The Social Model of Disability, Marxism and the Outlier Problem Becker states that, The adequacy of a theory

of distributive justice is now measured partly by its success in dealing with justice for the disabled. 1 Whilst I will not suggest that Marx offers a theory of justice, it being largely irrelevant to the purposes of this paper, I will explore the extent to which a broadly Marxist approach to disability is compatible with Marxs explicit conception of human nature and species-being. To that end, I will begin by presenting a Marxist critique of liberal societys approach to the disabled, broadly construed, and offering two responses; one utilising a Rawlsian approach, and one which relies on an exegesis of Marx. Both will be shown to be able to account for the needs of the majority of disabled persons, before going on to consider the more contentious issue of persons in permanent vegetative states. I will contend that Rawlsians can adequately account, should they choose to, for these persons in two ways: they can argue that because of a persons involvement in the system of fair cooperation, whilst they were a fully functioning member of society, they are owed a fair return even in a vegetative state; or, they can argue that there are also natural duties owed to these persons in addition to the requirements of justice as fairness. I will argue that neither of these responses is open to Marx: the rights that these persons may have under liberalism are the rights of egoistic man separated from the community and are incompatible with Communist society; and those in persistent vegetative states are rendered non-persons since they are no longer capable of free conscious activity, are no longer characterised by species-being ( Gattungswesen), and are therefore no longer distinctively human. 2 I will finally consider the response that in a Communist utopia, the realm of necessity will have been superseded and the issue of impairment and disability will be overcome through an application of science and technology. The Social Model of Disability The medical model of disability claims that, (i) an individual with a disability is not able to function at the level of the species norm because of some persistent biological property of the individual, and (ii) when it is possible, disablement should be corrected or prevented. 3 In response to this, the Social Model of Disability seeks to, outline a materialist understanding of disability as a form of oppression that could be fought against and overcome, 4 and it, locates the causes of disability squarely within society and social organisation, 5 focusing, on the fact that so-called normal human activities are structured by the general social and economic environment, which is
1Lawrence C. Becker, Reciprocity, Justice, and Disability, Ethics 116 (2005), pp. 9-39 (p. 9). 2Thomas E. Wartenberg, Species-Being and Human Nature in Marx, Human Studies 5 (1982), pp. 77-95 (p. 79). 3Christie Hartley, Disability and Justice, Philosophy Compass 6 (2011), pp. 120-132 (p. 121). 4Roddy Slorach, Marxism and Disability, International Socialism: A Quarterly Journal of Socialist Theory 129 (2011), pp. 111136 (p. 123).

constructed by and in the interests of non-impaired people. 6 The Social Model seeks to show that impairments become disabilities because of a socially constructed environment which is hostile to, and disadvantages, the impaired by creating the category of disability. 7 The Model derives much of its theoretical grounding from the Fundamental Principles of Disability issued by The Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) and centrally includes the claim that, In our view, it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments, by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society. Disabled people are therefore an oppressed group in society... Poverty is one symptom of our oppression, but it is not the cause. 8 Slorach provides a brief historical analysis of the genesis of disablement as a concept rooted in industrialisation. He states that the weaker, older or impaired were more likely to survive with settled agricultural production, being able to contribute to social and economic life, until capitalism forced them off the land. The Industrial Revolution sped up this process; factory workers could not have any impairment which would prevent them from operating machinery, establishing ablebodiedness as the norm for productive living and excluding the less able. Dependence became a social problem and impairment became equated with illness, with the least productive being segregated into workhouses, asylums, special schools and prisons, away from the ablebodied; In this way capitalism created disability as a particular form of social oppression. 9 We can observe some obvious links with Marxs own discussion of industrialisation in The Communist Manifesto where he writes that the bourgeoisie, has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties..and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest... [and] resolved personal worth into exchange value... [forced all] to adopt the bourgeois mode of production..has made the country dependent on the towns... [and develops] labourers, who must sell themselves piecemeal. 10 Abberley is more explicit that his analysis is of Marxist origin. He states that, Oppression is not an alternative explanatory device to exploitation, rather it is addressed to a different order of
5Michael Oliver, The Politics of Disablement: A Sociological Approach (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990) p. 11. 6Paul Abberley, The Significance of Work for the Citizenship of Disabled People, Paper presented at University College Dublin, April 15th 1999. 7Hartley, Disability and Justice, pp. 120-122. 8Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, Fundamental Principles of Disability (London: The Disability Alliance, 1975), pp. 3-4. 9Roddy Slorach, Marxism and Disability, pp. 111-120. 10Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 245-272 (pp. 246-251).

phenomena...Oppression is complementary to exploitation, extending the range of Marxist analysis to cover areas the latter concept cannot reach. 11 He states that there is an estimated 500 million people worldwide who are to be considered disabled, and over two thirds of these people live in developing countries.12 He goes on to claim that, As far as the majority of the worlds disabled people are concerned, impairment is very clearly primarily the consequence of social and political factors, not an unavoidable fact of nature,13 an entirely unsupported statement. Nonetheless, he goes on to explicate a Marxist analysis of the process of oppression in liberal societies: ageing is naturalised, disassociating it from impairment, making the latter seem an exceptional category; the affect of impairment on workers becomes the locus of analysis, creating a problem of disability, which focuses on returning the impaired to productiveness or on minimising the non-productivity of these citizens; finally, he claims that the beneficiary of this process is a historically and nationally situated capitalist society.14 In this way, the category of disabled people was a product of the rise of capitalism and its emphasis on work.15 He concludes by disparaging the unacceptable attempts of liberalism to remain difference-blind,16 and exhorts his readers that to advance discussion, we must bring, to bear the tools of todays social science, rather than those of the day before yesterday, 17 apparently entirely unaware of the irony of this statement.18 In another article he links this analysis to Engels statement that capitalism, permits so many deformities and mutilations for the benefit of a single class, and plunges so many industrious working-people into want and starvation by reason of injuries. 19 Interestingly, whilst maintaining the essentially Marxist character of his critique of liberalism and capitalism, he now acknowledges that the disabled are of marginal concern to Marx and his conception of humanity. With the withering away of capitalist society there would still be the issue of the biologically disabled who would not be fully integrated into communist society; they cannot fully contribute to socially valuable labour and
11Paul Abberley, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability, Disability, Handicap & Society 2 (1987), pp. 5-19 (p. 8). 12Abberley, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability, p. 11. 13Abberley, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability, p. 11. 14Abberley, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability, pp. 15-16. 15Abberley, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability, p. 17. 16Abberley, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability, p. 16. 17Abberley, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability, p. 18. 18Bill Armer, In Search of a Social Model of Disability: Marxism, Normality and Culture, in Colin Barnes and Geof Mercer (eds.), Implementing the Social Model of Disability: Theory and Research (Leeds: The Disability Press, 2004), pp. 48-64 (Electronic Version. Accessed 09/06/2013 http://disabilitystudies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/Barnes-implementing-the-social-model-chapter-4.pdf). 19Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (St Albans: Granada Publishing, 1969), p. 194.

therefore cannot be recognised as full members of Marxs utopia (I will return to this point below in the discussion of overcoming nature and eugenics). The Social Model of Disability aims to implicate capitalism, and the liberalism that compliments it, in intentionally marginalising the impaired. The suggestion seems to be that the structure of liberal societies is such that the less able-bodied will always be oppressed owing to the internal logic of capitalism and the requirement for able workers. Nonetheless, it seems that Abberley does not fully comprehend the implications of these claims, or chooses to ignore them. Whilst some people may not be able to fully contribute to socially valuable labour, there are some persons who will never contribute. As the next sections will seek to show, some are rendered non-persons on Marxs conception of humanity. The Disabled, Political Liberalism and Communism The purpose of this section will be to present Rawlsian and Marxist responses to the Social Model of Disability, in order to highlight that they are both broadly able to meet the challenges of the critique. The Rawlsian conception of persons as free and equal and the device of the original position, and the resultant principles of justice, can be utilised to evidence the unjust position of the impaired and suggest a remedy to their position. A Marxist response will be suggested based on the concept of Gattungswesen. By construing persons as fundamentally free and equal, behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls constructivism is able to highlight the injustice of the impaired in society. Rawls conceives of persons, politically not metaphysically, as free and equal in virtue of their possession of, a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good. 20 Importantly, Rawls theory demands the maximisation of primary goods so that persons can pursue their higher order interests. 21 Persons are at the mercy of circumstances, which are to be mitigated to the greatest extent possible, but are to also be held accountable for their choices.22 To the extent that they can contribute in some way, persons are free and equal members of the societal cooperative scheme and are therefore included in Rawls Second Principle which states that: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and

20Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 38. 21John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 72-77. 22John E. Roemer, Equality of Opportunity: A Progress Report, Social Choice and Welfare 19 (2002), pp. 455471 (pp. 454-457).

(b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.23 I believe that it is at the juncture that the Social Model of Disabilitys criticism is most salient. The lexical priority accorded to the Difference Principle over the Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) gives rise to the potentially unjust treatment of the impaired. By construing the impaired as part of the least advantaged, society can be structured according to the Difference Principle, with the impaired being entitled to welfare payments, for example, rather than designing the basic structure to accommodate the impaired and ensuring them FEO. In this way, the category of disability seems to be created so as to ease the able-bodied persons pursuit of greater wealth. Nonetheless, I think that the Difference Principle and FEO can be rendered more compatible with the needs of the impaired. FEO has two components: formal equality of opportunity which prohibits discrimination based on sex, race or disability (Although obviously it can be argued that certain professions require the able-bodied); and substantive equality which requires that all persons have a fair chance of accessing social positions and offices, regardless of their circumstances. 24 In his discussion of FEO, Sachs highlights that guaranteeing perpetual substantive equality is incompatible with each individuals pursuit of the good. As an example, he suggests the case of X who wants to undertake a masters degree in order to increase their chances of becoming a school principle. Ensuring that persons always have FEO is not compatible with people investing in their future as others will no longer have the same chance of securing whichever position the investing candidate seeks; this requires discouraging investment in order to secure everyone a perpetual fair chance of attaining positions.25 Sachs instead suggests that we should seek to guarantee one-time FEO, equalising persons chances at the age of majority. 26 He offers a final formulation of the principle of FEO as, Certain positional opportunities should be equal at the age of majority among the equally talented.27 By adhering to Sachs formulation of FEO, we can make society compatible with the needs of the impaired. We can seek to prepare impaired persons, coming of age, to benefit from membership in the system of fair co-operation, through designing institutions which meet their needs, rather than just focusing on formal FEO and trying to prevent discrimination on this basis. In acknowledging this future-orientated principle, we can simultaneously acknowledge the injustice of the lack of FEO for
23John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (London: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 302. 24Robert S. Taylor, Self-Realisation and the Priority of Fair Equality of Opportunity, Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2004) pp. 333-347 (p. 334). 25Benjamin Sachs, The Limits of Fair Equality of Opportunity, Philosophical Studies 160 (2012), pp. 323-343 (pp. 326-330). 26Sachs, The Limits of Fair Equality of Opportunity, pp. 326-335. 27Sachs, The Limits of Fair Equality of Opportunity, pp. 333-341.

those who are already of age and seek to enact rectificatory justice. Whilst I will not spell out exactly what this would require, it does seem plausible to suggest that this is at least compatible with Rawls theory; one-time FEO can provide us with the foundations to critique the arrangement of society, without needing to refute the lexical priority of the Difference Principle. The Marxist response I will suggest seems to require less gerrymandering to address the issue of disability. Wartenberg locates Marxs concept of species-being, the specific features that differentiate humanity from animals, in the Aristolean tradition. He states that, traditional philosophers have held that the proper or most complete fulfilment for individual things lay in their specific nature, their species-being.28 He goes on to argue that Marx reconceptualises Aristotles concept of humanitys species-being, living a life according to reason, as, not thought per se, but rather free conscious activity, that is labour in accordance with ones own conscious deliberation. 29 To this end, Marx explicitly states that, The animal is immediately one with its vital activity. It is not distinct from it. They are identical. Man makes his vital activity into an object of his will and consciousness. He has conscious vital activity. He is not immediately identical to any of his characterisations. Conscious vital activity differentiates man immediately from animal vital activity. It is this and this alone that makes man a species being. He is only a conscious being, that is, his own life is an object to him, precisely because he is a species-being. 30 Importantly, Wartenberg goes on to conclude that with this characterisation of persons, No longer can we see a person as better than another simply because of the type of activity he/she chooses to pursue. Rather, we can see conscious activity itself as human and, in an egalitarian assumption, something to be valued for its own sake.31 There is therefore no one specific activity which constitutes the good of humanity, and persons will widely differ in what activity they choose to fulfil their nature;32 their different natures and their different capabilities can thus be realised by different activities which are specific to their free conscious activity. Finally, by superseding the realm of necessity and nature, humanity achieves freedom; 33 impairments which can be overcome through

28Wartenberg, Species-Being and Human Nature in Marx, p. 77. 29Wartenberg, Species-Being and Human Nature in Marx, pp. 78-79. 30Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 83-121 (p. 90). 31Wartenberg, Species-Being and Human Nature in Marx, p. 80. 32Wartenberg, Species-Being and Human Nature in Marx, p. 82. 33Wartenberg, Species-Being and Human Nature in Marx, pp. 81-82.

the active management of social life and labour must surely be seen to be the ultimate expression of superseding the dictates of circumstance. It seems relatively clear that a Marxist response to the general issue of impairment can be derived from there considerations. Persons conceived of as realising themselves through free conscious activity has a significant impact on the way in which the impaired should be viewed; the concept is not one of scale as in Aristotle, where those who live most in accordance with reason are living the most worthy life,34 instead people realise themselves to the extent that they engage in conscious activity. The impaired are often capable of some form of activity and they can realise themselves through engaging in what is within their capabilities; we have it within our powers to regulate our social and work life to accommodate the impaired and to help them overcome the dictates of nature. It seems that at this general level, Marxs metaphysics is better able to accommodate the intuition that that the impaired should be accommodated in society, rather than marginalised or problematised. I have suggested that Rawls theory can be made to account for this issue, but doing so seems very much to be an afterthought, tacked on to make the theory fit the non-ideal world. Nonetheless, this is not the without qualification. The Social Model of Disability is significantly underspecified; impairment is a broad category and does not seem to account for those who are so impaired as to be genuinely disabled. It is to this issue that I now turn, considering the case of those in permanently vegetative states, to show that the political liberal and Marxist positions issue in different responses. Permanent Vegetative States (PVS) McLean notes the Human Rights Act (1998), as stating that, Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. Obviously this right is qualified, but it makes no mention of PVS. Importantly, McLean goes on to claim that patients do not die as a result of PVS, but as a result of being deprived of nourishment and hydration. 35 The Royal College of Physicians provides the following guidelines on management and end of life decisions: once diagnosis of PVS has been made, recovery cannot be expected and further therapy is to be considered futile; relatives of the patient are to be informed and should consider the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration; in England and Wales, decisions to withhold nutrition and hydration must be referred to the courts whilst issues of medication can be handled clinically; finally, since patients

34Wartenberg, Species-Being and Human Nature in Marx, p. 78. 35Sheila A M McLean, Permanent Vegetative State and the Law, Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry 71 (2001), pp. 126-127.

can never be considered wholly unaware, sedation is to be administered before the patient is denied nutrition and hydration in order to reduce suffering. 36 Rawls asserts that his theory is not metaphysical; the conception of persons as free and equal is a purely political construct. He offers us the example of Saul of Tarsus who, on the road to Damascus, became Paul the Apostle, and states that, such a conversion implies no change in our public or institutional identity, nor in our personal identity. 37 That his constructivism is not metaphysical suggests that persons who enter a PVS do not thereby lose their political status as free and equal; they are still accorded the same rights that they are entitled to under the Equal Basic Liberties Principle. Those in PVSs are still entitled to significant consideration in political liberalism, although they do raise the issue of their place within a scheme of fair cooperation. I think there are two potential responses to this. A Rawlsian could firstly argue that if the severely disabled has contributed to the reciprocal scheme, they are entitled to care and a fair return for their input. This could perhaps be undercut by arguing that there would be a scale at which persons contributions were heavily outweighed by their continuing dependence on aid so is perhaps not the ideal route to be taken by political liberals. The second response would be to follow Quong in accepting that these persons are not contributors to the reciprocal scheme and are not included in the scope of reciprocal obligations. Nonetheless, as he goes on to argue, the principles of justice are not representative of the totality of duties, there are natural duties which are applicable to all persons, regardless of the extent of reciprocity. Therefore, an obligation of aid to the infirm suggests that we have a duty to ensure that the lives of those in PVSs are as comfortable as we can reasonably make them (This may include withholding nutrition and hydration along with sedatives but categorically does not demand it). 38 Neither response is open to Marx. Not only are these people non-producers, as Abberley acknowledges, but they are not accorded any egoistic rights. Indeed, None of the so-called rights of man goes beyond egoistic man, man as he is in civil society, namely an individual withdrawn behind his private interests and whims and separated from community. Far from the rights of man conceiving of man as a species-being, species-life itself, society, appears as a framework exterior to individuals, a limitation of their original self-sufficiency. The only bond that holds them together is natural necessity, need and private interest, the conservation of their property and egoistic person. 39 (My emphasis)
36Royal College of Physicians, The Vegetative State: Guidance on Diagnosis and Management, Report of a Working Party of the Royal College of Physicians (2003), pp. I-17 (pp. 8). 37Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 31 38Jonathan Quong, Contractualism, Reciprocity, and Egalitarian Justice, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 6 (2007), pp. 75-105 (p. 93-98). 39Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 46-70 (p. 61).

In Communist society, when persons are no longer alienated from their species-being, persons do not hold natural, pre-political or human rights. If the purpose of life is the actualisation of speciesbeing, free conscious labour, what purpose can those in PVSs have? I would suggest absolutely none. Lacking any rights or duties of aid, where are these people left? The Critique of the Gotha Programme suggests the place of the severely disabled in a Communist society: In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished: after labour has become not only a means of life but lifes prime want...only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!40 The severely disabled, in Communist society, lack bourgeois rights. They have no abilities and they cannot contribute. The distributive principle, italicised, clearly does not include noncontributors. It does not seem an exaggeration to suggest that these people are not accounted for in Marxist thought and, being incapable of species-being, are not even considered to be persons in a metaphysical sense. A Response It might be objected that my characterisation of the Marxist response to the severely disabled misses out a key aspect of Communist society, overcoming the dictates of nature. As suggested by Coby, in Marxs utopia, Man...has the power to lift himself above his place, to survey the whole, and to put it to his use. Nature provides man his sustenance but at the same time is an object of investigation (philosophy and science), [and] of manipulation (technology). 41 Let us assume that in Communist society that technology and science are sufficiently developed so as to overcome scarcity and all are in a position to realise their species-being. We nonetheless have the new issue of potential birth defects which can be identified in advance. As Paul notes, scientific Marxists welcomed the idea of positive eugenics and quotes Hogbens statement that, intelligence, personality, and character were determined in substantial degree by hereditary, [and therefore] the enthusiasm of many socialists for eugenics is not surprising.42 A number of left eugenicists signed the 1939 Geneticists Manifesto, which states that, The most important genetic objectives, from a social point of view, are the
40Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 610-616 (p. 615). 41Patrick Coby, The Utopian Vision of Karl Marx, Modern Age 30 (1986), pp. 22-32 (p. 28). 42Diane Paul, Eugenics and the Left, Journal of the History of Ideas 45 (1984), pp. 567-590 (pp. 573-574).

improvement of those genetic characteristics which make (a) for health, (b) for the complex called intelligence, and (c) for those temperamental qualities which favour fellow-feeling and social behaviour.43 In a letter to Stalin, the noted Socialist geneticist H. J. Muller remarked, on the subject of positive eugenics and socialism, with so much pain to escape, it must occur by introduction of a new and higher artificial technique, one which will help to guide reproduction positively, humanely, and consciously, in the interests of society, of man himself. 44 I will not go so far as to claim that Marx himself would have necessarily condoned such practices, but they certainly seem compatible with his metaphysics. If the telos of mankind is free conscious activity, surely there is a positive requirement to ensure that all are capable of such self-realisation, or a negative requirement to prevent persons who cannot realise their species-being from being born. Conclusion The purpose of this paper has been to argue that whilst Marxism seems intuitively compatible with the issue of impairment and disability, on a closer reading of Marx there may be an essential disregard for the most seriously disabled. Whereas Rawls theory eschews a commitment to a metaphysical conception of persons, and can thereby accord persons rights even in cases of severe disability, Marxs conception of persons seems to suggest that when deprived of the capacity for species-being, persons are no longer persons in any meaningful sense. I have considered the objection that in a Communist society which can be supposed to have superseded the dictates of nature, this objection is rendered empty since impairment and disability can be overcome by a fruitful application technology and science. This has led to a further claim that if the ideal is to ensure persons are capable of realising their humanity through free conscious activity, there seems to be licence for the eugenics advocated in the early 20th century. Whether or not this is a concern would obviously depend on the readers own metaphysics. Word Count - 3969

43Paul, Eugenics and the Left, p. 583. 44John Glad, Hermann J. Mullers 1936 Letter to Stalin, Mankind Quarterly 43 (2003), pp. 305-319 (p. 316).

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Bibliography Abberley, Paul. The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability, Disability, Handicap & Society 2 (1987), pp. 5-19. Abberley, Paul. The Significance of Work for the Citizenship of Disabled People , Paper presented at University College Dublin, April 15th 1999. Armer, Bill. In Search of a Social Model of Disability: Marxism, Normality and Culture, in Colin Barnes and Geof Mercer (eds.), Implementing the Social Model of Disability: Theory and Research (Leeds: The Disability Press, 2004), pp. 48-64 (Electronic Version. Accessed 09/06/2013 http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/Barnes-implementing-the-social-model-chapter4.pdf). Becker, Lawrence C. Reciprocity, Justice, and Disability, Ethics 116 (2005), pp. 9-39. Coby, Patrick. The Utopian Vision of Karl Marx, Modern Age 30 (1986), pp. 22-32. Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England (St Albans: Granada Publishing, 1969). Glad, John. Hermann J. Mullers 1936 Letter to Stalin, Mankind Quarterly 43 (2003), pp. 305-319. Hartley, Christie. Disability and Justice, Philosophy Compass 6 (2011), pp. 120-132.

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Marx, Karl. Critique of the Gotha Programme, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 610-616. Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 83-121. Marx, Karl. On the Jewish Question, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 46-70. Marx, Karl. The Communist Manifesto, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 245-272. McLean, Sheila A. M. Permanent Vegetative State and the Law, Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry 71 (2001), pp. 126-127. Oliver, Michael. The Politics of Disablement: A Sociological Approach (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990). Paul, Diane.Eugenics and the Left, Journal of the History of Ideas 45 (1984), pp. 567-590. Quong, Jonathan. Contractualism, Reciprocity, and Egalitarian Justice, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 6 (2007), pp. 75-105. Quong, Jonathan. Liberalism without Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice, (London: Harvard University Press, 1971). Rawls, John. Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Roemer, John E. Equality of Opportunity: A Progress Report, Social Choice and Welfare 19 (2002), pp. 455-471. Royal College of Physicians, The Vegetative State: Guidance on Diagnosis and Management, Report of a Working Party of the Royal College of Physicians (2003), pp. I-17. Sachs, Benjamin. The Limits of Fair Equality of Opportunity, Philosophical Studies 160 (2012), pp. 323-343. Slorach, Roddy. Marxism and Disability, International Socialism: A Quarterly Journal of Socialist Theory 129 (2011), pp. 111136. Taylor, Robert S. Self-Realisation and the Priority of Fair Equality of Opportunity, Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2004) pp. 333-347. Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, Fundamental Principles of Disability (London: The Disability Alliance, 1975). Wartenberg, Thomas E. Species-Being and Human Nature in Marx, Human Studies 5 (1982), pp. 77-95.

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