Descartes' Mathesis Universalis by F r e d e r i c k P.

Van de P i t t c (Edmonton) It is a curious matter that an essential aspect of Descartes' method should he the subject of (or play a significant role in) a number of important commentaries 1 without ever being fully defined, or even properly characterized. Indeed, with respect to Descartes' mathesis universalis, even such a simple opening statement will be subject to criticism. For on the one hand it has been maintained that in the strict sense the term ^method' is reserved by Descartes to refer precisely to this mathesis universalis2 and, thus, the latter cannot in justice be called merely "an essential aspect" of his method. On the other hand, it has also been argued that the MU was merely a passing phase in Descartes' search for a method, later replaced by a more truly universal procedure.3
Disagreements among commentators are primarily of two kinds: The first concerns whether the MU is simply a universal mathematics; or whether it is to be understood as a still broader method, embracing all aspects of knowledge. The second involves whether the MU is a method which Descartes actually possessed; or simply a dream that was never fulfilled. Liard considers the MU to be essentially identical with the algebra of symbols which Descartes applied so fruitfully to geometry, and thus a universal mathematics ready at hand (p. 591).4 Boutroux sees the MU as an attempt at a universal method such as the mind might employ if it were dissociated from the senses and imagination. But this is a mere dream of youth, he concludes (p. 42), and since such a
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A complete list of such works would make up a very extensive bibliography, but the following titles provide a representative sample: Louis Liard, "La methode et la mathematique universelle de Descartes," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'etranger, X (1880), pp. 596600. Pierre Boutroux, L'imagination et les mathematiques selon Descartes (Paris: Alcan, 1900). Ernst Cassirer, Descartes: Lehre, Persnlichkeit, Wirkung (Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer, 1939). L. J. Beck: The Method of Descartes (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952). Jean-Paul Weber, La Constitution du texte des Regulae (Paris: Societe d'edition d'enseignement superieur, 1964). JeanLuc Marion, Sur l'ontologie grise de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1975). Albert G. A. Balz, Descartes and the Modern Mind (Hamden Conn.: Archon Books, 1967), p. 338. Also, p. 340: "Mathesis universalis would be the whole of Reason's science." Hereafter, except in quotations, 'mathesis universalis' will be simply 'MU.' Jean-Paul Weber, "La Methode de Descartes d'apres les Regulae," Archives de Philosophie, XXXV (1972), pp. 53-54. Page numbers in this paragraph refer to the works listed in note 1, above.

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science is impossible, Descartes settled for a make-shift method in which the imagination plays only a minor role (pp. 34-36). Cassirer has written of the MU in several works, but his essential position is that it is a universal science which only breaks down when the attempt is made to apply it to metaphysics (pp. 39-68). Beck tries to show the MU as a universal science extending beyond mathematics (p. 229), but unfortunately he continues to equate the term with 'universal mathematics' (the same passage from the Regulae is rendered both ways, pp. 194 and 199), and to insist that Descartes' unified science is dependent upon an extension of the "mathematical method" (pp. 230 and 237). Weber concludes that the MU is a universal mathematics which represents an early stage in Descartes' development, later replaced by a more general method (p. 11). Marion sees the MU as a universal method which involves an additional level of abstraction beyond mathematics, thus attaining the "mathematicite non-mathematique des mathematiques" (pp. 62-64). But the method fails because there is "no return" from this level of abstraction, and the objects of the method (order and measure) belong to the mind alone (p. 69).

In part, at least, this disagreement over the role of the M U in Descartes' work must reduce to a disagreement concerning the proper understanding of Rule IV in the Regulae ad directionem ingenii, since that is the only context in which the term is used by Descartes. This is one of those fortunate occasions, therefore, when a careful analysis of a single passage can potentially provide a definitive resolution of differences which persist in Cartesian scholarship. The following is an attempt to provide just such an analysis. The most careful structural analysis of the Regulae to date has been done by Weber in La Constitution du texte des Regulae. A great deal of interesting material was brought to light in this work, and the volume has been accepted as an important contribution to our understanding of the Regulae.5 But, unfortunately, Weber's analysis of Rule IV is incorrect, and it provides a formidable barrier to any ultimate resolution of the controversy surrounding Descartes' MU. It will be necessary, therefore, to point out exactly how this interpretation is incorrect, and provide the necessary revisions. The intended result of this revised interpretation will be to put an end to the long tradition of misconceptions, and consequent inaccurate translations, of Rule IV.
The essential problem with Weber's interpretation lies in his attempt to provide definitive statement of Rule IV by splitting what he refers to as the traditional version of the text into two parts: IV-A (AT, X, pp. 368-374, line 15); and IV (. \.

Weber's structural revisions were incorporated into the Philosophische Hibhtnhck edition by Heinrich Springmeyer: Regular ad directionem mgenii Kegeln rwr tu* richtung der Krkcnntniskrafl, cd. & trans., Heinrich Sprinpmcvcr, I inlet (ialn\ .nul Hans G nter Zckl (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 197^)

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P M4. line 1 (t .WO).'1 He is quite correct, of course, in finding fault with the traditional rsion H u t . unfortunately, in doing so his criticism foeuses upon the wrong issue, rim.mlv. he maintains that in I V - we are presented with merely a universal matheaties. and that this text must therefore represent an earlier stage in Descartes' developent a stage which Weber distinguishes from what he calls the "universal method" IV .' What Weher has not recognized is that a correct understanding of Rule IV ml even ol his own division of the text) is entirely dependent upon a proper interetation of the term 'muthesis universalis.' In brief, the crucial flaw in his interpretation is that in criticizing the traditional version of the text, he has neglected to criticize the traditional conception of M U as universal mathematics. A careful examination of the text reveals several misconceptions in this interpretation.

Almost every standard translation of the Regulae, whether into Dutch, French, German or English, has employed the equivalent of 'mathematics' for the term 'mathesis.' Even worse perhaps, the few remaining translations employ 'mathesis' in some passages, and 'mathematics' in others, without adequate notes to permit the reader to recognize the equivocation. The equivalence of these two terms is technically defensible in some cases. But when these terms are treated as equivalent throughout the entire text of Rule IV, the resulting confusion is not defensible. More to the point, the fact that Descartes employs three separate terms in Rule IV (^mathematica(e)? ^mathesis,' and 'mathesis universalis') would much more naturelly lead one to suppose that he intends to convey three distinct meanings. An important part of the following analysis will be the attempt to show that these terms are essentially distinct, and that these distinctions must be preserved if Rule IV is to retain its significance. The primary thing to keep in mind is that Rule IV is above all a discussion of method.8 Therefore, the significance that these terms convey must provide a contribution to the question of method in some form. In addition, since Descartes has already mentioned in Rule III that he feels free to employ words in his own way by referring them back to their original Latin significance, it would surely be wise to consider the origin of these terms as well.
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All references to the text of Rule IV will be to the "traditional version": (Euvres de Descartes (AT), ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris: Cerf, 1897-1913), X, pp. 371379. This set is currently being revised. However, for the sake of uniformity, references to Descartes' works will be to the original edition, since none of the changes proposed in the new edition will effect the study at hand. For Weber's recommendations on splitting the text, see Constitution, p. 3. Constitution, pp. 711. This is made clear by its title: "Necessaria est Methodus ad rerum veritatem investigandam" (AT, X, p. 371).

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The term 'maihesis' is, of course, originally a Greek word (), referring to the act or process of learning; the acquisition of knowledge. As the word was taken over into Latin, however, 'maihesis' began to be used more in the sense of '': something learned (i.e., the object of learning), or science. In Descartes' time, the term was commonly used to mean "mathematical science." This much tends to justify the standard translation.

But this is only one part of the tradition. Since the excellent study of Giovanni Crapulli, Mathesis Universalis, genesi di una idea nel XVI secolo,9 it has become necessary to recognize other aspects of the tradition as well. Of primary importance, the term 'maihesis' had been acquiring a technical use in this period that must also be taken into account. Tracing the development of the notion of a universal or generalized mathematics,10 Crapulli shows that several authors of the 16th Century had written works presenting mathesis as just such a discipline. In at least two cases, the term 'mathesis universalis' had been employed,11 implying the extension of this science to encompass all aspects of mathematical knowledge. At the same time, however, the conception was growing that this discipline could be something more: a prima mathesis, which (like prima philosophia in relation to other areas of philosophy) could serve as an ultimate foundation for all mathematical sciences.12 In other words, rather than simply a
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Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1969. The roots of this science have been discerned in the works of Aristotle and Eudoxus. See Beck, The Method of Descartes, pp. 200-201; and the Philosophische Bibliothek edition of the Regulae (note 5, above), p. 207, n. 6. Crapulli (Mathesis Universalis, p. 209) mentions only Van Roomen (Adrianus Romanus, 1561 1615), Apologia pro Archimede (1597). Jean Laporte credits J.-P. Weber with the discovery of this source: Le Rationalisme de Descartes (Paris: PUF, 1945), p. 9, n. 7. But Van Roomen used the term at least as early as 1593 in Ideae mathematicae pars prima, sive methodus polygonorum (Antwerpiae: Apud Joannem Keerbergium). The original Privilegio is dated 1590. In UCEuvre dc Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1971), Mme G. Rodis-Lewis also refers (Vol. II, p. 501. n. 52) to the work of J. H. Alsted (1588-1638), Methodus admirandorum mathematicorum complectens novem libros matheseos universae (Herborn, 1613). Weber gives an account of Van Roomen's sources: Constitution, Appendix A, pp. 247-249. Finally, the long list of distinguished mathematicians and their contributions, which is provided by Van Roomen himself, makes it clear that he is not the originator of the concept 'mathesis universalis,' but rather one who has coordinated and systematized a previous tradition. See Ideae mathematicae. Dedication to Oavius (first u n numbered leaf following the title page) and following pages. The Apologia pro Archimede of Van Roomen is not readily available, but Oapiilli quotes a passage from this work in which the term 'prima maihcsis' is employed "Jnscribemus autcm scientiam hanc nomine primac mathcmatuac, sou /MUMC matheseos, ad sirnilitudinem primae philosophiac" (Maihcsis (///. 2\*

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general set of rules iincl procedures, it could become a set of general principles in virtue of which the mathematical sciences achieve their validity.
However, this tradition still accepted prima mathfsis as a division within the science of mathematics Van Roomen divides mathematics first into "pura & impura sive mixta." ' iv mathematics is then broken down into ''universalis <fc specialty." And finally, universal mathematics is divided into " Logist ice & prima Mathesis."*3 This establishes two things clearly: First, that prima mathesis is the essential core of basic principles (and thus 'nmthesis' means here not "mathematics," but "the principles of mathematics"); and secondly, that these principles are firmly fixed within the discipline of mathematics itself.

Descartes understands this tradition very well,14 since he defines 'mathesis' (the science, rather than its history) as:
the ability to resolve all problems, and moreover to discover by one's own industry everything that can be discovered by the human mind in this science.15

Thus, mathesis is a command of the basic principles which govern the process of discovery (and therefore the process of learning) within the
214). See also Van Roomen's work, Universae mathesis idea, qua mathematicae universim sumptae natura, praestantia, usus et distributio brevissime proponuntur (Herbipoli: Apud Georgium Fleischmann, 1602). Chapter IV is entitled "De prima mathesi" (p. 20). Under this heading: "Principia habet tantum propria. Locum in Mathesi obtinet primum. Eadem ratione qua Prima Philosophia inter reliquas philosophicas scientias prima est" (lines 69). Crapulli shows clearly that while there does not seem to be a long tradition involving the term 'prima mathesis', there was nonetheless a significant history of the concept involved. See Chapter IV: "La 'scientia mathematica communis' in analogia alia 'prima philosophia' secondo B. Pereira" (Benito Pereira, 1535-1610), Mathesis Universalis, pp. 93-99. Universae mathesis idea, p. 14. In accordance with tradition, Logistice is presented as the organum scientiae; prima Mathesis as scientia itself. It may be noted that while "the tradition" has been mentioned several times, only Van Roomen's position has actually been presented. The following excerpt from the work of Alsted will confirm that Van Roomen's position was reflected elsewhere: "Caput I. Hexilogia Matheseo>s: Mathesis est pars encyclopaediae philosophicae, tractans de quantitate communiter. . . . Mathesis est generalis, vel specialis. Ilia etiam dicitur communis & universalis, haec propria. Mathesis generalis proponit praecognita mathematica, quae praecipiunt de disciplinarum mathematicarum natur & studio . . .." Methodus admirandorum mathematicorum, novem libris exhibens universam mathesin (Herbornae: Nassaviorum, 1623), pp. 56. All italics are in the original. This is the "secunda editio passim castigata & ornatius elaborata," and the title varies from the edition of 1613 referred to by Mme Rodis-Lewis. "In eumdem enim fere sensum duo soleo in Mathesi distinguere: historiam scilicet & scientiam. . . . Per Scientiam ver, peritiam quaestiones omnes resolvendi, atque adeo inveniendi propri industri illud omne quod ab humano ingenio in e scientia potest inveniri . . .. Letter to Hogelande, 8 February 1640 (AT. XII, Supplement [Index volume], p. 2, lines 1016).

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mathematical disciplines: precisely the meaning which 'prima mathesis' had come to convey. But, as usual, Descartes did not merely accept traditional teaching as he found it; he added his own contribution, as well. In this case, what Descartes added was the recognition that the accepted classification of principles within mathematics would still permit of (in fact demand) a distinct set of principles which falls outside mathematics, and is logically prior. That is, if prima mathesis is understood to be the most basic principles concerning quantity,16 it is still necessary to consider those principles which alone account for how it is that questions involving quantity arise in the first place. Descartes' essential divergence from the tradition, therefore, concerns the source of the most basic principles of mathematics. He recognizes that if one must account for principles outside mathematics, as well as those internal to the discipline, then the tradition is faced with a dilemma: Either prima mathesis is a division of mathematics in which case it is not self-contained (principia habet tantum propria, note 12, above), since it must relate to prior principles as well; or it is self-contained ("prima" mathesis in the strict sense), and thus outside mathematics, since it is logically prior to all questions of quantification. This insight prompted Descartes to be critical of the mathematics of his own period.17 He felt that it had not yet attained an awareness of the fundamental principles which were required to ground it as a science. By taking the concept ''prima mathesis' seriously, and recognizing that it must be logically prior to (i.e., outside) mathematics, he was enabled to do two things: First of all, he was able to provide the missing foundation, and give mathematics the status which it had always claimed. This in itself may be seen as no mean achievement, but he saw the second as his more significant contribution to science.
Descartes determined the prior principles required by mathematics to be those of order and measure, i.e., the primary relations through which any material is brought to the state of organization and systematization which is essential to science. What is most important here is that the basic elements should display the logically necessary relationships which alone can provide the basis for absolutely certain inferential relations as the structure of the science develops. But although these principles provide the essential
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Universae malhesis idea: "Mathematics princeps est quac soli quantitatum speculationi intenta est" (p. 14); "prima Mathesis cst quae vcrsatur circa quantitalcm absolute sumptam" (p. 20). The precise criticism in Rule IV is that the mathematical disciplines fail to demonstrate why their propositions arc true (/. c., how they arc related to first principles) and how further truths may be discovered. AT, X, p 375, lines 7 >

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foundation which permits mathematics to claim the status of science, they arc nonetheless not nnitftu to mat hematics. Rather, as the basis of inference itself, they are common to all disciplines. Uy focusing on these principles, therefore, Descartes is able to take the crucial step from the restrictions of a purely mathematical discipline to a potentially unlimited field of inquiry, i.e., to a universal science as such.1H

From this perspective, it seems very likely that Descartes was originally attempting to establish the mathematics of his period as a science when he discovered the principles of a universal method. We know that he had a universal mathematical procedure as early as 1619. |4> Me may very well have been trying to provide this method with proper foundational principles. In any case, he discovered the essential aspects of order: relations, proportions, etc., which make it possible to establish a discipline as a science, i.e., as certain and indubitable knowledge. 20
As we have already noted, Descartes determined that in order to become a science, any subject matter under consideration must be able to achieve a certain kind of organization and systematization. That is, unless we are able to detect patterns, and give order and structure to the material being dealt with, it could not be a proper object of science. In addition, when this organization can be provided, its elements must be so basic, and related so rigorously, that one can readily grasp both the truth involved and its inherent necessity.21 Thus the principles in terms of which a discipline may be constituted (and recognized as) a science are not merely the formal principles which provide validity on the basis of definitions, axioms, etc. They are, at the same time, the principles which render the subject intelligible. When these principles are once grasped, it is possible both to recognize all the truths of this science that have already been discovered (its "history"), and to extend the science through further discoveries.22
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Thus emerges the essential role of mathesis in Rule IV: It is the "bridge" by means of which Descartes is able to move outside the confines of mathematics. It should be noted that, because prima mathesis is considered to be outside mathematics, and therefore unrestricted, Descartes sees it as equivalent to mathesis universalis, and the former term is never used. This is the "scientia penitus nova" of which Descartes writes to Beeckman (26 March 1619): "qua generaliter solvi possint quaestiones omnes, quae in quolibet genere quantitatis, tarn continuae quam discretae, possunt proponi." AT, X, pp. 156157. Order provides the clarity required of intuition; inferential relations provide the basis for deduction. In Rule III we are told that intuition and deduction are the most certain avenues to science, and the only two which ought to be employed. AT, X, p. 370, lines 16-17. These criteria will immediately be recognized as referring to the simple natures and necessary relations of the Regulae. Just as in his definition of 'mathesis,' Descartes maintains in the Regulae that it is the mark of having mastered a science to be able to solve any of its problems, and to be able to make firm judgments on the matters to which it pertains. Otherwise we have learned only its history. See Rule III (AT, X, p. 367, lines 16-13).

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What Descartes learned with respect to mathematics, therefore, he considered a truth applicable to all other sciences as well: That the principles of validity of any science are at the same time the principles of discovery or learning within the science. And since order and relations provide the common basis for validity in all the sciences, they must also provide the basis for a common method.23 This is the foundation that our argument requires. .It is difficult to say whether Descartes began with the original meaning of the term '' and gradually worked Out his insight concerning the essential nature of scientia, or whether he followed the reverse procedure. In any case, it is clear that he employs the word 'mathesis' primarily in its Greek sense. He recognized that mathematics is (science) or (the "learnable") only in virtue of the fact that it is subject to , the process of learning.24 Since this same process is common to all the sciences, it is perfectly natural that he should employ the term 'mathesis universalis' to mean the universal principles of learning, or universal method. And the term 'mathesis' (when used alone) may mean the underlying principles which render mathematics a science, or simply the principles of learning (i.e., method) or indeed both, since Descartes understands these to be the same principles.25
With all of this in mind, we can now turn to Rule IV in order to determine its proper interpretation. Since Descartes is clearly aware of the intellectual movements of his time, it would be quite wrong to assume that his proposal in this rule is merely to provide another version of generalized mathematics. Throughout the rule (in both I V A and IVB), the emphasis is on something new or more precisely, on something as old as learning itself, but just now set in clear focus and declared to be a project capable of fulfillment. Because Descartes mentions the MU only in Rule IV, where he is concentrating on the essential problem of finding an appropriate method, the real import of his statements should be fairly clear. He is attempting to fulfill the various aspects of
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It should be noted that the identification of the principles of validity with the principles of intelligibility (learning) is the underlying significance of Descartes" assertion that the principles of knowledge may be called first philosophy or metaphysics. See note 53, below. Heidegger has recognized this distinction in the context of his work on Kant, but has not given the point its appropriate application to the work of Descartes. M. Heidegger. Die Frage nach dem Ding (T bingen: Niemeyer, 1962), . 54. This distinction is undoubtedly also what Marion is attempting to express in the phrase "la tnaihrmaticile non-mathematiquc des mathematiques" referred to above. That Descartes employs the word 'mathesis' in the sense of "method" becomes mote clear when we recognize that in Rule IV, which is totally dedicated to a discussion ol method, the word 'method' docs not occur at all on pages 374- 379 (i. e., in IV It) In these same pages, 'mathesis' and its variants occur eleven limes

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(Me tradition which we have outlined. The universal wisdom (sapientia) envisioned in Kule I is to include all the sciences, and is to he attained by means of the universal method ( M i l ) ol Rule IV. 2 "

But the conflict among commentators remains: It is generally agreed, on the one hand, that the intention of Descartes in Rule IV is to show how it is possible to work toward the universal wisdom of Rule I by means of a single, universal method. But this would be impossible if the MU were simply a universal mathematics. Yet, in surprising contrast, the predominant weight of commentary continues to maintain that the MU is precisely that a science of quantification. Undoubtedly the primary reason for this problem is the fact that the traditional reading of IVB is both incorrect and seriously misleading. When the text is properly understood, there is no need to see Descartes as offering anything less than a truly universal method. The tendency for commentators and translators to equate 'mathesis' and 'mathematics' in Rule IV leads them to present us with several very strange constructions. For example, when Descartes tells us that, in his search for a method, he was led from the consideration of particular mathematical disciplines (arithmetic and geometry) to a general study of mathesis, the latter is interpreted to mean simply mathematics. Because there is a clear distinction between the particular mathematical disciplines and the general field of mathematics, this interpretation has a prima facie cogency. But when, in the next sentence, the terms 'mathesis' and 'mathematicae' are both employed, a similar reduction of both terms to 'mathematics' makes the distortion more serious. It is normally translated:
I first sought to determine precisely what everyone understands by this term ["mathematics"], and why not only the sciences already mentioned [arithmetic and geometry], but also Astronomy, Music, Optics, Mechanics, and several others are called parts of mathematics.27

Once the two terms 'mathesis' and 'mathematics' are equated, this is a reasonable translation of the passage; but it completely obliterates
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Paolo Rossi tells us that during this period the ideal of a pansophia dominated all aspects of culture. Clavis Universalis, arti mnemoniche e logica combinatoria da Lullo a Leibniz (MilanoNapoli: R. Ricciardi Editore, 1960), p. 53. In a section on Descartes, Rossi makes it clear that Descartes was caught up in the movement toward a universal science. (Ibid., pp. 153 161). ". . . Quaesivi imprimis quidnam practise per illud nomen {Mathesis} omnes intelligant, & quare non modo jam dictae, sed Astronomia etiam, Musica, Optica, Mechanica, aliaeque complures, Mathematicae partes dicantur" (AT, X, p. 377, lines 12-16).

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the distinction, and subsequent relation, which Descartes is here attempting to establish. The passage is intended to say:
I first sought to determine precisely what everyone understands by this term [Maihesis], and why not only those already mentioned [arithmetic and geometry], but also Astronomy, Music, Optics, Mechanics, and several other mathematicae are called parts.28

This keeps the distinction clear: Mathesis is the master discipline, the science of principles, of which various mathematical disciplines (mathematicae) are the parts, or applications. This distinction is required by Descartes in order that he can display the relationship (the order of theoretical dependence) which exists between the principles of a major branch of science and the individual subdisciplines in which they are applied to some particular kind of object. With this in mind, when Descartes goes on to investigate the matter further, there is no tendency to become confused. But the traditional transJation has already gone astray. The problem is increased in the next passage, which reads (incorrectly):
Here indeed it is not sufficient to examine the derivation of the word: for since the term 'mathematics' means the same thing as 'disciplina,' all the other disciplines would with no less right than geometry itself be called mathematics. Yet there is hardly anyone with the least education who cannot readily distinguish among matters presented to him, which pertain to mathematics and which to other disciplines.29

Again the distortion makes it difficult to see the precise point. The passage should read:
Here indeed it is not sufficient to examine the derivation of the word: for since the term 'mathesis' means the same thing as 'disciplina,' all these other disciplines would with no less right than geometry itself be called mathematicae [/'. e., parts of mathesis].
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This reading derives support from an excellent source. The version of Adrien Baillet is the only one which we have that comes directly from Descartes' own manuscript. (See the remarks of M Adam, AT, X, p. 352). Although it is not a literal translation, it clearly could not be a paraphrase of a passage in which the comma after 'complures occurred: "Les pensees qui lui vinrent sur ce sujet, lui firent abondonner I'etude particuliere de FArithmetique & de la Geometrie, pour se donner tout entier la recherche de cette Science generate, mais vraye & infaillible, que les Grecs ont nommee judicieusement MATHESIS, & dont toutes les Mathematiques ne sont quc des parties" (AT, X, p. 484). It is curiously inconsistent for M Adam to call this passage "une traduction assez fidcle" (ibid., p. 353), and yet leave the comma in place. It should be omitted from the text. "Hie enim vocis originem spectare non sufficit; nam cum Mathcseos nomcn idem tantum sonet quod disciplina, non minori jure, quam Geomctria ipsa, Mathematicae vocarentur. Atqui vidcmus neminem fere cssc, si prima tantum scholarum limina let gerit, qui non facile distinguat ex ijs quac occurrunt, quidnam ad Mathesim pc-rli neat, & quid ad alias disciplinas" (AT, X, p. 377, lines 16-22).

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Descartes' point is that they should not be. In fact, he is saying that this is a distortion so gross that it must surely set in a clear light the inadequacy of appealing to mere definitions. 30 It is agreed that (etymologieally) 'mathesis9 and 'disciplina* mean the same thing. Both words signify that something is an object of learning, or perhaps indicate the process by which it is learned. 31 But neither tells us anything about the kind of subject matter with which the learning is concerned, in order to understand why one science is "part" of another, it is essential to consider the nature of the material dealt with. Thus, what is required here is not reference to the origin of words, but simply to the objects of the disciplines in question. Arithmetic deals with discrete magnitude, geometry with continuous magnitude. Together they express the primary significance of mathesis as applied to pure quantity. All the other mathematicae are more remote, since they involve the application of arithmetic and geometry to particular kinds of physical objects. But it is not so much the kind of objects that is at issue here. It is really the distinction, based on the order of theoretical dependence, between principles and the application of those principles. For when this perspective is assumed (the passage continues):
there is hardly anyone with the least education who cannot readily distinguish among matters presented to him, which pertain to mathesis [the principles] and which to the other disciplines [their applications].

From this it can be seen that, while the customary reading has always drawn a distinction between mathematics and other disciplines, what Descartes actually intends here is to distinguish between mathesis and the various mathematicae.
30

31

Arithmetic and geometry have a special claim to the title "mathematicae." In successive chapters of Universae mathesis idea (IVVI), Van Roomen presents "Prima Mathesis," "Arithmetical and "Geometria," establishing the relation of dependence of each upon the preceding: With respect to Arithmetic: "Principia habet turn propria, turn ex Prima Mathesi desumpta. Locum in Mathesi post primam, obtinet primum" (p. 22). With respect to Geometry: "Principia praeter propria, etiam desumit, turn ex prima Mathesi, turn ex Arithmetica. . . . Proximum in Mathesi locum post Arithmeticam obtinet" (pp. 2324). Chapter VII (Astronomia) simply says that the principles of astronomy are arithmetic and geometry (p. 27). Alsted calls arithmetic and geometry "pure" sciences of mathematics. All others are ordinary mathematics, applying quantification to either bodies or qualities. Methodus admirandorum mathematicorum . . ., p. 7. Even though etymology does not hold the key to this issue, it is instructive to note that Descartes explains 'mathesis' by means of 'disciplina.' For both of these terms can mean either "knowledge," or "the process of training through which knowledge is acquired."

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This distinction permits Descartes to go on to the next step, which is to show that mathesis, the science of principles applicable to quantity, is itself (in the order of theoretical dependence) subordinate to prima mathesis or MU. Thus, when the principles within mathematics are clearly distinguished from their applications, the basis is established for mathesis to serve as the bridge for the step outside mathematics. Descartes prepares the way for this transition by completing the explanation of why the mathematicae are called parts of mathesis. But the translation continues to mislead:
Thus, after a more attentive consideration, I finally determined that all and only those things are related to mathematics in which are examined a kind of order or measure, irrespective of whether it is in number, figure, stars, sounds, or any other object that such measure is investigated.32

When the word 'mathematics' is replaced with 'mathesis,' as it should be, one can see more clearly what Descartes is about. Only a discipline whose objects are subject to order and measure can be considered a mathematica (as , and thus ). But in addition to providing the subject matter for the process of learning, each discipline is referred back to mathesis as the science of principles (or prima mathesis) in terms of which it is grounded and achieves its validity. For both of these reasons, the various mathematicae are "parts" of mathesis. Stated more simply, the various mathematicae share with arithmetic and geometry the basic dependence upon order and measure. They are related to mathesis^ therefore, since it is the science of order and measure insofar as these apply to quantity. This clarification is necessary in order that Descartes can go on to make the further, and more important distinction: that is, between order and measure as they are related to quantity; and, on the other hand, the more basic principles of order and measure, which are logically prior and fall outside mathematic. The former is mathesis, the latter MU. This, therefore, is the precise point at which Descartes sets up mathesis as the "bridge." But the standard translation gives us merely:
And therefore I determined that there ought to be a general science which \vould be able to deal with all the questions that can arise concerning order and measure. without reference to any special subject matter, and called not by some foreign term. but by the traditional and accepted name 'universal mal hematics.' since u would
32

"Quod attenti s consideranti tandem innotuit, ilia omnia tantiim. in quibus mlo \el mensura examinatur, ad Mathesim refcrri, nee Interesse u t rum in numens. vel figuris. vel aslris, vel sonis, aliovc quovis objecto, lalis mensura quacicmkt sit " (A I , V pp. 377, line 22-378, line 4).

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l - r e d e r i c k . Van de P i t t e

contain everything in virtue ol which the other sciences are called parts of mathematics. '*

The most important problem with this reading is that the last lines should say instead:
. 'mathfsix univerxalis,' since it would contain everything in virtue of which other sciences and mtittiematicae are called parts.34

From mathesis (as the principles of mathematics), therefore, Descartes has now expanded the perspective to a universal mathesis which would include the principles of all other sciences, in addition to those of mathematics. 35 Because this issue is so important, and the passage has been the source of confusion for so long, the essential point should perhaps be repeated with greater precision: What Descartes is presenting here is the order of theoretical dependence between the various branches of mathematics, mathesis, and MU. The mathematicae deal with the whole range of physical objects and their properties. Mathesis provides their principles. Mathesis deals with the various aspects of order and measure as they apply to quantity. MU provides its principles. But the
-" " . . Ac proinde generalem quamdam esse debere scientiam, quae id omne explicet, quod circa ordinem & mensuram nulli speciali materiae addictam quaeri potest, eamdemque, non ascititio vocabulo, sed jam inveterato atque usu recepto, Mathesim universalem nominari, quoniam in hac continetur illud omne, propter quod aliae scientiae Mathematicae partes appellantur" (ibid., p. 378, lines 411). 34 This reading requires only that the ampersand be replaced between the words 'scientiae' and 'Mathematicae' to provide: "propter quod aliae scientiae & Mathematicae partes appellantur." This ampersand was omitted from the AT edition because it was thought to be added erroneously (see note to p. 378, line 10). Yet it occurs in both the Amsterdam edition and the Hanover manuscript. Perhaps even more important, it appears in Baillet's paraphrase: "... puis qu'elle renferme tout ce qui peut faire meriter le nom de Science & de Mathematique particuliere aux autres connoissances" (AT, X, p. 484). Again, Baillet's is the only version known to have been taken from Descartes' original manuscript. The ampersand must be reinstated. 35 The only commentator who has explicitly attempted to support this kind of interpretation is Jean-Luc Marion, in Sur Vontologie grise de Descartes, pp. 5564. But Marion has not provided the necessary analysis of mathesis, or of the passage above in which Descartes discusses the transition from mathesis to mathesis universalis. Without these essential elements, the interpretation remains inconclusive. After this work was completed, Marion's new translation of the Regulae appeared. He still does not make several of the distinctions suggested above, but he offers excellent supporting material against conflating mathesis and mathematics (Annexe II, pp. 302 309), and against any translation at all of the term 'mathesis' (p. 158, line 21-end). See Regies utiles et claires pour la direction de l'esprit en la recherche de la verite. Traduction selon le lexique cartesien, et annotation conceptuelle par Jean-Luc Marion, avec des notes mathematiques de Pierre Costabel (La Haye: M. Nijhoff, 1977).

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principles of order and measure which constitute the M U are the very principles of knowledge and inference as such, and are thus the basis of all possible scientia.
The contrast between this interpretation and the traditional version of Rule IV is quite clear: If mathesis is understood in the narrower, technical sense of "the principles internal to mathematics" (or simply "mathematics"), then no universalization of the concept could extent it beyond the limits of a science of quantification. Moreover, since such principles would already be all-pervasive within these limits, the addition 'univers'alis' would be redundant. But if mathesis is understood in its broader sense, "the principles of learning," then the addition of the term 'universalis' is not only meaningful, but extremely important. In effect, by restoring the original meaning of the word 'mathesis' Descartes is providing a distinctly different, and more firmly grounded significance for the established term 'mathesis universalis.' His intention is that the term should now legitimately denote what it had come by imprecise usage to suggest: the universal first principles of knowledge; the key to a universal science.36

It must be emphasized once more that Descartes does conceive his method to extend beyond mathematics, and to be universal in scope. The confusion which exists on this point is prompted by the fact that he tends to discuss the method in terms of mathematical problems to enhance the clarity of the procedures of method when they are applied to utterly simple objects. However, he apologizes for this procedure, stating that he is not concerned with ordinary mathematics, but quite another discipline. Mathematics may be seen as the outer shell of this method, but its actual content is the primary rudiments of human reason, and it is intended to extend to any subject matter whatever.37 In Rule VIII this position is even more explicitly formulated when an example is employed in which it is shown to be wrong to limit oneself to mathematics in attempting to solve problems. The example given is that of trying to find the line of refraction in optics (in Dioptrica anaclasticam vacant). One who attempts to achieve this end through mathematics alone, Descartes says, will necessarily fail. For the problem is not merely a matter of the principles of mathematics, but rather of physics.38 Instead, one must follow Rule I, seeking to discover the truth in all matters (de omnibus quae occurrunt veritatem quaercre cupiat).39 Then the problem, although difficult, can finally be solved.
36

It is extremely interesting to realize that in the very passage where Descartes attempting to eliminate an important error of his period (the conflation of mathcsis arid mathematics), commentators have misunderstood his intention because they have fallen into the same error. 37 AT, X, pp. 373, line 30-374, line 9. H ibid., pp. 393-394. Ibid., p. 394.

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16<S

l'rede r ick l. Van de Pi l i e

Throughout the R<>i>ulue we find Descartes expressing the same basic thought: Science consists of all the knowledge which we can have provided only that it is certain and indubitable. Therefore, since science is one, and universal in extent, the method by which we are to attain this knowledge must also be universal. 40
I ituilly we may attempt to draw more precise conclusions concerning the nature of Descartes' method: The MU is a universal method, but that does not mean that it is a simple procedure. For in addition to its procedural aspect, it is also a science of method, methodology in the strict sense. The evidence for this point is clear, since Descartes sa\s (Rule II) that everything to which we turn our attention must be an object of certain and indubitable knowledge (i.e., science). This is pre-eminently true with respect to the method which must be followed. But most important of all, Descartes calls the MU a science in the very passage in which he first names it (note 33, above). At the same time, it should be noted that the MU is not the universal wisdom of Rule I. It is only the means by which that ultimate science will be achieved. Therefore, the MU is universal not in the sense that it contains all knowledge, but in the sense that it will discover or disclose all knowledge. This is best understood by noting the way in which Descartes speaks of his method: distinguishing, that is, what it contains (as a science), from what it is to accomplish (as a procedure).

As we have seen, in one context he says that the method is to contain "the primary rudiments of human reason"; in another, that it is to contain "everything in virtue of which the other sciences and mathematicae are called parts." Note that he does not say simply that the M U contains all the other sciences. Yet, in the strict sense, of course, there is only one science and these others are parts of MU in precisely the same sense in which the mathematicae are parts of mathesis. They are not parts which together constitute the whole, but rather they are the various applications of the same basic principles. The order of theoretical dependence is preserved, with clearly distinguished levels: The MU is the methodology which grounds all science (including itself), because it contains the first rudiments of human reason. Then come philosophy, mathematics, physics, etc. each with its own appropriate internal principles. Under these major headings come the several branches of each science.

40

In a letter to Mersenne (27 February 1637) Descartes mentions that the Discourse on Method is intended to display not only the value of the method as this is exemplified in the accompanying Essays, but also the extent of application of the method: ". . . J'ai insere quelque chose de Metaphysique, de Physique et de Medecine dans le premier Discours, pour montrer qu'elle s'etend toutes sortes de matieres" (AT, I, p. 349).

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This hierarchy is confirmed when Descartes speaks of what the method is to accomplish. As a procedure,41 it is to extend itself to the eduction of truths with respect to any subject matter whatever; and it is to be the most powerful of human knowledge, since it is the source of all the others.42 As a science it is the source of principles; as a procedure, it is the means by which knowledge is revealed.43 And finally, Descartes tells us that while the MU extends to all that which is dealt with by the subordinate sciences, and much more besides, it nonetheless has fewer difficulties. The reason is that, while these other sciences will contain all the difficulties proper to MU, they will also contain the additional difficulties consequent upon their own particular objects but these latter problems will not occur in the MU.44 Clearly, then, the MU is not a universal science in the sense that it contains the other sciences, since it does not contain their difficulties.

Thus the MU is entirely distinct from Descartes' universal wisdom, and it must be investigated separately. It is the science which contains the principles of human knowledge;45 and the procedure by which these principles are applied to the other sciences. This double sense carried by the term 'MU' helps to explain some of the problems which commentators have encountered in attempting to explain this concept. But the concept is neither equivocal, nor ambiguous, and a careful reading of Rule IV permits us to characterize it very clearly. It is now possible to deal more decisively with the details of Weber's argument. The prima facie cogency which it offers is immediately lost when we realize that 'mathesis universalis' does not mean "universal mathematics." The contention that the "universal method"46 of VI-A is broader in scope than the mere universal mathematics of IV- becomes totally inappropriate. Obviously, then, there is no longer any justification for Weber's assertion that the method of IV-A and the
41 42 43

44 45 46

By method, Descartes says, he understands "certain and easy rules" to follow (AT. X. p. 371, lines 25-26). The basic sense of method, therefore, is procedure. AT, X, p. 374, lines 8-12. This dual role explains why Descartes can say in Rule VI11 that this method resembles that aspect of the mechanical arts by which they are able to do without outside assistance, and provide their own directions for making the instruments they require AT, X, p. 397, lines 4-6. This also clarifies why Descartes can define the science Mathesis as the ability to solve all problems and discover everything that can be known in this science. See note 15, above. This double use of the word 'science* troubles some commentators. See Descartes: (Euvres philosophiques, ed. F. Alquic (Pans: Ciarnici Freres, 1967), vol. II, p. 159, note 5. AT, X, p. 378, lines 11-16. This phrase, 'the principles of knowledge/ will be justified in the concluding discussion of Weber's position. The term 'universal method* is not used by Descartes in IV- . hut \Vchei is tjnUr correct in maintaining that Descartes clearly intends the method to lump ^ <> " knowledge of which we are capable. Sec AT, X, p. 372, lines 4

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F r e d e r i c k P. Van tie I ' i t t e

M l ) of I V - B arc entirely different. 47 In fact, as we have seen, there is every reason to see them as identical. I ; or this reason, it is unnecessary to take up a detailed consideration of Weber's second and third points: That the universal mathematics could not be merely a particular application of the method; and (his ultimate conclusion) that the universal mathematics must be a more or less remote preparation for the method which later evolved. But if these two aspects of the problem can be set aside, the final point raised by Weber requires more serious consideration.
At the end of Rule IV, Descartes observes that, being conscious of his own limitations, he has determined to follow an order in his search for knowledge that will always require him to begin with what is simplest and easiest, and never permit him to go on until nothing further seems to be required at this more basic level. That is why, he says, he has spent his time studying this MU to the best of his ability. In this way he hopes that, as he takes up the somewhat more profound sciences in their proper sequence, he will be able to deal with them accurately and not prematurely. But before making this transition, he will attempt to bring together and set in order whatever in the previous studies seems worthy of attention.48

Weber would like to read two things into this passage: First of all, he understands Descartes to be turning his attention away from universal mathematics at this point, and toward philosophy.49 Secondly, he interprets this to mean that the same method is not considered valid for both mathematics and philosophy, and consequently, that Descartes has not yet devised a properly universal method.50 Because this passage is part of IV, Weber believes it to constitute conclusive evidence that the universal mathematics cannot be identified with the method in its final (i.e., universal) form, and therefore, that IVB must have been written before IVA.
In part, what has already been said will serve to unravel the threads which are tangled here. Since the MU is not universal mathematics, but a truly universal method, it can be applied equally well to both mathematics and philosophy. Again, therefore, Weber's
47

48 49

50

"Ainsi, point de doute: la Mathematique universelle englobe toutes les sciences mathematiques, laisse de cote toutes les autres sciences, est tout autre chose qu'une Methode universelle." Constitution, p. 8. AT, X, pp. 378, line 26-379, line 9. "Que signifie ce passage? Evidemment que Descartes est sur le point de Veloigner' de la Mathematique universelle, pour se tourner vers des 'sciences un peu plus elevees' . . . qu'il designe lui-meme ail leu rs du nom de 'Philosophie/ " Constitution, p. 10. "La meme Methode ne vaut pas a lafoispour les Mathematiques et pour la Philosophie, et, par consequent, // n'y a pas encore de Methode proprement universelle." Ibid., emphasis in original.

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main contention (that IV-B is merely a remote preparation for IV-A) remains unsupported. But it is even more important to recognize that Descartes is not at this point turning from mathematics to take up philosophy. In fact, it is vital to realize that he has not in any significant sense dealt with mathematics at all in Rule IV. That is, mathematics has not been the object of his considerations in this rule. He has referred to mathematics (in his search for a method) only because it is in that context that, in earlier ages, the process or learning had been most successful, and therefore one could most clearly perceive the basic principles of learning. By this means he was able to characterize the MU as a science distinct from mathematics - but the MU is not yet fully defined.

What Descartes has been doing in Rule IV becomes more clear in Rule VIII. There he gives us the analogy of the blacksmith who would set up his trade without having any equipment to work with. He is thus forced at first to use natural objects - rocks and pieces of wood - as anvil, hammer and tongs. And with these, he would not at first attempt to make objects of trade for the use of others. Instead he would begin by fashioning proper tools for himself, in order that his work might be more skillfully and efficiently performed. By this example, Descartes tells us, we are taught that since our initial efforts have as yet only discovered certain rough precepts, which seem to belong rather to the innate capacity of the mind than to any developed technique, we should not at once attempt to settle the controversies of philosophy, or solve the difficulties of mathematics. Instead we must first employ them to diligently search out everything else that is required for the investigation of truth.51 By these remarks, Descartes means simply that we must make a careful examination of the powers of the human mind, and of the objects to which they are to be applied. This is explicitly stated both before and after the passage just cited.
In Rule IV, therefore, Descartes has merely distinguished his method as a universal process of learning, without stating very much about either the principles or the process which it involves. It is not until Rule VIII that he indicates how we are to go aboul defining matters more clearly: by determining the essential principles of the mind itself. For these alone could serve as the principles of the process of learning, and thus the principles of all science. This point receives its most explicit statement in the comments which Descartes has included in two of his published works: the Discourse on Method, and The Principles of Philosophy.

In Part II of the Discourse, Descartes says that all the rest of the sciences must borrow their principles from philosophy, and that he must attempt, first of all, to establish certainty there (in philosophy)
AT, X, p. 397, lines 6-23.

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I ' l e d e r i c k P. Van clc I ' i t t e

(he most important thing in the world.52 But the aspect of philosophy from which the other sciences must borrow their principles is first philosophy, or metaphysics. And in the Principles we are told that first philosophy, or metaphysics, "contains the principles of knowledge."53 The first task of any method, therefore, must be to establish its own foundation as a science, and (simultaneously) the foundation of all that it can reveal, by determining the principles of knowledge upon which the whole project depends. l;roiii this perspective, the error of Weber's interpretation becomes perfectly clear. For, rather than turning from mathematics to philosophy at the end of Rule IV, we see that Descartes is simply employing that aspect of the method which he has already isolated (the analysis of the ancients) in an effort to disclose the MU as a science: the principles of human cognition. He is turning from his consideration of method as a process to a more profound examination of it roots as a science in metaphysics. The remaining elements of Weber's interpretation can be dealt with briefly. There would be little point in entering into a detailed debate concerning the precise date to be assigned to the portion of Rule IV which he calls IVB. 54 But it can be readily seen that there is little basis for the contention that it is an earlier draft of IVA. In fact, if IVA and IVB are really two versions of the same basic statement if, that is, we are forced to choose between them then there can be no question of which is to be retained. IVB is a much more detailed statement of how Descartes' method was first discovered, and how it is to be understood. In fact, all of Weber's evidence concerning the separate status of IVB 55 works against the interpretation he offers. No trace remains of Descartes' original manuscript of the Regulae, and we cannot even be certain that the versions we do have, i. e., the Amsterdam edition of 1701, and the Hanover manuscript, were taken directly from the
52 53

54 55

AT, VI, pp. 21, line 30-22, line 4. Preface to the French edition of the Principles of Philosophy (AT, IX, part 2, p. 14). The point is repeated again when he speaks of the Principles as being divided into four parts, "the first of which contains the principles of knowledge, which is what may be called first philosophy or metaphysics" (ibid., p. 16). Weber's argument concludes: "IVB a etc, presque certainement, redige entre mi-octobre et debut novembre 1619" (Constitution, p. 17). Primarily concerning the fact that in the Hanover manuscript it is relegated to the status of an appendix. See AT, X, p. 374. note a.

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original.56 Therefore we do not know for what reason the copyist of the Hanover manuscript set IV-B at the end of his transcription. Perhaps it was written on different paper, or in a different ink. In some manner it must have been set off as distinct. But while Weber sees this as evidence for an earlier origin, it seems more likely to serve as proof of a later date. One does not tend to retain a single passage from an earlier draft of a work in progress. Whatever is essential in an earlier draft is incorporated directly into the new. When that has been done, the earlier version is no longer worth preserving. Such an isolated passage as Weber assumes IV-B to have been would far more likely be a revision, an improvement on the earlier work, resulting from a particular insight. Because of the extremely compressed manner in which IV-B is expressed, one might even see it as a set of notes hurriedly jotted down as the basis for a later, more thorough presentation of the material. But this perspective, too, is simply an opinion developed through long association with the text; and like that of Weber, it is unsupported by any objective evidence. The best interpretation here, surely, is to see IV-A and IV-B not as a duplication of the same text, but as complementary aspects of the same material.57
Much work is yet required if we are ever to fully define the precise nature of Descartes' MU. But surely that task is worthy of separate treatment. In the present context it is sufficient to eliminate those misconceptions which could prevent the acceptance of such clarification when it occurs. On this point Weber is entirely correct: It would be impossible to properly evaluate and explain the essential nature of Descartes' method if it is merely considered to be a universal mathematics. Such a method could not begin to perform the task that Descartes has set for himself. But a universal science of learning, when applied to the various objects of knowledge, could eventually provide the universal wisdom of which he speaks in Rule I.

56

57

M Adam maintains that the Latin manuscript employed for the 1701 edition was undoubtedly the same used as the basis for the "traduction flamande" offered by Glazemaker in 1684. He also feels that there is sufficient reason to believe the 1701 edition a faithful rendering of Descartes' original manuscript. But his position is based entirely on circumstantial evidence. See AT, X, pp. 353-356. For an evaluation ol the relative merits of these various sources, see H. Springmeyer, "Eine neue kritische Textausgabe der 'Regulae ad directionem ingenii' von Rene Descartes." in /.ciischrift fr philosophische Forschung, XXIV (1970), pp. 101 - 125. Crapulli provides a somewhat different perspective in his Introduction to the Latin-Dutch edition: Regulac ad Directionem Ingenii, texte critique etabli par Giovanni Crapulli. am la version hollandaise du XVII' siede (La Hayc: M. Nijhoff, 19(>f>). This is the perspective adopted by Marion (Sur I'oniolngic gnsc dc /V.\<Y/rfr>, pp. 55-59).

12 Arch. Gesch. Philosophie Bd. ft I

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However, because the M U is a science of principles, as well as a procedure for discovery, we are left with several unanswered questions. Precisely what are the principles of cognition that provide an adequate foundation for the universal method? And just how are we to understand the manner in which the procedure is grounded in them? Surely, from Descartes' confident manner of writing, we must assume that he believes himself to be in possession of this science. But, unfortunately, in the Rcgulae we find only a presentation of some of the procedures which these principles entail, rather than a statement of the principles themselves. We are left merely with the hope that a more careful analysis of these procedures may yet reveal their ultimate foundation.58
A debt of gratitude must be acknowledged to Prof. Dr. H. Wagner for his comments on an earlier draft of this work, and particularly for the phrase 'the theoretical order of dependence,' which catches so precisely the essential relationship involved in Descartes' thought.

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