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2013
STUDY GUIDE
President: Komal Kunwar Vice President: Ural Mishra Moderator: Nishchal Shrestha
CONTENTS
HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ............................................................................................... 3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ............................................................................................. 4 HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM ............................................................................................................ 6 CURRENT SITUATION......................................................................................................................... 8 RELEVANT UN ACTIONS .................................................................................................................... 9 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS..................................................................................................................... 11 QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER ........................................................................... 12 POSITION PAPER FORMAT ....................................................................................................13 REFERENCES .........................................................................................................................15
to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations; to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction; to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement; to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments; to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken; to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression; to take military action against an aggressor; to recommend the admission of new Members; to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in "strategic areas"; to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.
The current strategic conceptualization of two wars in Afghanistan belies the fact that the country is steadily becoming a narco-terrorist state. The linkage between the insurgency and the opium industry is widely evidenced. Over 62 percent of coalition fatalities have occurred in the southern Helmand province, which is also the primary opium producing province in Afghanistan. Further, the Taliban receives nearly 70 percent of its income from protection money and the sale of opium (much of this income comes from taxes imposed upon opium farmers). Additionally, the Taliban is receiving arms and money from traffickers and drug lords in return for protection. Also contributing to the insurgency is a disproportionate reliance upon crop eradication policies, which has created an increasingly large recruitment pool of disaffected farmers and other peasants. In the same way that the failings of the state economically have served to legitimize the drug industry, the failings of the state politically and in terms of providing security (exacerbated by the drug industry), have served to legitimize the insurgency. Both in the political and security realms the drug lords and insurgents are entirely reliant upon a steady supply of able Afghanis. As noted earlier, the drug interdiction and eradication policies that have ignored the elements political, economic, historical, and societal that drive farmers to produce opium, are serving to drive them towards the insurgency for support and protection. Further, many farmers have little choice regarding what to grow, as groups such as the Taliban directly coerce farmers to plant. Therefore, it is apparent that, given the striking degree to which the insurgency and the drug industry have come to benefit from each other, any policy which aims to combat one element must also consider the other.
fields and made opium its largest source of taxation. Taxes on opium exports became one of the mainstays of Taliban income and their war economy. The Taliban had no annual budget but they appeared to spend US$ 300 million a year, nearly all of it on war. The hard-line, Islamic-based, Pakistani sponsored Taliban gained control of the country. By 2000, Afghanistan accounted for an estimated 75% of the world's supply and in 2000 grew an estimated 3276 tonnes of opium from poppy cultivation on 82,171 hectares. At this juncture, a decree was passed banning the cultivation of opium, and production dropped to an estimated 74 metric tonnes from poppy cultivation on 1,685 hectares. Many observers say the ban - which came in a bid for international recognition at the United Nations - was only issued in order to raise opium prices and increase profit from the sale of large existing stockpiles. In September 2001 - before the 11 September attacks against the U.S. the Taliban allegedly authorized Afghan peasants to sow opium again. Despite having an ideological abhorrence towards drug use, the Taliban allowed, and even encouraged, continued opium cultivation as a means of financially propping up their regime until imposing an opium ban in 2000 using a strict religious rhetoric. As a result, opium cultivation steadily increased from 1990 to 2000. Since the 2001 invasion and the lifting of the Taliban opium ban, opium production in Afghanistan has increased from 70 percent of the overall global illicit opium production to 92 percent today. By 2005, Afghanistan had regained its position as the worlds No. 1 opium producer and was producing 90% of the worlds opium, most of which is processed into heroin and sold in Europe and Russia.
CURRENT SITUATION
The challenges for peace and stability in a country inflicted with disorders for more than three decades continue and the efforts made are commendable. However, as time passes, more problems arise and efforts to guarantee amity and security become harder. After years of intervention, Afghanistan lies on the brink of war, insurgent groups resilient, the government broken and the international community bushed. After years of refusing to negotiate, the U.S. government in early 2011 began to openly pursue a negotiated solution. While these talks have so far yielded few clear results, the international community and the Afghan government have continued to implement the transition plan agreed to in 2010, according to which Afghan security forces will be in the lead across the country by the end of 2014, allowing the gradual drawdown of the 140,000 international military forces from 40 countries fighting under an alliance led by NATO. The next major hurdle to be faced will be presidential elections in 2014. President Karzai is barred by the Constitution from running again, and the most recent Afghan elections in 2009 and 2010 revealed significant flaws in Afghanistans democratic institutions. Ensuring a credible election and an effective change of power in 2014 will be crucial for Afghanistans future stability, regardless of progress on reconciliation or on training of Afghan security forces. USIP is actively addressing these issues through three interrelated objectives:
Informing United States, Afghan and international policy and practice; Strengthening governance and the rule of law; Building understanding of and capacity in conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution for Afghan individuals and institutions.
RELEVANT UN ACTIONS
General Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan prior to 2001 Resolutions on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security:
Resolution ES-6/2 of January 1980 Resolution 35/37 of 20 November 1980 Resolution 36/34 of 18 November 1981 Resolution 37/37 of 29 November 1982 Resolution 38/29 or 23 November 1983 Resolution 39/13 of 15 November 1984 Resolution 40/12 of 13 November 1985 Resolution 41/33 of 5 November 1986 Resolution 42/15 of 10 November 1987 Resolution 43/20 of 3 November 1988 Resolution 44/15 of 1 November 1989 Resolution 45/12 of 7 November 1990 Resolution 46/23 of 5 December 1991
Resolution 47/119 of 18 December 1992 Resolution 48/208 of 21 December 1993 Resolution 49/140 of 20 December 1994
Two-part Resolutions on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for Peace and Security and Emergency International Assistance for the Reconstruction of War-Stricken Afghanistan:
Resolution 51/195 of 17 December 1996 Resolution 52/211 of 19 December 1997 Resolution 53/203 of 18 December 1998 Resolution 54/189 of 17 December 1999 Resolution 55/174 of 19 December 2000
Resolution 40/137 of 13 December 1985 Resolution 41/158 of 4 December 1986 Resolution 42/135 of 7 December 1987 Resolution 43/139 of 8 December 1988
Resolution 43/139 of 8 December 1988 Resolution 44/161 of 15 December 1989 Resolution 45/174 of 18 December 1990 Resolution 46/136 of 17 December 1991 Resolution 47/141 of 18 December 1992 Resolution 48/152 of 20 December 1993 Resolution 49/207 of 23 December 1994 Resolution 50/189 of 22 December 1995 Resolution 51/108 of 12 December 1996 Resolution 52/145 of 12 December 1997 Resolution 53/165 of 9 December 1998 Resolution 54/185 of 17 December 1999 Resolution 55/119 of 4 December 2000
Resolution 8 (1946) of 29 August - admission as Member of United Nations. Resolution 622 (1988) of 31 October - authorizes UNGOMAP deployment. Resolution 647 (1990) of 11 January - extends UNGOMAP for a final two months. Resolution 1076 (1996) of 22 October - calls for an end to hostilities, outside interference and supply of arms to the parties to the conflict; denounces discrimination against women and girls in Afghanistan. Resolution 1193 (1998) of 28 August - demands an end to hostilities and an investigation into the killing of two UN staff members and the military adviser to the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan. Resolution 1214 (1998) of 8 December - repeats demands of resolution 1193 and reaffirms support for the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan. Resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October - demands the Taliban turn over Usama bin Laden, forbids aircraft to take-of or land in Taliban-controlled territory without approval and freezes assets of the Taliban. Resolution 1333 (2000) of 19 December - repeats demand that the Taliban turn over bin Laden and imposes further measures on their territory pending concurrence with the demand. Resolution 1363 (2001) of 30 July - establishes a monitoring mechanism for the measures imposed under the previous two resolutions. Resolution 1386 (2001) of 20 December - authorizes the deployment for six months of an International Security Force For Afghanistan.
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POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Private Military Companies (PMCs) Although this idea has not been fully explored, the result of foreign intervention in Afghanistan has had a number of negative effects on the socio-economic as well as political situation. With the introduction of PMCs the political influence can be removed, which could possibly help lead Afghanistan to political and economic prosperity. As PMCs do not serve any country, they could be hired by the UN to help guide Afghanistan through a period of transition as well as help curb opium, hashish and marijuana production. The fight against the Taliban is crucial to Afghanistans future with the pull out of US and allied troops fast approaching, the hiring of PMCs could benefit the Afghani people. However, PMCs can be easily corrupted and turn be turned against the people that hired them if a larger offer comes in from and enemy group; they do not serve any country and as a result do not have a sense of pride towards the groups they protect. Aggressive Anti-Drug Production Strategies Afghanistan has long been affected by wide spread opium production, it has a strong grip hold on the economy, with many local farmers using the drug as a major cash crop. During the Taliban rule, harsh anti-drug production strategies curbed opium production by about 99% in Taliban controlled areas, and an estimated 35% reduction in poppy production and 65% reduction in potential heroin supply; however, these strategies consisted of threats, public punishment and forced eradication. These methods were while viewed as inhumane, however, were remarkably effective. Legalization of Opium Production The legalization of opium production in Afghanistan has been proposed by many INGOs including the International Council on Security and Development. They argue that with its legalization regulation of its production can be made easier, with permits being handed out to opium farmers. Opium is a major constituent of medicines such as morphine, which is a legal painkiller; economic analysts say that if opium production is legalized, the cost of medicines around the world would significantly decrease, making them more easily accessible and help stabilize Afghanistans economy. Non-Withdrawal of Foreign Troops The eminent withdrawal of most US troops in particular by 2014 poses an immediate threat to Afghanistans security, despite the fact that afghan troops have been trained by US forces, many feel that the Taliban and other insurgent groups would get a stronger hold on the country after the withdrawal of troops. However US Secretary of State John Kerry has stated that not all troops will be withdrawn, special forces and counterterrorism forces will remain but to a lesser extent. All other security measures are solely in the hands of Afghan forces.
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Current Situation What are your national interests in the situation and briefly explain the stance on the topic? What is your country doing to support or condemn the topic? What past resolutions or treaties have the country supported regarding the topic?
Solution What does your nation believe needs to be done to solve the problem? What would your country want to be included in the committees resolution?
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CLOSING REMARKS
As the delegates of the Security Council, you are expected to maintain utter diplomacy and adapt to situations accordingly. Remember, you are representing your country, not yourself. Your foreign policy is your holy grail- stick to it at all costs. The dais expects a high level of debate in the house, alongside proactive delegates and resolutions of the standard of the actual UNSC. Talking the most in committee does not make you the best delegate: the maturity in your speech, the quality of your debate, your outlook on the situation, level of contribution to the discussion, lobbying, ability to stand firm on your grounds yet compromise is what makes you a strong delegate and is what the dais is looking for. Make sure that you thoroughly understand the topic and if you have any problem at all, do not hesitate to approach the dais. Let the MUNning begin!
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REFERENCES
http://www.globalresearch.ca/syria-a-historical-perspective-on-the-current-crisis/24568 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14703995 http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=48516 http://sites.mgkworld.net/thessis08/files/communique_writing.pdf http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14703856 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/middleeast/un-reports-increased-number-of-displacedpeople.html?_r=0 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/emergencies/un-relief-supplies-depart-dubai-for-syria-1.1220716 https://www.facebook.com/syriaohr http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/ca9cbebc-0420-11e3-8aab00144feab7de,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2Fc a9cbebc-0420-11e3-8aab-00144feab7de.html&_i_referer=#axzz2cQohLQWE http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486a76.html http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=146&Body=Syria&Body1= http://ww3.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21578443-russia-and-america-try-bit-jaw-jawhow-about-diplomacy http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/05/13/Syria-opposition-to-consult-allies-overU-S-Russia-peace-initiative-.html http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-01-05/syria-political-prisoners/52387422/1 http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iOopJQLs2bnTmk3TRzytK_NIKcXg?docId=CNG. 0fe739f1f49df34b937ed993417cb269.721 http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/arab-league-observer-assad-committing-genocide-in-syria1.403756 http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/22/189842.html
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