Demetria, et al vs. Hon. Alba, et al GR # 71977 February 27.

1987

Ruling Yes, Section 44(1) of PD 1177 is unconstitutional. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. SC also ruled that the petitioner, as taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. SC ruled that although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

Facts Petitioners, as concerned citizens, and as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers filed petition for prohibition against respondent Hon. Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Section 44(1) of PD 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 which states that The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment alleging that it is contrary to the Constitution on the following grounds: o It violates Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution which states that No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations." It amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers to the executive

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

Respondents, through the Solicitor General, refuted the petition by: o o o o Questioning the legal standing of the petitioners Averring that there is no justiciable controversy involved Contending that the Section 44(1) of PD 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government against a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility. Stating that issue has become moot and academic due to the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution.

Issue Whether or not Section 44(1) of PD 1177 is unconstitutional

Philippine Constitution Association, et al vs Hon. Enriquez, et al GR # 113105 August 19, 1994 o Facts House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. GAB 1994 imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, making it as Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. Congress did not override the presidential veto. Petitioners o GR 113105 Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of a law. They argue that the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5) Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 because under the Constitution it should be o

education that is entitled to the highest funding, invoking Section 5(5), Article XIV GR 113105 and 113174 Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose

GR 113174, 113766 and 113888 Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the presidential veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH Petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and National Highway Authority.

Issue Ruling In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others. o Veto on special provisions The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation. Whether or not the President and Congress acted within the scope of their powers

Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as

unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy. o Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid. o

6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed then it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IXB of the Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, except with respect with respect to 1. G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: a) the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED.

Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president.

2.

b)

Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No.

Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs Secretary of Budget and Management GR # 164987 April 24, 2012

Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal

Ruling Facts Petitioner LAMP, a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country, filed petition for the issuance of TRO against respondents from complying with the provisions of the questioned law and for certiorari, questioning the constitutionality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.)9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004) on the following grounds: o The special provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. The implementation of the provision is flawed because it runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects; the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Yes, the mandatory requisites for judicial review are met. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the law's flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present controversy. The possibility of constitutional violations in the implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have been committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court. Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." In the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition. No, the implementation of the PDAF provision under the GAA of 2004 did not violate the Constitution or the laws. Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the

Respondents, on the other hand: o contended that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual grounds. Although they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF, they argue that the former should not be equated with "pork barrel," which has gained a derogatory meaning referring "to government projects affording political opportunism." In the petition, no proof of this was offered and thus, case should be dismissed for lack of actual case or controversy. invoked Philconsa v. Enriquez, where CDF was described as an imaginative and innovative process or mechanism of implementing priority programs/projects specified in the law. In Philconsa, the Court upheld the authority of individual Members of Congress to propose and identify priority projects because this was merely recommendatory in nature. In said case, it was also recognized that individual members of Congress far more than the President and their congressional colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.

Issues Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case

constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress was presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe into the truth of their claims.

Hence, absent a clear showing that an offense to the principle of separation of powers was committed, much less tolerated by both the Legislative and Executive, the Court is constrained to hold that a lawful and regular government budgeting and appropriation process ensued during the enactment and all throughout the implementation of the GAA of 2004.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa. This remains as valid case law. The Court sees no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.