Communist China's Capitalism The Highest Stage of Capitalist Imperialism Kenneth Austin

Communist Chinas Capitalism

The highest stage of capitalist imperialism*
Kenneth Austin
I have turned Hegel on his head and for the first time he is right side up. Karl Marx
In a twist on the Marxian dialectical process, capitalism may have brought forth communism as its antithesis, but Communist Chinas version of capitalism is a synthesis of exquisite irony. While it is often observed that modern China bears some similarity to a nineteenth-century capitalist economy (with access to twenty-first-century technology), the comparison turns all assumptions about capitalism and colonialism on their head. Capitalist Communist China, because it now generates enormous surplus savings and exports them to maintain macroeconomic balance, is the worlds great imperial economic power. The US, because it provides the reserve currency and accepts those savings, is the crown jewel of Chinas empire. There, however, the similarities end. Chinas imperial system is not based on military conquest. It is based on free access to the US capital market. Should the US decide to limit Chinas access to Americas financial markets and its accumulation of dollar reserves, Chinas impe* The views and analyses expressed herein are the authors own. They do not reflect those of the Department of the Treasury or the US Government and contain no nonpublic information. The author has never worked for the US Treasury Department on matters directly related to US or Chinese exchange rate policy.
Kenneth Austin is an International Economist with the US Treasury Department, and an Adjunct Associate Professor at the University of Maryland University College. He has previously taught at Marshall and Elon Universities,
and served in the US Foreign Service. He holds a PhD from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and an MA from the University of Stockholm.
WORLD ECONOMICS Vol. 12 No. 1 JanuaryMarch 2011
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rial system will collapse. Ultimately, the US owns the off switch for Chinas export machine, and China is in the vulnerable, dependent position.
Hobson and the two manifestations of excess savings: recessions and imperialism
Two of the characteristics of late nineteenth-century capitalist industrial societies were serious, periodic recessions and a renewed interest in acquiring colonies. The work of the iconoclastic English economist, John A. Hobson, a leading theorist of the Underconsumptionist school, provides a unifying theory to these phenomena. The work of Hobson, arguably the worlds most important forgotten Should the United States economist, inspired two far more decide to limit Chinas access famous works. Hobson and his co-author, to Americas financial markets and its accumulation of dollar Albert F. Mummery, laid out their reserves, Chinas imperial system business cycle theory in 1889 in will collapse. The Physiology of Industry: Being an Expos of Certain Fallacies in Existing Theories of Economics. The basic idea is that oversaving causes insufficient demand for economic output. In turn, that leads to recession and resource misallocation, including excessive investment in marketing and distribution. This was a direct challenge to a core thesis of the classical economists: Savings are always beneficial because they allow greater accumulation of capital. Keynes, almost 50 years after The Physiology of Industry, found there the essential ideas of the General Theory (first published 1936): the determinants of aggregate demand and the significance of savings investment imbalances. In Chapter 23 of the General Theory, Notes on Mercantilism etc., he lauded Hobson and Mummery for bringing the issue of excess saving to the fore. But Keynes disagreed with Hobsons theory that excess saving leads to unnecessary investment. Instead, Keynes believed that a relatively weak propensity to consume helps to cause unemployment by requiring and not receiving the accompaniment of a compensating volume of new investment (Keynes 1964, p. 370). Keynes attributed Hobsons error to the lack of an independent
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theory of the rate of interest. Hobson (Mummery had died many years earlier) considered Keynes work the completion and vindication of his efforts. Hobson took his excess savings theory in another direction in Imperialism: A Study, first published in 1902. In a closed economy, excess savings cause recessions, but an open economy has another alternative: domestic savers can invest abroad. Hobson attributed the renewed enthusiasm for colonial conquest among the industrial powers of the day to a need to find new foreign markets and investment opportunities. He called this need to vent the excess savings abroad The Economic Taproot of Imperialism. However, increasing foreign investment requires earning the necessary foreign exchange to invest abroad. This requires an increase in net exports. So foreign investment solves two problems at once. It reduces the excess supply of goods and drains the pool of excess saving. The two objectives are simultaneously fulfilled because they are, in fact and theory, logically equivalent.* Since industrialised countries tended to develop the same problem of excesses of savings over time, they could not solve the problem cooperatively among themselves. They needed to capture less developed economies to absorb the surplus savings and goods. For nineteenth-century European powers, colonies had several advantages. The borrower was captive and could be compelled to borrow and repay. The lenders courts guaranteed the sanctity of the lenders contracts. The colonist was able to grant its own exporters exclusive access to the colonys markets. As the saying went at the time: Trade follows the flag. The competition for suitable colonies led to the intense and often violent struggle among the great powers of the time. Hobson thought that the Imperialist System, with its expensive wars of conquest and competition for colonies, was extremely wasteful and economically destructive. His alternative was a more equitable distribution of income that would eliminate the excess savings. Hobsons Imperialism helped inspire a second, more famous work, Lenins Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916). But Lenin, unlike Keynes, was unable and unwilling to improve upon Hobson. Lenin
* For ease and continuity of exposition, a simple algebraic demonstration of this idea, using Keynesian terminology, is relegated to the Appendix.
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embraced Hobsons analysis, which was not inconsistent with Marxian business cycle theory, but his own analysis was vaguer and less insightful. Unlike Hobson, who clearly understood the equivalence of exporting surplus goods and surplus savings, Lenin believed that the two were different phenomena and that the export of capital was distinguishable from the export of commodities (Lenin 1916, Chapter VII, para. 4). In contrast to Hobson and Keynes, Lenin did not wish to reform and preserve the bourgeois capitalist system that he found morally repugnant. He wished to celebrate its demise. To Lenin, imperialism was so economically irrational that it meant the capitalist end-of-times. At the end of the Second World War, the industrialised nations more or less voluntarily dissolved their empires (implicitly confirming Hobsons conclusion that colonialism was a horrible business decision). At the same time, better macroeconomic management and improved financial markets made recessions milder and much less common in the developed world.
Economic stability in the modern world economy

For a long time after the Second World War, the US economy was able not only to place all of its own savings, but absorb a good deal of the rest of the worlds savings. This was most famously the case during the Asian financial crisis of 1997, when aggressive monetary easing by the Federal Reserve Board was able to avert a global recession. As a massive wave of capital flowed into the US, the dollar soared, the current account deteriorated and the American consumer was recognised worldwide as the consumer of last resort. Based on anecdotal evidence, Europe may suffer periodic excess saving and cannot absorb large foreign savings, but the serious, chronic problems of the past have faded. Among the G7, Japan has the greatest problem managing aggregate demand. The nominal interest rate has been effectively zero for a long time, rendering monetary policy ineffective. Japan is dependent on outward investment and exports to stimulate its economy. The emerging economies of Asia, China in particular, seem to have the same issues of excess savings as nineteenth-century Europe. As their economies production capacities increase, they are dependent on foreign
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markets to assure an outlet for their goods. Why this is so is not clear. Maybe it is easier to master the ability to make television sets than to master the art of running sophisticated financial systems. But, whatever the reason, these countries create savings more quickly than they create viable investments. So where can these countries find trading partners to accept their surplus savings and goods? Where can they find colonies? Like the industrialised countries of nineteenth-century Europe, they cannot vent the imbalances on one another because their neighbours have similar problems. Ironically, the US has accepted the role of colony. In his famous 2005 Global savings glut speech, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke laid out his theory that the global imbalances, particularly the US trade deficit and Chinas trade surplus, were driven by Asias large savings surpluses. He described his conclusions as somewhat unconventional. But it is, in fact, Hobsons story told again. The difference is that, this time, the flows have changed direction and go from poorer economies to richer economies. But the flows of savings still run forcibly from countries where domestic saving cannot be fully utilised. These uphill flows from poorer to richer countries are not market phenomena. As Bernanke noted: In practice, these countries increased reserves through the expedient of issuing debt to their citizens, thereby mobilizing domestic saving, and then using the proceeds to buy US Treasury securities and other assets. Effectively, governments have acted as financial intermediaries, channeling domestic saving away from local uses and into international capital markets (Bernanke 2005, para. 24). This is the modern, Chinese way of imperialism. China does not need to send imperial armies to safeguard its surplus savings. It merely needs to send a purchase order for US Treasury bills to New York. The US provides the deep financial markets that accept Chinas surplus capital and acts as Chinas consumer of last resort. Walmart and ToysRUs are Chinas colonial trading posts.
Is Chinas current imperial policy sustainable?

China and the other high-growth Asian economies are openly uneasy about their continuing accumulation of American assets, and the potential loss of value by inflation or depreciation (see Zhou 2009). But to stop
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accumulating those assets would mean allowing their own currencies to appreciate and reducing their net exports. It also would require them to find a use for their extra savings. However, it is rational for Asian nations to keep sending their capital abroad in the short term even when they expect their investments to go bad: it eliminates their savinginvestment imbalances. It is roughly analogous to throwing cargo overboard to right a listing ship, or undertaking a countercyclical Keynesian make-work project like digging holes and filling them up again: a rational response to exigent circumstances, but unsustainable in the long term. At the other end, Americas low savings rate is not a structural deformity, but an adaptive necessity to absorb Chinas excess savings. For a long time, the reduced domestic US savings rate offset the inflows of foreign savings and avoided a recession. Eliminate the capital inflows from China, and the US savings rate would again adjust to its environment. Eliminate the inflows during a recession, and the dollars depreciation would cause an increase in net exports and stimulate the US economy without any increase in debt. Of course, in China and other capital exporting countries, the effect on aggregate demand would be the opposite. The US does not necessarily borrow money from Asia because it needs the money. It borrows money because it maintains open capital markets and any person, central bank or sovereign wealth fund is free to buy reserve-quality assets or deposit money in the banking system. The US is essentially the equivalent of a bank that passively accepts deposits. It can raise or lower interest rates to encourage or discourage deposits, but it will not refuse them. In essence, America has become the worlds bank. But once nominal interest rates hit zero, the US has no instrument to deter foreigners from lending money to it, even if the inflows are not wanted. The problem is that the inflow of Asias excess savings tends to upset Americas savinginvestment balance just as they help to rectify Asias imbalances. It does not solve Chinas problem; it exports it. This is not to say that many countries that import capital and run current account deficits do not want or need to do so. There can be a happy coincidence of needs between countries that need to borrow money and countries that need to lend. But such flows should normally run from relatively developed countries to developing countries. This is clearly not the case for the US and Asia. The Asian flows to America are driven by Asias structural imbalances, not by Americas need for capital.
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The recent economic crisis shows that Americas absorptive capacity is limited. In retrospect, the great irony is that it was not the willingness of foreign creditors to hold increasing amounts of US assets that made the US external account imbalances unsustainable: it was the inability of US households to absorb and service more debt. The massive inflow of Chinese capital and the loose regulatory environment necessary to place it eventually led to a massive wave of bad loans and defaults. Martin Wolf (2008) gives an excellent description of the nature and magnitude of the global financial flows, especially the most important ones from China to American households. Wolfs description need not be repeated here. These flows can continue until the institutions of the recipient countries are ultimately overwhelmed. However, the US, the crown jewel of the Chinese imperial system, does not need the relationship. (Those who believe that US borrowing requires Chinese lending confuse cause and effect.) Should the US force its own savings rate back up again or close off its capital markets, it would leave no outlet for Chinas savings. Unlike the imperialists of Hobsons time, China is not in a position to use gunboat diplomacy to open markets and collect debts.
Asia and the dollars reserve currency status

The current dollar-based international financial architecture is in some ways a historical accident, or, maybe more accurately, a relic. The US dollar was the anchor or reserve currency of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates created by the Allies at the end of the Second World War. Under that system, countries that had balance of payments deficits had to dig into their reserves of dollars or gold to cover the deficit. Conversely, if they had surpluses, they generally had to buy and accumulate gold or dollar assets. In some circumstances, supplying the reserve currency was a burden. It complicated macroeconomic management. In the words of Henry Fowler, Lyndon Johnsons Treasury Secretary, Providing reserves and exchanges for the whole world is too much for one country and one currency to bear. In other circumstances, the reserve currency role conferred what the envious French called an exorbitant privilege. The US was in the unique position of always being able to finance its deficits since it could always
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print dollars. The US could potentially exploit its reserve currency status to borrow cheaply and live beyond its means. But, boon or burden, reserve currency status is always an honour, although prestige only goes so far in a practical world. Over time, the burden became too much for the US, which initiated the break-up of the Bretton Woods system, starting with the Smithsonian Agreement of 1971. The Bretton Woods system was soon replaced by a system of floating exchange rates among the major currencies. In principle, countries with floating exchange rates have no need for foreign exchange reserves, just as modern navies no longer need sailcloth. There is no need for the central bank to intervene and buy or sell foreign exchange. When a country has a balance of payments surplus or deficit, the exchange rate adjusts and eliminates the imbalance. It is a self-regulating system. But the US never abolished the institutional arrangements that allowed foreign countries to use the dollar as a reserve currency. Many smaller countries continued to fix their exchange rates against the dollar for a variety of reasons. So although the US dollar was nominally floating, the exchange rate was actually fixed against many foreign currencies. Ironically, the difference was that, this time, foreign governments, not the US government, fixed the dollars value. For a long time, this use of the dollar was not an important issue for the US. But gradually, particularly after the Asian Financial Crisis of the 1990s, a bloc of emerging Asian economies, including the Peoples Republic of China (which had never participated in the Bretton Woods system), became economically significant. This bloc has been dubbed Bretton Woods II, or BWII. Their economic growth has been export led: they transfer their surplus saving abroad to enable others to buy their exports. And at the end of the day, the US makes that policy possible by putting its financial markets at the disposal of the BWII bloc. The key difference between Bretton Woods II and the original Bretton Woods system is that while the US dollar is the BWII systems reserve currency, America does not formally participate. If the relationship is not mutually beneficial, the US can unilaterally end it, and its colonial status as importer of Asias surplus savings. It can do so by restricting the use of the dollar as a reserve currency. The US summoned the other Bretton Wood participants to the first Smithsonian conference. Almost 40 years later, it may, at its own discretion, call a Smithsonian II meeting to end
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Bretton Woods II. BWII depends on unrestricted access to US financial markets by foreign central banks and sovereign wealth funds. Ending those privileges would end BWII and Asias imperial export of capital. The USs ability to manage its economy would improve, but Asias economic management would weaken. The US government would probably have to pay more to borrow. But the big loss would be an intangible: the loss of the dollars vestigial status as a reserve currency an honour forgone.
The Great Recession and the struggle over global imbalances

Prior to the global recession, China had been allowing its currency to appreciate. As quickly as the recessions effect on Chinese exports became apparent, the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) halted the renminbis appreciation. That shifted the burden of adjustment away from China. Since then, Chinas exchange rate regime has been the acrimonious centre of conversation at almost all international forums, and the currency wars have become much hotter. The Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act was introduced in the US Congress to retaliate by slapping tariffs against imports of goods from any country that has an artificially low exchange rate. Such a tariff is widely considered to be a violation of WTO rules. However, controls on capital movements face no comparable legal hurdles. Article VI, Section 3, of the IMFs Articles of Agreement specifically allows members to exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements. Curiously, the possibility is rarely suggested. The focus of discussion is always on exchange rates and the resulting trade and current account imbalances, and the potential for a trade war. Little attention has been paid to the flow of Chinese savings (purchase of official reserves) that allows China to control its exchange rate. The US has no obligation to facilitate Chinas accumulation of dollar reserves. In recent months, some prominent economists have raised the issue. Daniel Gros of the Centre for European Policy Studies has suggested (Gros 2010) that the governments of the US and Japan could simply tell their Chinese counterparts that they can buy more Japanese or US assets
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only if they in turn allow foreigners to buy Chinese assets. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times seconded the idea shortly afterwards (Wolf 2010). Gary Hufbauer of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has suggested taxing the earnings on Chinese official holdings of dollar assets (Hufbauer 2010). In fact, US financial authorities would probably find they had a wide variety of powers to regulate the activities of central banks operating in American markets. Some might not even fit readily under the heading of capital controls, such as requiring foreign central banks to disclose all their foreign exchange operations in US markets. Such actions might be more of a disincentive than a prohibition, but effective nonetheless. US authorities may feel conflicted about such measures. Aside from an ideological dislike of capital controls and regulation of financial markets, this would be, at least superficially, a major policy change. On the other hand, major policy changes often occur as a result of exigent circumstances. In fact, it might be argued that such measures would reduce government intervention in US financial markets. They would prevent the government of China from intervening in US markets to regulate the exchange rate of the dollar against the renminbi.
Chinese investment and the search for raw materials

Chinas rapid industrialisation creates another problem, less avoidable than surplus savings: a massive demand for raw materials. China has fundamentally changed the structure of raw materials markets by becoming the major new source of commodity demand growth. Barclays Capital now produces a reguBarclays Capital now produces a lar monthly report on Chinas regular monthly report on Chinas raw material demand, called raw material demand called Feeding the Dragon. There Feeding the Dragon. is nothing inherently sinister about this, but it unavoidably leads to concerns about the security of Chinas supplies of energy and minerals. It also creates potential conflict and competition with other, established economies over raw material supplies. Again history seems to repeat itself, and the parallel with Japan before the Second World War is hard to avoid.
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Chinese investment in foreign natural resources addresses two problems. It develops Chinas supply of industrial inputs and helps vent surplus savings. Chinas low opportunity cost of capital is a key advantage in the competition for resources with western firms that must satisfy the demands of conventional shareholders. Like a nineteenth-century colonial power, China can and will go around the world and seek to obtain secure sources of raw materials. Some of the investments are in countries with stable investments climates, like Australia, but others often follow the path of previous colonial failures. They will not offer the security for its investments that China has sought in the US. Western foreign investment in the developing world is increasingly (but not always) constrained by legal and ethical restrictions imposed by their own governments, as well as a variety of NGOs and international institutions. The web of government investment incentives and subsidies enjoyed by western oil and mining companies can no longer match the direct support provided by the government of China. The Chinese government has gone as far as to create its own equity investment fund, the ChinaAfrica Development Fund (CADFund), to support its African investments. CADFund began with $1 billon and is expected to eventually reach $5 billion. China is willing to partner with pariah states, such as Sudan, under the guise of its policy of non-interference in internal affairs and respect for sovereignty. This gives Chinese companies, many or most of them state owned or affiliated, the advantage of working in areas in the absence of western competition. China often agrees to finance major infrastructure projects in return for natural resource concessions. This typically takes the form of undisclosed government-to-government agreements. Given the scope of Chinas investments and the unconstrained focus on Chinas economic needs, it is not surprising that it entangles itself in embarrassing episodes, from Afghanistan to Zambia. The Aynak copper mine being developed in war-torn Afghanistan sits atop an ancient Buddhist archaeological site. Chinese mining projects in Peru and Papua New Guinea displace indigenous peoples and draw fierce opposition on environmental grounds. Violent skirmishes break out between Chinese security guards and local workers over working conditions and pay in Zambia. Compelled by the same economic forces, China repeats the misadventures of nineteenth-century imperialists.
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Marxian economic determinism seems to reach out from the graveyard of ideas.
Is this the final crisis of communist Chinese capitalism?

No. More likely it is the end of the beginning. China needs to modernise its financial system so that it can better direct its saving to domestic investment or give households the secure savings options to meet their needs at lower savings rates. That is not an impossible task, but it cannot be accomplished quickly. China has shown that it can adapt and modernise, but an abrupt transition may be painful if it is forced by a sudden collapse of export opportunities. Another remedy for Chinas domestic imbalances is a more equitable distribution of income that would reduce the aggregate rate of savings. Hobson noted more than a century ago: There is no necessity to open up new foreign markets; the home markets are capable of indefinite expansion. Whatever is produced in England can be consumed in England, provided that the income or power to demand commodities, is properly distributed (Hobson 1938, p. 88; first published 1902). So we are left with a final irony: Chinas economy is a synthesis of capitalism (with its supposedly unjust distribution of income) and its antithesis, communism (with its supposedly more equitable income distribution). Yet Chinas income distribution is too uneven for it to function independently as a successful capitalist economy.
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Appendix: The logical equivalence of surplus savings and goods

This Appendix is offered to show that Hobsons arguments can easily be described using more modern, Keynesian terminology. Readers who are uninterested or unfamiliar with basic macroeconomics can skip the Appendix without loss of continuity. While most good economists should know this material, it is often forgotten or neglected. According to Hobson, the industrialised economies of his time tended to suffer from persistent excess savings or underconsumption. If these imbalances are not rectified, they cause recessions. Oversaving (excess supply of savings or, alternatively, an excess demand for bonds) in a closed economy is represented by the inequality: S > I* + (G T) (1)
The terms S, I* and (G T) mean: private saving, desired investment (excluding unintended inventory accumulation), and the government deficit (government spending minus taxes) respectively. Saving is the demand for assets (bonds). I* + (G T) is the supply of assets (bonds). The inequality means that savers cannot find adequate investments in which to place their savings. Private saving, by definition, is income (output) minus consumption and taxes: S = Y C T If we substitute Expression 2 into Expression 1, we get: Y C T > I* + (G T) Rearranging terms we get the inequality: Y > C + I* + G (4) (3) (2)
This is an excess supply of goods. Aggregate production, Y, is greater than the aggregate demand for goods: consumption, C, plus desired
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investment, I* (domestic investment by definition in a closed economy), plus government expenditure, G. In a closed economy, an excess supply of goods will cause a recession because some production cannot be sold. As shown above, an excess supply of goods is identical to an excess supply of savings. Hobsons terms oversaving and underconsumption were indeed equivalent. Today, this is introductory economics. In Hobsons day, it was economic heresy. In an open economy, oversaving and underconsumption can be vented abroad, avoiding a recession. It was the need to do this that Hobson called The Taproot of Imperialism. To express Hobsons argument in modern terms, we must extend the algebraic analysis above by noting that in an open economy goods can be bought and sold abroad. Similarly, savers can invest abroad. So we introduce the terms exports, X, and imports, M. Investment, I*, must be broken down into two parts, domestic and foreign, Id and If respectively. Expression 1 (the excess supply of savings) can now be rewritten: S > Id + If + (G T) (5)
Expression 5 is the excess supply of savings in an open economy. Clearly, the excess savings can be reduced or eliminated either by reducing savings (increasing consumption) or increasing foreign investment. This is Hobsons basic thesis. Foreign investment, If (buying foreign assets, including reserve accumulation), requires earning foreign currency by the net export of goods and services (X M). Balance of payments equilibrium requires that: If = X M (6)
This shows that increasing net exports is an essential part of, and not an alternative to, relieving the excess savings problem by increasing foreign investment. On the goods side in an open economy, Expression 4 must be rewritten to replace I* with Id + X M on the right-hand side. Y > C + Id + G + X M (7)
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Increasing net exports reduces the excess supply of goods by venting the extra output abroad. It will be shown that Expressions 5 (excess supply of savings) and Expression 7 (excess supply of goods) are equivalent. Insert Expressions 2 and 6 into Expression 5. Y C T > Id + X M + (G T) (8)
By rearranging terms, we show that Expression 8, the excess supply of savings, is the same as Expression 7, the excess supply of goods, in an open economy. Y > C + Id + G + (X M) (9)
Thus, not only does increasing net exports find a market for surplus production capacity, it allows domestic savers to make the foreign investments needed to absorb surplus savings. To export more savings, a country must export more goods, and vice versa. The export of goods and the export of capital are opposite sides of the same coin.
References Bernanke, B. (2005) The global saving glut and the US current account deficit. Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economics, Richmond, Virginia. Available online at: www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/(accessed 12 February 2010). Gros, D. (2010) How to level the capital playing field. Centre for European Policy Studies. Available online at: www.ceps.eu/book/how-level-capital-playing-field (accessed 17 November 2010). Hobson, J.A. (1938) Imperialism: A Study (3rd edn). London: George, Allen & Unwin Ltd (first published 1902). Hobson, J.A. & Mummery, A.F. (1889) The Physiology of Industry: Being an Expos of Certain Fallacies in Existing Theories of Economics. London: John Murray Publisher. Hufbauer, G. (2010) Patience and the Currency Wars. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 27 October. Available online at: www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped. cfm?ResearchID=1701 (accessed 17 November 2010).
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Kenneth Austin Keynes, J.M. (1964) The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (first published 1936). Lenin, V.I. (1916) Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Marxists Internet Archive. Available online at: www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ index.htm (accessed 15 January 2010). Wolf, M. (2008) Fixing Global Finance. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Wolf, M. (2010) How to fight the currency wars with stubborn China. Financial Times, 5 October. Available online at: www.ft.com/cms/s/0/52b8a8e4-d0b0-11df-866700144feabdc0.html#axzz15sHbD7lX (accessed 20 November 2010). Zhou, X. (2009) Reform the international monetary system. Speech, 23 March. Available online at: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/ english/956/2009/20091229104425550619706/20091229104425550619706_.html (accessed 29 January 2011).
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