Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
JANET RENO
Event: Interview with Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States on INS issues
Team Number: 5
Location: K Street
Participants - Commission:
Philip Zelikow, Executive Director
Dan Marcus, General Counsel
Christine Healey
Len Hawley
Barbara Grewe
Janice Kephart-Roberts, counsel
NOTES: PZ asked questions for Team 5 from questions provided below, with the
exception of questions 2 and 7, which were asked by JKR.
1. VIEW OF INS ROLE IN COUNTERTERRORISM. From the mid 1990s to the end of the Clinton
Administration, there was a significant increase in the DOJ's legal and financial resources dedicated to
counter-terrorism, due to both the President (PDDS 39 and 62 of note) and Congress. The FBI, US
Attorneys Offices, Office of Justice Programs, all received a large increase in funding. The FBI,
Customs, and Secret Service heads, among other sub-cabinet agencies are included in the PDD
distribution, but not the INS Commissioner.
• What was your view of the INS role in counterterrorism? (DOJ documents from
the 1990s reflect priorities for the INS in securing the SW border, Border Patrol,
counternarcotics, and countering illegal migration and alien smuggling, punctuated
by the Haitian and Cuban crises. Excluding and removing terrorists, and tracing
students, is not reflected.)
• What was your view of the INS ability to address counterterrorism?
• Do you think enough was done at the White House level to support the INS role
in counterterrorism?
Question asked instead: Whether or when the AG saw a connection between the INS and
CT issues?
Answer: I saw the connection from the beginning. I remember Hal Rogers wanting to
know why the INS couldn 't catch overstays and the fear about the numbers of people
getting in the US. I'll never forget my fall 1993 trip to San Diego. Meissner not yet on
board, and I saw hoards just waiting for us to leave so they could cross the border.
Every time, it was clear to me that if drug cartels could do it, so could terrorists. And
then I reviewed the northern border, and I shuddered looking at this long, barren border,
and wondered, how do I stop that? That's when we developed the Gatekeeper Initiative,
where what we ended up doing was pushing people out to the desert and then keeping
them alive.
2. INTELLIGENCE AND SENIOR BORDER MANAGERS. When you became aware of UBL and
other significant foreign terrorists as a threat to US interests, did you then or later ensure that this
information was shared with Commissioner Meissner? / never asked for her to be briefed on UBL, or
asked her what she knew of his activities. I assumed she was getting the intelligence she needed..
3. EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN TERRORISTS. FDD 39 in June 1995 directed the Attorney General
to use "all legal means available" to exclude or otherwise remove from the U.S. aliens who pose a
terrorist threat. Most of the individuals about whom you were briefed in connection with terrorism
prosecutions were aliens using the legal immigration system to enter the U.S. illegally.
• What did you do to follow up? Not asked.
• Did you use all legal means (ATRC, secret evidence, immigration laws as
pretext)? If not, why not? Not asked.
Did you consider asking Commissioner Meissner for a counterterrorism plan? If
not, why not? (There were CT plans that drifted at INS in the late 90s, but apparently she
never saw them nor asked for them.)
When the drugs were coming up, and the Texas problem large, and the same info was
coming in about crossings over the northern border, I said to Doris, we need to do
something, but we knew we didn 't have the money for the borders or the airports, and the
need for detention was great. Congress passed three laws that changed the immigration
arena greatly. And trying to get anything done was frustrating, because Congress had no
faith. I wanted to balance the Border Patrol with inspectors, determine effective
detention, but when we asked for IT support, instead we got more Border Patrol, and
never got the good balance. At one point, I did ask Doris for a northern border initiative,
but don't recall when.
4. STUDENT TRACKING. The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Law and FDD 62 in
1998 directed that the Justice Department (FBI and INS), and the State and the Education
Departments develop a strategy to track students from terrorism list countries, limit the duration of
their stay in the U.S., and know when they depart.
• What were your views of the value of a student tracking system?
• Why did you not require INS to implement it?
/ recall discussing how students were overstays, and how apprehending violators seemed
an impossible task, but I don't recall the specifics of the program or whether there was
money to do it. Will check on it for you.
5. ENTRY-EXIT. Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 directed the AG to develop an automated entry and exit program to collect records every alien
arriving and departing the US. The June 2000 Data Management Improvement Act directed
integration of DOJ/DOS electronic arrival and departure information, beginning in 2003. The Visa
Waiver Pilot Act of 2000 required collected entry/exit information from aliens provided a waiver by
the Act.
• What were your views of the value of an entry-exit program?
• Why did you not require INS to implement it?
/ don't recall how the funding came down and used, but trying to get the capacity to deal
with overstays, we simply didn 't have the resources to do it. Don't recall the budgetary
specifics, but will check on it. I recall Rogers taking Doris and I to the woodshed on the
issue, but I don't recall the funding issue.
8. CONTEXT. What were the most significant events and developments on immigration and border
issues during your tenure? What were the pressures coming from Congress? From the White House?
Not asked.