorney's fees in a landlord tenant trial court matter, much less a summary eviction, much less
$20,000 worth of them). Bar Counsel King displayed a particularly troubling resistance to
13
countenancing any of the grievances against other attorneys Coughlin then asserted, yet steadfastly
14
continued to devote Bar resources to addressing Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s dubious basis for filing
15
multiple grievances against Coughlin, contributing one of the legs to a four part quadruple jeopardy
16
approach Hill took, wherein Hill filed Motion for Orders to Show Cause before Judge Sferrazza in the
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Trial Court, before Judge Flanagan on Appeal, filed a TRO with Judge Schroeder in Justice Court,
19
and had Coughlin arrested for jaywalking and criminal trespass (the trespass arrest on November 12th,
20
2011 resulted in the resetting of the Trial in the RMC case resulting in the petit larceny conviction
21
involved in the SCR 111 Bar Counsel Petition (where Coughlin was not told to leave or warned to
22
leave the former home law office and where the Washoe County Sheriff's Office lied in a sworn
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written affidavit in attesting to have personally served Coughlin the Order of Summary Eviction
25
(Deputy Machem, November 7th, 2011 Affidavit on file) only to later have WCSO Supervisor Liz
26
Stuchell admit that her office considers it personal service for Deputy Machem to tape a document
27
to one's door when they are not home. NRS 40.253 requires either personal or constructive service.
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6
The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to
remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where
an Order Granting Summary Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only found
in situations inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the only
sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and those situations only apply
where, in:
16
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b) Advise

the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful
detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order
and,
40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a) The landlord or the
landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the justice court of
the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises
are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling, apartment,
mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the
matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order.
17
The way these summary eviction orders are being carried out and served in Washoe County
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presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There is not basis for effectuating a
lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in the case of the undersigned's former home law
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office. The above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language are inapplicable,
22
as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the Tenant did file an Affidavit
23
and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To require Nevada's tenants to get up and get
24
out within 24 hours of receipt of the order (what does that even mean? The use of terms like
25
rendition, rendered, notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt of the
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order language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV statutory
citations, and in employment law litigation where one must file a Complaint within 90 days of



receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing
receipt of such a letter, when actual receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice
5
6
standard that relies upon the days for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.).
In Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did not
reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on November 24,
2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on November 30, 2006, based on three
days for mailing after excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title
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VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of
a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown,
466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting plaintiff an additional three
days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).
With respect to any mention of 24 hours and the applicability of the JCRCP to cases like
these, NRS 40.400 Rules of practice, holds that :The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials,
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so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to
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the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such NRCP 6(a),(e) applies to the Order of
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Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy Machem alleged, under penalty of perjury, that he "personally
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served" upon me on November 1, 2011.
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ATTEMPT AT PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL
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Here is the undersigned's attempt to type out, word for word, the beginning of the proceeding
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in this matter (Coughlin's indigency has prevented securing the production of a certified transcript and
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hopefully it is obvious to the reader the points at which the undersigned interlineates commentary or
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analysis within the transcription itself, typically always set offf by parenthesesis. Further, the For The
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Record version of the audio of the petty larceny trial is available for free download here, as are the
two Interrogation Room videos of the September 9th, 2011 arrest at Walmart and the discovery
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produced by the City Attorney and the receipt for $83.82, showing the UPC for the cough drops did
appear on the receipt, contrary to Frontino and Officer Crawfords testimony.):
https://skydrive.live.com/redir?resid=43084638F32F5F28!921
(Beginning of audio transcript at 2:12 p.m.)

Marshall: all rise department for the Reno Municipal Court staff session the Hon.
Judge Howard:presiding
Hon. Judge Howard: Be seated everyone
Roberts: Your Honor last cases is City verses Zachary Coughlin: 11 CR 22176 Mr.
Coughlin would you step forward please?
Hon. Judge Howard: all right this is the time and place set for trial in regard to a
petit larceny alleged to been committed on September 9 of this year complaint alleges
that said defendant on or about September 9 2011 at Wal-Mart 2425 E. 2nd St. city of
Reno state of Nevada did take carrying away Wal-Mart property valued at less than
$250 with the intent to deprive Wal-Mart of said property said property consisted of
cough drops and a chocolate bar, Mr. Coughlin, is that your understanding of the
charge?
Coughlin: I believe so Your Honor
Hon. Judge Howard: all right part both parties ready to proceed at this time

Robert: Yes, Your Honor

Coughlin: no Your Honor I'm not ready to proceed
Hon. Judge Howard: why not

Mr. Coughlin: Well, there is a variety of reasons, Your Honor
Hon. Judge Howard: you have to speak up if you want me..
Coughlin: yes sir Your Honor, there's a variety of reasons, sir, I would say chief of
which is that it unlawful rent distraint is currently being applied to my files that are
necessary to defend this case I was evicted in justice court case REV2011-001708
recently, besides having an impermissible rent escrow deposit applied to me in that
case.
Hon. Judge Howard: what does that have to do with this case?
Coughlin: recently I have been affected all my files
Hon. Judge Howard: right
Coughlin: all my files incident to the defense of this case are currently being withheld
under in an impermissible rent distraint in violation of NRS 40.253 and 118 a.460
Hon. Judge Howard:what else you have other than this what else you have, as a basis
for not being prepared?
Coughlin: I made numerous attempts to contact the Reno City Attorney's office and
Ms. Roberts in attempts to discuss this matter



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Hon. Judge Howard: Ms. Roberts

Coughlin: and I have not been able to reach her
Hon. Judge Howard: or that sound basis for a continuance maybe she doesn't speak to
she is not required to
Coughlin: further there's a good deal of discovery that needs to be undertaken in this
regard Wal-Mart has been obstructive, as well as (unintelligible)
Hon. Judge Howard: what items of discovery
Coughlin: well I'd like to take some depositions as well have them respond to some
subpoena duces tecums I had served on them
Hon. Judge Howard: what else?
Coughlin: the same could be said for the Reno Sparks Indian Colony and this is a
complex case in terms you have the Indian colony renting property to Wal-Mart while
employing the same police patrolling the property on which they have a financial stake
in whether make an arrest there's Fourth Amendment issues involved in this case as
well is 42 section 1983 abuse of process's and police misconduct in terms of attempting
to obtain consent to an impermissible search through coercive means this is not a
simple case...civil recovery abuses are being alleged on the part of Wal-Mart attempted
state actors.. also, and I probably can't put into words, Your Honor, how truly
disruptive this eviction has been... I was evicted from my home office. I am an
attorney in the state of Nevada my client files are currently, I don't even know if I
should call them my files or my client's files are being withheld under an impermissible
rent distraint. Also, I was sexually assaulted by a bailiff in court the other day
Hon. Judge Howard: in this court
Coughlin: in Justice Court
Coughlin: all of these matters contribute to an unduly burdensome environment in
which my ability to defend this case has been unduly prejudiced in the extreme
Hon. Judge Howard:I am going to deny the request to continue I guess whether this is a
complex case is in the eye of the beholder, I don't typically find that these matters are
as complex as you've indicated they are on that as well that much of the argument that
you made here relating to sexual assault of a bailiff and another court your inability to
possess control your client files have no relevance in my mind to proceeding with the
charges and petty larceny alleged to have occurred at Wal-Mart on September 9
Coughlin: not just my client files or materials needed to defend this case are being
withheld
Hon. Judge Howard: I interrupt you sir, don't interrupt me.
Coughlin: Yes, sir.
Hon. Judge Howard: Additional note that the last hearing November 14 the city was
present with three witnesses the matter was continued, and we initially indicated that
we would note Mr. Coughlin's failure to appear we ordered a bench warrant and $1000
cash bail only to discover, unfortunately for Mr. Coughlin, that he was in custody so
the matter was reset. I think there's been sufficient time to prepare for trial in this
matter so we will proceed with trial all witnesses please stand and raise your right hand
so you can be sworn please
Coughlin: if I can just make my objections for the record, Sir?
Hon. Judge Howard: standing objections



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Coughlin: Ms. Roberts has agreed to a continuance submitting a written agreement to

the continues this matter

Howard:Ms. Roberts

Roberts: he initially had asked for a motion to continue sometime ago I went was for

the 14th and I did not object at that time am I think you sent me an e-mail after the 14th

and I said I would not object but Your Honor so at that time I did not object he has

filed additional motions with additional allegations that I think should be stricken and

not considered by this court and I'd like to withdraw my lack of opposition to

continuance

Hon. Judge Howard: will in any event this court is not going to agree to the stipulation

if there was a stipulation to continue with witnesses here for second time they're ready

to proceed this is case going forward, and we will swear in the witnesses

Marshall: I swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth

Witnesses: Yes, sir.

Marshall: They've been sworn.

Hon. Judge Howard: All right Mr. Coughlin do I need to go over the procedure here

today?

Coughlin: Yes, sir.
Hon. Judge Howard: the city has a burden of proof and as such will allow Ms. Roberts

to proceed with its case in chief initially she can do so by calling one more witnesses to

the witness stand you have an opportunity to cross examine each of those witnesses

once she has completed she can also offer any physical or documentary evidence that

she feels is relevant obviously subject to any objections that you might have to

relevancy. Once the city has concluded its case you will have an opportunity to present

a defense. I highlight the word opportunity because I think you understand there is no

requirement that you present any evidence whatsoever and should you choose not to

testify this court there's no inference as to your guilt or innocence based on your

decision not to testify on the other hand you have an absolute right to offer testimony

in the form of witnesses including yourself realizing that each of those witnesses will

be subject to cross-examination by the city attorney in fact if you have any additional

evidence physical or documentary that you would like me to review in most

circumstances I will do so subject once again to any objections that the city attorney

and he might have to that evidence once the two of you have submitted your respective

cases I will allow both of you to make closing arguments once concluded this court

will render a decision as your guilt for your innocence do understand?

Coughlin: I do have a question, Your Honor. You mentioned that I would be able to

present evidence if that evidence is being withheld from me at this point and it's

pending the resolution of a motion for return of personal property in Justice Court I

would be precluded from action accessing that evidence?

Hon. Judge Howard: I've ruled on that already, have I not?

Coughlin: It sounded like you said it didn't matter.

Hon. Judge Howard: I don't find that it's relevant to go forward with the trial today.

Coughlin: so if I have video evidence of retaliatory intent by Wal-Mart?

Hon. Judge Howard:you should've brought it with you today.

Coughlin: but if it's being withheld impermissibly under the law?




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Hon. Judge Howard: we are going forward today I have addressed the issue you can
bring it up on appeal if you feel that the decision of the Court is improper, understood?
Coughlin: Yes, Sir,Your Honor.
Hon. Judge Howard: Mr. Coughlin, lets you and I have an agreement today that we
will be respectful of one another you can tender any objections that you may have I do
not want you to be repetitious if you made an objection or a presentation and I've ruled
on it except that and let's move on. Do we have an understanding?
Coughlin: I do however to the extent that you've told me that my life and career are not
worth a continuance because it might cost a Wal-Mart associate another trip to the
court house I don't see where we are being respectful of me,Your Honor.
(2:27 PM)

Hon. Judge Howard: Very good, please proceed.

Roberts: Your Honor, can I invoke exclusionary rule asked Thomas Frontino.

Coughlin: Your Honor, may I just interject and address a couple preliminary motions

in limine and exclusionary motions?

Hon. Judge Howard: What?

Coughlin: I ask that any of the discovery that there Reno City Attorneys provided be

excluded under them motion in limine/ exclusionary rule and that we fully brief the

issues there and if before any such such discovery is admitted into evidence.

Howard: What is your motion in limine?

Coughlin: to exclude the the written statements of Mr. Frontino and the

Hon. Judge Howard: On what basis?

Coughlin: that the search was violative of the Fourth Amendment.

Hon. Judge Howard: City, a response?

Roberts: I think he needs to articulate how they invoke the Fourth and Fifth

aAmendments rather than just make bald assertion that they've violative.

Hon. Judge Howard: Well, I am going to deny your request.. NRS 170.4125 motions

are required to be made prior to trial you failed to do that in written form and I am not

going to consider them at this point in time because there have the obvious effect of

continuing this preceding today and I think that's what you're going after.

Coughlin: and I'll just interject an objection.

Hon. Judge Howard: I don't want to hear anything further, its denied.

Coughlin: I need to enter my objections for the record.

Hon. Judge Howard: Mr. Coughlin, I have given you fair warning if you continue to

persist in this line of performance I'm going to hold you in contempt (2:29 PM)

Coughlin: I won't be bullied into not entering my objections on the record.
Hon. Judge Howard: This matter will be continued because you're going to be placed

in custody now, you've been given fair warning, let's proceed.

Coughlin: Your Honor may I enter my objections in the record to preserve them for the

record on appeal?

Hon. Judge Howard: Go ahead.

Coughlin: It seems as though you've just told me that I may not because you just told

me you are going to have to be arrested if I do so I am a little scared to do that at this

point Your Honor and I move for your recusal from this case on that basis

Hon. Judge Howard: denied.




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Coughlin: Okay,then can I enter my objections for the record and state the basis for my

objections for the motions in limine?

Hon. Judge Howard:Mr. Coughlin: let's proceed, make your objections on the record

now, go ahead.

Coughlin: Okay, I don't mean to provide a reason to get angry.. Those motions were

submitted, I believe I have submitted those motions in writing.

Hon. Judge Howard: and they have been denied.

Coughlin: well it seemed as though a second ago Your Honor said that they had not

been submitted in writing

Hon. Judge Howard: All right! (pounds fist on desk making very loud sound,

courtroom microphone malfunctions with feedback for a period of time )

(2:30:06: p.m.)
Coughlin: further there is a coercive attempt to procure consent to a search based upon
not consenting. Probable cause was buttressed upon a failure to not consent to search
which as you stated earlier, Your Honor, asserting one's Fifth Amendment or Fourth
Amendment right cannot be used to infer evidence of guilt or to buttress a probable
cause finding for a search, particularly for a search that occurs prior to arrest.
Hon. Judge Howard: anything further?
Coughlin: I do.. I am terribly shaken by what you said to me, Sir, and it's affected my
ability to concentrate right now and defend my case given the 0 to 60 in one second
approach that I have witnessed you take with me today in terms of threatening me with
contempt upon the first attempt I believe I made to preserve and objections for the
record further I believe my motion for reconsideration the denial of appointed counsel,
but it was never ruled on. There is a Sixth Amendment right to counsel where the
possibility of jail time is.
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Hon. Judge Howard: your initial motion has been previously denied. I'll deny it
again in regard to motion for counsel I'll deny it again for the record that is founded
upon Scott versus Illinois which held that where an indigent individual, as you claim
you are, is not going to be sentenced to jail time, there is no requirement of the
appointment of counsel.
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2:47:33 pm
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Roberts: After you identified yourself as Wal-Mart asset protection what did you say to him
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Thomas Frontino: I identified myself as asset protection and that I needed to talk to him about some
items that he had taken from our facility.
25 Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: And did he say anything to you at that time:
Thomas Frontino: He pretended...He did not say anything, however he did come with us back into the
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store
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2:48:33 pm



Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Did you place Mr. Coughlin in custody, did you place handcuffs on

him at that time?

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Thomas Frontino: No, we did not touch him in any way, He was simply following our directions at

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that point.

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2:49:31

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: When you were walking Mr. Coughlin back to the AP Office was

he in handcuffs?

Thomas Frontino: No, he was not.

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: and were you escorting him in any way, did you have your arm

around him in any way?

Thomas Frontino: No, we did not.

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Once you were in the AP office, did you ask him any question or

have further discussion.

Thomas Frontino: I asked him about the items he concealed and he refused to cooperate any further

with our investigation....He just continued to say that he didn't do it when I asked him about the candy

bar and cough drops.

2:50:47
Zach Coughlin: Objection, Best Evidence Rule, why rely on Frontino's vague recollections rather than

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use any of the video tape.

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2:51:19:

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Did you ask Mr. Coughlin any more questions relevant to this

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situation?

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Thomas Frontino: I asked him for his information so we could enter it into our system.

2:52

argue about exclusionary rule regarding witness, Hazlett-Stevens in there watching, mention Howard

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made a woman leave earlier, all witnesses are male, etc.

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2:52:25 pm

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: What specific information did you ask of Mr. Coughlin?

Thomas Frontino: Identification, his name birth date, social security number.

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: And did he provide any of that information to you?

Thomas Frontino: No, he did not.

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Based upon his unwillingness to provide that information did you

take any further action?

Thomas Frontino: Yes, we called the police, the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Tribal Police

Department. They usually arrive within ten minutes, I believe my statement reflects it was less than

that.

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Were you present when the Officers decided to put handcuffs on
Mr. Coughlin
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Thomas Frontino: Yes.

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Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Prior to placing the handcuffs, did you observe the Officers place

their hands in Coughlin's pockets?

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Thomas Frontino: No.

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Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: What were the items you believe Mr. Coughlin had taken from

Wal-Mart?

Thomas Frontino: chocolate bar and two packages of cough drops.

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: were you able to recover those items.

Thomas Frontino: Uh, he consumed the chocolate bar and he consumed some of the cough drops as

well but we were able to get the packaging to everything.

Zach Coughlin: Objection, foundation

Hon. Judge Howard: Denied,

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Did you recover the packaging for the cough drops?

Thomas Frontino: Yes, I did.

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: So you were able to tell what type of cough drop it was?


Zach Coughlin: Objection, foundation.

Hon. Judge Howard: Overruled.

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Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: did you recover the candy bar wrapper that was associate with the

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candy bar you saw Mr. Coughlin consume?

Thomas Frontino: Yes, I did, and prepared a receipt to indicate what they value of those items are by

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taking the exact wrapper of the item and preparing a traning receipt so we can get the exact value of

what they sell for in Reno
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2:56:59
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Zach Coughlin: Objection hearsay
Hon. Judge Howard: Overruled! Did you hear me, Sir? Did you hear that?
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2:57:17
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Did you actually conduct the scanning of those items to creat the
training receipt
Thomas Frontino: I don't have a cashier number so I go with them and stand with them and watch
while they scan the items to create the receipt (check the tape to see).
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: So you actually observe them going through the motion of
scanning the items and preparing the receipt?
Thomas Frontino: Yes, I do.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Wish to enter as Exhibit 1 the receipt
Zach Coughlin: Objection: foundation and authentication, best evidence rule
Hon. Judge Howard: denied.
Thomas Frontino: identifies it as a training receipt with a list of items which he consumed or removed
from the facility, including the chocolate bar and the cough drops, I have the actual receipt with me
and that photocopy is consistent with it.
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Zach Coughlin: objection basis of lack of foundation, authentication, best evidence rule, he is not
qualified to testify with regard to the business practices of his employer in this particular
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circumstance, relevancy, to what extent is this probative.
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? Anything from Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: on jurisdiction? Indian Colony land, anyone with

a drop of tribal blood must be tride in tribal court.

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: He personally observed this document being produced by the

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maching and saw the items that he saw consumed or stolen by the defendant scanned into the register.

Hon. Judge Howard: Objection overruled, admitted.

5 Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: no further questions of this witness

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Cross of Frontino: 3:01:00

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Zach Coughlin: Mr. Frontino will you state your social security number for the record.

Hon. Judge Howard: he doesn't have to provide that.

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Zach Coughlin: Your Honor, I do not believe you are practicing law on behalf of the City Attorney's

Officer he.

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Hon. Judge Howard: before he speaks his ssn into the record...I am going to prevent it

10 Zach Coughlin: objection to the court's sua sponte practicing law on behalf of the city attorney's

office.

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Zach Coughlin: Mr. Frontino didn't you have a social security number on a piece of paper with my

name on it prior to the police arriving? (3:02:07)

Thomas Frontino: I do not recall.

C:So in you LP room did you have any piece of paper with what you thought was my name, social

security number, or other personally identifiable information already filled out.

Thomas Frontino: At the time you had only given us your name, that was it.

Zach Coughlin: Objection, non responsive.

Hon. Judge Howard: You asked the question, you got a response, your objection overruled, denied.

Zach Coughlin: so are you lying when you say I provided you my name?


Zach Coughlin: So, just to be clear, you are stating here under penalty of perjury under oath, that prior

to the police arriving I gave you my name?
Thomas Frontino: I am saying that we did not have the evidence required... we did not have the

information required, so whether you gave me your name or not was...was not the point, you were

uncooperative and that is why we notified police.

Zach Coughlin: Okay, just a second ago you testified that I gave you my name prior to the police

arriving, now it seems you are backing off of that a little bit, Mr. Frontino...and you are smiling

smugly.
Thomas Frontino: I don't remember whether you gave me your name or not at first, I know you did
not give me the information required for us to complete our investigation, that is why police were
notified.
Zach Coughlin: Okay, so you just lied earlier when you said yes, for sure I gave you my name prior
to the police arriving and that you didn't already have my name on a piece of paper and what you
thought was my social security number written on a piece of paper right there on your desk, in the
loss prevention office? Were you lying right there, Mr. Frontino?
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection, complex question.
Hon. Judge Howard: Its a complex question, lets ask a question, not a series of questions in narrative
form.



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Zach Coughlin: is it true that you just testified earlier that you did not have my name written on a

piece of paper in your office immediately upon bringing me back to it.

Thomas Frontino: I believe I did have your name but I do not remember conclusively whether or

not...I know that I did not have enough information to complete my investigation.

Zach Coughlin: Okay, so earlier when you testified that you didn't have my name on a piece of paper,

but then that the only way you got my name prior to the police arriving, was by me offering it, you

were lying? Under penalty of perjury? I don't know why you are smiling, Sir? There's nothing funny

about perjury.

Hon. Judge Howard: I don't see that as a smile, let's let the record be clear.

Thomas Frontino: I'm not quite understanding your question perhaps. I am saying that I did not have

enough information to proceed with my report without notifying police.

Zach Coughlin: Okay, well, I'll just write these questions down real simple.

Hon. Judge Howard: is that a question?

Zach Coughlin: I am making it a question right here.

Hon. Judge Howard: What you are doing is you are being argumentative, what I want you to do is ask

him questions.

Zach Coughlin: Were you lying when you said earlier that you didn't have what you thought was my

name

Thomas Frontino: No, I was not lying, I believe that I was making a statement that I still believe was

true...I believe you gave me your name and only your name at the time.

Zach Coughlin: Okay, so just a minute ago when you said now, I'm not sure whether you gave you

me your name or not? Which is it? The tape of this testimony right here will show that at first you

said you didn't have my nme?

Hon. Judge Howard: there is a question before him, I believe, let's see if he can address it.

Thomas Frontino: What was the question?

Zach Coughlin: Did you already testify today that you did not know my name when you brought me

back to the LP room.

Thomas Frontino: When I brought you back to the room, no I did not have your name?

Zach Coughlin: Did you have a name that you believe might be mine?

Thomas Frontino: Yes because you gave us a...a name, but without proper identification it is Wal-
Mart policy to call the police.

Zach Coughlin: So, now you are saying I gave you a name?

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Your Honor, asked and answered.

Zach Coughlin: Its been answered in several contradictory ways...

Hon. Judge Howard: Sustained, ask another question...

Zach Coughlin: At first its you didn't give a name, then its you gave us a name then its I'm not

sure if you gave a name then its you smiling some more...

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection, Your Honor, he's testifying...

Hon. Judge Howard: Mr. Coughlin, I have told you that I am not going to allow you to present

argument at this time, let's get along with another line of questions..

Zach Coughlin: Okay, but I'm confused...

Hon. Judge Howard: Another line of questions, the record is clear...

Zach Coughlin: Do you recall having a piece of paper with a name that you believe might be mine, on

your desk, immediately upon bringing me into what you call the asset protection room?




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Thomas Frontino: When we brought you back into the room our normal procedure is to get out our

information collection form and to get information from our suspect, we asked you your name, all of

your...

Zach Coughlin: Objection, Your Honor, I am not asking him was he was seeking to have collected

Hon. Judge Howard: What Mr. Coughlin is asking...its my understanding he's asking you if you had a

piece of paper on your desk with his name on it when he was brought back to the room? Is that

correct?

Zach Coughlin: With my name already on it.

Thomas Frontino: No....(nervous laughter from Frontino)..Absolutely not...I must have

misunderstood the question before, but absolutely no.

C:You didn't have a piece of paper, Sir, with my name and social security number on it?

Thomas Frontino: Already on it when you first entered the room? No.

Zach Coughlin: Yeah...yeah.

Thomas Frontino: Absolutely not.

Zach Coughlin: Did you have a piece of paper with my name on it?


Zach Coughlin: Something similar to my name on it?

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection, how would he know what name is similar to yours..

Hon. Judge Howard: Speculative...

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Speculative, yes

Hon. Judge Howard: Sustained.

Zach Coughlin: Similar in terms of one or two letters being different out of 20 or so letters..

Hon. Judge Howard: Mr. Coughlin...Mr. Coughlin...proceed with another line of inquiry.

Zach Coughlin: Okay, did you have a piece of paper with a name already on it when you brought me

into the office.

Hon. Judge Howard: Asked and answered...did you hear what I just said?

Zach Coughlin: I believe that was a different question, Sir. I didn't ask if it had my name, I asked if it

had a name on it.

Thomas Frontino: There is other people's names on the desk, so chances were, yes, there was another

piece of paper with somebody's name on it, somewhere on the desk.

Zach Coughlin: And you have video of this?

Thomas Frontino: There is video of the office at that time.

Zach Coughlin: Would have have those pieces of paper?

Thomas Frontino: There's a lot of paper...I didn't know which one you wanted me to bring.

Zach Coughlin: So, you are saying, under oath, that there wasn't a piece of paper with my name or a

name that is substantially similar to it, in the office already, at the time you brought me in there.

Thomas Frontino: When I brought you in our office there was no piece of paper with your name on it

or a name that was substantially similar.

Zach Coughlin: I will remind you that you are under oath, Sir. (3:10:37 pm)

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection, badgering


Zach Coughlin: Your Honor, I'm, uh...I do have respect for you, Sir. And I am not trying to waste the

Court's time with this next question, but I am trying to figure out what Mr. Frontino's final testimony

is with regard to whether I offered him my name prior to the police getting it. Mr. Frontino, is it your

testimony that I offered you my name prior to the police arriving?

Thomas Frontino: I do not remember if you specifically gave us your name at the time.




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Zach Coughlin: Did you testify earlier today that I did give you my name prior to the police arriving?

Thomas Frontino: I believe you might have, but I...but I do not recall conclusively enough to say

yes, for sure you did or no, you did not give us you name before the police arrived.

Zach Coughlin: Did you think you knew what my name might be?

Thomas Frontino: Absolutely not.

Zach Coughlin: Prior to the police arriving?


Zach Coughlin: Did you testify earlier that you had had previous interactions with mean indicate so

in your written statement provided to the police?

Thomas Frontino: I had seen you previous times...

3:12:09 pm

Thomas Frontino: Yes, I had had previous interactions with you...I had never spoken to you though.

Zach Coughlin: Had you had previous discussions with any other Wal-Mart employees or

supervisors, or loss prevention or asset protection individuals?

Thomas Frontino: Yes, I have.

Zach Coughlin: Did my name ever come up?

Thomas Frontino: No, it did not.

Zach Coughlin: How did you refer to me and how did those co-workers refer to me?

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection, I don't know what he is talking about, when did this

conversation happen, who was he talking to?

Hon. Judge Howard: Overruled.

Thomas Frontino: We generally referred to you as the laptop switcher, um for switching RAM and

hard drives and things like that...

3:13:34 pm

Zach Coughlin: and who made that statement?

Thomas Frontino: ap associates and electronics assocites and electronics associates.

Zach Coughlin: what are their names?

Thomas Frontino: Stanley Cunningham and there is another female who works in electronics, Jessie.

Zach Coughlin: Jessie What?

Thomas Frontino: I don't know here last name. I believe Alexis Trundy who now works t different

facility. My supervisor Anthony Rickerson.

Zach Coughlin: who is the gentlemn with shaved head, seems to be mybe Customer Service

Manager or an assistant store manger

Hon. Judge Howard: what is the relevance to this line of questioning.

Zach Coughlin: well, the Jessie, that Frontino refers to ...there was an incident where she accused me

of something nd this CSM or sernior walmart manager came over and was ble to verify that her

accusations were unfound or baseless.

Hon. Judge Howard: I don't see any relevance, and yes, its sua sponte, I m not going to allow
this line of inquiry. Lets speed up this process, ask another question.

Zach Coughlin: Yes, Sir, okay, just quickly, state the objection...He is making these accusations
that are prejudicial and to the extent I have a right to rebut them I wish to do so...
Hon. Judge Howard: I have ruled on it already ask another question.

Zach Coughlin: Okay, so you had a nickname for me but you had no idea what my name or identify

was?




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Thomas Frontino: I had seen you before and I had followed you before, but, no, nobody knew your

name that I knew of.
Zach Coughlin: any nobody had a name that they thought might be mine?

Thomas Frontino: I cannot speak to what other people thought? But you can testify as to what they

told you

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: that would be hearsay your honor?

Hon. Judge Howard: sustained.

Zach Coughlin: Habit, hearsay exception, business practice, custom, or policy.


3:16:57

Thomas Frontino: on the day in question Stanley Cunningham was the only other person working for

asset protection.

Zach Coughlin: Okay, so is it your testimony that immediately upon my entering the store you began

to follow me?

Thomas Frontino: No, I did not say that. I followed you immediately upon seeing you, and followed

you for approximately half and hour to an hour and I personally witnessed you select open and

consume a candy bar and select, open, and conceal two packages of cough drops.

Zach Coughlin: Did you tell the police that night that you personally saw the accused consume the

candy bar, but you did you fail to mention anything about personally seeing anything with regard to

the cough drops?

Thomas Frontino: I did not fail to make that note to them, I stopped you specifically for the candy

bar, because after consuming the candy bar and concealing the cough drops you went into the

bathroom with the cough drops, which, per Wal-Mart policy I had to then say well I can't stop him

for the cough drops because you could have flushed the cough drops, you could have done whatever

you wanted with the cough drops, however, I stopped you for the candy bar and that is why I stopped

you... we recovered more walmart merchandise later. It did not affect the charge in any way.

Zach Coughlin: any you say this was a candy bar.

Thomas Frontino: it was a chocolate...substance, I can give you the exact item, the receipt should be

on camera view from when you entered the AP office.

Zach Coughlin: and you say you saw me select it?

Thomas Frontino: I did see you select it.

Zach Coughlin: from where?

Thomas Frontino: From the candy isle...from...the ice cream endcap and ...the candy isle.

Zach Coughlin: is it a candy isle or an ice cream isle?

Thomas Frontino: its the same...place...cuz there's the...ice cream..endcap...that has...the candy isle.

Zach Coughlin: can you be more specific in regard to where in the store you say...

Thomas Frontino: when you enter the facility its about four isles, so about 40 feet when you pass the

registers you hang a left, and that's where all of our candy-type substances are.

Zach Coughlin: The candy isle? Endcap? Was it on an endcap?

Thomas Frontino: You selected it from the candy isle, theres the ice cream endcap andthen the candy

isle, you selected it from their.

Zach Coughlin: What's an endcap?

Thomas Frontino: It caps off the end of an isle

Zach Coughlin: so you are saying it wasn't selected from the candy isle?




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Thomas Frontino: I'm saying it was selected from the candy isle. There's an ice cream endcap, go

left there, and then there's the candy isle.

Hon. Judge Howard: Alright, I have heard enough, continue with another line of questioning, we have

heard repeatedly that he observed you select it from the candy isle, which is also associated with the

ice cream isle. He has explained to you what an endcap is, let's go forward.

Zach Coughlin: I believe this is very probative, Your Honor.

Hon. Judge Howard: Why? What's the relevance.

Zach Coughlin: I can tell you, Sir, but in order to

Hon. Judge Howard: I want you to explain it right now, what's the relevance?

Zach Coughlin: in Order to have my ability to impeach his testimony, Your Honor, there is some

leeway that would be helpful in order to have him put some answers on the record

Hon. Judge Howard: What is the relevance of this line of inquiry.

Zach Coughlin: I can tell you that...

Hon. Judge Howard: If you can't state it I am going to make you move on.

Zach Coughlin: I can state it, Sir, but to state it before I am able to get him put some things on the

record impairs my ability to impeach him.

Hon. Judge Howard: Finding no relevance to this line of inquiry I am not going to allow it.

Zach Coughlin: I will tell you the relevance..

Hon. Judge Howard: I am not going to allow it, move on!

Zach Coughlin: Your Honor, I didn't say I wouldn't reveal the relevance..

Hon. Judge Howard: Move On! I have given you every opportunity to reveal the relevance of this line

of inquiry...

Zach Coughlin: I don't believe you have, Your Honor...

Hon. Judge Howard: You failed to do it...I am not going to allow it

Zach Coughlin: I will state the relevance right now.

Hon. Judge Howard: No, its too late now, move on!

Zach Coughlin: Wow.

Hon. Judge Howard: We are not playing a game here.

Zach Coughlin: Wow.

Hon. Judge Howard: The next Wow that you make in these proceedings...under these

circumstnces,Sir, I m telling you now it demens the Court, I have given you every leeway possible

and you continue to push the buttons, now...either move on...ask another question.

Zach Coughlin: Yes, sir. So, the candy bar was taken from the endcap on the end of the candy isle,

you say?

Thomas Frontino: No, you took it from the candy isle.

Hon. Judge Howard: Did you understand...Hold on...Did you understand my admonishment about this

line of questioning?

Zach Coughlin: I believe so, Sir.

Hon. Judge Howard: Then why did you go right back to it and ask about the candy bar on the endcap

Zach Coughlin: I am asking him about it for impeaching him with regard to where this quote unquote

candy bar was selected from

Hon. Judge Howard: I don't want to hear anything else about the endcap or the isle, let's go forward.

Zach Coughlin: I'll just preserve my objection for the record, Your Honor, Mr. Frontino has testified

under oath that this candy bar was taken from an ice cream endcap on the end of the candy isle, but

the video evidence would suggest that its taken from somewhere entirely different, that would tend to




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undermine Mr. Frontino's testimony, impeach his character, and every other factual assertion he has

made here today.

Hon. Judge Howard: Do you have that evidence here today in your possession? Answer yes or no.

Zach Coughlin: I am not sure.

Hon. Judge Howard: You don't know whether you have that evidence in your possession?

C:That's....or whether Wal-Mart will provide it

Hon. Judge Howard: Mr. Coughlin, you are telling me, I want to be clear about this, that you are

uncertain as to whether you personally possess this video tape?

Zach Coughlin: I though you said whether I possess evidence that would impeach what he said and

testified to as to where the candy bar was

Hon. Judge Howard: are you in possession of a video tape, yes or no?

Zach Coughlin: of a video tape? Sir, I am unclear on what you are...But, Wal-Mart does have

cameras all over the store, so, whether or not I am, I would think it would be fairly easy for Wal-Mart

to show where this alleged candy bar was taken from and whether that jibes with what Mr. Frontino

has just said.

Hon. Judge Howard: Mr. Coughlin, I am going to hold you in contempt at this point in time, I think

that you have derogated the authority of the Court with unprofessional conduct repeatedly, you've

been given every opportunity to have this matter expedited and proceed to trial and have a just finding

but you continue to interfere with that process. I make a finding that you are guilty of direct

contempt, I am going to hold off with imposition until this proceeding is resolved. Alright, you can

continue your line of inquiry.

Zach Coughlin: Your Honor, I need to use the restroom.

Hon. Judge Howard: I beg your pardon?

Zach Coughlin: I need to use the restroom.

Hon. Judge Howard: We will take a five minute recess, I am going to remain here on the bench.

Zach Coughlin: Sir, I will be quick. (3:26:52 pm)....

(3:35:52 pm)

Hon. Judge Howard: We are back on the record. Mr. Coughlin has had an opportunity to use the

facilities and we will proceed.

Zach Coughlin: Thank you, Your Honor, Mr. Frontino, are you aware of whether or not you were

being tape recorded or video taped.

Thomas Frontino: Yes, I am, there's camera throughout the store and signs letting customers know

they are being tape.

Zach Coughlin: So, there's camera's throughout the store.

Thomas Frontino: There's not cameras everywhere in the store, primarily in high theft or safety

related areas.

Zach Coughlin: Was there any audio tape made?

Thomas Frontino: And, did you or anyone associated with Wal-Mart make any audio tapes in

connecdtion with this situation?

Zach Coughlin: No.

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3:37:27 pm

Zach Coughlin: Did Wal-Mart provide video tape to Ms. Roberts?

Thomas Frontino: I provided evidence to Ms. Roberts

27
Zach Coughlin: In fact, in your statement, in the discovery provided by the City Attorney, you stated

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that video evidence would be compiled?

26



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Zach Coughlin: and what did you provide.

Thomas Frontino: I provided evidence from within the office.

Zach Coughlin: by that do you mean just video evidence from the room in which you took the

accused to.

Thomas Frontino: I took video images of the room to which I took the accused to.

Zach Coughlin: Just that though?

Thomas Frontino: just that, yes. That is all we compiled, yes.

Zach Coughlin: why?

Thomas Frontino: because the primary, the only reson...we don't generally record video for fourteen

dollr petty larceny incidents, um...we did tht specifically this time because of accustion that were

made towards the officers.

Zach Coughlin: accustions by whom?

Thomas Frontino: accustion you had made toward the officers...you had made accusation that they

were making an unlawful search of your person.

Zach Coughlin: specifically, what was unlawful about it.

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection calls for a legal conclusion.

Hon: Judge Howard: sustained, sustined

Zach Coughlin: I am not asking it for the purposes of obtaining a legal conclusion, but merely for

him to restate what was said.

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: that's not the way he asked that question, Your Honor.

Hon. Judge Howard: ask another question.

Zach Coughlin: Yes, Sir, Your Honor. Did anyone, including myself, that was in that room that time,

specifiy in any way as to what was impermissible about such a search?

Thomas Frontino: No you did not.

Zach Coughlin: so your testimony is that accustions were made that the search was impermissible

Thomas Frontino: correct

C; but nothing more specific was said?

Thomas Frontino: no.

Zach Coughlin: was there any commentary about the impermissilbty of conditioning search based

upon the failure to consent to such search?


Zach Coughlin: well, wouldn't that contradicts what you just said with regard to whether any specifics

were said with respect to what was impermissible about the search.

Hon. Judge Howard: I'll allow it.

Zach Coughlin: Mr. Frontino, it seems though, again, that your testimony contradicts the testimony

you made not even three mintues prior. (3:40:33).

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: is that a question, Your Honor?

Zach Coughlin: I'm asking him to explain.

Hon. Judge Howard: Stop!. I will allow it. Do you understand it?

Thomas Frontino: I believe I do understand it. I can go through it from the beginning to end if you

like. There was point in time where you made an accusation that you had not given consent to

search, and it was at that time that Officer Crawford said make note, and I believe its in my police

statement, that there was notation that your pockets were searched after you were placed under arrest.

Zach Coughlin: Okay, correct me if I'm wrong, but this is wht I just heard you say there was no

dialogue or specifics mentioned about what was impermissible about such a search, but then upon




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further questioning you indicted tht there was some dialogue about how it was impermissible to
condition the search based upon the refusal to give consent for the search, to use refusal to give
consent as a basis for the search.
Thomas Frontino: You are completely misunderstanding what I said then.
Zach Coughlin: Well, I would say, of course I am because you have given three different
contradictory answers.
Hon. Judge Howard: being argumentative, let him resond to the question, go ahead.
Thomas Frontino: can you repeat the question.
Zach Coughlin: can you explain how it could not be contradictory for you to originally testify that
basing the permissibliy of the serach upon failure to give consentto the search was not discussed, and
then you testified that is was discussed, and then now you are testifying that it wasn't discussed?
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: objecdion calls for a conclusion.
Hon. Judge Howard: do you understand.
Thomas Frontino: I don't think I do.
Zach Coughlin: was there a discussion related to whether it was illegal to base the search upon a
failure to consent to a search, and you said yes.
Thomas Frontino: I will respond as best I am able to. Perhaps its best to start with they asked if they
could do a weapon pat down search, you consented to that, they did an outside pat down. After you
became non compliant, and uncooperative with the investigation and asked for an attorney, you were
placed under arrest. They arrested you put handcuffs on you, whatever they do, they then emptied
your pockets, as they do with every other person they put under arrest, at which time we then
recovered more stolen merchandise, which was the cough drops...It was at that time that you said I
didn't consent to a search, your can't, I ...I didn't give you consent to search me.
Zach Coughlin: Do you feel, Mr. Frontino, that ever time I put forth to you the inconsistency and
contradicdtions in your testimony that you respond by talking about things that are completely
unrelated.
Thomas Frontino: No, because I believe that's completely related.
Zach Coughlin: now, what did you tell the police when they arrived.
Thomas Frontino: I told the police that I had stopped you for shoplifting the chocolate item but that I
also believed you had cough drops on your person but that I also believed you had cough drops on
your person but that you had gone into the restroom but that I did not have positive evidence that you
still had some in your possession even though you had consumed some and disposed of the
packaging to them.
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(here Frontino contradicdts himself from sentence to sentence. He doesn't have positive evidence of
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the cough drops being what? Possessed, consumed? But by the next sentence he is attesting that
Coughlin had consumed some disposed of the packaging to them. So, where Wal-Mart policy
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apparently won't let Frontino do somethig with the bathroom, Frontino attempts to leverage the
police force to do that which his employer's policy forbids?
24
Zach Coughlin: have you discussed your testimony her today with the two Indian Colony Officers?

Thomas Frontino: No, I have not.

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Zach Coughlin: where you sitting with them for about an hour before court?

Thomas Frontino: probably for about half an hour (3:45:35).

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Zach Coughlin: Were you laughing and joking together?

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Thomas Frontino: Yes, we were.

25



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C:are you close to or do you have a personal relationship with those officers?
Thomas Frontino: No, I do not, but there are very few tribabl police officers so we tend to work with
them fairly regularly
Zach Coughlin: okay, so your testimony is, here, under penalty of perjury...I don't know why you are
smiling, thats not very funny, you wouldn't apprecfiate going into an operating roomand seeing a
surgeon joking around?
Thomas Frontino: I have just been reminded several times.
Zach Coughlin: Your testimony here today is that you provided statements, both oral and written, to
the two Indian Colony officers, from the time they arrived until the time they left, that you personally
witnessed something with regard to the cough drops. Was your testimony that you told the officers
that you personally witnessed the accused doing something with the cough drops?
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: asked and answered.
Zach Coughlin: in your written statement, what did you indicate with respect to the cough drops?
H I don'tremember, if I had the statement with me maybei t would.
Zach Coughlin: when the police arrived on the scene, did you make statements to the police regarding
previous interactions with the accused?
Thomas Frontino: I believe I did make the statements that I had followed you in that past, that I had
seen you in the past select and consume a package of M&M's, that you had a long standing history
with the store, that our management had already wanted to have you trespassed but had that far failed
to have an opprotunity to do so.
Zach Coughlin: Was the reason they wanted to have the accused trespassed based upon a retaliatory
motive in conjunction with the accused's attempts to hold Wal-Mart to the Return Policy which is
incorporated into all sales they make and which is clearly and expressly displayed both in the stores
and on Wal-Mart's website.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: I am going to object calls for him to speculate into the minds of the
managers as to why they wanted to trespass him.
Hon. Judge Howard: Do you know anything about that?
Thomas Frontino: I can speak to some of it, from my side, technically there are two different
operations in the store, there are operations that deal with customers, and there is asset protection
which we are technically field asociates, so we had our own reasons for wanting to have you
trespassed from the facility based upon our own dealings with you, we meaning my manager Anthony
Rickerson, Sean who is another assitant manager who is aware of you, Alodia, who is another
assistant manager who signed your trespass form.
Zach Coughlin: When you say we, are you just referring to individuals who work with you in your
particular AP group or in your particular Wal-Mart store?
Thomas Frontino: We do communicate between stores via email, we all have access to the same
database called apis A P I S.
Zach Coughlin: Did you communicate about me with other stores or did anybody else at your store?
Thomas Frontino: not to my know knowledge.
C:, so if the West 7th St. Walmart made a retaliatory threat to the accused in conjunction with the
accused pointing out that the managers, who had been there for over ten years, seem to conveniently
forget the Return Policy whenever the numbers don't work out in a way that makes them happy, is
that something you would have never been informed of
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: objection , relevance
Hon. Judge Howard: what is the relevance of this?



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Zach Coughlin: retaliatory motive, specifically for frontino or others to lie

Thomas Frontino: I get paid...
Hon. Judge Howard: Hold on, hold on. Objection sustained. I have given you a great deal of latitude.
We have had this witness testify for over an hour. We are going ot get through this trial tongith. The
court has a perogative to expedite this proceeding. In the future if you inquire into matters that are
not relevant, whether or not the city objects, I am going to cut you off.
Zach Coughlin: are you aware that an ap associate from Walmart made threats to the accused that he
would retaliate against they accused for trying to assert his rights under the Return Policy that
Walmart puts forth to customers, by having him banned from all walmarts and or maliciously
prosecuted.
Thomas Frontino: no, other than previous to court that several things were mentioned before that, no.
(3:53:47 pm)

Zach Coughlin: so you never communicated about the accused with any other walmart.

Thomas Frontino: we don't communicate directly through Apis its simply a database. I have never

receive a picture or an email about you.

Zach Coughlin: have you felt any pressure from your managers to retaliate against someone, maybe a

documentary filmmaker who is investigating

Hon. Judge Howard: you don't have to answer that question, that is irrelvant to this proceeding.

Another question.

Zach Coughlin: Do you believe your employer retaliates against individuals who shine light on their

employers failure to abide by their own Return Policy?

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: objection Relevanace

Hon. Judge Howard: sustained.

Zach Coughlin: so the issue of whether his employer is pressuring him to retaliate is not relevant

Hon. Judge Howard: thats right, I don't find it relevant, ask another question!

Zach Coughlin: so stanley cunningham was on break?

Thomas Frontino: yes, he was on lunch break.

Zach Coughlin: so, right when the accuse came into the store, you began tailing him, was anyone

watching the filmwhile you were tailing?

Thomas Frontino: no

Zach Coughlin: so nobody's watching the video/film?, its just being recorded?

Thomas Frontino: its being recorded so if its need we can go back to it and acquire it, in larger stores

with high theft that have pan tilt zoom cameras.

Hon. Judge Howard: We are just concerned with what is going on here!

Thomas Frontino: okay.

Zach Coughlin: your store does not have pan tilt zoom cameras?

Thomas Frontino: no, sir.

Zach Coughlin: did you watch any or attempt to watch any video of watch you allege was done with

the cough drops?

Thomas Frontino: no, I did not.

Zach Coughlin: why not?

Thomas Frontino: because I generally don't based upon $14.00 dollar petty larceny.

Zach Coughlin: but if your employer could get sued for wrongful arrest or damge to ones'

professional repution couldnt it become bigger issue thn fourteen dollar petit larceny

Hon. Judge Howard: he has answered the question as to why he did not review the video tape:

Zach Coughlin: and I am asking a follow up question.




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Hon. Judge Howard: ask another question!$##$%#$%! I am not going to allow that question! It has
no relevance!!!%^&*##$%#
Zach Coughlin: do you have any duty to ascertain whether or not the allegation you make and
whether any arrests you make are based in fact or supported by admissible evidence
Thomas Frontino: absolutely.
Zach Coughlin: does that duty not include bothering to look at the video?
Thomas Frontino: it did not have anything to do with bothering to look at the video, it had to do more
with looking at the places where I knew you had selected to conceal items, there not being specific
video evidence down those isles, because we don't have a lot of slip incidents in the candy isle,
walmart elects not to put a video camera in that isles.
Zach Coughlin: where do you alleged each item was specifically selected, opened, and then

concealed.

Thomas Frontino: The candy item you selected, opened, and consumed while walking around the

store.

Zach Coughlin: it was selected from an endcap you said from the candy isle

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: objection, that was not his testimony.

Hon. Judge Howard: that was not his testimony.

Zach Coughlin: I'm sorry, could I.

Hon. Judge Howard: no, its asked and answered, if you don't remember it you can review the

transcript later. Go forward with another question.

Zach Coughlin: oh, I'll be reviewing the transcript later. Where was the candy bar selected?

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Your Honor, asked and answered.

Thomas Frontino: in the candy isle.

Zach Coughlin: so not on an endcap, but somewhere within the isle itself.


Zach Coughlin: the candy bar was. Was it...and what item was that? You say it was a candy bar?

Thomas Frontino: It was a...yes, it was a chocolate item, I believe...I believe it had caramel inside it, I

didn't inspect it, it had already been consumed. I have a picture of the wrapper.

Zach Coughlin: and we have a number for it, a number for the bar code

Thomas Frontino: the UPC, yes, the bar code, the number on the receipt, yes, that's correct.

Zach Coughlin: would it be correct to say on the receipt its the third item down, magndblcrml number

007756713282

F: Yes, that is correct
C: okay, but you don't know what exact item that is.
F: Um, its the item that I have a picture of right here, based upon the UPC code usually I can discern
them
C: He's not entering that into evidence at this point I don't believe so, I don't know, if the Court's
accepting it
H; it hasn't been offered yet\
c: the bailiff took it from the witness and gave it to the judge, I'll note for the record
f: no, he has the receipt
r: no he didn't, that's not the correct record, the document the Judge has is Exhibit 1.
C: Hh, I'm sorry that was not the picture my mistake, I'm sorry, you were talking about the picture so
it seemed you were
F: no, it was not the picture
3:59:55


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4:00:00 p.m.

Zach Coughlin: okay, so this was taken from somewhere in the middle of the candy isle, you

personally witnessed that, right, you just testified to that correct?

Thomas Frontino: that you took it from the candy isle, yes, I couldn't tell you how far down exactly I

didn't pace it out.

Zach Coughlin: Oh...but, oh...okay...you said you personally eye witnessed this

Thomas Frontino: yes, but I don't take measuring tapes afterwords....or...

C:okay but generally you could say right on the edge of the isle or somewhere closer to half way.

Something like that, right? Because you...you are telling us...

Hon. Judge Howard: do you know exactly where it was? (4:00:33)

Thomas Frontino: Yes, I do...it was from....it was from...the candy isle.

Zach Coughlin: okay, but its not about where its from...wer're saying under penalty of perjury you

are saying that you personally eye witnessed the

Hon. Judge Howard: is there a question?

Zach Coughlin: yeah.

Hon. Judge Howard: where is it?

Zach Coughlin: I want to verify, where did he personally eye witness it.

Thomas Frontino: I was standing at the end of the isle and you selected it.

Zach Coughlin: was I standing right next to you?

Thomas Frontino: Of course not.

Zach Coughlin: okay then, well could you please be a little more specific.

Hon. Judge Howard: Could you be more specific as to where he picked up the item?

Thomas Frontino: All of our...I believe it was one of our nicer chocolates, it wasn't a Snickers or

anything, and it was selected in that first 4 to 8 foot section, because each section itself is four feet, so

it was selected from in there.

Zach Coughlin: from the candy isle?

Thomas Frontino: Yes, you selected several items from the candy isle, some of which you purchased,

some of which you left at the cash register.

Zach Coughlin: And you are saying you then saw me...that particular item whose bar code whoe

barcode we just entered into the record, you saw me open that and then consume it.

Thomas Frontino: I am saying yes, I saw you open it and consume it. You had a stack (4:01:35 p.m.;

Frontino starts to realize his is totally effed here) of....of....candy bars and other food items, that you

selected a bunch of items and put them in your cart, and then you.... then....sumbh....

(4:01:44 pm Frontino trips all over his thoughts and words and utters some quasi word while he
tries to think his way out of the shitpin he just walked himself into)
...t selected that one item out of your car, and you opened it and consumed.
(4:01:49 pm)

Zach Coughlin: Okay, and if that item is a refrigerated item, would it make any sense for it to be in

the candy isle, where there is no refrigeration?

(4:01:58 pm)
Thomas Frontino: There...there is on the endcap. (OH, GREAT POINT FRONTINO, TRY TO
BRING THE OLD ENDCAP BACK INTO NOW THAT YOU NAILED YOURSELF INTO
THE FIRST 4 BY 8 FOOT SECTION SPECIFICITY YOU REACHED FOR
EARLIER!)...that, that....that...that's my point...you selected a lot of items and put them all down.



Zach Coughlin: But your testimony under oath, under penalty of perjury was that you saw the accused

take that particular item, not from the endcap, but from the first 4 to 8 foot section of the candy isle,

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which is not refrigerated, right?

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Thomas Frontino: Correct.

Zach Coughlin: So, if that item, if we pulled up that item and that bar code and its shows its a

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refrigerated ice cream chocolate caramel confection, would that indicate you were inaccurate in what

you were telling the court?

5 Thomas Frontino: You could have easily picked it up from the candy isle?

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(4:02:45 p.m., hear Frontino's lying voice crack when he says the word isle, not even able to
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summons a halfway convincing delivery of his sad attempt to crawl out of the quicksand)
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Zach Coughlin: The ice cream bar from the candy isle? Wouldn't it be melted, wouldn't you think?

If it hd been sittin' there in the cndy isle?

Hon. Judge Howard: Is that a question? Is that your question?

Zach Coughlin: I am asking, does that make sense to you, if this item, if it is established this..

Thomas Frontino: I am saying you selected...

Zach Coughlin: I am not finished with my question, Sir.

Hon. Judge Howard: You are finished! You're done! Go ahead and respond.

Thomas Frontino: I am saying you selected several items and placed them all into the cart, um...yes, I

may have been mistaken, because you placed them all into the cart and then you did not proceed to

directly open the package after you selected it, you put it into the cart and selected it from various

other items that were put into the cart.

Zach Coughlin: So, if that item was an ice cream bar that would melt if it wasn't refrigerated and it

was selected where you say it was selected...that would be somewhat unusual wouldn't it, for a

refrigerated item to be selected from an isle that doesn't have refrigeration?

(4:03:50 p.m.)

F: to be completely honest? At a Walmart? No, no, it wouldn't be that unusual.

(4:04:12 p.m.)

Zach Coughlin: Would it be possible to review the video from that date in question and the isle in

question to see if the item in question...

Thomas Frontino: There are no video evidence of any of the refrigerated isles or the candy isle,

however, per Walmart policy you would have had to subpoena that information.

Zach Coughlin: And the litigation hold notice I placed you on at the time of the arrest? You didn't

respond to that?

Thomas Frontino: Well, uh..I ...I don't know of a litigation hold notice?

Zach Coughlin: Wherein you were informed of your duty to maintain....

Thomas Frontino: I was never informed:

Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection, Your Honor. This is an A.P.A. That doesn't know...

Hon. Judge Howard: Sustained, sustained. Yes, go forward, another question.

Zach Coughlin: So...you...destroyed all the video evidence?

Thomas Frontino: No, I did not destroy the evidence, it is automatically recorded over after several

months.

Zach Coughlin: has it been several months?




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Thomas Frontino: I would have to check back with my store to see its still on there or not, it

automatically after time records over itself

Zach Coughlin: Please do, and I will note for the record that I am hereby informing you and

requesting...

Hon. Judge Howard: Ask another question! Ask another question!!!

Zach Coughlin: So you don't know whether...you are saying there are no cameras above the candy

isle?

Hon. Judge Howard: Asked and answered!

Zach Coughlin: Okay. Is there something that looks like a camera above the candy isle?

F: I believe there might be one at the action ally, but I can't be sure that there is. There is another one
that actually points toward the meat department, but not down towards the candy isle
C: did you make any attempt to ascertain whether or not any of these selecting, opening, or
concealing acts were caught on tape?
F: I did look iin the soda isle to see if I could see you throwing and opening and throwing away the
coguh drop package and there waw not video there, the other package you threw away in the candy
isle and there's not video there.
C: there's not video there?
F: correct
c: meaning?
F: there...no...video...there.
C: okay so your saying its not a case of there's video but it doesn't show anything, its a matter of
there's just plain no video
f: correct there's not an image of that area that recorded.
C: so your store doesn't record the candy isle?
4:06:42
H: Asked and answered. He's testified repeatedly that there's no video on the candy isle, ask another
question.
C: what are those things on the ceiling at Walmart that look like, like, uh, I mean...I always assumed
they were cameras...they are like these little round orbs with a kind of little black pupil type look
surrounded by maybe a white plastic ring and they are interspersed all throughout the store they
would seem colloqually surveillance video, most people think or loss prevention cameras? What are
those things there are robably several hundred throughout Walmart
F; those are video cameras for the better part...some stores have false cameras that are simply the
pupil as you described..um..
c does your store
f my store I do not believe has any false cameras
c so if ther's cameras approximately every isle
r objection theres no testimony that there cameras approximately every isle
h i'll allow the question go ahead
c; is there cameras just about aove every isle
f as I have said before, no, pretty much down the netire grocery isle there is not one camera shing
down any of the actual isles thaty have the meat department produce deli and alcohol. Other than that
there is not a camera in any of the grocery isles'. We have camerass shining down the action allies, so
on the sides, but non of them shind down the isles
c okay, so...do any of these trash cans...are any of them...you alleged something with regard to the
trash cans and the cough drops, is that correct



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f: yes, you through the packaging to the cough drops into two separate trash cans.
Z and your're saying with regard to the cough drops is it accurate to say that you testified that you
personally witnessed the accused select the cough drops from some point in the store?
F yes, you selected them from the shelf in the pharmacy department
c where...where abouts is that
f um it was cold medicine it was in the cold medicine part of pharmacy its actually the first isle in
pharmacy right past the isle with femine hygeine and condoms on the right, on the right side, on the
right side of the isle we have all of our cough drops and cold medicine. That is where you selected
the cough drops from.
C does it seem c urious to you that your store appears to have a couple hundred cameras interspersed
thorought it yet neither you nor your employer have managed to gather any of the video evidence
which might support your testimony?
F no, for the same reason that I gave earlier, we don't generally complile video evidence on such a
minor incident, and incident we wouldn't have even called the police had you cooperated with...its
that minor
c: are you saying you conditioned your calling the police based upon a lack of cooperation
f yes I am
f such as?
F not cooperating
c: but could you be more specificallyf I had detained you for shoplifting you maintained yoru
innocence, which is acceptable, however without information to pursue our case against you we have
to also call police so that they can assist us.
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(Around 4:10:55 Frontino tries to say the wouldn't have called the cops if suspect had
cooperated, but then he defines cooperating I a way that enables walmart to proceed with their
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ase against one and mentions that they would call the police to accomplish that...more
contradictory stuff. So, which is it, Frontino? Would you have let the suspect go if he had
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provided the information you desired and cooperated or did you need to information
and cooperation to pursue your case against the accused? Talking out fo his ass again.)
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c your testimony is that the accused made some statements maintiaing his innocence? Is that
correct?
F yes, thats correct?
F; yes that's correct?
C is that consistent with yoru written statements
f: I don't know whats in my...i would have to look at my written statement, I don't know if I put
that in my written statement or not.
C and your saying.. some, uh, other candy items were selected and purchased
f correct
c do you have the receipt of the items that were purchase
f; no I do not.
C; did you ever have it
f no, it is still in the walmart's database.
C were you able to verify whether or not those other items were purchased? Those other candy
items or whether in fact the receipt has other candy items
f we watched you rign up all of your items, at no time did you present...



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c who is we?
F Stanley Cunningham and I, because Stanley..by the time you were at the register, Stanley was
now with me to make our apprehension because as policy we have two people so as he came back
from lunch you were at the register and he was with me. So perhaps it better if I say I witnessed
your transaction
c the truth is best, so rather than saying you and Stanley the chaning it to I, just say the
truth.
H Mr. Coughlin I have repeatedly advised you against arguing with the witness. Makign the
facial expressions which you just did, which you previously chastized Mr. Frontino for. I am
going to once again admonish you and warn you against such further actions. I have done so
repeatedly. Go forward.
C Yes, sir
H; with cuation
c Mr. Frontino it seems to me that you have just testified that you and Mr. Cunningham
witnessed the accused ring up the items and then you changed your testimony to indicate that
Mr. Cunningham was actdually not there to witness that.
R; objection thats not what he testified to You Honor
f: thats not what I am saying I'm saying I cannot speak to what he saw even though he was
standing next to me watching you
c did you did you just say
f; but he is not here to say that so I will say that I witnessed you
c well did you just testify that he wasn't back from break yet? From lunch?
f no that is not what I testified. I testified that he was back from break at the time you were at
the register.
C so when you said perhaps it better if I just say I witnessed, why did you make that
statement?
F because I was assuming that you were going to again question me about the using we
because I can't speak for we
c okay an dyou didn't make any statement to the effecdt that you should only say I because
Mr. Cunningham had not actually returned from lunch yet?
F no I did not make that statement.
C and if we reviewed the tape that won't be shown? The tape of this hearing?
r objection, I don't understand the questionable
h I don't understand either. Sustained. Ask another question.
C so where did you see the cough drops? You say you saw them selected in the pharmacy isle?
F correct
c then at what point did you see them...where you personally witnessed them being opened?
F you opened one item in the candy isle and discarded the package and you opened the second
package in the soda isle and discarded the package.
C so was it a case of opening the package and discarding it right away?
F on both cases you did not open them both at the same time. You opened one in the basket
discarded the package, you pretended to blow your nose with the paper towel that was above
the garbage can, pulled down the paper towel, you then put the package inside the paper towel
and then placed both items together the paper towel concealing the cough drop package into the
garbage can.
C and you personally witnessed this?



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F I personally witnessed this
c not on video...but with your own eyes?
F with my own eyes.
C how close were you?
F at that point I was standing on the endcap and you were standing just inside the isle
c nd this would be the candy isle?
F: so how many feet away would you say you were
f A few feet maybe...
c I don't know what a few feet means, does that mean less than ten would you say?
F definitely less than ten it was probably somewhere around 3.
c you were three feet away, you were at the endcap and the accused was where?
f I was at the endcap and were just inside the isle at the garbage can. Would you like...uh.
C and you weren't obscured in any way?
F no I was not
c you were in plain sight
f uh, I was hiding, I was not standing next to the garbage can.
C okay, so you said you were not obscured and then you said you were hiding
f my line of sight was not obscured, my body was obscured from your vision
c okay, and how is that possible was there some hole in the isle you peered through
f theres, theres the endcaps that have shelves so what we will do is we will either crouch down
or we will stand stall and look wherever we need to look through the gap and we get close
enough to it and the props in the shelves don't obscure our vision at all and alls the people that
were really looking for us they would see is our eyes, but that's if they were really looking for
us.
C so there's no products on the shelves that would impede your view of that?
F there are products on the shelves and there are times when there are products that could
obscure our vision, however, we don't choose those isles...we don't choose those endcaps to look
through as it obscures our vision
c well are there situations where you don't have a choice with respect to which endcap you look
through
f No.
c so, how is that possible, are you able to arrange where people take things
f We simply do not catch everyone.
C: and you say there was no attempt made to pay for the chocolate bar or the cough drops?
F: correct?
C: And how were you able to ascertain that?
F You did not attempt to pay for them, you concealed the items...the packaging that had the
UPC's in garbage cans, you also concealed the packaging to the wrapper underneath cart
sanitizer wipes in the corner of your cart.
C did you hear any discussions between the cashier and the accused?
F No, I did not.
C Did anybody that you know of at Walmart
R Your Honor, calls for speculation
H that you know of
f That I know of? No.



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C Did you make any efforts to ascertain whether the accused and the cashier had any
discussions with respect to the items
f No
c Is there ever a situation where an individual at Walmart selects and item and its damage or
something is wrong with it and they don't purchase it?
F Yeah, but they don't eat it also.
C Is there ever a situation where someone takes a bite of something and finds it tastes bad or
maybe an Odwalla drink has a rotten taste to it
H what is the relevance of the question?
C Well, Mr. Frontino is asserting that this items were opened.
H It was a package...did you indicate an olive?
C: No, I was referring to what he's...
H what item were you referring to in your question specifically, what was it?
C All. all three items... the cough drops and the candy bar which...or what Mr. Frontino calls
the candy bar which, I believe the UPC actually reveals is a refrigerated item.
H What is the relevance to your inquiry
C well in order to establish all the elements of the charge, one is intent.
H Intent?
C Yes, and if there is not an intent...
H How do those other situations relate to whether you intended to conceal, consume the items in
question here?
C I am asking Mr. Frontino what he does to ascertain whether or not there was, in fact, the
requisite intent or whether or not someone who is accused of these crimes might have sampled
something and found it to be unsaleable?
(4:20:42 p.m.)
H It has no relevance to these proceedings, it has no relevance.
C Okay, and I'll just preserve my objection to that for the record, I do believe it goes to...
H You keep talking over my rulings, and I have warned you about that haven't I. I have
indicated that you have an opportunity and you've expressed your understanding of your right
to appeal. The next time that you talk over one of my decisions or rulings, I am going to hold
you in contempt again, you have fair warning.
C I am sorry, Your Honor, I was always under the understanding that if I did not specifically
state my objection for the record, I would be precluded from later on arguing that on appeal, I
don't mean to disrespect you, Sir.
H Ask another question. I have made myself clear, you understand it. Ask another question.
C In your written statement you stated that the accused was initialy compliant but then became
non-compliant, in what way did the accused become non compliant?
F You would not provide us with any information in regards to yourself so that we would not be
able to enter you into our database, as I have previously stated.
C Okay, but then earlier you testified that the accused offered you his name, how is that
consistent.
F As I have previously stated, whether you have given us your name or not that is not enough
information for us to complete our investigation and to enter you into our system, as I have
stated before.
C Well, okay, that's fine...but my question didn't relate to that. My question related to how you
can stand here under oath and say one thing that inconsistent with something else you've said.



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To wit: you said earlier that the accused offered his name to you prior to the police arriving,
then just now, you described the accused as non-compliant, in part, because he failed to offer his
name to you. My question is: how is that non inconsistent and indicative of a lack of veracity
attendant to your testimony today, Mr. Frontino?
R Objection, Your Honor, that goes to argument.
H I am going to allow the question up to the point that it goes to veracity, which is a
determination that I make, not you, go ahead.
F as I believe I have stated earlier, I do believe you gave us your name, but I would not swear
my life on the fact that you gave us your name, however, even if you had given us your name,
you did not give us enough information for us to complete our investigation, so therefore, we
had to notify Tribal Police.
C Okay so when you say your are finding some non-compliance on the part of the accused and
the attendant consequence to that, ie, your calling in the police...what you assert was the noncompliance in your earlier testimony, was that there was a failure to give a name....but that
might not be it, apparently, according to your testimony. So, was there any other noncompliant behavior?
F You wouldn't give us your information, that was it.
C Information meaning?
F Name, address, identification, all items that you had on your person, but were unwilling to
share with us.
C So you are saying that a failure to provide those materials at Walmart will result in calling
the police?
F Anybody that fails to produce a valid form of identification will result in us calling the police.
C And...calling the police saying what...the person refused to give their identification?
F No, we call the police because at that point, Walmart pursues their right to pursue criminal
charges, and you are not on trial for not giving a name, you are on trial for petty larceny, so at
that point Walmart...
H He's answered the question, thank you.
(4:25:43 p.m.)
C So is refusing to allow Walmart to search the contents of one's bag or the plastic bag that
their purchases are in, is that also a basis for callign the police?
F We never search individuals, per policy Walmart does not search individuals
H His question is, is that a basis for contacting the police?
C So the well known practice of having someone stand by the door and say lets me check your
receipt against the contents of your bag...does that occur at Walmart?
F Uh, yes it does.
C Okay so if someone refuses to allow Walmart to search the contents of their platic bag and
their receipt...if someone refuses to consent to that search, what is your policy?
F To let them leave.
C So, someone can refuse to consent to that search and you let them leave?
F Correct.
C Have you ever detained someone for refusing to consent to such a search?
F If I were working and the door and failed to observed selection, concealment, and
consumption of those items, we never make stops based on those, so, if somebody's at the door,
its more of an insurance policy to check receipts...nobody is ever detained, um...
c There wasn't a lawsuit against Walmart recently



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f I couldn't speak to
H What is the relevance? What is the relevance to this line of inquiry. We are speaking about,
as I understand it, loss prevention officer and his observations and a greeter and what the
greeter can do. Do you see those as exactly the same thing?
C I see them as an overall policy on Walmart's part to condition whether or not they are going
to take retaliatory action based upon whether a customer is consenting to impermissible
searches and seizures.
H Alright. I don't see them as the same or even similar. Its not relevant.
C Yes, Sir, I'll move on.
H It's not relevant, ask another question.
C You say that you overhead some discussions between the Indian Colony Officers and the
accused with regard to the accused failure to consent to a search....having a consequence of the
accused being arrested for not consent....
f; No, Sir, you were not placed under arrest until you asked for a lawyer.
C Okay, so you are saying the accused asking for a lawyer was, uh, mentioned by the Officers as
having a consequence...
r Objection, calls for hearsay
c I'm...uh...excited utterance
r Your Honor, that's not an excited utterance.
H Sustained.
C Mr. Frontino has testified as to what they Officers have said, at length, previously.
H well...uh...just because the prosecutor has chosen not to objectd at certain times and has now
objected to what the Officers have said based upon hearsay, you still have to get over that hurdle, and
she may have even indicated relevance, once again, but in any event, I am sustaining her
objection.
C Can I just enter, respectfully, Your Honor, a pattern and practice argument, habit, hearsay

objection?

H Move on!

C So, just to be clear, Your Honor, I can ask Mr. Frontino about what he heard the Officer say in

regard to whether or not they were conditioning arrest upon failure to consent to..

r Objection, calls for hearsay

H If you can, if you can...provide me with a hearsay exception, number one, and number two provide

me with a relevance as to why that's relevant, yes, absolutely, so go forward.

C I feel it is relevant, Your Honor, because the results of the search, the fruit of the poisonous tree,

factor in heavily in the Reno City Attorney's case, without that...their case rests on...I don't know

what.. and whether or not these cough drops..

H So, before you go on, your argument is the fruit...I take it...what are the fruits here?

C Well in their arrest report they mention that the search incident to arrest yielded some cough drops,

not cough drops in a container or some packaging, but just some cough drops..and...

H So, if you were succesful and you Got that thrown out, on what basis would the case fall?

C Well, its....

H As fruit of the poisonous tree?

C Well, I believe the actus reus would be lacking...the property itself...the physical evidence, would

not be there to the extent its alleged to be physical evidence, that would not be available

H Alright, I understand...now give me the response to the hearsay objections




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c: I believe one is that its a statement against interest to the extent that this Walmart is rented out by
those Officer's employers to Walmart, the property Mr. Frontino testified earlier, that there is a close
working relationship with these Indian Colony Police, so much so that they are able to sit and have
jovial conversation and laughter for approximately 45 minutes prior to trial. They all may potentially
face a giant liability for a 1983 cause of action for a wrongful arrest, as such, there is a possibility that
they are acting in concert and that any statements made by Indian Colony Police are necessariliy
imputed to Walmart and therefore are a statement against interest.
H; Okay, alright, any response from the City?
R First of all, Your Honor, Mr. Frontino testified that he witnessed the defendant, I believe, consume
some of the cough drops, and regardless of whether there were any cough drops found in his pocket,
that that observation is not negated...we may not be able to ascertain the value of the cough drops
because we wouldn't have the package... in addition, even if the cough drops and the evidence related
to the cough drops was excluded that would not apply to the candy bar or the chocolate item that Mr.
Frontino referred to. Regarding the hearsay exception, I don't believe the fact that he may be even
best friends with one of the Officers makes or meets the hearsay objection, it doesn't meet any of
exceptions under the hearsay rule, there is no such thing as fear of liability and the Officer is not a
litigant in this matter, maybe a future litigant at some poitn with Mr. Coughlin, it certainly is not the
case today.
C: Your Honor,

H No, nothing further. I haven't found any hearsay objection, nor do I find this particularly relevant,

its sustained ask another question.

C: Alright, Your Honor, and I will just preserve the objection for the record that its not being
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that it does hae indicia of reliability given the
contemporaneous nature of the statement, particularly with regard to it being a performative
utterance.
(Oh, man, did that half court shot at the buzzer piss Judge Howard off, to the point where he
has to bash someone just for having the industry to leverage technology)
H: Ask another question! I gave you every opportunity to give me your argument. What you have

done now it say well, you know what? I have gone to my little laptop and I've got some additional

information that I want to present... and I have repeatedly indicated to you: one shot, I make the

ruling, we move on....and ONCE AGAIN, you've gone behind my ruling and added additional

information. Ask the question, Sir!

C: Okay, and also just to the extent that commands are not hearsay. Mr. Frontino, did you make

any statements to the accused that you would bargain with the accused and that if he gave you back

this or that item you would let him go...

f No, I did not.

C Do you ever make such statements?

F I believe you are referring to the fact that after I had already had the police there I had said that had

you cooperated then they would not have been involved. Per policy, we could have allowed you

leave the facility upon putting your information into our system.

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(4:36:26 p.m. Note: Frontino uses the word choice allowed you to leave, which clearly
indicates the accused not being there entirely voluntarily)



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C How is that different?

F How is what different?

C It seems as though my question was: Did you make any statements that, if you cooperate and you

gives us this back, we will let you go... and you said, no, and then you said, basically, no, I told you

if you would have cooperated, we would have let you go and it seems as though you are saying those

are different thing...

f had you not removed stuff from our facility we wouldn't have detained you? Its a if you hadn't

done this, we wouldn't have...

H: stop, stop, stop... Go ahead.

C My question to you, Sir, is: can you explain to me how there's fundmentl difference between your

assertion that you did not say If you cooperate and give the stuff back then you'd let the accused

go, and your subsequent assertion that they accused was only arrested because he didn't cooperate

and give the stuff back?

R Your Honor, that's not what he said.

H I'll let him respond. Overruled. Go ahead.

F So, what I...uh..I believe your question was asking me if I tried to bargain with you...and I never

tried to bargain with you...the difference to me was that I was stating the fact that had you done

this...had you simply given us identification, per Walmart policy under the...under what we had in

front of us...we could have allowed you to leave our facility by just putting you into our system...

C And did you also make the statement that had you simply given the items back

f I don't believe I made the statement that had you simply given the items back...no...I believe I was

pretty explicit by stating that had you cooperated...we wouldn't have given a rat....

c By cooperated did you mean both: give your identification AND given the items back?

F Um...I...primarily just wanted your information...

f: I am not asking you what you wanted, Sir, I am asking you what you said.

F Um.... cooperation means cooperation in whole...um...had you not given the items
back...it wouldn't have changed....
(4:38:52 p.m )
c Okay, that seems incongruous... cooperation...
r Well, objection, Your Honor, how's he going to give the items back that he's already eaten?
So, I mean, I think its a ridiculous line of questioning anyway
H It's not relevant, but he continues on this path, ask another question!
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(4:39:03 p.m. OH, ITS PRETTY RELEVANT, THOUGH....One, the big smoking gun,
allegedly, in the police report is that the fruit of the poisonous tree, the one foil sheet of 6 Duract
Cough melts, exacty one half of a package like those sold at Wal-Mart, was culled from the
Fourth Amendment violating search of Coughlin's pockets...a search which -Frontino admits
only took place immediately after Coughlin indicated he wanted an attorney. So, crafty vet
Pam Robert's non-sequitur about how what's the point if he already at the stuff anyways,
aside, clearly, Frontino wanted some Duract Cough Melts back. And Judge Howard was only
to eager to chime in with his assessment that Roberts point was such a good one, despite the fact
that pretty much the prosecutions whole case came down to one sheet of 6 Duract Cough Melts
being found in Coughlin's short's pockets. Further, the search extended to all sorts of cargo
pockets, arguably well beyond the scope allowable for such a search incident to arrest. There
has to be a line somewhere. A body cavity search would have been impermissible, right? Then's
there's Frontino's whole... I was primarily wanting to get the identification...tip toeing around



whether he bargained with the old give us the stuff back, and it's all good and especially
wanting to stay away from the whole, let us coerce a confession out of you, under the guise that
2
we will let you go, only to reneg on the deal once you incriminate yourself....Then Frontino trips
3
up by admitting he views cooperation to mean cooperation in whole, ie, giving the
identification and giving the stuff back, or at least, giving a confession. Clearly, with Frontino,
4
anything less than confessing, consenting to a search, and giving something back is tantamount
to being non-compliant, and failing to cooperate...at which point he calls his buddies on the
5 Tribal Police Force ot come in and do the impermissible searching)
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c So do know whether or not the items that were on the receipt the accused got upon paying for
items what was on that receipt?
F I believe I already told you no.
(4:39:39 p.m.)
C I believe you did, Sir. So my question is, so you don't know whether or not three, four, or five
boxes of cough drops were on it.
F Um...there was no cough drops rung up because I was in plain sight.
C There was no cough drops rung up on the receipt? I am not talking about the receipt of the
allegedly stolen items...I am talking about the receipt for somewhat for $70 or $80 around there,
for the items the accused paid for.
F I couldn't speak for every...
H Stop! You have already answered the question, I know it. Asked and answered, ask another
question.
C Okay, he just said there was no cough drops on the receipt, that's correct?
f: Cough drop...
H Stop! I have ruled! Ask another question.
C Okay...Do you know whether the accused made any statements to the cashier which resulted in the
cough drops being put on the receipt?
F She would have had to hand key them in, so type in the receipt, so...in terms of verbal
communciation I would not have been able to hear, but she would have had to hand key in the
items...um...based off of a UPC that she would have had to have memorized or that you would have
had to have memorized..
(4:40:41 p.m.)
c Okay, but if she had rung up one package of cough drops, she could have just...if one had have
been purchased and rung up, and then, say the accused said, oh, there was a couple more,
then she could have just hit the times 2, times 3 button for quantity...
f Um...I don't believe the cash registers....whether or not they still allow that or not...its against
policy for them to do that though.
C Okay, so you say whether they STILL allow that...so does that indicate that, to your
knowledge that, in the past, such a practice had occurred?
F Yes, they could.
F For instance, if someone bought four packages of diet cokes, 12 packs, and they didn't want to
lift each of those heavy packages up, they say: I had four of these, then the cashier could scan
one of them and they could say: okay, and there's three more and cashier would hit quantity
times 3 or something like that...?
f Yes, they could, but not in that order, but yes they could...



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c And your testimony today is you do not know whether any such statements were made
regarding
f No, I was not in earshot of the communication that you guys had, as I stated earlier...
c Oh, I didn't realize that is what you stated...so you are saying that you were not within earshot
of the transaction between the accused...
H He testified to that previously, MOVE ON!
C Okay, was anybody that you are aware of at Walmart...?
R Not, asked and answered...
H Not...asked and answered and its not relevant, 'nother question!
(4:42:40 p.m., man, Judge Howard certainly is helpful to prosecutor Roberts, constantly
chiming in with objections of his own like the above relevancy objection, although, its hard to
understand how that would not be relevant, given it could potentially go directly to whether or
not the accused made an indication to the cashier as to the quantity of cough drops purchased,
etc....).
c Do you know whether the accused not only bought a package of the very cough drops that are
alleged to be stolen here but also made statements to the cashier with respect to an additional
quantity of the same item being purchased?
H Now, he indicated that he could not hear the discussion between you and the cashier? Do you
recall that testimony? Yet, you turn right around and ask him that question once again...
c Because, I see...
h Ask another question!
C Your Honor, its because I see..
H Ask another question!
C Did you earlier say you could hear what was said between the cashier and the accused?
F No, I did not.
C Okay, so a review of the tape won't show that.
F No.
c So, is it possible that...and just to clarify...you said you don't know what's on the...let's clal is
the $80 receipt...you don't know what items were on that?
F on the receipt for the $80 of items you purchased at the facility, no I do not know what items were
on that
(4:43:54 p.m. Oh, man, here Judge Howard sees it coming and really, really wants to try to
stop it from happening....must try to bully defendant out of pointing out another in a line of
salient incongruities in Frontino's testimony, here, it concerns the fact that Frontino testified
earlier that he knew no cough drops were rung up by the cashier, yet just above he testified that
he didn't know what items were on that receipt...only to turn around and assert that his spidey
vision or whatever enable him to discern from the women's clothing section each and every
item rung up)
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c So you don't know whether or not there is

25 h He doesn't know what items are on the receipt
c Okay, but earlier he testified that he knew that the receipt didn't have an entry for a box of
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cough drops
H Ask another question! ASK ANOTHER QUESTION!!#@$#@$#@4
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C Okay, earlier, did you testify that you knew a box of that same UPC for those cough drops was
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NOT on the $80 receipt?



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F I watched your transaction and I did not see the identical cough drops rung up on your
receipt..
c You watched the transaction...you were able to see it closely enough...yet you weren't able to
hear any of the transaction?
F That is correct?
C Do you have some hearing problems?
F No, I do not.
C Do you have super powerful vision?

F I can simply see farther than I can hear people speaking at normal voice.

C About how far where you from the point of ringing up the items on the $80 receipt?

F Uh...probably about thirt feet behind you....behind the registers...

c Okay, so, where you....when you say behind the registers, is that...would that put you closer to the

back of the store or the front of the store?

F Um...the front of the store..

c Near the entrance...

f Uh...no, by back of the store/front of the store, your talking about front to back its not relevant to the

exits.

C I guess its...is it fair to say the front of the store is where the exits are?

F Yes.
C Entrance and the exits at the front of the store/

f Yes.

C Okay, so, can you give me some indication where you were located at the time the items were

being rung up?

F at the time you were specifically being rung up, I was standing in women's apparel, which is

directly behind the registers, its about twenty feet away from the registers...

c You said you were about thirty feet away

f Correct, I was in women's apparel.

C So...but then you said twenty feet?

R Your Honor, he's really being argumentative, he explained where he was, that then...um...he's

splitting hairs...the women's department was twenty feet away, but then he said he was thirty feet

away, there's no inconsistency...I don't think there is either...here's the deal, Mr. Coughlin, we started

the testimony of this witness at approximately 2:40, and not it is approximately 4:44 pm, I want you

to expedite your cross examination, which has been quite extensive, and the court's granted you a

great deal of leeway, and I want you to move towards wrapping this up. I don't want to hear

questions that have already been addressed previously, with that you may proceed.

C I'm sorry Your Honor, would it be possible to help me find my place on whether the last objection

was ruled on...oh yeah, I remember is was about twenty to thirty feet I was seeking clarification with

regard to

H the objection was sustained.

C Mr. Frontino, from your vantage point from, in your words, about thirty feet away from where this

was being rung up, when you were located in the women's apparel section compared to the register

number 17, maybe...

f Uh...I believe it was 17 because it was the cigarette isle if I remember correctly..

c You were saying you were able to discern each and every item that was rung up on that $80 receipt

and verify to yourself that none of those items had the same UPC as the cough drops or the candy

bar...




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(4:48:31 p.m.)
f I couldn't tell you that every single item was verified, however, I had the packaging to the
cough drops, and I was specifically looking for the cough drops beign purchased...um...I didn't
care if there was other candy items being purchased because they did not match the cough
drops that I had in my hand...
c So you say you were not able to discern every item purchased, while at the same time you
were able to discern that none of the items purchased had the same UPC as the cough drops?
F None of them had the same packaging therefore I could make the observation that they could
not have the same UPC, so...no I could not read the UPC but they were not the same items as
they one's I had...
c Okay, so if the accused was able to present the $80 receipt and it had the exact same UPC as
the cough drops, that would directly contradict what you are saying, wouldn't it, Sir?
F Yes, it would.
(4:49:35 p.m.)
c So, just to be clear, you have testified here today, that you are absolutely sure that the $80
receipt does not have the item with any entry with the same UPC and therefore the same
packaging, as the cough drops, and that if such a receipt is presented, with the same UPC, then
your testimony would necessarily be impeached
r Objection, that's now calling for...uh...legal conclusion regarding whether he's impeached or
not.
H Sustained.
C Withdraw that aspect with regard to whether he is impeached or not...Then...your testimony
would be inaccurate?
F I would say if you were able to provide a valid receipt from that exact transaction, then, yes, it
would
c And do you know who the cashier was on that transaction?
F I do not know who the cashier was, no.
C Do you or anyone you are aware of at Walmart ask that cashier whether any statements were
made by the accused with regard to whether there were a quantity to add on any purchase?
F Not to my knowledge, no.
c Did you make any attempts to query that cashier in that regard?
F No.
c And, nobody else, to your knowledge, at Walmart did?
F No.
C Does that seem reckless to you?
(4:51:28 p.m.)
r Objection
H Sustained
(Judge Howard rules on the objection before Roberts even state her basis, again and again, in
her favor)
C Just a moment ago you said, with respect to your discerning from thirty feet away in the
women's clothing isle, what
was purchased at a particular cash register, from behind a six foot four, two hundred and fifty
pound man, where you were standing...you were able to see?



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f I was not behind, um...um...is there a question...um I was behind the cash register, I was not
behind you... I was standing in women's apparel, so unless you were standing on the conveyor
belt, you wouldn't be blocking my view..
(4:52:09 p.m.)
c So would you say you were directly behind the conveyor belt?
F I would say that I was...probably not 90 degrees behind it...I didn't measure, but I was behind
it, and I could see the items that were being purchased...
c Each and every one of them
f Yes
c And you were able to remember each and every one of those items for which and $80 receipt
was made?
f Absolutely not. I...I...I am not saying that I remember currently every item that you
purchased...I know that you did not have items that our purchased that matched the items you
selected and consumed.
C Well, that brings up, earlier you said that I didn't discern or verify whether you had
purchased the same candy items, I was focused on making sure you hadn't purchased an item
with the same UPC as the cough drops...that's what you said earlier, correct?
R Uh...um...uh...Objection, again, he's not restating the testimony accurately.
H Is that what you testified?
F I testified that I watched and I was primarily only looking for the items that I had seen you
select and conceal or consume
C Isn't it accurate to say that your testimony earlier was that you were primarily only looking
for the cough drops...and then you made a statement about not caring whether the candy...
H Is this a complex question once again? ASK A QUESTION.
C Okay, earlier your statements with regard to what you were primarily concerned with, did
they not specifally limit your concerns to the cough drops?
F They were primarily concerned with the cough drops because the chocolate item was still left
and hidden in the cart.
C I am just asking you, Sir, about your earlier testimony, not your state of mind about what
you, what you feel about the events or your recollections, just what you testified to earlier...is it
fair to say that what you testified to earlier was that I was primarily only concerned about
making sure that the cough drops or an item of the same UPC was not being purchased...to
the exclusion of not caring whether or not similar candy items were being purchased? Did you
not say that on the record today?
F I believe that I said earlier that I was concerned with the items that you had selected and
consumed...um....the cough drops were a primary concern, but, you also did not ring up
anything that included the chocolate item.
C Yet, earlier, didn't you testify that a number of candy items were selected and later
purchased?
F Yes.
C But, now your are saying, that your were somehow able to verify and discern from thirty feet
away that that particular candy item was not...the UPC for that, was not also included on the
$80 receipt.
F I was primarily only concerned with the cough drops, I was watching for the candy, the
wrapper...the candy was still in the cart.
c And that's where I have an objection, non-responsive.



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H Are you done?

C No, Sir, I am not, I just objected to the fact that he didn't answer the question I asked. Everytime he
gets cornered he starts talking about irrelevant stuff.
(4:55:43 p.m.)
H If your tendering that objection to the Court, its overruled.
C Were you able to verify, from your position of some thirty feet away, that the candy item
alleged to have been stolen...and the UPC for that candy item, was not included on the $80
receipt?
F I was unable to verify, other than the fact, that it was not hand keyed in, it was never
presented for scanning...
c Okay, but similar to the cough drops, you were not able to verify that the same item was key
in, or an item with the same UPC was key in, and upon that a quantity number was added to
the receipt to reflect the purchase of the item, the chocolate item, you are alleging was stolen?
F You selected two packages of cough drops and one candy bar, and...and... one of that identical
chocolate item, and no more, so had...there where no other items for her to be able to ring up
(4:56:56 p.m.)
c Well earlier you testified that a number of chocolate items were purchased?
F Those specific ones.
C Well you also testified that you had no idea, specifically, what was on the $80 receipt?
F Correct, I do not know what was on your $80 receipt.
C Well, I think its geometry or something from high school, the transitive property of this and
that would suggest that how could he not know whats on the
H ITS ARGUMENTATIVE!
C Well, I am asking him..
H ITS ARGUMENTATIVE!%^#$%$#@%
c Sir, how can you know something was not on the receipt if you testified that you don't know what
was on the receipt?
F Because I saw how many of the items you selected.
C Okay, can you give us a specific number now and specifically identify in some way what those
items were?
(4:57:59 p.m.)
F you selected the two packages of cough drops that I have pictures of an a receipt for, and you
selected the chocolate item.
(NOTE: he says two packages of cough drops...BUT WOULDN'T THAT MAKE 3 BOXES IF
YOU ADD THE ONE ON THE $80 RECEIPT?)
c Okay, and then theres was...I selected another $80 worth of stuff?
f You selected other candy items, yes, and you paid for some of them and you left some of them
at the register.
C Okay, and how do you know that amongst those paid for was not an item with the same
UPC?
(4:58:20 p.m BAM JUDGE HOWARD SLAMS SOMETHING DOWN ON HIS BENCH)
H Asked and answered a hundred times. I don't know why you continue to beat this horse, I
really truly don't. Ask another question. Mr. Coughlin, you have ten minutes remaining in the
cross examination of Mr. Frontino. I think that's where you are headed in any event. Argue it

on appeal. And currently let the record reflect that it is now five minutes to five and that five minutes

after five Mr. Coughlin's testimony, or cross examination, rather, will be terminated.




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C Okay. Did you make any statements to the Officer about... we...I guess you said we and then

we speculated about whom you meant by we about how we've been watching the accused, and we

first became aware of, or worried...took notice of him...when he took a photograph of a television,

and... then you named specifically a manager, a blond haired lady in her late forties...Did you make

such statements?

F Never have I made such statements.

(5:00:25 p.m.)

c Did you make statements to the Indian Colony Officers with respect to previous interactions with

the accused that elicited your consternation?

F Uh...watch does consternation mean?

C It means your were suspicious of him, so you were watching him?

f Yes.

C Can you specify in detail what those statements were?

F That we had had issues with the Defendant in the past that...we had been hoping to trespass him for

suspected activies in the

store for suspected hardware swapping with laptops and things of that nature...I had previously seen

you and followed you before, but did not detain you because I was honestly hoping for more...I was

hoping there would more than a package of M&M's. So, I had my own reasons to follow you before

the incident in question.

C Okay, so you're saying you made no statements to the Indian Colony Officers with respect to

suspicion being aroused by either you or someone you work with at Walmart including a Manager

who is a female related to the taking of a photograph of a flat-screen television?

F I personally know nothing of the photograph. This is the first thing I have heard of it.

C I am not asking you what you know about the photograph, I am asking you about the statements

you made to the Indian Colony Police.

(5:02:13 p.m. Check to see Police were asked about the photograph)

f Uh...no, I did not make a statement about a photograph.

C Okay, so if someone had been tape recording that interaction between you and the Indian Colony

Police, and it revealed that you did make such a statement, would that mean that you are lying now?

F Yes, if that was the case, if there was video evidence, that would be the case.

C Or audio, okay....So, you say, at some part of the store, you witnessed not only the cough drops

being opened, but then concealed?

F Correct.

C Did you ever witness the cough drops being consumed?

F Some of them were consumed in the store.

(5:03:10 p.m.)

H And his response was some of them were consumed in the store.

C Which doesn't specify whether he witnessed them...it might be speculation...its a curious way to

phrase it

h Did you observe him to consume the items within the store?

F Yes, Sir, I did.

C So, to be clear, you are not saying, that you observed the accused consumed the cough drops
in the store?
(5:03:38 p.m THIS IS THE FIRST TIME FRONTINO DECIDES TO SAY HE WITNESSES
THE COUGH DROPS BEING CONSUMED. AT ALL OTHER TIMES HE STOPPED
SHORT OF SAYING CONSUMED AND INSTEAD WENT WITH SELECTED AND



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CONCEALED, WHEREUPON HE ALSO MADE MENTION OF THE ACCUSED
ENTERING THE RESTROOM AND HOW WALMART POLICY DID NOT ALLOW FOR
HIM TO FOLLOW IN TO THE RESTROOM)
c So, to be clear, you are now saying that you observed the accused consume the cough drops in the

store?

F Yes, Sir, I am.

C Where did that occur?

F Throughout the store.

C Specifically, where?

F You were....in....um...household cleaning chemicals...electronics....you were throughout the store

domestics...you were throughout the store...consuming food.

C Okay, now you are saying consuming food
(5:04:08 p.m.)
f Cough drops. You were consuming cough drops... you were consuming the chocolate.

C Are you sure which was being consumed? It sounds as though...

f I am sure both were being consumed.

C And how are you sure?

F I watched you do it.

C How many were consumed?

F I didn't count.

C So you were able to watch, but you weren't able to discern how many?

R Objection, he said he didn't count, Your Honor.

H Sustained.

C So, how many cough drops were recovered?

F Uh....part of one package...it was approximately six out of one of the packages that were recovered?

C Okay, so how many are in each package?
(5:04:59 p.m)
F I would have to look.. I don't recall how many were in each package...They were attached...they
were in blister packs
c. Not enough to make two packages?

F No, not enough to make two packages?

C Well then how are you able to assert that two were stolen?

f Because you opened two, and you concealed the contents of two.

C And your store's policy is...what? You said something about a bathrooom and not being able to...

h Asked and answered...go on

c Okay, so, is it your store's policy that if you aren't able to recover the items, you still assert and

affect an arrest charging that the items were stolen?

F Will you ask the question again?

C Yeah. How do you know two packages were stolen if you only recovered part of one?

F I made an assumption that both were stolen.

C And did you have any evidence of that assumption?

F You selected and concealed the contents of two packages...that was my assumption. The

packages were thrown in the garbage, which would render us unable to account for them...
27
(5:06:27 p.m. THIS IS INTERESTING BECAUSE HERE FRONTINO CLASSIFIES HIS

28
TESTIMONY AS BOTH AN EYE WITNESS ACCOUNT OF COUGH DROPS BEING


CONSUMED, ONLY TO THEN CHARACTERIZE THE DECISION TO CHARGE FOR THE

COUGH DROPS AS TO BE PREMISED UPON HIS ASSUMPTION THAT HE MADE, THAT
2
THE COUGH DROPS WERE CONSUMED IN THE RESTROOM...SO, WHICH IS IT,
3
FRONTINO, DID YOU ACTUALLY PERCEIVED THE CONSUMPTION WITH YOUR OWN
EYES, OR DID YOU HAVE TO ASSUME THEY WERE CONSUMED WHILE THE SUSPECT
4
WAS IN THE RESTROOM?)
1
(5:06:50 p.m.)
c Well, if the contents of two packages were stolen, even if some of them were consumed...surely you
7
would have recovered some wrappings or something that would add up to two packages incident to
the impermissible search, wouldn't you? Yet, you didn't. How is that possible to say two were
8
concealed, yet only part of one was recovered upon a full search.
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(5:07:11 p.m. NEXT, IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT FRONTINO SAYS WHETHER

THE REST WERE EATEN OR THE REST WERE FLUSHED IN THE TOILET... WHICH
INDICATES A LACK OF CERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THEY WERE EATEN OR
CONSUMED...YET JUST A MINUTE AGO FRONTINO, AFTER APPARENTLY DEDUCING
THAT THE CASE WOULD BE MUCH STRONGER IF HE WOULD JUST SAY HE SAW THE
COUGH DROPS BEING CONSUMED, DID, IN FACT, TESTIFY THAT HE WAS AN EYE
WITNESS TO THE COUGH DROPS BEING CONSUMED....WHICH BEGS THE QUESTION:
WHY DOES FRONTINO THEN TALK ABOUT HOW HE MADE AN ASSUMPTION AND
THEN GO ON TO POSTULATE AS TO WHETHER THE REST WERE EATEN OR THE REST
WERE FLUSHED IN THE TOILET...WALMART LOST THAT PROPERTY....)
f Whether the rest were eaten or the rest were flushed in the toilet, Walmart lost that property.
C So, on what basis do you call the State down to arrest somebody?
(5:07:29 p.m. like instances like )
F Based upon the chocolate bar, I made that statement clear earlier.
C Okay, but you still charging two packages of cough drops where you have nothing but an
assumption to speak to one and a half packages worth of the contents of the cough drops.
H Question?
C Yes, do you have anything to support what was charged, that two were stolen when you only
recovered after full search what you allege to be half the contents of one?
Roberts objection asked and answered
Howard if you can respond please do
fronting no I mostly have I believe I stated earlier I assumed you had removed both from the
facility because you threw the packaging to both away and concealed both, um, you did
consumed some in the facility I didn't count how many that was
Coughlin okay were you ever made aware or have any knowledge of any arguments between the
accused and the customer service counter with respect to the enforcement of the return policy
Roberts objection relevance
Howard relevance and at this point it's 5 min. after five and so we will end cross examination you
could save that issue for appeal or make a record that this inquiry has been replete with non-relevant,
repetitious inquiry in Wigan and at this point thank you very much
Howard Call you next witness
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Coughlin Can I just preserve my objection that I have more questions for the witness just dismissed
Roberts I call Ofc. Crawford as a witness
Coughlin Your Honor was my understanding court hours end at five? is that not the case nuclear to
have prior commitments
Howard we are going to continue on I think I told you earlier when I said we were can have this
matter resolved tonight
Coughlin so are we how long could we possibly be here tonight
Howard till we finish
Coughlin well I was relying upon posted court hours that say court ends at five
Howard will continue will continue
Coughlin I don't know that I can state Your Honor
Howard proceed with your case
Roberts officer Crawford please please state your full name and spell your last name for the record
Crawford Kameron Lane Crawford
Coughlin Your Honor may I use the restroom in
Howard will take it you've got until 510 don't be late
Coughlin my clock says it's a time now
Howard Sir, you better get going and you've got until five ten on this clock right here we are going to
proceed at that time the court will remain on the bench (5:10:52 p.m.)
Howard we are back on the record it is approximately 511 and we will proceed Ms. Roberts
Roberts officer Crawford what is your job
Crawford IMO tribal police officer for the Reno Sparks Indian colony
Roberts and how long have you been employed with the Indian Colongy
Coughlin just quickly I will enter my objections for the record with regard to anything officer
Crawford may wish to testify with under the exclusionary rule objections are
Howard I can't hear you sir
Coughlin I am sorry Your Honor I am very light-headed and I think I need to eat something my blood
sugar is I'm having trouble I am very tired and lightheaded I probably need to eat something
Howard I can hear you now go ahead
C I was restating my objections for the record that we've gone over some link with Mr. Frontino but
now wish to apply them to officer Cameron Crawford you know all the exclusionary rule objections
Howard Sir I am having difficulty understanding what your objection is the city imposed and
requested the rule of exclusion I granted that so what is your check shims to this witness
Coughlin the city requested a role of exclusion?
Howard:
Robert Your Honor I requested
Coughlin I'm confused I which incarcerated their goals? They want a rule of exclusion?
Howard what is your objections Sir?
Coughlin well I am seeking to exclude from being entered into evidence fruit of the poisonous tree
the alleged fruit
Howard that request is denied overruled go ahead please
Roberts officer Crawford how long have you been employed by the Reno Sparks in: eight
Crawford a little over three months now
Roberts on September 9 of 2011 reviewing training
Crawford I was yes
Roberts and Hoosier training officer



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Crawford officer Donnie Braun worth

Roberts and his CD officer that some hallway
Crawford yes
Roberts and were UN officer Braunworth dispatch to 2425 E. 2nd St. the Walmart located there
Crawford yes
Roberts and is that Walmart in the city of Reno (5:17:47 p.m. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE
THAT ROBERTS DOES NOT REQUEST HERE FOR THE COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL
NOTICE AS TO JURISDICTION, AND THERE IS A SALIENT POINT IN DISPUTE WITH
RESPECT TO WHETHER THE CITY NEEDED TO ESTABLISH THAT COUGHLIN HAS NO
INDIAN OR TRIBAL BLOOD OR AFFILIATION AND THAT TRIBAL COURT IS NOT THE
APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR SUCH AN ARREST, WHERE, AS HERE, IT occurred ON TRIBAL
LAND)
Crawford yes, it is.
Roberts and when you arrived there with officer Braunworth did you come in contact with the suspect
for shoplifting
Crawford yes we did
Roberts where was that suspect located when you first make contact with him
Crawford will in the Walmart security office
Robertsand you remember Mr. Fontenot was present at that time that you make
contact with the suspect
Crawford yes he was
Robert since you recognize the suspect that he made contact with on September 9 is the press in the
courtroom today
Crawford yes he is
Roberts would you please state what he is wearing and ratesetting
Crawford is wearing a dark colored soup with the dark-colored shirt and a setting where the defendant
would be sitting
Howard the record will reflect that Crawford identified Mr. Coughlin
Roberts when you first make contact with Mr. Coughlin had you on was he standing sitting or what
Crawford he was sitting down on a bench
Roberts okay and it was any kind handcuffs restraints
Roberts
roberts and when you approach the suspect you have to ask him any questions or have a discussion
with him
crawford I did ask him questions
Roberts and what questions should you ask him
Crawford I advised him why I was there that Walmart had called because they suspected he had taken
property I then told him that it was my decision to either write up the citation or take him to jail and
that I would prefer to write him a citation so I didn't jam up our Boulevard with unnecessary people
going up there(5:19:28 p.m.) I asked him specific questions because he did not have ID on him at the
time I asked him questions like what Richard date of birth where do you live so I could run them
through dispatch to make sure he didn't have any warrants also to fill out the citation of he refused to
provide those provide that information
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(THIS WHOLE BUSINESS ABOUT PREFERRING TO WRITE A CITATION SEEMS ALL THE
MORE PHONY IF WRITING A CITATION WOULD NOT TYPICALLY ENTAIL
2
CONDUCTING A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST)
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Robert so in order to cite summonsed arrest you need out certain information to fill out the citation
Crawford guest muskrat
Roberts and what pieces of information you need to have
Crawford date of birth, Social Security number, place of employment, contact phone number stuff
like that
Roberts their full name?
Crawford their full name, yes
Roberts and did he provide any of that to you when you asked
Crawford he did provide his full name yes
Roberts so other than his full name he didn't provide you with any other information for you to fill
out the citation?
Crawford I believe he may have provided his address or the city you live I apologize may provide the
city he lived another one that he refused all questions
Roberts said there was insufficient information to issue a citation
Crawford no maam
Roberts did you or officer Braunworth conduct a search of the suspect?
Crawford officer Braun worth asked him if he had any weapons on him he said he did not we asked
him if we could go ahead and make sure that he did not have any weapons on them he said we could
Roberts okay let me ask you and let me stop you just right there, at this point you know he's there for
what type of charge
Crawford Petty larceny
Roberts and is that routine for you to ask about whether or not if you are going to take someone into
custody ask whether not they have any weapons
Crawford yes it is
Roberts and is it routine for you to confirm assuming they consent to Pat Donna make sure that they
don't have any weapons
Crawford yes it is
Roberts and that's what you do with this particular suspect?
Crawford correctly told me not to go into his pockets but that I could search for weapons so I search
the outer clothing of his pockets to make sure he didn't have any weapons he did not have weapons
Roberts so he limited his consent
Crawford yes he did
Roberts any respect to that limitation
Crawford yes ma'am
Roberts did that happen before or after you were asking him questions concerning the information
you needed to fill out the citation?
(5:21:51 p.m.)
Crawford after
Roberts at some point did you continue to try to get information so that she could fill out a citation
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Crawford I believe I asked him several times for information and tried to explain to him that the
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citation would be better that it would be better to take a citation than going to jail all he had to do was
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provide me this information. His argument was that it was the same exact charge and that I wasn't
helping him and all. I said well it you wouldn't have to go to jail you could go home tonight and he
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still refused to answer any questions and asked for an attorney.
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(5:22:11 p.m.)
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( Here, Officer Crawford is lying under oath. He is attesting that he offered to simply write a citation,
and thus spare the accused the custodial arrest, if only the ACCUSED WOULD PROVIDE HIS
INFORMATION, AND SPECIFICALLY, OFFICER CRAWFORD IS INDICATING THAT HE
DID NOT PREMISE THE DECISION BETWEEN ISSUING A CITATION OR EFFECTING A
CUSTODIAL ARREST (AND, OF COURSE, CONDUCTING A SEARCH INCIDENT THERETO
THAT ARREST) UPON WHETHER OR NOT THE SUSPECT ADMITTED GUILT AS TO THE
PETTY LARCENY CHARGE. HOWEVER, THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED ON
SEPTEMBER 9TH, 2011 AT WALMART. BOTH FRONTINO AND CRAWFORD
SPECIFICALLY INDICATED TO THE ACCUSED THAT IF HE WOULD ONLY ADMIT HIS
GUILT, THEY WOULD ISSUE HIM A CITATION, AND, THEREFORE, HE COULD AVOID A
TRIP TO PARR BOULEVARD AND A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST;. THIS IS LIKELY
THE MAIN APPEALABLE ISSUE IN THIS CASE, IE, WHETHER THE POLICE CAN BASE
THE DECISION TO ARREST, RATHER THAN ISSUE A CITATION UPON WHETHER OR
NOT THE SUSPECT CONFESSES GUILT, RATHER THAN UPON SOME REASONABLY
ARTICULATED SUSPICION).)
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Roberts okay so once he asked for the attorney was was your decision-making process?
Crawford I advised him that I could no longer asking any questions I mean I could have asked him
questions related to date of birth and stuff like that but I couldn't asking questions about the crime and
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then placed him under arrest for petty larceny because he refused to give the information to fill out
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the citation or to run his name for warrants and he was placed under arrest at the time.
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(5:22:45 p.m. THE ABOVE REPRESENTS WHAT I FIND MOST OBJECTIONABLE ABOUT
THIS CASE. COUGHLIN (ACCORDING TO BAR COUNSEL PATRICK O. KING, COUGHLIN
USED TO BE AN ATTORNEY AND KING THINKS ITS JUST TERRIBLE, SAID IN A
REAL MOCKING/DERISIVE TONE BY KING TO COUGHLIN, THAT COUGHLIN IS NO
LONGER AN ATTORNEY...KING ALSO HAS MADE A GREAT DEAL OF FALSE AND
MISLEADING STATEMENT TO AND ABOUT COUGHLIN AND REFUSED TO PROVIDE
COUGHLIN COPIES OF MOST OF WHAT WAS PROVIDED TO KING INCIDENT TO THE
VARIOUS GRIEVANCES FILED BY RICHARG G. HILL, ESQ. AND JUDGE DOROTHY
NASH HOLMES (WHOSE BOUNTY OF MATERIALS PROVIDED TO KING INCLUDE ITEMS
THAT HOLME'S FELLOW RENO MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE, HONORABLE JUDGE
WILLIAM GARDNER, RECEIVED FROM HIS SISTER, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUDGE LINDA GARDNER, IN THE FORM OF A 3 YEAR OLD SANCTION ORDER ISSUED
BY HON. LINDA GARDNER AGAINST COUGHLIN, FOR WHICH COUGHLIN FILED A
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, AND WAS, ACCORDING TO HIS THEN
EMPLOYER, WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES, AND ITS EXECTUTIVE DIRECTOR PAUL
ELCANO, FIRED FOR, AND ONLY FOR, THE CONDUCT BEFORE JUDGE LINDA
GARDNER THAT LED TO HER ISSUING SANCTIONS AGAINST COUGHLIN IN A DIVORCE



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TRIAL WHEREIN HE REPRESENTED A VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INCIDENT TO

HIS POST AS A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ATTORNEY WITH WLS.)
Coughlin sorry I just would like to interject here with an objection to the extent that any information
gleaned a recovered for an arrest for a misdemeanor that did not occur within the officers present
should be excluded the actus reus involved in this crime charge is alleged to have occurred outside of
this officers presence and NRS provides that if that is the case no custodial arrest is permissible as
such any search incident to arrest any such custodial arrest should be excluded
Howard Ms. Roberts
Roberts Your Honor this officer attempted to build the issue the suspect a citation and it's his own
actions that prevented him from doing's just that because he can't fill out the citation if he doesn't
know the information that the defendant in the suspect in this case was unwilling to give to him there
was a complainant that observed the misdemeanor action and what he is doing is affecting arrest
based upon statement of an eyewitness that was right there I don't believe there was an unlawful arrest
by this police officer.
(5:24:02 p.m.)
Howard the objection is overruled Mr. Coughlin precipitated the need to arrest him by refusing to
provide the needed information for the citation, go ahead
Roberts Ofc. Crawford when you after you
Coughlin on just Internet objection that that is a factual determination that has apparently been ruled
upon prior to any counter evidence the ignited or my being given any chance to so admit such counter
evidence
Howard you will have an opportunity to cross-examine this was
Robert I just wondered how long it way before I got interrupted before I asked my next question
(5:24:05 p.m)
Roberts Ofc. Crawford
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Howard let me say and this is for your benefit once again we will have a hearing in regard to content
once this proceeding is concluded so every time you engage in one of these unprofessional acts I'm
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keeping count and we will address them at the end of this trial one thing has nothing to do with the
other I will make a separate and independent decision in regard to guilt or innocence but I have
20 already made a finding in regard to contempt with that go ahead and proceed
Coughlin and I'll enter an objection with regard to the fact that...
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Howard I don't want to hear anything from you at this point time!#*&^$$&*^!$@%
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Coughlin at the possibility of jail time exist I have a right to counsel
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(So, THAT MAY BE THE EVEN BIGGER APPEALABLE ISSUE HERE. FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
NRS 200.460 Definition; penalty.
1. False imprisonment is an unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another, and
consists in confinement or detention without sufficient legal authority.



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2. A person convicted of false imprisonment shall pay all damages sustained by the
person so imprisoned, and, except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, is guilty of a
gross misdemeanor.
NRS 171.126 Arrest by private person.

A private person may arrest another:

1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2. When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
3. When a felony has been in fact committed, and he has reasonable cause for

believing the person arrested to have committed it.

City Attorney Roberts offered testimony from both Frontino and Officer Crawford
purporting to establish that Frontino did not make a citizen's arrest. However, Frontino did inform
Coughlin in an extremely hostile and authoritative tone that Coughlin had to come with
Frontino back to the loss prevention room in order for Wal-Mart to complete this investigation.
Coughlin clearly felt he had no choice in the matter and that any failure to comply with Frontino's
dictates would be equivalent to resisting a shopkeeper's privilege to make a type of citizen's arrest.
To the extent Wal-Mart and Frontino are viewed to have made the arrest, under NRS 171.104, then
Coughlin clearly (both of the Interrogation Room videos establish that Coughlin handed his State of
Nevada driver's license to Officer Crawford, despite Officer's Crawfords, sworn, express testimony
to the contrary. In so doing and providing his name and address to Officer Crawford (and
Coughlin's address is clearly indicated on his driver's license as well) Coughlin provided all the
required information set forth in NRS 171.1774 for the issuance of a citation after arrest by a
private person under NRS 171.1772.
NRS 171.104 Arrest defined; by whom made.

An arrest is the taking of a person into custody, in a case and in the manner authorized

by law. An arrest may be made by a peace officer or by a private person.
NRS 171.1772 Issuance of citation after arrest by private person.

Whenever any person is arrested by a private person, as provided in NRS 171.126, for
any violation of a county, city or town ordinance or state law which is punishable as a
misdemeanor, such person arrested may be issued a misdemeanor citation by a
peace officer in lieu of being immediately taken before a magistrate by the peace
officer if:
1. The person arrested furnishes satisfactory evidence of identity; and
2. The peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested will
keep a written promise to appear in court.
NRS 171.1774 Form and contents of citation: When issued after arrest by private
person.
1. In those instances described in NRS 171.1772, the peace officer summoned after the
arrest shall prepare a misdemeanor citation manually or electronically in the form of a
complaint issuing in the name of The State of Nevada or in the name of the
respective county, city or town, and containing:



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(a) A notice to appear in court;

(b) The name and address of the person;
(c) The state registration number of his vehicle, if any;
(d) The offense charged, including a brief description of the offense and the NRS or
ordinance citation;
(e) The time when and place where the person is required to appear in court;
(f) Such other pertinent information as may be necessary; and
(g) The signatures of the private person making the arrest and the peace officer

preparing the citation.

NRS 171.124 Arrest by peace officer or officer of Drug Enforcement Administration.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 and NRS 33.070 and 33.320, a

peace officer or an officer of the Drug Enforcement Administration designated by the
Attorney General of the United States for that purpose may make an arrest in
obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) For a public offense committed or attempted in the officers presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor,
although not in the officers presence.
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NRS 171.124(1)(b): (b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross
misdemeanor, although not in the officers presence was clearly violated here by Officers Crawford
and Braunworth. The charged crime, petty larceny RMC 8.10.010, is a simple misdemeanor, and
it was not alleged to have occurred in the officer's presence. Enter Officer Crawford's perjury about
Coughlin failing to provide Officer Crawford his license. Enter a nationally published Associated
Press story title Reno Attorney Suspened for Shoplifting. Enter vast damage to Coughlin's
professional reputation and personal life, including the instant temporary suspension and looming
Disciplinary Board formal hearing. Then there is the blood in the water sharks like Richard G. Hill,
Esq. prey upon, leveraging to their advantage with all the innuendo they can muster (Hill made tacky
allegations of finding a crack pipe and a bag of weed in Coughlin's former home law office, though
Hill never did manage to produce a picture of such items or explain what he did with them or why he
did not call the police to report the crime of possession...certainly Richard has called the Reno Police
Department or Bar Counsel at every other possible opportunity, so....But at least Hill made his false,
defamatory, and declasse allegations against one whom has put in the hard time amongst those
lawyers concerned for lawyers (and a few judges) whom have stared things down that someone of
Hill's depth would find to be an unfathomable abyss. Without the alleged crime being committed in
their presence, these Tribal Police Officers (and Officer Crawford was in his first two weeks on the
job at the time of this arrest, and still a trainee, which is obvious by the way he grabs Coughlin's
shopping bag out of Coughlin's lap at least twice prior to the technical point of arrest, as evinced on
the two Interrogation Room videos) had to attempt to game the system some by offering perjured
testimony that is clearly contradicted by the two Interrogation Room videos that prosecutor City
Attorney Pam Nifong, er, Pamela Roberts, Esq., offered to Judge Howard, despite the fact that SHE
KNEW IS WAS FALSE. WHY DOESN'T BAR COUNSEL ACCEPT MY GRIEVANCE
AGAINST PAM ROBERTS? DOES SHE PLAY WITH SOME NET THAT THE REST OF US
SOLO PRACTITIONERS ARE NOT GRANTED? IS SHE A PROTECTED MEMBER OF SOME
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ESTABLISHMENT, LIKE ALL THE PUBLIC DEFENDERS WHOM ARE SEEMINGLY HELD
TO AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT STANDARD OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT THAN ARE
THOSE THE SUBJECT OF THE GRIEVANCES FILED BY RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., (on
behalf of former client's that Hill throws under the bus, no less, and of course after having extracted
some $20,000 in fees from....) and Judge Nash Holmes? Why is it that Bar Counsel Patrick King so
quickly dismisses the various grievances Coughlin filed after the inspiration provided by Hill? If
Coughlin's law license is taken away over a candy bar, allegedly stolen on a Saturday night and
nowhere near the practice of law...then what should Robert's punishment be for offering material
testimony by a police officer that she knew to be false about an incredibly salient aspect of her case
in chief?
Clearly, the overly chummy Frontino and Officer's Braunworth and Officer Crawford (all
who were palling around with each other for over 45 minutes in the hallway prior to trial and all who
remained at the courthouse until 8:30 p.m. to hear the verdict -and Frontino was done testifying by
5:10 p.m., and City Attorney Robert's invoking the rule of exclusion prevented him from passing the
time as a spectator) were gaming the system, wishing to effect a search incident to a custodial
arrest and to cover their tracks afterwards to make it all appear by the book, what with their constant
use of buzz words delivered in the least natural tone imaginable upon the witness stand in response to
City Attorney Roberts prompting (and after a good 45 minute does of coaching by City Attorney
Roberts immediately prior to trial).)
Roberts Ofc. Crawford when you place a suspect under arrest what did you physically do what are the
steps that you take to put someone in custody
Crawford once we have the suspect in handcuffs physically search them he search incident to arrest
per policy among
Roberts did you do that in this case
Crawford I did yes
Roberts and where the handcuffs put in front of them are behind him
Crawford behind him
Roberts and once you place them behind his back you did conduct a search incident to arrest?
Crawford yes
Roberts and what is the rationale for doing that
Crawford to protect the officer it's a safety issue from him getting into the patrol car or protecting
himself in case he has any weapons so he doesn't hurt an officer or himself
(5:26:35 p.m. ITS FUNNY, BECAUSE SOME MIGHT SAY THE TERRY PAT DOWN
WEAPONS SEARCH TESTIFIED TO EARLIER SHOULD HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THE
OBJECTIVES OFFICER CRAWFORD JUST MENTIONED, BUT, GUESS NOT...EVEN
THOUGH AT THIS POINT THE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE HIS HANDS CUFFED BEHIND
HIS BACK)
Roberts and when you conducted a search incident to arrest did you find any items related to the
nature the petty larceny that was alleged by Frontino
Crawford yes we did
Roberts what did you see
Crawford we found cough drops and a wrapper of cough drops in his pocket
Roberts okay when you are there prior to being placed under arrested the defendant make any
statements to you regarding his guilt or innocence
Crawford he did not know



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Roberts did the defendant complains you about Walmart's treatment of them
Crawford yes he did
Roberts was that before or after he was placed under arrest
Crawford after the arrest long after
Roberts when you put him when you took him to their place after after you did the search incident to
arrest what did you do next
Crawford I escorted him to the patrol vehicle and placed them in the back
Roberts and where did you transport him to
Crawford Washoe County Sheriff's office
Roberts was the transport from Walmart to Washoe County Jail uneventful
Crawford uh...it was
Roberts uneventful or eventful?
Crawford or eventful I apologize you I was eventful
Coughlin objection leaving the witness obviously
Howard also state that
Roberts did anything happen on the way to the jail with a suspect in your car
Crawford before we left Walmart he kicked the window one time and was told to stop. He did stop.
(5:28:17 p.m.)
Coughlin objection coaching the witness
Howard overruled
Roberts what else to do
Crawford he started throwing himself around the back I asked him before we went to Washoe County
Sheriff's Office on or off he thought it was more comfortable to have it off even though our policy is
to put them into a seatbelt I was trying to be polite to him because we're having so many issues I
didn't actually want to have to reach across him to put on to begin with up to Park Boulevard when he
did start turn itself around the backseat of the car saying we were trashing him around
Howard apparently for the record we will indicate that Mr. Coughlin apparently found this testimony
humorous
Coughlin No, sir, that is not correct
Howard apparently found this testimony humorous...
Coughlin I don't acknowledge that characterization as correct.
Roberts Ofc. Crawford after he threw himself around in the back of your patrol car was there any
thing else that happens before you got the jail involving the suspect
Crawford to statements he made about us trying to take advantage of the working man's dollar in
reconstruction and colony thinks that nature just statements
Roberts I have no further questions for this witness
Howard Mr. Coughlin cross examination of Ofc. Crawford
Coughlin Ofc. Crawford you realize you're under oath center
Crawford yes
Coughlin so were you lying when you said you offered to put a seat belt on the accused
Crawford No, sir.
Coughlin You weren't lying?
Crawford No, sir
Coughlin did the accused point out to you during the freeware car ride to our on 395 at speeds in
excess of 50 miles an hour that it was negligent for you and your partner to fail to both put a seatbelt



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on the accused or offer to and further negligence was exhibited in your failure to do so once the
accused requested you do if so put a seatbelt on the accused
Crawford sorry I'm confused on the question
Roberts that's a complex question
Howard is a complex question is done it repeatedly
Coughlin do you recall the accused making statements to you during the car ride to par
Crawford yester
Coughlin to the car right aren't clued a trip on Highway 395 in excess of 50 miles an hour
Crawford yester
Coughlin did he just make statements with regard to your failure to provide a seatbelt
Crawford yester
Coughlin did the accused ask if he could have a seatbelt?
Crawford Nosair
(5:31:20 p.m.)
Coughlin what statements did he make with respect to the seatbelt
Crawford devices that were being negligent with respect not providing a seatbelt even though he told
us he did want one and that it was a violation of state law and that we were violating it even though
he told a student while on
Coughlin are you aware of whether any recordings were made concerning the content of the
conversation between you your partner and the accused
Crawford no sir we do not have audio in our patrol car
Coughlin I did not ask you whether you have audio sir I asked you whether you are aware whether or
not any such audio recordings were made by you, or the State or by some punk with a smart phone
Crawford no I cannot
Coughlin and you know you're under oath
Crawford Yes, sir.
Coughlin so you're saying about the accused said something like that he didn't feel very comfortable
traveling in excess of speeds 50 mi./h on the freeway without a seat belt
Crawford I believe the accused did say that
Coughlin did you perceive the loan
Crawford Nosair
Coughlin why not
Crawford because it's not policy to pull over on the side of the freeway to put a seatbelt on with
Coughlin okay did you make any attempts to do so after pulling off freeway
Howard Mr. Coughlin we have been down this road before but what is the relevance with regards
your guilt or innocence on the petty larceny of whether or not you are provided seatbelt?
Coughlin I would like to
Howard sir don't interrupt how does that go your guilt or instance of the shirt of petty theft
Coughlin maybe we could ask Ms. Roberts that since she's the one who asked these questions in the
first place she's the one who brought up the seatbelt on the ride over and all the stuff ...and I didn't see
you sua sponte object to her...
Howard Ms. Roberts
Roberts grinding object to the relevance the testimony I listened from loss of star Crawford dealt with
the noncompliant nature and attitude of the defendant Mr. Coughlin also known as the accused and I
think that goes to the credibility and the consistency in the testimony of Mr. Francine who also
testified about his lack of cooperation and compliance



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Howard okay Coughlin give you the last word go ahead

Coughlin who were talking about the objection here? And this is your objection Your Honor?
Howard okay the testimony is not relevant go ahead and go to another line of questioning
Coughlin well it was relevant when Ms. Roberts was asking about seatbelts and stuff okay sir you
said under oath that the accused kicked the window
Crawford I believe yes
Coughlin you believe so
Crawford he either... The accused either kicked the window or hit it with his head I'm assuming
he...he kicked it
Coughlin hit it with his head you say?
Crawford one of the two yes
Coughlin but earlier you said you were sure that he kicked the window you sat here as a man with a
badge under oath and told this court that you knew the accused kicked a window and now now it's you
believe... Might've been his head...mighta been his foot....I just don't know... is that true?
Crawford know it was his foot
(5:35:25 p.m.)
Coughlin now you're sure But which is it with his foot I believe it was his foot Earth said it was his
foot
Howard question
Coughlin Which is it?
Crawford Let me clarify. The window was kicked one time extremely hard. The second time
either the back window or the far passenger-side window was also hit and made a loud noise.
The first time it was either kicked with his foot or the accused's head. There was a footprint on
the window; however, which window was hit with his foot or his head is unknown. It was
either one of the other
(5:35:58 p.m. GOOD GAWD WAS THAT A SHAKEY DEPICTION OF THINGS THAT MIGHT
HAVE HAPPENED MIXED WITH FACTUAL TIDBITS CONNOTING CERTAINTY, DRESSED
DOWN BY INCONSISTENCY AND CONJECTURE...A Judge can only jump in with sua sponte
objections to save such floundering witnesses so much....and that's after Officer Crawford says: Let
me clarify...? Wow.)
Coughlin Do you ever have anyone else in the car whose footprint it could've been.
Coughlin nope I keep my car clean.
Coughlin I didn't ask you if you keep your car clean, partner. I asked you if you ever had anybody
else in the car...
Roberts objection Your Honor he has to question and then he answered in said no and then explained
Howard sustained
Coughlin okay, so you keep your car clean
Crawford yes
Coughlin what time of the day did you clean your Windows on that day?
Howard asked another question, that's irrelevant.
Coughlin okay, what hour did you clean your car on that day?
Crawford oh that depends on the day I work graveyard
Coughlin I didn't ask you about anything I said on that day
Crawford on that day what kind I clean my window
Coughlin yet
Crawford it wasn't my patrol car



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Coughlin go well so you keep your car clean but this wasn't your patrol car so I guess when you say
something about your car it's kind of a non sequitur because we weren't dealing with your car here
were we so the footprint could've been from somebody else given that it wasn't your car and who
knows whether or not the person whose car it was keeps there's clean?
Roberts Your Honor is there question there? I'm objecting
Howard ask a question You are running out of time use your time wisely go ahead ask another
question.
Coughlin you said I had to be the key is footprint because you keep your car clean correct
Crawford yes
Coughlin then you said it wasn't your car
Crawford you said it was my car,
Coughlin No, no, no....your testimony was the car that was used for the arrest was not your car
correct?
Crawford yes
Coughlin so than how would you know whether or not the footprint on the window was the
accused's?
Crawford it had to of been yours
Coughlin On what basis do you say it had to of been the accused?
Crawford Because I don't remember somebody else kicking that car window within the time the
accused was arrested>
Coughlin Okay, but did you inspect the car window for footprints when you took possession of the
car that day?
Crawford No.
Coughlin So how can you be sure that there wasn't a footprint on the car window already?
Crawford I guess I'm not.
(5:38:09 p.m.)
Coughlin yeah but you just said you were and that it had to of been mine right?

Crawford you kicked it

Coughlin was it a head butt or a kick, Sir, because you didn't even seem to sure of that?

Crawford it was a kick to the driver side passenger or rear window....

(5:38:25 p.m.)
Coughlin so it's a kick now, and not a head butt?
Crawford possibly ahead but to the passenger side rear win in our windows are tinted you can't see
very well
Coughlin okay did you take any photographs of this phone footprint
Crawford neurosurgeon were not church registration property nor did any destruction of property
that's when the photographs were taken
Coughlin okay seven session the relevancy of this
Howard I don't find it relevant debated dead horse go ahead and write if you will you're beating a
dead horse go and ride it but you have a limited amount of time that cut you off so that once again
repetitive questions nonrelevant questions so you go ahead
Coughlin surgeon you make statements the a in Fiji and consents to the search that he would be
arrested
Crawford Yes, sir.
Coughlin you are under Oath, Sir.



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Howard you have asked and he answered the question ask another one
Coughlin did you make any statements to the accused that there was some scenario under which he
would not be arrested
Crawford I did I advised him that he can have a citation instead of being arrested I think that is what
you are asking...so yes.
Coughlin so what were the conditions for that?
Crawford I just need your personal information so the court would have proper contact information
and date of birth and stuff to get ahold of you.
(5:40:16 p.m. So, here, Officer Crawford testifies that Coughlin failed to provide his date of birth and
the citation was not possible however the interrogation videos clearly show Coughlin providing his
Nevada drivers license to Officer Crawford, and all drivers license have the drivers date of birth listed
clearly on them and the arrest report filled out by Officer Crawford clearly lists Coughlin's date of
birth, just as it is listed on Coughlin's driver's license. Further, Crawford Arrest Report and
Declaration of Probable Cause clearly have cribbed other information from Coughlin's driver's
license, such as hair and eye color, height, and weight.)
Coughlin's you're saying that the accused did not provide that information?
Crawford yes I am saying that.
Coughlin so how did you get the accused name?
Crawford Uh... you gave it, Sir.

(5:40:20 p.m. Here, Officer Crawford continues his astounding streak of contradicting himself and
his stated certainty from one sentence to the next by indicating that the accused did not provide that
information only to then, one sentence later, admit that Officer Crawford got Coughli's name from
Coughlin himself. What is the obvious subtext here is that Wal-Mart's Frontin is using 'cooperate
and non-compliant in much the same way that these two Tribabl Police Officers are using provide
your information for a citation...ie, confess your guilt, or we will have you arrested and search.
One must confess their guilt to be cooperative, compliant, and to be said to have provided the
information necessary to issue a citation, period. Frontino could be seen throwing buzz words and
carefully coached/crafted phrases around earlier in his testimony when he took care to point out that it
is acceptable for the accused shoplifter to maintain their innocence. Well, good. Well good)
Coughlin did Mr. Frontino tell you the accused name
Crawford he might have, yeah, I don't recall really, but he might of, yeah, if he already had it
(5:40:25 p.m.)
Coughlin do you recall whether he had a name that was the excuse
Crawford Jennifer Corbett
Coughlin Junior: and Mr. friend tonight in a paper brought his desk
Crawford yes he did have stuff on paper
Coughlin what was said
Crawford I think it was just his notes on times and things like that and a copy of the receipt of what
the accused had potentially took but of now I'm not too sure
Coughlin today included in personally identifiable information like the accused's name?
NOTE: the Trial in 11 CR 22176 in RMC goes on for about 2 more hours, though they are
largely devoid of substantive content, mostly just Officer Braunworth struggling to remember
27
anything about anything that every happened ever.

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With respect to the upcoming criminal trespass matter and some other matters brought up in
the SCR 117 Petition (which, would seem to of had a highly prejudicial pall cast over the instant SCR
111 Petition). Coughlin has repeatedly been harassed this year by Nevada Court Services, which may
be committing the unauthorized practice of law in the eviction services context. NCS lists Lew Taitel
as its Staff Attorney and indicates he is associated with their business organization. Incidentally,
Mr. Taitel is also employed by the Reno Municipal Court as an in house public defender...which is
interesting because he was appointed to represent Zach Coughlin, Esq. (recently suspended from the
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practice of law and the subject of an SCR 117 Petition instigated by Bar Counsel Patrick King and
Richard G. Hill, Esq (King and Hill were opposing counsel together on a recent high profile case,
Milsner v Carstarphen, a published decision of the N. S. Ct.). Hill's practice focuses on collections
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law, similar to Taitels. King has steadfastly refused to provide Coughlin an opportunity to even view
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or review (much less obtain a copy) of the voluminous materials provided to King by Judge Dorothy
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Nash Holmes (whom apparently gave Bar Counsel King Linda Gardners Order after, by his own
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admission, Judge William Gardner got the Order form his sister Linda and gave it to Judge Nash
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Holmes. Hon. William Gardner informed Coughlin in April that he "couldn't remember" if he was
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aware of Judge Nash Holmes letter to the State Bar of Nevada concerning Coughlin. Judge Nash
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Holmes sentenced Coughlin to 5 days in jail for summary contempt. Coughlin was never provided a
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copy of the Order Judge Nash Holmes allegedly issued on on March 28th, 2012, until Coughlin found
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it attached to a SCR 117 Petition. Judge Nash Holmes allegedly delayed the start of Coughlin's traffic
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ticket Trial in 11 TR 26800 to meet and confer with Biray Dogan of the Washoe County Public
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Defender's Office and Zach Young, Esq. of the Washoe County District Attorney's Office Hill signed
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a criminal complaint for criminal trespass and had Coughlin arrested at Coughlin's former law office
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(from which Coughlin was subject to a wrongful summary eviction from a commercial tenancy,
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instituted just prior to Coughlin's arrest and conviction for petit larceny of a candy bar from a Wal-
Mart, a story which was picked up by the associated press and has run in newspapers as far away as
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Indiana. Hill and his associate Baker tried to steal the "rent escrow" of $2,275 which Judge Sferrazza
forced Coughlin to deposit in a summary eviction proceeding, in direct contravention to NRS
40.253(6), and totally illegal under Nevada law, in that JCRCP 84 requires the Reno Justice Court to
publish and get the Nevada Supreme Court to sign off on such a rent escrow in summary eviction rule
like JCRLV 44 prior to contravening the express dictates of a statutory scheme like that found in NRS
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40.253. where the nonpayment of rent was not alleged and the only Notice served was a No Cause
Eviction notice, see NRS 40.253).
Anyways, Coughlin has an upcoming criminal trespass trial in Reno Municipal Court in case
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RMC 11 CR 26405, to be presided over by Judge William Gardner, whose sister is Judge Linda
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Gardner, with whose April 2009 Order for Sanctions under NRS 7.085 Patrick King has only just
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recently use to form the basis of a grievance against Coughlin, though King refuses to divulge who
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submitted or filed or why such an old Order for Sanctions, received by the Bar on March 15th, 2012.
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Further, Judge William Gardner refuses to recuse himself from Coughlin's Criminal trespass
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trial, set for June 18th, 2012, (and the spectre of Judge Gardner sentencing Coughlin to an extended
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incarceration is somewhat necessitating this filing, which is not as polished as it would be otherwise)
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even though he has a familial relation with Judge Linda Gardner, whom Coughlin filed a Mandamus
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action against in response to the April 2009 sanctions by Judge Linda Gardner against Coughlin.
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Further, Judge William Gardner worked for the City of Reno as a prosecutor as recently as two years
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ago and Coughlin has a pending litigation, anticipated future litigation, and or a past matter wherein
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the City of Reno and the City Attorney's office are arguably parties thereto:
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http://www.ccwashoe.com/public/ck_public_qry_doct.cp_dktrpt_frames?backto=P&case_id=CV11-
03126&begin_date=&end_date=

CV11-03126 - ZACH COUGHLIN VS. MATT MERLISS, M.D. et al.

Filing Date: Wednesday, October 26th, 2011 Type: GC - GENERAL CIVIL

But, certainly, the Reno Justice Court is listed as a party, and Nevada Court Services is listed
as a party, and Lew Taitel is listed as Nevada Court Services's "Staff Attorney" and "associated with"
their company, shares a fax line, apparently a receptionist, and an address and office space. When
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Coughlin was arrested for jaywalking while peacefully filming Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's
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crew throwing away his heirlooms, the owner of NCS, Jeff Chandler, drove over to the site of the
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arrest and watched
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Moet Further, and Judge William Gardner is aware of this an has failed to take any action, the
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the and
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confidential discovery and was listed as Coughlin's attorney of record, only to mysteriously have
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Roberto Puentes, Esq., substituted in as counsel (until Judge Gardner granted his withdrawal because
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RMC public defender appointed to Coughlin, Lew Taitel, Esq., received Coughlin's
the case was "hard"), and despite the fact that Taitel violated RMC Rule 5 when he failed to file a
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motion in writing requesting his withdrawal as attorney of record.

Judge Nash Holmes has recently copied and pasted pretty much the entire contents of the
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Rules of Professional Conduct into an Order in 11 TR 26800 (a traffic citationtrial) wherein she
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alleges she has found Coughlin in "criminal contempt", and stopped the proceeding pending her
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sending the State Bar of Nevada boxes of materials she feels indicate Coughlin's "decompensating",
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materials that included filings from the criminal trespass matter Judge William Gardner is presiding
over involving Coughlin, wherein Richard Hill signed the criminal complaint, 11 CR 26405. Again,



Judge William Gardner "couldn't remember" if he knew anything about his RMC co-judge Judge
Nash Holmes, sending anything to or communicating with the State Bar of Nevada about Coughlin's
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alleged "decompensating". Judge Nash Holmes did scream at Coughlin in open court that she would
have Coughlin arrested if he said Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s name one more time, despite the fact that the
issue of RPD Sargent Tarter retaliating against Coughlin for Coughlin pointing out to him that just
days before an Reno Police Department Officer Chris Carter had, perhaps in jest, indicated that he
takes bribes from Richard G. Hill, Esq. in exchange for "doing what Richard Hills says to do and
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arresting who he says to arrest". Judge Nash Holmes exclaimed, on the record, in 11 TR 26800, that
she doesn't "care about retaliation, or bribery, or police misconduct" (the RMC has refused to provide
a copy of the audio of that Trial to Coughlin despite at least 3 written request and attempts to pay
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being made by Coughlin and the State Bar of Nevada Bar Counsel Patrick King, whom was providing
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a copy of that audio, has similarly rebuffed Coughlin's requests to even review, much less, copy the
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audio of that Trial, which is a "public record".
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Incidentally, at that Trial, Judge Nash Holmes suddenly demanded of Coughlin, following a
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restroom brake wherein she refused to allow Coughlin to take his yellow legal pad with him to the
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restroom, as to whether Coughlin has a "recording device" and whether he was "recording" at that
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time. Pretty much immediately thereafter Judge Nash Holmes, in perhaps a pretextual effort to effect
a search incident to arrest and allow herself to be absolutely sure of all that was on Coughlin's person
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and whether it may have included a recording device that was recording at that time, decided that
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Coughlin had committed summary contempt in her presence, and sentenced him to 5 days in jail,
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beginning right then, and denied a stay. Judge Nash Holmes also kept a $100 bond from Coughlin's
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mother despite the fact that the Washoe County Jail did not release Coughlin prior to the expiration of
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the 5 days.



RMC Marshall Scott Coppa, whom was in the party transporting Coughlin to Washoe County
Jail with the smart phone and micro sd card that seemed to disappear for quite a while and travel back
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and forth between the jail, the RMC, and, perhaps the WCDA, and maybe some others places, only to
finally make its way back to Coughlin some 37 days later with all the data wiped...that Marshal
Coppa, sent the State Bar of Nevada a letter complaining that Coughlin wanted to see the docket in a
RMC case and that Coughlin was "asking questions" and stuff and just, generally, not getting the
whole police state thing Marshall Coppa and Harley, et al, like to get on with down there at the RMC.
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Coughlin,'s Public Defender, Biray Dogan, Esq., and his boss, Jeremy Bosler and Jim Leslie,
have refused to respond to Coughlin's inquiries as to why and whether Dogan met with Reno
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Municipal Court Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes (whose staff could not locate her for a good 40 minutes
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while Coughlin and RPD Sargent John Tarter waited for the 1:00pm Trial to start in 11 TR 26800,
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wherein Tarter had issued Coughlin three traffic tickets immediately after telling Coughlin to leave
Richard G. Hill's office, where Hill was withholding Coughlin's state issued identification (driver's
license) and Coughlin's wallett and client's files, as well has computer hard drives (at least one hard
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drive was accessed during the 6 weeks it and Coughlin's client's files remained in Hill's possession
19
(Hill had to go on vacation for 6 weeks, so, despite the dictate of a hearing within 10 days of
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Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 filing of a Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien under NRS
40.253(7)-(8), a hearing was not held until December 20th, 2011, at which time Judge Sferrazza made
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Coughlin pay $480 for "storage fees" of his personal property, despite the fact that its was only stored
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for 17 days and would fit in a 10 x 30 storage shed that would normally cost about ($100 per month)
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and despite Hill having admitted that the site of Coughlin's former law office was burglarized on
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December 12th, 2012, and that Hill was not sure what you like this girl hot all was stolen, except that
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he did notice the 62 inch DLP HDTV was missing as well as some other flat screens, high end audio



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equipment, and that the law office looked completely torn asunder.
With Coughlin's conviction by Judges Gardner and Nash Holmes' Reno Municipal Court cojudge, Judge Kenneth Howard (whom also sentenced Coughlin to 3 days in jail for "summary
contempt, though apparently, unlike Judge Nash Holmes, not contempt of a "criminal" nature) in
RMC 11 CR 22176, the incident to the Wal-Mart "candy bar and cough drops" petit larceny matter
for which Coughlin was convicted and had his law license suspend recently, making it into a story by
the Associate Press (AP), published in locales as far away as Indiana, it will be interesting to see
whether any of the above makes a candy bar look a little de minimis.
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Finally, the undersigned acknowledges that this submission is rather lengthy, however, the
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undersigned's and his family's lives were negatively affected in the extreme back in 2002 when he
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took the advice of the Character and Fitness Committee and went with one of the three pro bono
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attorney's we will provide you the names of... (only one name was provided, it cost $5,000, there
exists a transcript of the hearing he attended wherein he mentions that his representation was pro
bono, then fails to clarify that he was actually getting paid $5,000, and thereafter passed off the case
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to his first year associate, whereupon it promptly languished until, allegedly, this Court decided to
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grant Coughlin a license in September of 2004 (as the recent SCR 117 Petition states), however, due
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to that attorney's negligent representation, an angry sounding letter from the Chairman of the
Character and Fitness committee in January 2003 essentially telling Coughlin to quit being a squeaky
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wheel, and perhaps another instance of the Director of Admissions deciding not to forward on some
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key document provided her to this Court for review (as she did at the end of this Court's deferment
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period in September 2003 in connection with Coughlin's application for a license to practice
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law...)...so the undersigned submits the materials herein in an effort to demonstrate his competence as
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a professional, and extreme desire to remain a licensed member of the State Bar of Nevada, and to
have the temporary suspension set aside.
CONCLUSION
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The undersigned asks this Court, respectfully, to consider setting aside its temporary
suspension of his law license and to allow the undersigned additional time to supplement this
Opposition and heavily edit and proof read it, and respectfully apologizes for the rough draft quality
of this work, but points to the exigencies present requiring that it be submitted so...
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AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social security
number of any person.
Respectfully submitted this: June 18th, 2012,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.

18
PO BOX 3961

19
Reno, NV 89505

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Pro Per Attorney

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DECLARATION OF ZACH COUGHLIN IN SUPPORT OF THE FOREGOING DOCUMENT
1. This Declaration is made pursuant to the provisions of NRS 53.045, I am presently in the State of
Nevada and I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, subject to the
3
caveat that this filing needs much more proof reading, however, the exigency of the undersigned
criminal trespass trial within a matter of hours and the spectre of Hon. Judge Linda Gardner's brother
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Hon. Judge William Gardner incarcerating the undersigned at length presents a situation wherein this
5 filing is somewhat rushed. Coughlin wishes for this to apply to the SCR 117 petitoin as well.
2
2. Declarant is the Attorney in the above titled action.

3. Declarant avers that the factual statements set for above in the foregoing document are, to the
best of his knowledge and understanding, accurate.
4. I, Zach Coughlin, am available to testify, if necessary, as to these matters. I declare under penalty
of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dated this June 18th, 2012
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/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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Proof of Service:
On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to all registered electronic filers, and to those whom are not I placed a true and correct copy
3
of the foregoing document in the usps mail on this date:
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Patrick O. King, Esq. Assistant Bar Counsel

9456 Double R. Blvd Suite B

Reno, NV 89521

Dated this June 12th, 2012
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/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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INDEX TO EXHIBITS
1. Exhibit 1: The two Wal-Mart receipts from September 9th, 2011, one for $83.82, representing items
selected and paid for and one for $14.72, representing items allegedly consumed while shopping and
4
not paid for, and proof of the exact item represented by the various Universal Parcel Codes (UPC)
indicated on the respective receipts; four (4) pages.
3
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6
2. Exhibit 2: Discovery propounded by the City of Reno City Attorney's Office in RMC 11 CR
7
22176, including RSIC Officer Crawford's Arrest Report and Declaration of Probable Cause and
his Incident Report and Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino's signed, sworn Criminal Complaint; seven
8
(7) pages.
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EXHIBIT 1
EXHIBIT 1
nOTE:
UPC No.:732216300932 APPEARS
ON THIS RECEIPT FOR $83.82 AS WELL AS ON THE NEXT RECEIPT FOR
$14.72, DESPITE WAL-MART'S FRONTINO
AND OFFICER CRAWFORD TESTIFYING
UNDER OATH THAT THAT UPC ONLY APPEARED
ON THE RECEIPT FOR $14.72.
NOTE: this is a "receipt" for the allegedly stolen or consumed items

propounded in discovery by the Reno City Attorney
Magnum Ice Cream Bar Nutrition Information | ShopWell

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NOTE: the URL listed above for this page ends with
the UPC of this "Magnum Double Caramel Ice Cream
Bar", 7756713282 (the "zero" at the start of that
number on the $14.72 Wal-Mart receipt is
traditionally left off of UPC notations, as here).
This frozen or refrigerated item would not be
found in "the candy isle" as Thomas Frontino swore
that he "personally eye witnessed"
Coughlin select it from "the candy isle"
and also swore that none of Wal-Mart's
oz
legion of cameras captured any of that
activity on video...
Magnum Ice Cream Bar

S, Double Caramel 3.38
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Ingredients:
Ice Cream: Milk, Cream, Sugar, Whey, Mono and Diglycerides, Locust Bean Gum, Vanilla Bean Specks,
Carrageenan, Natural Flavor, Annatto Extract (Color), Caramel Color, Belgian Milk Chocolate Coating: Sugar,
Chocolate Liquor, Cocoa Butter, Milk, Milk Fat, PGPR (Emulsifier), Soy Lecithin (Emulsifier), Natural Flavor,
Caramel Sauce: Water, Sugar, Corn Syrup, High Fructose Corn Syrup, Nonfat Milk Solids, Coconut Oil
Modified Corn Starch, Caramel Color, Salt, Mono & Diglycerides (Emulsifier), Carrageenan, Soybean Oil
Sodium Citrate, Potassium Sorbate (Used to Protect Quality), Natural Flavor, Chocolatey Coating: Coconut
Oil, Sugar, Cocoa, Soy Lecithin (Emulsifier), Vanilla Extract.
Personalize this Nutrition Label
Nutrition Facts
Serving Size 1.0 bar (95 g)
Servings Per Container 1
file:///D|/...20ie%20and%20firefox/7756713282%20magnum%20double%20caramel%20single%20ice%20cream%20bar.htm[6/11/2012 3:07:34 PM]
UPC
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UPC
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NOTE: THE UPC IS LISTED IMMEDIATELY BELOW AND MATCHES THAT FOUND ON
BOTH THE RECEIPT FOR $14.72 AND THE RECEIPT FOR $83.82, DESPITE
FRONTINO AND THE RSIC OFFICER CRAWFORD TESTIFYING UNDER OATH THAT THIS UPC
ONLY APPEARED ON THE RECEIPT FOR $14.72
$8.39
UPC
UPC No.:732216300932 Mfg. Item No.:221010 Duract Max Strength Cough 8 Hour 30 mg 12Ea
Cherry Item No :C4394672 Ndc 73221630093 Generic Name Dextromethorphan Hbr.As per
California's Law SB 514 (Simitian), you must be over 18 to buy this product. This Regulation of
Dextromethorphan-Containing Products prohibits the sale of products containing dextromethorphan to
a person under the age of 18 in an over-the-counter sale. Trade Name Duract Max Strength Cough
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EXHIBIT 2
EXHIBIT 2
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Jun 11 2012 08:19 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
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In Re Matter of:
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THE FOLLOWING OPPOSITION TO SUSPENSION AND

OPPOSITION TO PETITION OF BAR COUNSEL FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION FROM
THE PRACTICE OF LAW PURSUANT TO SCR 111 AND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME TO SUPPLEMENT THIS OPPOSITION
document and moves this Court for the relief requested herein. This filing is further based upon the
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papers and pleadings on file herein and in the case in the trail court and the appeal in the District
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Court and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted herewith and any oral argument this
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Court may desire. And, quickly, in case this is the last thing I get to do in the law, I would like to
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take this opportunity to make and plea that Nevada courts consider the ground-breaking holdings in a
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few recent foreclosure defense cases concerning National Banking Act preemption in light of the
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recent Dodd-Frank Act implementation. Bank of America, likes to have its subsidiary Recontrust
- 1/20 OPPOSITION TO PETITION OF BAR COUNSEL FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF
LAW PURSUANT TO SCR 111 AND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO SUPPLEMENT THIS
OPPOSITION
seek to avoid our state's law by claiming it is a "national bank" and therefore not subject to laws like
NRS 649.171, which requires a foreclosure trustee to have a license from our state.
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In re Johnson, 460 B.R. 234, 247 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011) (finding no conflict preemption
where the state law did not significantly impair the bank's ability to collect on its debt); National
Bank preemption issue is a red-herring because the Congress intended that National Banks be exempt
from regulation as to loan origination, and not as to recovery when the loan is in default. While a
subsidiary of Bank of America like Reconstrust has constituted itself as a National Bank, which is an
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utter sham, such machinations should be disregarded by Nevada courts. Protection for National Banks
was provided, in order to put them on a level playing field vis-a-vis state chartered institutions, when
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it came to interacting with the public in making loans. State law remedies have always been a subject
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of regulation by the state and local authorities. The 'hows', 'whys' and 'wherefores' of loan
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enforcement have been left up to the states. Some states have anti-deficiency laws on foreclosed
mortgages, and some do not. Some twenty one (21) states require judicial foreclosure, while the rest
do not. Federal law has no power to interfere with this aspect of the banking industry, and never has.
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Foreclosure trustees like Reconstrust may not simply free itself of these inconvenient consequences.
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To rule that "national banks" like Reconstrust could avoid the technicalities of Nevada foreclosure
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law, while other foreclosure companies cannot, would be to confer a competitive advantage that
would probably run afoul of the antitrust laws. The area of enforcement of debts to national banks,
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has never been the subject of preemption. BAC has attempted to clothe its subsidiary Reconstrust
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with the power of preemption, ie,. to ignore state law, when it comes to foreclosure law. The extent to
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which a national bank may avoid compliance with state law, has very recently been decided in the
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case of; Bell v. Countrywide Bank NA et ai, (U.S.D.C. Ut., March 15, 2012]. The federal court went
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into a detailed analysis of "preemption" in holding that Reconstrust was not exempt from compliance
OPPOSITION
with local, Utah law when it foreclosed upon property for Bank of America. The parallel with the
laws of Nevada is unmistakable. "Utah statutes require banks- including Utah-chartered banks- to
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foreclose deeds of trust only thru identified trustees. The question for decision is direct: Does
ReconTrust, a Texas corporation, and by definition a "national bank" -although it neither takes
deposits nor makes loans -have the power to conduct non-judicial foreclosures in Utah trust deeds on
real property located in Utah without complying with Utah statutes? The direct answer is no. It does
not have such power." slip opinion at pp 9.
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Bank of America, likes to have its subsidiary Recontrust seek to avoid our state's law by
claiming it is a "national bank" and therefore not subject to laws like NRS 649.171, which requires a
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foreclosure trustee to have a license from our state. On March 13, 2012, the United States District
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Court for the Northern District of West Virginia affirmed the stricter analysis now required under the
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Dodd-Frank Act for determining whether a consumer claim brought against a bank is preempted by
the National Bank Act ("NBA"). The district court did so when it reversed the orders of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the district dismissing three separate adversary proceedings against
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Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. ("Capital One") as preempted under the NBA. Meluzio v. Capital One
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Bank (USA), N.A., 1:11cv58, 1:11cv59, 1:11cv33, 2012 WL 847324 (N.D.W. Va. 2012). The
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consolidated appeals of James Meluzio, Mary and Thomas Romeo and Tina and Jason Jones (colcollectively "the debtors") stemmed from their allegations that Capital One violated West Virginia
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state law by continuing its collection calls after being informed that the debtors had retained counsel.
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Capital One moved to dismiss their state law claims as preempted by the NBA. On March 7, 2011 the
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Bankruptcy Court concluded that the claims were preempted under the doctrine of conflict
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preemption and granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the district court found that after the
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Bankruptcy Court issued its decision, the legal analysis governing preemption by the NBA had
OPPOSITION
dramatically changed because of the enactment of the Dodd- Frank Act and the publication of the
amended regulations by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"). Prior to the Dodd-
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Frank Act, the NBA contained no express preemption provision. The Dodd-Frank Act introduced a
new provision, effective July 21, 2011, that addressed NBA preemption. The new provision codifies
the standard set forth in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, Fla. Ins. Comm'r, 517 U.S.
25 (1996). In Barnett, the Supreme Court concluded that the state statute allowed banks to engage in
practices forbidden by the federal statutes and consequently the state statutes were "an obstacle to the
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accomplishment" of the purposes of the federal statute. Both the Dodd-Frank Act and the OCC
regulation tie preemption to the Barnett standard. Accordingly, courts must now determine whether
the state statute either (1) imposes an obligation on a national bank that is in direct conflict with
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federal law, or (2) stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
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objectives of Congress.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
With respect to the alleged Wal-Mart petit larceny of a chocolate bar and some cough
medication drops/melts: the accused did not go into the store and grab those items and leave. The
Wal-Mart associate testified that the accused ate the chocolate bar (and that he saw me take it off the
shelf in the candy isle) while the accused was shopping for any paid for approximately $90 of other
groceries. However, the UPC of the chocolate bar from the receipt in question shows it was an ice
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cream bar, meaning it wouldn't have been in the candy isle, but rather the refrigerated isle. Thus, the
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beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable to that criminal case appears not to have been met
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where, amazingly, the multimillion dollar establishment, Wal-Mart, with literally hundreds of
cameras placed strategically throughout the store, claimed in the trial court that no video footage
exists or ever existed of any of the events testified to at trial beyond the 2 videos propounded of the
OPPOSITION
interactions between the accused and Wal-Mart loss prevention staff and Reno Sparks Indian Colony
police in a 5 by 8 by 12 interrogation room utilized by Wal-Mart. Oddly, the video from the
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interrogation room show the RSIC Officers being handed a CD or DVD by the Wal-Mart loss
prevention associate upon their exiting the interrogation room. So, the only evidence being the
alleged eye witness testimony of the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate, his credibility undermined
by the fact that he testified, under oath, that he personally saw the accused select the chocolate bar
from the candy isle, then consume it while walking throughout the store shopping. Again, the UPC
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from the wrapper of the chocolate bar item allegedly stolen clearly reveals that the UPC belongs to a
refrigerated item, an ice cream bar, therefore undermining the Wal-Mart associates claim to have
witnessed the accused select it from the shelf in the candy isle, which is not refrigerated.
Further, the only other piece of allegedly incriminating evidence was the fruit of an
impermissible search. The RSIC Officer testified that he only made and arrest, and therefore
conducted a search incident to arrest in light of the accused's alleged refusal to provide his driver's
license. However, the two videos of the detention and search in the Wal-Mart interrogation room
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clearly reveal the accused providing that same RSIC officer his driver's license and the Officer
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radioing in the driver's license number to run a routine check, and the arrest report clearly contains the
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driver's license number of the accused and other information culled from the RSIC officer's review of
the driver's license. Further, the partial contents of a cough melt package was found in the accused
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pockets. However, the receipt for the $90 of groceries and sundries the accused purchased
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immediately prior to the arrest bares and entry with the exact same UPC of the cough melts found in
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the accused's pocket.
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Then, the Wal-Mart witness admitted, under oath while testifying, that he could not hear
whether or not the accused told the cashier ringing up the some $90 of items purchase whether the
OPPOSITION
accused had or had consumed a certain a quantity of the cough medication drops/melts. The Wal-
Mart loss prevention associate further testified that it was a common and accepted practice at Wal-
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Mart for shoppers to inform cashiers of the number or quantity of a certain item they were purchasing
rather than have the cashier ring up each of the duplicative items one by one. Further, the Walmart
and Indian Colony Officer testified that on the receipt for the items the accused did pay for, the UPC
of the type of cough medication melts they say the accused stole did not appear, however, a review of
that receipt clearly shows that that UPC for cough melts is an entry on that receipt. Also, amazingly,
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the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate testified that he could glean, from 30 yards away, each and
every item the cashier rung up for me and that those items did not include such a box of the cough
medication melts. However, the accused showed in court and in exhibits that the receipt for the items
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the accused purchased did have one item with the same UPC as the exact type of cough medication
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melts. So the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate admitted neither he nor anyone at Wal-Mart could
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say that they could hear whether the accused told the cashier a quantity to ring up for the cough
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medication melt box with the same UPC as the ones Wal-Mart alleges were stolen or consumed while
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shopping.... Further, the Indian Colony Officer testified that he only arrested the accused and
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conducted a search incident to arrest because the accused didn't provide the accused's driver's license
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to him. However, the video of the Wal-Mart interrogation room interview clearly shows the accused
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giving the officer the accused's driver's license and him radioing it in to his dispatch and him taking
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down the DL number and other information off of it. Further, the receipt from the $90 of groceries the
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accused paid for contains an entry with the UPC of the exact type of cough medication melts that the
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officer found in the accused's pocket upon conducting the search incident to arrest. The Wal-Mart
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associate and Indian Colony Officer both testified that the receipt did not contain an entry for the
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cough drops, but the copy of the receipt in the police report and discovery and a review of the UPC
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OPPOSITION
and subsequently looking up the item assigned that Universal Parcel Code clearly shows that a box of
those cough medication melts were, in fact, included on that receipt. the accused am all for owning up
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to things but this wasn't a "walked into the store, grabbed some stuff, tucked under one's shirt, and
dashed away" type situation. Plus Wal-Mart's loss prevention staff had told the accused just weeks
before they would retaliate against the accused by having the accused banned from all their stores for
arguing with their customer service personnel about a curious practice wherein Wal-mart staff and
managers seem to "forget" or favorably remix the terms of their store's return policy and or claim
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that policy is a "courtesy" rather than a bargained for term included in a contract for the sale of goods:
http://www.enotes.com/consumer-issues-reference/purchases-and-returns
The accused makes no admission of guilt to the charge for which a conviction was entered.
However, to the extent the question of guilt is already decided, mitigating circumstances do exist
here. The accused was unable to afford a medication he takes sometime in August 2011 because he
could not afford it due to fact that his then domestic partner of four and a half years essentially stole
approximately two months of rent from him before moving out in late June 2011. The accused helped
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this domestic partner finish her final 3 years of college (in many ways, including financial), in the
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four and half years they were together, whereupon she (who discovered she had early onset insulin
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dependent diabetes at 11 years old and is dealing with other issues exacerbated by that condition)
promptly ended to relationship and began moving out just 2 days after graduating from college.
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There is more to that aspect of this situation, mitigating factors, but the undersigned's desire to protect
the privacy rights of others, though materials have been provided to Bar Counsel in that regard.
Further, it is possible that police and prosecutorial misconduct played some role in this
conviction (the City of Reno Attorney's Office indicated it had received nothing in relation to the
September 9th, 2011 arrest when the accused called on or about September 15th, 2011, however,
OPPOSITION
subsequent discovery suggest that the RSIC faxed all or portions of the police report to the City
Attorney's Office on September 13th, 2011. Regardless, the accused was denied a copy of arrest
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reports and witness statements by the RMC, the City Attorney's Office, and the RSIC Police
Department for an entire month following the arrest, whereupon it was only propounded after the
October 10th, 2011 arraignment, thereby prejudicing the accused's ability to mount a defense.
Additionally, the Reno City Attorney prosecutor put on testimony by the RSIC Officer concerning the
alleged failure of the accused to provide his driver's license to the officer, and thereby justifying a
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custodial arrest and concomitant search incident to arrest, where the prosecutor was in possession of
video clearly showing the accused providing that officer his driver's license). Further, it may be that
the Reno Municipal Court was remiss in not contemplating some alternative court in any way, or
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otherwise alerting the accused to the possibility thereof, especially where the accused was denied the
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Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel (Bar Counsel's Exhibit 1 contains a printout from the RMC
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indicating that the accused did not wish to have court appointed counsel, however, the Motion for
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Court Appointed Counsel and Affidavit of Indigency the accused filed in the trial court suggest
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otherwise, as does the Motion for Reconsideration of the Denial of Counsel the accused also filed in
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the trial court), particularly where it seems clear the accused established his indigency, and was
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allegedly wrongfully evicted from his former home law office less than one month prior to the trial
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date (in an eviction from a commercial rental where the non-payment of rent was not alleged and
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where the only eviction notice served was a No Cause Eviction notice....NRS 40.253 expressly
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forbids the use of summary eviction proceedings against commercial tenants where the non-payment
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of rent is not alleged or noticed), for which the accused's request for a continuance was denied,
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despite his indicating to the trial court that opposing counsel in the eviction matter was applying an
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unlawful rent distraint under NRS 118A.520 to exculpatory materials and other materials supporting
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OPPOSITION
the accused's contention that Wal-Mart personnel had made express threats of retaliation against the
accused just a short time before the arrest in response to the accused's complaining about the failure
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of Wal-Mart personnel to follow or admit to awareness of the existence of the express terms of WalMart's return policy.
Additionally, Judge Elliot's Order in the appeal of this matter seems to apply a civil standard
to the issue of whether the RMC was to create transcripts of the Trial in the appeal (ans bill the
accused later, rather, Judge Elliot's Order cites a civil statute that allows the court to not even begin
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making the transcripts until they have been paid for, however, this was a criminal matter, and this, in
conjunction with the accused's being denied the accused's right to counsel, incarcerated for three days
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under a summary contempt ruling stemming from this very trial, and and some alternative sentencing
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court option not being broached in any way, may provide some avenue for arguing that a temporary
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suspension from the practice of law is not warranted.
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The accused reported this arrest to his physician, and the physician's and pharmacy records
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confirmed that the accused called and canceled his August 2, 2011 appointment and indicated he
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would not be filling his prescriptions. This was largely due to the expense of these prescriptions
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being prohibitive in the context of the dissolution of the four and a half year relationship with his
domestic partner and her absconding with multiple months worth of rent, the discovery of which by
the landlord in August 2011 quickly led to a contentious summary eviction proceeding (the landlord
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did not plead the failure to pay rent in an apparent attempt to avoid the necessity of litigating the
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failure to cure habitability issues reported by the tenant and ignored by the landlord). The accused is
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now back on those medications and under the care of his physician and progressing well.
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OPPOSITION
Lastly, the undersigned reported the conviction in the trial court, while an appeal was pending
in District Court to Bar Counsel. The undersigned reported the conviction to Bar Counsel on his own
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and, as far as the undersigned knew at the time, prior to Bar Counsel being aware of the conviction.
Further, depending upon how the length of time between the rendition or notice of entry of the
conviction and when the undersigned reported the conviction to Bar Counsel is measure, the
undersigned arguably timely complied with the within 30 days dictate of SCR 111 (only introduced
in 2007, and perhaps somewhat difficult to find given that the Rules of Professional Conduct might
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seem a more apt place to look for such a reporting requirement...), and if not, then the undersigned
was only a few days beyond the within 30 days requirement, all while filing an appeal and litigating
a contentious summary eviction from the undersigned former home law office.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
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The accused hereby request to have all the arguments and memorandum on file in the trial
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court and District Court appeal incorporated by reference herein, particularly with respect to the
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denial of court appointed defense counsel. Perhaps the most salient question here is: if this
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conviction is serious enough to take away one's law license, the how could the charge not be serious
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enough to deserve court appointed defense counsel or a jury trial where the accused established his
indigency and was evicted from his former home law office (wrongfully, in light of NRS 40.253's
prohibition against utilizing summary eviction proceedings against commercial tenants where the
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non-payment of rent is not alleged and only a No Cause Eviction Notice was served) just days prior to
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the trial in the matter from which this conviction springs?
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Though not permitted to be cited as precedent under SCR 123, footnote 3 in the opinion from
In Re Noel Gage indicates FN3. Even though an opposition to the petition is not expressly permitted
OPPOSITION
by the rules, bar counsel does not oppose Gage's filing of an opposition. The undersigned submits
this Opposition in the spirit of that footnote and asks this Court not to view that as a violation of SCR
123.
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STATE v. NEVENS. 197 N.J. Super. 531 (1984). 485 A.2d 345. The judicial system must
once again rely on the trial courts as the gatekeeper. The Legislature has established a self-regulating
provision in the Code that can be used to protect against frivolous prosecutions under the 1991 Act.
The gap-filler measure is the de minimis infraction provision, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11. It provides: The
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assignment judge may dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to
constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's
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conduct: a. Was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negated by the person
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whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense; b. Did
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not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or c. Presents such
other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in forbidding
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the offense. The assignment judge shall not dismiss a prosecution under this section without giving
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the prosecutor notice and an opportunity to be heard. The prosecutor shall have a right to appeal any
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such dismissal. [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11.] The statute, with modifications, was modeled after MPC 2.12. 1
Final Report, supra, source or reference note to 2C:2-11, at 23. The drafters of the MPC
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summarized the historical basis for that section as a kind of unarticulated authority to mitigate the
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general provisions of the criminal law to prevent absurd applications. 2 Final Report, supra,
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commentary to 2C:2-11, at 74. Our courts have not hesitated to use that statute to terminate a
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potential prosecution when the charge has been trivial or the prosecution would have been absurd.
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State v. Brown, 188 N.J.Super. 656, 671, 458 A.2d 165 (Law Div.1983); see, e.g., State v. Zarrilli,
OPPOSITION
216 N.J.Super. 231, 240, 523 A.2d 284 (Law Div.) (dismissing charge of underage consumption of
alcoholic beverage where the defendant took a sip of a friend's beer), aff'd, 220 N.J.Super. 517, 532
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A.2d 1131 (App.Div.1987); State v. Nevens, 197 N.J.Super. 531, 534, 485 A.2d 345 (Law Div.1984)
(dismissing theft charge stemming from the defendant's taking of a few pieces of fruit from a buffet
table); State v. Smith, 195 N.J.Super. 468, 477, 480 A.2d 236 (Law Div.1984) (stating that statute
avoids an injustice in a case of technical but trivial guilt).
In State v. Nevens, Mr. Nevens and his wife, after eating lunch at the Cornucopia Buffet in
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the Golden Nugget in Atlantic City, decided to leave the buffet with several pieces of fruit and eat
them outside for dessert. Mr. Nevens was later stopped on the boardwalk by hotel security guards and
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charged with theft of two bananas, an orange, an apple and a pear. The court held that Nevens was not
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stockpiling food since he did not attempt to take enough food to satisfy one additional meal for either
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himself or his wife and characterized the entire infraction as de minimis. In State v. Smith, the
defendant was charged with shoplifting three pieces of bazooka bubble gum valued at $. 15 from a
"7-11" convenience store. ' The defendant moved for a dismissal of his prosecution based upon the
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"de minimis" doctrine. The court noted that "[i]n the milieu of bubble gum pilferage the only cases
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more trivial were those involving two pieces or one"' and subsequently dismissed the case.'
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Constitutional Rights The protection of an individual's constitutional rights is another area of

the law wherein the courts disagree on the subject of the applicability of the de minimis doctrine.
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Some courts hold that constitutional rights are so sacred in our system of justice that they can never
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be compromised, regardless of how small the invasion. In Hessel v. O'Hearn, the Seventh Circuit
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Court of Appeals succinctly summed up the de minimis doctrine and constitutional rights and noted
that any violation of substantive constitutional rights-such as the right to freedom of speech, or the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures entitles a prevailing plaintiff to at least
OPPOSITION
nominal damages. Thus, the court intimated that even the smallest of intrusions are actionable. 977
F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1992). Id. At 301-02, 304.
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People v Curtis (2003) NY Slip Op 51717(U), 2 Misc 2d 1003(4), 784 NYS 2d 922:.
defendant was observed by the deponent store detective at a Stop & Shop store, to take a bottle of
Advil valued at $6.59, place it in her pocket book and walk out of the store without paying for the
medication. Defendant was arraigned on March 3, 2003, at which time the court, sua sponte,
dismissed the complaint in the furtherance of justice pursuant to CPL 170.40. The People moved by
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affirmation dated March 21, 2003 to reargue the determination of the court and Defendant submitted
papers in opposition dated April 30, 2003. At hearing, the parties stipulated that defendant has had no
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prior contacts with the criminal justice system, is a well respected public school teacher who has
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taught kindergarten for 21 years and at the time of the incident her life was consumed by her role as
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sole caregiver for her terminally ill husband, who died prior to the hearing date. It was also noted at
hearing that defendant had been removed from working in the classroom by her employer as a result
of her arrest. Following hearing, the court adheres to its original determination and dismisses the
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complaint in the furtherance of justice pursuant to CPL 170.40 for the reasons hereinafter stated. The
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current language of CPL 170.40 reflects the historical shift in power to dismiss pending cases in the
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furtherance of justice from the executive branch of government to the judiciary. With the enactment
of Sections 663, 664 and 671 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1881, the New York State
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Legislature replaced the common law doctrine of "nolle prosequi", which granted to the prosecutor
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discretion to discontinue a prosecution in progress, by permitting the court to dismiss an indictment
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"in the furtherance of justice." See People v. Rickert, 58 N.Y.2d 122, 126 (1983); People v. Clayton,
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41 A.D.2d 204, 206 (2d Dep't 1973); Peter Preiser, Practice Commentary, in N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law ss
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170.40 (McKinney 1993); Sheila Kles, Criminal Procedure II: How Much Further is the Furtherance
OPPOSITION
of Justice?, 1989 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 413, 414. The district attorney retains the prerogative to
prosecute people who commit crimes. People v. Zimmer, 51 N.Y.2d 390, 394. However, "one of the
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reforms effected through the years [*2]in the procedure to dismiss accusatory instruments in the
interest of justice was to remove the power to do so from the offices of the District Attorney and
Attorney-General and lodge it, instead, in the courts alone." 58 N.Y.2d at 131. The former statutory
language of CPL 170.40 and CPL 210.40 required a "sensitive balance between the individual and the
State" and "the use of the statute depended only on principles of justice, not on the legal or factual
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merits of the charges or even on the guilt or innocence of the defendant." People v. Clayton, 41
A.D.2d 204, 206 (2d Dep't 1973). However, the antecedent statutes which granted power to the court
to dismiss a criminal action in the interest of justice failed to provide specific guidelines for the
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exercise of that power. In People v. Belge, 41 N.Y.2d 60 (1976), the Court of Appeals called for
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amendment of CPL 210.40, arguing that "[t]o the extent that the section now fails to prescribe
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specific criteria for the responsible exercise of the discretion granted by the section and fails to
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require the court to articulate the manner and extent to which the particular case meets such criteria, it
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is open to misuse and effective appellate review is made difficult, if not impossible." 41 N.Y.2d at 62.
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The Legislature responded to the court's concerns with the amendments to CPL 170.40 and CPL
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210.40 promulgated in 1979. 58 N.Y.2d at 127. In reviewing the current language of CPL 170.40, as
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amended in 1979, the Court of Appeals noted: "Throughout its history, and no less today, its thrust,
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even to the disregard of legal or factual merit, has been 'to allow the letter of the law gracefully and
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charitably to succumb to the spirit of justice'" 58 N.Y. at 126 quoting People v. Davis, 55 Misc.2d
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656, 659. Thus, despite the creation of statutory criteria which the court must consider in the
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application of CPL 170.40, the underlying historical considerations of looking beyond the legal and
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factual merits of the case to avoid injustice by granting dismissal in the furtherance of justice have
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OPPOSITION
remained intact. ...the de minimis value of the item taken, a $6.59 bottle of Advil pain medication,
which occasioned a de minimis harm, allows the court to regard the character, history and personal
circumstances of defendant in order to fairly balance her interest against that of the community.
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In the instant case, there is some comparision to the Advil theft. The cough medication melts
allegedly consumed (and there is some argument to be made that any consumption in the store more
of a vandalism or destruction of property or sampling rather than a technical petit larceny) contain
dextromethorphan, and ingesting an entire box or two of those Duract DXM 30mg cough melts would
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likely render one to be incapable of forming the intent necessary to violate the petit larceny section of
the Reno Municipal Code, 8.10.040, in addition to easing or dissociating one from the uncomortable
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effects of coming off of one's, say, antidepressants too rapidly Sec.. 8.10.040. - Petit larceny. It is
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unlawful for any person to take or carry away the property of another with the intent to deprive the
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owner of his property therein, in any value less than $250.00, and for his conviction therefor, he shall
be fined in an amount not more than $1,000.00 and/or be incarcerated not more than six months. In
addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution. Further, there is some
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question as to whether the conviction is a void judgment considering the arrest occurred on
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reservation land and the Reno City Attorney prosecutor failed to establish jurisdiction in that the race
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of the accused and whether or not the accused had any tribal blood (which would therefore make
tribal court the appropriate court of jurisdiction) was established.
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"Ancient doctrines have survived in legal forums where they make common sense, serve the
public at large, and at the same time do not disserve the ends of justice .... , This general principle has
been illustrated in this Article regarding the enduring legacy of the legal maxim, "de minimis non
curat lex," the law cares not for trifles. Schlichtman v. N.J. Highway Auth., 579 A.2d 1275, 1279
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990). To be clear, the undersigned does not consider stealing anything
OPPOSITION
from anyone, a trifle. Just as conducting searches that are violative of the Fourth Amendment are not
acceptable, just as lying on the witness stand in an attempt to procure a conviction is not acceptable,
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just as putting on testimony that a prosecutor knows to be false is not acceptable, just as failing to
timely provide an accused access to the police report and witness statements, just as denying an
accused in a criminal prosecution his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel where jail time is a
possibility, only to then sentence the accused to three days of jail is likely violation of the spirit of the
Sixth Amendment...
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However, the privilege of being an attorney typically requires more of one than is acceptable
from the general public. Attorney who commits act of professional misconduct by shoplifting will be
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censured, where, at time of incident, attorney judgment was sufficiently impaired to cause her
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aberrational conduct and where attorney has sought and obtained appropriate psychological help.
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McKinney Judiciary Law 90; N.Y.Ct. Rules, 691.2. Matter of Mongioi, 213 A.D.2d 107, 631
N.Y.S.2d 77 (2d Dep't 1995). Conviction of class B misdemeanor of theft and admission to charge
of shoplifting warranted 24"month suspension from practice of law, stayed on condition that attorney
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commit no further acts of theft, where attorney had no prior disciplinary record, restitution was made
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in both instances, he was well-regarded as competent and talented lawyer, he had recently lost his
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employment, he was receiving treatment for personal and emotional stress, including intensive
treatment since time of incidents, he made full and free disclosure in disciplinary investigation and
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was cooperative toward proceedings, he admitted conduct in both petitions, and he was contrite and
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remorseful. Rules for Lawyer Discipline, Rule 1.2, subd. A(2); Standards for Imposing Lawyer
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Sanctions, Standard 9.3. Application for Disciplinary Action 113 A.L.R. 1179 Page 340 113 A.L.R.
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1179 (Originally published in 1938) 1997 ND 234, 571 N.W.2d 370 (N.D. 1997). Attorney
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convictions for shoplifting and his failure to report one of those convictions to Bar Association when
OPPOSITION
specifically questioned warranted suspension from practice of law for 18 months, with one year of
suspension stayed pending successful completion of one-year probation period and appropriate
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counseling. Code of Prof.Resp., DR 1"102(A)(3, 4, 6), DR 1"103(A). Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fidler,
83 Ohio St. 3d 396, 1998-Ohio-39, 700 N.E.2d 323 (1998).
Factually, there is more to this case than is gone into in detail here, however, the undersigned
has presented Bar Counsel with medical records, treatment undergone, continuing monitoring and
support sources, other mitigating factors, and other confidential information which may assist this
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Court in ruling on this matter.

Further, the District Court in the appeal of this matter, indicated that the setting of a hearing
for the appeal was merely and imaginary exercise, as no hearing would take place, as a matter of
course, despite one seemingly being required by NRS 189.
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Concerning appeals from justice to district court, NRS 189.030(1) provides: "The justice shall,
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within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the district court the
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transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified copy of his docket."
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However, NRS 4.410(2) provides: "The fees for transcripts and copies [of justice's court proceedings]
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must be paid by the party ordering them. In a civil case the preparation of the transcript need not
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commence until the fees have been deposited with the deputy clerk of the court." Braham v. Dist. Ct.,
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103 Nev. 644, 747 P.2d 1390 (1987).
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Finally, the undersigned acknowledges that he needs to do better overall, and guard more
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closely against acting in any manner which might give off even the appearance of impropriety, and
take stronger precautions to insure that he is financially solvent enough to absorb the sorts of slings
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OPPOSITION
and arrows that one should expect to come their way in this world without a reoccurence of the
circumstances detailed herein.
CONCLUSION
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The undersigned asks this Court, respectfully, to consider not suspending his law license and
to allow the undersigned additional time to supplement this Opposition.
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Respectfully submitted this: May 24th, 2012,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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PO BOX 3961
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Reno, NV 89505
Pro Per Attorney
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OPPOSITION
DECLARATION OF ZACH COUGLIN IN SUPPORT OF THE FOREGOING DOCUMENT
1. This Declaration is made pursuant to the provisions of NRS 53.045, I am presently in the State of
Nevada and I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
2. Declarant is the Attorney in the above titled action.
3. Declarant avers that the factual statements set for above in the foregoing document are, to the
best of his knowledge and understanding, accurate.
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4. I, Zach Coughlin, am available to testify, if necessary, as to these matters. I declare under penalty
of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dated this May 24th, 2012
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/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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OPPOSITION
Proof of Service:
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document to all registered electronic filers, and to those whom are not I placed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document in the usps mail on this date:
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Reno, NV 89521
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Dated this May 24th, 2012
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/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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OPPOSITION
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Oct 05 2012 09:40 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
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In Re Matter of:
10 Nevada Bar No: 9473
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR

COUNSEL AND, POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY
COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLINS SCR 102(4)(d)
PETITION IN CASE 61426
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document and moves this Court, or the Board, Panel, Bar for the relief requested herein. This filing
is further based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein and in the companion case before the
Nevada Supreme Court in 60838 and 61426.
FACTS
1. Patrick King, Esq., Bar Counsel of the North, and NNDB Chairman J. Thomas Susich
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continue to display an alarming lack of appreciation for due process, basic fairness, and other notions
of fair play and substantial justice...and now seeks to subvert the express ruling of the Nevada
- 1/62 MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
Supreme Court in its June 7th, 2012 Order by turning the Hearing that has already been set (as
confirmed by the SBN's Laura Peters, in writing) for September 25th, 2012 into a "due process combo
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pack express package" wherein all the various matters set forth in King's Complain shall also be
addressed, despite the Order by the Nevada Supreme Court and the text of SCR 111 very clearly
indicating the "sole purpose" of the hearing will be to determine the punishment for the one criminal
conviction contained in Bar Counsel's SCR 111 petition of May 10, 2012 in 60838 and where an
"immediate hearing" is further required in light of Coughlin's SCR 102(4)(d) Petition filed, and
unopposed by the SBN in 61426.
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2. SBN Clerk of Court of the Laura Peters has assured Coughlin that no service of any SBN v
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Coughlin Complaint has been effected as of this date and that Coughlin is in no danger of defaulting
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for failure to answer any such Complaint. However, Clerk of Court Peters indicated to Coughlin that
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she did not file Coughlin's September 17th, 2012 Motion to Dismiss in light of directions from Bar
Counsel Patrick O. King, Esq., and further, NNDB Chairman, J. Thomas Susich has made similar
indications of the extent to which King is attempting to circumvent procedural rules attendant to these
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matters and cause Coughlin further damages and delay, particularly with regard to the dictates of SCR
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116. The scheduling of the hearing is the domain of the NNDB and is not to be handed of to the
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prosecutor here, Bar Counsel Pat King. Peters, King, and Clark have all admitted that King and
Clark are seeking to circumvent the procedural rules and Order related to the scheduling and holding
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of the hearing in response to the Court's June 7th, 2012 Order in 60838 and with regard to the
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"immediate hearing" required upon Coughlin's August 13th, 2012 Petition in SCR 61426, which Bar
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Counsel has failed to Oppose, and for which, therefore, Coughlin is entitled to the relief he therein
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sought, ie, the dissolution of the temporary suspension of his license to practice law.
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3. By and Order of the Nevada Supreme Court on June 7th, 2012 Coughlin's constitutionally
protected property right, his law license, was temporarily suspended: "Pursuant to SCR 111,
temporary suspension and referral to the appropriate disciplinary board are mandatory when an
attorney has been convicted of a "serious" crime, which includes theft. SCR 111(6)-(8). Accordingly,
pursuant to SCR 111(8), we refer this matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of
a formal hearing before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent
of the discipline to be imposed. Furthermore, pursuant to SCR 111(7), we hereby temporarily suspend
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attorney Zachary B. Coughlin from the practice of law in Nevada, pending final disposition of the
disciplinary proceedings."
4. In a written communication from SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters on July 26th, which
was cc'd to Bar Counsel Patrick King, Clerk Peters wrote: " Mr. Coughlin: I have been contacted by
Tom Susich of the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I understand that you would like to schedule
a formal hearing in your matter. I have gathered some available dates in September and October let
me know what will work for you: September 25, 26 or 27 October 15, 16, 17, 18, 30 or 31 Thank you,
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Laura Peters". In an written correspondence from Coughlin to Clerk of Court for the SBN Peters:
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"Subject: Hearing... Dear Ms. Peters, Please set the hearing date as soon as possible for any matter
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involving me that has been referred to the bar or the disciplinary panel. thanks Zach Coughlin". The
SBN's Peters responded, in writing, on August 17th, 2012, to Coughlin: "RE: Hearing...Zach: How
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about September 25th, work for you?". Coughlin responded to Peters, in writing, on August 17th,
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2012: "That works thanks" with a copy of Peter's correspondence of August 17th, 2012 setting forth
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the September 25th, 2012 Hearing date. Coughlin wrote to NNDB Chairman J. Thomsas Susich, Esq.
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on September 11th, 2012 indicating, in writing: " The hearing is set for... Hearing date... I look
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forward to our Hearing on September 25th, 2012. Zach Coughlin".

4.1 Upon information and belief, in early May 2011, prior to any SCR 111 Petition or SCR
105 Complaint being filed, Bar Counsel violated SCR Rule 121(5) Confidentiality: "5. Temporary
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suspension under Rule 102(4). In the event that the state bar files a petition with the supreme court for
the temporary suspension of an attorney before a formal complaint is filed in the underlying
disciplinary proceeding, then the matter shall be treated as confidential. If the court grants the
petition, then the matter shall become public upon entry of the order granting the petition. If the
court denies the petition, then the matter shall remain confidential until a formal complaint is
filed or the matter is otherwise concluded."
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5. On September 11th, 2012, in a telephone conversation with Coughlin, SBN Clerk of Court
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confirmed that the hearing previously noticed, set, and schedule for September 25th, 2012 was "still
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scheduled" and "on the calendar". During that conversation, Clerk of Court Peters admitted that
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"there is a hearing set for the 25th (of September), we set that just on the SCR 111 Petition. Now
there is a Complaint and I think that Pat and David want to combine it, I didn't know that at the time
that I set your hearing date." Coughlin then asked Peters "So, the hearing is still set on the
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calendar?". Peters responded "on the calendar it is". Then Peters indicated that "as soon as the
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Hearing was set, they (Pat King and David Clark) said 'oh, wait, wait, we want to combine it with the
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Complaint's Hearing as well, so they filed a Complaint and I served it on you." when I set your
hearing (for September 25th, 2012), I did not know that David (Bar Counsel David Clark) and Pat
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(Pat King) wanted to combine that (hearing on the SCR 111 and SCR 102(4)(d) Petitions in 60838
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and 61426) with a SBN v. Coughlin Complaint the SBN has been threatening to file against
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Coughlin)".
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6. Bar Counsel King has continually referred to Coughlin, as a "former attorney", often when
speaking directly to Coughlin, and has further mentioned to Coughlin that Coughlin has been
"disbarred", while speaking in a mock devastated tone when mentioning the sadness King would
himself feel if Coughlin lost his law license, which echoed the venomous chill in the air when David
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Clark recalled to Coughlin, regretfully about that one time an attorney committed suicide before Clark
got a chance to prosecute him, and that regret, to be clear, was due to missing the chance to prosecute
that attorney prior to the suicide. King is apparently unaware that disbarments were made irrevocable
in Nevada in 2008 or the fact that one is still "an attorney" during a temporary suspension of one's law
license.
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7. Coughlin appeared at the northern officer the State Bar for the calendared, agreed upon,
noticed, and set September 25, 2012 Hearing notice to him and the NNDB's Chairman Susich and
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required by this Court's June 7th, 2012 Order and SCR 111(8). While Coughlin sat waiting in the
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lobby out walked Clerk of Court Peters and Bar Counsel Patrick King, King holding a stack of papers
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then handing them to Clerk Peters, and King whom greeted Coughlin and entere a conversation that
when approximately like this:
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King: Zach.
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Clerk Peters: I am supposed to hand you this Complaint.
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King: Your're served (motioning to Clerk Peters to hand Coughlin the stack of papers). You are
officially served. She's the Court Clerk. You're served.
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Coughlin: Aw.. I think one has to be served by a non-party under SCR 109.
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King: No, you're served ,she's the Clerk of Court, so take it. She's serving you, your are officially
served and so I will issue a default judgment against you if you don't accept it.
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Peters: I mailed it out.

Coughlin: Is my hearing going to be held right now?
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King: First, take this.
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Coughlin: What about my Hearing that's what I'm here for right now.
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King: First, take this.
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Coughlin I think you actually can't serve people when they are showing up for a Hearing.
King yes I can absolutely can,
Coughlin: I have cases that say you can't.
King: I absolutely can things don't go your way because you don't accept responsibility (King grabs
the stack of papers from Peters and attempt to insert them into Coughlin's suit jacket after pulling the
middle button on Coughlin's blazer away from Coughlin's torso, whereupon King gives up on that
approach). I'll drop it at your feet here your served (King bends down and places the stack of papers
on top of Coughlin dress shoes).
Coughlin you are a party though it has to be a non-party that's the law
King: Zach. don't play games!
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Coughlin: It's not a game, Pat, it's the law.

Peters: Zach, please?
Coughlin: Where is my hearing?
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King: Hi Paula where you witness that I'm serving or that rather Laura is serving Zach Coughlin with
the Complaint.
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Paula: Sure? (looking bewildered beyond all measure).
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King Here is this, take it, take it, Zach.

Coughlin: We go to have my hearing today?
King: First order of business is for you to accept the Complaint
Coughlin: For you may be Pat, but you're not the one who hasn't had a law license last four months
over a candy bar so
King are going to take the complaint it's a formal complaint I'm been a default you him him. You can
pretend you didn't get it else is take a default
Coughlin: Pat I filed a motion to dismiss. Seems like you are trying to put Clerk of Court Peters in
kind of a bad spot.
King No, you haven't filed it it's been rejected,
Coughlin: By who, the prosecutor? The prosecutor rejected it, Pat?
King: Listen the Clerk of Court Peters rejected it because it doesn't say what it's dismissing. You are
not even acknowledging that you have been served so take the Complaint and then you can answer it.
You're been served right now
Coughlin: well I guess you're free to argue that, that you a party that is serving me.
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King: No, the Court clerk is serving you. Your at the State Bar office being served with a Complaint
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Coughlin I I've got cases this the you can serve a criminal defendant when they show up to a civil
proceeding
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King: This is State Bar.

Coughlin: Oh, I get it. We're playin' prison rules, huh? Like in that movie The Cable Guy when Jim
Carrey is playing pickup ball and says "Oh, we're playing prison rules" to the guys who just fouled
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him so hard? I guess, we are "playin' 'prison rules'" down here at the State Bar, huh? Are we going to
have my hearing today? Because the Hearing is limited in scope and purpose, right?
King: Zach listen to the Court Clerk.
Coughlin: Okay.
Peters: when you and I talked about the date for September 25 that was a tentative thing I have not
formally notice that I never did
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King: Because you did not answer the complaint because you did not answer the complaint by me
explain Mr. Coughlin the suspension that you receive from the Supreme Court which is their order
safety of a problem with the Supreme Court.
Coughlin I did with the SCR 102(4)(d) Petition? Why didn't you answer that, Pat? Now, I win on
that on default, too?
King: That's the Supreme Court they suspended you pending...pending a disciplinary Complaint
which is what that is (motioning to a stack of papers King had earlier laid at Coughlin's feet).
Coughlin: So this is a new Complaint filing?
King know the suspension is pending the disciplinary action that I bring. I have not filed any
disciplinary action they suspended you pending disciplinary action him this is disciplinary and him
(motioning to the stack of papers on the ground).
Coughlin: SCR 111(8) and the Supreme Court's order said that the hearing is limited to the sole
purpose of determining Mr. Coughlin's punishment for that upon which the SCR 111 Petition was
brought.
King: it does not say that, it says 'pending a disciplinary action by the State Bar'
Coughlin: I am talking about the "hearing before the Disciplinary Panel" under SCR 111(8) and the
Court's June 7th, 2012 Order, that is different than some hearing Under an SCR 105 Complaint. That
the whole import of the language in SCR 111(8), which the Court quotes exactly in its June 7th, 2012
Order for Temporary Suspension of Law License where it reads, "the supreme court shall"..."refer the
matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing before a hearing
panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed".
King: Listen to me, I am trying to help you. That Complaint (pointing at the stack of papers on the
ground) is the Complaint that we will have the Hearing on...
Coughlin: We are having a Hearing today, and if we don't, you default, and I get my license back.
King: If you answer that Complaint, then..you will have the right to appear at a Hearing and argue
your case to the Disciplinary Panel. If you do not file a Verified Answer to the Complaint, then we
will move forward, and proceed on a default basis, and the Panel may accept every allegation in the
Complaint as true.
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Coughlin: So you refused to file the Motion to Dismiss I submitted for filing?
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King: What Motion to Dismiss?
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Coughlin: The one Clerk Peters said you told her not to file.
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King: I didn't tell...I don't tell the Court Clerk what to do...
Coughlin: I sent it to you Pat. What Motion to Dismiss?
King: What are you asking to be dismissed? It doesn't say what you are asking to be dismissed. You
can't have it both ways, Zach.
Coughlin: Pat, do you have a case number,? Do you have a case number on that, on that, Pat?
King: Pick it up and read it. Pick it up and read it.
Coughlin: I can wait around her a little while longer for you to get my Hearing going, but at some
point I think I would be justified in assuming you are refusing to proceed with or hold the Hearing
you set and noticed, so...you might want to get Chairman Susich or somebody down here and get this
Hearing, here, happenin', Pat.
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LAW AND LEGAL ARGUMENT

A state cannot exclude a person from the practice of law in a manner or for reasons that
contravene the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 105. Due
process requirements; notice and opportunity to be heard
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An attorney is entitled to due process in disciplinary proceedings concerning his or her

conduct.[FN1] Due process in disciplinary proceedings requires that the attorney be given notice of
the proceeding and an opportunity to defend at a hearing, and that the proceeding be essentially fair.
[FN2] Due process requires that, in an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the attorney must be notified
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of clear and specific charges and must be afforded an opportunity to anticipate, prepare, and present a
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defense.[FN3] The precise procedural protections of due process vary, depending upon the
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circumstances, because due process is a flexible concept unrestricted by any bright-line rules.[FN4]
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An attorney is not denied due process where he or she voluntarily leaves the hearing with full
knowledge that the proceedings will continue in his or her absence.[FN5] There is no denial of due
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process where an attorney is served with a complaint and requests for admissions before the bar files
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the complaint in the supreme court where the rules do not require that the complaint be filed before it
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is served.[FN6] In addition, an attorney's due process rights are not violated, even though the attorney
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is not allowed to attend a grievance committee meeting, if the attorney is served with notice of the
bar's charges and is afforded an opportunity in the disciplinary hearing to be heard.[FN7]
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A statute providing for automatic disbarment of an attorney for conviction of an offense involving
moral turpitude does not violate due process if the attorney has notice of the disbarment proceedings,
and is able to present his or her position to the board on professional responsibility and argue that his
or her crimes did not involve moral turpitude.[FN8]
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What is important is that the disciplinary board's recommendations put the attorney on notice of the
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charges he or she must answer to the satisfaction of the court.[FN9] As to the discipline imposed, due
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process requires that an attorney facing discipline be permitted to explain the circumstances of the
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alleged offense and to offer testimony in mitigation of any penalty
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to be imposed.[FN10]
Where the evidence at the hearing discloses misconduct not charged in the original notice, the bar
may move to amend the notice to conform to the proof, but if no such motion is made, the attorney
may be disciplined only for the misconduct alleged in the original notice.[FN11]
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An attorney may be temporarily suspended without a pre-suspension hearing where the risk of
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erroneous deprivation is minimized by provisions allowing the attorney to continue his or her existing
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practice for a specified time and allow for immediate hearing and prompt resolution of the matter.
[FN12]
Due process requires a court to provide notice and opportunity to be heard to an attorney prior
to imposing a lifetime ban on the attorney's pro hac vice status in the court's local division.[FN13]
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Attorney suspended from practice of law was not deprived of due process by state court
disciplinary procedure, as would warrant imposition of different discipline in reciprocal discipline
proceeding, for attorney's ethics violation in misleading lower court in underlying inheritance action
by filing motion to withdraw funds consigned in lower court for client, but failing to disclose that
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client had died and misstating that there were no minors involved, since attorney had full notice and
opportunity to be heard in state court disciplinary proceeding. In re Oliveras Lopez De Victoria, 561
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009).
Attorney was not denied due process at presentment before trial court in disciplinary
proceeding by admission of complainant's testimony at earlier hearing before reviewing committee;
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complainant was unavailable, and attorney had a full and fair opportunity to and in fact did cross
examine complainant at hearing before review committee. Statewide Grievance Committee v.
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Johnson, 108 Conn. App. 74, 946 A.2d 1256 (2008), certification denied, 288 Conn. 915, 954 A.2d
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187 (2008).
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Attorney was properly notified of disciplinary proceeding, and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
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proceed, where hearing notification was sent by both regular and certified mail to attorney's last
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address on file with the Clerk of Appellate Courts and both mailings were returned, marked "not
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deliverable as addressed," and same notice was mailed to Colorado address that attorney had listed in
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a responsive pleading in a prior disciplinary action, and that notice was also returned, marked "return
to sender." Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 215. In re Lober, 241 P.3d 81 (Kan. 2010).
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Attorney had no due process right to jury trial in discipline proceeding, even though license to
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practice law was a property right. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. In re Gargano, 460 Mass. 1022, 957
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N.E.2d 235 (2011).
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Supreme Court observes due process in exercising disciplinary jurisdiction over an attorney, but
disciplinary proceedings are not encumbered by technical rules and formal requirements. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14. In re Disciplinary Action against Garcia, 792 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 2010).
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Attorney's conviction for two misdemeanor counts of theft warranted immediate suspension of
attorney's license under disciplinary rule authorizing immediate suspension pending final disposition
of disciplinary proceeding predicated upon conviction for serious crime. In re Disciplinary Action
Against Fisher, 2008 ND 151, 754 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 2008).
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The standards of due process in an attorney disciplinary proceeding are not equal to those in a
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criminal matter. Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St. 3d 521, 2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d
12
467 (2008). [FN1] The Florida Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1999). [FN2] Bradley v.
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Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646, 1871 WL 14737 (1871); Jaen v. Coca-Cola Co., 157 F.R.D. 146,
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31 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 178 (D.P.R. 1994). [FN3] In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, 160
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Wash. 2d 317, 157 P.3d 859 (2007). [FN4] Steinert v. Winn Group, Inc., 440 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir.
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2006). [FN5] Colangelo v. State Bar, 53 Cal. 3d 1255, 283 Cal. Rptr. 181, 812 P.2d 200 (1991).
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[FN6] The Florida Bar v. Daniel, 626 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1993). [FN7] The Florida Bar v. Committe,
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916 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1098, 126 S. Ct. 1890, 164 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2006).
[FN8] In re Krouner, 920 A.2d 1039 (D.C. 2007). [FN9] Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 85 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1985). [FN10] The
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Florida Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1999). [FN11] Edwards v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 3d 28,
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276 Cal. Rptr. 153, 801 P.2d 396 (1990). [FN12] In re Lamm, 116 N.C. App. 382, 448 S.E.2d 125
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(1994), decision aff'd, 341 N.C. 196, 458 S.E.2d 921 (1995). [FN13] Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399
F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 873, 126 S. Ct. 381, 163 L. Ed. 2d 167 (2005).
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SCR Rule 119. Additional rules of procedure.

1. Record. The record of a hearing shall be made available to the attorney at the attorneys expense
on request made to bar counsel. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83
S. Ct. 1175, 10 L. Ed. 2d 224, 2 A.L.R.3d 1254 (1963).
2. Time limits not jurisdictional. Except as is otherwise provided in these rules, time is
directoryand not jurisdictional. Time limitations are administrative, not jurisdictional. Failure to
observe directory time intervals may result in contempt of the appropriate disciplinary
board or hearing panel having jurisdiction, but will not justify abatement of any disciplinary
investigation or proceeding.
3. Other rules of procedure. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the Nevada Rulesof Civil
Procedure and the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure apply in disciplinary cases.
The undersigned (Coughlin) submitted to the Supreme Court of Nevada's electronic filing
system an Opposition to Bar Counsel's petition on or about May 24th, 2012, as an original matter
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given the online system would not allow filings in the case itself (60838). The Clerk's Office
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refused to file, mark as received, or, apparently, in any way make the Justices of this Court away of
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the Opposition. Only after the undersigned reputation has been sullied by news outlets far and wide
(an article appeared in papers in at least three different cities, separated by the vast expanse of our
state) did the Clerk's Office allow Coughlin to file something in an attempt to tell his side of the
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story here and avoid the prejudice that would be done his child custody, foreclosure defense,
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bankruptcy, and other other clients should Coughlin's law license be suspended, even temporarily..
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SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS....NRCP 5(e), Filing With the
Court Defined: The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules
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shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court....The clerk shall not refuse to accept for
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filing any paper presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form
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as required by these rules or any local rules or practices. NRCP 5(e).
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accused of stealing $755,000 candy bars from a client yet he was temporarily suspended and his
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Coughlin is not
suspension has now lasted over four months. Only after the undersigned reputation has been sullied
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by news outlets far and wide (an article appeared in papers in at least three different cities, separated
by the vast expanse of our state) did the Clerk's Office allow Coughlin to file something in an
attempt to tell his side of the story here and avoid the prejudice that would be done his child
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custody, foreclosure defense, bankruptcy, and other other clients should Coughlin's law license be
suspended, even temporarily...
It is the official duty of the clerk of a court to record (Nash v. Campbell County Fiscal
Court, 2011 WL 1620587 (Ky. 2011). [FN2] ) or file all the papers in a cause presented by the
parties, and to indorse the correct date of the filing on them. Estate of Johnson v. Ciarpelli, 71
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A.D.3d 1482, 896 N.Y.S.2d 752 (4th Dep't 2010); In re Simmonds, 271 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. App.
Waco 2008)The duty is purely ministerial (Benson v. District Clerk, 331 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. Crim.
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App. 2011) (writ of habeas corpus) and the clerk may not refuse to perform except on the order
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of the court. Cave v. Elliott, 190 Md. App. 65, 988 A.2d 1 (2010); In re Smith, 270 S.W.3d 783
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(Tex. App. Waco 2008).
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It is important to note that Coughlin has already had a very important attempted filing
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rejected by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Nevada, and now Bar Counsel Patrick King, Esq. is,
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according to Clerk of Court of the State Bar of Nevada, Laura Peters, telling her not to file somethign
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Coughlin has submitted for filing.
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Further, Coughlin served his SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in SCR 61426 and his SCR111(10)
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Motion to Dissolve Temporary Suspension upon both Bar Counsel for the North, Patrick King and
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Bar Counsel for all of Nevada and the main Southern Office of the SBN, David Clark on August
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13th, 2012, with both consenting to waive any personal service by a non party rule under SCR 109,
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and further, where Clerk of Court Laura Peters signed a "Notice of Receipt" of those documents that
also bore a heading that it was a "Proof of Service". See attached in Exhibit 1. So, the SBN wants to
deem Peters "not a party" sufficient to serve Coughlin with something requiring personal service, but
does not want Peters to be deemed "a party" sufficient that her signature attesting to a "Notice of
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Receipt" effectuates any SCR 102(4)(d) requirement that a "Petition shall be served on Bar
Counsel"? Or, the SBN has just failed to timely respond to Coughlin's August 13th, 2012 SCR
102(4)(d) Petition in 61426 and his SCR 111(10) Motion to Dissolve Temporary Suspension in
60838, both served on the SBN and NNDB Chairman J. Thomas Susich that very day, August 14th,
2012.
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Rule 104(3). State bar counsel....

3. A grievance against bar counsel or bar counsels staff shall be investigated at the direction
of the president of the state bar and heard by the board of governors. A decision of the board of
governors against bar counsel may be appealed to the supreme court under the Nevada Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
SCR 105(2):. Commencement of formal proceedings. Formal disciplinary proceedings are
commenced by bar counsel filing a written complaint in the name of the state bar. The complaint
shall be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the attorney of the charges against him or
her and the underlying conduct supporting the charges. A copy of the complaint shall be
served on the attorney and it shall direct that a verified response or answer be served on bar
counsel within 20 days of service; the original shall be filed with bar counsels office. The time to
respond may be extended once by the chair for not more than 20 days for good cause or upon
stipulation of the parties. In the event the attorney fails to plead, the charges shall be deemed
admitted; provided, however, that an attorney who fails to respond within the time provided may
thereafter obtain permission of the appropriate disciplinary board chair to do so, if failure to file is
attributable to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
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The SBN has admitted, via Clerk of Court Laura Peters, that not only has the SBN
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agreed to and already set for hearing the referral to the Board called for in the Nevada Supreme
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Courts June 7th, 2012 Order Temporarily Suspending Coughlins License to Practice Law, but also
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that any SBN v. Coughlin Complaint Bar Counsel Pat King wishes to throw together at the last
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minute in an attempt to skirt the limits of the jurisdiction granted the Board in the Courts June 7th,
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2012 Order, given Kings stated intention to attempt to make a combo-hearing out of the Hearing
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called for in that Order, despite its sole purpose language and the same found in SCR 111(8), in
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addition to the fact that given Coughlins Petition in 61426, under SCR 102(4)(d), requires an
immediate hearing, and that Petition was duly served on August 13th, 2012, both on the Board via
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Chairman Susich and both offices of the SBN, via Clark and King, and Peters personal receipt
thereof, which the SBN has still failed to respond to (much less challenge the reconsideration motion
in 60383, etc. (who is talking about whos competence, again?)...
Further, it is a virtual certainty, given Pat Kings established modes., that any such
Complaint he files, upon it being properly served and not insufficient due to illegibility of the
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photocopies of any exhibits (take it from me given 60302 and 60317, I know...) will be wholly
insufficient in that it will in no way comply with SCR 105(2), and so, as a preemptive measure,
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please be advised that any such Complaint ought take particular care to state who brought what
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grievance, and avoid conclusory assertions about something lacking legal merit or otherwise
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broadly demonstrating incompetence.
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Further, any assertions by the SBN that sending such a Complaint via certified mail,
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especially where a phone call to SBN Clerk of Court Peters on September 14th, 2012 yield her giving
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Coughlin the SBNs word that given the SBNs apparent attempt to serve Coughlin via Certified
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mail some Complaint Pat King apparently followed through on in his promise to thrown together
haphazardly in hopes of defeating any due process accorded the hearing on September 25th, 2012,
would not require a response at least until the SBN receives back as unclaimed some second
attempted certified mailing under SCR 109.
Proceedings instituted a long time after the commission of the act complained of are
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regarded with disfavor. In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 474 P.2d 116 (1970). Bar Counsel is
purportedly, and ever so conveniently seeking delay Coughlins procedural rights to a hearing on the
temporary suspension of his law license (which has already lasted longer than the NNDBs
punishment for an attorney who admitted to misappropriating about 755,000 candy bars, from his
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clients, during the course of his duties as an attorney rather than, allegedly, on a Saturday night at a
Wal-Mart an in no way connected to the practice of law, and under circumstances that indicate the
conviction stemmed from a proceedign wholly devoid of due process, and where the appeal thereto
was improperly dismissed based upon a failure of the RMC to order the transcripts produced within
10 days (the District Court cited to a civil statute in blaming Coughlin for failing ot point to a
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transcript in his Appeal Brief where the RMCs practice of demanding indigent defendants use one
and only one court approved transcriptionist and pay her up front is violative of Nevada law.
Since it is essential that the bar and the public perceive the process of the discipline of an
attorney as fair, orderly, and rational, and implicit in this perception is the timely and efficient
resolution of complaints. In re Grossman, 448 Mass. 151, 859 N.E.2d 423 (2007). A delay in
bringing disciplinary proceedings against an attorney it is to be placed into context as a
mitigating factor to be balanced against a number of aggravating factors. In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Boelter, 139 Wash. 2D 81, 985 P.2d 328 (1999).
The purpose of the attorney disciplinary process is not to punish the offender[FN4] but to
protect the public. Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 922 A.2d 554 (2007),
reinstatement granted, 2007 WL 2128391 (Md. 2007). The principal reason for attorney discipline is
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to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity and trustworthiness of lawyers in general. In
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re Scanio, 919 A.2d 1137 (D.C. 2007) Attorney discipline is designed to protect the public, the legal
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profession, and the legal system and to deter other attorneys from engaging in unprofessional
conduct. In re Non-Member of State Bar of Arizona, Van Dox, 214 Ariz. 300, 152 P.3d 1183
(2007). Thus, the judgment of a disciplinary proceeding must be fair to the attorney. The
Florida Bar v. Cox, 718 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1998).
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The purpose of the temporary suspension of a lawyer is more than disciplinary; it is also
intended to prompt a response to the board's inquires so the disciplinary action may proceed in a
timely and informed fashion. Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Fields, 790 N.W.2d
791 (Iowa 2010).
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Upon information and belief, in early May 2011, prior to any SCR 111 Petition or SCR 105
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Complaint being filed, Bar Counsel violated SCR Rule 121(5) Confidentiality: "5. Temporary
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suspension under Rule 102(4). In the event that the state bar files a petition with the supreme court
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for the temporary suspension of an attorney before a formal complaint is filed in the underlying
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disciplinary proceeding, then the matter shall be treated as confidential. If the court grants the
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petition, then the matter shall become public upon entry of the order granting the petition. If the court
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denies the petition, then the matter shall remain confidential until a formal complaint is filed or the
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matter is otherwise concluded." In early May 2012 Coughlin received a disturbing phone call from a
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client wherein the exact same information regarding some purported "taking away your right to
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practice in (REDACTED) Court" was mentioned by the client, despite not such deprivation of
Coughlin's right to practice in said (REDACTED) Court ever being mentioned by anyone other than
Bar Counsel Pat King (whom referenced such a non-existent Order to Coughlin and Chief Bar
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Counsel David Clark during an informal three hour meeting Coughlin had with those Bar Counsel in
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Reno on August 13th, 2012, while serving the SCR 102(4)(d) and SCR 111(10) filings by Coughlin).
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King is simply wrong, recklessly and negligently so, and in violation of SCR 111. King needs to
stop behaving like a fall semester freshman high school girl with no self esteem taken by every
letterman walking past her wearing a football jersey to school on a Friday game day, eager to be
accepted by the "in crowd" with the "juice" in Nevada legal circles (and overly willing to be used for
even the most loathsome of chores, like, say a SCR 117 Petition for a Judge whom had Coughlin
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arrested for "criminal summary contempt), and, rather, faithfully uphold the duties of his Office, as
the integrity of the legal profession in this State requires it. No such "Order" was ever entered by the
(REDACTED) Court, and it is obvious that King had improper communications with Coughlin's then
client.
Such an anticipated SBN v Coughlin SCR 105 Complaint, according to King, will be based
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largely upon Coughlin allegedly wearing "pajama bottoms" to the Reno Municipal Court filing
counter one day while inquiring about a parking ticket or some other non-sensensical high school
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jibberish, will contain more of the same reckless and lacking in foundation mentions of "breaking
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into" the former law office and "broken locks" despite the fact that no factual support exists for such
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an allegation, there were no "broken locks" ever mentioned by anyone (and if Hill is willing to make
up finding a "bag of weed and crack pipe" along with describing what Hill's own videos show to be
vitamins as a "large quantity of pills", then you know Richard G. Hill, Esq. would have been all over
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any "broken locks" at the former home law office, yet, there simply were none, not that that would
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stop Pat King or J. Thomas Susich from cobbling together such an allegation in the SCR 117 Petition
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in 60975) along with something about Coughlin being subject to a custodial arrest for "jaywalking"
by the Reno Police Department while Coughlin was filming Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's crew
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loading up a dump truck with items of personal property then located in Coughlin's former home law
24
office (the arrest occurred shortly after Coughlin discovered that Hill's contractor, Phil Stewart, had
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used Coughlin's own distinctive plywood to "secure" or "board up the property" in December 2011,
26
for which the landlord was ultimately awarded costs, $1,060 of which were based upon Stewart's
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invoice for "securing the property", which included the cost of plywood, and "fixing a leak in the
basement" despite NRS 118A.460 only allowing costs for "moving, storing, and inventorying" a
tenant's personal property), which Coughlin was unable to remove during the scant 13 hours he was
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afforded to do so by the Reno Justice Court's Order following a Hearing on Coughlin's November
16th, 2011 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien (the Hearing was not set or conducted with the
"10 days" required by NRS 40.253(7)-(8) because Richard G. Hill, Esq. needed to go on a six-week
vacation shortly after Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 filing (in a matter now on appeal in SCR
60331 and 61838, wherein, somehow, a commercial tenant, Coughlin (whom was both running a law
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practice and Coughlin Memory Foam, a foam mattress business from his home, which was
previously utilized for commercial purposes by a drug and alcohol rehabilitation counseling business
and is zone for mixed use purposes) was summarily evicted based upon a No Cause Eviction Notice
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only (ie, the non-payment of rent was neither noticed, pled, nor argued by the landlord) despite the
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clear dictate against the use of summary eviction proceedings against commercial tenants not based
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upon the non-payment of rent (Bench Book stuff) set forth in NRS 40.253. The December 21st,
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2011 Order "Resolving" Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien actually required
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Coughlin to pay the exact same amount of rent for 17 days (November 1 to November 17th, 2011),
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$480 (ie, pro-rated from the $900 per month rental agreement) as Coughlin would have under a "fair
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rental value", for the "full use and occupancy of the premises" despite the fact that Hill somehow
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signed a Criminal Complaint for Trespass Against Coughlin, on November 13th, 2011 despite any
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Summary Eviction Order not being served in accordance with NRS 40.400 (and therefore NRCP 5
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and 6(e) vis a vis the "within 24 hours" of "receipt" of the lockout order, and, therefore, any such
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lockout that had occured being rendered a nullity or pursuant to a void Order) and where the Washoe
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County Sheriff's Office Civil Process Service Supervisor Liz Stuchell has admitted in writing that the
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Affidavit of Service filed November 7th, 2011 by Deputy Machen, attesting to having "personally
28
served" the Summary Eviction Order on November 1st, 2011, was, in fact, purportedly merely posted
to the door of Coughlin's former law office while Coughlin was not home, at which point a Soldal v.
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Cook County violating illegal lockout occurred. In a February 7th, 2012 written correspondence to
Coughlin, Stuchell wrote: "Mr. Coughlin, Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that
day was personally served by Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The
residence was unoccupied at the time. Liz Stuchell, Supervisor WCSO Civil Section".
NRS 40.253 speaks to service of Lockout Orders: The court may thereupon issue an order directing
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The text of
the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary Eviction was signed by
October 27th, 2011 (though not mailed to Coughlin until after the November 1, 2011 lockout had
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allegedly already occured). That language is only found in situations inapplicable to the one incident
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that in the summary eviction from Coughlin's former home law office. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and
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NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and
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those situations only apply where, in: 40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1
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or 2 must: ...(b) Advise the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an
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unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
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providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the county to
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remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order and, 40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon
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noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of
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complaint for eviction to the justice court of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile
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home or commercial premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
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apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the
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matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to
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remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The way these summary eviction
proceedings are being carried out in Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates
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Nevada law. There is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in
this case. The requirements attendant to serving Summary Eviction Orders and conducting lockouts
are found in NRS 40.253 in two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language are
inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the Tenant did file
an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To require Nevada's tenants to get
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up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the order (what does that even mean? The use of
terms like rendition, rendered, notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt
of the order language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
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statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a Complaint within 90
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days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in
15
imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive
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notice standard that relies upon the days for mailing extension of time for items served in the
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mailing, etc.). In Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the
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record did not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on
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November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on November 30, 2006,
21
based on three days for mailing after excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim
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under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90
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days of receipt of a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
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Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (granting plaintiff an
26
additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... Further, as seen in the Anvui case, there is
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some argument respecting not effecting a lockout for at least 5 days where a lease has not expired by
its terms, as Coughlin's arguably had not.
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However, in his January 20th, 2012 Second Motion for Order to Show Cause, Richard G.
Hill, Esq. did not get all bogged down in legal research and stuff, instead he just pointed out:
"FACTS SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1 (the Summary Eviction Lockout
Order) was served on Coughlin on November 1, 2011 by the Washoe County Sheriffs Department
in its customary manner, by posting same on the front door of the property in the manner
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customary for evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changed at that time,
thereby ejecting and dispossessing Coughlin of possession of the Property." Hill went on to lie again
12
in that January 20th, 2012 Motion when he equated his offer to let Coughlin get some of the
13
personalty Coughlin was unable to remove, due largely to Hill failing to remove the chain link
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padlock from the backyard gate that Hill had only just installed in time for the 13 hours Coughlin had
to remove his property in exchange for Coughlin waiving his rights to the $700 damage deposit
Coughlin provided upon moving in, where Hill spins it: "12. On Friday, December 23, 2011,
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Coughlin had a crew of helpers, and made progress. Nonetheless, Coughlin failed to remove all of
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his belongings from the Property. Coughlin failed to remove his things despite having been given
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additional time to do so after the time set by the Reno Justice Court in its order of December 21,
2011 (EXHIBIT 2) had expired." Apparently, to Hill, at least one has " failed to remove all of his
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belongings from the Property. Coughlin failed to remove his things despite having been given
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additional time to do so" where Hill threatens to have one arrested for criminal trespass or larceny (of
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their own stuff, arguably) if one is on the property one minute past 5 p.m., unless one waives any
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right to their damage deposit (which neither Hill nor the Landlord eve did return, nor did they
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comply with the requirement that they provide an itemized statement indicating an application
thereof justifying such a failure to return such deposit within 30 days....and Hill does not want to get
into whether his conduct is violative of the FDCPA or whether he is licensed a as debt collector). In
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that Motion, Hill continued on: "13. On December 30, 2011, Coughlin moved this Court for a
temporary restraining order to prevent Merliss from disposing of the items he (Coughlin) had
abandoned on the Property. Coughlin's motion was fully briefed, and the Court entered its order
denying the motion on January 11, 2012. A true and correct copy of this Court's January 11,2012
order is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3. 14. On Thursday, January 12, 2012, in accordance with
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EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3, a licensed contractor hired by Merliss began cleaning up the Property
and disposing of the abandoned items still remaining there. 15. Early that afternoon, while the
contractor was hauling the first of several loads of abandoned property to the transfer station (dump)
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for disposal, Coughlin stopped the contractor in traffic and attempted to prevent him from carrying
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out his task. 16. Specifically, Coughlin stood in front of the contractor's vehicle in an effort to
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prevent him from proceeding to the transfer station. Coughlin threatened to sue the contractor.
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Coughlin climbed up on the contractor's vehicle. Coughlin then called the police and falsely told
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them that the contractor had stolen his possessions, and that the contractor had tried to run him over.
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Coughlin's acts were specifically calculated to prevent the contractor from disposing of the
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abandoned property, and to frustrate and interfere with Merliss' compliance with this Court's January
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11, 2012 order. 17. When Mr. Hill of the undersigned's office was notified of the foregoing, he went
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to the transfer station and presented EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3 to the police. The contractor was
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then allowed to proceed. 18. However, before the contractor could return to the River Rock Property,
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Coughlin was there. He had his video camera and was walking up and down the street screaming and
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yelling at the police, the contractor, and Mr. Hill, once Mr. Hill arrived. At the instruction of the
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police, Mr. Hill then obtained a temporary protective order ("TPO") again~t Coughlin from the Reno
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Justice Court. Coughlin ended up being arrested and taken to jail that day as a result of his antics at
the transfer station and the Property."
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The thing is, and Coughlin would sure like to get the 911 tapes (or, more likely, with Hill, any
recordings that may exist of Hill calling somebody in particular he may have had in mind with the
RPD) of calls by Coughlin (and if Wal-Mart can call 911 over a candy bar, or a skater board over an
iPhone he seems to have set down on the concrete ground in downtown Reno, then skaterboarded off
some 100 yards away for sufficiently long period of time to seem to have been pretty much the only
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person not to have heard somebody who picked it up threaten to throw it is in the river if it went
unclaimed can call 911 (and make up a bunch of lies on the spot for the purpose of manipulating the
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police into assuages the skateboarders own negligence vis a vis the iPhone) is it unreasonable for
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Coughlin to call 911 upon happening, totally by chance, to cross paths with Hill's contractor while
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driving, catching site of a huge dump truck full of Coughlin's personal property headed towards the
town dump? Hill admits the Order denying Coughlin's Motion for a TPO (and hey, family heirlooms
are pretty fungible, right? Who needs a TPO for that? And its not like the landlord could just accept
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rent in the meantime, or that the property still remains unrented to this day, some 11 months after the
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lockout, and apparently, some $60,000 worth of attorney's fees paid to Hill for a two bedroom home
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that appraises at around $90,000 currently, if that. And Hill's fantastic legal work ("wrong site
surgery" and all) was surely worth the risk of a wrongful eviction lawsuit (and check out those
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potential damages under Winchell v. Schiff, 124 Nev. 938, 193 P.3d 946 (2008), not that the loss of a
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patent attorney's career could amount to all that much). Regardless, its not all that colorable for Hill
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to allege Coughlin was violating some Order entered on January 11th, 2012 by Coughlin's conduct of
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January 12th, 2012 when NRCP 6(e) provides that 3 days for mailing is to be accorded to account for
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the service of filings, even filings electronically served on registered efilers like Coughlin. Its
similar to Hill wanting a criminal trespass arrest where NRCP 6(e)'s three days for mailing where no
personal service was accomplished (by way of NRS 40.400) and Hill's et al did not even comply with
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the constructive service requirements of mailing the summary eviction lockout order prior to Hill's
breaking into Coughlin's former home law office on November 1st, 2011, with the help of the
WCSO, in violation of Soldal v. Cook County where Coughlin was not accorded the "24 hours"
cushion after Coughlin's "receipt" of the lockout order mentioned in this Court's own packets on the
service of Lockout Orders, which Hill himself attached as a subsequent exhibit recently...It gets
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funnier. The civil division of the Justice Court and the Sheriff's Office think that whole "within 24
hours" language in NRS 40.253 means "within 24 hours" of the Sheriff's "receipt" of the Order from
the Justice Court...While other's think it is "within 24 hours" of the tenant's receipt of the Order from
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the Sheriff...and this Court's official forms and instructions seem to imply that "at least 24 hours"
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from "receipt" of the lockout Order must be accorded to a tenant. Who knows? But, it is not clear,
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as Hill suggests, that the "usual custom and practice of the Washoe County Sheriff's Office" is black
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letter law upon which Bar grievances, custodial criminal trespass arrests, multiple Motion for Order
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To Show Cause, tens of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees sanctions against a pro se appellant,
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etc. are warranted. Somehow the District Court found a way to sanction Coughlin with $40,050
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worth of attorney's fee in that appeal of the summary eviction without holding a single hearing, well,
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other than the Hearing on Hills Order to Show Cause, which was denied when Coughlin destroyed
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Hill's contractor Phil Stewart on cross-examination. (Really, Phil? Really? You could fell "a
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depression" in your 2 ton loaded to capacity dump truck upon Coughlin allegedly "climbing up on
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it", though you indicated you had already "alighted from the vehicle", but, wait, you could see
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Coughlin's head above the tailgate walls in your rear view mirror (which doesn't seem to be there on
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any the many videos of the events of that day. And even if such a mirror where present on Stewart's
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truck, that doesn't really explain how all the personalty stacked up so high in the truck bed (replete
with specialized add-on high stack retaining walls) wouldn't obscure any purported view of
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Coughlin's head high above the area above the specialize hydraulic dump truck's tailgate, confirming
Stewart's mere suspicion that Coughlin climbed on his truck. Coughlin swears under oath he did not
climb on Stewart's truck. Hill needed a little "fact" to spice up his Motion to Show Cause just
enough, and "Coughlin climbed up on the truck" was "just the ticket", and Stewart did not mind
going along for the ride, so long as... And none of the many videos from that day actually show any
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of the Yosemite Sam cartoon villian type behavior Hill attributes to Coughlin in his wonderfully
imaginative Motion for Order to Show Cause and or Application for Order of Protection concerning
the events involved in the jaywalking custodial arrest Hill had Coughlin subjected to on January
12th, 2012.
Much like Hill's contractor, Phil Stewart, flat out lying in an affidavit when he swore
Coughlin "climbed up on" his truck, Hill similarly lied in an affidavit about Coughlin, apparently
while "engraged" making "physical contact" with Hill. On Page 2 of Hill's Affidavit attach to his
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Motion for Order to Show Cause, January 20th, 2012, Hills attests: "5. On Friday, December 23,
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2011, we unlocked the house at 9:00 a.m. as ordered. We overlooked the chain on the back gate.
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There was nobody at the house when we were there. At approximately noon, my staff informed me
that an enraged Mr. Coughlin had called the office screaming that he could not get in the back yard.
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When I finished the meeting I was in, I immediately went over and unlocked the back gate. Coughlin
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had a small crew. He charged at me and made physical contact. He was enraged. We left. When we
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returned at 5:00 p.m., Mr. Coughlin was screaming and yelling obscenities. He drove off in a small U
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-Haul. His crew remained. We walked the property with them. The inside .ground floor was mostly
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cleared of all but a big TV. The basement had been cleared somewhat, but there was still a lot of
"junk. " We could not access the attic. We went outside. I told Coughlin's crew they could remove
anything and everything outside, if they would only try to rehang the gate that Mr. Coughlin had
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taken off the hinges before we could get over to unlock it. I told them I would lock the gates in the
morning.
That is really interesting. Compare the above to the following excerpt from page 3 of Hills
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition in CV11-03628, the appeal of the summary eviction Order: "12. While
at the property to remove the padlock, Coughlin, on more than one occasion, screamed profanities at
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Merliss' counsel, and, at one point, charged Mr. Hill and attempted to physically intimidate him.
At least the audio of this incident was captured on tape. 13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday,
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December 23,2011, counsel granted Coughlin and his agents additional, unfettered, and
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unlimited access to the outside of the property to remove any remaining items." Whereas in his
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January 20th, 2012 sworn Declaration Hill goes so far as to indicate Coughlin "made physical
contact" (which is a damn lie anyways), in Hill's then associate Casey Baker, Esq.'s NRCP 11 signed
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition, HIll's associate Baker will only go so far as to say that Coughlin, "at
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one point, charged Mr. Hill and attempted to physically intimidate him." Baker was standing directly
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next to Hill during the interacation wherin Hill swore, under penalty of perjury, that Couglhin "made
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physical contact" with Hill). Sounds like Casey Baker, Esq. was not quite willing to "spice up" the
story line as Hill himself was. Casey probably did not have enough reason to sign on to the lies
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about Coughlin "climbing on" the contractor's truck. In Hill's Application for a Protection Order
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against Coughlin Hill slips up and claims that Coughlin was "climbing on the contractor's truck,
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picking through the contents" back at Couglin's former home law after the interaction at the "transfer
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station" (town dump), whereas Hill's contractor indicated in his Affidavit that the alleged "climbing"
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on his truck occurred at the "transfer station". However, both Hill and his contractor, Phil Stewart
indicate that the Reno Police Department "requested" that Hill filed a Protection Order Application
against Coughlin. If that is true, its improper. The RPD can provide individuals information about
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seeking one, but when the RPD goes a step further and starts urging individuals to file protection
order applications, or, as has recently been the case with RPD Officer Alan Weaver and Sargent
Oliver Miller, whom, upon information and belief, urged Northwind's apartment maintenance man
Milan Krebs to sign a fraudulent criminal complaint against Coughlin for "disturbing the peace" on
July 3rd, 2011, and again urged Superior Mini Storage's Matt Grant to sign a similar baseless
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"disturbing the peace" criminal Complaint against Coughlin on approximately September 21st, 2012
then there is more than a little indication that the RPD is out of control and attempting to incite
members of the public to sign fraudulent criminal complaints based upon a retaliatory animus by the
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RPD towards Coughlin. Officer Weaver and Sargent Dye showed up to an unnoticed July 5th, 2012
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bail hearing for Coughlin, presided over by Judge Linda Gardner's brother RMC Judge William
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Gardner (whom received Coughlin's timely Notice of Appeal of the criminal trespass conviction,
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under NRS 189.010, yet failed to forward it on to the District Court, which somewhat recently
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dismissed Coughlin's appeal in that matter, wherein Sargent Dye and Officer Weaver testified under
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oath, with City Attorney Jill Drake singing backup, the the effectd that, despite bail only being valid
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based upon one reason in Nevada (to secure the defendant's attendance at trial) the "public health and
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safety" dictated increasing the cash required to bail out Couglin TENFOLD, from a bondable $1,415
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to a CASH ONLY $3,000. Consequently, upon Judge Gardner so impermissibly raising Coughlin's
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bail, alleging a "public health and safety" rationale for so doing, Couglin was forced to spend 18 days
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in jail, wherein the opportunity to timely contest the $40,050 attorney fees award to Richard Hill
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incident to the summary eviction appeal ran, all while Coughlin was denied any opportunity to access
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justice or file documents from jail, and where Coughlin sustained signficant damages, financial and
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otherwise, and where the jail refused to transport Coughlin to a hearing on a landlord tenant matter
wherein he was a named party. The extent to which local law enforcement is willing to play "kick
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the can" with an attorney, particularly where Bar Counsel Pat King is so willing to join the chorus, is
troubling, and indicates the judiciary need issue a clarion call out to announce the extent to which
such misconduct can not, and will not, be tolerated. Such a retaliatory animus towards Coughlin by
the RPD is likely due to his September 7th, 2011 Complaint with respect to a wrongful, retaliatory,
and fraudulent arrest by RPD Officer Nicholas Duralde, which was accompanied by extortionate
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threats by RPD Officer Ron Rosa that if Coughlin didn't cooperate they would "call the Nevada Bar
and let them know how you cooperated with our investigation. How's that runnin' for ya?" While
Duralde testified that he did not hear or recall Rosa's coercive threats to Coughlin just prior to the
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arrest, the fact that Duralde echoed those threats by saying "Now, I can arrest you for larceny. Now,
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I can do a search incident to arrest. How's that?" tends to undermine Duralde's contention that "he
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doesn't recall" hearing anything like what Officer Rosa was capture on tape saying to Coughlin just
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prior to the arrest. Upon making a Fourth Amendment violating arrest completely lacking in
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probable cause, and smugly "joking" to Coughlin about the "benefits" associated with charging
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Coughlin with a "felony", (at the time of the August 20th, 2011 arrest, the felony larceny amount
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limit was $250 and above) compared to a misdemeanor (under some half baked "grand larceny" of an
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allegedly lost or mislaid or abandoned three year old iPhone 3G that the alleged victim testified was
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only then worth "about $80-100" on eBay or Craigslist), ie, search incident to custodial arrest
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possible where probable cause lacking to arrest, or even reasonable suspicion missing to do a pat
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down, where alleged crime occured outside officer's presence, after 7 p.m., and no citizens arrest
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immediately effectuated, particularly where Coughlin himself made a 911 call prior to Officer's
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arriving and where video from minutes prior to officer arriving reveal Coughlin suggesting the 8-12
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hostile late teens to early twenties skater boarders relax, stay peaceful, refrain from assaulting and
battering Couglin, and wait for the police arrive so a lawful, peaceful resolution could be attained
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(with Coughlin even cautioning the youths about a then recent tragic death occurring not far from
that location).
Further Hill just flat out lies in his January 3rd, 2012 Opposition to Amended Motion for
Emergency Restraining Order. Well, he did tell the truth when he wrote, on page 3: "11. On Friday,
December 23,2011, counsel for Merliss neglected to remove the padlock to the back gate of the
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property." That is true, he did do that, and it did prevent Coughlin from removing all his property
during the scant 13 hours Coughlin had to move it. But, when Hill swears, on page 3, that:
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"Coughlin's access to the house itself was never hindered.:" he is just "sippin' drank" or something,
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as, obviously failing to remove a lock on a gate gonna tend to have that effect, now...and when Hill
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swears: " 13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, December 23,2011, counsel granted Coughlin and
his agents additional, unfettered, and unlimited access to the outside of the property to remove any
remaining items. The only condition placed on that access was that Coughlin's helpers agreed to
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replace the gate on its hinges as best they could. Coughlin and his agents failed to remove the
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remainder of Coughin's property from the yard that night, and failed to put the gate back on the
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hinges." Coughlin was never made aware of any such "offer" by Hill, and, even if he had been, hey,
it's the "outside of the property", Rich, people generally put their valuables inside, you know?
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Then the HIll prevarication and obfuscation express kicks into overdrive, when, in his
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition he continues on: "C. Coughlin is Not Entitled to A Stay Coughlin
claims to have deposited $250 with the justice's court pursuant to NRS 40.385, although he has not
provided any proof in support of his claim. Attached hereto as EXHIBIT 10 is a true and correct
copy of the justice's court's docket as of December 19, 2011. That docket shows that Coughlin paid a
filing fee for his appeal on December 12, 2011, in the amount of $216.00." Well, actually, Judge
Sferrazza waived the Justice Court's $24.00 filing fee, and the $216.00 represents the District Court's
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filing fee, and its not really clear whether that date is when the check was cashed by the District
Court, or whether the Justice Court held on to the check for quit4e awhile before shipping it along
with the ROA to the District Court, etc., etc. Hill continues: "It is entirely unclear from the following
entries of that docket whether or when Coughlin ever paid an additional $250.00 under NRS 40.385."
That might, technically be true, Rich, to the extent that you wrote it on January 3rd, 2012, and are
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sneakily indicating that you are looking at an old docket from the Justice Court from December 19th,
2012, even though Coughlin made a big deal to you and the Justice Court, in writing, that he was
depositing the $250.00 supersedeas bond mentioned in NRS 40.385, on December 22nd, 2011, a fact
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which Hill himself mentions in his own filings...So, kind of a lack of candor to the tribunal there to
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make all this argument based upon some old docket and the extent to which it fails to reveal or
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"make clear" matters to which Hill had ready written notice of via his own e-Flex account and
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service of filings upon him connected thereto, in addition to Coughlin's faxes, emails, and there
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might have even been a service of a Notice of Posting Supersedeas Bond (need to check on that
19
more), etc. in connection with the depositing on December 22nd 2012, the $250 required for a stay
20
during appeal of a summary eviction in NRS 40.385. And, actually, Hill slipped up a bit there, in
21
light of the following: And, actually, Hill, in his January 20th, 2012 filing, admitted that Coughlin
22
sent him that December 22nd, 2011 email notifying him of the posting of the $250 supersedeas bond
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seeking a stay, when he admits, on page 3: "11. Pursuant to EXHIBIT 2, Coughlin was provided
25
access to the Property on Thursday, December 22, 2011. That day, Coughlin sent an email to the
26
undersigned and Judge Sferrazza, in which he essentially announced that he was entitled to a
27
stay, and to return to and continue in possession of the Property. Judge Sferrazza quickly
28
responded by email, and reminded Mr. Coughlin that the stay had been denied." Found in
Exhibit 1 is the December 22nd email to Hill's Office that alerts them to the posting of $250 ,
specified as a "supersedeas bond", with a citation to NRS 40.385:
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Hill's January 3rd, 2012 Opposition continues, on page 8: "Even if Coughlin eventually paid
some amount toward an appeal bond, it was not in time to stay the eviction during this appeal. To do
that, a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond posted, prior to the lockout. The
lockout here occurred on November 1, 2011. By the time Coughlin managed to find that statute and
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pay any money to the court, he had been locked out of the property for six weeks. As such, any
request for a stay was, and is, moot. At this point, Coughlin does not have any rights in either the real
12
or personal". Oddly, Anvui saw a stay granted after a lockout was conducted, and Hill (RPC 3.1
13
"meritorious contention" issues) cites to no legal authority for his contention that "to stay the eviction
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during this appeal...a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond posed, prior to the
lockout." Citation? None.
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Despite Hill's strange approach of not actually indicating that his office did not get an
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December 22nd, 2011 email notifying them of the posting of $250 for a supersedeas bond seeking a
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stay under NRS 118A.385 (but rather, Hill focuses on what one cannot glean from looking at a dated
docket...), Hill's Office was made aware of such matters, in writing, in the following December 22nd
email to Hill's Offiee: "...Further, this is all moot at this point as I have filed a Supersedeas Bond of
23
$250, and according to NRS 40.385, I automatically get a stay of eviction and am entitled to
24
return to the property and continue in possession. The statute sets the Supersedeas Bond
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(which yields a stay) at $250 if rent is under $1000, unless the Court wishes to rule that I am a
commercial tenant. However, if the court does rule that I am a commercial tenant, the No
Cause Eviction Notice in this case, under NRS 40.253 makes a Summary Eviction Proceeding
impermissible, as Summary Eviction Proceedings are not allowed against commercial tenants
where only a No Cause Eviction Notice is filed. Its one or the other, but Mr. Hill and Baker
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cannot have it both ways. Further, the Courts Order of December 21, 2011 is just that, and
Order, its not an agreement, its not a settlement, etc, etc. and the audio record clearly reflects
that. NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to NRS
40.253: 1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be obtained
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by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the expected costs on
appeal. In an action concerning a lease of commercial property or any other property for which
the monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may, upon its own motion or that of a party, and upon a
13
showing of good cause, order an additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal.
14
A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction of the appellate court and irrevocably appoints the
15
clerk of that court as the surety's agent upon whom papers affecting the surety's liability upon the
16
bond may be served. Liability of a surety may be enforced, or the bond may be released, on motion
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in the appellate court without independent action. 2. A tenant who retains possession of the premises
19
that are the subject of the appeal during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in
20
the amount provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes
21
due. If the tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings for a summary
22
eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin,
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Esq.".
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Oh, and Hill and Stewart admit to this in a video. Richard Hill's contractor, for some strange
26
reason, removed a ladder Coughlin owns from the property, preventing Coughlin's access to the attic
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upon his being allowed that scant 13 hours to remove his property (and the attic had been renovated
to allow for storage of a considerable amount of property. If Coughlin was Hill he would have called
the RPD to report the "larceny" of his ladder by Hill, in a RICO thing with his contractor. But Hill
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escaped prosecution that time, over they whole ladder deal. It never was made clear why the
contractor removed the ladder from the property, other than, perhaps, like the applying of a lock to
the backyard gate, make it even more unlikely that Coughlin would be able to remove all he needed
to, especially given the limited funds for moving vehicles and hired help, in the scant 13 hours
allowed under the December 21st, 2012 Order.
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Things have just gotten too ridiculous where an attorney's license gets placed in jeopardy for
saying "Wow" in court (or King threatens to buttress an SCR 105 Complaint upon such scandalous
12
behavior while the RPD can violate the Fourth Amendment while making threatening, coercive
13
statements and smugly, menacingly joking to an arrestee (whom dared ask if the officer actually had
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reasonable suspicion to conduct such an evasive Terry Stop style weapons check pat down on one
whom himself called 911 to report an attack by skater youths, while holding his Pekingness and
bicycle, which the skaters were trying to rob the attorney of when they weren't "jokingly" making
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sudden attempts to reach into the attorney's pockets) about overcharging an arrest to get around the
19
dictates against conducting a custodial arrest and search incident thereto for some ill supported petty
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larceny of an iPhone, allegedly occuring after 7 pm, outside the officer's presence, based upon some
"lost, mislaid, or abandoned" property fact pattern worthy of a law school final exam where someone
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finds an iPhone on the ground in downtown Reno, offers it up to the denizens of a downtown skate
24
plaze shortly before midnight on a Saturday, then threatens to "throw it in the river" if someone does
25
not claim it immediately, which eventually leads to an attorney being attacked by a group of youthful
26
skateboards making up every lie they can think of to prevent any inference that said iPhone was
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abandoned and or rescued from waste or destruction or that assaulting and battering one who does
not immediately turn over an iPhone to a hostile, violent group of 8 to 12 late teens early twenties
skaterboards yelling things like "give us the phone faggot". Further, in Nevada, a larcenous intent
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must exist at the time one takes possession of lost or mislaid property. "A taking with the intention
of returning the property, or a taking without the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his
property, will not amount to larceny, even though the perpetrator, after gaining possession of the
property, formed that intent. State v. Clifford, 14 Nev. 72, 33 Am.Rep. 526; State v. Ward, 19 Nev.
297, 10 P. 133; Robinson v. Goldfield Merger Mines Co." Harvey v. State, 78 Nev. 417, 422-23, 375
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P.2d 225, 227-28 (1962) [78 Nev. 417, Page 420] , 46 Nev. 291, 213 P. 103. The requirement that the
original taking and the felonious intent coexist in point of time was properly mentioned in the written
instructions given in the instant case. Moreover, we recognize that the question of whether the
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property was originally taken with such intent is one of fact, the determination of which is to be
14
made from a consideration of all the circumstances preceding, attending and following the taking of
15
the property. State v. Cudney, 47 Nev. 224, 218 P. 736.
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There has already been testimony in such a pending criminal matter against an attorney the
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the attorney did not attempt to furtively or immediately flee the scene where he was allegedly free
19
handed such an iPhone, and where the Witness Statements conveniently left out the whole bit about
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the man holding the phone up and threatening to "throw it in the river" (an an admission by several
hostile witnesses that that did occur was caught on videotape) and, not only that, but actually lied an
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indicated these witnesses "personally eye witnessed" the attorney just walk up and "grab" the iPhone
24
off the ground, etc. Oh, also, the whole arrest was caught on tape too, as were the moments prior
25
thereto, and the alleged victims are clearly shown lying to 911 operators about someone "socking a
26
minor" to engender a more rapid and urgent police response. Never mind that the alleged "socking"
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was actually flinching went an 18 year old, along 8-12 of his hostile and aggressive friends
attempting to rob the attorney of his bicycle and or dog, made a "joking" and sudden movement
intended to make the attorney think the 18 year old was "reaching in" the attorney's pockets...Add to
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that the fact that they Officer announced to the attorney within seconds of arriving on seen that he
was going to conduct a search incident to arrest, and only later made up a bunch of pretextual
rationale to support conducting a Terry Stop pat down, then a search incident to arrest, while alleging
the attorney's question as to, whether the officer had a sufficient basis to conduct such a pat down or
search incident to arrest, without anything more to support a larceny probable cause analysis than an
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allegation that one possessed an iPhone that was purportedly left on the ground, whereupon that
person called 911 upon being attacked by a group of 8-12 immediately after failing to instantly
adhere to their threatening demands to consent to a search on one's pockets, accompanied by a touch
13
of assault and battery to boot, and some hate speech. Such is not supportable, particularly where
14
merely pending for denying one due process required under the law, and particularly SCR 102(4)(d)
15
and SCR 111(8) and SCR 111(10).
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The fact that the criminal trespass custodial arrest occurred at a time when Coughlin still had
18
not received back the $2,275 "rent escrow" the Reno Justice Court forced Coughlin to deposit with
19
the RJC in that very summary eviction proceeding/"Trial" (all while Coughlin was, at least according
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to Hill, supposed to hire movers and rent a U-Haul and otherwise have sufficient funds to conduct a
large scale move of a home law office after having just gone from zero to expert on landlord tenant
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law litigating a "Trial" for a law office tenant in a matters of days...). Coughlin made such a deposit
24
or $2,275 "rent escrow" with the RJC on October 17th, 2011 (after the October 13th, 2011 summary
25
eviction hearing in Rev2011-001708 wherein the RJC Judge ruled that Coughlin "had established a
26
material issue of fact" as to retaliation and habitability (and perhaps discrimination, that is not clear)
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and set a "Trial" (but only if Coughlin deposited $2,275 in a "rent escrow" account with the RJC by
October 17th, 2011) for October 25th, 2011 (despite a "Trial" under JCRCP 109 requiring 20 days to
respond to a Complaint, under NRS 40.251, ie, a plenary unlawful detainer action with all the
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attendant due process trimmings). Further, the Summary Eviction Order stemming from the October
25th, 2011 "Trial" (it was noticed as a "Trial" in writing by the Court, referred to as a Trial by the
Court) and the accompanying criminal trespass conviction stemming therefrom are likely void do to
the fact that Coughlin filed, on October 18th, 2011 a Notice of Appeal (on a form that, by the way,
indicated McLaughlin's exposure for any attorney's fee award would be limited to $15.00, much less
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the $40,050 ultimately entered against Coughlin in an attorney's fee sanction in CV11-03628 by
Judge Patrick Flanagan. That Notice of Appeal form was provided to Coughlin by a Clerk of the
RJC in response to a specific request by Coughlin for the form to appeal the Order stemming from
13
his October 13th, 2011 summary eviction proceeding, and the forms on the RJC web site at the time,
14
under a heading of "Notice of Appeal" linked to that same form, and did not in any way specify such
15
form to only apply to appeals of small claims actions). Coughlin's filing of a Notice of Appeal of
16
that October 13th, 2011 Order following the summary eviction proceeding, under Mack v. Mack-
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Manley, divested any jurisdiction of the RJC to hold such a "Trial" on October 25th, 2011, and any
19
such "Trial" was void for lack of jurisdiction anyway, NRCP 60(b)(4) in light of the dictates of NRS
20
40.253(6) ("shall make no further Order" upon the Justice Court finding tenant had established a
21
genuine issue of material fact, which Judge Sferrazza indicated Coughlin had in his Order following
22
the October 13th, 2011 summary eviction proceeding, and again, on the record, during the October
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25th, 2011 Trial, Judge Sferrazza again stated that he set the matter for "Trial" upon his making a
25
"finding that Coughlin established a genuine issue of material fact", which, under Anvui, and NRS
26
40.253(6), prevented Judge Sferrazza from making any further order, and the lack of a corollary to
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Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44 in the RJC, along with the dictates against unwritten/not approved
28
by the Nevada Supreme Court and counter to express statutory mandates in NRS 118A and NRS 40
"house rules" set forth in JCRCP 83 should have prevented forcing Coughlin to make any "rent
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escrow" deposit of $2,275 right in the middle (actually after it should have ended) of a summary
eviction proceeding.
JCRCP RULE83.RULES BY JUSTICE COURTS
Each justice or justice court in a township with more than one justice, by
action of a majority of the justices thereof, may from time to time make and
amend the rules governing its practices not inconsistent with these rules.
Copies of rules and amendments so made by any justice court shall upon
their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court, but shall not
become effective until after approval by the Supreme Court and
publication. In all cases not provided for by these rules the justice
courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with
these rules.
Further, any "Trial" in that summary eviction matter, and therefore any
criminal trespass arrest based upon any failure to properly adhere to some
improperly served Lockout Order stemming therefrom, is also void in light
of the noncompliance with JCRCP 109: SETTING OF TRIAL IN
ACTIONS
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"(a)In no case shall a trial on the merits be set less than 20 calendar
days after service of summons and complaint."
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To continue the temporary suspension of Coughlin's constitutionally protected
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(under the Fourteenth Amendment, a law license is a "property right") law license
based upon conjecture, hearsay, Pat King's "innocent" mistakes about "facts" and
various orders so terribly subject to being found void under NRCP 60(b)(4), etc. and a
criminal trespass conviction similarly suspect, particularly where Coughlin's filings
Further, Judge Sferrazza admitted that the RJC did not have a rule for forcing
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Coughlin to make such a "rent escrow" deposit at the time such was ordered on
October 13th, 2011 in the summary eviction proceeding. And even if the RJC did
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have such a rule speaking to "deposits" with the RJC, JCRRT Rule 2 makes clear that
such a rule does not apply to "landlord tenant matters":
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JCRRT Rule 2. Application of Rules. Except as otherwise provided by

statue, these rules apply to all civil proceedings filed in Reno Township
except small claims and landlord tenant matters.
Oh, and Hill still managed to get Coughlin subject to the November 13th, 2011 custodial
arrest (ie custodial have someone with color of law make you strip naked and spread your buttocks
search incident to arrest, and even apparently allow a complete copying and, some times "erasing" of
one's smart phone, separate micro sd data card, or laptop pursuant to such a "search incident to
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arrest"...like what occurred on February 27th, 2012 incident to the traffic citation trial before RMC
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Judge Nash Holmes (whom told Coughlin she would have him arrested if he said Richard G. Hill's
13
name one more time) in 11 TR 26800 2I stemming from the three traffic citations RPD Sargent John
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Tarter called in a different RPD Officer to issue Coughlin incident to Coughlin being told to leave
15
Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s law office where Coughlin had gone (upon being released from jail on
16
November 15th, 2011) to retrieve his keys, wallet, state issued identification and client's files from
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Hill, whom refused to provide such items to Coughlin, upon Coughlin being bailed of jail after
spending three days there in connection with the criminal trespass arrest connected to the criminal
20
Complaint signed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. At that February 27th, 2012 traffic citation Trial in RMC
21
11 TR 26800 (and not even some juicy reckless driving thing, just a plain old "failure to come to a
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complete stop at a stop sign/California Roll/Boulevard Stop traffic ticket"), Coughlin was sentenced
to five days jail, denied a stay (despite being a practicing attorney with actual clients depending upon
him) by RMC Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes seconds after Coughlin testified that RPD Sargent Tarter
26
"lied" during his testimony concerning what Coughlin's purported to be a retaliatory issuance of
27
multiple traffic citations incident to Coughlin repeating to Tarter what may have been a sarcastic
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repose to Coughlin by RPD Officer Chris Carter during the criminal trespass arrest from Coughlin's
former home law office just days prior, when Coughlin queried Carter if he, too, was on Hill's
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payroll. In Judge Nash Holmes written February 28th, 2012 Order Finding Defendant in Contempt
of Court and Imposing Sanctions (a five day immediate trip to jail, and a failure to release Coughlin
after the fourth day despite the RMC accepting and failing to return $100 Coughlin's mother
deposited with the RMC upon an agreement being made to so release Coughlin at the end of the
fourth day...which was not adhered to), Judge Nash Holmes somehow found it fair to impose the
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following upon a pro se indigent criminal defendant (much in line with the RMC's prerecorded
arraignment videos which basically attempt to scare any and all out of even darign to represent
themselves before the RMC, especially where Keith Loomis, Esq. and the boys down there provide
13
such a ready lubricant to the, uh, justice the RMC dispenses: "The court had the defendant sworn at
14
the beginning of the trial, stating that the court has found that most self-represented defendants tend
15
to testify a great deal as they cross- examine opposing witnesses, so the defendant would be under
16
oath from the start, too. exhibits were marked or admitted." That practice apparently is read to
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provide support for some contention that Coughlin violated some RPC while appearing as a pro se
19
criminal defendant in a traffic citation Trial, where Coughlin's smart phone and micro sd card were
20
searched incident to his arrest for "summary contempt committed in the Court's presence" and
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"booked into evidence" where they stayed for some 37 days, and where returned to Coughlin with all
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the data erased, but not before lots of contradictory statements were made by the Sheriff's Office, the
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City of Reno Marshal's, the RMC, the Washoe County District Attorney's Office, and the Washoe
25
County Detention Facility regarding the chain of custody of that smart phone and data card, whether
26
it was removed from the evidence room at the jail and transported back to the RMC on February
27
28th, 2012, whether a micro sd card was even included in the property so inventoried then booked
28
into evidence, and whether that micro sd card was released to an associate of Coughlin or kept with
the smart phone for those 37 days. Curiously, in Judge Nash Holmes March 30th, 2012 Order
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Releasing Property, that Order indicates: "IT IS ORDERED that the Washoe County Sheriffs Office
shall release to the Defendant, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, three items taken from him on
February 27, 2012 at Washoe County Regional Detention Facility during his booking for
incarceration pursuant to the imposition of a 5-day jail sentence for Contempt of Court in the above-
entitled case, to wit: one Samsung Cell Phone; one T-Mobile Cell Phone; and one Braun Electric
Razor, as identified in Case Number WC 12-1805 and referred to under Control # C-47951."
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That's the thing, though. There were four items, not three. Marshal Harley, whom made sure
12
he was the one doing the lookin' through of the pockets and pattin' down of the body and all that, he
13
made a big deal about how the micro sd card was not in the smart phone. Actually, Marshal Harley
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pretty much rendered an Order convicting Coughlin of this and that in conjunction with his
conducting the search incident to arrest of Coughlin. The fourth was a micro sd card, capable of
holding an entire libraries worth of books on it in digital format. While the smart phone was
18
returned, with the micro sd data card inserted into it, it was not found that way during the "search
19
incident to arrest". The micro sd card was not inserted into the phone. Such a micro sd card can be
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inserted into a flash drive adapter, into a digital camera, into a lot of things, not necessarily one's
smart phone. And the Washoe County Regional Detntion Facility did not return the phone
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immediately in compliaince with the Order, but rather indicated that the Washoe County District
24
Attorney Office had to give permission and or get to possess the materials first, with "Maddy" of the
25
WCSO indicating Coughlin need contact Mary Kandaras of the WCDA's Office.
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Eventually, after 37 days, the smart phone and micro sd card were returned to Coughlin with
all the date therein erased, but not before Judge Nash Holmes entered an Order accusing Coughlin,
vaguely, of lying (not getting all that specific though with respect to just what it was Coughlin was
apparently "lying" about, but some reference was made to rules related to the media and court
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proceedings...and then a laundry list copy and pasted from teh RPC of all the purported violations of
various RPC's that Coughlin was found to have committed "by clear and convincing
evidence"...including such vague and entirely devoid of any explication or factual rulings that
Coughlin was guilty of demonstrating a "lack of fairness to opposing counsel" or "prolonging
proceedings", etc...Coughlin did report to City Attorney Allison Ormaas during a brief plea
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bargaining session immediately before the Trial that RPD Officer Carter made a statement (perhaps
said sarcastically while arresting an attorney for criminal trespass where the RPD refused to issue a
citation or identify themselves as law enforcement prior storming in Coughlin's former law office's
13
"basement", where a stay is mandated under NRS 118A.380, where one's rent is less than $1,000 and
14
damages awarded are nil, for no more than a $250 deposit, at a time when Coughlin had yet to be
15
returned the $2,275 impermissible "rent escrow" deposit forced upon him in a summary eviction) that
16
"Richard Hill pays me a lot of money so I arrest who he says to arrest and do what he says to do"
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upon Coughlin asking Carter if he, too, was on Richard G. Hill's payroll. It appears that at some
19
point, perhaps while they were whispering in each other's ears (as Coughlin noted on the record
20
during the Trial in 11 TR 26800) during the Trial that Marshal and City Attorney Ormaas were
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afraid Coughlin may have some evidence of Ormaas's admitting to Coughlin that she was in no way
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going to following up on an statements by an RPD Officer that may tend to present and admission of
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accepting some improper benefit in exchange for committing official misconduct under color of law,
25
or otherwise document such information. The RMC's Marshal Harley seemed to be upset about the
26
possibility that Coughlin may have some evidence of Harley purporting to personally serve Coughlin
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the Order to Show Cause in CV11-03628 (and Machen's Affidavit of Service filed March 8th, 2012
28
indicates Machen "personally served" Coughlin, which not the case, as apparently Machen did not
want to wait around for a few minutes for Coughlin's bargaining session with City Attorney Ormaas
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to end, which means Machen was cutting a corner, which is something courts and local law
enforcement punish ordinary citizens for every day in Washoe County. When Marshal Harley began
to realize Coughlin's questions to him were revealing some questionable issue (so, you don't know
whoat WCSO Deputy handed you this Order to Show Cause? You have no idea? You didn't
recognize him at all? Did he "personally serve" me it, or did you, Marshal Harley? Why is this even
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being personally served? And why while I am attending court on a totally unrelated matter? Is that
proper? Is that somewhat hostile and done in an attempt to embarass Coughlin at the courthouse? Is
that appropriate?
Is there even a rule requiring such an "Order to Show Cause" be personally
13
served"? Have not found one yet...Especially where Coughlin was a registerd efiler at the time, and
14
therefore, likely had already been deemed served. Where the subsequent Affidavit of Service thefore
15
indicated it was actually the same WCSO Deputy Machen having "personally served" such Notice on
16
Coughlin, along with some impromptu questioning of Harley as to whether such service was being
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done bas To the extent City of Reno Marshal Harley barged in to that bargaining session purporting
19
to personally serve Coughlin Notice of a Hearing and or Order to Show Cause in connection with
20
Hill's Motion for Order to Show Cause in the appeal of the summary eviction matter (which resulted
21
in a quadruple jeopardy cocktail courtesy of Hill, based largely upon the same acts which resulted in
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Coughlin being arrested for "jaywalking", and Hill getting a TPO, and Bar Counsel Pat King making
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a federal case of Hill's January 13th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin submitted to the SBN, wherein
25
Hill leads off with an allegation that Coughlin was "ghostwriting for" someone for whom Coughlin
26
was listed as attorney of record. Huh? Then Hill went to "comply with his RPC 8.3 obligation" by
27
reporting the conviction underpinning the current temporary suspension (something Coughlin
28
himself reported in compliance with SCR 111 prior to any knowledge of Hill's having done so, not
that Bar Counsel bothered to mention that in its SCR 111 Petition, something this Court made note of
a lack thereof in its June 7th, 2012 Order).
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Incidentally, RPD Sargent Monica Lopez admitted during a videotaped interview that neither
she nor her fellow office, Carter, identified themselves as law enforcement while calling to Coughlin
at the basement door prior to the landlord opening it, nor requested or warned Coughlin to leave the
property prior to arresting him from criminal trespass from Coughlin's former home law office on
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November 13th, 2011...despite Hill testifying under oath that they did so identify themselves prior to
the landlord opening the "basement" door and that the RPD Officer did issue a warning to leave to
12
Coughlin or otherwise provide Coughlin a chance to heed such a warning prior to effecting a
13
custodial arrest. What makes that even more troubling is the fact that Hill provided the City of Reno
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prosecutors video of pretty much all events other than the "knock and identify themselves" as law
enforcement Hill purports the RPD did (even where RPD Sargent Lopez indicates neither she nor
Officer Carter did so identify themselves prior to the basement door being opened by the landlord).
18
Amongst the videos that Hill filmed on November 13th, 2011 that Hill did manage to provide to City
19
of Reno prosecutors was a video of Coughlin asking Officer Carter and Sargent Tarter, prior to the
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point of arrest, why, if they felt he was trespassing, they wouldn't simply issue a citation in lieu of
making a custodial arrest. Hill's own video establishes that Hill's testimony during the criminal
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trespass matter is extremely problematic respecting whether the RPD identified themselves prior to
24
the landlord opening the door and whether the RPD issued Coughlina warning to leave and
25
opportunity to heed it prior to effecting a custodial criminal trespass arrest. Hill had Coughlin
26
arrested for criminal trespass, even where Coughlin had to pay for "storage" the same amount, $480
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as the Lease Agreement required for "full rental value for full use and occupancy of the premises"
for 17 days of "storage" of Coughlin's personal property, and even where NRS 108.475 and NRS
40.760 indicate a summary eviction is required where one is "using a storage facility as a residence"
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(if that was the case, which has not been established), not a criminal trespass arrest, particularly
where RPD Officer Chris Carter, in violating Soldal v. Cook County, expounded to Coughlin upon
his learned views on "service" of eviction orders like some modern day Friedenthal. Then there is
the fact that Coughlin's former home law office was robbed of approximately $8,000 worth of
personalty on December 12th, 2011 (during the six week wait for a Hearing on Coughlin's Motion to
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Contest Personal Property Lien, again, because, according to Hill, the RJC was going to postpone
setting any such hearing until Hill's six week vacation was over, despite the statutory dictate that
such a hearing be set within 10 days of Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 filing of a Motion to
13
Contest Personal Proeprty Lien). The December 21st, 2011 Order on Coughlin's Motion to Contest
14
Personal Property Lien required Coughlin to rush into his former home law office, and take in the
15
specter of it having been torn asunder and robber, with a chortling Richard G. Hill, Esq. standing on
16
filming the occasion, and quickly throw together an "inventory of anything lost, stolen or damaged",
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then hop over to Kinko's or some wi-fi and email the RJC with such an inventory, copying Hill in the
19
process. Even though the statutes in Nevada are amongst the harshest towards tenants compared to
20
the other 49 states, the RJC, Washoe County Sheriff's Office, Reno Police Department, and landlords
21
like Dr. Matthew Joel Merliss, MD (a Chico, Ca. based neurosurgeon whom graduated from Beverly
22
Hills HS) and their attorney (or, their unauthorized practice of law committing "eviction consulting
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and process service" company, like Nevada Court Services) really go the extra mile in making
25
Nevada a very dangerous, and perhaps, lethal, place to be a tenant. Oh, and the Judge finding
26
Coughlin guilty of the Reno Municipal Code's version of criminal trespass, RMC Judge William
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Garnder, found support for the "when on property with an intent to vex and annoy" the owner of a
28
property version of criminal trespass where the Judge and prosecution also maintained that Coughlin
was "secretly" going on the property (apparently Coughlin was haunting the subconscious of the
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property owner where the prosecution did not have support for the "failed to leave after being warned
to do so" version of criminal trespass in RMC 8.10.010 is also the brother of the Family Court Judge
Linda Gardner whose April 2009 Order for Sanctions of Coughlin incident to Coughlin's service for
legal aid organizations Washoe Legal Services as a domestic violence attorney was cited as the "sole
reason" for Washoe Legal Service firing Coughlin, and which formed the basis for Coughlin's
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Petition for Writ of Mandamus challenging said Order for Sanctions in 54844 and whom admitted,
on the record, in the case flowing from Coughlin's criminal trespass arrest, in RMC 11 CR 26405,
that he "passed along" to his fellow RMC Judge Nash Holmes "his own sister's" over three years old
13
Order for Sanctions ($1,000 attorney's fee award personally payable by Coughlin under NRS 7.085
14
despite Coughlin's citing to an ALR article demonstrating the position he maintained to be the
15
majority viewpoint in Amercian jurisprudence, ie, no setting off "duty" such as alimony for
16
unsecured third party credit card debt where other spouse is sole signatory. A far flung doctrine of
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the necessaries threat by various unsecured debt holders, where none of the debts are likely large
19
enough to engender much litigation, hardly makes vexatious a failure to agree to John Springgate's
20
proposed marital settlement agreement
21
. RMC Judge William Gardner refused to recuse himself from Coughlin's criminal trespass trial
22
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despite acknowleding that he was aware that his passing on his sister's 2009 Order for Sanctions to
24
Judge Nash Holmes had resulted in a grievance being filed with the SBN, based upon his sister's
25
Order for Sanctions, upon Judge Nash Holmes forwarding said Order onto the SBN. Bar Counsel
26
King issued that "grievance" based upon Judge Linda Gardner's 2009 Order for Sanctions its own
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case number, yet has continued to refuse to specify how that case came to be, who filed the grievance
based upon that Order, or in any other way indicated that such grievance came to be other than an
immaculate conception of sorts.
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Speaking of RMC Judge Nash Holme's submission of grievances and complaints to the SBN
immediately after Coughlin, unsuccessfully sought to invoke his right to appeal the "criminal
summary contempt" Order Judge Nash Holmes rendered on February 27th, 2011 in the Trial for a
traffic citation, in Coughlin's March 7th, 2012 filing in 11 TR 26800 of a Notice of Appeal (which
despite the dictates of NRS 189.010, .020, .030, and .060 and ATTY GEN. OPINION NO. 79-4
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Criminal Appeals From Municipal CourtNRS 189.010 and 189.020 (1979). The RMC has
continued to fail to transmit Coughlin's appeal of the criminal summary contempt Order to the
District Court. Further, Coughlin's own Washoe County Public Defender Biray Dogan, Esq.
Then, Mr. King alleged he would point towards some pending criminal investigation as a
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basis for a Compliant. Tell that to the indicted on federal compaign violation charges attorney's the
SBN is not commenting on.
Somehow, the District Court managed to find it equitable to sanction Coughlin $40,050 in
attorney's fees in the appeal of that summary eviction matter, and the judge making that ruling was
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previously a member of the same law firm as Coughlin, yet refused to recuse himself from the
21
matter. Bar Counsel King has also previously threatened (while attempting to coerce Coughlin's
22
assent to some snake potion SCR 117 deal when King is not busy attempting to fabricate a SCR 105
23
"informal meeting" with Coughlin out of a purported offer by King to actually let Coughlin even
24
view (not copy though) or "see the materials submitted along with the grievances", despite the fact
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that King stormed away from the Bar's Northern Office conference room seconds into Coughlin
reviewing such materials, along with all such materials being stuffed back into their box, upon it
becoming clear that Coughlin wished to view the materials prior to being interrogated by King other
otherwise have King deem the occasion an "informal meeting" under SCR 105). King seeks to
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prolong a temporary suspension incident to a thoroughly defrocked "candy bar petty larceny"
conviction (and the dismissal of the appeal was based upon an impermissible applciation of NRS
189.030 and NRS 4.410(2) wherein a civil statue speaking to paying up front for a transcript was
applied to justify dismissal a criminal appellant's appeal (a growing in Nevada's courts as seen in a
similar case included in Exhibit 1) as a justification for placing a temporary suspension on Coughlin
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throughout a lengthy potential SBN v Coughlin Complaint proceeding (that will be, according to
King, based upon pending criminal charges, Coughlin wearing "pajama pants" to a Municipal Court
filing counter while checking on a traffic ticket, some alleged video of someone swearing in a police
13
officer's presence, a non-existent/CGI-ish "Order" by a (REDACTED) Court Judge that only exists in
14
the mind of Pat King (who is known for being rather sloppy and lazy like that, you know, when it
15
comes to due process and people's way of making a living, and constitutionally protected property
16
rights, while bringing his dog to work to hang out in the Bar's Northern Office's lobby, a Great Dane,
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which, admittedly, is a magnificently regal animal, though it was not in the December 2012 Animal
Law issue like Coughlin's Pekingnese Jackson Pawluck). "Patty Ice" knows Coughlin loves him.
However, it is inappropriate for King to seek to prolong Coughlin's temporary suspension so
unreasonably, where, especially, King has maintained he intends to seek a "combo-hearing" that will
largely be based upon a Complaint that alleges Coughlin has pending criminal charges: Where the
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only relevant factual allegation contained in Disciplinary Board's affidavit, filed in support of its
25
petition for attorney's temporary suspension from the practice of law, was that a criminal indictment
26
had been filed against the attorney, this sole allegation, without more, was insufficient to justify
27
summary suspension and the immediate imposition of temporary restrictions. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rules
28
102, subd. 4(a), 111, subd. 1. Matter of Monteiro, 1984, 684 P.2d 506, 100 Nev. 440. Coughlin has
not been indicted on federal election law/campaign contribution violations. The charges Coughlin
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does currently face say a lot more about the prosecutors than they do about Coughlin, and the fact
that a June 7th, 2012 email from Coughlin to a prosecutor was followed four hours later by a
suspension of this Court, signed by three Justices, one of whom has previously recused himself from
Coughlin's case appeal of the dismissal of Coughlin's wrongful termination lawsuit against Washoe
Legal Services, 60302 (and granted, the Justice referenced has longstanding ties to and altruistic
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interactions with legal aid entities throughout the state...) provides a further reason for this Court to
consider, en banc, Coughlin's various requests to have the temporary suspension of his law license
dissolved (Coughlin filed a Motion for Resconsideation of the Temporary Suspension on June 11th,
13
2012 in light of the Nevada Supreme Court's failure to file Coughlin's May 24th, 2012 attempt at
14
filing an Opposition to the SCR 111 Petition in 60838, in violation of NRCP 5(e), and a August 13th,
15
2012 SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in 61426, in addition to a SCR 111(10) Motion to Dissolve the
16
Temporary Suspension of the same date in 60838.
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As to the reasonableness of allowing Bar Counsel's attempt to subvert procedural SCR's

based upon pending criminal cases, the RJC docket in RCR2011-063341 is incorrect in that it fails to
detail the extent to which DDA Zach Young violated NRS 178.405 by filing, with a file stamp time
of 2:55 pm an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Appear as Co-Counsel despite the fact that DDA
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Young and Coughlin's public defender Biray Dogan, in RCR2012-065630 met in a clandestine status
24
conference on February 27th, 2012 at 1:30 pm, despite the fact that on February 24th, 2012 (and the
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files documents this as well) that very MSC was continued until March 29th, 2012 in light of a
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scheduling conflict attendant to the fact that Coughlin had a traffic citation trial involving Coughlin
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in the RMC on that very day, February 27th, 2012 in 11 TR 26800 set for 1:00 pm. Bar Counsel
King has threatened to file a SBN v Coughlin SCR 105 Complaint based upon a filing by Coughlin
incident to the defense of a "misuse of 911 or emergency services", a charge that presents DDA
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Young with the difficult tasks of prosecuting one for (and some guessing is required here as DDA
Young is taken to not specifying much of anything in the information in his Complaints) calling 911
to report fear of the police and or a failure by a 911 operator to accord such an allegation any
legitimacy...which explains why DDA Young seeks to conspire with Coughlin's public defender
Dogan to amend such a charge to a "resisting arrest" simple misdemeanor, down from a gross, and
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thereby leverage the threat of a conviction of a crime that actually, upon a conviction, would invoke
a SCR 111(6) "serious offense) Petition by Bar Counsel) criminal matter that has been pending since
Coughlin was subject to a custodial arrest on January 14th, 2012 at his then shared residence with
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two individuals from whom he rented a room, and against which he was ultimately awarded Orders
14
of Protection in FV12-00187 and FV12-00188. The same RPD Sargent, Paul Sifre, who ordered a
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trainee, Officer Leedy, to effect a custodial arrest of Coughlin on January 12th, 2012 at Coughlin's
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former law office ordered Coughlin arrested again less than 48 hours later for the "misuse of
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emergency services" incident to Coughlin calling 911 to report the sudden disappearance of his dog,
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in the context of weeks of attacks by his two former housmates (slashed tires, furniture thrown in the
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street, death threats, being chased up the stairs by a man with a 10 inch butcher knife yelling threats,
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having hot coffee thrown on him, interference with his mail, etc., etc.), and despite the fact that NRS
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33.018 does define "domestic violence" to include violence against one's pets or animals. Sargent
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Sifre indicated to Coughlin upon bringing 7 other RPD Officers to "respond" to Coughlin 911 call
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upon the violent roomates making menacing statements and gestures in response to the
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disappearance of Coughlin's dog, that it was merely a "matter for animal control" and that Sifre was
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arresting Coughlin because "you keep placing yourself in situations where you are a victim", and
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despite that statement being captured on tape, DDA Zach Young continues to prosecute that case.
DDA Young and Coughlin's public defender did seek to prevent Coughlin from becoming aware of
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their attempts to "reduce" that gross misdemeanor to one that would invoke an SCR 111(6) "serious
crime" Petition by Bar Counsel if a conviction is procured, as just because a charge is conveniently
reduced to "resisting arrest", and therefore a "lesser offense" (gross misdemeanor versus
misdemeanor) does not mean the impact on one's life would be less, especially in light of SCR 111.
Dogan failed to apprise Coughlin of DDA Young attempt to so amend the Complaint in that Matter
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in his July 31st, 2012 filing in RCR2012-065630, despite Coughlin previously demanding notice of
any and all filings by either side. Sandwiched between the two arrests in 48 hours by RPD Sargent
Sifre, was an intervening pull over by the same RPD Officer whom wrongfully arrested Coughlin on
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August 20th, 2011 in RCR2011-063341, Nicholas Duralde, along with 5 other cops assisting Duralde
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in notifying Coughlin that his license plate was suddenly missing, shortly after Coughlin was
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released from jail, on January 13th, 2012, incident to a "jaywalking" arrest. Coughlin attempted to
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submit a written complaint to the RPD regarding the retaliatory, coercive, pretextual conduct by RPD
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Officer's Duralde and Ron Rosa, which the RPD rejected on September 7th, 2011)(and unless the
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Ninth Circuit has a jewel somewhere that was missed, no matter how backwards and ignorant an
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arrest is, how pretextual or baseless, even for "jaywalking", the police can copy, view, and search
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one's laptop or smart phone (even a practicing attorney advocating on a client's behalf who gets
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arrested for summary contempt committed in a the presence of a Judge: Some courts have relied on
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the Supreme Courts holdings in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and United States
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v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) to hold that officers can search arrestees cell phones incident to
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arrest, concluding that they are part of the arrestees person. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501
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(Cal. 2011); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Young, 278 F.
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Appx. 242 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Kan. 2007).15
Robinson and Edwards, decided nearly 30 years ago, should be read narrowly in light of the more
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recent holdings in Chadwick and Gant. Searches of the person are distinguishable from searches of
electronic data stored in devices carried by the person, making Chadwick and Gant more directly
applicable).
Judge Nash Holmes has admitted in writing to communications with those involved in that
clandestine, unnoticed, violating of attorney client privilege, February 27th, 2012 MSC in RCR2012-
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065630 involving Dogan and DDA Young. However, that did not, apparently, despite the dictates of
NRS 178.405, stop Judge Nash Holmes from continuing on with the traffic citation Trial minutes later
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in 11 TR 26800, wherein she sentenced Coughlin's to 5 days in jail, and denied a stay to Coughlin
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despite his then representing client's as a lawyer in time sensitive matters, finding Coughlin's guilty of
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"summary criminal contempt" (which Coughlin had to report to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office and State Bar of Nevada as a SCR 111 criminal conviction). Curiously, the Order
for Competency Evaluation was signed by Judge Clifton, but the RJC's file and docket therein
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indicate that Judge Schroeder presided over the 2/27/12 1:30 pm Status Conference, despite the fact
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that the files indicates such a conference was reset, on 2/24/12 to 3/29/12 (RJC Judge Schroeder
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stated to Coughlin at the January 31st, 2012 Hearing on Extending the Stalking and Harassment
Protection Order Richard G. Hill, Esq received within 40 minutes of filing it, on January 12th, 2012,
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"do you want to go to jail" upon Coughlin attempting to broach the subject of whether, perhaps, Hill
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was abusing the TPO process to aid in preventing opposing counsel from collectin evidence in
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support of a damages analysis incident to a wrongful eviction lawsuit, particularly one of a "wrong
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site surgery" variety for Hill's neurosurgeon client, in that Hill utilized a summary eviction
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proceeding against a commercial tenant not based upon the non payment of rent...ie, a "wrong site
surgery" to make an analogy Hill's neurosurgeon client might easily grasp.
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As to the purported "summary criminal contempt" Order by Judge Nash Holmes, it is not clear
there is such a "misdemeanor crime" in Nevada. That February 28th, 2012 Order read: "The court
finds that the defendant's actions were intentional and done in utter disregard and contempt for the
court, and in the presence of the court, for purposes of disrupting and delaying the proceedings and
dishonoring the rule of law and this court, and constitute the misdemeanor of criminal contempt, a
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violation of RS 22.0 I O. Good cause appearing therefore, the following sanctions are imposed: IT IS
ORDERED, pursuant to NRS 22.100, that the defendant be incarcerated at the Washoe County
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Regional Detention Facility for the term of five (5) days, fro m the time he was taken into custody on
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this court's order on February 27, 2012, and that sentence shall not be reduced for any reason...."
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NRS 22.010 Acts or omissions constituting contempts. The following acts or

omissions shall be deemed contempts: 1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent
behavior toward the judge while the judge is holding court, or engaged in judicial
duties at chambers, or toward masters or arbitrators while sitting on a reference or
arbitration, or other judicial proceeding. 2. A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct
or violent disturbance in the presence of the court, or in its immediate vicinity,
tending to interrupt the due course of the trial or other judicial proceeding. 3.
Disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the
court or judge at chambers. 4. Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to
be sworn or answer as a witness. 5. Rescuing any person or property in the custody
of an officer by virtue of an order or process of such court or judge at chambers. 6.
Disobedience of the order or direction of the court made pending the trial of an
action, in speaking to or in the presence of a juror concerning an action in which the
juror has been impaneled to determine, or in any manner approaching or interfering
with such juror with the intent to influence the verdict. 7. Abusing the process or
proceedings of the court or falsely pretending to act under the authority of an order
or process of the court.
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In Judge Nash Holmes February 28th, 2012 Order Finding Defendant in Contempt of Court
and Imposing Sanctions, the Order reads: "9) defendant's lying to the court in response to direct
questions posed by the court with regard to his recording the proceedings". No evidentiary support or
other allegation have been made by Judge Nash Holmes to support that finding. Further, that Order
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seems to take an overly narrow view of what is permissible subject for cross-examining a police
officer, and at one point, Judge Nash Holmes stated, on the record, that she does not "care about
retaliation, or bribery, or corrutpion" or words substantially similar to that effect, and the Order itself
suggests Judge Nash Holmes finds those subject wholly irrelevant to a criminal prosecution,
regardless of the vast body of case law devoted to retaliatory arrests, witness bias, materials not
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offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather the witness's state of mind, etc., etc. That
Order included the following: "defendant's repeatedly injecting allegations of bribery, perjury, and
police retaliation into the matter after the court instructed him not to, and directed him to limit himself
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to i sues pertaining to the facts of the "Boulevard Stop;" 5) defendant's repeatedly trying to insert
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"Richard Hill" into his questions and statements when such person was not relevant to the
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proceedings and the defendant had been ordered to stop discussing that...defendant's continually
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accusing the court of denying him the right or ability to ask questions...defendant' s failing and
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refusing to properly examine the witness, despite numerous admonitions by the court to stop
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repeating questions, misstating answers, injecting irrelevant material, arguing with the witness and
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mischaracterizing the testimony. During that proceeding Judge Nash Holmes asked Coughlin "Are
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you recording this proceeding?". Coughlin prefaced his answer with an assertion that he a a
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Constitutional Right now to be coerced into answering such sua sponte interrogation, but answered
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truthfully that he was not recording the proceeding at the time that question was posed to him by
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Judge Nash Holmes, though, to be sure, the RMC was recording the proceeding, it is a part of the
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public record, and Coughlin surely now has no means of confirming what exactly may have been on
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his smart phone or micro sd data card given both were returned to him damaged and with all the data
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previously therein erased, though likely not before his privacy had been raped by various local law
enforcement entitites perusing the contents therein under some "search incident to arrest" approach.
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In a letter/complaint/grievance to the SBN from the RMC's Judge Nash Holmes, dated March
12th, 2012, it is written: "We are setting that case for trial and attempting to serve him at the most
recent address we have (1422 E. 9th St. #2 Reno NY 89512), although I heard today he may be living
in his vehicle somewhere....It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending
on this attorney. My Judicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public Defender in February...
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and they stated that they represent him in a Gross Misdemeanor matter in RJC...You will have the full
cooperation of myself, the other judges, and the staff of Reno Municipal Court in your pursuit of this
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matter. Mr. Coughlin has positioned himself as a vexatious litigant in our court, antagonizing the
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staff and even our pro temp judges on the most simple traffic and misdemeanor matters. I do think
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this is a case of some urgency, and I apologize for taking two days to get this package to you; our
IT person was ill and could not make the copies of the audios of Mr. Coughlin's hearings until today,
and I felt it was important that the audios be included in the materials to be considered by the State
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Bar. On February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he was actively practicing law and had
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appointments with clients. I do not know if that was true, but if so, he could be causing serious harm
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to the practice of law in Northern Nevada and could be jeopardizing someone's freedom or property
interests...." Such concern for Coughlin's client's "freedom or property interests" did not result in
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Judge Nash Holmes according any real consideration to issuing a stay of any sort to Coughlin prior to
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the immediate and unfathomably unexpected summary 5 day jail sentence incident to a traffic citation
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Trial over a California Roll/Boulevard Stop. Why, in a letter date February 14th, 2012, when
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Coughlin was still living at his fromer E. 9th St. address, Judge Nash Holmes would have "heard he
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(Coughlin) may be living in his vehicle somewhere" is curious, though not at all out of line with
Coughlin's past experience with the some individuals at the RMC and the City of Reno Marshals.
Coughlin has no idea what "pro tem" Judges he ever had any interactions with at the RMC of an
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import whatsoever. The passage wherein Judge Nash Holmes apologizes for "taking two days to get
this package to you" implies a previous communication with the SBN, though hopefully not the sort
of attempts to drum up complaints where none should reasonably issue like that see with the RPD's
Office Weaver and Sargent Miller, or in the apparent exorting Richard Hill by the RPD to file a
protection order against Coughlin. Further, Judge Nash Holmes went on to issue what are likely void
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"double jeopardy" violating Orders subsequent to Coughlin filing a notice of appeal on March 8th,
2012 of the Contempt finding. It is improtant to note, the February 28th, 2012 Order Finding
Defendant in Contempt and Imposing Sanctions, which purports to issue a conviction for
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"misdemeanor criminal contempt" was never received by Coughlin, despite it purportedly being
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mailed to Coughlin's former home law office address at a time that the RMC had Coughlin's then E.
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9th St. address, and despite Coughlin having a change of address on file with the USPS at that time
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(though there were issues with getting the USPS to process or recognize that incident to the domestic
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violence against Coughlin on E.9 9th St.). Regardless, Coughlin only ever first even saw the
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February 28th, 2012 Contempt Order, and probably even then did not realize it purported to issue
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"misdemeanor criminal contempt" conviction (Coughlin still has some confusion as to the distinction
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between criminal and civil contempt and a reading of the NRS 22.010 cited does little to alleviate that
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confusion, though Coughlin has gathered various ALRs and AmJurs on the appealability of summary
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contempt findings and does not belive Judge Nash Holmes Order is sufficiently specific under the
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Houston decision (Judge Pomeranz, handcuffs, etc). Further, Bar Counsel King has gone on to
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threaten Coughlin extensively with the use of sections of subsequenttly issued Orders by Judge Nash
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Holmes that purport to make findings "by clear and convicing" evidence of various violations of
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RPCs for conduct that Judge Nash Holmes already entered an Order on February 28th, 2012. That is
double jeopardy and or law of the case, and not a proper basis for delaying the hearing required under
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SCR 111(8), etc. The SBN and King can have it if they want it with Coughlin, but they ought to
have to do it in compliance with the rules, period, rather than have King get down on all fours an
surreptiously crawl behind a standing Coughlin's knees, only to have whoever give Coughlin a swift
push to the torso, causing him to topple over backwards. And the SBN should be prevented from
doing its bit where it shows Coughlin a flower, prompts him to smell it, then manipulates some
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apparatus built into what is actually a phony flower that sprays water in Coughlin's face. And then
there is the cans of mixed nuts the SBN gave Coughlin that actually contained projectile confetti sorts
of material.
Hill applied for a TPO against Coughlin on January 12th, 2012 when Hill noticed Coughlin
peacefully filming from the public sidewalk at Coughlin's former home law office Hill's crew
throwing into a dump truck the property that Coughlin was unable to remove in the scant 13 hours
accorded him in the Order "Resolving" Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property line, on
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December 24th, 2011, especially where Hill placed a chain link and padlock on the backyard gate to
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Coughlin's former home law office, making removing many, many items unfeasible. Hill failed to
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remove the chain link padlock until only a couple hours remained to move a great deal of property,
and said padlock was only placed on that back yard gate in the one or two days immediately prior to
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the time allowed to remove property....Further, despite billing Coughlin some $1,060 for "securing
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the property" (one would think paying $460 under NRS 118A.460 for "storage" of personalty might
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include "securing" it, but no, it would not...and Hill's contractor saved on expenses incident to such
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"securing" by using Coughlin's own plywood to board up the back porch. Speaking of the extent to
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which Judge Nash Holmes continued on to conduct the Trial in 11 TR 26800 despite the 2/29/12
Order for Competency Evaluation signed by Judge Clifton and file stamped 1:31 pm, despite the
statutory dictate that "the other departments" "shall suspend any other proceedings relating to the
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defendant until to defendant is determined to be competent", found in NRS 178.405, DDA Young
himself violated NRS 178.405 in that his 2/29/12 Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Appear as Cocounsel bares a file stamp of 2:55 pm. Please correct the docket in this regard, as well as revising it to
reflect all of Coughlin's filings, which were all file stamped, yet are not indicated on the docket,
especially the Notice of Appearance Coughlin filed, while Coughlin was still a licensed attorney, in
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addition to any Substitutions of Counsel Coughlin filed so very long ago (no matter what DDA
Young tries to argue about how "untimely" Coughlin's attempts to be rid of the public defenders
obstructive presence are).
Additionally, there is a clear retaliatory animus evince by both Dogan and DDA Young's
participation in the Feburary 27th, 2011 "clandestine" Status Conference where Coughlin's filing of
February 17th, 2011 in that same case RCR20120-065630 That February 14th, 2012 filing by
Coughlin in RCR2012-065630 was attached by Pat King and or J. Thomas Susich in the SCR 117
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Petition in 60975 (and King has repeatedly threatened to attach it to or reference it in the SCR 105
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Complaint he keeps hyping in an ill advised attempt to get Coughlin to sign up for a SCR 117 trip)
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and referenced by Judge Nash Holmes in her various Orders and written complaint to the SBN when
she cites Coughlin with "quoting lyrics to rock songs" in a filing was critical of Dogan's work as a
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public defender for Coughlin, especially where Dogan was attorney of record and failed to appear for
24
a hearing...Never mind that the only lyrics to any songs that were quoted by Coughlin in any filings
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so far was the quotation to a rap song in the February 17th, 2012 filing in the case that Dogan
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represented Coughlin on in Reno Justice Court, RCR2012-065630, wherein an Order for
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Competency Evaluation was entered at 1:31 pm on February 29th, 2012, whereupon, shortly
afterwards, Judge Nash Holmes continued on to hold the traffic citation Trial from which the
"summary criminal contempt" charge underpinning most of Bar Counsel King's SCR 117 Petition
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and from which most of King's threats of a SBN v Coughlin Complaint seem to rely (to the extent
such a Complaint would rely on anything other than King's typical legal drivel, which continually
fails to cite to any legal authority whatsoever and evinces the work of a man entirely unfamiliar with
Lexis, Westlaw, AmJur., ALR, Proof of Facts, or any other bastion of actual lawyering. The lyric
Coughlin quoted in that February 17th, 2012 filing (which was necessitated by the fact that Dogan
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failed to appear for a court date on February 13th, 2012 for which he and Coughlin had, when they
met in person and spoke for over an hour about the case on or about February 7th, 2012 agreed
Dogan would appear on Coughlin's behalf and that Dogan was already "attorney of record" in the
13
matter and assigned to the case) was quoted merely as a commentary on the spiritual choices one is
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faced with various local power brokers and their agents are behaving like goons: "Okay, your a goon,
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what's a goon to a goblin?". Hardly a rationale for pulling some lawyers ticket, Mr. King. Nor for
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submitting a complaint questioning a lawyers competency to the SBN.
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SCR Rule 111(8). Attorneys convicted of crimes.

"8.Referral to disciplinary board. Upon receipt of a petition filed under
subsection 4 of this rule, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a
serious crime, the supreme court shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in
accordance with the provisions of subsection 7 of this rule, refer the matter to
the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing
before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the
extent of the discipline to be imposed..."
SCR Rule 102(2). Types of discipline:
Misconduct is grounds for: "2. Suspension by the supreme court. A suspension of
6 months or less shall not require proof of rehabilitation; a suspension of more
than 6 months shall require proof of rehabilitation to be demonstrated in a
reinstatement proceeding under Rule 116...."
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Given that the Board and the SBN are and have effectively denied Coughlin a timely hearing
called for by the Court's Order and SCR 111(8), and now have failed to provide an "immediate
hearing" pursuant to Coughlin's filed and served SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in case number 61426.
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SCR Rule 116. Reinstatement: "1. Order of supreme court required. An

attorney suspended as discipline for more than 6 months may not resume
practice unless reinstated by order of the supreme court. 2.Procedure for
reinstatement. Petitions for reinstatement by a suspended attorney shall be
filed with bar counsel's office, which shall promptly refer the petition to the
chair of the appropriate disciplinary board. The chair shall promptly refer the
petition to a hearing panel, which shall, within 60 days after referral, conduct
a hearing. ...
4. Tender of costs in advance. Petitions for reinstatement under this rule
shall be accompanied by an advance cost deposit of $1,000 to cover
anticipated costs of the reinstatement proceeding."
The 60 days mentioned above only further highlights the potential for a contempt finding
where the SBN and Board have failed to schedule a hearing for this matter despite Coughlin filing an
Opposition to the SCR 111 Petition, or at least submitting an Opposition as early as May 24th, 2012,
and eventually getting the Court to file something in that vein on June 10th, 2012, which has remain
unchallenged by Bar Counsel. Bar Counsel appears rather busy with other things, and any such
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overburdened condition will only be exacerbated by a protracted involvement with Coughlin, who
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can rake it a little if anyone hasn't noticed yet. King's close and prolonged involvement with Richard
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G. Hill, Esq. (the were opposing counsel on one of the biggest cases of either of their careers, the
March 2012 reported decision in Milsner v Carstarphen)
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CONCLUSION
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Please dissolve the temporary suspension of Coughlin's law license and require the SBN to
remit whatever compensation to Coughlin this Court feels is just, and or, in the alternative, require the
SBN and NNDB or Panel to immediately set for Hearing (very soon) a Hearing limited to the dictates
set forth in SCR 111(8) and this Court's June 7th, 2012 Order, ie, determining the punishment for the
candy bar issue, which arguably has been more than served already given the four months length of
the suspension and other peripheral matters.
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Declaration: I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to NRS 53.045 that,

to the best of my knowledge, the information contained herein is true and
correct.
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Respectfully submitted this: October 2nd, 2012,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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PO BOX 3961
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Reno, NV 89505
Pro Per Attorney
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Proof of Service:
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document to all registered electronic filers or those otherwise consenting to electronic service in a
waiver of the application of NRCP as set forth in SCR 109, and to those whom are not I placed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document in the USPS mail on this date and or complied with all
service requirements set forth in SCR 109:
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9

Reno, NV 89521
David A Clark, Esq., Bar Counsel
State Bar of Nevada
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Address: 600 East Charleston Blvd.
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Las Vegas , NV 89104
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Phone Number: 702-382-2200
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Fax number: 702-385-2878

J. Thomas Susich, Esq., Chairman NNDB
Nevada Employment Security Division
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Address: 1675 E. Prater Way, Suite 103
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Sparks , NV 89434
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Fax number: 775-284-9513
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Dated this October 2nd, 2012
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/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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FILED
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Electronically
01-30-2012:04:48:12 PM
Joey Orduna Hastings
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 2730987
Document Code: 2645

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney for Appellant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
ZACH COUGHLIN;
10
Appellant,
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vs.
CITY OF RENO
Respondents.
)
)
)
)
) CASE NO: CR11-2064
)
) DEPT. NO: 10
)
)
)
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OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
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COMES NOW, Appellant Zach Coughlin, by and through his attorney, Zachary Barker
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Coughlin, Esq , and offers his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal. This Opposition is based
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upon the attached Points and Authorities and the pleadings and papers on file in this case (though
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the Record on Appeal is deficient in that much of it is in the form of an illegible "four pages per
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page" version of what was provided the Reno Municipal Court, whereas a "one page per page"
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version of those papers and pleadings were provided to the Reno Municipal Court and in a manner
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expressly authorized by the Reno Municipal Court.
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
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- 1
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 30, 2011, the Reno Municipal Court held a Trial of Appellant for the charge of
Petit Larceny (RMC 8.10.040). See Certified Copy of Docket, filed December 23, 2011. Though
Pam Roberts had agreed in writing to a continuance previous thereto, she decided to change her
mind on the date of the Trial, and Judge Howard refused one anyway. In fact, Judge Howard
thought it was such an urgent matter of public importance to get this petit larceny charge of a
"chocolate bar and some cough drops" done that he get literally an entire Department of the Reno
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Municipal Court working until 9 pm at night on November 30th, 2011, with everybody collecting
overtime, all courtesy of the public fisc.
Appellant received a fine in the amount of$360.00 and 24 hours of community service, but
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then Judge Howard realized he was mistaken in his belief that Appellant had failed to appear for the
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originally scheduled November 14th, 2011 Trial Date. So Judge Howard excised his earlier
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requirement that Appellant before 24 hours of Washoe County Sheriff work program community
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service, with no extensions, by December 18ht, 2011, despite the Appellant being indisposed
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serving three days in Washoe County Jail immediately following the Trial in this matter pursuant to
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a finding Summary Contempt Order announced by Judge Howard at the conclusion of the
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November 30th, 2011 Trial in this matter, only to return to the full time practice of law upon the
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conclusion of the three day sentence (A Motion for Stay requested by the Appellant while being
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handcuffed and arguing that his client's would be unduly prejudiced by such a Summary Contempt
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finding) was curtly dismissed by Judge Howard one sentence into arguing for it. See Certified Copy
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of Docket. On December 13, 2011 Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in this matter. See Certified
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Copy of Docket. At the conclusion of the Trial in this matter, and on the record and part of the
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official audio recording of this matter, Judge Howard announced to the undersigned that he was
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giving the undersigned an additional three days beyond that normally afforded litigants, to file a
Notice of Appeal on account of Judge Howard's summarily sentencing the undersigned attorney to
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three days in jail for "contempt committed in the presence of the Court".
It is very, very odd that the "Certified Docket" and the "Record on Appeal" do not seem to
verify the filing of many of the papers and pleadings from the undersigned in Exhibit 1. This
manner of filing papers and pleadings was expressly authorized by RMC Filing Office Supervisor
Donna Ballard.
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Another thing that is curious and clearly very, very wrong is that the "Judgment and Order of
the Court" that was allegedly file stamped on Novemer 30th, 2011 (yet lacks a clerk's handwritten
intials in the blank calling for as much) indicates that the undersigned pled "Guilty" to the charge.
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Now, how a 5 hour Trial could have taken place when a "guilty" plea was entered (and, again, the
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undersigned did not ever pled guilty in this case, far from it) is not clear, but a lot of things aren't
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clear. How could the incredibly implausible and shaky testimony and evidence put on here for the
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accused theft of about $10 of edibles (in a County that has had about 15% unemployment for about
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3 years now, with an accused that has received no foodstamps, Section 8 housing, medi-caid, no
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nothing....no to mention that the evidence strongly shows that there was no theft in this matter). So,
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what of the "guilty" plea mentioned? Does that invoke NRS 177.015(4)? Or does it just show the
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sloppy and or prejudicial manner in which Veronica Lopez et al do their duties in Department 4?
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NRS 177.015(4): "Appeals to district court and Supreme Court. The party aggrieved in a criminal
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action may appeal only as follows:. 4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 of NRS
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174.035, the defendant in a criminal case shall not appeal a final judgment or verdict resulting from
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a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere that the defendant entered into voluntarily
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and with a full understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, unless the
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appeal is based upon reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the
legality of the proceedings. The Supreme Court may establish procedures to require the defendant to
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make a preliminary showing of the propriety of the appeal. " How is it that this charge, alleging the
consuming of a "chocalate bar and some cough drops" results in a custodial arrest over one day, a
$360 fine plus another $40 for "court processing charges", in addition to 24 hours of Sheriff's "work
crew" community service, to be completed "with no extensions" in a matter of 15 days by one who
is engaged in the full time busy practice of law, immediately after that same attorney finishes
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serving three days in jail (no Stay granted, no tier time in jail, no phone calls to protect client's
affairs) for a Summary Contempt Order in a case where the indigent accused was denied his Sixth
Amendment Right To Counsel, and any continuance, not even one, even where a wrongful eviction
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with all sorts of attendant procedural and substantive errors in REV2011-001708 unduly prejudiced
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the accused's ability to put on a defense, particularly where materials essential to such a defense
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where being wrongfully withheld by the opposing counsel in the eviction matter (whom was also
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withholding another attorney's client files and that attorney's drivers license and whom the
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undersigned can't find a single attorney in town who has a single good thing to say about that
attorney, his name being Richard G. Hill, Esq.)?
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II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Please see EXHIBIT 4: December 12th, 2011 emailed filing (as authorized by the RMC in
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lieu of faxing) to the RMC's renomunirecords@reno.gov that should, but does not appear
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appropriately in the record on appeal, containing just the email cover sheets proving the attached
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pdf's were received by the RMC and therefore the contents thereof should be appropriately printed,
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provided, and filed by the RMC to the District Court, rather than the illegible "four pages per page"
style the RMC has put in the Record on Appeal. Further, please see EXHIBIT 2:
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DECLARATION OF ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ. for a somewhat thorough accounting of
the relevant facts here. Further, it seems a "tolling motion" was timely filed her, so in the interest of
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judicial economy its is likely necessary to figure out whether the Notice of Appeal and this Request
to Set a Hearing with the 60 days from the filing of the Notice of Appeal here is appropriate or if it
would be for naught. Further, Judge Howard's signature on various papers and Orders appears to be
a "rubber stamp" mold of his signature, which is, perhaps, not permissible. Additionally, on the "not
on pleading paper" "
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. Further, the Summary Contempt Order completely lacks an Proof of
Service, indeed, there is no record of any service of this Summary Contempt Order in the Record on
Appeal. Another thing that is not only interesting, but indicative of the ad hoc, slapdash manner in
which convictions are handed out and trials are conducted in Judge Howard's court room. Such
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convictions can require an attorney such as the undersigned to comply with SCR 111. Or entail
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filing an appeal like this one, which will not only likely cost the City of Reno quite a bit of money
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during particularly down economic times, but which have even more far reaching effects upon a
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number of people. The "Judgment of Conviction and Court Order" (have fun figuring out if NRCP
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59 is applicable to something with that title) does not have a Proof of Service, per se, but there is
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something for a litigant to sign, usually with a bullying Marshal hulking over he or she in a
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demeaning, authoritarian, and derisive tone....However, the Marshal who initialed (yet provided not
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further identifying information) this section, writing in "REFUSED" and a time of 8:23 pm,
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apparently filed to later adjust this "time of service" is you can call it that. Perhaps he or she should
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have, considering that the "For The Record" software the RMC uses and provides litigants
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purchasing the recording of the audio of a trial indicates that the "Judgment and Court Order" in this
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matter was finally concluded at 8:46 p.m. a full twenty three minutes AFTER the time the Marshal
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wrote on the quasi-Proof of Service form of 8:23 p.m. (where the Marshal wrote REFUSED, which
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was a lie, it was not refused, and further, the handcuffed and manhandled undersigned was not really
in much of a position to prevent the five to six Marshals there from folding up such a document and
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putting in the undersigned laptop bag or his pockets, or otherwise providing a copy of the document.
What the RMC means by "REFUSED" is not clear. Veronica Lopez, Judge Howard's menacing
"Judicial Assistant" sneered to the undersigned on the phone, when he called the following Monday
seeking a copy of any such documents that the undersigned "had his chance to get one and blew it"
and then Lopez proceeded to taunt the undersigned some more and hang up abruptly after lying that
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she would fax copy of the "documents" supposedly refused on November 30th, 2011 to the
undersigned fax number as listed on the State Bar's website. The flagrant level of belligerence
demonstrated by some many of the personnel associated with the RMC, particularly Judge Howard's
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Department, many of whom are "former prosecutors" or otherwise associated with a prosecutorial
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incubation period really suggests a complete lack of oversight and accountability being applied to
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the RMC by the judiciary, the public, and the powers that be. The November 30th, 2011 "Judgment
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of Conviction and Court Order" (which appears to bare a rubber stamp mold of Judge Howard's
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signature, which looks completely inauthentic, "rubber stampish", overly uniform, and identical
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every time I have seen it anywhere) 8:33:11 pm on November 30th, 2011 in Judge Howard's court
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room.
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Further, the "interrogation room" video from Wal-Mart filed with the RMC on 12/13/11 and
the materials in EXHIBIT 5 (which includes Discovery produced by Reno City Attorney compared
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to receipt of "purchased" items, both filed in legible form with the RMC, yet not included in legible
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form in the Record on Appeal) NOTE: THIS IS THE RECEIPT FOR THE ITEMS THAT WERE
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RUNG UP AND FOR WHICH MONEY WAS PAID. WAL-MART'S THOMAS FRONTINO
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AND RSIC OFFICER CRAWFORD LIED WHEN THEY BOTH TESTIFIED THAT THEY
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VERIFIED THAT THE UPC FOR THE "COUGH DROPS" ON THE RECEIPT ON THE PAGE
ABOVE THIS ONE DID NOT APPEAR ON THE RECEIPT FOUND BELOW). HOWEVER,
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CLEARLY THAT SAME UPC APPEARS ON BOTH RECEIPTS (THE UPC IS 0732211630093).
FRONTINO EVEN TRIED TO TESTIFY THAT HE WAS ABLE TO DISCERN FROM
APPROXIMATELY 50 FEET AWAY THAT HE COULD TELL EXACTLY WHAT ITEMS
AND WHAT UPC'S WERE BEING RUNG UP AT THE REGISTER AND THAT HE WAS
ABLE TO VERIFY THAT THE UPC'S FOR THE COUGH DROPS ON THE "STOLEN"
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RECEIPT" WERE NOT FOUND ON THE "PURCHASED" RECEIPT. HOWEVER, CLEARLY,

FRONTINO WAS WRONG OR LYING, OR BOTH.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
So, here is how much Pam Roberts, Esq. and John Kadlic, Esq. think of this Court, our
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judicial system, NRCP 11, rules governing prosecutorial misconduct WDCR 10, DCR 12, WDCR
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12(1), Rules of Professional Conduct related to refraining from suborning perjury, etc., etc. Pam
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Roberts, Esq.'s Motion to Dismiss consisted of just thus:
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"
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
COMES NOW Respondent CITY OF RENO, by and through, Pamela G.
Roberts, Deputy City Attorney, and files its Motion to Dismiss Appeal as follows:
This Motion is based upon the pleadings and documents on file herein, and the
following Legal Argument.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
On November 30, 2011, the Reno Municipal Court convicted Appellant of
Petit Larceny (RMC 8.10.040). See Certified Copy of Docket, filed December
23, 2011. Appellant received a fine in the amount of$360.00. See Certified Copy
of Docket. On December 13, 2011 Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in this
matter. See Certified Copy of Docket. Pursuant to NRS 1 89.010, the Appellant
had 10 days from November 30, 2011 to file his Notice of Appeal. This 10 day
rule applies to the Reno Municipal Court. See Root v. City of Las Vegas, 84 Nev
258, 439 P2d 219 (1968). There are no exceptions.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Respondent respectfully requests that this
Honorable Court enter an Order dismissing this appeal. DATED this 19th day of
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January, 2012, JOHN J. KADLIC Reno City Attorney By: PAMELA G.

ROBERTS Deputy City Attorney"
Now, for the $112,000 per year in compensation that Deputy Reno City Attorney Pam
Roberts has averaged over the last several years, one might be forgiven for expecting that she could
provide some citation to the NRCP that forms the basis for her Motion to Dismiss Appeal. (See,
EXHIBIT 3: Salary information for the years 2009 and 2010 for Deputy Reno City Attorney Pam
Roberts, Esq. from www.TransparentNevada.com). However, Roberts failed to cite to NRCP 12(b)
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at all, much less specify which section of NRCP 12(b) she may be arguing for a Dismissal under.
So, perhaps, Roberts should be on trial for theft, as her Motion certainly does not seem to suggest an
honest day's work for an honest day's pay. As such, Respondent's Motion must fail. Certainly, the
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undersigned's Motion's have failed in other cases before this Court where he has, allegedly, failed to
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cite to a specific procedural rule supporting the relief he requested. That is, unless this Court prefers
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to hold pro se litigants who are living at the poverty line to a much higher standard than it holds
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government attorneys who are compensated extremely well to prosecute misdemeanor crimes and
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assisted by several full time staff members and a generous equipment and expense account.
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Regardless, Roberts Motion to Dismiss fails to comply with WDCR Rule 12. : "Motions; points and
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authorities and decisions. 1. Except as provided in Rule 1, all motions shall be accompanied by
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points and authorities." Roberts motion contains no authority to support a number of aspects of
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her argument.
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Further, the Proof of Service on Robert's motion is addressed to an address for the
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undersigned that Roberts should have known was no longer current given the January 10, 2012
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Notice of Appearance the undersigned filed in this matter with his current 1422 E. 9th St. #2, 89512
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address. As such, Roberts motion is improperly notice and should fail. Further, even if opposing
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counsel Roberts wishes to argue the Motion to Dismiss may have been served electronically via E-
Flex (something she has not established or offered any proof of), the Proof of Service she attached to
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her Motion to Dismiss does not indicated her Motion was so served electronically. And its this kind
of sloppy, careless, inattention to detail that permeated throughout Robert's practice at Trial in this
matter, wherein she suborned the perjury of multiple witnesses for her employer, the City of Reno,
despite the fact that Roberts herself propounded to the undersigned video evidence which proves the
testimony she put on the stand amounted to suborning perjury.
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Please see the undersigned's Declaration, under penalty of perjury attached hereto, concerning
the following excerpt from the end of the audio record of the November 30th, 2011 Trial in RMC 11
CR 22176, which represents a completely true and accurate transcription (made from the CD of the
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Trial that the undersigned purchased from the RMC and taken from the file named:
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"[MCFTRB]_20111130-2033_01ccaf9f451ed090" ; this audio excerpt and perhaps the entire audio
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record will likely be provided to the District Court in the form of an attachment to a Supplemental to
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a motion in compliance with the indications given by Appeals Clerk Lori Matheus and Clerk of
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Court Orduna Hastings) of what was said in open court, on the record, beginning at 8:33:11 pm on
November 30th, 2011 in Judge Howard's court room:
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"JH: alright we are back on the record in regard to City v. Zachary Coughlin.
I was admittedly remiss in not advising Mr. Coughlin of his right to appeal.
We do want to take care of that now on the record. Mr. Coughlin, you have
the right to appeal the decision of this Court. You can do so by filing a Notice
of Appeal. Customarily, it's 10 days and thats, uh, I'm sure you are fully
aware of that...What I am going to do is grant an extension to that statute in
light of the fact that you will not be released from custody until December
3rd, so your 10 days will run effective December 3rd at 8 pm, so you will
have 10 days from that date to file a Notice of Appeal with this Court, now
once you file your Notice of Appeal there are several things that you will have
to do, principal among those is to obtain a copy of the transcript at your
expense. Once the transcript has been forwarded to the District Court, there is
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no Trial de novo, you are probably aware that the District Court judge will
review the four corners of the transcript to determine, one, whether this court
has made any legal errors that would justify a reversal of this matter or
whether there is sufficient evidence within the transcript to justify the finding
of guilt that I have made here today. Is there any questions at all with regard
to the appeal process?
ZC: The availability of a Stay, that I guess would go more towards the
finding of Contempt? Um, when you say "appeal process" are you referring
to...?
JH: The filing of appeal in regard to the petit theft.
ZC: Not in regard to the Contempt?
JH: No, thats a summary proceeding and we are going to go forward with
that. One thing that I will say in regard to the petit theft Trial and subsequent
sentencing, however, its my recollection, improperly, that you had failed to
appear at the previous proceeding, and that's not correct, uh, there was another
reason as to why we were unable to proceed, so I am going to delete the 24
hours of community service, the fine of $360 will stand. Alright, any other
questions involving the Appeal process?
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ZC: Yes, to the extent my law practice's clients, that their cases will be
unduly prejudiced by your incarcerating me right now...
JH: I am standing by that and I wish you would have thought about that after
each admonishment that I gave you during the Trial.
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ZC: You are saddened by that.

JH: We are in recess. " (commotion of Marshals can be heard and the audio
recording of the record of the Trial ends).
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You know what my favorite part of this is? That "file stamp" in the Record on Appeal for that
document, whatever it is, kind of a court printout thing in the RMC, with a filed on date stamp of
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11/30/11...why, I guess they are calling that the "Judgment of Conviction and Order"...its not on
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pleading paper, hmmmn...know what else? Its just about the only document in the Record on
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Appeal with a file stamp that doesn't have a RMC Deputy Clerk's handwritten initialing on it. Why,
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oh why isn't there a Deputy Clerk's initials on that particular file stamping? Why is that? Isn't that
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document and when it was "rendered" under RMCR 9 the whole point of Pam Robert's Motion to
Dismiss the Appeal? (RMCR Rule 9: "Appeals to District Court Except as otherwise provided in
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NRS 177.015 a defendant in a criminal action tried before a Municipal Court Judge may appeal
from the final judgment therein to the Second Judicial District Court, at any time within 10 days
from the date that judgment is rendered.")
Assuming the RMC doesn't have to closely adhere to the RJC practices and procedures of the
Justice Courts-and it must under NRS 5.073 Conformity of practice and proceedings to those of
justice courts ...), but regardless, Pam Roberts' motion wastes everybody's time here, as NRCP 6
holds that one doesn't count the day of the event in computing and that one gets 3 additional days for
where no personally service was effectuated, and clearly the RMC's conduct in showing papers in a
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man's face while he is handcuffed, then snatching and dashing off with the appears a huff...refusing
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to even let the accused know what it is they want signed and or to allow to review said papers is
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very telling with respect to the conception of some in the RMC of the "fundamentals of due
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process". So , even if one measured from an oral pronouncement from the bench on 11/30/11
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(which is debatable, but Roberts offers no legal research into what a judgment being rendered or
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what rendition of the judgment actually entails or means? Does it mean reduced to writing? Does it
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mean orally pronounced? Doe is mean entered into a docket or imply some requirement for Notice
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of Entry of the Order or Judgment, with a file stamp, proof of service, etc.? any time within 10 days
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from the time of the rendition of the judgment Also in the Record on Appeal (ROA) the 11/30/11
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Summary Contempt Order lacks any sort of Proof of Service, so...has there not been a final
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appealable Order in this matter yet? Do I not have to be appropriately served that Contempt Order?
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Where is the proof of such Further, the "certified docket" does not seem to contain the filing emailed
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to the address RMC's D. Ballard approved the use of on 12/12/11.
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NRS 189.010 Appeal must be taken within 10 days. Except as otherwise provided in NRS
177.015, a defendant in a criminal action tried before a justice of the peace may appeal from the
final judgment therein to the district court of the county where the court of the justice of the peace
is held, at any time within 10 days from the time of the rendition of the judgment.
Quite arguably NRS 189.010 is inapplicable the the RMC as the RMC does not have justices
of the peace.
NRS 189.065 Dismissal for failure to set or reset appeal for hearing.
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1. An appeal must be dismissed by the district court unless perfected by application of the
defendant, within 60 days after the appeal is filed in the justice court, by having it set for hearing.
2. If an appeal has been set for hearing and the hearing is vacated at the request of the appellant,
the appeal must be dismissed unless application is made by the appellant to reset the hearing within
60 days after the date on which the hearing was vacated.
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The undersigned hereby applies for any such hearing that is required.
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Rule 19. Appeals from municipal and justice courts.
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1. All appeals from the municipal or justice courts in criminal cases shall be set for trial or
hearing within 60 days of the date of application for setting. A setting beyond 60 days may be made
only if approved in writing by the trial judge or the chief judge. If a trial setting is continued by order
of the court, the case shall be reset within 60 days of the date of the order for continuance.
2. If multiple settings for appeal trials in any one court department exceed the capacity of that
department, settings shall be made in the designated department scheduled to handle the overflow. If
that courts calendar becomes full, assignment shall be made to any other available department.
3. Appeals in criminal cases shall be set for trial on Thursdays and Fridays, unless the trial judge
or the chief judge grants permission to make such settings on other judicial days.
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A post-judgment tolling motion was timely filed here, arguably on December 12th, 2011,
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though, if not, then certainly on December 13th, 2011. Please see Exhibit 4 attached hereto. As
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such, the time to appeal from the final judgment is tolled until after the tolling motions are
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resolved. NRAP 4(a)(4) lists the only motions that are tolling: 1. A motion for judgment as a matter
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of law under NRCP 50(b); 2. A motion under NRCP 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of
fact; 3. A motion under NRCP 59 to alter or amend the judgment; and 4. A motion for a new
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trial under NRCP 59. According to the stated rules, these motions must be filed within 10 days of
service of the notice of entry of judgment to effectively toll the time to appeal the final judgment. The
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Supreme Court has clarified that the counting for the 10 days does not include intervening Saturdays,
Sundays, or non-judicial days according to NRCP 6(a). Winston Prods. Co., Inc. v. DeBoer, 122
Nev. 517, 134 P.3d 726 (2006). Any additional time added for service is counted by calendar days
after the initial 10 days. Id. In addition to tolling the time to file a notice of appeal, a tolling motion
also tolls the time to appeal from special orders made after final judgment, such as orders awarding
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attorney fees and costs. Id. In the event that your tolling motion is not filed within the allowed 10
days, you should still file the motion with the understanding that the time to appeal the final judgment
is not tolled. If the District Court is inclined to grant your motion after a notice of appeal has been
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filed, the District Court does not technically have jurisdiction to enter an order dealing with subject
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matter that is pending on appeal, but the District Court may recommend its inclination to enter such
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an order to the Supreme Court. Mack-Manley v. Mack, 122 Nev. 75, 138 P.3d 525 (2006). The
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Supreme Court then has the authority to remand the matter to the District Court to enter the order
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according to the District Court's inclinations. Id. So, given that the undersigned has a series of
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legitimate legal arguments to somehow change the judgment, the Appellant hereby requests, under
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District Court Rule 13(7), permission to allow this litigants to file a motion for reconsideration upon
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leave of court. Other local rules, such as Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 2.24(b) and Second
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Judicial District Court Rule 12(8), require that a motion for reconsideration or rehearing be filed
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within 10 days of service of notice of entry of judgment. Although an order granting or denying a
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motion for reconsideration is not itself appealable, the Supreme Court will consider arguments raised
26
in the motion for reconsideration so long as the District Court considers your motion on the merits,
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your notice of appeal is filed after the order disposing of the motion and the motion and order are
included in the record on appeal. Arnold v. Kip, 168 P.3d 1050 (Nev. 2007).
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TIMING TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL

The notice of appeal is a basic document that does nothing more than put the superior Court on
notice of which Municipal Court orders you believe were decided incorrectly. By way of analogy
to the instant scenario, NRAP 4(a)(1) requires that a notice of appeal be filed in the District Court
within 30 days after ser-vice of notice of entry of the order from which an appeal is taken. If a
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tolling motion has been timely filed, NRAP 4(a)(4) allows the notice of appeal to be filed within 30
days after service of notice of entry of the order disposing of the final tolling motion. One's appeal
to the Supreme Court must be taken from an appealable order. NRAP 3A(b) lists many of the
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orders that can be appealed. If one has not properly perfected one's appeal, occasionally the
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jurisdictional defect can be corrected during the pendency of the appeal, depending on the type of
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jurisdictional defect. Sustainable Growth Initiative Comm. v. Jumpers, LLC, 122 Nev. 53, 128
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P.3d 452 (2006).
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udgment is not made final by a mere written minute or an oral pronouncement by a court or
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judge without the preparation and filing of a journal entry. Euclid v. Muller, 134 Ohio App. 3d 737,
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732 N.E.2d 410 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1999). In Magee v Lothrop (1939) 60 Nev 202, 96
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P2d 201, 106 P2d 751, it was stated that the law of Nevada is settled that the period of time for
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taking an appeal runs from the rendition of the decision of the court, not from the time of the filing
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of the formal findings and formal judgment. The rule stated above was applied in Nelson v Paul
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(1951) 68 Nev 365, 233 P2d 857, in which the trial judge first signed a document entitled "Opinion
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And Orders On Demurrer And Motions To Strike," which, after an extensive discussion of the legal
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principles involved, provided in part as follows: "For the reasons given, it is therefore ordered, that
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the defendants Joe Anacabe and Fabiana Anacabe, his wife, be dismissed and stricken as parties
defendant herein." Subsequently a document entitled "Judgment" was signed and filed by the trial
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judge. That document stated: "The demurrers of the defendants Joe Anacabe and Fabiana Anacabe,
his wife, having been sustained by order duly made on the 3rd day of July, 1950, and said
defendants having been dismissed and stricken as parties defendant herein, without leave to amend
as to said defendants; now, on motion of said defendants Joe Anacabe and Fabiana Anacabe, his
wife, It is ordered and adjudged that the complaint herein be, and the same is hereby, dismissed and
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that said defendants have and recover of the plaintiff above-named their costs, taxed at $2.50."
Appeals taken within 6 months from the filing of the document entitled "Judgment" but more than
6 months after the filing of the document entitled "Opinion and Orders, etc.," were dismissed, the
13
court saying: "By the order of the trial court the rights of the Anacabes were fully determined. No
14
further judicial determination remained to be made. The fact that the 'Judgment' specified more
15
clearly than did the order the action taken by the court upon the demurrers does not constitute the
16
'Judgment' an exercise of further judicial determination in that respect. By its recitals it purports to
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relate what had already been accomplished by the order and does not purport to take new and
19
further action. That document, then, was merely a more formal statement of the judgment as it had
20
already been rendered." An instrument entitled "Decision and Opinion," which concluded that the
21
plaintiffs were entitled to judgment against the defendants in a specified sum of money and directed
22
counsel for the plaintiffs to prepare findings and facts and conclusions of law in conformity with
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this opinion, and not the findings and formal judgment subsequently filed, was held in Lind v
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Raynor (1952) 69 Nev 164, 243 P2d 783, to constitute the judgment rendition of which started the
26
time for appeal running, and the appeal, having been filed more than 6 months after the filing of the
27
"Decision and Opinion," was consequently dismissed. The court relied on the wellestablished
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Nevada rule that time for appeal from the judgment commences to run from the pronouncement by
the court of its determination of the matter, which constitutes a rendition of the judgment, and not
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from the date of the filing of the formal findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. The
Nevada rule under which the time for taking an appeal runs from the rendition of the court's
decision, and not from the time of the subsequent filing of the formal findings and formal
judgment, was held in Coleman v Moore (1925) 49 Nev 139, 241 P 217, to be applicable in a
situation in which a judge, after rendering a judgment, died and his successor signed the formal
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judgment. A statute providing that in case of the death of a district judge after rendition of a
decision, the succeeding judge should make an examination of the decision, and sign and settle the
findings, and cause judgment to be entered, was held not to affect the time in which an appeal
13
might be taken after the rendition of judgment, but merely to provide how a succeeding judge
14
might perfect a judgment rendered by a predecessor since deceased. The following additional
15
authority is relevant to the issues discussed in this section: CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases:
16
See Alaska Nat. Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049 (Alaska 1977), 20. Appellate court properly
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dismissed appeal on grounds of lack of jurisdiction where notice of appeal was filed prior to
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issuance of formal order, and where there was no reason why appellant could not have amended
20
notice of appeal after becoming aware that former order disposing of case was actually filed; only
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final judgments are appealable and filing notice of appeal is sole necessary jurisdictional step.
22
Stoermer v. Edgar, 104 Ill. 2d 287, 84 Ill. Dec. 440, 472 N.E.2d 400 (1984). Judgment that resolved
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substantive issue before trial court was appealable, though trial court subsequently signed a
25
document denominated "judgment," stating its conclusions and reasoning for earlier order, that was
26
not itself an appealable judgment. V.A.M.S. 511.020; V.A.M.R. 74.02. Martin v. Director of
27
Revenue, 44 S.W.3d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2001). Appeal brought more than 30 days after order
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was untimely, notwithstanding that it was brought within 30 days of entry of judgment, where order
appealed from (dismissing party on preliminary objections in nature of demurrer) was final
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appealable order which need not be reduced to judgment. U.S. Nat. Bank in Johnstown v. Johnson,
506 Pa. 622, 487 A.2d 809 (1985). Appeal taken from oral decision of trial court would be treated
as if it had been timely filed after entry of subsequent formal judgment which had been entered
after case had been remanded to trial court, notwithstanding fact that plaintiff failed to appeal again
following entry of written judgment where litigation had been protracted, and it was clear from
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record that trial court's oral decision was intended to be its final act regarding case. Beauvais v.
Notre Dame Hospital, 120 R.I. 271, 387 A.2d 689 (1978). Appeal based on trial court's rendering
of written "Reasons for Judgment" following granting of application for new trial was premature
13
where effect of granting new trial was to suspend previously rendered and signed judgment, and
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where judgment following new trial had not been reduced to writing and signed by judge as
15
required by state statute. Ready v. Sun Oil Co., 315 So. 2d 840 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
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125. Time of rendition or entry West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Judgment
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280, 281 A judgment record or docket should afford definite and reliable information as to the time
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of the rendition of a judgment.[1] Sometimes a judgment is entered as of the date when it was
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signed by the judge[2] or as of the date when the judgment was rendered.[3] [FN1] Herrington v.
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Heidelberg, 244 Miss. 364, 141 So. 2d 717 (1962). [FN2] State ex rel. Harp v. Vanderburgh Circuit
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Court, 227 Ind. 353, 85 N.E.2d 254, 11 A.L.R.2d 1108 (1949). [FN3] Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Mills
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v. Union Springs Guano Co., 26 Ala. App. 136, 155 So. 710 (1934);46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
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125. As to determination of the time of entry, see 108. As to the time for perfecting an appeal as
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computed from the time of rendition or entry of judgment, see Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review
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292. Appeal of guilty plea 3 Root v. City of Las Vegas, 454 P.2d 894, 894+, 85 Nev. 326, 326+
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(Nev. May 27, 1969) (NO. 5630) 4 Root v. City of Las Vegas, 439 P.2d 219, 219+, 84 Nev. 258,
258+ (Nev. Apr 03, 1968) (NO. 5288). Roberts cites to Root, as case not really applicable as it
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relates to an entirely different situation than the case at bar. Root concerned the appeal of a guilty
plea, not a thoroughly objected to and conducted in a suspect style contested trial.NV ST 1 DIST
CT Rule 33; Rule 33. Appeals to District Court in criminal matters from Justice Court and
Municipal Court. Honestly, the approach taken by the First Judicial District Court may be a more
sound one: Rule 33. Appeals to District Court in criminal matters from Justice Court and Municipal
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Court. 1. Pursuant to NRS 189.010 for appeals from proceedings in the Justice Court and pursuant
to NRS 266.595 and NRS 5.073 for appeals from proceedings in the Carson City Municipal Court,
a Notice of Appeal in a criminal action tried before a Justice of the Peace or the Municipal Court
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Judge must be filed within 10 days from the entry of the judgment. 2. At the time of filing of the
14
Notice of Appeal, the appellant shall file a request with the Justice Court or Municipal Court that
15
proceedings be transcribed. 3. Pursuant to NRS 189.065 or NRS 5.073, the Justice Court or
16
Municipal Court shall transmit to the Clerk of the District Court the transcript of the case, all other
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papers relating to the case and a certified copy of its docket of the case within 10 days after the
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Notice of Appeal is filed. 4. Pursuant to NRS 189.065 or NRS 5.073, the appellant must perfect his
20
or her appeal by having the appeal set for hearing by the District Court within 60 days after the
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Notice of Appeal is filed. 5. The appellant shall file his or her brief within 30 days after the matter
22
is set for hearing, provided the written transcript of the proceedings has been prepared and filed
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with the District Court and provided to the parties. The respondent shall file his or her opposing
25
brief within 20 days thereafter, and any reply brief by the appellant shall be filed within 10 days
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thereafter. But the WDCR has a rule on the matter too: Rule 19. Appeals from municipal and
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justice courts. 1. All appeals from the municipal or justice courts in criminal cases shall be set for
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trial or hearing within 60 days of the date of application for setting. A setting beyond 60 days may
be made only if approved in writing by the trial judge or the chief judge. If a trial setting is
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continued by order of the court, the case shall be reset within 60 days of the date of the order for
continuance. 2. If multiple settings for appeal trials in any one court department exceed the capacity
of that department, settings shall be made in the designated department scheduled to handle the
overflow. If that courts calendar becomes full, assignment shall be made to any other available
department. 3. Appeals in criminal cases shall be set for trial on Thursdays and Fridays, unless the
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trial judge or the chief judge grants permission to make such settings on other judicial days. 4. In
civil appeals from the justice court, appellant shall file within 30 days after the filing of a notice of
appeal a written brief containing a statement of the errors committed in the justice court with
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accompanying authorities which shall not exceed 5 pages. Within 20 days after the filing and
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service of appellants brief, respondent shall file a written answering brief which shall not exceed 5
15
pages. Under statute providing that an appeal shall be dismissed unless perfected by defendant
16
within 60 days after appeal is filed in justice's court by having it set for trial, defendant need not
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actually obtain trial setting within 60-day limit, but need only apply for trial setting within that
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time; disapproving Plankinton v. District Court, 93 Nev. 643, 572 P.2d 525. N.R.S. 189.065.
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Thompson v. First Judicial Dist. Court, Storey County, 1984, 683 P.2d 17, 100 Nev. 352. Under
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municipal statutory charter provision that appeals to district court may be taken from any final
22
judgment of municipal court in same manner as in cases of appeal from justice court, and statute
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relating to appeals from justice court and requiring party intending to appeal to file with justice and
25
to serve upon district attorney, a notice of appeal, party desiring to appeal from judgment of
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municipal court sufficiently meets requirements when notice of appeal is filed with municipal judge
27
and is served upon city attorney who conducted proceedings in municipal court. St.1949, c. 132,
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29; N.C.L.1929, 11310, 11313. State ex rel. Digby v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, in and
for Clark County, 1952, 244 P.2d 866, 69 Nev. 186.
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933, 479 N.E.2d 698 (1985). Where defendant was tried and convicted, and court imposed
sentence and rendered judgment, but where clerk failed to enter judgment pursuant to rule, Court of
Appeals lacked appellate jurisdiction. State v. Lee, 562 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).Original
unsigned minute book entry of judgment was not appealable, since it did not meet statutory
requirement that "rendition" of judgment means that it be reduced to writing, signed and made a
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matter of record, or filed. Egantoff v. Herring, 177 So. 2d 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965).
Here, the undersigned, Coughlin, made numerous attemtps to see that the "Judgment and Court
Order" here was a matter of record, and the RMC filign office, all the way up to 12/13/11, indicated
13
it was not. properly dismissed. Cornelius v. Tubbesing, 576 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1979).
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Appeal would be held in abeyance and cause remanded to trial court for rendition and entry of final
15
judgment where only indication of final judgment on transcript was docket entry, and where docket
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entry was styled in singular although defendant had been charged with two counts of possession of
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controlled substances. State v. Gonterman, 565 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
Under Rev. Laws, 7513, notice of appeal from a conviction and sentence in justice's court
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upon both law and fact held sufficient. Jensen v. District Court of Seventh Judicial Dist., in and for
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Esmeralda County, 1916, 161 P. 162, 40 Nev. 135.; Furthermore, jurisdiction cannot be conferred
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upon an appellate court by the consent or stipulation of the parties or **1234 their counsel. Jasper
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v. Jewkes, 50 Nev. 153, 254 P. 698 (1927); In Re Hanley's Estate, 23 Cal.2d 120, 142 P.2d 423
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(1943). However, this authority does not apply here. This is not a stipulation of parties situation,
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Judge Howard makes his Judement and Order fo the Court and he gets to decide when it runs from
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and when the period to file a Notice of Appeal is measure from. He did so here, and in accordance
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with the the filing of the Notice of Appeal in this matter is timely. NRS 189.030 provides that, The
justice must, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the district
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court all papers relating to the case and a certified copy of his docket." Here, the RMC failed to
transmit an accurate Record on Appeal. Indeed several filing by the undersigned are missing
entirely. Therefore the underlying conviction should be overturned. NRCP 60's Drafters Note 2004
Amendment mentions that : The revisions to subdivision (c) are technical with the exception that
the 6-month limit now starts to run from service of notice of entry of the judgment rather than the
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date of rendition of the judgment under the former rule." It leaves to much up to the vagaries of
what may have been said in court, what a judge might cross out later (as happened here), what a
judge may realize five minutes later when the stresses and pride one deals with in a courtroom
13
subside (as may have happened here, where Judge Howard, to his credit, admitted he was mistaken
14
in believing the undersigned failed to show up for the original November 14, 2011 court date).
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Tolling, time for appeal Contractor's post-judgment motion to amend order qualified as a motion
16
to alter or amend judgment, which tolled the time contractor had to file notice of appeal; the motion
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was in writing, invoked rule on amendment of judgments, asked to vacate the judgment of
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dismissal, and appended proof that the charter, for want of which contractor's suit was lost, had
20
been restored and urged the district court to consider statute, which provided that reinstatement of
21
an administratively revoked limited liability charter related back to the date on which the company
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forfeited its right to transact business as if such right had at all times remained in full force and
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effect; disapproving Alvis v. State, Gaming Control Bd., 99 Nev. 184, 660 P.2d 980, Nardozzi v.
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Clark Co. School Dist., 108 Nev. 7, 823 P.2d 285, and Whitehead v. Norman Kaye Real Estate, 80
26
Nev. 383, 395 P.2d 329. AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 2010, 245 P.3d So long as a
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post-judgment motion for reconsideration is in writing, timely filed, states its grounds with
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particularity, and requests a substantive alteration of the judgment, not merely the correction of a
clerical error, or relief of a type wholly collateral to the judgment, there is no reason to deny it
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status as a motion to alter or amend judgment, which tolls the time in which a party has to file
notice of appeal; disapproving Alvis v. State, Gaming Control Bd., 99 Nev. 184, 660 P.2d 980,
Nardozzi v. Clark Co. School Dist., 108 Nev. 7, 823 P.2d 285, and Whitehead v. Norman Kaye
Real Estate, 80 Nev. 383, 395 P.2d 329. AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 2010, 245 P.3d
1190. The undersigned, Coughlin, filed tolling motions in this case, therefore tolling should be
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found. Petitioner's postjudgment motions to amend or make additional findings of fact or to alter or
amend the judgment denying his petition to seal court records were tolling motions, and thus,
petitioner's notice of appeal filed before trial court's disposition of such motions was filed too early
13
to vest jurisdiction in the appellate court. In re Duong, 2002, 59 P.3d 1210, 118 Nev. 920. A notice
14
of appeal filed after the timely filing of a post-judgment tolling motion, but before the formal
15
disposition of the motion, is ineffective and fails to vest jurisdiction in the appellate court. Moran v.
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Bonneville Square Associates, 2001, 25 P.3d 898, 117 Nev. 525. Timely motion for new trial is a
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tolling motion for purposes of rule providing that notice of appeal filed before formal disposition of
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any timely postjudgment motion shall have no effect. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 59(a); Rules
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App.Proc., Rule 4(a)(2). Chapman Industries v. United Ins. Co. of America, 1994, 874 P.2d 739,
21
110 Nev. 454. Timely motions for amendment of trial court's findings, amendment of the judgment
22
and new trial tolled running of appeal period and rendered ineffective all notices of appeal which
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were filed before formal disposition of the timely postjudgment motions and thus, trial court erred
25
in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the timely tolling motions. Rules Civ.Proc.,
26
Rules 52(b), 59(a, e); Rules App.Proc., Rule 4(a)(2). Chapman Industries v. United Ins. Co. of
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America, 1994, 874 P.2d 739, 110 Nev. 454. So, everything in this case is a total mess if one
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considers that the December 13th, 2011 filing by the undersigned was both a Notice of Appeal and
a tolling motion and then Judge Howard entered an Order that may have disposed of it, but he may
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have entered it so soon after getting it that it suggests and extreme prejudice on his part, where the
Reno City Attorney arguably did not even have an opportunity to respond before Judge Howard
tee'd off on it....then its whether the subsquent "Supplemental" pleadings benefit from a "relation
back" doctrine or whether tolling applies and whether the original or any subsequent Notices of
Appeal were time, premature, or even effective. Now my head has exploded. And even if Judge
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Howards 12/15/11 Order disposed of the tolling motion, Well, on 12/16/11 Coughlin filed another
Notice of Appeal, so this thing arguably ought to go forward, sorry Ms. Roberts, going to have to
earn some of the $112,000 a year in your pursuit of ruining my life (alright, that's dramatic and
13
lacks perspective) for the price of a candybar while you suborn the perjury of a trio of testosterone
14
addled mid 20 something knucklheads high fiving each other in the interrogation room video you
15
propounded and out in the hallways at trial until 9 pm at night....but its not like the RSIC police and
16
Wal-Mart, which lease the property its located on from those who own and run the RSIC have a
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conflict of interest or anything, right? Plus, no one ever asked me or ascertained whether I have
19
any tribal blood, so this judgment may be void for lack of jurisdiction as, should that be the case,
20
jursidication is appropriate before Judge Van Walraven, not Judge Howard.
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CONCLUSION
Regardless, the "Judgment" or "Order" here was not appropriately served on the undersigned
23
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on November 30th, 2011. Further, the undersigned made many, many calls and written attempts
25
and trips to the RMC to obtain a copy of the Contempt Order, the Guilty Judgment, and the audio
26
recording of the Trial and all were either not granted, not provided, or provided in such a delayed
27
manner as to create an unduly prejudicial situation adversely effecting the undersigneds rights
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sufficient to impermissibly compromise fundamentals notions of fairness and due process.
Further, the Order is "rendered" when Judge Howard says it is "rendered", and Judge Howard
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6
clearly indicated, on the record, as demonstrated in the audio record, which will be available to the
District Court ultimately, the 10 day deadline for filing a Notice of Appeal would not begin running
until after the 3 day Summary Contempt Order's three day jail sentence concluded. Damn, this
stuff is complicated. Sure it nice to see the government goign hard as a mother to protect lil ol'
Wal-Mart whom is rumored to be the subject of a documentary about how they have a intricate
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system of weasling out of their "Return Policy" and retaliating against those who call them on it.
Also, this document does not contain any social security number or other inappropriate material
pursuant to NRS 239B.030.
Dated this January 30th, 2012
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/s/ Zach Coughlin_________________

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
NV Bar No. 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
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PROOF OF SERVICE
1
2
I, Zach Coughlin, declare:
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10
On January 30th, 2012, I, Mr. Zach Coughlin served the foregoing document by faxing and
serving upon registered efilers and depositing a true and correct copy in the US Mail addressed to:
PAM ROBERTS, ESQ
JOHN KADLIC, ESQ
Reno City Attorney's Office - Criminal Division

P.O. Box 1900 Reno , NV 89505
Phone Number: 7753342050
Fax number: 7753342420
Attorney for Respondent, City of Reno
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13
----------------------------Zach Coughlin
AGENT OF APPELLANT
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1
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3
INDEX TO EXHIBITS
1. EXHIBIT 1: COLLECTION OF EMAILED CORRESPONDENCE AND FILING WITH
THE RENO MUNICIPAL COURT (RMC); One hundred and fifty one (151) pages.
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5
6
2. EXHIBIT 2: DECLARATION OF ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ.; Eleven (11) pages.
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8
9
3. EXHIBIT 3: Salary information for the years 2009 and 2010 for Deputy Reno City Attorney
Pam Roberts, Esq. from www.TransparentNevada.com; One (1) page.
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12
4. EXHIBIT 4: December 12th, 2011 emailed filing (as authorized by the RMC in lieu of
13
faxing) to the RMC's renomunirecords@reno.gov that should, but does not appear
14
appropriately in the record on appeal, containing just the email cover sheets proving the
15
attached pdf's were received by the RMC and therefore the contents thereof should be
16
appropriately printed, provided, and filed by the RMC to the District Court, rather than the
17
18
illegible "four pages per page" style the RMC has put in the Record on Appeal; Five (5) pages.
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5. EXHIBIT 5: Discovery produced by Reno City Attorney compared to receipt of
21
"purchased" items, both filed in legible form with the RMC, yet not inluded in legible form in
22
the Record on Appeal; Eight (8) pages.
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FILED
EXHIBIT #1
EXHIBIT #1
Electronically
01-30-2012:04:48:12 PM
Clerk of the Court
Hotmail Print Message
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=4b...
records request for incident report urgent please

From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 10/04/11 3:10 PM
To:
renomunirecords@reno.gov
1 attachment
records request to reno city attorneys office oct 4.pdf (66.5 KB)
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not
the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you
have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the
contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
1 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
2 of 47

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE
This message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is
privileged, work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s),
you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on
the contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not
the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in
any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client,
work product, or other applicable privilege.
records request
Sent: Tue 10/04/11 4:41 PM
To:
2 attachments
RMC subpoena.pdf (67.8 KB) , RECORD_REQUEST_Zach Coughlin to RMC.pdf (20.2 KB)
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
3 of 47
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the
intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have
received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents
of this information is strictly prohibited.
1/29/2012 8:20 PM

Reno Municipal Court appointment of counsel

Sent: Mon 11/28/11 11:42 AM
To:
ltaitel@sbcglobal.net; renomunirecords@reno.gov
Dear Mr. Taitel,

I understand you have been assigned to represent me in the Reno Municipal Court trespass Complaint against
me. Please note that my address has recently changed to:
Zach Coughlin
817 N. Virginia St. #2
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
I have recently been evicted and it has caused enormous upheaval to my life, and I am indigent, as such, I believe a
continuance is necessary and ask that you seek one for the December 13th, 2011 "trial" that I only became aware of through
calling the Reno Municipal Court. Also, please provide me a copy of any motions or pleadings you have filed on my behalf
and any documentation that you have been provided by the court, opposing counsel, or anyone else. I prefer such
documentation be emailed, but I realize that may not be possible. I would like to obtain a copy of the Complaint and
Discovery, including the probable cause sheets and any witness statements as soon as possible.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
4 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
5 of 47

contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the named
recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from disclosure
under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure, copying,
distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited
and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the
sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone
other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable
privilege.
records request
Sent: Mon 11/28/11 2:30 PM
To:
1 attachment
RECORD_REQUEST_FORM_2010[1] rmc trespass 11 13 11 records request 11-22185.pdf (20.8 KB)
Zach Coughlin, 817 N. Virginia St. #2

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
FW: temporary address change and instruction to pursue a continuance

1/29/2012 8:20 PM

Sent: Tue 11/29/11 3:14 PM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
1 attachment
Motion for Continuance to Reno City Atty Roberts RMC.pdf (448.9 KB)
Ms. Roberts and RMC Records Supervisor Donna,

I am forwarding this apology I sent to Judge Howard in response to his remonstration responding to my email to
him, in an abundance of caution to avoid ex parte communications with the court, outside your presence. Please
also find attach e a NRCP Rule 11 safe harbor filing ready sanctions motions I am hereby serving on you,
invoking the 21 day safe harbor, with a reservation that any misconduct you commit in the court's presence may
be punished sua sponte or subject to contemporaneous sanctions requests, particular with regard to you blase
dismissal of the official misdoncut, malicious prosecution, 42 USC Sec 1983 deprivations of civil rights under
color of state law and all those other things your office and Hartshorn, et all have been sued for over the years.
Please find attached my Motion for Continuance, being filed by fascimile today with the RMC.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Licensed in Nevada and USPTO
privilege.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: howardk@reno.gov
Subject: RE: temporary address change and instruction to pursue a continuance
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 17:22:45 -0800
6 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
7 of 47
Zach Coughlin,
request of cd of trial in 11 CR 22176 2I

Sent: Thu 12/08/11 4:00 PM
To:
Hello, I am writing to request a copy of the cd of the record of trial in 11 CR 22176 2I in addition to a copy of the Contempt
Order and any other orders made in that matter, in addition to a copy of the docket.
Please email these to me if possible. I will agree to pay the copying costs or the paper documents or the audio cd/dvd. I
need these as soon as possible please.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:20 PM

privilege.
REQUEST FOR RECORDS CD/DVD OF TRIAL AND OTHER

DOCUMENTATION URGENT PLEASE
Sent: Thu 12/08/11 5:45 PM
To:
1 attachment
RECORD_REQUEST_FORM_2010[1] trial cd and orders to RMC 12 8 11 final.pdf (441.5 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
8 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM

privilege.
signed REQUEST FOR RECORDS CD/DVD OF TRIAL AND OTHER

DOCUMENTATION URGENT PLEASE
Sent: Thu 12/08/11 5:56 PM
To:
1 attachment
RECORD_REQUEST_FORM_2010[1] trial cd and orders to RMC 12 8 11 signed.pdf (446.2 KB)
I am resending the Records and REcording of Trial request form, SIGNED, just in case that is necessary.
Thank You,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
9 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM

privilege.
To: renomunirecords@reno.gov
Subject: REQUEST FOR RECORDS CD/DVD OF TRIAL AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION URGENT PLEASE
Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2011 17:45:27 -0800
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
10 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
privilege.
RMC said I could file this by email

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 7:28 PM
To:
1 attachment
12 11 11 final motion for new trial city of reno v coughlin RMC 11 CR 22176.pdf (12.9 MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 8950
fax: 949 667 7402
11 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
12 of 47

privilege.
Motion for New Trial Etc. in RMC 11 CR 22176

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 7:40 PM
To:
fiskm@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
1 attachment
RMC 11 CR 2217 part two Exhibit 1 pages 1-300 of Motion for New trail from 12 12 2011.pdf (8.6 MB)
I received approval to file by email from RMC

This is the second file in the filing. Please note, the file name of the attachment should actually have the correct
case number of RMC CR 22176. It is missing the 6 on the end in the file name of the attachment
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:20 PM

privilege.

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 7:57 PM
To:
1 attachment
RMC 11 CR 22176 part three Exhibit 1 pages 301-600 of Motion for New trail from 12 12 2011.pdf (9.7
MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
RMC 11 CR 22176 part four Exhibit 1 pages 601-701 of Motion for New
trail from 12 12 2011 ey
13 of 47
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14 of 47

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 8:23 PM
To:
1 attachment
RMC 11 CR 22176 part four Exhibit 1 pages 601-701 of Motion for New trail from 12 12 2011 ey.pdf
(11.8 MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
Sent: Mon 12/12/11 8:29 PM
To:
1 attachment
(14.4 MB)
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
15 of 47

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
To: fiskm@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
Subject: Motion for New Trial Etc. in RMC 11 CR 22176
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 19:57:50 -0800
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
16 of 47

privilege.
audio of the November 30th Trial in Judge Howards court

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 9:56 PM
To:
https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid=43084638f32f5f28&resid=43084638F32F5F28!1031&parid=root
Maybe that will be easier, that is where the exculpatory video evidence is sent to you as well, a continuation of
exhibit one. I appreciate the RMC allowing me to file via email this way as sometimes my fax service is clunky.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
17 of 47

privilege.
Sent: Tue 12/13/11 2:26 PM
To:
1 attachment
(11.8 MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
records request
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
18 of 47

Sent: Tue 12/13/11 4:02 PM
To:
renomunirecords@reno.gov; fiskm@reno.gov
2 attachments
RECORD_REQUEST_FORM walmart RMC 11 CR 22176 IC 110627 trial cd and orders to RMC 12 8 11
signed.pdf (453.4 KB) , RECORD_REQUEST_FORM_2010[1] rmc trespass 11 13 11 records request 11 CR
22185 City of Reno v Coughlin signed.pdf (510.9 KB)
Let this writing also werve as the cover letter called for in RMCR 5(D):
attorney's name,: Zach Coughlin, Esq.
the firms name: Zach Coughlin, Esq.
address, 817 N. Virginia St. #2
fax number 949 667 7402
telephone number: 775 229 6737
the attorneys state bar number: NV Bar No: 9473
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
12 11 11 Defendants Motion for New Trial, Set Aside, Vacate Judgment/Conviction of underlying crime and
Contempt in Court's Presence finding/ IFP Petition/ Motion for Reconsideration/Notice of Appeal, Case Statment
in case: city of reno v coughlin RMC 11 CR 22176; Records Request form Defendant and Request for
Transcription at Public's Expense and Request for a copy of the audio recording of the Trial of 11 30, 2011 1:45
pm to end in RMC 11 CR 22176.
Additionally, I never received service of any Notice of Appearance nor a Motion to Withdraw by Lew Taitel, Esq.
the attorney appointed to represent me as required by RMCR Rule 3: Authorization to Represent
A. Attorneys representing defendants shall promptly serve written notice of
their appearance with the City Attorney and file the same with the Court.
B. An attorney desiring to withdraw from a case shall file a motion with the
court and serve the City Attorney with the same. The court may rule on
the motion or set a hearing."
Further, RMCR state: "Rule 5: Motions by Facsimile

A. All rules and procedures that apply to motions filed in person at the
court shall also apply to motions filed by facsimile, except as otherwise
specified in this rule.
B. All persons are eligible to use motion-by-facsimile procedures.
C. All motions filed by facsimile must be accompanied by a cover sheet
which must include the persons name, address, fax number and
telephone number.
D. All facsimile motions filed by an attorney must include the attorney's
name, the firms name, address, fax number and telephone number. In
addition, the attorneys state bar number must be conspicuously
displayed on the cover sheet.
E. All motions filed by facsimile must be accompanied by proof of service.
Service may be accomplished by facsimile when the receiving party is a
governmental agency, an attorney, or with the consent of the receiving
party. If service of the motion is accomplished by facsimile the 3-day
allowance for mailing shall not be computed into the time for response.
F. A defense attorney filing a motion in the first instance must also file a
proper authorization to represent.
G. Any motion received by the court after 4:30 p.m. or on a non-court day
shall be filed on the following court day.
Rule 6: Continuances
No continuance shall be granted, including a stipulated continuance, except
for good cause. A motion or stipulation for continuance must state the reason
therefore and whether or not any continuance has previously been sought or
granted."
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1/29/2012 8:20 PM

fax number 949 667 7402
And: "Rule 9: Appeals to District Court
Except as otherwise provided in NRS 177.015 a defendant in a criminal action
tried before a Municipal Court Judge may appeal from the final judgment
therein to the Second Judicial District Court, at any time within 10 days from
the date that judgment is rendered."
Judge Howard informed me during his oral pronounce of his Contempt Order and Guilty Verdict on 11 30,2011
that he would afford me an additional 3 non judicial days to file a Notice of Appeal or any other Motion, Request
for Reconsideration, or other Motion seeking relief from his 11 30 2011 rulings on account of his sua sponte, with
no possibility of Stay or prior judicial review ordering his Marshalls to slam be into handcuffs and throw me into
Jail, kind of like in Houston v. 8th Judicial District Court, escept Judge Howard didn't cool down like Judge
Pomeranz did and Houston wasn't defending a criminal charge that carred a possibility of incarceration of
substantial length after being denied his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel. I am formally complaining about
Judge Howard;s conduct in that regard, please place a copy of this in his personnel file and let me know whether
you think a Complaint to the Judicial Discipline Commission would be appropriate, in your professional opinion.
I filed my Notice of Appeal in 11 cr 22176 yesterday with the RMC via email, as previously given permission to do
by the RMC. To the extent that was ineffective, let this writing act as a Notice of Appeal and agreement to pay
all charges required for such.
PROOF OF SERVICE:
I emailed a copy of this to Pam Roberts for the Plaintiff City of Reno on this date, a true and correct copy and
further email her a copy of all the 12 11 11 MOtion for New Trial, etc. yesterday to:
Pamela G Roberts
Company: Reno City Attorney's Office - Criminal Divison
Address: P.O. Box 1900
Reno
, NV
89505
Fax number: 775-334-2420
Email: robertsp@reno.gov
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
fax: 949 667 7402
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privilege.
IFP/ FINANCIAL INQUIRY APPLICATION

Sent: Wed 12/14/11 12:22 AM
To:
ballardd@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
2 attachments
Coughlin IFP and Financial Inquiry Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 26405 2I.pdf (381.9 KB) , Coughlin
IFP and Financial Inquiry Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 22176 2I.pdf (372.0 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Ms. Ballard,
Please note, the gentleman I worked with at the filing office counter today informed me there were no
appeal fees, bonds, or other charges that I could pay (including transcription costs) as "all charges are
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
22 of 47

being taken from" my bail in the respective matters. Please email me the audio from the November
20th,2011 Trial in 11 cr 22176 2I and proof of service of any Contempt Order or Guilty Verdict/Order
in that matter. Please file this as well as a Opposition to Any Motion to Continue Trial in 11 cr 26405,
dept 2, and a Motion to Set Aside or Vacate any Order Granting Continuance in response to such an
Order Granting Continuance. Please email, fax, or mail me a copy of the Notice of Appearances by
both Taitel and Puentes and the Motion and Order Granting Withdrawal of Taitel, if it exists. I would
like a copy of the docket in both 11 CR 26405 2I and 11 CR 22176, despite your informing me today
that I would need to subpoena the docket to have any chance of seeing it and that I would not be
provided access to documents in the public record, including Orders in both of these cases.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
privilege.
RE: Message left on 12/13/2011

Sent: Wed 12/14/11 6:52 PM
To:
roperj@reno.gov; fiskg@reno.gov; ballardd@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
23 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
24 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
25 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
26 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 16:26:47 -0800

From: RoperJ@reno.gov
To: ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: Message left on 12/13/2011
Mr. Coughlin,
I received your message that you left on my phone on December 13, 2011 in regards to a complaint against Marshal
Menzel. The Marshal Division takes all citizen complaints seriously and investigates all complaints received in writing or
verbally. However, I would need more information from you prior to moving forward with an investigation. I encourage
you to come to the court to obtain a statement form, or contact me directly should you wish to pursue this matter. As to
your request to obtain a copy of Marshal Menzel's personnel file, I am unable to provide that to you without a valid
subpoena or warrant.
27 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
28 of 47

You also stated you were attempting to obtain a copy of your Judgement of Conviction from Dept. 4, specifically Veronica
Lopez, you can reach her at 326-6673. I am aware that a copy of your Judgement of Conviction was provided to you and
booked into your property on the night you were arrested. You are entitled to another copy should you wish.
Thank you,
Justin Roper
Chief Marshal/Department of Alternative Sentencing
Reno Municipal Court
775-334-1254
RMC 11 CR 22176
Sent: Thu 12/15/11 11:59 PM
To:
howardk@reno.gov; ballardd@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov; fiskm@reno.gov;

renomunirecords@reno.gov; lopezv@reno.gov
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
FAX COVER SHEET
DATE: December 15, 2011

TO: .RMC et al
FAX NO: RMC approved email filing
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
29 of 47
RE: . City of reno v Coughlin RMC 11 CR 22176 2I

Motion for New Trial,Notice of appeal and other issues
Dear RMC,
I do not mean to be disrespectful in contacting the court via email. I have been so stamped
out by the events of the last few months that its all I can do to try to protect my rights to get
information and media to the court in my attempts to access justice. Veronica Lopez told me on
the phone on Monday of this week that she would fax me a copy of the Order and Contempt finding from the 11
30, 2011 Trial, yet I have not received any such fax. I have not received any order in any form, not on my release
from the 3 days summary incarceration, not ever. The RMC confirmed there has been no Notice of Entry of any
order in their docket or anything, etc.
I believe the following should be added to record and presents a strong argument for a
conflict of interest or other 60(b) basis for setting aside the verdict and contempt Order in
RMC 11 CR 22176 2I. I did not plead guilty in that case, and any RMC record that
suggests that is completely inaccurate. Please let me know if your records indicate I plead
guilty in that matter. Further, I have never been provided a copy of the Guilty Verdict/Order
in this matter, I requested on to be emailed to me and sent in the USPS mail. Please serve
me a copy of the order, preferably by email and USPS mail. Further, the "RMC's official
court transcriptionist" informed me yesterday that she could not quote me or accept an
money from me for the transcript on appeal. Further I have been told by court staff that I
would never be provided access to the audio recording of the Trial of 11 30, 2011. I believe
I have a right to it, and need it on an exigent basis in connection with the various motions I
have, will, or intend to to file challenging the decision in this case. The RMC filing office
informed me there has been no Notice of Entry of Order in this matter at this point.
T
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
30 of 47

fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
FW: RMC 11 CR 22176

Sent: Fri 12/16/11 12:00 AM
To:

1 attachment
emergency filing rmc 11 cr 22176 12 15 11.pdf (260.9 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
31 of 47

Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
To: howardk@reno.gov; ballardd@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov; fiskm@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov;
lopezv@reno.gov
Subject: RMC 11 CR 22176
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2011 23:59:45 -0800
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
FAX COVER SHEET
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
32 of 47

TO: .RMC et al
Dear RMC,
T
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
33 of 47

Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
emergency filings
Sent: Fri 12/16/11 7:55 AM
To:
renomunirecords@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov
2 attachments
12 16 11 emergency filing with fax cover sheet rmc 11 cr 22176.pdf (330.0 KB) , fax cover sheet and
notice of denial of service clarification motion.pdf (202.1 KB)
1/29/2012 8:20 PM

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
FW: 121 River Rock

Sent: Sat 12/17/11 12:15 AM
To:
ballardd@reno.gov; howardk@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov; hazlettstevensc@reno.gov; puenteslaw@aol.com
Unbelievable. The idea that exculpating evidence is being withheld under some "lien" is transmitted into the
universe, next thing I know, my law office is broken in to and the Richard B. Hill gang is stil asserting a lien on
property that was stolen, in my opinion, as a result of their own negligence, leaving a window air conditioner unit
in a window, without even putting a window jam between the top of the sill and lower pain, facing a sidewalk a
block from the Lakemill Lodge and across from City Center Apartments, great. Great. And I still have not been
faxed or appropriately served the Order and Contempt Order I was told would be faxed to me.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
34 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
35 of 47

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
To: cdbaker@richardhillaw.com; knielsen@richardhillaw.com; sgallagher@richardhillaw.com
Subject: RE: 121 River Rock
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 15:43:38 -0800
Dear Mr. Baker,
I drove by the property recently and saw you had added boarding up the front door on very, very recently.
Unfortunately, your client and your firm, despite billing up some $1,060 for "securing" the property on top of
charging $900 for storage for what could fit inside a 10x20 foot storage shed, never once providing an inventory,
and contributing to a wrongful arrest and defamation causing me and my clients great damage, failed to take
even basic steps to secure the property, despite my making numerous written requests that you do so, including,
but not limited to, taking the damn window unit air conditioner out of the window facing the sidewalk on the
side of the house very close to the damn Lakemill Lodge, or even putting a strong stick in between the bottom
sliding window pain and the top of the sill to prevent someone from simply pushing in the window unit air
conditioner and pushing the window up to gain access. Further, a blanket that was on the orange circular couch
is clearly in the flower bed in front of the house. Additionally, there are reports that someone with your office
gave someone a mattress from the inventory of Coughlin Memory Foam (a Nevada licensed business located at
1/29/2012 8:20 PM

the property) and an expensive mattress platform has clearly been damaged and placed in the flower bed as
well, in addition to one of the wooden porch shades being removed from the front porch. You and your client
are, of course, liable for all of this.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
From: cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: rhill@richardhillaw.com
Subject: 121 River Rock
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 13:50:02 -0800
Mr. Coughlin:
The River Rock property has been broken into. We believe the break-in occurred sometime on Monday,
36 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM

December 12, 2011. There appear to be items missing, including the TV in the living room, perhaps a computer
monitor, and perhaps some stereo equipment. I cant tell what else. The contents of the residence appear to
have been rifled through.
I am providing you with this information as a courtesy. This email does NOT constitute permission for you to go
to the River Rock property.
Casey D. Baker, Esq.

Richard G. Hill, Chartered
652 Forest Street
Reno, Nevada 89509
Phone: (775) 348-0888
Fax: (775) 348-0858
Email: cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
CONFIDENTIAL: ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT; ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

This e-mail may contain legally privileged or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, please do not read, copy, use, or disclose this
communication to anyone other than the intended recipient. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender and delete the email message from
your system. Thank you.
Circular 230 Notice.
To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. federal tax advice contained in this communication (including any
attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting,
marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein.
emergency
Sent: Mon 12/19/11 4:32 PM
To:
supplement to motion to set aside all orders, see attached exhibit, there is no initialing on
the filestampe for the order on the 11 30th, 2011
Tom said there was no docket entry or record of anything as of 12 13 11, i wans't provided copy of discovery for
over 30 days after arrest, rmc said it didn't have pc and witness satements but rec'd date indicates otherwise,
potentially, release sheets fromjail property inventory does not show 11 30 11 order, I declare under penalty of
37 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM

perjury i did not refuse any order or the chance to have a physical copy of one.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
I will fax this to Ms. Roberts and the RMC as well, this is a courtesy copy
Sent: Mon 12/19/11 5:15 PM
To:
1 attachment
RMC 11 CR 22176 12 19 11 filing with 3 exhibits.pdf (9.1 MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
38 of 47
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
39 of 47

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
no reply from Transcriptionist

Sent: Wed 12/21/11 12:02 AM
To:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
40 of 47

Nevada Bar No: 9473
Dear RMC,
It is my understanding the Judge Howard's order regarding email does not extend to the
address to which I am sending this correspondence: renomunirecords@reno.gov which is
the email address filing office supervisor Donna Ballard indicated to me was acceptable for
sending correspondence and filings to the RMC in lieu of faxes. I am writing because the
email address I was provided for RMC "official transcriptionist" Pam Longoni yielded a
"return to sender/failed transmission" message when I wrote to the email address provided
for her: plongoni@charter.net. Further, please see the forwarded email below that I sent to
Ms. Longoni. I have not received a return call from her regarding my recent messages to
her. I was told by a RMC filing office counter employee that I must get the transcript
through Ms. Longoni, as she is the "official transcriptionist" for the RMC. Please confirm
that I am no able to have another certified court reporter or transcriptionist create the
official transcript and indicate by what date this must be done, how it must be done, etc.
I was told by RMC filing office staff, including Ms. Ballard, that the RMC would not accept
any filings fees, bonds, or any other payments from me in relation to the underlying case 11
CR22176 2I or the appeal of that matter given that the RMC was holding the bail money I
paid into the court. If this is not the case or if I must pay anything into the RMC to ensure
that my appeal goes forward, please indicate as much in writing and with particularity. If I
am able to use any other transcriptionists and or the RMC has a list of such with contact
information, please provide such in writing.
Sincerely,
/s/Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Defendant/Appellant
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
41 of 47

privilege.
To: plongoni@charter.net
Subject: where to pay and how much
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 22:44:37 -0800
Dear Ms. Longoni,

I have left you several messages. I wish to pay whatever it is I have to pay to get this
appeal transcript going and to preserve all my rights to review of the decision in RMC 11 cr
22176. Further, I would like a copy of the audio from the hearing as soon as possible.
Please provide specific detailed instructions as to how to pay and how much and anything
else I need to do.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
42 of 47

privilege.
proof of insurance and registration Affidavit/Declaration and supporting

documentation
Sent: Mon 1/09/12 5:58 PM
To:
renomunirecords@reno.gov; renodirect@reno.gov
1 attachment
Zach Coughlin license plate 838NER proof of insurance and registration for citations 544281 and
r47190389731.pdf (1737.4 KB)
Dear Reno Municipal Court Clerk's Office,
My name is Zachary B. Coughlin.

My vehicle and myself were appropriately insured, as verified by the attached Proof of Insurance for
my USAA automobile insurance at the time of both Traffic Citations No's: 544281 and R47190389731.
Copies of both citations are attached as well. My vehicle, at the time of both citations, was in
compliance with Nevada law with regard to vehicle registration. A true and correct copy of this
Affidavit and the attached copies of Traffic Citations No's: 544281 and R47190389731 and a true and
correct copy of the Proof of Insurance for the time of both citations from my USAA automobile
insurance (Policy Number 0098527 96C 7104 3) and a true copy of my DMV automobile Registration
Certificate for both 2011 and 2012 is attached hereto.
I attest that the assertions contained herein are true and make this Declaration under penalty of perjury
pursuant to NRS 199.145.
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
43 of 47

Please find attached a 6 page pdf with this Affidavit/Declaration and the accompanying copies of the
two citations and the proof of insurance at the time and date of both citations and the same for the
registration for the vehicle. I am disputing the "failure to come to a complete stop" part of the citation
in 544281 and understanding that I have a hearing in Reno Municipal Court on 2 6 12 at 8:30 am in
that regard, please correct me if that is not the correct date and time.
Also, I have called several times and keeping leaving messages about disputing the following parking
tickets, and do not believe any "additional fines" should have attached to the base fine where I have
communicated that I am disputing them and have not receive a response with regard to the date and
time of my hearing to dispute them:
Citation Details
Citation Number: 020146724
Amount Due: $60.00
Issue Date:
12/03/2011 10:30:00
Plate Number: 838NER
State:
NV
Related Citations
We have found the following additional outstanding citations for this license plate
number. Please check the box next to each additional citation that you would like to pay
for at this time.
Citation Number
Issue Date
Amount Due
020145322
11/03/2011 03:20:00 $55.00
Sincerely,
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
44 of 47
Zach Coughlin
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118

fax: 949 667 7402
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may
contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it
to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking
of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the named
recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable
law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or
omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message
in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any
copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work
product, or other applicable privilege.
debt validation documentation request and dispute letter under FDCPA

to City of Reno et al
Sent: Mon 1/09/12 6:09 PM
To:
renodirect@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
Dear City of Reno,

This writing is written notice to you that I dispute the debt your office and the City of Reno
and or the Reno Municipal Court has recently sent me, alleging that I owe some debt for
either parking tickets and or traffic citations. Further, I request verification and
documentation in support of your contention that I owe such a debt pursuant to the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act.
Sincerely,
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
45 of 47

Zach Coughlin1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402

To: renomunirecords@reno.gov; renodirect@reno.gov
Subject: proof of insurance and registration Affidavit/Declaration and supporting documentation
Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 17:58:47 -0800
Dear Reno Municipal Court Clerk's Office,
My name is Zachary B. Coughlin.

My vehicle and myself were appropriately insured, as verified by the attached Proof of Insurance for
my USAA automobile insurance at the time of both Traffic Citations No's: 544281 and R47190389731.
Copies of both citations are attached as well. My vehicle, at the time of both citations, was in
compliance with Nevada law with regard to vehicle registration. A true and correct copy of this
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
46 of 47

Affidavit and the attached copies of Traffic Citations No's: 544281 and R47190389731 and a true and
correct copy of the Proof of Insurance for the time of both citations from my USAA automobile
insurance (Policy Number 0098527 96C 7104 3) and a true copy of my DMV automobile Registration
Certificate for both 2011 and 2012 is attached hereto.
I attest that the assertions contained herein are true and make this Declaration under penalty of perjury
pursuant to NRS 199.145.
Please find attached a 6 page pdf with this Affidavit/Declaration and the accompanying copies of the
two citations and the proof of insurance at the time and date of both citations and the same for the
registration for the vehicle. I am disputing the "failure to come to a complete stop" part of the citation
in 544281 and understanding that I have a hearing in Reno Municipal Court on 2 6 12 at 8:30 am in
that regard, please correct me if that is not the correct date and time.
Also, I have called several times and keeping leaving messages about disputing the following parking
tickets, and do not believe any "additional fines" should have attached to the base fine where I have
communicated that I am disputing them and have not receive a response with regard to the date and
time of my hearing to dispute them:
Citation Details
Citation Number: 020146724
Amount Due: $60.00
Issue Date:
12/03/2011 10:30:00
Plate Number: 838NER
State:
NV
1/29/2012 8:20 PM
47 of 47
Related Citations
We have found the following additional outstanding citations for this license plate
number. Please check the box next to each additional citation that you would like to pay
for at this time.
Citation Number
Issue Date
Amount Due
020145322
11/03/2011 03:20:00 $55.00
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118

fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:20 PM

Page 1 of 1
where to pay and how much

Sent: Fri 12/16/11 10:44 PM
To:
plongoni@charter.net
Dear Ms. Longoni,

I have left you several messages. I wish to pay whatever it is I have to pay to get
this appeal transcript going and to preserve all my rights to review of the decision in
RMC 11 cr 22176. Further, I would like a copy of the audio from the hearing as
soon as possible. Please provide specific detailed instructions as to how to pay and
how much and anything else I need to do.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy
Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s)
only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are
hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the
taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential,
intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work
product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are
notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on
the contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or
are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and
destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a
waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=1198565f-dbcf-4a36-... 1/30/2012
1 of 5
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=f54...
Fwd: Attached Image / Subpoena

From: Donna Ballard (BallardD@reno.gov)
Sent: Tue 11/29/11 3:22 PM
To:
zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
1 attachment
0660_001.pdf (28.7 KB)
-----Original Message----From: "MUNI CT 1st Floor Clerks" <canon@reno.gov>

To: "DONNA" <ballardd@reno.gov>
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 16:14:15 -0800
Subject: Attached Image
Donna Ballard
Senior Court Specialist
1 South Sierra Street
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775)334-3101
RE: Attached Image / Subpoena

Sent: Tue 11/29/11 3:53 PM
To:
Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
I am so sorry, I must have misunderstood.

These must be served and the affidavit portion completed before they can be file stamped in.
Thank you,
Donna
-----Original Message----From: Zach Coughlin <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>
To: <ballardd@reno.gov>
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 15:48:31 -0800
Subject: RE: Attached Image / Subpoena
Dear Ms. Ballard,

Thank you sending these and agreeing to stamp and emal them back to me
today, very, very much appreciate.
Sincerely,
1/29/2012 9:39 PM
2 of 5
Zach Coughlin
email is the best way to contact me, having phone issues today.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are
not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that
you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based
on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the named
distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is
prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please
notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately.
Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or
other applicable privilege.
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 15:22:14 -0800

From: BallardD@reno.gov
Subject: Fwd: Attached Image / Subpoena

Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 16:14:15 -0800
Donna Ballard
Reno, Nevada 89501
1/29/2012 9:39 PM
3 of 5

(775)334-3101
Donna Ballard
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775)334-3101
Fwd: Attached Image

Sent: Tue 11/29/11 4:47 PM
To:
zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
1 attachment
0661_001.pdf (42.9 KB)
Thank you. I am taking it up to the Department now.

Donna
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 17:42:28 -0800
Donna Ballard
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775)334-3101
Re: IFP/ FINANCIAL INQUIRY APPLICATION

Sent: Wed 12/14/11 12:09 PM
To:
Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
I did not inform you that you would need a subpoena to get a copy of the docket. I advised you that your
records request will be sufficient for copies of documents as public record and did not specify specific
documents.
I am forwarding this email to Department 2, Department 4 and the Chief Marshal for further action.
1/29/2012 9:39 PM
4 of 5

To: <ballardd@reno.gov>, <renomunirecords@reno.gov>
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 00:22:07 -0800
Subject: IFP/ FINANCIAL INQUIRY APPLICATION
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Ms. Ballard,
Please note, the gentleman I worked with at the filing office counter today informed me there were no appeal
fees, bonds, or other charges that I could pay (including transcription costs) as "all charges are being taken
from" my bail in the respective matters. Please email me the audio from the November 20th,2011 Trial in 11 cr
22176 2I and proof of service of any Contempt Order or Guilty Verdict/Order in that matter. Please file this as
well as a Opposition to Any Motion to Continue Trial in 11 cr 26405, dept 2, and a Motion to Set Aside or
Vacate any Order Granting Continuance in response to such an Order Granting Continuance. Please email,
fax, or mail me a copy of the Notice of Appearances by both Taitel and Puentes and the Motion and Order
Granting Withdrawal of Taitel, if it exists. I would like a copy of the docket in both 11 CR 26405 2I and 11 CR
22176, despite your informing me today that I would need to subpoena the docket to have any chance of
seeing it and that I would not be provided access to documents in the public record, including Orders in both
of these cases.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1/29/2012 9:39 PM
5 of 5

Donna Ballard
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775)334-3101
1/29/2012 9:39 PM
1 of 22
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=e4...

Sent: Tue 11/29/11 3:48 PM
To:
ballardd@reno.gov
4 attachments
RMC subpoena Ellis Walmart Manager and loss prevention manager.pdf (42.7 KB) , RMC subpoena
Janice store clerk walmart arrest receipt cashier 2nd St. 89501 Walmart.pdf (44.3 KB) , RMC subpoena
Store Manager Brian Bain 2nd st Walmart Reno and LP supervisor 2nd St. 89501 Walmart.pdf (43.3 KB) ,
RMC subpoena fill in the blank for name stylein city of reno v coughlin 11 cr 22176 2I.pdf (43.7 KB)
Dear Ms. Ballard,

Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 15:22:14 -0800

1/29/2012 9:43 PM
2 of 22


Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 16:14:15 -0800
Donna Ballard
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775)334-3101

Sent: Tue 11/29/11 4:29 PM
To:
ballardd@reno.gov
1 attachment
RMC various walmart subpoenasreno v coughlin 11 cr 22176 2I.pdf (56.9 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
3 of 22

privilege.
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 15:53:46 -0800

I am so sorry, I must have misunderstood.
These must be served and the affidavit portion completed before they can be file stamped in.
Thank you,
Donna
To: <ballardd@reno.gov>
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 15:48:31 -0800
Dear Ms. Ballard,

Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
4 of 22

Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 15:22:14 -0800


Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 16:14:15 -0800
Donna Ballard
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775)334-3101
Donna Ballard
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775)334-3101
IFP/ FINANCIAL INQUIRY APPLICATION
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
5 of 22

Sent: Wed 12/14/11 12:22 AM
To:
ballardd@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
2 attachments
Coughlin IFP and Financial Inquiry Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 26405 2I.pdf (381.9 KB) , Coughlin
IFP and Financial Inquiry Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 22176 2I.pdf (372.0 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Ms. Ballard,
Please note, the gentleman I worked with at the filing office counter today informed me there were no
appeal fees, bonds, or other charges that I could pay (including transcription costs) as "all charges are
being taken from" my bail in the respective matters. Please email me the audio from the November
20th,2011 Trial in 11 cr 22176 2I and proof of service of any Contempt Order or Guilty Verdict/Order
in that matter. Please file this as well as a Opposition to Any Motion to Continue Trial in 11 cr 26405,
dept 2, and a Motion to Set Aside or Vacate any Order Granting Continuance in response to such an
Order Granting Continuance. Please email, fax, or mail me a copy of the Notice of Appearances by
both Taitel and Puentes and the Motion and Order Granting Withdrawal of Taitel, if it exists. I would
like a copy of the docket in both 11 CR 26405 2I and 11 CR 22176, despite your informing me today
that I would need to subpoena the docket to have any chance of seeing it and that I would not be
provided access to documents in the public record, including Orders in both of these cases.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
6 of 22
privilege.
RE: IFP/ FINANCIAL INQUIRY APPLICATION

Sent: Wed 12/14/11 3:45 PM
To:
ballardd@reno.gov
You might want to ask the gentleman clerk I was working with about
everything he said.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1/29/2012 9:43 PM

privilege.
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 12:09:40 -0800

Subject: Re: IFP/ FINANCIAL INQUIRY APPLICATION
I did not inform you that you would need a subpoena to get a copy of the docket. I advised you that your
records request will be sufficient for copies of documents as public record and did not specify specific
documents.
I am forwarding this email to Department 2, Department 4 and the Chief Marshal for further action.

To: <ballardd@reno.gov>, <renomunirecords@reno.gov>
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 00:22:07 -0800
Subject: IFP/ FINANCIAL INQUIRY APPLICATION
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Ms. Ballard,
Please note, the gentleman I worked with at the filing office counter today informed me there were no appeal
fees, bonds, or other charges that I could pay (including transcription costs) as "all charges are being taken
from" my bail in the respective matters. Please email me the audio from the November 20th,2011 Trial in 11 cr
22176 2I and proof of service of any Contempt Order or Guilty Verdict/Order in that matter. Please file this as
7 of 22
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
8 of 22

well as a Opposition to Any Motion to Continue Trial in 11 cr 26405, dept 2, and a Motion to Set Aside or
Vacate any Order Granting Continuance in response to such an Order Granting Continuance. Please email,
fax, or mail me a copy of the Notice of Appearances by both Taitel and Puentes and the Motion and Order
Granting Withdrawal of Taitel, if it exists. I would like a copy of the docket in both 11 CR 26405 2I and 11 CR
22176, despite your informing me today that I would need to subpoena the docket to have any chance of
seeing it and that I would not be provided access to documents in the public record, including Orders in both
of these cases.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Donna Ballard
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775)334-3101
RE: Message left on 12/13/2011

Sent: Wed 12/14/11 6:52 PM
To:
roperj@reno.gov; fiskg@reno.gov; ballardd@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
Dear Chief Marshal Roper, and the RMC,

Thank you for your quick reply. I actually requested a copy of some
documentation related to my complaints about both incidents with Marshal
Mentzel be placed in his employment or personnel file, not that you provide
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
9 of 22
me a copy of his file. I would like one, or a copy of any complaints against
any Marshals, but I realize a subpoena would likely be required to have any
chance at that. Negligent Training, Hiring, Supervision.
I never received a copy of the Contempt Finding and Guilty
Verdict/Judgment/ORder or whatever from the 11 30, 2011 Trial before Judge
Howard in 11 CR22176 2I, though "Veronica" (no one will tell me her last
name, but she works closely with the RMC Judges) said the only "service" of
those Orders that was ever attempted on me occured while I was handcuffed,
after which point some Marshalls (I did not catch their names and they
manhandled me roughly into handcuffs, refusing to even let me save my
notes on my laptop at the sudden conclusion of Judge Howards Order and
Contempt finding. This is truly reprehensible to not even let me save my
damn notes and act like I was some perp who just knocked of a god damn
liquor store with a firearm. Some people need to get a grip inside. Please
place a copy of this written complaint against whatever Marshals were
involved in that in their employment/personnel files as well. Please provide
me a copy of any complaints you have received against any Marshals.
I would like a copy of the 11 30, 2011 Order and the audio of the Trial. I
believe you have a duty to find out what those Marshals did with this
document that "Veronica" alleges they attempted to serve on me, though,
even 14 days after the Trial, the "docket" in the RMC filing office still
contains no Order, no mention of an Order, and certainly no Proof of Service
of anything of the sort, nor have they responded to any of my documentation
requests or a request of the audio of the Trial of 11 30, 2011, despite an
exigent need for such to prepare Relief from Judgment Motions that have
deadlines of 10-20 days from "service" of the "Order", and who knows how
that will be measure. Why it was necessary to cost the public a bunch of
overtime pay for the 5 or so Marshalls, and who knows how many court staff
to stay until nearly 9pm on 11 30, 2011 to complete this "Trial", and how it
was such a damn emergency, especially where Richard Hill was able to get a
continuance because he was going to be on vacation in the trespass case
against me 11 CR 22185 2I, despite the fact that Lew Taitel never receive my
consent to such a Motion for Continuance, and further Taitel was arguably
conflicted out of representing me considering his "association" with Nevada
Court Services and the torts the committed against me, which resulted in a
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
10 of 22
lawsuit being filed against them, or at least an IPF Petition and Proposed
Complaint in District Court, prior to Taitel's appointment and representation.
If the RMC can afford all that damn overtime for everyone, why couldn't it
appoint me a defense attorney in RMC 11 CR 22176, especially where Judge
Howard ruled, not 20 minutes into Trial that he was finding me in Contempt
of Court and would decide the sentence (which obviously included a
possibility of incarceration) at the conclusion of the Trial?
Further M. Mentzel clearly bumped Donna Ballard out of the way in his zeal
to establish dominance of me, a person who was providing absolutely no
resistance at the time. Mentzel went on to start order me to leave the
premises after my conversation with Ballard and the file clerk was done.
Duh, Mentzel, it was 5:00 pm or so "closing time" what do you think I am
going to do, hang out and chill with you guys? Look at the Notice of Hearing
or Docket in RMC 11 CR22176 2I (I am also hereby requesting a copy of
the audio or video of the hearing from the RMC) and the hand written
interlineations I made on the document M. Mentzel provided me in court on
10 11, 2011, where I mention the problems associated with asking questions
about my Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel where only the possibility of
jail time exists. I asked Mentzel at that time a question about the process and
he got very angry, threatening, and insulting with me, then later, criticized my
appearance before Judge Gardner, I believe he said I was "sarcastic" and or
rude to the Judge in the same way I had been to Mentzel himself. I submit
that citizens trying to access justice should not be taken as a personal affront
to RMC employees like Mentzel, and that he needs to strongly consider how
he comes across to the public when he acts the way he does, and carries a
firearm, color of law, a badge, and apparently, the blessing of the RMC in
carrying out behavior that seems more fitting for a nightclub bouncer than a
Marshal. Further, the video played at arraignments is overly hostile and
threatening in my opinion, especially the parts where Judge Gardner makes
statements on the "extremely" poor choice it would be to represent one's self
pro se and all these tones and words used that make it sound like pro se
defendants will be punished for not either copping a plea or going with one
of the "four former prosecutors" who are now drawing a paycheck from the
RMC/Citizenry to fulfill the Sixth Amendment. I am something completely
other than impressed with the work done by Lew Taitel, Esq. for me in RMC
11 CR 22185 2I, in that regard. Why shouldn't defendants in the RMC, after
viewing the arraignment video and receiving representation like that which I
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
11 of 22
received from Taitel, feel like lambs being led to slaughter? Baah,
baaaaaaaaah! Two other Marshals were there yesterday when Mentzel was
berating me, I would like their names, please.
Now, just awhile ago, "RMC Court Transcriptionist Pam Longoni" called me
on the phone ("while driving" according to Ms. Longoni) and informed me
that the RMC must permit her access to the audio files, and that, while she is
linked into "their system" (meaning the RMC's), the RMC must take some
additional step to allow Ms. Longoni to access the audio files and continue
with the process of tending ot a request for a Transcript on Appeal. I was
told by a female RMC counter clerk that I would not ever be provided a copy
of the audio recording of the 11 30, 2011 Trial, but that I may purchase from
Ms. Longoni an official transcript, and that "appeal transcripts are billed at
$4.10 per page" etc. and that a substantial deposit would be required, and that
"No Transcript is considered to be official ordered, and commencement of
transcription will not begin, until receipt of the required deposit..." I asked
Ms. Longoni to inform me of everything I must do or pay to have the
transcript deemd officialy ordered and she informed me that she could not tell
me that, despite the apparent hard and fast deadlines applied to ordering,
officially, such a transcript, with the RMC in an Appeal context, until the
RMC allowed Ms. Longoni to access the RMC "system" and view/hear the
audio of the 11 30, 2011 Trial in 11 CR22176 2I. Ms. Longoni angrily hung
up the phone on me and is now not returning my calls and has failed to
respond to my request that she inform me, in writing, as to where to send
money or a deposit or anything else required for the transcript. I have yet to
receive a fax from the RMC's "Veronica" (whose last name has repeatedly
been denied to me) despite her angry assurances on the phone on 12 12, 2011
that she would finally hae the RMC attempt to appropriately (or almost
appropriately) serve me a copy of the Contempt Finding and Guilty Order
stemming from the 11 30, 2011 Trial in RMC 11 CR 22176 2I. Please have
this request and communication reiterated to whoever it concerns at the
RMC, and have such a copy of those documents emailed, faxed, and mailed
in the US Postal Service mail immediately. Further, please do the same with
respect to the audio of the 11 30, 2011 Trial in RMC 11 CR 22176 2I, and of
course I will pay a reasonable cost for the cd to the extent my IFP is not
granted. The RJC and Washoe District Court charge about $30 per cd. The
also provide copies of the dockets in cases without demanding a subpoena
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
12 of 22
force them to first. Please ask the gentleman Ms. Ballard saw me working
with yesterday what he said in that regard about providing me a copy of
anything, much less the docket in either RMC 11 CR 22176 2I or RMC 11
CR 22185 2I.
I believe I am entitled to a copy of the audio recording quickly, whether or
not a transcript has been officialy ordered, for the purposes of appeal or for
any other purposes. I believe in something called "transparency" in
goverment. Sunshine.
Let me ask you a question: If a Judge told you to jump off a bridge, would
you? It is my belief that Judge Howard ordered everyone to clear the
courtroom, including a female, shortly after my 11 20, 2011 Trial began and
it became clear that I was not going to lay down meekly for the Court, or for
Wal-Mart, or for the Reno City Attorney. 2 million of my people starved to
death during a "Great Famine" between 1848-1850 in Ireland, despite being
surrounded by water and fish, where the English were arresting Irishmen who
attempted to save their families and their own live's by fishing. I will be
fishing here, gentleman. Deal with it. I want that recording, for, among
many other reasons, to see if Judge Howard merely asked those who might
be called as witnesses to leave or whether he demanded every member of the
public leave before he sent me off to Guantanamo, er, I mean the Washoe
County Detention Facility after the Military Tribunal, er, the Trial in RMC.
Interestingly, while at the Washoe County Detention Facility, I have been
made to strip naked while being videotaped, wear a green dress for days on
end, go without a toothbrush for days, refused any opportunity to make
phone calls to protect my clients cases from prejudice, forced to spread apart
my buttocks and allow an overly long look at my anus by Sheriff's Deputies,
and further, I was forced to submit to a position on my knees in the
immediate vicinity of two Sheriff's Deputies crotches in some sadistic forced
simulation of performing oral sex upon those men. Rico/Negligent Hiring,
Training, Supervision, 42 USC Sec. 1983 Deprivation of Civil Rights Under
Color of State Law, etc., etc. Qui Tam, Whistleblower. Mr. Roper, I doubt a
Federal Court Judge would require that I have come obtained a Statement
From you to complain about any Marshal's conduct. I am pretty sure this and
my other correspondences have placed you on notice.
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
13 of 22
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 16:26:47 -0800

From: RoperJ@reno.gov
To: ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: Message left on 12/13/2011
Mr. Coughlin,
I received your message that you left on my phone on December 13, 2011 in regards to a complaint against Marshal
Menzel. The Marshal Division takes all citizen complaints seriously and investigates all complaints received in writing or
verbally. However, I would need more information from you prior to moving forward with an investigation. I encourage
you to come to the court to obtain a statement form, or contact me directly should you wish to pursue this matter. As to
your request to obtain a copy of Marshal Menzel's personnel file, I am unable to provide that to you without a valid
subpoena or warrant.
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
14 of 22

You also stated you were attempting to obtain a copy of your Judgement of Conviction from Dept. 4, specifically Veronica
Lopez, you can reach her at 326-6673. I am aware that a copy of your Judgement of Conviction was provided to you and
booked into your property on the night you were arrested. You are entitled to another copy should you wish.
Thank you,
Justin Roper
Chief Marshal/Department of Alternative Sentencing
775-334-1254
RMC 11 CR 22176
Sent: Thu 12/15/11 11:59 PM
To:

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
FAX COVER SHEET

TO: .RMC et al
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
15 of 22

Dear RMC,
T
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
16 of 22

fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
FW: RMC 11 CR 22176

Sent: Fri 12/16/11 12:00 AM
To:

1 attachment
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
17 of 22

Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
lopezv@reno.gov
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2011 23:59:45 -0800
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
FAX COVER SHEET
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
18 of 22

TO: .RMC et al
Dear RMC,
T
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
19 of 22

Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
FW: 121 River Rock

Sent: Sat 12/17/11 12:15 AM
To:
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
20 of 22

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 15:43:38 -0800
Dear Mr. Baker,
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
21 of 22

Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 13:50:02 -0800
Mr. Coughlin:
1/29/2012 9:43 PM
22 of 22

652 Forest Street
Reno, Nevada 89509
Phone: (775) 348-0888
Fax: (775) 348-0858

1/29/2012 9:43 PM
1 of 19
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=66...
request for arrest records

Sent: Tue 10/04/11 3:22 PM
To:
lcooley@rsic.org; voldenburg@rsic.org; rariwite@rsic.org; police@rsic.org

1 attachment
records request to rsic police.pdf (65.8 KB)
lcooley@rsic.org, voldenburg@rsic.org, rariwite@rsic.org, police@rsic.org,

TO:
October 4, 2011
Dear Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police Records Department and
Administrators, including Chief Cooley, Attorney Oldenburg, and Tribal
Administrator Ariwhite,
My name is Zach Coughlin. I wish to obtain any and all records available
incident to an arrest at the E. 2nd St. Walmart by the Reno Sparks Indian
Colony Police on or about Saturday October 10th, 2011 at between
approximately 9pm and 10:30pm. I want any and all records, video, audio,
paper documentation or otherwise that I have a right to. I am representing
myself. I have sought these records from the Reno Municipal Court's
Records Office and they kept telling me they didn't have them yet and that I
should return sometime soon. Finally, they admitted the do not keep these
records and they must be obtained from your office. This delay has unduly
prejudiced my case and I request that you provide these records to me at
once, with no delay, please. The RS Indian Colony Police refused to give me
a copy of these records today when I spoke with Sargent Avansino, who was
polite and helpful otherwise. I believe this case should be dismissed.
Signed electronically and signed in a signed attached PDF. I can come pick
the records up with identification if that is required or I hereby give you
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
2 of 19
permission to email them to me or mail them to the address below:

Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Subpoena and request for arrest records

Sent: Tue 10/04/11 4:26 PM
To:

2 attachments
gov.uscourts.nvd.52455.8.0 hernandez against reno sparks indian police.PDF (224.4 KB) ,
gov.uscourts.mied.209033.1.0 Sweeney Class Action Walmart.PDF (415.2 KB)
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
3 of 19
October 4, 2011
Dear Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police Department and Counsel,
My name is Zach Coughlin. I have now been informed by both the Reno
Municipal Court and the Reno City Attorney's officer that neither entity can
provide my requested records. You have them, I believe I have a
constitutional right to them. If you feel differently, please explain in writing
why that is the case. Please review:
Construction and effect, in false imprisonment action, of statute providing for
detention of suspected shoplifters, 47 A.L.R. 3d 998
Liability of municipality or other governmental unit for failure to provide
police protection, 46
A.L.R. 3d 1084
Personal liability of policeman, sheriffs, or similar peace officer or his bond,
for injury suffered as
a result of failure to enforce law or arrest lawbreaker, 41 A.L.R. 3d 700
Admissibility of defendant's rules or instructions for dealing with shoplifters,
in action for false
imprisonment or malicious prosecution, 31 A.L.R. 3D 705
Genuine issue of material fact, as to whether homeowner voluntarily
consented to warrantless search of his residence, or whether he had been
coerced into giving his consent by officers' alleged refusal to honor his
requests to speak with attorney, and by their alleged threats that, unless he
consented, he would be forced to wait outside while officers obtained
warrant and then "t[ore] his house apart and arrest[ed] his girlfriend,"
precluded entry of summary judgment for government in civil for- feiture
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
4 of 19
action in which only evidence supporting government's position was

evidence that homeowner sought to suppress. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
511(a)(7), 21 U.S.C.A. 881(a)(7). U.S. v. One Piece of Real Property
Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099;Manning v
Commonwealth (1959, Ky) 328 SW2d 421.
Please consider this a subpoena requesting all records having anything to do
with this incident.
I wish to obtain any and all records available incident to IC110627 at the E.
2nd St. Walmart by the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police on or about
Saturday October 10th, 2011 at between approximately 9pm and 10:30pm. I
want any and all records, video, audio, paper documentation or otherwise that
I have a right to. I am representing myself. I have sought these records from
the Reno Municipal Court's Records Office and they kept telling me they
didn't have them yet and that I should return sometime soon. Finally, they
admitted the do not keep these records and they must be obtained from your
office. This delay has unduly prejudiced my case and I request that you
provide these records to me at once, with no delay, please. The RS Indian
Colony Police refused to give me a copy of these records today when I spoke
with Sargent Avansino, who was polite and helpful otherwise. I believe this
case should be dismissed.
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
Sincerely,
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
5 of 19
Zach Coughlin
This message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information
that is privileged, work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the
intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or
omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If
you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete
this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone
other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other
applicable privilege.
Civil Results
Party Name
Court
Case
NOS Date Filed Date Closed
1 Reno Sparks Indian Tribal Council (dft) nvdce 3:2007-cv-00023 440 02/27/2007 07/17/2007
Appellate Results
Party Name
Court
Case
NOS Date Filed Date Closed
2 Reno Sparks Indian Tribal Council (pty) 09cae 07-16422 3440 08/10/2007 12/27/2007
RE: request for arrest records

Saved: Sun 12/04/11 3:49 AM
To:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

1/29/2012 10:01 PM
6 of 19

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
To:pgoins@rsic.org, lcooley@rsic.org; voldenburg@rsic.org; rariwite@rsic.org; police@rsic.org
Subject: request for arrest records
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2011 15:22:39 -0700
lcooley@rsic.org, voldenburg@rsic.org, rariwite@rsic.org, police@rsic.org,

TO:
October 4, 2011
Dear Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police Records Department and
Administrators, including Chief Cooley, Attorney Oldenburg, and Tribal
Administrator Ariwhite,
My name is Zach Coughlin. I wish to obtain any and all records available
incident to an arrest at the E. 2nd St. Walmart by the Reno Sparks Indian
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
7 of 19
Colony Police on or about Saturday October 10th, 2011 at between

approximately 9pm and 10:30pm. I want any and all records, video, audio,
paper documentation or otherwise that I have a right to. I am representing
myself. I have sought these records from the Reno Municipal Court's
Records Office and they kept telling me they didn't have them yet and that I
should return sometime soon. Finally, they admitted the do not keep these
records and they must be obtained from your office. This delay has unduly
prejudiced my case and I request that you provide these records to me at
once, with no delay, please. The RS Indian Colony Police refused to give me
a copy of these records today when I spoke with Sargent Avansino, who was
polite and helpful otherwise. I believe this case should be dismissed.
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
8 of 19

your cop lying, see your video drivers license produce ap overview at
6:49 mark
Sent: Sun 12/04/11 4:05 AM
To:
lcooley@rsic.org; voldenburg@rsic.org; rariwite@rsic.org; police@rsic.org; robertsp@reno.gov
pgoins@rsic.org, lcooley@rsic.org; voldenburg@rsic.org; rariwite@rsic.org; police@rsic.org

Subject: your cop lying, see your video drivers license produce ap overview at 6:49 mark
We spend half the "trial" arguing about whether your lying cops had enough
"information" (their definition included personally identifiable information to
identify the accused sufficiently to issue a citation, A CURRENT NEVADA'S
DRIVERS LICENSE WOULD DO JUST FINE ON THAT ACCOUNT) to
issue a citation, and how, because they didn't, they had to conduct a search
incident to arrest, yet YOUR OWN DAMN VIDEO (OR RATHER,
WALMART'S, BUT ITS HARD TO SEE WHERE YOU GUYS END AND
WALMART BEGINS), THAT YOU EFFING PRODUCED (OR RATHER
THE RENO CITY ATTORNEY PRODUCED AFTER THE BOYS AT
WALMART "COMPILED" VIDEO, WHICH CURIOUSLY DID CONTAIN
A FUCKING SECOND OF VIDEO SHOWING ANY OF THE ALLEGED
CONCEALING OR CONSUMING THE ITEMS IN QUESTION! SHOWS
THE ACCUSED HANDING THEM A DRIVERS LICENSE AND THEM
CALLING IT IN TO CHECK FOR PRIORS (THAT WILL SHOW UP IN
DISPATCH REPORTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION). THESE
KEYSTONE COP EFFUPS HAVE DEFAMED ME AND YOU
SPONSORED IT, CULTIVATED IT.
I CAN GIVE YOU UNTIL TUESDAY TO MAKE A STRONG EFFORT TO
CORRECT THIS, AFTER THAT, I HAVE TO MAKE MY MOVES AND
FILE MY MOTIONS. JUDGE VAN WALRAVEN WOULD BE
ASHAMED OF HOW THIS HAS BEEN HANDLED.
THE OFFICERS ARE KAMERON CRAWFORD AND BRAUNWORTH, WHO CAME ACROSS A
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
9 of 19

FAR MORE COGNITIVELY IMPAIRED IN COURT THAN HE DID IN PERSON, TO AN EXTENT
THAT WOULD SUGGEST HE WAS DISHONORING THE LEGAL PROCESS BY HIS
"PARTICIPATION", AND ITS ALL ON TAPE.
I want you to move for, OR ASK THE CITY ATTORNEY TO MOVE

FOR, a Rule 59 Motion to Set Aside or some other motion to have the
Judgment Set Aside. Your cop witness clearly had a driver's license
produced to him at the 6:49 mark of WALMART'S OWN DAMN VIDEO!
And you suborned his perjury on the witness stand in violation of many of
the POLICE CODES YOU ARE HELD TO. Further, what are you going to
say when the UPC from the alleged receipt appears on the purchased receipt,
in combination with Frontino's adamant assertion that they wouldn't, in
combination with the same from Crawford, in combination with Frontino
admitting he couldn't hear what was said between the accused and the
cashier, in combination with the "same UPC, hit the quantity number"
practice common at Walmart? Further, your Officer Crawford, as a witness,
admitted on tape at the trial that "he didn't have enough EVIDENCE to issue
a citation so he arrested and did a search incident to arrest" to get more
evidence before Reno City Attorney Roberts and Judge Howard could jump
in and cut him off. That's gametime. Frontino, Crawford, and Braunworth,
sat around joking like goofy frat boys the preceeding 30 minutes in the
hallway in front of the court room, like a group of 3 buddies who hang out all
the time, except, 2 get paid by you, and one gets paid by Wal-Mart, who pay
the people who pay you. Then all three of them wait around the hear the
verdict at 8 pm hours after Frontino and Crawford finished testifying.
Maybe the don't realize Judge Howard wasn't ruling on the Appeal, the Rule
59, 60 motions, Motion for Reconsideration, defamation, wrongful arrest,
false imprisonment lawsuits, etc. Fix it now while you can. Wait till I get the
video from Walmart that Frontino is hiding from you, and don't you just want
to know if some "other" audio or video exists of the interrogation.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
10 of 19
privilege.
Re: your cop lying, see your video drivers license produce ap overview at
6:49 mark
From: Pamela Roberts (robertsp@reno.gov)
Sent: Mon 12/05/11 7:49 AM
To:
Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com); lcooley@rsic.org; voldenburg@rsic.org; rariwite@rsic.org;

police@rsic.org
Mr. Coughlin: Please discontinue any further correspondence with me via email. Please file and serve any
motions or notices in accordance with the rules of the applicable court. Pam Roberts, Deputy City Attorney.
To: <lcooley@rsic.org>, <voldenburg@rsic.org>, <rariwite@rsic.org>, <police@rsic.org>,
<robertsp@reno.gov>
Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2011 04:05:27 -0800

"information" (their definition included personally identifiable information
to identify the accused sufficiently to issue a citation, A CURRENT
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
11 of 19
NEVADA'S DRIVERS LICENSE WOULD DO JUST FINE ON THAT

ACCOUNT) to issue a citation, and how, because they didn't, they had to
conduct a search incident to arrest, yet YOUR OWN DAMN VIDEO (OR
RATHER, WALMART'S, BUT ITS HARD TO SEE WHERE YOU GUYS
END AND WALMART BEGINS), THAT YOU EFFING PRODUCED
(OR RATHER THE RENO CITY ATTORNEY PRODUCED AFTER THE
BOYS AT WALMART "COMPILED" VIDEO, WHICH CURIOUSLY
DID CONTAIN A FUCKING SECOND OF VIDEO SHOWING ANY OF
THE ALLEGED CONCEALING OR CONSUMING THE ITEMS IN
QUESTION! SHOWS THE ACCUSED HANDING THEM A DRIVERS
LICENSE AND THEM CALLING IT IN TO CHECK FOR PRIORS
(THAT WILL SHOW UP IN DISPATCH REPORTS AND OTHER
DOCUMENTATION). THESE KEYSTONE COP EFFUPS HAVE
DEFAMED ME AND YOU SPONSORED IT, CULTIVATED IT.
I CAN GIVE YOU UNTIL TUESDAY TO MAKE A STRONG EFFORT
TO CORRECT THIS, AFTER THAT, I HAVE TO MAKE MY MOVES
AND FILE MY MOTIONS. JUDGE VAN WALRAVEN WOULD BE
THE OFFICERS ARE KAMERON CRAWFORD AND BRAUNWORTH, WHO CAME ACROSS
A FAR MORE COGNITIVELY IMPAIRED IN COURT THAN HE DID IN PERSON, TO AN
EXTENT THAT WOULD SUGGEST HE WAS DISHONORING THE LEGAL PROCESS BY HIS

say when the UPC from the alleged receipt appears on the purchased
receipt, in combination with Frontino's adamant assertion that they
wouldn't, in combination with the same from Crawford, in combination
with Frontino admitting he couldn't hear what was said between the accused
and the cashier, in combination with the "same UPC, hit the quantity
number" practice common at Walmart? Further, your Officer Crawford, as
a witness, admitted on tape at the trial that "he didn't have enough
EVIDENCE to issue a citation so he arrested and did a search incident to
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
12 of 19
arrest" to get more evidence before Reno City Attorney Roberts and Judge
Howard could jump in and cut him off. That's gametime. Frontino,
Crawford, and Braunworth, sat around joking like goofy frat boys the
preceeding 30 minutes in the hallway in front of the court room, like a
group of 3 buddies who hang out all the time, except, 2 get paid by you, and
one gets paid by Wal-Mart, who pay the people who pay you. Then all
three of them wait around the hear the verdict at 8 pm hours after Frontino
and Crawford finished testifying. Maybe the don't realize Judge Howard
wasn't ruling on the Appeal, the Rule 59, 60 motions, Motion for
Reconsideration, defamation, wrongful arrest, false imprisonment lawsuits,
etc. Fix it now while you can. Wait till I get the video from Walmart that
Frontino is hiding from you, and don't you just want to know if some
"other" audio or video exists of the interrogation.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
13 of 19
defamation lawsuit/wrongful arrest/perjury under color of state law

arrest.
Sent: Mon 12/12/11 10:07 PM
To:
nhardjo@rsic.org; carthene@reno.gov; htobey@rsic.og
Dear RSIC Police and Ms. Carthen,

Please provide me a copy of the video cd/dvd that Walmart's Frontino handed
your two Officers, Kameron Crawford and Braunworth when they were
escorting the suspect from the interrogation room in RMC 11 CR 22176. I
don't care if you think the tape/disc is not probative. I want it. Plus I want all
the dispatch tapes, especially where Kameron is calling in the suspect's
driver's license (which he testified the suspect refused to give him, but darn
it, its right there on the interrogation room footage, Kameron being givent he
driver's license card. Then the walmart guy Frontino testifies there was not
footage other than the interrogation room footage, yet he clearly hands the
two RSIC officers a cd/dvd when there are leaving the room. I am still
bothered that Sargent Avansino stonewalled me on the discovery for a whole
month following the arrest.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
<robertsp@reno.gov>
Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2011 04:05:27 -0800

1/29/2012 10:01 PM
14 of 19

DID CONTAIN A FriggING SECOND OF VIDEO SHOWING ANY OF
AND FILE MY MOTIONS.

1/29/2012 10:01 PM
15 of 19
preceding 30 minutes in the hallway in front of the court room, like a group
of 3 buddies who hang out all the time, except, 2 get paid by you, and one
gets paid by Wal-Mart, who pay the people who pay you. Then all three of
them wait around the hear the verdict at 8 pm hours after Frontino and
Crawford finished testifying. Maybe the don't realize Judge Howard wasn't
ruling on the Appeal, the Rule 59, 60 motions, Motion for Reconsideration,
defamation, wrongful arrest, false imprisonment lawsuits, etc. Fix it now
while you can. Wait till I get the video from Walmart that Frontino is hiding
from you, and don't you just want to know if some "other" audio or
video exists of the interrogation.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV
fax: 949 667 7402
FW: defamation lawsuit/wrongful arrest/perjury under color of state law

1/29/2012 10:01 PM
16 of 19
arrest.
Sent: Fri 12/16/11 7:56 AM
To:
nharjo@rsic.org
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
To: nhardjo@rsic.org; carthene@reno.gov; htobey@rsic.og
Subject: defamation lawsuit/wrongful arrest/perjury under color of state law arrest.
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 22:07:47 -0800
Dear RSIC Police and Ms. Carthen,

Please provide me a copy of the video cd/dvd that Walmart's Frontino handed
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
17 of 19
your two Officers, Kameron Crawford and Braunworth when they were
escorting the suspect from the interrogation room in RMC 11 CR 22176. I
don't care if you think the tape/disc is not probative. I want it. Plus I want all
the dispatch tapes, especially where Kameron is calling in the suspect's
driver's license (which he testified the suspect refused to give him, but darn
it, its right there on the interrogation room footage, Kameron being givent he
driver's license card. Then the walmart guy Frontino testifies there was not
footage other than the interrogation room footage, yet he clearly hands the
two RSIC officers a cd/dvd when there are leaving the room. I am still
bothered that Sargent Avansino stonewalled me on the discovery for a whole
month following the arrest.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
<robertsp@reno.gov>
Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2011 04:05:27 -0800

DID CONTAIN A FriggING SECOND OF VIDEO SHOWING ANY OF
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
18 of 19

AND FILE MY MOTIONS.

preceding 30 minutes in the hallway in front of the court room, like a group
of 3 buddies who hang out all the time, except, 2 get paid by you, and one
gets paid by Wal-Mart, who pay the people who pay you. Then all three of
them wait around the hear the verdict at 8 pm hours after Frontino and
Crawford finished testifying. Maybe the don't realize Judge Howard wasn't
ruling on the Appeal, the Rule 59, 60 motions, Motion for Reconsideration,
defamation, wrongful arrest, false imprisonment lawsuits, etc. Fix it now
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
19 of 19
while you can. Wait till I get the video from Walmart that Frontino is hiding
from you, and don't you just want to know if some "other" audio or
video exists of the interrogation.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 10:01 PM
1 of 57
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=dd...
motion for continuance

Sent: Fri 11/11/11 1:40 AM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov
Dear Counselor Roberts,

I believe you are the prosecutor for the case against me, State v. Coughlin,
which I believe is still set for trial on November 14th, I think at 1pm. I am
not totally sure that there is a duty to serve you on such a thing, but I filed a
Motion for Continuance and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel
sometime within about the last 10 days, I would say. I believe I attempted to
copy you on it, but have recently been evicted and its been a very difficult
time in terms of coordinating paperwork, etc., etc. I apologize for any
inconvenience this may have cause you. I am unsure of whether the
November 14th trial is still set to take place. I believe fairness dictates that it
be continued to a later date. I have request counsel but have yet to receive
any, or wait, I was denied a request to receive counsel because Judge Howard
said there is not a 6th amendment right to counsel where, even though jail
time is technically a possibility, the state does not anticipate seeking jail
time...or something like that, however, I found some cases that say I should
still get counsel appointed, especially where I show I am indigent, and I
believe I qualify as indigent rather easily. Can and would you agree to a
continuance? I believe I tried to contact about this prior to filing my Request
for a Continuance. I maintain my innocence in this case and feel any sort of
conviction, especially one involving any sort of theft based charge, would
work a terrible injustice and greatly damage my reputation and employment
prospects. I want a jury trial, too.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
2 of 57

privilege.
RE: motion for continuance

Sent: Wed 11/16/11 3:35 PM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov
Ms. Roberts,
Thanks for your reply. Please ascertain from Walmart whether any Walmart
employees had, previous to this incident, made any threats respecting
maliciously having the accused banned from Walmart's incident to a
disagreement over Walmart staff and managers curious practice of
"forgetting" their return policy, despite some individuals having worked there
over 10 years....Further, I believe it relevant and part of your duty to provide
exculpatory information to ascertain whether the RSIC police officer made
statements wherein he attempted to coerce a consent to an impermissible
search and further buttressed his probable cause finding to conduct a search
incident to arrest, expressly, in words, to the accused, upon the accused's
failure to consent to such a search.
Please provide a list of any witnesses you intend to call at trial, including a
summation of the matters the will testify to, in addition to producing a copy
or making available for reproduction any documentation, audio, video, or
other materials intended to be used in any way at trial.
Thank You,
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
3 of 57

Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:36:45 -0800
From: robertsp@reno.gov
Subject: Re: motion for continuance
Mr. Coughlin, we were closed on Friday and I have just read your email. If you have not received confirmation
from the Court that your trial date has been continued, you will need to appear this afternoon at 1:00 pm in
Courtroom B of the Reno Municipal Court. We can discuss your case further at that time and if we are unable to
resolve the case, you can ask the Court again for a continuance and I won't object. However, it is the Court's
decision to grant your motion to continue.
It is also the Court's decision whether to appoint you a legal defender. I do not plan to ask for jail time, so the
Court is not required to appoint you an attorney. In addition, you have no right to a jury trial in a misdemeanor
case.
I hope your housing situation improves. See you this afternoon. Pam Roberts, Deputy City Attorney.

To: <robertsp@reno.gov>
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 01:40:53 -0800
Subject: motion for continuance

sometime within about the last 10 days, I would say. I believe I attempted
to copy you on it, but have recently been evicted and its been a very
difficult time in terms of coordinating paperwork, etc., etc. I apologize for
any inconvenience this may have cause you. I am unsure of whether the
November 14th trial is still set to take place. I believe fairness dictates that
it be continued to a later date. I have request counsel but have yet to receive
any, or wait, I was denied a request to receive counsel because Judge
Howard said there is not a 6th amendment right to counsel where, even
though jail time is technically a possibility, the state does not anticipate
seeking jail time...or something like that, however, I found some cases that
say I should still get counsel appointed, especially where I show I am
indigent, and I believe I qualify as indigent rather easily. Can and would
you agree to a continuance? I believe I tried to contact about this prior to
filing my Request for a Continuance. I maintain my innocence in this case
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
4 of 57
and feel any sort of conviction, especially one involving any sort of theft
based charge, would work a terrible injustice and greatly damage my
reputation and employment prospects. I want a jury trial, too.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118

Sent: Wed 11/16/11 5:30 PM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov
Thanks Ms. Roberts,

Can you tell me who the three witnesses are that showed up on November
14th, 2011 for trial at 1pm? I did obtain a copy of the "discovery" about the
second day it was made available to me from your office in person. At that
time, no video evidence was made available to me. Is there now some video
or audio recording to which I may be provided access? Would you mind just
emailing me the names of the intended witnesses. Do you believe you do not
have a duty to make a reasonably diligent inquiry of either Walmart or RSIC
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
do assess the validity of the matters mentioned in my last email, ie the

retaliatory motive vis a vis Walmart and or the impermissible search/ 42 USC
Sec 1983 police misconduct of the RSIC officers?
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Licensed in Nevada
privilege.
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 17:12:21 -0800

Subject: RE: motion for continuance
Mr. Coughlin, you should have already received a notice regarding the availability of discovery and request for
reciprocal discovery. You just need to call ahead at 334-2050 and arrange to pick it up. You are entitled to
copies of all the reports and witness statements and video we may have on this case. Since I am not calling any
additional witnesses that are not already mentioned in the reports/statements, I am not obligated to send you
an additional list of witnesses. I am also not obligated to do any further investigation or interviews. Pam
Roberts.
5 of 57
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
6 of 57

Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:35:48 -0800
Ms. Roberts,
Thanks for your reply. Please ascertain from Walmart whether any Walmart
employees had, previous to this incident, made any threats respecting
maliciously having the accused banned from Walmart's incident to a
disagreement over Walmart staff and managers curious practice of
"forgetting" their return policy, despite some individuals having worked
there over 10 years....Further, I believe it relevant and part of your duty to
provide exculpatory information to ascertain whether the RSIC police
officer made statements wherein he attempted to coerce a consent to an
impermissible search and further buttressed his probable cause finding to
conduct a search incident to arrest, expressly, in words, to the accused, upon
the accused's failure to consent to such a search.
summation of the matters the will testify to, in addition to producing a copy
or making available for reproduction any documentation, audio, video, or
other materials intended to be used in any way at trial.
Thank You,
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:36:45 -0800

Mr. Coughlin, we were closed on Friday and I have just read your email. If you have not received
confirmation from the Court that your trial date has been continued, you will need to appear this afternoon at
1:00 pm in Courtroom B of the Reno Municipal Court. We can discuss your case further at that time and if we
are unable to resolve the case, you can ask the Court again for a continuance and I won't object. However, it
is the Court's decision to grant your motion to continue.
It is also the Court's decision whether to appoint you a legal defender. I do not plan to ask for jail time, so
the Court is not required to appoint you an attorney. In addition, you have no right to a jury trial in
a misdemeanor case.
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
7 of 57

Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 01:40:53 -0800

not totally sure that there is a duty to serve you on such a thing, but I filed
a Motion for Continuance and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel
November 14th trial is still set to take place. I believe fairness dictates
that it be continued to a later date. I have request counsel but have yet to
receive any, or wait, I was denied a request to receive counsel because
Judge Howard said there is not a 6th amendment right to counsel where,
even though jail time is technically a possibility, the state does not
anticipate seeking jail time...or something like that, however, I found some
cases that say I should still get counsel appointed, especially where I show
I am indigent, and I believe I qualify as indigent rather easily. Can and
would you agree to a continuance? I believe I tried to contact about this
prior to filing my Request for a Continuance. I maintain my innocence in
this case and feel any sort of conviction, especially one involving any sort
of theft based charge, would work a terrible injustice and greatly damage
my reputation and employment prospects. I want a jury trial, too.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act,
18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you
are not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
8 of 57

that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action
based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the
named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from
disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure,
copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information
is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s),
please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form
immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work

Sent: Thu 11/17/11 3:37 PM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov
Dear Ms. Roberts,

I do not mean to suggest you do not know what your duty it. Believe me, I am well aware that you could mop
up the court room with a neophyte attorney such as myself. I was merely hoping to get some direction from you
regarding trial practice approaches in general.
Sincerely,
Zach

Sent: Mon 11/21/11 1:05 PM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov
Dear Ms. Roberts,

I wish to obtain a copy of the video and will go the your office's lobby
shortly hoping to be provided one. Please respond to me regarding my
request from a continuance.
Sincerely,
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
9 of 57

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Licensed in Nevada
privilege.
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 07:40:44 -0800

CC: colterp@reno.gov
Mr. Coughlin, the three witnesses who were there at the first trial date include: Thomas Frontino (Walmart
employee) and Officers Crawford and Braunworth from the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police. I obtained the
video at the first trial date from the Walmart employee and it is available for you to view or get a copy. You
may want to view it at the City Attorney's Office as the CD doesn't seem to work on everyone's computer. Penie
Colter will be able to assist you. I am not clear on what you think my duty is, but I know what my duty is and I
will not debate it via email. Pam Roberts, Deputy City Attorney.
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 17:30:36 -0800
Thanks Ms. Roberts,

14th, 2011 for trial at 1pm? I did obtain a copy of the "discovery" about the
second day it was made available to me from your office in person. At that
time, no video evidence was made available to me. Is there now some
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
10 of 57
video or audio recording to which I may be provided access? Would you

mind just emailing me the names of the intended witnesses. Do you believe
you do not have a duty to make a reasonably diligent inquiry of either
Walmart or RSIC do assess the validity of the matters mentioned in my last
email, ie the retaliatory motive vis a vis Walmart and or the impermissible
search/ 42 USC Sec 1983 police misconduct of the RSIC officers?
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Licensed in Nevada
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 17:12:21 -0800

Mr. Coughlin, you should have already received a notice regarding the availability of discovery and request for
reciprocal discovery. You just need to call ahead at 334-2050 and arrange to pick it up. You are entitled to
copies of all the reports and witness statements and video we may have on this case. Since I am not calling
any additional witnesses that are not already mentioned in the reports/statements, I am not obligated to send
you an additional list of witnesses. I am also not obligated to do any further investigation or interviews. Pam
Roberts.
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
11 of 57

Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:35:48 -0800
Ms. Roberts,
Thanks for your reply. Please ascertain from Walmart whether any
Walmart employees had, previous to this incident, made any threats
respecting maliciously having the accused banned from Walmart's incident
to a disagreement over Walmart staff and managers curious practice of
"forgetting" their return policy, despite some individuals having worked
there over 10 years....Further, I believe it relevant and part of your duty to
provide exculpatory information to ascertain whether the RSIC police
officer made statements wherein he attempted to coerce a consent to an
impermissible search and further buttressed his probable cause finding to
conduct a search incident to arrest, expressly, in words, to the accused,
upon the accused's failure to consent to such a search.
summation of the matters the will testify to, in addition to producing a
copy or making available for reproduction any documentation, audio,
video, or other materials intended to be used in any way at trial.
Thank You,
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:36:45 -0800

confirmation from the Court that your trial date has been continued, you will need to appear this afternoon
at 1:00 pm in Courtroom B of the Reno Municipal Court. We can discuss your case further at that time and
if we are unable to resolve the case, you can ask the Court again for a continuance and I won't object.
However, it is the Court's decision to grant your motion to continue.
It is also the Court's decision whether to appoint you a legal defender. I do not plan to ask for jail time, so
the Court is not required to appoint you an attorney. In addition, you have no right to a jury trial in
a misdemeanor case.
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
12 of 57


Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 01:40:53 -0800

I believe you are the prosecutor for the case against me, State v.
Coughlin, which I believe is still set for trial on November 14th, I think
at 1pm. I am not totally sure that there is a duty to serve you on such a
thing, but I filed a Motion for Continuance and a Motion for
Appointment of Counsel sometime within about the last 10 days, I would
say. I believe I attempted to copy you on it, but have recently been
evicted and its been a very difficult time in terms of coordinating
paperwork, etc., etc. I apologize for any inconvenience this may have
cause you. I am unsure of whether the November 14th trial is still set to
take place. I believe fairness dictates that it be continued to a later date.
I have request counsel but have yet to receive any, or wait, I was denied a
request to receive counsel because Judge Howard said there is not a 6th
amendment right to counsel where, even though jail time is technically a
possibility, the state does not anticipate seeking jail time...or something
like that, however, I found some cases that say I should still get counsel
appointed, especially where I show I am indigent, and I believe I qualify
as indigent rather easily. Can and would you agree to a continuance? I
believe I tried to contact about this prior to filing my Request for a
Continuance. I maintain my innocence in this case and feel any sort of
conviction, especially one involving any sort of theft based charge,
would work a terrible injustice and greatly damage my reputation and
employment prospects. I want a jury trial, too.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
13 of 57
18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If
you are not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby
notified that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of
any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended
only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or
exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that
any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents
of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the
named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies
in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any
attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
temporary address change and instruction to pursue a continuance

Sent: Mon 11/21/11 4:06 PM
To:
howardk@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov
Dear Judge Howard Deputy City Attorney Roberts,

I have been evicted and perhaps subject to an illegal lockout and unlawful
rent distraint by an attorney representing my Beverly Hills High School
graduate California Neurosurgeon landlord, who has spent approx $30,000 in
attorneys fees pursuing a summary eviction, and whose attorney is
withholding my state issued indentification, wallet, and all materials
necessary to my law practice all in an unlawful rent distraint prohibited by
NRS 40.460 and 40.520. I am pursuing a continuance of the upcoming
hearing/trial, I cannot even access when that hearing is. I have informed
opposing counsel Roberts of some of the issues which will require extensive
discovery, a jury trial, and more time to afford myself a legitimate
opportunity to defend this case. I have not been served any Order responding
to my request for appointment of counsel, as I believe it is required even if
the State does not "intend" to seek jail time, where any incarceration is a
possibility, the Sixth Amendment guarantees it.
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
14 of 57
Please note that my temporary address for now is:

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
c/o Silver Dollar Motel
817 N. Virginia St., Unit # 2
Reno, NV 89501
The opposing counsel in the summary eviction matter is withholding my
phone as well and refusing to allow me to access any mail that may remain at
the property from those times when the USPS was processing my official
Change of Address. Email is the best way to get in contact with me during
this transition period.
For instance, I am unware whether my Motion for Appointment of Counsel
was granted or not. I called Judge Howard's assistant and requested that she
email me the docket in this case and any pleadings or orders filed, including
any order that may have stemmed form any of my previous motions, as I am
not sure how those were ruled on. I believe my internet based fax service
will allow me to receive those materials at my number 949 667 7402, though
I would prefer email, but I know many governmental entities prefer to fax
such items. I am requesting a jury trial, a substantial continuance, and the
appointment of counsel. I object to the RMC's practice of refusing to tell
litigants who the 4 "house" appointed defenders are upon questioning.
Further, it has become clear that some of these "former prosecutors" who are
now the gang of four "house" defenders, do not even announce to accused
arraignees that they are, in fact, the defender or an attorney or that they may
be representing the arraignees. I am hereby filing a motion in limine
regarding any materials or information gleaned from the unlawful search by
the RSIC Officer, who clearly announced that they would base their probable
cause to arrest and conduct a search incident to arrest upon any failure to
consent to a search by the accused. Further, the alleged conduct did not
occur in the Officer's presence, and I believe there exists authority preventing
a minor misdemeanor arrest and transport under those circumstances.
Additionally, more time is needed to conduct discovery in this matter,
especially in light of allegations that Walmart had previously threatened
individuals, including, perhaps, the accused, with retaliatory action, including
illicit abuse of process, for the purported attempts by someone to have the
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
15 of 57
Walmart Return Policy enforced, and to hold accountable all Walmart

employees and managers, some of whom have over a decade experience in
their positions, who curiously "forget" they Return Policy Walmart holds out
to the public when it is convenient to do so, the same Return Policy that
Walmart used to drive out of business so many competitors. Further, this
case is likely to get extremely complicated given the apparent conflict of
interest stemming from the fact that the Walmart in question is on land
owned by the RSIC, which may own or employ the RSIC police, and which
is rented or owned in part by Walmart.
I know Opposing Counsel Roberts may appreciate a continuance as well and
the opportunity it would afford her to fulfill her NRCP 11 duty and other
prosecutorial duties to conduct a reasonably diligent inquiry into these
matters.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
privilege.

Sent: Mon 11/21/11 7:18 PM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
Ms. Roberts, the opposing attorney's unlawful rent distraint is preventing me from providing all the discovery I
would like to provide you with or ascertain the need to do, and further is preventing me from having access to
the materials and information I need to litigate this case.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Licensed in Nevada
privilege.
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:36:45 -0800

Mr. Coughlin, we were closed on Friday and I have just read your email. If you have not received confirmation
from the Court that your trial date has been continued, you will need to appear this afternoon at 1:00 pm in
Courtroom B of the Reno Municipal Court. We can discuss your case further at that time and if we are unable to
resolve the case, you can ask the Court again for a continuance and I won't object. However, it is the Court's
decision to grant your motion to continue.
It is also the Court's decision whether to appoint you a legal defender. I do not plan to ask for jail time, so the
Court is not required to appoint you an attorney. In addition, you have no right to a jury trial in a misdemeanor
case.
-----Original Message-----
16 of 57
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
17 of 57

From: Zach Coughlin <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 01:40:53 -0800

November 14th trial is still set to take place. I believe fairness dictates that
it be continued to a later date. I have request counsel but have yet to receive
any, or wait, I was denied a request to receive counsel because Judge
Howard said there is not a 6th amendment right to counsel where, even
though jail time is technically a possibility, the state does not anticipate
seeking jail time...or something like that, however, I found some cases that
say I should still get counsel appointed, especially where I show I am
indigent, and I believe I qualify as indigent rather easily. Can and would
you agree to a continuance? I believe I tried to contact about this prior to
filing my Request for a Continuance. I maintain my innocence in this case
and feel any sort of conviction, especially one involving any sort of theft
based charge, would work a terrible injustice and greatly damage my
reputation and employment prospects. I want a jury trial, too.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
18 of 57

verint user agreement

Sent: Mon 11/21/11 8:40 PM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov
Hi Ms. Roberts,
Sorry, don't mean to be a pain, but I DON'T AGREE to this Verint software
policy...its calls for allowign them to inspect my office and paying them for
their inspection fees and all this other stuff that is so unduly oppressive. Its
just an AVI file, its as though they disable it just for the purpose of preventing
you from watching the movie unless you agree to their oppressive, onerous,
contract terms, and how does this benefit taxpayers? Authentication issues
can be addressed through the traditional means, I don't see the value add.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Licensed in Nevada
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
19 of 57

privilege.

Sent: Tue 11/29/11 1:33 PM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov
Dear Ms. Roberts,

The opposing attorney in the Summary Eviction Proceeding against me in my home law office/business is
asserting a lien against my office, law practice files, and materials necessary to discovery production and
defending the case that you are the prosecutor on. I believe a continuance is absolutely necessary in the
interests of justice. Additionaly, you have been informed that Walmart previous to the arrest in this matter
became upset at the accused and made threats of malicious prosecution and abuse of process incident to the
accused questioning various Wal-mart personnel and managers about Wal-Marts curious practice of remixing
and forgetting the Return Policy stated in writing at Walmart.com (and expressly made applicable to purchases
made in Wal-Mart stores). A manager named "Ellis", though who may have identified himself as "John" and a
Loss prevention associate at the West 7th Street Wal-Mart in Reno allegedly told the accused that they would
have him banned from all Wal-Marts in retaliation for the accused seeking to do something to which he was
legally entitled to do, return and item at a Wal-Mart stores in accordance with Wal-Mart's stated and written
Return Policy. There are other retaliatory aspects to the conducts and statements made by both Wal-Mart and
RSIC personnel in this case.
Additionally, the video "evidence" that you provided is shameful. It consists of two short clips in some Wal-Mart
back room where 5-6 people, including 2 RSIC officers acting under color of state law on land their employer
owns and leases to Wal-Mart attempt to coerce not only a confession, but a consent to search. There is no audio
of the video, at least not the video you provided, that is. Where is the video of the alleged acts? How you can
maintain a case such as this stemming from the accused acts in a store like Wal-Mart, that has hundreds of
cameras and only provide video from some backroom that proves nothing and, in the words of "Jeannie" the
contact person at your office "doesn't show anything", I am not sure, and whether that is violative of your duties
as a prosecutor, Nifong, NRCP 11 (see Schumacher's application of that civil rule to the DA) is not clear. You
have been informed that the RSIC officer committed police misconduct and yet you brazenly announce in writing
that you do not intend to follow up on that, nor do you feel compelled to.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
20 of 57

privilege.
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 07:59:37 -0800

Dear Mr. Coughlin, you will need to file a motion to continue in compliance with Reno Municipal Court
procedures. As I have stated in a previous email, I do not object to your motion to continue, however, it is up
to the Judge whether or not he will grant your motion. Regarding the video which I obtained at your previous
court date, I have told you that you can come to our office and view the video. If you still want a copy, I
believe our staff will be able to make one for you. NRS 174.235 does not require me to do more than what I
have already done. We have provided you with the reports we have, listed the witnesses we will call and made
the video available to you. Pam Roberts, Deputy City Attorney.
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 13:05:28 -0800
Dear Ms. Roberts,

I wish to obtain a copy of the video and will go the your office's lobby
shortly hoping to be provided one. Please respond to me regarding my
request from a continuance.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

121 River Rock St.
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
21 of 57

Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Licensed in Nevada
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 07:40:44 -0800

CC: colterp@reno.gov
Mr. Coughlin, the three witnesses who were there at the first trial date include: Thomas Frontino (Walmart
employee) and Officers Crawford and Braunworth from the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police. I obtained the
video at the first trial date from the Walmart employee and it is available for you to view or get a copy. You
may want to view it at the City Attorney's Office as the CD doesn't seem to work on everyone's computer.
Penie Colter will be able to assist you. I am not clear on what you think my duty is, but I know what my duty
is and I will not debate it via email. Pam Roberts, Deputy City Attorney.
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 17:30:36 -0800
Thanks Ms. Roberts,

14th, 2011 for trial at 1pm? I did obtain a copy of the "discovery" about
the second day it was made available to me from your office in person. At
that time, no video evidence was made available to me. Is there now some
video or audio recording to which I may be provided access? Would you
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
22 of 57
mind just emailing me the names of the intended witnesses. Do you

believe you do not have a duty to make a reasonably diligent inquiry of
either Walmart or RSIC do assess the validity of the matters mentioned in
my last email, ie the retaliatory motive vis a vis Walmart and or the
impermissible search/ 42 USC Sec 1983 police misconduct of the RSIC
officers?
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Licensed in Nevada
18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you
are not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified
that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action
based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the
named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from
disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure,
copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information
is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s),
please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form
immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 17:12:21 -0800

Mr. Coughlin, you should have already received a notice regarding the availability of discovery and request
for reciprocal discovery. You just need to call ahead at 334-2050 and arrange to pick it up. You are entitled
to copies of all the reports and witness statements and video we may have on this case. Since I am not
calling any additional witnesses that are not already mentioned in the reports/statements, I am not
obligated to send you an additional list of witnesses. I am also not obligated to do any further investigation
or interviews. Pam Roberts.
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
23 of 57

Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:35:48 -0800
Ms. Roberts,
Thanks for your reply. Please ascertain from Walmart whether any
Walmart employees had, previous to this incident, made any threats
respecting maliciously having the accused banned from Walmart's
incident to a disagreement over Walmart staff and managers curious
practice of "forgetting" their return policy, despite some individuals
having worked there over 10 years....Further, I believe it relevant and
part of your duty to provide exculpatory information to ascertain whether
the RSIC police officer made statements wherein he attempted to coerce
a consent to an impermissible search and further buttressed his probable
cause finding to conduct a search incident to arrest, expressly, in words,
to the accused, upon the accused's failure to consent to such a search.
Please provide a list of any witnesses you intend to call at trial, including
a summation of the matters the will testify to, in addition to producing a
copy or making available for reproduction any documentation, audio,
video, or other materials intended to be used in any way at trial.
Thank You,
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:36:45 -0800

confirmation from the Court that your trial date has been continued, you will need to appear this
afternoon at 1:00 pm in Courtroom B of the Reno Municipal Court. We can discuss your case further at
that time and if we are unable to resolve the case, you can ask the Court again for a continuance and I
won't object. However, it is the Court's decision to grant your motion to continue.
It is also the Court's decision whether to appoint you a legal defender. I do not plan to ask for jail time,
so the Court is not required to appoint you an attorney. In addition, you have no right to a jury trial in
a misdemeanor case.
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
24 of 57


Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 01:40:53 -0800

I believe you are the prosecutor for the case against me, State v.
Coughlin, which I believe is still set for trial on November 14th, I think
at 1pm. I am not totally sure that there is a duty to serve you on such a
thing, but I filed a Motion for Continuance and a Motion for
Appointment of Counsel sometime within about the last 10 days, I
would say. I believe I attempted to copy you on it, but have recently
been evicted and its been a very difficult time in terms of coordinating
paperwork, etc., etc. I apologize for any inconvenience this may have
cause you. I am unsure of whether the November 14th trial is still set to
take place. I believe fairness dictates that it be continued to a later
date. I have request counsel but have yet to receive any, or wait, I was
denied a request to receive counsel because Judge Howard said there is
not a 6th amendment right to counsel where, even though jail time is
technically a possibility, the state does not anticipate seeking jail
time...or something like that, however, I found some cases that say I
should still get counsel appointed, especially where I show I am
indigent, and I believe I qualify as indigent rather easily. Can and
would you agree to a continuance? I believe I tried to contact about this
prior to filing my Request for a Continuance. I maintain my innocence
in this case and feel any sort of conviction, especially one involving any
sort of theft based charge, would work a terrible injustice and greatly
damage my reputation and employment prospects. I want a jury trial,
too.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
25 of 57

775 338 8118
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy
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FW: temporary address change and instruction to pursue a continuance

Sent: Tue 11/29/11 3:14 PM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
1 attachment
Motion for Continuance to Reno City Atty Roberts RMC.pdf (448.9 KB)
Ms. Roberts and RMC Records Supervisor Donna,

I am forwarding this apology I sent to Judge Howard in response to his remonstration responding to my email to
him, in an abundance of caution to avoid ex parte communications with the court, outside your presence. Please
also find attach e a NRCP Rule 11 safe harbor filing ready sanctions motions I am hereby serving on you,
invoking the 21 day safe harbor, with a reservation that any misconduct you commit in the court's presence may
be punished sua sponte or subject to contemporaneous sanctions requests, particular with regard to you blase
dismissal of the official misdoncut, malicious prosecution, 42 USC Sec 1983 deprivations of civil rights under
color of state law and all those other things your office and Hartshorn, et all have been sued for over the years.
Please find attached my Motion for Continuance, being filed by fascimile today with the RMC.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
26 of 57

privilege.
To: howardk@reno.gov
Subject: RE: temporary address change and instruction to pursue a continuance
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 17:22:45 -0800
Dear Judge Howard,

My apologies Your Honor. I have had an unlawful rent distraint applied to all
my office equipment and the files necessary to defend this case and produce
motions, incident to a summary eviction stemming from a lease that was at
least in part commercial, had a rent escrow deposit forced upon me in
violation of Nevada Law, had all my computers printers, everything subject
to the distraint. I have a netbook it won't accept a printer and on and on. I
apologize. I do note that the RMC rules allow for filing by facsimile, though
I gather not to the fax number listed for yoru chambers at www.nvbar.org.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin,
6:49 mark
Sent: Sun 12/04/11 3:37 AM
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
27 of 57

To:
robertsp@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; kadlicj@ci.reno.nv.us
I want you to move for a Rule 59 Motion to Set Aside or some other motion
to have the Judgment Set Aside. Your cop witness clearly had a driver's
license produced to him at the 6:49 mark of YOUR OWN DAMN VIDEO!
the prosecutorial codes you are held to and NRCP 11. Furher, what are you
going to say when the UPC from the alleged receipt appears on the purchased
receipt, in combination with Frontino's adamant assertion that they wouldn't,
in combination with the same from Crawford, in combination with Frontino
cashier, in combination with the "same UPC, hit the quanity number" practice
common at Walmart? Further, your own witness admitted on tape at the trial
that "he didn't have enough EVIDENCE to issue a citation so he arrested and
did a search incident to arrest" before you and Judge Howard could jump in
and cut him off. That's gametime. I will avalanche you with motion and
lawsuits if you don't fix this defamation you funded and supported, what with
you little 30 minutes witness coaching session that kept all the other litigants
waiting from 1:00 to 1:30 while you called in Frontino, Crawford, and
Braunworth. Wait till I get the video from Walmart that Frontino is hiding
from you, and don't you just want to know if some audio exists of the
interrogation.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
28 of 57

privilege.
FW: your cop lying, see your video drivers license produce ap overview at
6:49 mark
Sent: Sun 12/04/11 3:45 AM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; kadlicj@ci.reno.nv.us
"information" to issue a citation, and how, because they didn't, they had to
conduct a search incident to arrest, yet YOUR OWN DAMN VIDEO, THAT
YOU EFFING PRODUCED! SHOWS THE ACCUSED HANDING THEM
A DRIVERS LICENSE AND THEM CALLING IT IN TO CHECK FOR
PRIORS (THAT WILL SHOW UP IN DISPATCH REPORTS AND OTHER
DEFAMED ME AND YOU SPONSORED IT, CULTIVATED IT, AND
SMUGLY TALK SMACK TO ME IN COURT ABOUT MY NEEDING TO
USE THE BATHROOM AND HOW YOU HAVE "HAD TWO KIDS AND
CAN HOLD MY BLADDER" GENDER SEXUAL HARRASSMENT. I
GET EVICTED (WRONGLY, COMMERCIAL LEASES PRECLUDE
SUMMARY EVICTION WHERE NO CAUSE EVICTION NOTICES ARE
ALL THAT IS SERVED) BY THE RICHARD G. HILL GANGBANG
EXPRESS, WHILE BEING ASSAULTED BY NEVADA COURT
SERVICES, WHICH LISTS MY COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY LEW
TAITEL AS "ASSOCIATED WITH" ON THE NEVADA COURT
SERVICES WEB SITE, LEW AGREES TO A CONTINUANCE OF THE
TRESPASS TRIAL BECAUSE RICHARD HILL NEEDS TO GO ON A
VACATION, BUT I CAN'T GET A FUCKING CONTINUANCE WHERE
RICHARD HILL IS APPLYING AN UNLAWFUL RENT DISTRAINT TO
MY EVIDENCE TO DEFEND AGAINST THIS BULLSHIT FUCKING
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
29 of 57
WALMART FIASCO! THEN AFTER TAITEL AGRESS TO A

CONTINUANCE, ONLY THEN AFTER REVIEWING MY PERSONAL
FILE, HE FIGURES OUT I AM SUING HIM, OR AT LEAST NEVADA
COURTS SERVICES. SOMEBODY PUT A NICE COLLECTION OF
VIDEOS UP ON YOUTUBE ABOUT IT, SOME CRAZY
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKER. YOU OUGHT TO BE ASHAMED.
I CAN GIVE YOU UNTIL TUESDAY, AFTER THAT, I HAVE TO MAKE
MY MOVES AND FILE MY MOTIONS.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
To: robertsp@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; kadlicj@ci.reno.nv.us
Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2011 03:37:24 -0800
I want you to move for a Rule 59 Motion to Set Aside or some other motion
to have the Judgment Set Aside. Your cop witness clearly had a driver's
license produced to him at the 6:49 mark of YOUR OWN DAMN VIDEO!
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
30 of 57
the prosecutorial codes you are held to and NRCP 11. Furher, what are you
going to say when the UPC from the alleged receipt appears on the purchased
receipt, in combination with Frontino's adamant assertion that they wouldn't,
in combination with the same from Crawford, in combination with Frontino
cashier, in combination with the "same UPC, hit the quanity number" practice
common at Walmart? Further, your own witness admitted on tape at the trial
that "he didn't have enough EVIDENCE to issue a citation so he arrested and
did a search incident to arrest" before you and Judge Howard could jump in
and cut him off. That's gametime. I will avalanche you with motion and
lawsuits if you don't fix this defamation you funded and supported, what with
you little 30 minutes witness coaching session that kept all the other litigants
waiting from 1:00 to 1:30 while you called in Frontino, Crawford, and
Braunworth. Wait till I get the video from Walmart that Frontino is hiding
from you, and don't you just want to know if some audio exists of the
interrogation.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
31 of 57

privilege.
6:49 mark
Sent: Sun 12/04/11 4:05 AM
To:
lcooley@rsic.org; voldenburg@rsic.org; rariwite@rsic.org; police@rsic.org; robertsp@reno.gov

"information" (their definition included personally identifiable information to
identify the accused sufficiently to issue a citation, A CURRENT NEVADA'S
DRIVERS LICENSE WOULD DO JUST FINE ON THAT ACCOUNT) to
issue a citation, and how, because they didn't, they had to conduct a search
incident to arrest, yet YOUR OWN DAMN VIDEO (OR RATHER,
WALMART'S, BUT ITS HARD TO SEE WHERE YOU GUYS END AND
WALMART BEGINS), THAT YOU EFFING PRODUCED (OR RATHER
THE RENO CITY ATTORNEY PRODUCED AFTER THE BOYS AT
WALMART "COMPILED" VIDEO, WHICH CURIOUSLY DID CONTAIN
A FUCKING SECOND OF VIDEO SHOWING ANY OF THE ALLEGED
CONCEALING OR CONSUMING THE ITEMS IN QUESTION! SHOWS
THE ACCUSED HANDING THEM A DRIVERS LICENSE AND THEM
CALLING IT IN TO CHECK FOR PRIORS (THAT WILL SHOW UP IN
DISPATCH REPORTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION). THESE
KEYSTONE COP EFFUPS HAVE DEFAMED ME AND YOU
SPONSORED IT, CULTIVATED IT.
I CAN GIVE YOU UNTIL TUESDAY TO MAKE A STRONG EFFORT TO
CORRECT THIS, AFTER THAT, I HAVE TO MAKE MY MOVES AND
FILE MY MOTIONS. JUDGE VAN WALRAVEN WOULD BE
THE OFFICERS ARE KAMERON CRAWFORD AND BRAUNWORTH, WHO CAME ACROSS A
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
32 of 57

FAR MORE COGNITIVELY IMPAIRED IN COURT THAN HE DID IN PERSON, TO AN EXTENT
THAT WOULD SUGGEST HE WAS DISHONORING THE LEGAL PROCESS BY HIS

say when the UPC from the alleged receipt appears on the purchased receipt,
in combination with Frontino's adamant assertion that they wouldn't, in
combination with the same from Crawford, in combination with Frontino
cashier, in combination with the "same UPC, hit the quantity number"
practice common at Walmart? Further, your Officer Crawford, as a witness,
admitted on tape at the trial that "he didn't have enough EVIDENCE to issue
a citation so he arrested and did a search incident to arrest" to get more
evidence before Reno City Attorney Roberts and Judge Howard could jump
in and cut him off. That's gametime. Frontino, Crawford, and Braunworth,
sat around joking like goofy frat boys the preceeding 30 minutes in the
hallway in front of the court room, like a group of 3 buddies who hang out all
the time, except, 2 get paid by you, and one gets paid by Wal-Mart, who pay
the people who pay you. Then all three of them wait around the hear the
verdict at 8 pm hours after Frontino and Crawford finished testifying.
Maybe the don't realize Judge Howard wasn't ruling on the Appeal, the Rule
59, 60 motions, Motion for Reconsideration, defamation, wrongful arrest,
false imprisonment lawsuits, etc. Fix it now while you can. Wait till I get the
video from Walmart that Frontino is hiding from you, and don't you just want
to know if some "other" audio or video exists of the interrogation.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
33 of 57
privilege.
discovery request;
Sent: Wed 12/07/11 1:16 AM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
Dear Ms. Roberts,

In the discovery you provided in this matter there is a fax from the RSIC to
you that has a fax heading for what appears to be "page 1" followed by pages
without that heading...then a heading with "page 4" etc... I want the entire
contents of anything provided by the RSIC and Walmart to you or anyone
connected with the Reno City Attorney or the Reno Municipal Court.
Further, I want all media provided by Walmart, and I question why you
needed 45 minutes with the three witness who testified at the November 30th,
2011 trial, from 1pm to 1:45pm. Additionally, you are hereby served a
NRCP 11 motion requiring you to correct the perjury you suborned in court
with respect to the patently contradictory testimony of Officer Crawford vis a
vis the video evidence you yourself provided in discovery.
Further, I spoke with Mr. Hazlett-Stevens shortly after the September 9, 2011
arrest in this matter demanding a copy of all documentation or discovery that
I had any right to. I was told I would not have any opportunity to review
such materials prior to the arraignment, which was not set for a full 30 days
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
34 of 57
out from the arrest. Do I not have a right to a copy of the pc sheet, arrest
report, and witness statements within 48 hours of the arrest? The fax to your
office from the RSIC is dated 9/12/2011, yet my written demands and
requests for such discovery and documentation were met with refusals to
provide such materials, and, in some case, claims that your office did not
even have such materials and would not get them until after the arraignment.
Further, I spoke with and provided written requests to RSIC Sargent
Avansino within 2 days after the arrest and he refused to provide the
materials, as did the Reno Municipal Court. Please alert the court to any
wrongdoing on your's or the Reno City Attorney or the RSIC part in this
regard in prejudicing my ability to defend my case by delaying the
production of essential discovery, then refusing to agree to a continuance at
trial, after earlier providing a written agreement to such a continuance.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
35 of 57
RE: your failure to propound discovery

Sent: Thu 12/08/11 3:44 PM
To:
hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov
Mr. Hazlett-Stevens,
We did definately talk on the phone regarding the matter to which I do not
have representation, the RSIC arrest case 11 DR 22176 2I for which Deputy
City Attorney Pam Roberts is the prosecutor. I was denied my Sixth
Amendment right to court appointed defense counsel in that matter, and
represented myself. As such, there is no rule precluded you from
communicating with me about 11 DR 22176 2I. You did speak with me
about that. I called you within a couple days of the September 9th, 2011
arrest in that matter describing my exigent desire to obtain a copy of the
discovery. I was transferred to you and we spoke at length about it, you
describing why you could not give it to me. Is it your contention that your
office or the State does not have a duty to provide the defendant a copy of
certain pieces of discovery within 48 hours of arrest?
Regarding the matter for which Mr. Puentes took the baton from Mr. Taitel, is
it clear to you how Mr. Taitel was somehow, apparently, able to assent to a
continuance, only to, apparently, find some need to pass the baton to Mr.
Puentes very, very shortly thereafter? Why did Mr. Taitel's status as attorney
of record change? Was it due to a conflict? Why didn't that conflict prevent
Mr. Taitel from abstaining from assenting to the continuance in the trespass
case, which was scheduled for trial December 13, 2011?
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
36 of 57

fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2011 07:34:25 -0800

From: Hazlett-StevensC@reno.gov
Subject: Re: your failure to propound discovery
Mr. Coughlin. You are represented by counsel and I cannot correspond with you. I have never correponded
with you, and your statement that you spoke with me is false. I have never spoken with you. You may have
your attorney, Roberto Puentes, contact me with any discovery issues or issues regarding the City's Motion to
Continue. Please do not correspond with me regarding this case in the future. As an attorney, you are fully
aware that I cannot communicate with a you as a represented party. Do not contact me without your counsel.
Thank you,
Chris
Christopher Hazlett-Stevens
Deputy City Attorney
City of Reno
Tel: 326-6628
Fax: 334-4226
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED
This e-mail message transmission and any documents, files or previous e-mail messages attached to it, are
confidential and are protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you are not the
intended recipient or a person responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that
any review, disclosure, copying, dissemination, distribution or use of any of the information contained in, or
attached to this e-mail transmission is STRICTLY PROHIBITED. If you have received this transmission in error,
please immediately notify us by forwarding this e-mail to the sender or by telephone at (775) 334-2050 and
then delete the message and its attachments.
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
37 of 57

To: <hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov>
Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2011 01:48:03 -0800
Subject: your failure to propound discovery
Dear Mr. Hazlett-Stevens,

I am writing to request a copy of any and all discovery, pleadings, documentation,
correspondences, or media in any way connected to the trespass case against me for which
Lew Taitel was apparently my court appointed attorney, but whom no longer is. Further, I
wish to be copied on everything past and present in any way related to this matter until
and after I procure another attorney. I did not agree to the continuance you sought, nor
was I informed you were seeking it. I find it particularly troubling that a continuance was
granted in the trespass case to the same man who is applying an unlawful rent distraint on
both my client files, personal property, AND THE EXCLUPATING EVIDENCE I NEED
TO DEFEND MYSELF IN THE PETIT LARCENY CASE FOR WHICH I DETAIL THE
COMPLAINTS I HAVE AGAINST YOU AND YOUR OFFICE'S HANDLING
BELOW. NO CONTINUANCE WAS GRANTED OR AGREED TO AT TRIAL BY
THE RMC OR MS. ROBERTS, PERHAPS SHE WAS TOO BUSY ALLEGEDLY
SUBORNING THE PERJURY OF RSIC OFFICER KAMERON CRAWFORD.
In the discovery your office provided in the petit larceny matter Ms. Roberts prosecuted
against me there is a fax from the RSIC to you that has a fax heading for what appears to
be "page 1" followed by pages without that heading...then a heading with "page 4" etc... I
want the entire contents of anything provided by the RSIC and Walmart to you or anyone
connected with the Reno City Attorney or the Reno Municipal Court. Further, I want all
media provided by Walmart, and I question why you needed 45 minutes with the three
witness who testified at the November 30th, 2011 trial, from 1pm to 1:45pm.
Additionally, you are hereby served a NRCP 11 motion requiring you to correct the
perjury you suborned in court with respect to the patently contradictory testimony of
Officer Crawford vis a vis the video evidence you yourself provided in discovery.
Further, I spoke with you, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens, shortly after the September 9, 2011 arrest
in this matter demanding a copy of all documentation or discovery that I had any right to.
I was told I would not have any opportunity to review such materials prior to the
arraignment, which was not set for a full 30 days out from the arrest. Do I not have a
right to a copy of the pc sheet, arrest report, and witness statements within 48 hours of the
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
38 of 57
arrest? The fax to your office from the RSIC is dated 9/12/2011, yet my written demands
and requests for such discovery and documentation were met with refusals to provide such
materials, and, in some case, claims that your office did not even have such materials and
would not get them until after the arraignment. Further, I spoke with and provided written
requests to RSIC Sargent Avansino within 2 days after the arrest and he refused to provide
the materials, as did the Reno Municipal Court. Please alert the court to any wrongdoing
on your's or the Reno City Attorney or the RSIC part in this regard in prejudicing my
ability to defend my case by delaying the production of essential discovery, then refusing
to agree to a continuance at trial, after earlier providing a written agreement to such a
continuance.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, y ou are hereby notified that
Here is service of the Motion for a New Trial, Set Aside, Va

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 9:52 PM
To:
hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
39 of 57
Is it about time for you to get that CD/DVD that Walmar'ts AP guy Faustino
handed the two Reno Sparks Indian Colony officers when they were leading
the suspect away in cuffs...not the video you gave me of sling blade
badgering the lawyer I got those two videos you gave me which just the
badgering in the interrogation room. I am talking about the cd/dvd that
Walmart's guy gave them as they were walking out....Doesn't it seem like you
really need to get that now, to stay on the right side of Nifong? You
remember Nifong, don't you. Walmart ap guy sit there on the stand, under
penalty of perjury and testify that no video was collected in any way related
to me or this case aside from the 2 interrogation room videos you provided
(with a highly suspect 14mb "codec" program required to view the
videos....can you indicate why that is necessary to watch a simple old .avi
file?).
why did you suborn the perjury of both the walmart guy and the officers
regarding no other video existing? I can't figure that one out. Ms. Roberts,
don't you practice in RMC quite a bit? Maybe I am confused, but doesn't the
RMC rules permit serving a government attorney such as yourself via email?
What do you have against email? It is economical for those of use who don't
have such public largesse to work with. Here is service of the Motion for a
New Trial, Set Aside, Vacate, etc., etc:
https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid=43084638f32f5f28&resid=43084638F32F5F28!1031&parid=root
Its only something like 1,000 pages.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
40 of 57

privilege.
Date: Mon,
FW: records request

Sent: Tue 12/13/11 4:02 PM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov
2 attachments
RECORD_REQUEST_FORM walmart RMC 11 CR 22176 IC 110627 trial cd and orders to RMC 12 8 11
signed.pdf (453.4 KB) , RECORD_REQUEST_FORM_2010[1] rmc trespass 11 13 11 records request 11 CR
22185 City of Reno v Coughlin signed.pdf (510.9 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
41 of 57

To: renomunirecords@reno.gov; fiskm@reno.gov
Subject: records request
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2011 16:02:02 -0800
fax number 949 667 7402
Dear Mr. Fisk,

I really need a copy of the audio of the Trial in 11 CR 22176 and a copy of
both the Contempt Order and the Guilty Verdict (Veronica said she would fax
one and that the RMC never sent or served me a paper copy beyond shoving
some papers in my fax when I was being handcuffed then taking them away
from me separately in a huff when I stated that I might like to know what it
was I was to sign or read it (or 6th Amendment, etc). However, I have
received no fax of those Orders as Veronica said she would send me
yesterday. She said it in an angry unprofessional tone and I am hereby
complaining in writing about that and Marshall Monte's angry threatening
tone and language to me at the arraingment of October 11, 2011. Please
place a copy of this in their personnel files and the record in both of my CR
RMC cases.
I was told by a RMC filing office counter clerk yesterday that I was not
allowed to get a copy of the audio of my 11 30, 2011 hearing before Judge
Howard, that I would only be able to get a transcript after using the one
transcriptionist the RMC approves of and after paying her a substantial
amount of money up front, but that ultimately, the audio would never be
made available to me.
Is this the case? Please respond in writing or email me a copy of the audio
files and the pdf's or whatever file type the Contempt Order and Guilty
Verdict etc, in 11 CR 22176 are in, in addition please provide the Motion to
Withdraw and Notice of appearance in 11 CR 22185 by Taitel and then
Puentes. I sent you the video exhibits with the same mysterious Verint codec
that the RMC provided me. Why a simple .avi file needs some mysterious
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
42 of 57
codec that is about 13mb in size is truly a mystery to me.

12 11 11 Defendants Motion for New Trial, Set Aside, Vacate Judgment/Conviction of underlying crime and
Contempt in Court's Presence finding/ IFP Petition/ Motion for Reconsideration/Notice of Appeal, Case Statment
in case: city of reno v coughlin RMC 11 CR 22176; Records Request form Defendant and Request for
Transcription at Public's Expense and Request for a copy of the audio recording of the Trial of 11 30, 2011 1:45
pm to end in RMC 11 CR 22176.
Additionally, I never received service of any Notice of Appearance nor a Motion to Withdraw by Lew Taitel, Esq.
the attorney appointed to represent me as required by RMCR Rule 3: Authorization to Represent
A. Attorneys representing defendants shall promptly serve written notice of
their appearance with the City Attorney and file the same with the Court.
B. An attorney desiring to withdraw from a case shall file a motion with the
court and serve the City Attorney with the same. The court may rule on
the motion or set a hearing."
Further, RMCR state: "Rule 5: Motions by Facsimile

A. All rules and procedures that apply to motions filed in person at the
court shall also apply to motions filed by facsimile, except as otherwise
specified in this rule.
B. All persons are eligible to use motion-by-facsimile procedures.
C. All motions filed by facsimile must be accompanied by a cover sheet
which must include the persons name, address, fax number and
telephone number.
D. All facsimile motions filed by an attorney must include the attorney's
name, the firms name, address, fax number and telephone number. In
addition, the attorneys state bar number must be conspicuously
displayed on the cover sheet.
E. All motions filed by facsimile must be accompanied by proof of service.
Service may be accomplished by facsimile when the receiving party is a
governmental agency, an attorney, or with the consent of the receiving
party. If service of the motion is accomplished by facsimile the 3-day
allowance for mailing shall not be computed into the time for response.
F. A defense attorney filing a motion in the first instance must also file a
proper authorization to represent.
G. Any motion received by the court after 4:30 p.m. or on a non-court day
shall be filed on the following court day.
Rule 6: Continuances
No continuance shall be granted, including a stipulated continuance, except
for good cause. A motion or stipulation for continuance must state the reason
therefore and whether or not any continuance has previously been sought or
granted."
fax number 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
43 of 57

And: "Rule 9: Appeals to District Court
Except as otherwise provided in NRS 177.015 a defendant in a criminal action
tried before a Municipal Court Judge may appeal from the final judgment
therein to the Second Judicial District Court, at any time within 10 days from
the date that judgment is rendered."
Judge Howard informed me during his oral pronounce of his Contempt Order and Guilty Verdict on 11 30,2011
that he would afford me an additional 3 non judicial days to file a Notice of Appeal or any other Motion, Request
for Reconsideration, or other Motion seeking relief from his 11 30 2011 rulings on account of his sua sponte, with
no possibility of Stay or prior judicial review ordering his Marshalls to slam be into handcuffs and throw me into
Jail, kind of like in Houston v. 8th Judicial District Court, escept Judge Howard didn't cool down like Judge
Pomeranz did and Houston wasn't defending a criminal charge that carred a possibility of incarceration of
substantial length after being denied his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel. I am formally complaining about
Judge Howard;s conduct in that regard, please place a copy of this in his personnel file and let me know whether
you think a Complaint to the Judicial Discipline Commission would be appropriate, in your professional opinion.
I filed my Notice of Appeal in 11 cr 22176 yesterday with the RMC via email, as previously given permission to do
by the RMC. To the extent that was ineffective, let this writing act as a Notice of Appeal and agreement to pay
all charges required for such.
PROOF OF SERVICE:
I emailed a copy of this to Pam Roberts for the Plaintiff City of Reno on this date, a true and correct copy and
further email her a copy of all the 12 11 11 MOtion for New Trial, etc. yesterday to:
Pamela G Roberts
Company: Reno City Attorney's Office - Criminal Divison
Address: P.O. Box 1900
Reno
, NV
89505
Fax number: 775-334-2420
Email: robertsp@reno.gov
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
44 of 57

privilege.
RMC 11 CR 22176
Sent: Thu 12/15/11 11:59 PM
To:

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
FAX COVER SHEET
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
45 of 57

TO: .RMC et al
Dear RMC,
T
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
46 of 57

tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
FW: RMC 11 CR 22176

Sent: Fri 12/16/11 12:00 AM
To:

1 attachment
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
47 of 57

Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
lopezv@reno.gov
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2011 23:59:45 -0800
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
48 of 57

FAX COVER SHEET

TO: .RMC et al
Dear RMC,
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
49 of 57
T
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
emergency filings
Sent: Fri 12/16/11 7:55 AM
To:
2 attachments
12 16 11 emergency filing with fax cover sheet rmc 11 cr 22176.pdf (330.0 KB) , fax cover sheet and
notice of denial of service clarification motion.pdf (202.1 KB)
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
50 of 57
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
FW: 121 River Rock

Sent: Sat 12/17/11 12:15 AM
To:
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
51 of 57

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 15:43:38 -0800
Dear Mr. Baker,
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
52 of 57

Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 13:50:02 -0800
Mr. Coughlin:
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
53 of 57

652 Forest Street
Reno, Nevada 89509
Phone: (775) 348-0888
Fax: (775) 348-0858

Sent: Mon 12/19/11 5:15 PM
To:
1 attachment
RMC 11 CR 22176 12 19 11 filing with 3 exhibits.pdf (9.1 MB)
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
54 of 57

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
no reply from Transcriptionist

Sent: Wed 12/21/11 12:02 AM
To:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
55 of 57

tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Dear RMC,
It is my understanding the Judge Howard's order regarding email does not extend to the
address to which I am sending this correspondence: renomunirecords@reno.gov which is
the email address filing office supervisor Donna Ballard indicated to me was acceptable for
sending correspondence and filings to the RMC in lieu of faxes. I am writing because the
email address I was provided for RMC "official transcriptionist" Pam Longoni yielded a
"return to sender/failed transmission" message when I wrote to the email address provided
for her: plongoni@charter.net. Further, please see the forwarded email below that I sent to
Ms. Longoni. I have not received a return call from her regarding my recent messages to
her. I was told by a RMC filing office counter employee that I must get the transcript
through Ms. Longoni, as she is the "official transcriptionist" for the RMC. Please confirm
that I am no able to have another certified court reporter or transcriptionist create the
official transcript and indicate by what date this must be done, how it must be done, etc.
I was told by RMC filing office staff, including Ms. Ballard, that the RMC would not accept
any filings fees, bonds, or any other payments from me in relation to the underlying case 11
CR22176 2I or the appeal of that matter given that the RMC was holding the bail money I
paid into the court. If this is not the case or if I must pay anything into the RMC to ensure
that my appeal goes forward, please indicate as much in writing and with particularity. If I
am able to use any other transcriptionists and or the RMC has a list of such with contact
information, please provide such in writing.
Sincerely,
/s/Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Defendant/Appellant
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
56 of 57

privilege.
To: plongoni@charter.net
Subject: where to pay and how much
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 22:44:37 -0800
Dear Ms. Longoni,

I have left you several messages. I wish to pay whatever it is I have to pay to get this
appeal transcript going and to preserve all my rights to review of the decision in RMC 11 cr
22176. Further, I would like a copy of the audio from the hearing as soon as possible.
Please provide specific detailed instructions as to how to pay and how much and anything
else I need to do.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
57 of 57

privilege.
1/29/2012 9:44 PM
FILED
EXHIBIT #2
EXHIBIT #2
Electronically
01-30-2012:04:48:12 PM
Clerk of the Court
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Document Code: 1520

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney for Appellant Zach Coughlin
ZACH COUGHLIN;
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Appellant,
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vs.
CITY OF RENO
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Respondents.
)
)
)
) DEPT. NO: 10
)
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)
)
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DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.

ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ., being first duly sworn, deposes and under penalty
of perjury avers:
1. I am a resident of the City of Reno, County of Washoe, State of Nevada, and over 18 years
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of age. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated on
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information and belief, and as to those items I believe them to be true. This declaration is made in
25
support of Appellant's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal, and represents my testimony if
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called on to present same in court.
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2. I am an attorney duly licensed as such by the State of Nevada to practice before all courts
of this State and before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada.
3. My office represents the Appellant, Zach Coughlin, in this matter.
4. My office was never properly served with the instant motion by mail or hand-delivery. Cf.,
NRCP 5.
5. I wrote to the Reno Municipal Court at the email address listed for correspondence on their
website: renomunirecords@reno.gov in addition to emailing back and forth with and speaking on
the phone with Reno Municipal Court "Senior Court Specialist" Donna Ballard, whom identified
herself to me on several occasions as the Filing Officer Supervisor, as did several other RMC filing
13
officer personnel. Ms. Ballard gave me permission to file papers and pleadings in the RMC via
14
email to the following address: RenoMuniRecords@reno.gov. Ms. Ballard assured me that this was
15
appreciated given that faxes did not come through as clearly and that longer filings would
16
unnecessarily tax their fax machines. Ballard indicated that the filings I emailed to her and the
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RMC would be printed out and included in the Record on Appeal should an Appeal be necessary or
19
pursued. However, given the primacy of a Notice of Appeal (even where, as here, there was a
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timely filed tolling motion), I worried that the RMC would suddenly somehow try to assert that the
21
filings I emailed to the authorized RMC email address would not be accepted, and, therefore, on at
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least one occasion, I printed a "four page per page" version of what was filed by email, and went
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into the RMC and had it file stamped, "just in case". Alas, what wound up in the Record on Appeal
25
was an illegible scanning of this "four page per page" version, not the much clearer "one page per
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page" version Ballard promised me would appear in the Record on Appeal.
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6. It was on December 13th, 2011 when I personally hand delivered that version of the Notice
of Appeal to the RMC for filing, and at that time an RMC filing office clerk whom I believe is
named "Tom" confirmed to me and Ballard that Veronica Lopez has verified to him that my Notice
of Appeal was timely filed on that day and that Judge Howard had expressly approved so filing a
Notice of Appeal at that time and ruled that so doing would be and was timely.
7. In accordance with the factors enunciated by the Nevada Supreme Court in Brunzell v.
Golden Gate Nat. Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 p.2d 31 (1969) and as set forth in SCR 155, I show
the Court:
a) I have been practicing law in Nevada for approximately 7 years. My practice emphasizes
family law, patent law, foreclosure defense, real estate, real estate litigation, landlord-tenant work,
13
consumer rights, domestic violence advocacy, employment law, business, business litigation and
14
general commercial law. My current standard hourly rate is $225.00 per hour. Upon inquiry, I
15
understand that rates to be well within the range of fees charged by other attorneys with comparable
16
qualifications in the community for similar services. The fees charged were actually, reasonably and
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necessarily incurred.
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b) The work that was actually performed in connection with the instant opposition is itemized
20
thusly and has been actually incurred and billed to my client: $1,500.00 for preparing and filing this
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal, which was necessary and reasonable under the
22
circumstances.
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8. I have personally reviewed all attached exhibits to the opposition referenced above, and
each exhibit is a true and correct copy of what it purports to be.
9. I, Zach Coughlin, do hereby swear, under penalty of perjury, that the following excerpt
from the end of the audio record of the November 30th, 2011 Trial in RMC 11 CR 22176 represents
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a completely true and accurate transcription (made from the CD of the Trial that the undersigned
purchased from the RMC and taken from the file named: "[MCFTRB]_20111130-
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7
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2033_01ccaf9f451ed090" ) of what was said in open court, on the record, beginning at 8:33:11 pm
on November 30th, 2011 in Judge Howard's court room:
"JH: alright we are back on the record in regard to City v. Zachary Coughlin.
I was admittedly remiss in not advising Mr. Coughlin of his right to appeal.
We do want to take care of that now on the record. Mr. Coughlin, you have
the right to appeal the decision of this Court. You can do so by filing a Notice
of Appeal. Customarily, it's 10 days and thats, uh, I'm sure you are fully
aware of that...What I am going to do is grant an extension to that statute in
light of the fact that you will not be released from custody until December
3rd, so your 10 days will run effective December 3rd at 8 pm, so you will
have 10 days from that date to file a Notice of Appeal with this Court, now
once you file your Notice of Appeal there are several things that you will have
to do, principal among those is to obtain a copy of the transcript at your
expense. Once the transcript has been forwarded to the District Court, there is
no Trial de novo, you are probably aware that the District Court judge will
review the four corners of the transcript to determine, one, whether this court
has made any legal errors that would justify a reversal of this matter or
whether there is sufficient evidence within the transcript to justify the finding
of guilt that I have made here today. Is there any questions at all with regard
to the appeal process?
ZC: The availability of a Stay, that I guess would go more towards the
finding of Contempt? Um, when you say "appeal process" are you referring
to...?
JH: The filing of appeal in regard to the petit theft.
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ZC: Not in regard to the Contempt?

JH: No, thats a summary proceeding and we are going to go forward with
that. One thing that I will say in regard to the petit theft Trial and subsequent
sentencing, however, its my recollection, improperly, that you had failed to
appear at the previous proceeding, and that's not correct, uh, there was another
reason as to why we were unable to proceed, so I am going to delete the 24
hours of community service, the fine of $360 will stand. Alright, any other
questions involving the Appeal process?
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ZC: Yes, to the extent my law practice's clients, that their cases will be
unduly prejudiced by your incarcerating me right now...
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JH: I am standing by that and I wish you would have thought about that after
each admonishment that I gave you during the Trial.
ZC: You are saddened by that.
JH: We are in recess. " (commotion of Marshals can be heard and the audio
recording of the record of the Trial ends).
10. However, what is really interesting is that the Reno City Attorney/RMC/ and RSIC Police
all refused to provide even an arrest report or probable cause sheet for one month following the
September 9, 2011 arrest at the center of this matter. The Reno City Attorney's office, (including in
10
a telephone conversation I had with Hazlett-Stevens, Esq.) repeatedly refused to provide an arrest
11
report, probable cause sheet etc., indicating that they "did not even have those things" throughout the
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period between the 9/9/11 arrest and the court date of October 10, 2011, despite the fact that
subsequently propounded discovery from Roberts shows the Reno City Attorney's Office was faxed
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these items by the RSIC (an the RSIC, RSIC Sargent Avansino, etc. all gave me the same song and
ance about "we don't have it, can't give it to you even if we did", etc., etc..
11. RMC Judge Howard runs the Reno Municipal Court with an iron fist, sentencing
attorneys who say "wow" under their breath upon some incredible departure from due process
fundamentals by Judge Howard to a summary contempt order requiring Judge Howard's Marshals to
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essentially gang grope an attorney, knock his laptop out of his hands so he cannot save his trial
22
notes, and take him away to a three day bed and breakfast up at 911 Parr Blvd, complete with no
23
opportunity to make a phone call to arrange the avoidance of prejudicing client matters. Judge
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Howard attempted to specify his rationale and basis for a summary contempt finding by rotely ready
25
off some form document or section of his Bench Book checking a box with some generic
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description like "committed contempt contrary to the administration of justice or in derogation of the
authority of the court" in a manner that does not quite satisfies the requirements that Joseph
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Houston fought so eloquently for in Houston v. Eighth. Judicial District Court, 122 Nev. Adv. Op.
51 (2006). Judge Howard makes Orders far exceeding his jurisdiction, Ordering members of the
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public to never contact anyone at all associated with the Reno Municipal Court by email, or even
use general email addresses like renomunirecords@reno.gov, jumping into traffic cases in other
judges departments to have his filing office operatives issue invective and threats, sometimes in the
form of being accosted by five armed strangers demanding to know information to which they have
no right, in an awesome show of force, power, control, and fascism. The "Docket" in this matter
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contains no indication of a Notice of Entry of Order ever being made in the completely under Judge
Howard's thumb and control "docket" in this matter. Several personnel (including a younger female
I was brought when I asked to verify something with a supervisor) in the RMC Filing Office
13
admitted to me that the RMC filing office has zero oversight over Judge Howard, nor any system of
14
checks and balances, as they entire filing office cowers in fear of the wrath of Judge Howard like
15
some poor battered spouse hoping to avoid another three day trip to the hole for some minor
16
transgression, such as making eye contact with him.
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Judge Howard ignored his own "Bench Book" and went so far outside his jurisdiction as to
19
resort to citing a case from Michigan for the proposition that I, an indigent individual, was not
20
entitled to appointed counsel where, as here, the charge carried with it the possibility of jail time.
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Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. (2006) held that if the possible sentence includes any
22
jail time the defendant must be afforded an attorney. One thing is clear, at the conclusion of
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the11/30/11 trial, Judge Howard's Marshal's suddenly assaulted Coughlin, placing him in cuffs,
25
refusing to allow him to save his trial notes on his laptop, then shoved some papers in Coughlin's
26
face, demanding Coughlin sign them without any opportunity to review what they said or know
27
what they were. As is so typical of those completely corrupted by their unfettered power, these
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Marshals quickly were irked at Coughlin's meager attempts to inquire as to what it was they wanted
him to sign, pulling the papers away from Coughlin while refusing to explain at all, mocking him
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with their derision and taunts that they would simply "put that you refused" in the blank on the
from....Apparently this shameful scene is tantamount to service of an order to some, however, as
Washoe County Jail Records reveal, the belongings Coughlin came with and left with incident to his
3 day getaway trip to Parr, courtesy of Judge Howard's intemperance show conclusively that those
Marshals did not ever leave an Order of 11/30/11 with Coughlin or in any way allow Coughlin to
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maintain possession of such, or even to later access it.

12. Further, Judge Howard;s Judicial Assistant, upon Coughlin's release from WCDC,
refused to provide Coughlin a copy of any such Order, then this Veronica Lopez lied to Coughlin,
13
promising to fax him a copy in a darkly menacing tone, yet failing to ever do so. Further, what oral
14
pronouncements were issued by Judge Howard at the 11/30/11 Trial's conclusion, certainly did not
15
reflect all that was written in the Guilty Verdict and concomitant Summary Contempt Order, as
16
such, no deadline for filing an appeal subject to RMCR 9 could begin running until proper service of
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any such Order occurred, something that has yet to be made clear, whether "constructive service" or
19
otherwise. Prior to divulging the Record on Appeal to the District Court, the RMC Filing Office
20
certainly never let the undersigned see any "docket", much less a certified one. Regardless, I was
21
refused on multiple instances by RMC filing office personnel any copy of, viewing, or access to the
22
docket in 11 CR 22176, but the same gentleman clerk (perhaps named "Tom") did confirm to me, on
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December 13th, 2011, I believe, that, as of that date, there was absolutely no entry or indication
25
anywhere in his system or any records, electronic or otherwise to which he is normally afforded
26
access to indicate any entries had been made in the docket since prior to the 11/30/11 Trial in that
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matter. The undersigned suspects what Judge Howard hates so much about email is that he cannot
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intimidate a computer into saying something was file or received at a different time than that which
the 1's and 0's of the computer's processor tell it was the time and date, much less than manner or
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content, all of which is recorded in magnificent clarity, electronically, when one sends (pursuant to
an express permission to so file pleadings in the RMC given by RMC Filing Office Supervisor
Donna Ballard) in an emailed pleading.
13. Further, it seems ill advised for John Kadlic and the Reno City Attorney's Office in
general to remain on this case, his name listed as filing pleadings (he is listed with Pam Roberts as
"Attorney's for the Respondents" in the instant Motion to Dismiss), as Kadlic has been known to ask
the undersigned's family physician father, in front of the undersigned for a prescription of this or
that or to be fit in here or there and who knows what other weird conflicts of interest (ie, whether or
13
not a certain family physician has a demonstrated tendency toward a Mnchhausennn by Proxy
14
style of parenting, etc., etc.: http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/295258-overview), or where
15
Kadlic and Dr. Coughlin's relationship has apparently been strained by Dr. Coughlin failure to "take
16
sides" sufficient to please City Attorney Kadlic pursuant to the City Attorney Kadlic's divorce from
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his former wife, Paulette and tensions emanating therefrom between Kadlic and his daughter Blair.
19
14. Pam Roberts suborned the perjury of Reno Sparks Indian Colony Officer Kameron
20
Crawford during the November 30th 2011 Trial in RMC 11 CR 22176 when she called him as her
21
own witness, and he testified that the accused failed to provide his driver's license, thus giving
22
Crawford the probable cause he needed to conduct a search incident to arrest. However, previous to
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this, Pam Roberts herself possessed security camera footage of the accused giving Crawford his
25
current State of Nevada Driver's License (and dispatch records confirm that Crawford called in the
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accused drivers license number in conjunction with the accused handing over his drivers license to
27
Crawford). Further, this video that Roberts was in possession of show Thomas Frontino, Wal-Mart
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Asset Protection associate, handing the two RSIC officers additional video evidence beyond that of
the interrogation room video wherein the undersigned provided his State of Nevada driver's license
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to RSIC Officer Crawford. Further, Roberts suborned the perjury of Frontino when he so falsely
testified that there existed no other video footage (despite the legion of surveillance cameras
interspersed over practically every isle at Frontino's Wal-Mart) of any matters pertinent to the
charge for which the undersigned was accused, including, incredibly, absolutely no footage of any
of the alleged concealing or consuming or doing of any other elements of the crime charged, despite
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the fact that they very interrogation room video Roberts possessed showed Frontino so providing
such additional media evidence to RSIC Officers Crawford and Braunworth.
15. While NRS 5.075 requires that: "Form of docket and records. The Court Administrator
13
shall prescribe the form of the docket and of any other appropriate records to be kept by the
14
municipal court, which form may vary from court to court according to the number and kind of
15
cases customarily heard and whether the court is designated as a court of record pursuant to NRS
16
5.010..." RMC Court Administrator Matt Fisc apparently cease being so employed sometime in,
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approximately, November 2011, throwing everything into disarray and vitiating any sense of checks
19
and balances or oversight as to the unfettered dominance exhibited by Judge Howard over the
20
system of justice dispensed at the RMC, preventing the undersigned from exercising his Sixth
21
Amendment Right to Counsel and from getting a jury trial. The RMC website claims: "The Reno
22
Municipal Court was established by charter in 1966 by the State Legislature. We are a high-volume,
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limited jurisdiction court of record which adjudicates criminal misdemeanor (e.g., domestic
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violence, DUI, drug paraphernalia and petty theft) and traffic violations committed by adults within
26
the City of Reno proper. We are a non-jury court with bench trials only. Misdemeanor offenses
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committed within the county limits are handled by the local Justice Courts as are all gross
misdemeanors and felonies."
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16. Judge Howard refused to even grant the undersigned a continuance where the undersigned
has recently been wrongfully evicted from his home law office via an impermissible application of a
summary eviction proceeding against a commercial lessee where failure to pay rent was not alleged
and or the eviction Notice was a No Cause Eviction Notice. The undersigned indicated that an
unlawful rent distraint was at that time being applied to exculpatory evidence and evidence
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establishing a retaliatory motive and intent on the parts of both Wal-Mart and the Reno City
Attorney's Office (given the specter of multiple police misconduct and or negligent hiring, training,
and supervision, 42 USC Sec. 1983, defamation lawsuits the City of Reno faces in connection with
13
misconduct Officers committed against the undersigned in the past six months and of which the
14
Reno City Attorney's office was aware) necessary to the defense of the trial in this matter. Such
15
evidence may evince a retaliatory intent and declaration on the part of various Wal-Mart personnel
16
and RPD personnel where the undersigned had been wrongfully arrested just some two weeks prior
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to the 11/30/11 Trial in this matter, and subject to a wrongful lockout just four weeks prior to the
19
Trial (not just a lockout from one's home or office, but both, and a law office no less). The
20
undersigned submitted a complaint about RPD Officer misconduct to the RPD On September 7,
21
2011, and again on several other occasion One such complaint involved reporting that, at the time,
22
of the undersigned's November 12, 2011 wrongful custodial arrest for "trespass" a RPD Officer had
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admitted to the undersigned that the opposing attorney in that summary eviction proceeding,
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Richard G. Hill, Esq. "pays him a lot of money and so he arrest whom Hill tells him to arrest and
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does what Hill says to do". The Reno City Attorney's Office defends the RPD in police misconduct
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lawsuits and has a vested interest in smearing the undersigned's reputation.
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17. As for Judge Howard's Summary Contempt Order in this matter, it is entirely untrue to
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say that there was order that spelled out the details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous
terms so that the person should have readily known exactly what duties or obligations were imposed
on him. Judge Howard failed to issue any Order "that spelled out the details of compliance in clear,
specific, and unambiguous terms so that the person should have readily known exactly what duties or
obligations were imposed on him...". Rather, Judge Howard, about 10 minutes into Trial, began
menacingly threatening the undersigned, attempting to badger, berate, and intimidate the undersigned
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into failing to defend himself in this matter, to refrain from preserving objections for the record, etc.,
etc.
18. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
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The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
security number of any person.
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DATED this 30th day of January, 2012.
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______________________
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FILED
EXHIBIT #3
EXHIBIT #3
Electronically
01-30-2012:04:48:12 PM
Clerk of the Court
Search Results TransparentNevada

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Search for:
Search type:
pamela roberts
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2 results for pam ela roberts

Base Pay
Benefits
Total Pay
& Benefits
5750 Deputy City Attorney II
$95,590.21
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$114,572.88
Reno
2010
Deputy City Attorney II
$92,457.02
$19,878.26
$110,582.44
Reno
2009
Name
Position
PAMELA ROBERTS
PAMELA ROBERTS
Jurisdiction Year
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
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http://transparentnevada.com/salaries/search/?q=pamela+roberts&t=name&j=reno&y=any
1/30/2012
FILED
EXHIBIT #4
EXHIBIT #4
Electronically
01-30-2012:04:48:12 PM
Clerk of the Court
1 of 5
RMC said I could file this by email

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 7:28 PM
To:
1 attachment
12 11 11 final motion for new trial city of reno v coughlin RMC 11 CR 22176.pdf (12.9 MB)
Dear RMC,
I called an wrote earlier and received approval to file the attached pdf and
media files by email rather than fax or other submission. This filing is large,
as such, it must be broken down into segments. this is part one, part two will
be in the next email. I will pay whatever filing fee or bond or whatever I
have to pay to access justice in this here case.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 8950
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 7:40 PM
1/30/2012 6:19 AM
2 of 5

To:
1 attachment
RMC 11 CR 2217 part two Exhibit 1 pages 1-300 of Motion for New trail from 12 12 2011.pdf (8.6 MB)
I received approval to file by email from RMC

This is the second file in the filing. Please note, the file name of the attachment should actually have the correct
case number of RMC CR 22176. It is missing the 6 on the end in the file name of the attachment
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 7:57 PM
To:
1 attachment
RMC 11 CR 22176 part three Exhibit 1 pages 301-600 of Motion for New trail from 12 12 2011.pdf (9.7
MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1/30/2012 6:19 AM
3 of 5

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
Sent: Mon 12/12/11 8:23 PM
To:
1 attachment
(11.8 MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/30/2012 6:19 AM
4 of 5

privilege.
Sent: Mon 12/12/11 8:29 PM
To:
1 attachment
(14.4 MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/30/2012 6:19 AM
5 of 5

privilege.
To: fiskm@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
Subject: Motion for New Trial Etc. in RMC 11 CR 22176
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 19:57:50 -0800
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
1/30/2012 6:19 AM
FILED
EXHIBIT #5
EXHIBIT #5
Electronically
01-30-2012:04:48:12 PM
Clerk of the Court
NOTE: THIS IS THE RECEIPT FOR THE ITEMS THAT WERE RUNG UP AND FOR WHICH MONEY WAS PAID. WALMART'S THOMASCase
FRONTINO
AND RSIC OFFICER CRAWFORD
LIED
BOTH TESTIFIED
3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC
Document
1 WHEN
FiledTHEY
09/06/13
Page 581 ofTHAT
664 THEY VERIFIED
THAT THE UPC FOR THE "COUGH DROPS" ON THE RECEIPT ON THE PAGE ABOVE THIS ONE DID NOT APPEAR ON
THE RECEIPT FOUND BELOW). HOWEVER, CLEARLY THAT SAME UPC APPEARS ON BOTH RECEIPTS (THE UPC IS
0732211630093). FRONTINO EVEN TRIED TO TESTIFY THAT HE WAS ABLE TO DISCERN FROM APPROXIMATELY 50
FEET AWAY THAT HE COULD TELL EXACTLY WHAT ITEMS AND WHAT UPC'S WERE BEING RUNG UP AT THE REGISTER
AND THAT HE WAS ABLE TO VERIFY THAT THE UPC'S FOR THE COUGH DROPS ON THE "STOLEN" RECEIPT" WERE
NOT FOUND ON THE "PURCHASED" RECEIPT. HOWEVER, CLEARLY, FRONTINO WAS WRONG OR LYING, OR BOTH.
FILED
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Document Code: 1425

Zach Coughlin
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney for Pro Se Appellant denied Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel
Electronically
02-07-2012:12:19:36 AM
Clerk of the Court
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ZACH COUGHLIN;
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Appellant,
vs.
City of Reno;
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Respondent.
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) Case No: CR11-2064
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) Dept No: 10
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APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

COMES NOW, Appellant, Zach Coughlin, by and through himself as he was denied his Sixth
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Amendment Right To Counsel, and files this Appellant's Opening Brief: This Motion in is based
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upon the pleadings and papers on file in this matter, both in this appeal and the underlying RMC 11
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CR 22176 and the following legal argument. The undersigned files this Opening Brief with the intent
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to file a Supplemental to it or a Notice of Errata with respect to this filing, and a more complete
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Opening Brief by February 6, 2012. This is being done due to confusion as to whether the within 30
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days deadline, which would seam to fall on Saturday, February 4th, 2012, would allow filing timely a
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- 1 Appellant Opening Brief
Brief on February 6, 2012. In an abundance of caution, this is submitted to at least get something
filed.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
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Indeed, NRCP RULE 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER

PAPERS requires that:
(a) Service: When Required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every order
required by its terms to be served,... (b)(2) Service under this rule is made by: (A)
Delivering a copy to the attorney or the party by: (i) handing it to the attorney or to the
party; (ii) leaving it at the attorneys or partys office with a clerk or other person in
charge, or if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office;
or (iii) if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the
persons dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion residing thing a copy by electronic means if the attorney or the party
served has consented to service by electronic means... The served attorneys or
partys consent to service by electronic means shall be expressly stated and filed in
writing with the clerk of the court and served on the other parties to the action. The
written consent shall identify: (i) the persons upon whom service must be made; (ii)
the appropriate address or location for such service, such as the electronic-mail address
or facsimile number; (iii) the format to be used for attachments; and (iv) any other
limits on the scope or duration of the consent. An attorneys or partys consent shall
remain effective until expressly revoked or until the representation of a party changes
through entry, withdrawal, or substitution of counsel. An attorney or party who has
consented to service by electronic means shall, within 10 days after any change of
electronic-mail address or facsimile number, serve and file notice of the new
electronic-mail address or facsimile number. (3) Service by electronic means under
Rule 5(b)(2)(D) is not effective if the party making service learns that the attempted
service did not reach the person to be served. (4) Proof of service may be made by
certificate of an attorney or of the attorneys employee, or by written admission, or by
affidavit, or other proof satisfactory to the court. Failure to make proof of service shall
not affect the validity of service.
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It was reversible error in the underlying matter where the Court: refused to grant a
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continuance of the November 30th, 2011 Trial, failed to provide the Sixth Amendments guarantee of a
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Right to Counsel both in the petit theft Trial and once even the specter of a Summary Contempt
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finding was announced. Way too prejudicial to deny the right to counsel then announce the Court
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would nail the undersigned with contempt for attempting to zealously advocate on his own behalf.
Further, refusing to allow inquiry into the stated retaliatory motives of Wal-Mart and its Asset
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Protection division, especially vis a vis, Wal-Mart's established practice, even by its managers, of
outright lying the the public repeatedly about the terms and effect of the posted Return Policy
applicable to purchases in Wal-Mart stores. Additionally, prosecutorial misconduct, (suborning
perjury, failing to turn over discovery in a timely manner, lying about whether the Reno City
Attorney had received anything from the RSIC, etc) justify overturning the verdict. Additionally, the
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prosecutions improper motive in this retaliatory prosecution stems from a desire to undermine the
undersigned's credibility and ability to litigate especially vis a vis the wrongful arrest, negligent
hiring training and supervision lawsuit that the Reno City Attorney received warning of well in
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advance of the arrest in this matter. Further improprieties and due process deficiencies in the Reno
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Municipal Court and its filing office justify overturning the conviction. Additionally, a Notice of
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Entry of Order here from the RMC is likely required given the Order was complete outside the
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presence of one of the parties (made in absentia), and therefore rendition of Order is likely not
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sufficient. Further, the prosecution did not meet its burden to prove any of the elements of the crime
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charged: (a) Intentionally steals, takes and carries away, leads away or drives away... Each of the
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three witnesses contradicted themselves as the material facts, including whether the UPC at issue
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appeared on both receipts and whether the undersigned provided his driver's license to the RSIC
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Officers, which the video showed he did, and therefore, the probable cause to conduct a search
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incident to a custodial arrest is vitiated and perjury apparent by all three witnesses and misconduct by
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the Reno City Attorney. All arguments made below, whether at Trial or in the papers on file or
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otherwise submitted to the RMC are hereby incorporated by reference.
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RMC Sec. 8.10.040. - Petit larceny: It is unlawful for any person to take or carry away the
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property of another with the intent to deprive the owner of his property therein, in any value less than
$250.00, and for his conviction therefor, he shall be fined in an amount not more than $1,000.00
and/or be incarcerated not more than six months. In addition to any other penalty, the court shall
order the person to pay restitution. (Code 1966, 11.12.003; Ord. No. 2762, 1, 8-13-79; Ord. No.
3866, 1, 9-25-89; Ord. No. 4815, 1, 10-28-97; Ord. No. 5058, 1, 11-12-99) State law reference
Petit larceny, NRS 205.240. NRS 205.240 Petit larceny; penalty.
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1. Except as otherwise
provided in NRS 205.220, 205.226, 205.228 and 475.105, a person commits petit larceny if the
person:
(a) Intentionally steals, takes and carries away, leads away or drives away:
(1)
Personal goods or property, with a value of less than $650, owned by another person;
(2)
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Bedding, furniture or other property, with a value of less than $650, which the person, as a lodger, is
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to use in or with his or her lodging and which is owned by another person; or
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property, with a value of less than $650, that the person has converted into personal property by
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severing it from real property owned by another person.
(3) Real
(b) Intentionally steals, takes and carries
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away, leads away, drives away or entices away one or more domesticated animals or domesticated
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birds, with an aggregate value of less than $650, owned by another person.
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penalty is provided pursuant to NRS 205.267, a person who commits petit larceny is guilty of a
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misdemeanor. In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution.
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2. Unless a greater
[1911 C&P 374; A 1947, 85; 1949, 127; 1943 NCL 10324](NRS A 1965, 300, 1007; 1967,
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500; 1969, 531; 1983, 547; 1985, 751; 1989, 1434; 1995, 13; 1997, 342, 1114; 1999, 3109; 2009,
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1243; 2011, 165)
NRS 205.251 Determination of value of property involved in larceny offense.
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For the purposes of NRS 205.2175 to 205.2707, inclusive:
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larceny offense shall be deemed to be the highest value attributable to the property by any reasonable
1. The value of property involved in a
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standard.
pursuant to a scheme or continuing course of conduct may be aggregated in determining the grade of
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2. The value of property involved in larceny offenses committed by one or more persons
the larceny offenses. Grant v. State, 24 P.3d 761 234 LARCENY 234II Prosecution and Punishment
234II(B) Evidence 234 54 Weight and Sufficiency 234k57 k. Intent. Nev.,2001 Requisite finding of
intent to permanently deprive owner of property was supported in grand larceny prosecution by
evidence that defendant was seen tucking casino patron's purse into his jacket several times and
heading towards lobby and exit of casino. N.R.S. 205.220 , subd. 1, 205.222, subds. 2, 3. Hogan v.
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State, 536 P.2d 1028 Nev.,1975 There was sufficient evidence of felonious asportations of air
conditioner from fenced compound at rear of store to support convictions for grand larceny
notwithstanding defendants' assertions that they found the air conditioner outside the fence and
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believed it was abandoned. N.R.S. 205.220 . State v. Phipps, 282 P. 1024 Nev.,1929 Evidence in
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prosecution for larceny of mining property held not to show codefendant's intent to take, steal, or
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carry away personal property. State v. Ward, 10 P. 133 Nev.,1886 The facts that defendant took a
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horse from the premises of its owner without his knowledge, and rode it for a certain distance, and
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then abandoned it, after removing and concealing the saddle and blanket, are sufficient to justify a
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finding of intent permanently to deprive the owner of his property, although defendant testifies that
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he had engaged another to take it back, and when he did not appear he expected some one to take it
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back, or that the animal would stray back.
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NRS 205.0824 Deprive defined. Deprive means to
withhold a property interest of another person permanently or for so long a time that a substantial
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portion of its value, usefulness or enjoyment is lost, or to withhold it with the intent to restore it only
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upon the payment of a reward or other compensation, or to transfer or dispose of it so that it is
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unlikely to be recovered. NRS 205.0832 Actions which constitute theft.
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provided in subsection 2, a person commits theft if, without lawful authority, the person knowingly:
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1. Except as otherwise
(a) Controls any property of another person with the intent to deprive that person of the property.
(b) Converts, makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, or without authorization controls
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any property of another person, or uses the services or property of another person entrusted to him or
her or placed in his or her possession for a limited, authorized period of determined or prescribed
duration or for a limited use.
(c) Obtains real, personal or intangible property or the services of
another person by a material misrepresentation with intent to deprive that person of the property or
services. As used in this paragraph, material misrepresentation means the use of any pretense, or
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the making of any promise, representation or statement of present, past or future fact which is
fraudulent and which, when used or made, is instrumental in causing the wrongful control or transfer
of property or services. The pretense may be verbal or it may be a physical act.
(d) Comes into
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control of lost, mislaid or misdelivered property of another person under circumstances providing
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means of inquiry as to the true owner and appropriates that property to his or her own use or that of
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another person without reasonable efforts to notify the true owner.
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(e) Controls property of
another person knowing or having reason to know that the property was stolen.
(f) Obtains
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services or parts, products or other items related to such services which the person knows are
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available only for compensation without paying or agreeing to pay compensation or diverts the
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services of another person to his or her own benefit or that of another person without lawful authority
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to do so.
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(g) Takes, destroys, conceals or disposes of property in which another person has a
security interest, with intent to defraud that person.
(h) Commits any act that is declared to be theft
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by a specific statute.
(i) Draws or passes a check, and in exchange obtains property or services, if
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the person knows that the check will not be paid when presented.
(j) Obtains gasoline or other fuel
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or automotive products which are available only for compensation without paying or agreeing to pay
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compensation.
2. A person who commits an act that is prohibited by subsection 1 which involves
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the repair of a vehicle has not committed theft unless, before the repair was made, the person received
a written estimate of the cost of the repair. Its was reversible error where Judge Howard Did not
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comply with the above and the burden of proof was not met in consieration fo the evidence offered.
Further, Appellant was refused his opportunity to testify or put on evidence, City of Reno suborned
perjury, ect, etc. Intent was missing too, and, assumign the accusations are true, anyone consuming
that many of those cough drops would not be capable of forming the requisite intent. Driver's license
was offered, therefore reversible error to allow basing the search on failure to provide driver's license
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or sufficent indentifying information to issue a citation. Fruit of poison tree.

Appellants incorporates by reference all arguments, filings, correspondence etc made in the
trial court or so far in this appeal, especially those in the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.
`
The 2008 Limited Court Jurisdiction Bench Book and its 2010 Supplement set forth a number
of appealable issues in this matter, including:
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT Summary punishment is only permissible for direct contempts (those
acts identified in NRS 22.010 committed within the immediate view and presence of the judge).
Questions to analyze for Summary Punishment Is the contempt eligible for summary
punishment? ? Act or omission performed in presence of Court ? Immediate judicial action was
required to maintain or restore authority/justice/dignity of the Court ? Was there an order that spelled
out the details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that the person should have
readily known exactly what duties or obligations were imposed on him? ? Is the contempt on in
which the person has omitted performing an act which is yet in the power of the person to perform?
What type of contempt exists? ? Civil in which punishment is appropriate? ? Civil in which
imprisonment to force performance is appropriate? ? Criminal in which adjudication of a
misdemeanor is appropriate? What is the sentence imposed? ? Imprisonment in county jail not to
exceed 25 days ? Fine not to exceed $500 (payable to county/city treasurer) ? Both above mentioned
fine and imprisonment ? If civil , expenses, including attorney fees, of injured party if the contempt
involves disobedience to a lawful order or writ ? Is the contempt one that involves failure to do an
act which is yet in the power of the person to perform? If so, is imprisonment in the county jail
necessary or appropriate to force the person to comply with the act? ? Is the contempt failure to
appear or testify before a grand jury? If so, imprisonment must cease when the grand jury is no
longer empanelled. Have you completed the written order? (Must have a written order filed) ?
Recites the facts constituting the contempt in the immediate view and presence of the court or
judge; ? Finds the person guilty of the contempt; and ?
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Prescribes the punishment for the contemp
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing the undersigned respectfully requests that this Court vacate,
overturn, or otherwise set aside the underlying Judgment and Order of Conviction in this matter
(RMC 11 CR 22176). Appellant Declares under penalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 53.045, that the
assertions in this document are true and correct.
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AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030

Dated: February 6, 2012
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/S/ Zach Coughlin________

Zach Coughlin, Appellant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
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Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I served a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Opening
rd
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Brief upon the following party by electronically filing on February 3 , 2012 and therefore serving
upon registered efiler:
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Pamela Roberts, Esq.
John Kadlic, Esq.
PO
Box 1900
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Reno, NV 89505
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Attorney for City of Reno
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Date this February 6rd, 2012:
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/S/ Zach Coughlin

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FILED
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Document Code: 2075

Zach Coughlin
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Electronically
02-07-2012:09:44:49 AM
Clerk of the Court
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ZACH COUGHLIN;
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Appellant,
vs.
City of Reno;
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Respondent.
)
)
)
) Case No: CR11-2064
)
) Dept No: 10
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE OPENING BRIEF

COMES NOW, Appellant, Zach Coughlin, by and through himself, and files this
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APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE OPENING BRIEF. THIS
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FILING IS BEING RESUBMITTED AS MS. MATHEUS IS STILL REJECTING CRIMINAL
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CASE FILINGS, DESPITE WDCR: 2012-02-06 23:50:34.0 Subject: Your electronic filing, Re:
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CR11-2064 - Other Municipal Court Criminal - MO - Mtn for Extension of Time, was rejected by
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Second Judicial District Court - State of Nevada. Case Number: CR11-2064 Case Type: Other
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Municipal Court Criminal - MO Document Type: Mtn for Extension of Time Reason(s) for rejection:
This document was rejected yesterday as the case number on the document is incorrect. The Second
- 1 Appellant's Motion for Extension of Time and Page Limit Exception
Judicial District Court does not recognize case number CR-2064. Please correct the case number on
your document and resubmit. If you have any questions, please contact Lori at 328-3114. Further,
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Appeals Clerk Matheus rejected an Opening Brief attempt filed last Friday in contravention of
WDCR 18.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
WDCR Rule 18. Papers which do not comply with rules. Except in criminal cases and writs
arising from criminal cases, filing office personnel shall refuse to file any document or pleading
which is not properly signed by all persons, or which does not comply with these rules, Nevada Rules
of Civil Procedure, the District Court Rules, or applicable statutes.
Appellant has had numerous filings in the criminal matter rejected by the filing office in
contravention of WDCR 18 and therefore request an extension of time to file this Opening Brief.
WDCR Rule 11. Extension or shortening of time. 1. All motions for extensions of time shall
be made upon 5 days notice to all counsel. Such motion shall be made to the judge who is to try the
case, or, if the judge is not in the courthouse during regular judicial hours, to a judge on the same
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floor who shall set or cause the motion to be set for early hearing. (For the sake of this rule
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Department 10 is deemed to be on the second floor.) 2. Except as provided in this subsection, no ex
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parte application for extension of time will be granted. Upon presentation of a motion for extension,
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if a satisfactory showing is made to the judge that a good faith effort has been made to notify
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opposing counsel of the motion, and the judge finds good cause therefor, the judge may order ex
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parte a temporary extension pending a determination of the motion. 3. For good cause shown, the
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judge who is to try the case, or if the judge is not in the courthouse during regular judicial hours, the
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chief judge, may make an ex parte order shortening time upon a satisfactory showing to the judge that
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a good faith effort has been made to notify the opposing counsel of the motion. 4. Extensions to
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answer or otherwise respond to a complaint shall not exceed 40 days without court approval. The trial
judge shall determine the appropriate sanction if this rule is violated. Appellant cites excusable
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neglect or other circumstances (like opposing counsel in an summary eviction from one's law office
based on no cause notice, not nonpayment of rent, commercial tenant in cv11-03628 getting him
wrongfully arrested and police misconduct and the failre to return security deposit and Appellants
recently being a victim of domestic violence in EPO granted in FV12-00188, and FV12-00187 in
askign for an extension and page limit exception.
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WDCR Rule 19. Appeals from municipal and justice courts.

1. All appeals from the municipal or justice courts in criminal cases shall be set for trial or
hearing within 60 days of the date of application for setting. A setting beyond 60 days may be made
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only if approved in writing by the trial judge or the chief judge. If a trial setting is continued by order
14
of the court, the case shall be reset within 60 days of the date of the order for continuance.
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2. If multiple settings for appeal trials in any one court department exceed the capacity of that
department, settings shall be made in the designated department scheduled to handle the overflow. If
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that courts calendar becomes full, assignment shall be made to any other available department.
3. Appeals in criminal cases shall be set for trial on Thursdays and Fridays, unless the trial judge
or the chief judge grants permission to make such settings on other judicial days.
4. In civil appeals from the justice court, appellant shall file within 30 days after the filing of a
notice of appeal a written brief containing a statement of the errors committed in the justice court
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with accompanying authorities which shall not exceed 5 pages. Within 20 days after the filing and
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service of appellants brief, respondent shall file a written answering brief which shall not exceed 5
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pages.
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My mountain bike was stolen right about the time landlord Merliss had NV Eneregy trespass
on my property and do an unnoticed shut off of electricity. All the food in my refridgerator went bad,
and other damages were incurred. NV Energy asserted privity of contract where the are not allowed
to, while being a monopoly supplying an essential Service. www.ShameOnNVEnergy.com
Further, just last Friday, February 3rd, 2012, NV Energy again shut off Appellants electricty without
notice, and now is refusing to allow Appellant to have service started, demanding all sorts of
documentation, proof, private, personally identifiable information, and specific forms of
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agreements to which NV Energy, a monopoly, has not right. That cause this Brief to exceed 5
pages and forms a basis for this request to allow an extension of time to refine and finish Appellant's
Opening Brief.
Indeed, NRCP RULE 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER
PAPERS requires that:
(a) Service: When Required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every order
required by its terms to be served,... (b)(2) Service under this rule is made by: (A)
Delivering a copy to the attorney or the party by: (i) handing it to the attorney or to the
party; (ii) leaving it at the attorneys or partys office with a clerk or other person in
charge, or if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office;
or (iii) if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the
persons dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion residing thing a copy by electronic means if the attorney or the party
served has consented to service by electronic means... The served attorneys or
partys consent to service by electronic means shall be expressly stated and filed in
writing with the clerk of the court and served on the other parties to the action. The
written consent shall identify: (i) the persons upon whom service must be made; (ii)
the appropriate address or location for such service, such as the electronic-mail address
or facsimile number; (iii) the format to be used for attachments; and (iv) any other
limits on the scope or duration of the consent. An attorneys or partys consent shall
remain effective until expressly revoked or until the representation of a party changes
through entry, withdrawal, or substitution of counsel. An attorney or party who has
consented to service by electronic means shall, within 10 days after any change of
electronic-mail address or facsimile number, serve and file notice of the new
electronic-mail address or facsimile number. (3) Service by electronic means under
Rule 5(b)(2)(D) is not effective if the party making service learns that the attempted
service did not reach the person to be served. (4) Proof of service may be made by
certificate of an attorney or of the attorneys employee, or by written admission, or by

affidavit, or other proof satisfactory to the court. Failure to make proof of service shall
not affect the validity of service.
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It was reversible error in the underlying matter where the Court: refused to grant a
continuance of the November 30th, 2011 Trial, failed to provide the Sixth Amendments guarantee of a
Right to Counsel both in the petit theft Trial and once even the specter of a Summary Contempt
finding was announced. Way too prejudicial to deny the right to counsel then announce the Court
would nail the undersigned with contempt for attempting to zealously advocate on his own behalf.
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Further, refusing to allow inquiry into the stated retaliatory motives of Wal-Mart and its Asset
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Protection division, especially vis a vis, Wal-Mart's established practice, even by its managers, of
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outright lying the the public repeatedly about the terms and effect of the posted Return Policy
applicable to purchases in Wal-Mart stores. Additionally, prosecutorial misconduct, (suborning
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perjury, failing to turn over discovery in a timely manner, lying about whether the Reno City
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Attorney had received anything from the RSIC, etc) justify overturning the verdict. Additionally, the
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prosecutions improper motive in this retaliatory prosecution stems from a desire to undermine the
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undersigned's credibility and ability to litigate especially vis a vis the wrongful arrest, negligent
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hiring training and supervision lawsuit that the Reno City Attorney received warning of well in
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advance of the arrest in this matter. Further improprieties and due process deficiencies in the Reno
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Municipal Court and its filing office justify overturning the conviction. Additionally, a Notice of
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Entry of Order here from the RMC is likely required given the Order was complete outside the
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presence of one of the parties (made in absentia), and therefore rendition of Order is likely not
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sufficient. Further, the prosecution did not meet its burden to prove any of the elements of the crime
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charged: (a) Intentionally steals, takes and carries away, leads away or drives away... Each of the
three witnesses contradicted themselves as the material facts, including whether the UPC at issue
appeared on both receipts and whether the undersigned provided his driver's license to the RSIC
Officers, which the video showed he did, and therefore, the probable cause to conduct a search
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incident to a custodial arrest is vitiated and perjury apparent by all three witnesses and misconduct by
the Reno City Attorney. All arguments made below, whether at Trial or in the papers on file or
otherwise submitted to the RMC are hereby incorporated by reference.
of appealable issues in this matter, including:
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The 2008 Limited Court Jurisdiction Bench Book and its 2010 Supplement set forth a number
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT Summary punishment is only permissible for direct contempts (those
acts identified in NRS 22.010 committed within the immediate view and presence of the judge).
Questions to analyze for Summary Punishment Is the contempt eligible for summary
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punishment? ? Act or omission performed in presence of Court ? Immediate judicial action was
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required to maintain or restore authority/justice/dignity of the Court ? Was there an order that spelled
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out the details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that the person should have
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readily known exactly what duties or obligations were imposed on him? ? Is the contempt on in
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which the person has omitted performing an act which is yet in the power of the person to perform?
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What type of contempt exists? ? Civil in which punishment is appropriate? ? Civil in which
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imprisonment to force performance is appropriate? ? Criminal in which adjudication of a
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misdemeanor is appropriate? What is the sentence imposed? ? Imprisonment in county jail not to
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exceed 25 days ? Fine not to exceed $500 (payable to county/city treasurer) ? Both above mentioned
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fine and imprisonment ? If civil , expenses, including attorney fees, of injured party if the contempt
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involves disobedience to a lawful order or writ ? Is the contempt one that involves failure to do an
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act which is yet in the power of the person to perform? If so, is imprisonment in the county jail
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necessary or appropriate to force the person to comply with the act? ? Is the contempt failure to
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appear or testify before a grand jury? If so, imprisonment must cease when the grand jury is no
longer empanelled. Have you completed the written order? (Must have a written order filed) ?
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Recites the facts constituting the contempt in the immediate view and presence of the court or
judge; ? Finds the person guilty of the contempt; and ? Prescribes the punishment for the contemp
Appellant could not reasonably be said to have been appropriately or sufficiently informe
dof just how he could comply with Judge Howard's contempt warning/finding/order 10 minutes into a
6 hour Trial, nor could Appellant or anyone be said to be capable of both zealously advocating on
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their own behalf while also complying with Judge Howard's menacing and vague Order that
contravened fundamental notions of fairness and due process. Appellant requests that all filings,
correspondences, and arguments made in the Trial Court or so far in this Appellate Courte be
incorprorated by reference herein.
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CONCLUSION
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Based upon the foregoing the undersigned respectfully requests that this Court grant an
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extension to refine the Opening Brief and exception to page limit rule in WDCR 19 any other relief
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this Court deems just. Appellant Declares under penalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 53.045, that the
assertions in this document are true and correct.
AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030
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Dated: February 5rd, 2012
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/S/ Zach Coughlin________

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PROOF OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I served a copy of the foregoing document upon the
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following party by electronically filing on February 3 , 2012 and therefore serving upon registered
efiler:
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Pamela Roberts, Esq.
John Kadlic, Esq.
PO Box 1900
Reno, NV 89505
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Attorney for City of Reno
Date this February 3rd, 2012:
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/S/ Zach Coughlin

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FILED
Electronically
02-15-2012:11:42:40 PM
Clerk of the Court
code: 2385
ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ.
NV BAR NO 9473
1422 E. 9TH ST. #2
RENO, NV 89512
TEL: 775 338 8118
FAX: 959 667 7402
ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM
ATTORNEY FOR PRO PER ATTORNEY APPELLANT
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ZACH COUGHLIN
APPELLANT
ZXXXXXXXX
CR11-2064
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CITY OF RENO
RESPONDENT
XXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL; OR ALTERNATIVELY,
ON APPEAL
Zach Coughlin, Plaintiff/

Appellant
1422 E. 9th St. #2,
Reno, NV 89512
ON APPEAL
FILED
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Electronically
02-22-2012:05:47:25 AM
Clerk of the Court
+Document Code:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
ZACH COUGHLIN;
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Appellant,
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vs.
CITY OF RENO
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Respondents.
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) DEPT. NO: 10
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SUPPLEMENT TO APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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COMES NOW, Appellant Zach Coughlin, by and through his attorney, Zachary Barker
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Coughlin, Esq , and offers his SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO DISMISS. The undersigned was
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instructed by the Second Judicial District Court to submit a cd/dvd for filing as an exhibit to a filing
in this manner.
TABLE OF CASES AND STATUES CITED
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STATUTES
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
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Did the District Court Violate Coughlin's 6th Amendment
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Right to Confront Witnesses When it Prohibited Defense

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' 24 Counsel from Conducting a Full and Complete

Cross-Examination?
Did the District Court Commit Judicial Misconduct
Throughout the Trial Which Prejudiced Coughlin's
Due Process? .
Did the District Court Error by Admitting Inadmissible Hearsay Statements
Against Coughlin?
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In the first 10 min. trial judge Howard disagreed with the defendant on the record as to whether or not
the case he was about to try was a complex case rather judge Howard had already made up his mind that he
was not on lag but that was rather open and shut any dedicated judge our new house rule on this case before it
even started which is kind of impermissible under most notions of due process and fundamental fairness judge
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Howard banged his fist my gavel mind you but his fist on the bench causing terrible feedback on the
microphones recording proceedings exhibited an unbalanced and erratic approach to his rulings in this matter
that are indicative of a bias or other evident impartiality this is particularly troubling where so many ancillary
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matters involving the Reno Municipal Court have arisen recently with respect to the defendant including
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violations of Reno Municipal Court rules by house former prosecutor Lou tale in not only set the case for
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which he's his own conflict checking procedure should have alerted him to the fact that Coughlin was sailing
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an entity with which tale shares of office and receptionist and a boom list table as associated with its business
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that being Nevada court services on about court services website but also where Taylor failed to comply with
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Reno Municipal Court rule five in filing a motion to withdraw stating with sufficient particularity in writing
his rationale for withdrawing rather tale manage to broker a withdrawal from the case behind-the-scenes
without hacking do reveal is embarrassing departures from the rules special conduct the complicity of their
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Reno Municipal Court allowing this is troubling particularly where judge Howard then proceeded to deny the
accused is six-member right counsel to bang his this on the bench in an apparent a mosh to the year he's been
playing football at you and our and where judge Howard informed the defendant that he would have him
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arrested and incarcerated should the defendant continued to attempt to preserve objections for the record on
appeal a scant 5 min. into the trial room of the
Judge Howard, at 2:31:52 pm in the AT, responded to the pro so accused Defendant arguing that the Sixth
Amendment, as interpreted by Ainsgliser requires the appointment of counsel where even the mere possibility
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of jail time is present under a plain reading of the charge. Judge Howard cited to Scott v. Illinois for his
contention that the RMC was not required to provide an indigent like the Appellant any appointed counsel.
Under Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), counsel must be appointed in any case resulting in a
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sentence of actual imprisonment. However, in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Court ruled that
counsel did not need to be appointed if the defendant was not sentenced to any imprisonment. It was reversible
error for Judge Howard and so rule particularly where he ultimately did sentence appellant to three days
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incarceration. Further this perversion of any holding in Scott versus Illinois on Judge Howard's part is
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indicative of the troubling lack of fidelity to the true intent of the sixth amendment and fundamental motions
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of due process and fair play. For Judge Howard to make men's attempts to reconcile his deep desire to
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sentence to incarceration for the appellant in this matter while also and denying the appellant his sixth
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amendment right to counsel in the trial court by reaching out to leverage the statute related to summary
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contempt committed in the course presents indicates a troubling lack of intellectual hon than esty on the court
part and further elucidates a disturbing incapability of the court to grasp the importance they should attach to
once fundamental right to zealously advocate on their own behalf particularly in a criminal matter were either
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incarceration is a possibility or as here were both incarceration and severe damage to a property right i.e. a law
license will necessarily follow upon a conviction given the dictates of Nevada Supreme Court rule 111 in that
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the charge here petty larceny clearly comes within the purview of Supreme Court rule 111 subsection 6 in that
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that any offenses for which an essential element involves any type of theft are necessarily defined as a
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quotations serious offense in quotations within the text of Nevada Supreme Court won't 111.
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Construction and Application of Sixth Amendment Right to CounselSupreme Court Cases. 33
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A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (Originally published in 2009). The U.S. Supreme Court decided that actual imprisonment
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was the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.
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Ct. 1158, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1979). The petitioner was convicted of shoplifting merchandise valued at less than
$150. The applicable state statute set the maximum penalty for such an offense at a $500 fine or one year in
jail, or both. The petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the state appeals court and then by the state supreme
court, notwithstanding his argument that the Sixth and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution required that
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the State provide trial counsel to him at its expense. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, determining that the
Federal Constitution did not require a state trial court to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant unless actual
imprisonment was imposed. The court explained that actual imprisonment was a penalty different in kind from
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fines or the mere threat of imprisonment, and limiting the application of the right to counsel to cases where
imprisonment was actually imposed and not just threatened was sound. The court said that the precedent of
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972), had proved reasonably workable,
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but any extension thereof would create confusion and impose unpredictable and substantial costs on the states.
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Accordingly, the court held that no indigent criminal defendant could be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
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unless the State had afforded him the right to the assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.
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In judge Howard's judgment order of conviction in this matter this frankly appalling when considering
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the lengths to which judge Howard goes to manage to deny an indigent defendant his sixth amendment right to
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counsel while at the same time entering an order that resulted in the defendants incarceration this is
particularly startling and disturbing considering that judge Howard reasoned from the bench at the trial that
Scott the Illinois allowed him to deny the indigent defendant his sixth amendment right to counsel in that jail
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time would not be ordered in this matter judge Howard in no way at that time limited that ruling which he
rendered from the bench the term rendered or upon rendition appears in NRS 189.010 and is applicable to the
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deadline upon which criminal appellants must file a notice of appeal as extensively briefed in the motion to
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dismiss and its accompanying opposition and supplement thereto rendered or rendition essentially means when
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the court or judge verbally announces something the bench as such judge Howard's oral ruling with regard to
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the fact that incarceration would not occur in this matter is binding upon judge Howard it is law the case
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however judge Howard in order incarceration in any mincing attempts to suggest that the fact that the
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incarceration was for a fine of summary contempt committed in the course presents under NRS 22.010 sub
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three should simply be unavailing particularly where a fundamental constitutional right is involved and where
it judge Howard's ruling as rendered from the bench 5 min. into the trial did not limit the application of his
ruling in any way as such no incarceration the matter what it stems from is permissible in this matter or
anything connected thereto as such this entire judgment order of conviction is void us as the two are
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inextricably intertwined in fact sixth amendment right to counsel once right to zealous advocacy summary
contempt finding and a conviction for the crime alleged herein are all inextricably intertwined in ways
disturbing the judge Howard has event such a clear disregard for matters that have such a preeminent
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importance in the canyon of due process and notions of fundamental fairness further at the trial when after 5
min. of proceedings that is to say trial it only been going on just a few scant minutes and a defendant upon the
first time he tried to preserve and objections for the record judge Howard going quote from 0 to 60 in one
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second" announced to the defendant in a bullying menacing voice that he would have the defendant clearly
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custody and the trial continued if the defendant were to continue to try to preserve issues for appeal or
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objections thereto. The fact that judge Howard is a former prosecutor in addition to judge Garner in a former
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prosecutor in addition to the fact that at least three of the four appointed defense attorneys that the Reno
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Municipal Court his contract with our former prosecutors either with the Reno city attorney's office or the
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Dist. Atty.'s office is unsettling as the appearance created is one of an environment where a cabal of former
prosecutors has managed to gain a monopoly of the Reno Municipal Court and work in conjunction with
prosecutors from the Reno city attorney's office to essentially leverage the court as a bill collector or the city of
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Reno in addition to having the ancillary benefit of being able to undermine defame and otherwise unduly
burden any citizens who might take issue with the myriad of constitutional violations in deprivations of
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fundamental rights that he Reno Police Department and the Reno Sparks Indian colony carry out on a daily
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basis and in practically every arrest and search incident to arrest that occurs within this County indeed this
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spirit of retaliatory arrest and retaliatory prosecution cannot be countenanced by the District Court citizens
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should not face a guaranteed arrest merely for invoking their constitutional rights yet that is just exactly what
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happens on a daily basis and the Reno city attorney cannot be said to be unaware this where the fact that a
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pattern practice habit and custom is carried out within the police force is about the Reno Sparks Indian colony
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and the Reno police apartment such that any future negligent hiring trainer supervision claims that might issue
similar to those that arose in Eoff the city of Reno incident to a wrongful arrest and 42 USC section 1983
lawsuit of recent note. As to the former prosecutor cabal appearance at the Reno Municipal Court takes on of
late of the four appointed defense attorneys Lew Taitel, Esq., Roberto Puentes, Esq., Keith Loomis, Esq. and
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Jane McKenna that the Reno Municipal Court has finally admitted to the defendant are the names of the
appointed defense counsel three of them are former prosecutors with the Washoe County Dist. Atty.'s office
there is some indication that Thomas Viloria. Esq is also associated with the RMC as a defense attorney in
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some manner, however that has not been confirmed. However, Kelly Viloria, Esq. is a former Washoe County
Dist. Atty. it is important to note that the defendant immediately after the arrest in this matter which occurred
just days after the defendant filed a complaint with the Reno Police Department alleging police misconduct
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and that time when the Reno city's attorneys office was aware of such a complaint the defendant sought a copy
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of the police report from the arrest for which the trial in this case involved the Reno Sparks Indian colony
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repeatedly refused to provide a copy of this report both in response to written and in person request by the
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defendant for these materials including the conversation with a sergeant haven't seen who repeatedly gave
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conflicting contradictory statements with regard to the existence of such materials availability thereof and
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whether or not they had been provided to the Reno city attorney's office the defendant called the Reno city
attorney's office and spoke with Reno city attorney deputy Christopher Hazlitt Stevens in the week following
the September 9, 2011 arrest Mr. Hazlitt Stevens informed the accused that he Reno city attorney's office did
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not having materials incident to the arrest and would nine back have any such. Until after the arraignment
which was set equal month out from the September 9 arrest for October 10 subsequent productions from the
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Reno city attorney's office indicate that the Reno city attorney's office had received faxes from the Reno
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Sparks Indian colony it didn't take a genius or Sherlock Holmes to figure this out as fax headers bear witness
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to that these of the the documents produced by Reno city attorney Pam Roberts bearing complete and again the
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fax headers with her page numbers and page counts indicate that not everything is been provided in addition
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indicating that shortly after the September 9 arrest and probably incident to the fuss and sunshine the
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defendant was bringing to this matter people were busy data Reno Sparks Indian colony Police Department
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and the Reno city attorney's us particularly in light of the September 7 complaint filed by the defendant
alleging police misconduct by the been P which happened to involve some of the very same issues before the
court in this matter specifically retaliatory prosecution and retaliatory arrest incident to citizens invoking or
attempting to insert their constitutional rights including those guaranteed by the fourth and Fifth Amendment
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Reno city attorney prosecutor Pam Roberts is a big fan of spelunking in fact Ms. Roberts seems to hate
sunshine or what other conclusion could one make upon a review of this record Ms. Roberts seeks to have this
appeal dismiss before it even gets off the ground based upon some perverted interpretation of NRS 189.010
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she lies to this court when she suggests that a CD was not provided to her office and she is gone to great
lengths to avoid hearing portion of the audio record wherein judge Howard announced or further rendered his
order with respect to the deadline to file a notice of appeal in this matter Ms. Roberts has apparently gone so
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far as to have her e-mail address shut down the one which is reversely been held up to public on the State Bar
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Nevada's website it undersigned attempted to provide Ms. Howard a strike that provide Ms. Roberts courtesy
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copy of the audio wherein judge Howard announced that the notice the deadline file a notice of appeal would
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not begin running until after three days incarceration he ordered incident to the summary contempt finding that
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judge Howard made justice can't 5 min. into the trial despite the fact that he said such a finding would result at
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trial continued judge Howard displayed even further just how crafty he can be when he really wants to get
something accomplished duet rather than continue the trial which might afford the accused some means of
obtaining the exculpatory materials for which unlawful rent distraint was being applied by Richard Hill
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Esquire incident to the wrongful eviction from the excuse former home law office where in the retaliatory at
intent of Walmart and its asset protection staff which had previously been expressly stated by Walmart and its
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asset protection staff could be accessed and provided to the court for the purpose of aiding in the defendants
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defense of the crime charged in this matter. He transcript of the trial in this matter is almost complete the
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undersigned urge is the court to refrain from doing that which the Reno Saturday attorney obviously one which
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is to prevent any sunshine showing on this matter or the troubling lack of checks and balances in the Reno
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Municipal Court and the problems incident to having a cabal of former prosecutors let loose in the hen house
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that is the Reno Municipal Court indeed these problems include the fact that the undersigned was denied the
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right by judge Howard it got covered 10 arraignment to know the names and identities of equal or former
prosecutors" that either the Reno city attorney or Reno Municipal Court has contracted with wide
representation to indigent defendants in matters for the Reno Municipal Court the undersigned in clearly be
heard on the record of that arraignment querying judge Gartner a former prosecutor himself much like judge
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Howard as to his right to know the names of these into individual contracted defenders this was necessary for
the purpose of doing complex checks and ascertaining their qualifications and characteristics judge Gartner
curtly refused to provide such information further judge Gardner's Marshall and Marshall Mentzel was may
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seem rude and threatening in response to the undersigned making queries at that time related to the sixth
amendment essentially the Reno Municipal Court once people, and there forked out some money and leave
causing the Reno Municipal Court is marshals and the Reno city attorney as little hassle along the way and as
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little expense as possible sometimes as here this is accomplished by skimping on things like the sick man right
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to counsel and involves extreme creativity specially on the part of judge Howard wherein he manages to not
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only denied the indigent criminal defendant his six-member right counsel where incarceration is ultimately
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ordered that he also manages to do so where no right to seek review of his summary contempt finding or estate
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thereof is afforded the accused is important to note that at the conclusion of the trial wearing Ms. Roberts had
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already gone home and the Walmart is loss prevention associate Fontenot and his two buddies on the Reno
Sparks Indian colony police force were milling about in the lobby outside the court spite the fact that two of
three witnesses in that group had finished testifying hours previous to the conclusion of the trial and
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incarceration of the accused pro se indigent defendant could been denied his right to counsel and where the
Reno Municipal Court apparently facing such great budget issues that skimping on the six-member right is
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necessary somehow still manage to keep upwards of six court employees working overtime for approximately
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4 hours so that the matter of such extraordinary public concern that of a Petit larceny trial wearing a candy bar
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was allegedly liberated from Walmart could be expeditiously addressed back to the October 10 arraignment
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Gartner refusing by the name of the prospective defenders Lewis tale was appointed to Mr. tales conflict
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checking procedures did not catch the fact that the defendant here the undersigned Coughlin had actually sued
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Nevada court services the process server with whom tale shares both in office and receptionist and which list
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table as associated with their business on the Nevada court services website tale violated Reno Municipal
Court rules in seeking withdraw from the matter without file a written motion in that regard only after Taylor
been pretty to extremely sensitive and confidential information and files incident the defense this matter tale
still is yet to divulge this are in any way document this impropriety instead tales good friend Roberta point as
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who also subsequently had revealed Coughlin that he has a business relationship with Nevada court services
himself mysteriously appeared in Mr. tales status counsel for the same defendant Coughlin in another matter
RMC 11 CR 26405 wherein Coughlin was charged with trespassing in connection to the same property
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involved in the eviction from Coughlin's former home office in Reno justice court case rev 2011 00 1708
which involve Richard G Hill Esquire signed a criminal complaint for trespass against Coughlin. While
Coughlin was arrested for trespass upon Hill submitting a sign criminal complaint to the same Reno Police
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Department officer Chris Carter that admitted to Coughlin that Hill bribes him, the Reno Police Department
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refused to arrest anyone from Coughlin's former Reno Municipal Court appointed public defender Luis take
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tolls business partners Nevada court services for their trespass upon Coughlin's former home law offices gated
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backyard which was caught on tape and can be seen on YouTube right now. It's also very incestuous and
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confusing that it would really take much than the five pages mentioned in the scores briefing order to spell it
17
18
19
out suffice to say Mr. Puentes was recently granted his motion to withdraw from representing Coughlin in the
trespass case before Reno Municipal Court by former prosecutor now Reno Municipal Court judge Gartner
who just a scant two years ago was working for the Reno city attorney's office who employs Pam Nifong, er,
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21
22
Pam Roberts, who cares not that she is suborning perjury of Walmart witness Fontenot and the two Reno
Sparks and incline police officers rest assured whether this appeal is dismissed or not or whether a de novo
23
trial is afforded as the undersigned believes it is as no one is argued or tablet that is orders court record and
24
that the hearing date set in this matter should not be treated as a real legitimate hearing date it's entirely
25
possible some sunshine his guests shine on this matter and all the incestuous conflict of interest and self-
26
dealing evident in the matter upon which this appeal is based
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A little sneak peek at the transcript for the case appealed here reveals:
- 9
1
2
"
Beginnings audio transcript at 2:11:56 PM
Coughlin: are you having them sit together because they are on the same team?
Marshall Mentzel: my courtroom. I put people where I want them.
Coughlin: okay but why are they put together?
7
8
Marshall: all rise department for the Reno Municipal Court staff session the Hon. Judge Howard presiding
Howard: be seated everyone
10
11
Roberts: Your Honor last cases city verse Zachary Coughlin 11 CR 22176 Mr. Coughlin would you step forward please
12
Howard all right this is the time and place set for trial in regard to a
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In regard to a heady larceny alleged to been committed on September 9 of this year complaint alleges that said defendant
15
on o and will will and will in no small him as him terribly shaken r about September 9 20 11th hour Walmart 2425 E. 2nd
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St. city of Reno state of Nevada did take carrying away Walmart property valued at less than $250 with the intent to
17
deprive Walmart of said property said property consisted of cough drops chocolate bar Mr. Coughlin is that your
18
understanding of the charge
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Coughlin:I believe so Your Honor
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Howard: all right part both parties ready to proceed at this time
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Robert: Yes, Your Honor
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Coughlin: no Your Honor I'm not ready to proceed
24
Howard: why not
25
Mr. Coughlin: Well, there is a variety of reasons, Your Honor
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Howard: you have to speak up if you want me..
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- 10
. Coughlin: yes sir Your Honor, there's a variety of reasons, sir, I would say chief of which is that it unlawful rent distraint
is currently being applied to my files that are necessary to defend this case I was evicted in justice court case REV2011-
001708 recently, besides having an impermissible rent escrow deposit applied to me in that case
Howard:what is that have to do with this case?
Coughlin: recently I have been affected all my files
Howard: right
Coughlin: all my files incident the defense of this case are currently being withheld under in him permissible rent distraint
in violation of NRS 40 - 25376 and 118 a.460
Howard what else you have other than this what else you have, as a basis for not being prepared?
10
Coughlin: I made numerous attempts to contact the Reno city attorney's office Ms. Roberts in attempts to discuss this
11
matter
12
Howard: Ms. Roberts
13
Coughlin: and I have not been able to reach her
14
Howard or that sound basis for Brenda continuance maybe she doesn't speak to she is not required to Coughlin further
15
there's a good deal of discovery that needs to be undertaken in this regard Walmart has been obstructive, as well as
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unintelligible
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Howard: what items of discovery
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Coughlin: well I'd like to take some depositions as well have them respond to some subpoena duces T comes I had served
19
on them
20
Howard what else
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Coughlin the same could be said for the Reno Sparks Indian: a this is a complex case in terms you have the Indian colony
22
renting property to Walmart while employing the same police patrolling the property on which they have a financial stake
23
in whether make an arrest there's fourth amendment issues involved in this case as well is 42 section 1983 abuse of
24
process's and police misconduct in terms of attempting to obtain consent an impermissible search through coercive means
25
this is not a simple little case civil recovery abuses are being alleged on the part of Walmart attempted state actors as well
26
I can probably put into words and math Your Honor Huck truly disruptive this eviction it is I was evicted from my home
27
office man attorney in the state of Nevada my client files are curling I don't even know if I should call the my files to my
28
- 11
clients files are being withheld under an impermissible rent distraint I was sexually assaulted by a bailiff in court the other
day
Howard in this court
Coughlin in justice court
Coughlin all of these matters can shipping to an unduly burdensome environment in which by that ability to defend this
case has been unduly prejudice in the extreme
Howard I thank you amended to my request to continue I guess whether this is a complex case is in the eye of the
beholder I don't typically find that these matters are as complex as you've indicated they are on that as well that much of
the argument that you made here relating to sexual assault of a bailiff and another core your inability to possess control
10
your client files have no relevance in my mind to proceeding with the charges and petty larceny alleged to have occurred
11
at Walmart on September 9
12
Coughlin not just my client files or materials needed to defend this case are being withheld
13
Howard I interrupt you sir don't interrupt me
14
Coughlin yester
15
Howard additional note that the last hearing November 14 the city was present with three witnesses the matter was
16
continued initially indicated that we would note Mr. Coughlin's failure to appear we ordered a bench warrant and $1000
17
cash bail only to discover unfortunately for Mr. Coughlin was in custody so the matter was reset will will I think there's
18
been sufficient time to prepare for trial in this matter so we will proceed with trial all witnesses please stand rich array can
19
be sworn please
20
Coughlin if I can just know my objections for the record will
21
Howard standing objections
22
Coughlin Ms. Howard has agreed to a continuance submitting a written agreement to the continues this matter
23
Howard Ms. Roberts
24
Roberts he initially had asked for a motion to continue sometime ago I went was for the 14th and I did not object at that
25
time am I think you sent me an e-mail after the 14th and I said I would not object but Your Honor so at that time I did not
26
object he has filed filed additional motions with additional allegations that I think should be stricken and not considered
27
by this court and I'd like to withdraw my lack of opposition to continuance
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- 12
Howard will in any event this court is not going to agree to the stipulation if there was a stipulation to continue without
witnesses witnesses here for second time they're ready to proceed this case going forward they will judge but will swear
the witnesses
Marshall G swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth
witnesses yester
Marshall evolved and sworn
Howard all right Mr. Coughlin do I need to go over the here today?
Coughlin yester and Howard the city has a burden of proof and as such will allow Ms. Roberts to proceed with its case in
chief initially she can do so by calling one more witnesses to the witness stand you have an opportunity to cross examine
10
each of those witnesses once she has completed she can honestly offer any physical or documentary evidence that she
11
feels is relevant obviously subject to any objections that you might have to relevancy initiatives by this court wants the
12
city has concluded its case you will have not Saturday to present a defense case I highlight the word opportunity because I
13
think you understand there is no requirement that you present any evidence whatsoever and back should you choose not
14
to testify this court there's no inference as to your guilt or urine hundred cents based on your decision not to testify on the
15
other hand you have an absolute right to offer testimony in the form of witnesses including yourself realizing that each of
16
those witnesses will be subject to cross-examination by the city attorney in fact if you have any additional evidence
17
physical or documentary that you would like me to review in most circumstances I will do so subject once again to any
18
objections that the city attorney and he might have to that evidence once the two of you have submitted your respective
19
cases I will allow both of you to make closing arguments once concluded this court will render a decision as your guilt for
20
your innocence do understand?
21
Coughlin I do have a question Your Honor the couple you mentioned that I would be able to present evidence if that
22
evidence is being withheld from me at this point and it's pending a stay in motion for return of personal property in justice
23
court I would be precluded from action accessing that evidence?
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Howard I've ruled on that already have I not
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Coughlin it sounded like you said it didn't matter
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Howard I don't find that it's relevant to go forward with the trial today
27
Coughlin so if I have video evidence of retaliatory intent by Walmart
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Howard you should've brought it with you today

- 13
Coughlin but if it's being withheld impermissibly under the law
Howard: we are going forward today I have addressed the issue you can bring it up on appeal if you feel that the decision
of the scores in proper understood
Coughlin yester Your Honor yes if I question I did with
Howard Mr. Coughlin lets you and I have a agreement today that we will be respectful of one another you can tender any
objections that you may have I do not want you to be repetitious if you made an objection or a presentation and I've ruled
on it except that and let's move on to understanding I do however
Coughlin I do however to the extent that you've told me that my life and career are not worth a continuance because it
might cost Walmart associate another trip to the court house I don't see we are being respectful of me Your Honor
10
2:27 PM
11
Howard very good but proceed
12
Roberts Your Honor Ryan can invoke exclusionary rule asked Thomas and Tina is by
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Coughlin Your Honor FICA just interject and address a couple preliminary motions in limine and exclusionary motions
14
Howard got
15
Coughlin won't ask any of the discovery that there Reno city attorneys provided be excluded under them motion in
16
lemonade exclusionary rule and that we fully briefed the issues there and if before any such such discovery is admitted in
17
evidence
18
Howard which emotional lemony
19
Coughlin to exclude the the written statements of Mr. Fontenot and the
20
Howard will on what basis do like often that their violative of the fourth amendment
21
city
22
Howard city a response
23
Roberts I think he is articulate how they invoke the fourth fifth amendments rather than just make bald assertion that
24
they've violative will
25
Howard well and good and denied a request many in NRS 170 4125 motions are required to be made prior to trial you
26
failed to do that in written form on knock in or register them at this point in time because there have the obvious effect of
27
continuing this preceding today and I think that's where you're going not request that
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Coughlin and I'll just Internet injection

- 14
Howard I want to hear anything further is denied
Coughlin winey dinner my objections to the records are mad do so
Howard Mr. Coughlin and giving you fair warning if you continue to persist in this line of performance I'm going to hold
you in contempt 2:29 PM
Coughlin I won't be bullied into and not entering my objections on the record new line Howard this matter will be
continued because you're going to be placed in custody now you can giving fair warning let's proceed
Coughlin Your Honor may I enter my objections in the record to preserve them for the record on appeal
Howard go ahead
Coughlin seems as though you've just told me that I may not because you just told me you are going to have to be arrested
10
if I do so I am a little scared to do that at this point Your Honor and I move for your recusal from this case on that basis
11
Howard
12
Coughlin paroles
13
Howard denies
14
Coughlin okay then can I enter my record and state the basis for my objections for the motions in limine
15
Howard Mr. Coughlin let's proceed Baker objections on the record now go ahead
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Coughlin okay citizen originally get angry I believe I have. Those motions submit I believe I have submitted those
17
motions in writing
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Howard and they have been denied
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Coughlin well it seemed as though a second ago Your Honor said that they had not been submitted in writing
20
Howard: all right (pounds fist on desk making very loud sound! Microphone now functions with feedback for an extended
21
period of time )
22
2:30:6: PM:
23
Coughlin further there is a coercive attempt to procure consent to a search based upon not consenting. Probable cause was
24
buttressed upon a failure to not consent to search which as you stated earlier Your Honor asserting Fifth Amendment or
25
fourth man right cannot be used to infer evidence of guilt will or to buttress a probable cause finding for a search
26
particularly for a search that occurs prior to arrest
27
Howard: anything further?
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- 15
Coughlin I do I am terribly shaken by what you said to me, Sir, and it's affected my ability to concentrate right now and
defend my case given the 0 to 60 in one second approach that I have witnessed you take with me today in terms of
threatening me with content upon the first attempt I believe I made to preserve and objections for the record further I
believe my motion for reconsideration for counsel was never ruled on there is a six amendment right to counsel where the
possibility of jail time is
Howard: your initial motion has been previously denied all denied again in regard to motion for counsel all denied again
for the record that is founded upon Scott versus Illinois which is that an injured event and visual as you claim you are if
they are not going to be sentenced to jail time there is no requirement of the appointment of counsel..."
9
10
11
12
That's just a taste in the transcript will reveal much of interest to the District Court and in fact much for which the District
13
Court likely has some liabilities should it seek to turn a blind eye to the due process deficiencies endemic to that which
14
occurs on a daily basis in the Reno Municipal Court. Further it's disturbing to have that the Reno Municipal Court has
15
clearly submitted to the District Court a record on appeal but is entirely incomplete and attempts to thwart the
16
undersigned's attempts to expose some of the problems in due process deficiencies prevalent within the Reno Municipal
17
Court at this time in addition to the various factual and legal bases for this appeal the undersigned has this court forced the
18
Reno Municipal Court to provide actual one page per page reproductions of the Iowa means all of them at the
19
undersigned sheet approval file from Reno Municipal Court for office supervisor Donna Ballard instead of these
20
decidedly illegible four pages per page versions additionally incorporated by reference are all the arguments factual and
21
legal assertions made within the opposition and any other filings in this or the trial court the opposition the motion to
22
dismiss filed by Ms. Roberts further as this court has made clear to the undersigned in other cases the failure to oppose a
23
motion will be taken under the Pope case and district court rule 13 as admission of the validity of the arguments made and
24
for which no opposition was provided in that regard Ms. Roberts court refusal to respond to any of the matters set forth in
25
the undersigned's recent filings in this case should r result in the same types of admissions that the undersigned has had
26
found as rising against him in other cases in Department 10, further is troubling that were some departments prefer to
27
decide cases on the merits other departments indicate to certain litigants that NRCP 6(e) does not accord litigants an
28
additional three days to respond to notions etc. where electronic service has occurred despite the plain reading of that rule
- 16
indicating that it does. Also, see Deboer. The undersigned signed a test under penalty of perjury that upon information
believed to factual legal assertions made herein are true to the best of his knowledge although admittedly this recitation
given the exigencies and Harrington Reno city attorney Roberts was about intention to make sure this case never sees
the light of judicial review.
5
6
Additionally judge Howard admitted he was remiss not informing the undersigned of his right to appeal
respect to the conviction the Petit larceny charge however judge Howard could be said to have attempted to
8
9
10
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12
13
14
mislead the undersigned with respect to whether or not he would have any right to appeal the summary
contempt finding as upon being queried in that regard judge Howard denied that any such review would be
accorded in curtly stated that he was going forward with that despite his "saddened by the extent to which
doing so would prejudice the undersigned engaging criminal defendant attorneys clients cases.
Notes from review of Record on Appeal
Clearly the Record on Appeal from the Reno Municipal Court is missing much of what Coughlin filed.
15
The RMC expressly gave Coughlin permission to file by email rather than fax. That permission cannot
16
reasonably be said to have been revoked prior to December 20th, 2011. As such, the full "one page per page"
17
production of the various filing Coughlin submitted to the RMC (whith the express written permission of RMC
18
Filing Office Supervisor Donna Ballard) shoudl be included in the Record on Appeal, not the "four page per
19
page" version that has been scanned n by the RMC in a manner to make it especially illegible.
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22
23
24
25
26
27
The undersigned is filing now (attached as Exhibit X) a copy of the Record on Appeal, which the
RMC has apparently title "APPEAL PROCEEDINGS FROM MUNICIPAL'S COURT" (which includes on
bates stamped page 2 a "CERTIFIED COPY OF DOCKET".
Page 9 of the ROA reveals the "ARREST REPORT AND DECLARATION OF PROBABLE
CAUSE" filled out by Reno Sparks Indian Colony (RSIC) Officer Cameron Crawford. Crawford perjured
28
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himself with his testimony at trial in this matter (and Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts suborned his perjury in
violation of numerous Rules of Professional Conduct and prosecutorial standards).
3
4
5
6
7
Crawfords testimony is littered with lying and or sloppy errors, justifying overturning the conviction in this
matter. At 5:54 pm on the audio transcript from 11/30/11 in RMC 11 CR 22176 (AT) Cameron incidates that
the UPC for the "cough drops" Coughlin was accused of stealing "did not appear on the receipt" of the items
8
9
10
11
Coughlin actually purchased:
Crawford: I did check for the UPC, yes, just the numbers
Coughlin: for which?
12
Cr: For both.
13
Co: For Both? So, now you're saying that the UPC for the cough drops did not appear on the receipt?
14
Cr: Correct.
15
Co: So, if the UPC for the cough drops does appear on the receipt, that would make your testimony, inaccurate
16
or unreliable?
17
18
Cr: I guess. I don't know.
Co: You guess?
19
20
21
22
23
Also at 6:05pm Crawford amdits (and that when he showed up to the scened, Walmart's Frontino
24
already had a Criminal Complaint filled out. This directly contradicts Frontino's earlier testimony that day that
25
Frontino did not know Coughlin's name prior to Crawford receiving it from Coughlin, and that Frontino did
26
not have a Criminal Complaint filled out, with Couglhin's name inserted into even prior to Crawford and
27
Braunworth showing up to investigate. Frontino clearly offered perjured testimony in that regard. THIS
28
DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS Frontinos ealiery tetiomy that he didnotknow Coughlin's nme priorto rawford
- 18
getting it from Coulhin. Furter, this implicates Frotino for perjruyeve further i consideration of te fact tat
Frontino lied wene idicated tat he id ot ave a seetofc paperwih Coughln's nam isat ext to Couhli
wimmediatelwenFrontinoescorted Coughlin backto Walmar'ts nterrogation room
4
5
6
7
At 6:06 pm AT Crawford indicates that he only conducted the search of Coughlin's pockets after he placed
handcuffs on Coughlin.
8
9
10
11
Further, Crawford clearly performs an impermissible search of Coughlin's bag on the "AP OVERVIEW9/9/2011" video (hereinafter "AP Overview", see attached as Exhibit X) at 9:28:30, well prior to any cuffs
12
being put on and well prior Crawford searchign in Coughlin's pockets. It is this bullying, menacing approach,
13
combined with Crawfords oft exhibited willingness to bend the rules as to the Bill of Rights (when he is even
14
aware they exist) that is truly troubly, particularly where it is the same entity that is paying Crawfords check
15
that is renting the land to Wal-Mart. Crawford can be seen at various points in the AP Overview video jab
16
stepping towards Couglin, over and over, in an overly aggressive fashion, with the standing Crawford jutting
17
18
his crotch towards the sitting Coughlin's face, over and over, in some sort of precursor to an apparent bull rush.
It is ridiculous to watch.
19
20
21
22
Further, earlier in this "AP Overview" video at 9:24:27 pm Coughlin can clearly be seen responding to
Crawfords request for Coughlin's driver's license by giving Crawford Coughlin's driver's license. Crawford
23
lied about this at trial, and even asserted that he was unable to issue a citation to Coughlin in light of
24
Coughlin's refusal to provide Coughlin's drivers license. However, the Arrest Report and Probable Cause
25
sheet Crawford filled out (see the ROA page 9) clearly show that Crawford had Coughlin's driver's license
26
number (which he got from the driver's license Coughlin gave Crawford, as shown in the AP Overview video
27
at 9:24:24 pm). Further, as indicated on the probable cause sheet, Crawford wrote down the address for
28
Coughlin from Coughlin's driver's license: 121 River Rock St. Reno, NV 89501. Additionally, Crawford
- 19
grabs Coughlin's shopping bag from out of Coughlin's hands at 9:24:36 pm, in an impemissilbe show of
dominance and abuse of power, occuring well prior to any "technical" point of arrest. Crawford tried to
describe this process as Coughlin "voluntarily" submitting to a sort of weapons frisk, however the video
reveals something far from a voluntary encounter, with Crawford himself committing a crime by grabbing the
5
6
7
bag out of Coughlin's hands, then lying about it in his report and subsequently at Trial. Further, Crawford
goes beyond a simple "pat down to check for weapons" when he pulls Coughlin's hat off of Coughlin's head at
9:25:09 pm.
8
9
10
11
Crawford received Coughlin's driver's license from Coughlin at 9:24:27 PM in the AP Overview
video. The video clearly reveals it is Coughlin's State of Nevad drivers license Coughlin hands to Crawford,
which Crawford subsequently called into the Incline Dispatch Center (which contracts with the RSIC) to run a
12
check for priors using Coughlin's name and drivers license number. Upon receiving the driver's license,
13
Crawford looks at it and pins it to a clip on his front right shirt pocket, shortly before conducting a pat down of
14
Coughlin. At 9:24:30 pm the female hispanic Wal-Mart employee re-enters to small 10 by 10 foot confined
15
interrogation room, making it 2 RSIC Officers and two Wal-mart AP Associates/supervisors in the room with
16
Coughlin. At 9:24:50 pm, Walmart's Frontino can clearly be seen planting somethign into Coughlin's
17
18
shopping bag. Next at 9:25:18 pm, another male, caucasian Walmart AP Associate enters this small, confined
interrogation room, making it five on one.
19
20
21
22
At the beginning of what was provided by the Reno City Attorney as the AP Overview video, at
9:17:36 pm, Frontino enters the interrogation room ahead of Coughlin, whom enters with the shopping cart
23
and bag of some $85 worth of purchases he had just paid for. In the lower right hand corner of the screen
24
clearly visibile is a computer monitor and printer atop a desk. Atop this printer is a CD/DVD disk in a
25
white sleeve. Frontino and an another Walmart AP Associate are in the room with Coughlin seconds later.
26
AT 9:17:45 Frontino reaches into the shopping cart and pulls what appears to be a brown wrapper of some sort
27
out. This wrapper is clearly set in the middle of a near empty shopping cart (Coughlin's $85 worth of purchase
28
all fit within a singular small white plastic shopping bag which. This brown wrapper does not have anything
- 20
atop it obscurring it in any way where it was in the shopping cart prior to Frontino pulling it out. Upon
information and belief, as is standard operating procedure for Walmart's AP personnel in this situations, the
unnamed Walmart AP Associate can be seen pressing record on his record device at the 9:17:58 mark, though
Walmart would subsequently deny having any such audio records and would further fail to respond to
Coughlin's Subpoena duces tecum.
6
7
8
9
10
11
At the 9:18:55 pm mark a Walmart Customer Service Manager ("Matt") in an Oakland Raider's jersey enters
the room. Frontino attempts to give this CSM the items he believes were stolen to this CSM, along with a red
bag of M&M's. However, Frontino's attempt to include this bag of M&M's in what is delivered to the CSM
12
(who, obstensibly goes off with the items to create a "receipt" of the allegedly stolen items) is rebuffed by the
13
unnamed Walmart AP Associate also in the room at the time. At Trial, Frontino testified that this Associate
14
was not present during the relevant times, as he was "on break".
15
16
17
18
19
At 9:19:09 Frontino is seen opening and reachign into the left upper drawer of his desk and pulling out
a clipboard with paper affixed to it. From this time until a full four minutes later at 9:23:15 when the RSIC
Officer's Braunworth and trainee Crawford arrive, Frontino can be seen threatening and attempting to
alternatively intimidate Coughlin and offer Coughlin "deals" whereby an admission will be treated with
20
21
22
lenience in the form of "letting you go" . Unnamed can be seen adjusting his recording device and walkie talk
at 9:22:34 pm. At 9:24:11 pm Frontino pulls out a sheet of paper from a file in his lower left desk drawer. At
23
9:24:32 a hispanic female Walmart Supervisor enters the room, making the total 2 Walmart employees, and
24
two RSIC Officers and Coughlin in a 10 foot by 10 foot room. While jutting his crotch forward into the sitting
25
Coughlin's face, Crawford grabs the plastic bag with Coughlin's purchases out of Coughlin's lap and demands
26
that Coughlin allow him to do a "pat down" to check for weapons. This weapons check "pat down" beginning
27
at 9:25:00 pm is overly long and involves much manipulation and rubbing of Coughlin's pockets, well beyond
28
that reasonably necessary to assure the suspect did not have a weapon.
- 21
1
2
Crawford lied about whether Coughlin would provide his driver's license because he is sneaky and
dishonest. Crawford knew that the law in Nevada does not allow for an Officer like Crawford to arrest one
accused of a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the officer. In such situations, an Officer may
5
6
7
issue a citation, but not conduct a custodial arrest. Without a custodial arrest, the officer is unable to perform a
search incident to an arrest. However, Crawford badly wanted to perform such a search incident to arrest here,
and so he lied about whether Coughlin provided his driver's license. Then, at Trial, Crawford lied about just
8
9
10
11
how he was able to get Coughlin's drivers license number, address, date of birth adn teh exact height and
weight listed on Coughlin's drivers license if Crawford did not receive the driver's license form Coughlin upon
request. It is particularly troubling that Crawford lied there, saying that he received all that information at the
12
Washoe County Jail. This is patently false. Crawford showed up to the jail with Braunworth, transferred
13
custody of Coughlin to the jail, and left shortly thereafter. Coughlin was present the entire time that Crawford
14
was at the jail and no such documentation was provided by the jail to Crawford, and Crawford did not fill out
15
any further paperwork while at the jail. Further, if that really was the case, then why wouldn't the Jail have
16
provided Crawford Coughlin's sociial securty number (that is called for on the Arrest and Probable Cause
17
18
19
sheet Crawford filled out)? The same could be asked for the other blanks askign for information on that form,
including the suspects: place of birth, home phone, business phone, next of kin, ocupation and business
address, etc., etc.
20
21
22
Further, and this is important for jurisidctional purposes considering one with any hint of tribal or
23
Native American blood who is accused of a crime of this nature while on tribal land is only triable in Tribal
24
Court, Crawford lied when filling out this Arrest Report and Declaration of Probable Cause (hereinafter
25
ARDPC) when he indicates that Coughlin's race is "White" and his ethnicity is "Non-hispanic". Coughlin did
26
not indicate what race or ethnicity he is to Crawford or anybody else on this date. Crawford made the
27
expedient choice and put down his own opinion about Coughlin's race and ethnicity. The conviction is void
28
for lack of jurisdiction in that regard.

- 22
1
2
3
Further on page 9 of the ARDPC, Crawford swears: "The undlersigned, Kameron Crawford, a police officer,
of RSIC, hereby declares under penalty of perjury that the above-named defendant has been arrested on
5
6
7
probable cause and is subject to detention for the above-iisted offense(s). Either personally or upon
information and belief this officer leamed the following facts and circumstances which support the arrest and
detention: On 9/9/11 at about 2121 hours, I responded to 2425 E. 2nd St. Reno, NV 89502 for a petit larceny.
8
9
10
Upon my arrival I met with asset protection associate Thomas Frontino who made a citizens arrest for petit
larceny. Frontino was in possession of the stolen items."
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It is not clear at all how Frontino could have "been in possession of the stolen items" without having
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conducted a "search incident to" "citizens arrest" (which, as both Wal-Mart's Frontino and Crawford testified,
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is against Wal-Marts policy and did not occur here. This type of sloppy and reckless approach to evidence
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gathering and police work pervades Crawford's approach. Further, there was no testimony offered that
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Frontino made a "citizens arrest" and this ARDPC was not included in the copy of the Criminal Complaint
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served on Coughlin and it was not introduced into evidence at Trial. Further, Coughlin's driver's license
number is statutorily defined as a piece of personally identifiable information and as such should be redacted
from the Record on Appeal and any other documents in the public record.
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The "fruits" of the impermissible search by Crawford must be subject to the exclusionary rule as
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clearly, nothing in this ARDPC could reasonably be said to give Crawford probable cause to conduct a search
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incident to arrest, particularly where the alleged conduct upon which this misdemeanor charge stems from did
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not occur in the officer's presence. This is particularly true given the absolute lack of anything in the ARDPC
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that could be said to state, with any degree of specificity or particularity, just what exactly is was that formed
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the basis for the finding of probable cause, other than completely conclusory and circular assertsion made only
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by the preprinted text of the ARDPC itself. Simply put, this is robo-police work at its absolute worst. The
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menacing, lunging posture Crawford took throughout the overly long interrogation in a back room at Wal-
Mart, which, curiously, was taped by two video cameras, yet was "supposedly" not not audio recorded by
either Wal-Mart, or any of the three AP associates or one Store Manager who were in and out of the room. AP
worker Frontino and a hispanic female Wal-Mart supervisor can be seen in the AP Overview video givin each
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other a "high five" at 9:24:50 pm. Hopefully that "high five" will be worth it to Wal-Mart for the ensuing
rounds of litigation that will undoubtedly stem from this wrongful arrest, which will likely include, but not be
limited to claims for wrongfull arrest, defamation, conspiracy, retaliation, fraud, etc., etc.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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Nature of the Case
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Course of Proceedings in the District Court
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

T
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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Appellate issues involving a purely legal question are reviewed de novo. Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev.
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, , 244 P.3d 765, 775 (2010).
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Wal-Mart did not present any evidence of fingerprints, or produce the actual cough drop boxes or
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chololate bar wrapper.
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We generally review a district courts decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion, Hernandez v. State, 124 Nev. 639, 646, 188 P.3d 1126, 1131 (2008), but to the extent the
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evidentiary ruling rests on a legal interpretation of the evidence code, de novo review obtains. See
United States v. LeShore, 543 F.3d 935, 941 (7th Cir. 2008).
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A
The Trial Court admitted rank hearsay violating Coughlin's right to confrontation by
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an unidentified declarant.
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There was Insufficient Evidence to Support Coughlin's Conviction for
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Petit Larceny and for the Summary Contempt finding as well. Further clear error was present in mnay
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respects here and the trial court committed reversible Error by Admitting Inadmissible Hearsay
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Statements
Against Coughlin?
To satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause , if the State seeks to introduce
hearsay statements against a criminal defendant, such evidence must bear adequate indicia of
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reliability by either falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception , or the State must
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demonstrate that the statement possesses particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. If the
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statement does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception , the statement is "presumptively,
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unreliable and inadmissible for confrontation clause purposes ." Ramirez v. State, 114 Nev. 550,
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958 P.2d, 724, 729 (Nev. 1998) (citations omitted).
The Trial Court admitted an improper hearsay statement during the testimony
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of Frontino. It was clear error for Judge Howard to allow Frontino to announce rank unspported
hearsay that actually demonstrates Frontino's perjury, for the purposes of discrediting the accuses,
while at the same time repeatedly refusing to allow any inquiry into WalMarts expressly stated
retaliatory intent and expresses intention to abuse process against the defendant here. Further
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subpoenas and subpoena duces decums were file in this matter yet Walmart and it employees did not
show up or otherwsie respond or produce these materials.
Whenever .............. a hearsay statement by a non-testifying
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declarent that does not come within any exception to the

hearsay rule....is admitted against a criminal defendant, there
is presumptively a confrontation clause violation , subject only
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to the prosecutor's ability to meet its burden of showing that
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the circumstances under which the statement was made gave it
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adequate particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id at
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729.
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V. Did the Prosecution Commit Prosecutorial Misconduct by suborning perjury, lying about whether
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they had already received materials from teh RSIC, failign ot provide all exclupatory materials, or
recklessly ignoring all the holes in Walmart and the RSIC PD's stories?
The Trial Court Violated Coughlin ' s 6th Amendment Right to
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Confront Witnesses When it Prohibited Defense Counsel from

Conducting Full and Complete Cross -examination?
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The cornerstone of our criminal justice system is that the accused enjoys the right to
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confront all witnesses against him. U.S. C. Const p. amend. 6. The Constitutional right of crossexamination
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may be a defendant's only recourse to refute evidence against him. When a witness
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gives testimony that is false or evasive the confrontation clause is satisfied only by giving the
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defense full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through examination.
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Pantaro v. State, 138 P. 3d 477 (Nev. 2006).

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TTrial Court's have wide discretion to control crossexamination
that attacks a witnesses general credibility,
however a trial court 's discretion is ...narrowed or bias
(motive) is the object to be shown and the examiner must be
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permitted to elicit any facts which might color a witnesses

testimony. Id.
The Defense should have been permitted to ask the three witnesses all of the questions that were
objected to and for which the RMC refused to allow the defendnat to ask.
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The Coughlin record on appeal might have received a significantly different impression of the three
11
witnesses and and his credibility if Defense Counsel had been permitted to cross-examine on the
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issue of whether the witness lied in his sworn statement to police and whether the RSIC
Officer's lied, etc.
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NRS 50.085(3) permits impeaching a witness on cross-examination about questions

about specific acts as long as the impeachment pertains to truthfulness or untruthfulness and no
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extrinsic evidence is used.
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CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
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PVIII. Did the Trial Court Commit Judicial Misconduct Throughout the
Trial Which Prejudiced Coughlin ' s Right to Due Process?
A trial court should act as a referee of the contest between the parties. It should be fair
and impartial as between the parties and their attorneys and allow them considerable freedom in
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the presentation of their respective cases in their own way. A trial court has a certain amount of
discretion to control the proceedings before it. The court is constrained however by a requirement
that all criminal defendants are entitled to a fair trial. If the actions of the trial court prejudice a
defendant's right to a fair trial then obviously an abuse of discretion is present. Belden v.
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Wyoming, 01-57, Wyo. 2003.
Trial Courts should be mindful that innocuous conduct in some circumstances may
constitute judicial misconduct. Judges should be mindful of the influence they wield. Parodi vs.
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B. Washoe Medical Center, 111 Nevada 365, 367. This court said it best in Parodi at 589.
The average juror is a laymen . The average laymen looks with the
most profound respect to the presiding judge and the jury is as a rule
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alert to any remark that will indicate favor or disfavor on the part of
the trial judge.
Human opinion is often times formed upon circumstances meager and insignificant in
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there outward appearance. And the words and utterances of a trial Judge sitting with a jury in
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attendance are liable, however unintentional, to mold the opinion of members of the jury to the
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extent that one or the other side of the controversy may be prejudiced or injured thereby. The
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influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly a great weight and his lightest
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word or intimation is received with deference and may prove controlling. Starr V. United States,
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153 U.S. 614 at 626. (1894).

This Court recognized in Parodi Id. at 591 that trial counsel is faced with a "hopson's
choice" of either objecting to the misconduct which of course has the attendant risks of
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antagonizing the trial judge further and exasperating the jury or by not objecting jeopardizing their
right for appellate review. This Court went on to rule that by failing to object, at the time of the
judicial misconduct, that appellate review would not be precluded. Errant conduct is reviewable
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under the plain error doctrine. Oade v. State, 114 Nev. 619, 960 P.2d 336 at 338.
24
Throughout Coughlin's trial the Trial Court repeatedly, however inadvertently and
25
unintentionally, expressed impatience and was discourteous to trial counsel. These comments had
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an adverse impact on Coughlin's trial counsel which in turn may have affected the acceptance or efficacy of
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Coughlin's defense.
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The errors cited herein were clearly erroneous, cumulative and had a prejudicial affect on
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Coughlin's case.
Examples of judicial misconduct in trying to usurp trial counsel's role are numerous and
are seen as early as opening statement.The Trial Court's remarks and actions throughout
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the trial were clearly prejudicial. What has been outlined for this court is not exhaustive of every
comment made by the Trial Court nor was it meant to be.
The highlights presented of judicial misconduct show cumulative error that was so
egregious and prejudicial that the defense could not get a fair trial, therefore Coughlin's case
should be reversed.
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Further is important to note that the Reno Police Department and opposing counsel novation case
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Richard G Hill joined forces again to get the undersigned arrested a custodial arrest mind you for
jaywalking on January 12, 2012 incident to the undersigned peacefully filming in collecting evidence of
from a public spot Hill and his perjury providing contractor Phil, that will ultimately be used in the
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wrongful eviction lawsuit that is sure to ensue and to which is now likely to be added a wrong all arrest
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last against the Reno Police Department, actually , these matters may best be set forth by copying a
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recent letter from the undersigned herein:
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theubject: RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
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Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800
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From: LStuchell@washoecounty.us
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CC: mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us
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Mr. Coughlin
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Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served by Deputy Machen
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by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The residence was unoccupied at the time.
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Liz Stuchell, Supervisor
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WCSO Civil Section
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From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
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Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:58 AM
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To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva, Roxanna; kadlicj@reno.gov;
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fourthestate@gmail.com; jamesandreboles@msn.com
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Subject: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
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Dear IA Supervisor Stuchell and DDA Kandaras,
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I realize you will likely not read all of this. The main thing is I am respectfully requesting that you
confirm with Deputy Machem that he did, in fact, "personally serve" the Summary Eviction Order on
me at 121 River Rock St., Reno 89501 on November 1, 2011 at 4:30 pm, in connection with performing
the lockout. It is my position that I was not "personally served" and I am trying to figure out whether
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Deputy Machem is lying or whether the phrase "personally served" means something other than what I
believe it means, etc., etc. I appreciate your attention to this.
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I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an Affidavit of Service filed by or for WCSO
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Deputy Machem with respect to the service of a Order Granting Summary Eviction against me (in my
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law office where non-payment of rent was not alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a
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$2,275 rent escrow deposit was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6), especially where a stay of
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eviction was not granted even while the RJC held on to most all my money...).
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My issue with the WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service indicates that he "personally served"
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me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and MERS fraud I come across in my day job
(and do you wonder how many attorneys in the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with
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who are watching and witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes
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being a foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me the Summary
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Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served" in compliance with all time
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related rules because it was done in the "usual custom and practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the
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"usual custom and practice of the WCSO? I hear a lot about this "within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go
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hunting for some black letter law to support what those at the RJC and in the clueless community at
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large (which often includes Nevada Legal Services and Washoe Legal Services, the people you guys had
such trouble actually serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may have actually helped improved legal
services in this community, if they were not dismissed due to insufficiency of service of process, even
where the IFP required the WCSO to served the defendants....). Anyway, back to the "within 24 hours"
phraseology: "
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This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of
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the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order... is inapplicable to this
situation, where an Order Granting Summary Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011. That
language is only found in situations inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS
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40.253(5)(a) are the only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and those
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situations only apply where, in:
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40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b) Advise the tenant: . (2)
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That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a
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summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant,
directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order
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and,
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40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the landlords agent may
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apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the justice court of the township in which the dwelling,
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apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located or to the district court of the county in
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which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has
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jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable
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of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The way these summary
eviction proceedings are being carried out in Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and
violates Nevada law. There is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did
in this case. The above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language are
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inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the Tenant did file an
Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To require Nevada's tenants to get up
and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the order (what does that even mean? The use of terms like
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rendition, rendered, notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt of the order
language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV statutory citations, and
in employment law litigations where one must file a Complaint within 90 days of receipt of a Right To
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Sue Letter, a situation which follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter,
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when actual receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon the days
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for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In Abraham v. Woods Hole
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Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did not reflect when the plaintiff
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received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on November 24, 2006. The court calculated that
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the 90-day period commenced on November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding
Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must
exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C.
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2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80
L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... ...
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Dear Washoe County Sheriff's Office,
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1
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_of_process
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"Substituted service
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When an individual party to be served is unavailable for personal service, many jurisdictions allow for
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substituted service. Substituted service allows the process server to leave service documents with
another responsible individual, called a person of suitable age and discretion, such as a cohabiting adult
or a teenager. Under the Federal Rules, substituted service may only be made at the abode or dwelling
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of the defendant.[4] California, New York,[5] Illinois, and many other United States jurisdictions
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require that in addition to substituted service, the documents be mailed to the recipient.[5] Substituted
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service often requires a serving party show that ordinary service is impracticable, that due diligence has
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been made to attempt to make personal service by delivery, and that substituted service will reach the
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party and effect notice.[5]"
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I am pretty sure "personally served" means you served the person in person, not that a person named
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Machem went and posted a notice on a door, personally himself. See, I think you guys are thinking of
the "person" in the word personally as applying to the server, when in all instances I have ever seen it
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used in the law, the "person" part of "personally" applies to the person being served. Help me out here,
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Mary.
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https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid=43084638f32f5f28&resid=43084638F32F5F28!
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1897&parid=root
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Also, does the WCSO have a position on what type of service is required of eviction orders prior to the
WCSO or whoever does it, being able to conduct a lockout?
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http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/nrcp.html
NRCP RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER... (c) Default Judgments: Defendant Not
Personally Served. When a default judgment shall have been taken against any party who was not
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personally served with summons and complaint, either in the State of Nevada or in any other
jurisdiction, and who has not entered a general appearance in the action, the court, after notice to the
adverse party, upon motion made within 6 months after the date of service of written notice of entry of
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such judgment, may vacate such judgment and allow the party or the partys legal representatives to
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answer to the merits of the original action. When, however, a party has been personally served with
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summons and complaint, either in the State of Nevada or in any other jurisdiction, the party must make
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application to be relieved from a default, a judgment, an order, or other proceeding taken against the
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party, or for permission to file an answer, in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (b) of this
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rule.
Okay, so, really, you guys do this for a living, right...you serve people things....and sign Affidavits under
penalty of perjury and stuff, and you are telling me you believe "personally served" can included
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situations where the person was not there? Okay.....You do know that, like, a Summons and Complaint
need to be "personally served" in the sense that, say Machem, would need to see that person and serve it
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on them (I don't think they have to take the paper, they don't need to agree to accept service, but
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Machem does need to see that person, in person, personally when he is swearing under penalty of
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perjury that he "personally served" somebody. Usually "personally served" is only done in the case of
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the first thing filed (unless there is an IFP) in a case, the Summons and Complaint. Thereafter, typically,
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people just effect "substituted service" because its cheaper, less of a hassle, and "personal service" is
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only required for serving the pleadings that start a case, the Summons and Complaint. Wow....Okay, so
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this is my whole point, these state sponsored lockouts under color of state law should not be being done
so fast, unless you guys "personally serve" the tenant, I feel the law is quite clear, you have to effect
"substituted service" which, under NRCP 6(a) and NRCP 6(e) and NRCP 5(b)(2) (and NRCP, not
JCRCP is applicable to eviction matters according to NRS 118A) the tenant cannot be deemed to have
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received or constructively received the Order until the 3 days for mailing has passed.
Personal service by process server
Personal service is service of process directly to the (or a) party named on the summons, complaint or
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petition. In most lawsuits in the United States, personal service is required to prove service. Most states
allow substituted service in almost all lawsuits unless you are serving a corporation, LLC, LLP, or other
business entity; in those cases, personal service must be achieved by serving (in hand) the documents to
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the "Registered Agent" of a business entity. Some states (Florida) do not require that the documents
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actually be handed to the individual. In California and most other states, the documents must be visible
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to the person being served, i.e., not in a sealed envelope. If the individual refuses to accept service, flees,
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closes the door, etc., and the individual has been positively identified as the person to be served,
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documents may be "drop" served, and it is considered a valid service. Personal service of process has
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been the hallmark for initialing litigation for nearly 100 years, primarily because it guarantees actual
notice to a defendant of a legal action against him or her. Personal service of process remains the most
reliable and efficacious way to both ensure compliance with constitutionally imposed due process
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requirements of notice to a defendant and the opportunity to be heard. [2]^ The National Law Review:
The Continuing Relevance of Personal Service of Process
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And even if something indicates Coughlin "knew" about the Order, much like in the case of Coughlin's
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that was dismissed where the Washoe County Sheriff's didn't manage to get the "personal service" of
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the Summons and Complaint done in time, or "sufficiently", opposing counsel in that matter could tell
you that "actual notice" is not a substitute for compliance with the service requirements.
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Which is nice because folks like Richard G. Hill, Esq. have less of an opportunity to game the system
and swoop in with lockout then assert a bunch of hooey about NRS 118A.460 "reasonable storage,
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moving, and inventorying expenses" subjecting the tenant's personal property to a lien. Richard G. Hill
insisted on throwing away the last thing my beloved grandmother gave me before she died 2 years ago in
the town dump. He and his contractor lied about so many things, including the fact that they used my
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own damn plywood to board up the back porch of the property, then submitted a bill to the court in an
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exhibit for $1,060 for "securing" the property (which doesn't really apply to NRS 118A.460's
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"reasonable storage moving and inventorying expenses" like it is required to...further, the charged me
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$900 a month for storage and sent me a bill for such prior to my arrest for trespassing at the 121 River
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Rock location,...well if they charged me $900 to have a home law office there, then how is it someone
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could be trespassing if they are being charged the full rental value for "use and occupancy of the
premises"? Further, even if it was a storage situations, there are sections of NRS 118A devoted to
evicting someone from a storage facility, not arresting them for trespass, and certainly not a custodial
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arrest where the RPD Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez admit they never issued a warning to me or
asked me to leave prior to conducting a custodial arrest (which required $800 of bail, great!, and 3 days
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in jail, no less). This is especially poor form where Officer Carter admitted to me that he takes bribes
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from Richard Hill. Hey, if Officer Carter did not say that to me, go ahead and sue me, my man....I'm
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waiting.....that's what I thought.
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He can say he was joking all he wants, but it ain't no joking ass situation to me when you are arresting
me and causing a google search result for my name to show an arrest....that's damaging the only thing I
have of monetary value (my professional reputation and name). It ain't no stand up hour when you are
putting me in cuffs, bro. And Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to properly query Hill as to
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whether he had sent me, prior to the trespassing arrest, a bill for the "full rental value" of the property,
a value that, at $900, was the same charge for the full "use and occupancy" of the premises. And
Richard G. HIll, Esq. was too busy chortling and filling out the Criminal Complaint to bother setting
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them straight, despite my cues, I guess.
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Now, add to that malfeasance the fact that Judge Sferrazza let Casey Baker, Esq. prepare the Order,
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which means faithfully put to writing what the Judge announced, not attempt to steal $2,275 for your
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Californian Beverly Hills High School graduate neurosurgeon client by slipping in something the judge
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never said, ie, that the neurosurgeon gets to keep the $2,275 that Judge Sferrazza order the tenant to
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pay into the Reno Justice Court as a "rent escrow" deposit required to preserve the right to litigate
habitability issues. Now, nevermind the fact that Judge Sferrazza actually did not have the jurisdiction
to require that (there is not JCRLV 44 in Reno, that's a Vegas rule, and if Reno wants a rule like that of
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its own JCRCP 83 requires the RJC to publish it and get it approved by the Nevada Supreme Court
first....period.). Okay, so, to take it a step even further, Baker's order goes on to say "but the $2,275
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won't be released to the neurosurgeon yet, "instead that sum shall serve as security for Coughlin's cost
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on appeal, pursuant to Nevada JCRCP 73...". But wait, doesn't that mean Coughlin then gets a Stay of
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Eviction during the pendency of the Appeal? Isnt' that was a security that large must be for? Because
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the "Appeal Bond" is set by statute at only a mere $250....so holding on to 10 times that much of
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Coughlin's cash must have been for the "Supersedeas Bond" mentioned a yielding one a Stay of
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Eviction in NRS 40.380 and 40.385.

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I know, I know, its confusing because actually those sections force the landlord, his attorneys and the
RJC to choose between viewing Coughlin as a residential tenant whose rent is less than $1,000, and
whom therefore is only required to post a measly supersedeas bond of $250 (and remember, a
supersedeas bond equals a stay of eviction equals not trespassing) or the the other choice is to view
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Coughlin as a commercial tenant, which would allow charging a higher supersedeas bond (except for
that pesky part about his rent being under the $1,000 required by the statute to do so, his rent being
only $900), except, darn it, old Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey Baker, Esq. elected to pursue this
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summary eviction proceeding under a No Cause Eviction Notice, which is not allowed against a
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commercial tenant (ie, you can't evict a commercial tenant using the summary eviction procedures set
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forth in NRS 40.253 unless you alllege non payment of rent and serve a 30 Day Non Payment of Rent
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Notice To Quit, which they didn't because they "are just taking the path of least resistance here, Your
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Honor (insert their smug chuckling and obnoxious/pretentious "can you believe this guy?" laughter and
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head shaking...).
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NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within 10 days, appeal from the judgment
rendered. But an appeal by the defendant shall not stay the execution of the judgment, unless, within the
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10 days, the defendant shall execute and file with the court or justice the defendants undertaking to the
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plaintiff, with two or more sureties, in an amount to be fixed by the court or justice, but which shall not
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be less than twice the amount of the judgment and costs, to the effect that, if the judgment appealed
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from be affirmed or the appeal be dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and the cost of appeal,
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the value of the use and occupation of the property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiff during
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the pendency of the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and filing the undertaking, all further proceedings
in the case shall be stayed.
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So, why on earth is the City Attorney's Office still trying to try Coughlin on the trespass charge for
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which he endured a custodial arrest and for which old Richard Hill is still filing Motion's to Show Cause
on in the appeal of the summary eviction matter in CV11-03628? Why, oh why? Does the Reno City
Attorney's Office have some sort of vested interest in keeping Coughlin down, busy, besotted,
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encumbered, or otherwise? It, why, it couldn't be because Coughlin has a really good wrongful arrest
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cause of action against the Reno Police Department, could it? http://www.youtube.com/watch?
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v=5PR7q4OI5b0
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And, well, yeah the Washoe County Sheriff's Office didn't quite get those Summons and Complaints
served in that one case Coughlin was suing his former employer in, the one where Coughlin was granted
an Order to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, which required the Washoe County Sheriff's Office to serve
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the Summons and Complaints....But what does that have to to with the 6 days Coughlin spent in jail on
the arrest shown in the youtube video above? Its not like the Washoe County jailed videotaped a scene
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where they were forcing Coughlin to get naked and put on a green dress. What's that? It is? They did do
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that? Really? No...What? They also forced him to simulate oral and anal sex with deputies, in the guise
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of some ridiculous "procedure" necessary to insure Deputy safety? Oh, wow. And they retaliated
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against him for failing to answer their religious preference interrogation questions by placing him in an
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icy cold cell for hours at a time, refusing him medical care despite his plaintive cries for help, while
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wearing a thin t-shirt? Wow. They didn't jam a taser needle in his spine for extended periods of time,
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though, did they? Your kidding! Whats next, your going tell me Sargent Sigfree of the Reno PD ordered
a custodial arrest on Coughlin for "jaywalking" while Coughlin was peacefully filming, from a public
spot, Richard G. Hill's fraudulent contractor Phil Howard destroying and taking to the town dump
items of enormous sentimental value to Coughlin that he was prevented from retrieving from the
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property during the scant time he was allowed to (after he paid $480 worth of a lien for what he knew
not, because, despite, ol' Contractor Phil's fraudulent $1,060 bill for "securing" the back porch (with
screws facing the outside, inexplicably, and a window unit a/c left in the window facing the sidewalk
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near the Lakemill Lodge, secured by nothing but duct tape
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It is kind of a combo neon sign that says "Burglarize this Place, Everybody!"), Coughlin's former home
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law office was burglarized on December 12, 2011 while Richard G. Hill was holding its contents
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(including, tackily, Coughlin's client's files, like the ones for the foreclosure defense actions, etc.),
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asserting his "lien". A lien for "storage" where the charge for storage, $900, was the same as the charge
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for "full use and occupany" was. However, that $900 a month for "storage" also included another
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$1,060 charge for "securing" (and that bill actually listed "fixing a leak in the basement...neither of
which seem to have much to do with the "reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying" expenses such
a lien is provided for under NRS 118A.460....). Jeez, your probably going to tell me Sargent Sigfree
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ordered another custodial arrest on Coughlin just two days after the jaywalking arrest, for the same
fact pattern that Master Edmondson granted Coughlin's applications for Protections Orders against
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based upon the battery and assaults that his former housemates committed. Because, Sargent Sigfree
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thinks its "misuse of 911" for Coughlin to call when he returns home at night and his dog has
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mysteriously disappeared, and his housemates make menacing commentary about it. Surely, Coughlin,
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a former domestic violence attorney would have nothing helpful to add to Sargnet Sigfree's expert
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opinion that "animal abuse is not domestic violence" (tell that to NRS 33.010, Sarge) and that its,
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rather, "a matter for animal control" and that Sargent Sigfree was "trying to help" Coughlin by
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arresting him, again, and necessitating the $1,500 bail associated with the gross misdemeanor charge,
"Misuse of 911" because, as Sargent Sigfree told Coughlin "you keep putting yourself in situations
where you are victimized" so it was necessary to arrest Coughlin in that regard.
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But hey, at least NV Energy hasn't refused to let Coughlin get any electrical service for the past week
since those with the Protection Orders against them cancelled the service and NV Energy shut it off,
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without providing any notice to Coughlin, right. Nevermind. But...but surely when NV Energy shut of
the power to Coughlin's home law office on October 4th, 2011, just hours prior to the bad faith
"inspection" with videographer of Coughlin' s home law office that Casey Baker, Esq. thought so very
12
necessary one day before Coughlin's Tenant Answer was due...surely NV Energy did not leave the back
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gate to Coughlin's home law office open and speed off, Coughlin's beloved mountain bike suddenly
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missing (the one the parents of his girlfriend of 5 years gave him)? Well, NV Energy is probably not
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retaliating against Coughlin for complaining about that by refusing him electric service for the past
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seven days, you would have to assume....
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NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of premises to pay rent
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during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to NRS 40.253:
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1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be obtained by filing with the
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trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the expected costs on appeal. A surety upon the bond
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submits to the jurisdiction of the appellate court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of that court as the
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suretys agent upon whom papers affecting the suretys liability upon the bond may be served. Liability
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of a surety may be enforced, or the bond may be released, on motion in the appellate court without
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independent action. A tenant of commercial property may obtain a stay of execution only upon the
issuance of a stay pursuant to Rule 8 of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and the posting of a
supersedeas bond in the amount of 100 percent of the unpaid rent claim of the landlord.
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2. A tenant who retains possession of the premises that are the subject of the appeal during the
pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the underlying contract
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between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes due. If the tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord
may initiate new proceedings for a summary eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant
to NRS 40.253.
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RS 40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings for want of form. In all cases of appeal
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under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, the appellate court shall not dismiss or quash the proceedings for
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want of form, provided the proceedings have been conducted substantially according to the provisions
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of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive; and amendments to the complaint, answer or summons, in matters of
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form only, may be allowed by the court at any time before final judgment upon such terms as may be
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just; and all matters of excuse, justification or avoidance of the allegations in the complaint may be
given in evidence under the answer.
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NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and Nevada
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Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so far as they are not
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inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned
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in those sections.
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But, back to the Sheriff's Office. And, I am not really buying the idea that you guys don't know NRCP 4
through 6 like the back of your hand, but....hell, maybe you don't. But, clearly the language in NRS 40
about how the Sheriff may "remove tenant from the property within 24 hours of receipt of the Order"
do not apply where the Tenant filed a Tenant's Answer and showed up to the Hearing and litigated the
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matter. Especially where, as here the lease had not terminated, by its terms, but was rather renewed.
This is particularly true where NRS 118A prevents so terminating a holdover tenant's lease for a
retaliatory or discriminatory purpose.
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I would hate to see people start to think the Washoe County Sheriff's Office is cutting corners on the
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whole "personally served" thing (just so a landlord could get what they want quicker), just like I would
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hate for people to think the Reno Municipal Court is letting the bottom line get in the way of providing
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that whole Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel where jail time is even a possibility thing. And, hey, if
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the RMC denies an indigent attorney the Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel, the finds him guilty of
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NRS 22.030, Summary Contempt Commited in the Presence of the Court, and the puts him in cuffs
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when the Trial ends, summarily sentencing him to 3 days in jail for violating NRS 22.030, well....that's
no big deal, right, I mean, the RMC technically kept its promise that the underyling charge, though
technically it could result in incarceration would not...because the incarceration was for a whole dang
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different charge, ie, Summary Contempt in the presence of the Court....and so what if the whole
zealous advocate thing and the denying the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel thing and the
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Summary Contempt thing don't go so well together....Or if 6 court employees had to stay til 9pm getting
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paid overtime at the RMC to get 'r done...
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NRCP 4: "(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be served together. The
plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made
by delivering a copy of the summons attached to a copy of the complaint as follows:...(6) Service Upon
Individuals. In all other cases to the defendant personally, or by leaving copies thereof at the
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defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process. [As amended; effective January 1, 2005.] (e) Same:
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Other Service. (1) Service by Publication. (i) General. In addition to methods of personal service, when
the person on whom service is to be made resides out of the state, or has departed from the state, or
cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or by concealment seeks to avoid the service of
12
summons, and the fact shall appear, by affidavit, to the satisfaction of the court or judge thereof, and it
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shall appear, either by affidavit or by a verified complaint on file, that a cause of action exists against
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the defendant in respect to whom the service is to be made, and that the defendant is a necessary or
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proper party to the action, such court or judge may grant an order that the service be made by the
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publication of summons. Provided, when said affidavit is based on the fact that the party on whom
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service is to be made resides out of the state, and the present address of the party is unknown, it shall be
a sufficient showing of such fact if the affiant shall state generally in such affidavit that at a previous
time such person resided out of this state in a certain place (naming the place and stating the latest date
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known to affiant when such party so resided there); that such place is the last place in which such party
resided to the knowledge of affiant; that such party no longer resides at such place; that affiant does not
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know the present place of residence of such party or where such party can be found; and that affiant
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does not know and has never been informed and has no reason to believe that such party now resides in
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this state; and, in such case, it shall be presumed that such party still resides and remains out of the
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state, and such affidavit shall be deemed to be a sufficient showing of due diligence to find the
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defendant. This rule shall apply to all manner of civil actions, including those for divorce"
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I guess it don't matter much to me which one of you pays me my damages for the wrongful eviction,
illegal lockout, whether its the landlord, his attorney, or the Sheriff's Office. Your money is always good
with me.
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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Subject: RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
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Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800
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From: LStuchell@washoecounty.us
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CC: mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us
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Mr. Coughlin,
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Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served by Deputy Machen
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by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The residence was unoccupied at the time.
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Liz Stuchell, Supervisor
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WCSO Civil Section
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From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
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Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:58 AM
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To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva, Roxanna; kadlicj@reno.gov;
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fourthestate@gmail.com; jamesandreboles@msn.com
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Subject: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
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Dear IA Supervisor Stuchell and DDA Kandaras,
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I realize you will likely not read all of this. The main thing is I am respectfully requesting that you
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confirm with Deputy Machem that he did, in fact, "personally serve" the Summary Eviction Order on
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me at 121 River Rock St., Reno 89501 on November 1, 2011 at 4:30 pm, in connection with performing
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the lockout. It is my position that I was not "personally served" and I am trying to figure out whether
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Deputy Machem is lying or whether the phrase "personally served" means something other than what I
believe it means, etc., etc. I appreciate your attention to this.
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I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an Affidavit of Service filed by or for WCSO
Deputy Machem with respect to the service of a Order Granting Summary Eviction against me (in my
law office where non-payment of rent was not alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a
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$2,275 rent escrow deposit was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6), especially where a stay of
eviction was not granted even while the RJC held on to most all my money...).
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My issue with the WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service indicates that he "personally served"
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me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and MERS fraud I come across in my day job
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(and do you wonder how many attorneys in the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with
15
who are watching and witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes
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being a foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me the Summary
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Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served" in compliance with all time
related rules because it was done in the "usual custom and practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the
"usual custom and practice of the WCSO? I hear a lot about this "within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go
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hunting for some black letter law to support what those at the RJC and in the clueless community at
large (which often includes Nevada Legal Services and Washoe Legal Services, the people you guys had
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such trouble actually serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may have actually helped improved legal
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services in this community, if they were not dismissed due to insufficiency of service of process, even
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where the IFP required the WCSO to served the defendants....). Anyway, back to the "within 24 hours"
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phraseology: "
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This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of
the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order... is inapplicable to this
situation, where an Order Granting Summary Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011. That
language is only found in situations inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS
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40.253(5)(a) are the only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and those
situations only apply where, in:
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40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b) Advise the tenant: . (2)
That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a
summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant,
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directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
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order
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and,
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40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the landlords agent may
apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the justice court of the township in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located or to the district court of the county in
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which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has
jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable
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of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The way these summary
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eviction proceedings are being carried out in Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and
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violates Nevada law. There is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did
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in this case. The above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language are
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inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the Tenant did file an
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Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To require Nevada's tenants to get up
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and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the order (what does that even mean? The use of terms like
rendition, rendered, notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt of the order
language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV statutory citations, and
in employment law litigations where one must file a Complaint within 90 days of receipt of a Right To
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Sue Letter, a situation which follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter,
when actual receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon the days
for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In Abraham v. Woods Hole
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Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did not reflect when the plaintiff
received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on November 24, 2006. The court calculated that
the 90-day period commenced on November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding
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Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must
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exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C.
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2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80
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L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).
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Further, despite what the inaccurate handouts of Nevada Legal Services may say about this 24 hours
and the applicability of the JCRCP to cases like these, NRS 40.400 Rules of practice, holds that :The
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provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative
to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS
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40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such NRCP 6(a),(e)
24
applies to the Order of Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy Machem alleged, under penalty of
25
perjury, that he "personally served" upon me on November 1, 2011. That is a lie by Mr. Machem,
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unless "personally served" is defined in a rather impersonal way and or Machem and I have totally
27
different understanding of the definition of "personally served", which may be the case. Or, perhaps the
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Sheriff's Office is busy and doesn't want to wait around to "personally serve" every tenant it wishes to
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evict. Fine, then just use the "mail it and allow three days" rule in NRCP 6(e)...the landlord's might not
like it, but they can use that frustration as an incentive not to jump to litigating every disagreement
about habitability that a tenant brings to them. You may not realize how ridiculous some landlord's get.
In my case, I offered to fix basic things that clearly implicated the habitability rules in NRS 118A.290
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and the Californian neurosurgeon, Beverly Hill High School graduate landlord balked and complained
then hired and attorney four days into a dispute.....at which point the rules against contacting
represented parties prevented much in the way of real settlement discussion, particularly where
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opposing counsel has continuously demonstrated a complete indifference to pursuing settlement (why
would he at the rates he bills hours at?). I just don't think the Sheriff's Office needs to sully its image or
damage the citizen tenants of Washoe County in the name of pleasing people like Dr. Matt Merliss or
Richard G. Hill, Esq.
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I AM REQUESTING, IN WRITING, THAT BOTH OF YOUR OFFICES INVESTIGATE THIS AND
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PROVIDE A SWORN AFFIDAVIT FROM MR. MACHEM THAT ADMITS THAT I WAS NOT
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PERSONALLY PRESENT WHEN HE SERVED THE ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION IN RJC
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REV2011-001708 ON 11/1/12 AT 4:30 PM (ACCORDING TO HIS AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE). YOU

NEVER KNOW, I MIGHT HAVE IRREFUTABLE PROOF THAT I WAS SOMEWHERE ELSE AT
THAT TIME, SO, BE CAREFUL. There simply is not anything specific in Nevada law addressing how
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such Summary Eviction Orders are to be served and carried out. The sections dealing with
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NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and exclusion of tenant for
25
default in payment of rent....
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6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless of the information
28
contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the
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justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the
parties, to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in this
section. If the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer and the
tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant
or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant....
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7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and service of a motion,
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file a motion with the court, on a form provided by the clerk of the court, to dispute the amount of the
costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 for the inventory, moving
and storage of personal property left on the premises. The motion must be filed within 20 days after the
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summary order for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of the premises by the tenant, or within
13
20 days after:
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(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed from the premises; and
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(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
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whichever is later.
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8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a hearing on the motion.
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The hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of the motion. The court shall affix the date of
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the hearing to the motion and order a copy served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable or other
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process server. At the hearing, the court may:
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(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 and any
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accumulating daily costs; and

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(b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of the charges determined to be due or
if no charges are determined to be due...."
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I also want to know why NRS 40. 253(8) was not followed with respect to my November 17th, 2011 filing
of a Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien. Why didn't the WCSO serve notice, as required by NRS
40.253(8) upon the landlord's attorney Richard Hill? Why didn't I get a hearing within the 10 days
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called called for by that section (to get back my client's files no less), but rather, I had to wait a full 33
days to get a hearing, and service of notice of the hearing was not effectuated, as required by NRS
40.235(8), by the WCSO. Why?
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Please provide an indication, in writing, of the names and case numbers for the last 20 incidences when
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the WCSO has served notice of a hearing set pursuant to NRS 40.253(8). What's that? The WCSO has
15
NEVER served such notice? Yet the WCSO is there with bells on (or Machem is) to lie in Affidavits of
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Service to lock out the citizen tenants of Washoe County impermissilby early vis a vis NRCP 5(b)(2) and
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NRCP 6(e)? Why is that? Is it a conspiracy? Does money talk? When I was arrested for trespassing on
November 12th, 2011 by RPD Officer Chris Carter and Sargent Lopez, Carter admitted to me that
"Richard Hill pays him a lot of money and therefore he arrests whom Richard Hill says to and does
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what Richard Hill says to do...." Both Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to investigate, despite
prompting, whether Richard Hill has sent the tenant/arrestee a bill or demand letter in bill for the full
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rental value of the property, $900 per month, under some interpretation of the "reasonable storage,
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moving, and inventorying expenses" collectable by a landlord under a personal property line set forth in
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NRS 118A.460 (one could also interpret such a bill as Hill's withdrawing or eradicating the Order of
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Summary Eviction itself, which was not "personally served" by the Washoe County Sheriff (despite
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what their Affidavit of Service says...I wasn't even there at the time they changed the locks...and so the
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Summary Eviction Order was not properly served under NRCP 6, and despite the Reno Justice Court
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impermissibly converting $2300 of my money under a "rent escrow" Order its required I comply with
in order to litigate habitability issues in a summary eviction proceeding under NRS 40.253, despite NRS
40.253(6)'s express dicate against such an Order (unless, pursuant to JCRCP 83, a justice court gets
such a rule, like Justice Court Rule of Las Vegas (JCRLV) Rule 44, published and approved by the
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Nevada Supreme Court, which the RJC has not, rather, the RJC applies all these insidious secret
"house rules" (like forcing tenants to deliver themselves to the filing office to submit to personal service
notice of a summary eviction hearing within, like, 12 hours of the Tenant filing a Tenant's Answer or
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Affidavit in response to an eviction Notice, rather than the service requirements of such notice following
NRCP 6 (days for mailing, etc., etc., in other words, in the RJC everything is sped up imperissilby to
help landlord's out, and the NV. S. Ct ruling in Glazier and Lippis clearly contemplate personal liability
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against the Court and or Judges themselves for so doing)....A Qui Tam action or something a la
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Mausert's in Solano County, I believe, in California, would be very interesting...Still haven't heard
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anything from the Reno PD about the various complaints I have filed with them in writing related to the
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wrongful arrests, excessive force and other misconduct committed against me, though they did arrest
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me the other day for calling 911incident to some domestic violence for which I was granted to Extended
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Protection Orders against my former housemates....old Sargent Sigfree ordered that arrest, as he did
two days prior when he ordered a custodial arrest of me for "jaywalking".
Funny thing, I never heard anything back from the RPD about complaints like the following one:
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From:
NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent:
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Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM
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****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
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We're sorry the following problem was found during review

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of your submitted report T11005956:
THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER THIS REPORT WAS
PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE ADDRESSED.
Thank you,
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Officer WOZNIAK,
Reno Police Department
What is interesting there is that at least I was provided the name of an officer, a "Wozniak" (though I
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have been unable to confirm the existence of
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such an RPD Officer...
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or whether " THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER THIS
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REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE
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ADDRESSED."
What is more strange is that I submitted several online police reports to the Reno PD (a couple of which
asserted complaints against various Reno PD officers, or asked why RDP Officer Carter, whom
admitted taking bribes from Richard G. Hill, Esq. at the time of my custodial arrest for trespassing (the
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one where Richard Hill signed a Criminal Complaint for trespass, then Officer Carter and Sargent
Lopez refused to follow up on my imploring them to ask Hill whether he has recently sent me a bill for
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the "full rental value" of the property, the same amount that had been charged for the "use and
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enjoyment" of the premises, $900, in comparision to what NRS 118A.460 may deem "reasonable
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storage" expenses for which a lien is available to a landlord, though NRS 118A.520 has outlawed rent
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distraints upon tenant's personal property....Regardless, between January 8 - 12th, 2012, and was
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arrested twice by the Reno PD shortly after submitting these written complaints to the Reno PD.
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tually, upon being released from jail on November 15th, 2011, incident to the custodial trespass arrest, I
went to Richard HIll's office to get my wallet and driver's license. He refused to provide it to me until
late November 22nd, 2011. Hill called the Reno PD on the 15th (or maybe I did because he was
withholding my state issued ID, the one I would need to rent a room, drive my car, and my wallet, which
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is kind of useful in such situations....). Anyways, Sargent Tarter of the Reno PD showed up, he went
inside Hill's office with Hill for quite some time and the result was Tarter telling me to leave. I did, but
while driving down St. Laurence towards S. Virginia (Hill's office is at 652 Forrest St. 89503 and would
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have required turning down the wrong way of a one way street, Forrest, to go back to Hill's Office (so
clearly I was not headed to Hill's office) Sargent Tarter began tailing me, then he pulled me over, then
he gave me a ticket, in retaliation if you ask me for reporting RPD Officer Carter admitting that he
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takes bribes from Hill to Sargent Tarter minutes earlier. Uh, well, anyways, another Sargent calls me
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later that night, taking the "good cop" role. But upon informing him of what RPD Officer Carter told
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me about Hill paying him money to arrest people during the 11/12/11 trespassing arrest, that Sargent
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immediately informed me that, despite this being the first he heard of that, he was sure that was not
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happening....I guess RPD Officer Carter is trying to explain away his comments about Richard Hill
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paying him money to arrest people by dismissing them as sarcasm, a joke, said in jest, whatever....but I
don't see how that situation (a license attorney getting arrested for a crime, a conviction for which
would result in that attorney being required to report said conviction to the State Bar of Nevada under
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SCR 111, etc., and possibly resulting in a suspension of that attorney's license to practice law, or
worse...) is all that jocular of a situation. Combine that with the too quick to dismiss my reports of
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bribery by Richard Hill to officer Carter to the RPD Sargent who called me on 11/15/11 regarding the
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retaliation by Sargent Tarter that I complained of, and I don't think it is all that unreasonable for
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anyone to take RPD Officer Carter at his word regarding Richard G. Hill, Esq. paying him money to
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arrest whom Hill says to arrest. Add to that Sargent Sigfree ordering my arrest for jaywalking (by a
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trainee RPD Officer) on January 12th, 2011 (custodial arrest, bail of $160 emptied my bank account
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out, or pretty close to it) while I was peacefully filming from a public spot Richard G. Hill, Esq's
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contractor Phil Howard, whom had submitted bills in courts records and filings under the lien for
"reasonable storage moving and inventorying" found in NRS 118A.460, even where old Phil used my
own plywood at the property to board up the back porch (curiously leaving the screws holding up the
plywood exposed to exterior of the property where anyone could easily unscrew them, and also leaving
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in a window unit ac secured only by ducttape in a window facing a sidewalk by the LakeMill
Lodge....which resulted in $8,000 at least of my personal property being burglarized from my former
home law office on Decmeber 12th, 2011 while Hill was asserting a lien on all my personal property
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found therein (and my client's files, which arguably are not even my property, but rather, the client's
property). Hill went on to place what he believes to be my social security number in court records, on
purpose, despite his signing an Affirmation pursuant to NRS 239B.030 that that was not the case
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(attaching a two page report to the RPD as an Exhibit). Then Hill and his contractor Phil Howard both
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committed perjury when the signed Declarations attesting that I had climbed on the contractors truck
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or ever touched Hill. Hill lies constantly, whether under penalty of perjury or now, so I don't have time
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to rebut every little lie he makes (he makes me out to comes across as a Yosemite Sam caricature of a
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human being in his filings when he describes me...).
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Further, why am I arrested for trespassing and not those from Nevada Court Services where they went
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behind closed gate the the backyard of my home law office and banged on window extremely loudly for
40 minutes at a time 3 times a day, one guy ringing the doorbell, one guy moving around all other sides
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of the property banging on the windows, peering in closed blinds, and affecting a phony "color of law"
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tone, resemblance, and verbal communications, misleadingly announcing that they were "Court
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Services, come out now!", wearing their pretend Sheriff outfits, big equipment saddled belts (including
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firearms, I believe, and radios), etc. ,etc.
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQ132q2O7DY
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Add to that that Nevada Court Services Jeff Chandler drives by in his Monster Truck baring his
personalized "NCS" license plate while I am in the RPD squad car, handcuffed, outside my former law
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office at 121 River Rock, at the time of the 1/12/12 jaywalking arrest and the appearances are troubling.
Now, add to that that Lew Taitel, Esq. was my court appointed public defender in the Reno Municipal
Court in the trespass case, and that Judge Gardner had refused to provide me the names of prospective
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appointed defense counsel (I wanted to run a conflicts check) at my arraignment (where Marshal
Mentzel barked at me in a threatening tone, using menacing language), whereupon Taitel was appointed
as my defense attorney and filed a notice of appearance, and received my confidential file, pc sheet,
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arrest reports, ssn, etc....only its turns out that Taitel shares and office and a receptionist with Nevada
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Court Services and they list him and his picture on their website as "associated with" their Process
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Server corporation, despite the prohibition lawyers face against fee sharing with non-lawyers. Then,
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Taitel somehow manages to get out of defending my case without filing a Motion to Withdraw as
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Counsel, despite that being required by the Reno Municipal Court Rule 3(B):
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RMCR Rule 3(B): Authorization to Represent (B): An attorney desiring to withdraw from a case shall
file a motion with the court and serve the City Attorney with the same. The court may rule on the
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motion or set a hearing.
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But, perhaps most troubling of all is the implication that the Reno City Attorney's Office, which defends
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actions against the City of Reno Police Department and its Officers, has a vested interest in discrediting
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me in advance of the wrongful arrest lawsuit that the Reno City Attorney's office knew was imminent at
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the time of all of the above incidents, relating to the following August 20th, 2011 wrongful arrest by
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RPD Officer's Duralde and Rosa. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0 So, that's what

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attempting to coerce a suspect's consent to an impermissible search sounds like? Add to that that the
trespassing case is before Judge Gardner, whom most recently was employed with the Reno City
Attorney's Office.
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And, you know what is funny? Officer Del Vecchio cuffed me and placed me in his squad car last
summer after he terrified me and another gentleman who had bicycles. He veered across the road and
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screeched his squad car to a halt, jumped out, and did some other stuff, then demanded my name and
ID...and the lawyer in me didn't like that that much, and he didn't like me not wanting to give it to him.
This occurred right in front of my home law office in the summer of 2011. He cuffed me and told me I
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was going to jail for something about a light on the front of my bicycle (the one NV Energy likely stole
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when the shut off my power, unnoticed, on October 4, 2011) despite my bike actually having such a
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light....but then Del Vecchio's partner did him a solid and talked some sense into him, and I humbled it
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up for Del Vecchio and we both let it go, and I didn't go to jail....Until Del Vecchio was present
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supervising some Officer's training at the scene of my custodial (9 hour) jaywalking arrest) on 1/12/12.
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But Del Vecchio, I guess either didn't want to or wasn't able to talk some sense into Sargent
Sigfree.....and then Sargent Sigfree (the spelling is likely off) had me arrested and charged with a gross
misdemeanor, "Misuse of 911" just two days later, on January 14th, 2011 when I called 911 to report
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that my roommates were laughing menacingly when I asked them why my dog was missing (I had also
been chased up to my room numerous times since moving in with these people, something I had to do
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because so much of my money had been taken up with bail or lost earnings due to all these wrongful
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arrests and abuse of processes mentioned above...also these housemates had chased me with a ten inch
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butcher knife, two of my tires were slashed, I was locked out all night on New Years Even when these
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changed the locks at around midnight, had my furniture thrown in the street, property stolen, coffee
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thrown on me, destroying my smart phone in the process, etc., etc...And despite the housemate having
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an outstanding arrest warrant, and animal abuse being listed amongst the elements of domestic violence,
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Sargent Sigfree told me he was arresting me because I "keep putting yourself in these situations", like,
where I am a victim, and that he was "trying to help you", he said with a smirk and a laugh to his fellow
RPD Officers, whom then proceeded to use excessive force against me. I guess he was helping me by
saddling me with a gross misdemeanor with a $1,500 bail, especially where its been arranged for Court
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Services, or pre-Trial Services to forever deny me an OR, despite my meeting the factors for such set
forth in statute (30 year resident, entire immediate family lives here, licensed to practice law in Nevada,
etc., etc)...I guess it should not be too much of a surprise to me that Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts
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failed to address the perjury of all three of her witnesses or that her fellow Reno City Attorney
Christopher Hazlett-Stevens lied to me about whether or not the Reno City Attorney's Office even had
any documentation related to my arrest or whether it would in the month before my arraignment,
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despite that fact that subsequent productions of discovery tend to indicate that the Reno City Attorney's
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Office did have those materials at the time. I could be wrong about some of this...But that would require
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and awful lot of coincidences.
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Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq
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CONCLUSION
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Regardless, the "Judgment" or "Order" here was not appropriately served on the undersigned
on November 30th, 2011. Further, the undersigned made many, many calls and written attempts
and trips to the RMC to obtain a copy of the Contempt Order, the Guilty Judgment, and the audio
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recording of the Trial and all were either not granted, not provided, or provided in such a delayed
manner as to create an unduly prejudicial situation adversely effecting the undersigneds rights
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sufficient to impermissibly compromise fundamentals notions of fairness and due process.

Further, the Order is "rendered" when Judge Howard says it is "rendered", and Judge Howard
clearly indicated, on the record, as demonstrated in the audio record, which will be available to the
District Court ultimately, the 10 day deadline for filing a Notice of Appeal would not begin running
until after the 3 day Summary Contempt Order's three day jail sentence concluded. Damn, this
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stuff is complicated. Sure it nice to see the government goign hard as a mother to protect lil ol'
Wal-Mart whom is rumored to be the subject of a documentary about how they have a intricate
system of weasling out of their "Return Policy" and retaliating against those who call them on it.
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Also, this document does not contain any social security number or other inappropriate material
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pursuant to NRS 239B.030.
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Dated this February 22, 2012
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/s/ Zach Coughlin_________________

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
NV Bar No. 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney for Pro Se Appellant Denied Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel
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PROOF OF SERVICE
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I, Zach Coughlin, declare:

On this date, I, Mr. Zach Coughlin served the foregoing document by faxing, emailing,
delivering and serving upon registered efilers and depositing a true and correct copy in the US Mail
addressed to:
PAM ROBERTS, ESQ
JOHN KADLIC, ESQ
Reno City Attorney's Office - Criminal Division

P.O. Box 1900 Reno , NV 89505
Phone Number: 7753342050
Fax number: 7753342420
Attorney for Respondent, City of Reno
dated February 22, 2012
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Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
AGENT OF APPELLANT
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9 6 13 0204 62337 NVD Stamped 13 CV 474 RCJ WGC 664 Pages IFP MTN Proposed Complaint Coughlin V Wal-Mart, Reno Sparks Indian Colony, RSIC Opt

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9 6 13 0204 62337 NVD Stamped 13 CV 474 RCJ WGC 664 Pages IFP MTN Proposed Complaint Coughlin V Wal-Mart, Reno Sparks Indian Colony, RSIC Opt

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Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 1 of 664

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

wAL=MART; RENO SPARKS INDIAN COLONY ET AL..

Civil Action No.

APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS

My take-home pay or wages are: $

per (specify pay period)

(a) Business, profession, or other self-employment

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 2 of 664

4. Amount of money that I have in cash or in a checking or savings account:

/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zachary Barker Coughlin

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 3 of 664

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

VARIOUS TORTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS

JURY TRIAL DEMAND RESPECTFULLY MADE

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 4 of 664

SHERIFF'S OFFICE; WASHOE COUNTY

COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURY

multitude of obstacles, many involving judicial, prosecutorial and law enforcement

misconduct as detailed more fully at the following:

Coughlin is working diligently to draft a Complaint that complies with all

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 5 of 664

knowingly put on lies by RSIC Officers Crawford, Braunworth, and Wal-Mart's

Indigent Defense Order) Coughlin his Sixth Amendment right to counsel,

B. False Arrest Actions and Prior Convictions The Sixth Circuit's

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 6 of 664

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 7 of 664

court conviction cannot by itself require dismissal [of a civil rights

defamation of character, negligence , false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious

All defendants named above are believe to reside in Washoe County

7) Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1343 (a)(3) and 42 U.S.C.

by the Fourth Amendment violations attendant to the search incident to an unlawful

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 8 of 664

This is an action for relief in damages, injunctive relief (Washoe County

the color of governmental authority resulting in 42 U.S.C. 1983 Violation of

Plaintiffs constitutional rights guaranteed to him by the United States of America

act of battery on Plaintiff.

pursue this matter:

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 9 of 664

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States or by an

protection of civil rights.

alleges, avers, and complains as follows:

believed to be residents of the City of Reno, and Washoe County.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays for judgment against Defendants,

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 10 of 664

according to proof at trial;

d. For an award of attorney fees, costs, expenses and interest as allowed by

e. For an award of injunctive relief (requiring the Washoe County

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 11 of 664

_____ Reno/Carson Messenger Service.

_____ Personal Delivery.

/s/Employee of Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq.,

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 12 of 664

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DECLARATION IN

Court's decision seem to be made in an exercise of its original jurisdiction (ie,

Rehearing, etc. woudl be indicated:

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 13 of 664

A.2d 308 (D.C. 1984).

Case 3:13-cv-00474-RCJ-WGC Document 1 Filed 09/06/13 Page 14 of 664