1 Does Historical Materialism need Natural Selection?

PAUL NOLAN ABSTRACT: It is a standard criticism of Cohens account of historical materialism (one, indeed, made by Cohen himself) that the consequence explanations that connect productive development with changes in economic structures (and superstructures) are less convincing than they could be in the absence of an account of how the propensity of specific relations of production to enhance productive power (given the level of productive power already achieved) could explain the spread of those relations, and thus changes in economic structures. In this paper, I argue that Cohens rational-choice case for the explanatory primacy of productive forces over relations of production in fact provides a general answer to that question, one with which any further elaborations of historical materialisms consequence explanations must be consistent. However implausible rational choice may be as a general mechanism, in the absence of an alternative mechanism to explain the fact of productive development it cannot be finally dismissed. But I go on to argue that a mechanism involving a selection of production relations and other cultural traits through differential survival and reproductive success is both more robust than Cohens mechanism, and maintains the explanatory primacy of productive power. This revision to the foundations of historical materialism has important implications for the way that we conceive of both historical materialism and human history. Introduction It has often been said that the publication of G. A. Cohens Karl Marxs Theory of History: A Defence inaugurated a decisive transformation in our understanding of historical materialism, and this whether we were sympathetic or unsympathetic to the books account of the theory (and its style of argument). Historical materialism needed and deserved the kind of sustained analytical attention that the Darwinian theory of natural selection, for instance, standardly receives, and Cohen gave it that attention. Before I go on to make some critical remarks, I should say that I regard Cohens reconstruction of historical materialism as probably being as coherent an account as possible while remaining reasonably faithful to Marxs intentions. I also happen to agree with much of Cohens account. His clarification of the conceptual repertoire of historical materialism (productive forces or powers, material and social relations of production, the distinction between the economic structure and the superstructure in terms of a prior distinction between powers and rights, and so on); his assertion of the explanatory primacy of productive power; his appreciation of the significance of the long-term development of productive power for supporting that explanatory primacy; his argument for the (partly) functional nature of the explanations in question; and so on. Cohens may not be the final word on these topics, but his work represents a decisive step forward in our understanding of historical materialism. Nor does this list exhaust the achievements of Cohens book. There is hardly an important topic in Marxist social theory on which the book does not have something illuminating to say.

Where I disagree with Cohen, in a way that I hope the ensuing discussion will make clear, is in his account of the fundamental processes underlying historical materialism. Historical Materialism I take the fundamental claim of historical materialism to be that there is a tendency for social phenomena to change to those that will, given the nature of the existing productive forces, enhance productive power. The nature of the existing productive forces, therefore, explains forms of society (such things as work relations, economic structures, legal and political superstructures, and ideologies), and there is a strong tendency for productive power to develop historically. Cohen (1978, 160-3, 249, 278-9; 1983, 201-2; 1988, 7-8, 10-3) argues that historical materialist explanations are (partly) functional, or consequence, explanations in which the rise and persistence of economic structures are explained by the propensity of these structures to allow or encourage productive development. But historical materialism must, consequently, explain how those social relationships that have this effect on productive power become established (Cohen, 1978, 285-6; 1988, 11-2). As Cohen puts it (1988, 12): How does the fact that the economic structure promotes the development of the productive forces explain the character of the economic structure? Cohen (1978, 266, 271, 285-6; 1988, 11-2, 18) calls answers to this question elaborations or mechanisms, and he says (1988, 12) that he provides some not very satisfactory answers to the question in chapter 10 of Karl Marxs Theory of History, where he outlines four elaborations and applies them to historical materialist explanations. But I would argue that Cohen provides a partial, but nevertheless general, answer to the question in chapter 6 of that book, in his case for the explanatory primacy of the productive forces over relations of production and economic structures (1978, 15060). Cohen (1978, 152-5, 158-9; 1983, 198; 1988, 20-5, 85-6) argues that people have the trans-historical intelligence to generate improved productive techniques, and that they (or enough of them, enough of the time) are rational enough, in conditions of scarcity, to choose those relations of production that allow or encourage this productive development (because such development will reduce the burden of human labour).1 So, how does the fact that the economic structure promotes the development of the productive forces explain the character of the economic structure? By enough people, enough of the time, recognising that fact and (in conditions of scarcity) rationally choosing the relations that allow or encourage productive development (and prevailing in any (class) conflict with
1

There is perhaps a tension in Cohens case for primacy between the roles played by the desire to reduce the burden of human labour and the desire to alleviate scarcity. Insofar as improved productive techniques are used to reduce the burden of human labour, they will not alleviate scarcity, and, of course, vice versa. I say perhaps because Cohens (1978, 152) definition of scarcity as a kind of potential scarcity may resolve the tension.

3 those opposed to such social changes). This form of explanatory primacy can fairly be described as a rational-choice primacy.2 Cohen likens historical materialisms needed elaborations to Darwins (excellent) and Lamarcks (unacceptable) elaborations of natural-historical functional explanations (1978, 271, 285-6; 1988, 12). But Cohen claims that, because historical materialism lacks excellent (or even very satisfactory) elaborations, the theory is in a similar position to natural history in its pre-Darwin state. Cohen (1978, 287-9) outlines several possible elaborations of functional explanations in social theory: purposive, Darwinian, Lamarckian, and a fourth, a special case of the purposive elaboration, involving self-deception. But he does this without reference to his case for primacy, and therefore without acknowledging that this case has implications for any possible elaborations. In fact, Cohens purposive elaboration seems to me to add little to his rational-choice case for primacy. His second, Darwinian elaboration, on the other hand, may not actually be consistent with his case for primacy. Cohen (1978, 280, 287-9) provides an illustrative example of the Darwinian elaboration, in which producing units within a competitive economy exhibit variations in size. Because the larger producing units are able to achieve greater economies of scale, competition favours the survival of the larger producing units, and the median size of producing units increases over time. Therefore, the increase in the median size of the producing units occurred because such an increase brought about economies of scale. One of the features that make this elaboration Darwinian, Cohen (1978, 288) says, is that the variations in size are chance variations in that, because no one is aware of the functional value of greater size, the explanation of the variation is unconnected with the functional value of greater scale, and the units vary in size for a variety of fortuitous reasons.3 It is hard to see, though, how this Darwinian mechanism could be used to elaborate functional explanations of economic structures by productive forces in Cohens version of historical materialism. Cohens rational-choice case for primacy assumes that (enough) people choose particular production relations precisely because they know about their functional value. If the choice of the appropriate production relations is unconnected with the functional value of those relations, perhaps because no individual or group
2

Alan Carling (1993, 38) aptly describes Cohens version of historical materialism as involving an intentional primacy. I prefer the term rational-choice primacy, however, because , although his argument is unencumbered by the conceptual paraphernalia of rational-choice theory, that is the kind of intentional primacy that Cohen suggests. 3 In discussing some conceptual issues involved in functional explanations, Cohen (1978, 281-2) gives an example of a society that took up a religion because they liked the prophets looks, and not because they needed a religion (though they did need a religion). Subsequently, nine non-religious societies die out, but the one religious society survives. Cohen says that this is an illustration of an unsuccessful functional explanation of the presence of religion in that society. It has always seemed to me, however, that if, as Cohen implies, this society survived because it had a religion, then this is a second example of a successful functional explanation with a Darwinian elaboration. The elaboration is Darwinian because the choice of the successful variation (the religion) is unconnected with the functional value of that variation.

4 actually knows which relations of production are best for productive development, then this is not an example of Cohens kind of primacy. It is possible to render this Darwinian elaboration consistent with Cohens case for primacy if (but only if) the relations of production are rationally chosen and maintained in order to encourage productive development by means of a competitive (market) economy in which blind, quasi-Darwinian selection could operate. Such Darwinian selection must, therefore, take place entirely within intentional selection. This would make Cohens Darwinian elaboration, like the one involving self-deception, merely another special case of his purposive elaboration. Moreover, given that Darwinian explanations need to specify a selection mechanism, and the only one that Cohen mentions is a competitive market, this seems to limit its possible applications to the rise and persistence of capitalist economic structures. Of these four elaborations, Cohen applies only the purposive and the Darwinian to historical materialist explanations of the economic structure by the productive forces, and these explanations focus on the adaptation of the economic structure to the productive forces (1978, 289, 292-3) during the rise of capitalism. Unfortunately, one of the social variations involved is not a chance variation in the sense specified by Cohen. Consistently with his case for primacy, but not consistently with his Darwinian elaboration, capitalist relations of production were rationally chosen because of their functional value in encouraging productive development. And, of course, it is the relations that have been rationally chosen that are historically the most significant because they are the ones that eventually triumph. This is not an example of a Darwinian elaboration, then, precisely because the choice of the triumphant variation is connected with the functional value of that variation. It is not, therefore, a chance variation in the required sense. It is perhaps significant that Cohen uses the word competitive, rather than Darwinian, to describe this process (1978, 293). In a competitive elaboration, but not in a Darwinian elaboration, (some) people rationally choose the production relations that become established because of their beneficial effect on productive power.4 Now, while this example is certainly competitive rather than Darwinian, in reality the distinction between Darwinian and competitive selection is difficult to draw, and the difference might anyway be a matter of degree. What if half of the people who chose the more adaptive, capitalist relations did so for rational reasons (because they recognised the functional value of the relations), while half of them made the choice for nonrational reasons (perhaps because they thought that God favoured capitalist enterprises)?5 Perhaps such a situation could best be described as involving a mixed
4

In response to criticism, Cohen (1988, 25-9) develops two alternative arguments for productive force primacy, the second of which might seem to be Darwinian. Because it involves the rationality premiss, albeit a more restrained use of it (Cohen, 1988, 27), however, it is actually a competitive elaboration (though one that sees military, rather than economic, competition as the selective mechanism). 5 Cohen (1996, 14-6) makes a similar point in arguing that his account of historical materialism does not rule out an elaboration involving chance variation and social selection. I think that if Cohen compares what he says about chance variation in footnote 1 on page 288 of Karl Marxs Theory of History (1978) with

5 elaboration, with a Darwinian element and a competitive (and therefore a purposive, rational-choice) element. For reasons given elsewhere (Nolan 2002a, 82), however, I am sceptical about the extent of human rationality in complex, real-world situations, and I would usually be inclined to regard competitive processes in such situations as largely Darwinian processes involving some form of blind, selective mechanism. Cohen, of course, may be less sceptical about human rationality than I am, and he could claim that the picture he paints here of straightforwardly purposive and more complex competitive elements both playing a part in the rise of capitalism is not unrealistic. But there is, nevertheless, a potential problem with all of this. Cohen (1978, 135; see also Cohen, 1983, 205 and Cohen and Kymlicka, 1988, 87) points out that, for historical materialism, productive development does not take place for a miscellany of uncoordinated reasons. As I noted above, however, Cohen does not acknowledge that his case for primacy limits the elaborations that he can consistently propose. Indeed, Cohen (1978, 287-8) perhaps gives the impression that historical materialisms functional explanations can receive elaborations as radically different as Darwinian and Lamarckian elaborations of natural-historical functional explanations. But Darwinism and Lamarckism, notwithstanding Darwins own Lamarckian lapses, are actually very different theories, with very different implications for how the organic world works (Dawkins, 1988, 288-303). This is at least to suggest, therefore, that productive development can occur for a miscellany of uncoordinated reasons; as uncoordinated, indeed inconsistent, as natural selection and the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Now, not only must the reasons for productive development be coordinated in some way, but the scope for different elaborations is perhaps even narrower than this suggests. All elaborations must be consistent with Cohens case for primacy. All elaborations must, therefore, involve the rational choice of relations of production that allow or encourage productive development. So any elaborations suggested by Cohen cannot really be analogous to a general mechanism such as natural selection. They can only be analogous to particular elaborations of natural selection, such as optimal foraging theory or kin selection theory. Purposive and Darwinian elaborations of historical materialist explanations may be compatible, but we would need to have an argument to show that this is not simply providing a miscellany of uncoordinated reasons for productive development. And we would also need a new case for primacy, one that is not so dependent upon a rationalchoice mechanism. But perhaps we need that anyway. Cohens critics have argued that, given the discrepancies between individual and collective rationality and between asocial and socially located rationality, it is improbable that individuals or groups will standardly combine both the interest in and the power to bring about productive development. Cohen

what he says about the mathematicians on pages 15-6 of his Imprints interview (1996), he will see that this elaboration, whatever other merits it might have, is not Darwinian in his original sense.

6 acknowledges that his critics are right to see problems here (Cohen 1988, 26; Cohen and Kymlicka 1988, 95-7).6 Partly for reasons of my own, I too think that Cohens case for primacy is less than decisive. Although Cohen (1978, 41-2, 45-7; 1988, 4) emphasises the centrality of the growth of knowledge in the development of productive power, he fails to emphasise that knowledge is a prerequisite of the rational choice of which social relations, in the given social circumstances, and of which productive techniques, in the given natural circumstances, would bring about productive improvement. Such knowledge is just as necessary as the combination of interest and power and, for most of human history, even more unlikely (Nolan 2002a, 82).7 So the rational choice of those relations of production that will allow or encourage productive development is neither a robust underpinning for the primacy of productive power nor (for most of human history) a realistic mechanism for historical materialisms functional explanations (to the extent that these are different). But whatever the force of these criticisms, Cohen (1978, 153-5; see also Cohen and Kymlicka 1988, 99-105) effectively trumps them by pointing out that, historically, productive improvement occurs more frequently than productive regression. My impression is that some of his critics do not fully appreciate the force of this argument. There really is no question that, whatever short-term or localised regressions have taken place, Cohen is correct here. Productive development, defined in terms of output per unit labour input, has undoubtedly occurred over the long-term (Harris 1993, 217, 219). Cohens case for primacy, although it does not provide sufficient grounds to predict a strong enough tendency to productive development, does begin to explain this trend to productive development. As long as Cohens critics do not provide a better explanation of this long-term productive development, their criticisms will remain inconclusive. If we want to develop a stronger case for primacy and a more robust general mechanism for historical materialism (and these surely amount to the same thing), then we need to utilise Darwinian natural selection, not merely as an elaboration of a theory developed without reference to natural selection, but in a much more full-blooded manner. A Natural Selection of Cultural Traits Natural selection claims that inherited traits that enhance reproductive success (given the place of the organisms within their environment) tend to be more successfully reproduced than traits that do not so enhance reproductive success. Reproductively more successful traits therefore gradually replace reproductively less successful traits within populations. I think that it is possible to adapt this Darwinian logic in order to apply it to human history and historical materialism.
6

See Cohen (1988, 26-9) and Cohen and Kymlicka (1988, 101-3) for some attempts to deal with these problems. 7 Alan Carling (1988, 220-1, 225-8) says that Cohens case for primacy involves a transhistorical rationality, whereas only an historically situated rationality is really plausible. But my criticism seems to be (following Carlings classification of rational-choice theories) that Cohens case for primacy demands too much in the way of cognitive rationality, whereas only a much thinner form of (instrumental) rationality can be realistically attributed to most historical actors most of the time.

7 It is surely uncontroversial to say that, within human populations, behavioural variations can explain variations in rates of survival and reproduction. So, for example, a foraging group that took only those prey species that maximised its nutritional returns per unit of foraging time would, other things being equal, have a higher rate of survival, and probably of reproductive success, than groups that did not hunt so efficiently. But to say that such behavioural variations are explained by genetic variations, are thus inherited, and therefore become more or less common in successive generations through their effect upon reproductive success, is much more controversial. Indeed, there are good reasons to think that the changes in social behaviours that historical materialism is interested in are not genetically explained. Before I can apply this sequence of claims to human society and history, then, I must amend it to say that the relevant behavioural variations, rather than being genetically generated and reproductively transmitted, are intellectually generated and behaviourally transmitted. In other words, they are cultural variations. This substitution of cultural variations for genetic variations raises an obvious problem. It would be convenient if I could assume that cultural traits are passed on in a straightforward way from a parent to its offspring.8 However, although this can be true of cultural variations, it might not be. Cultural variations can be transmitted to nonoffspring, and they may not be transmitted to offspring. So there is a disassociation between the transmission of the relevant cultural characteristics and the process of biological reproduction, such that a cultural trait that reduces reproductive success could spread within a human population, while a cultural trait that enhances reproductive success might not spread.9 Given that cultural traits are likely to be relatively easily transmitted between individuals that are not related in the required parent-offspring way, it is difficult to use individuallevel selection in Darwinian explanations of historical change. However, if cultural traits are transmitted from generation to generation within human groups,10 this should increase the ratio of between-group variation to within-group variation. If reproduction takes place largely within those groups, then we can apply a form of group selection to human history.11 Those cultural variations that happen to enhance the reproductive success of the groups that exhibit them, given the place of the groups within their environment, will

Not that genetically-based traits are straightforwardly transmitted, of course, in sexually reproducing species. 9 This is a problem for any attempt to use Darwinian forms of explanation in social theory, even for those, such as the Darwinian theory of the firm, that use differential social reproduction, rather than differential biological reproduction, as the selective mechanism. 10 Within human groups, that is, more than between human groups. 11 Compare the point made by such an arch-opponent of group selection as Richard Dawkins (1989, 263). Group selection is a common, but often unstated, assumption in attempts to use Darwinian forms of explanation in social theory. A Darwinian theory of the firm, for instance, seems to involve group selection. I see no obvious reason to think, incidentally, that group selection is inconsistent with a sophisticated methodological individualism, in which the characteristics of groups are reducible in principle to individuals and their properties (including their relational properties).

8 tend to be more successfully transmitted than alternative cultural traits that do not so enhance reproductive success, and will therefore spread within the wider population.12 Perhaps some would regard these as implausible claims, given the ease with which people seem to reproduce across linguistic, national, ethnic and other group boundaries, and the ease with which groups seem to adopt cultural traits from other groups. But this perception may be derived from modern conditions that are historically highly unusual. Recent research on cultural transmission in foraging and farming/herding societies seems to show that cultural information tends to be passed on within groups, from older to younger generations, mainly from parents to offspring, and usually to offspring of the same gender. This transmission tends to take place during childhood and adolescence, and is essentially completed by the mid-teens (Shennan, 2002, 40-5, 48-51). The heritability of cultural traits, moreover, seems to be at least as high as that of genetic traits (Shennan, 2002, 42-3).13 I would not conclude from this evidence that an individual-level selection of cultural traits would work as a standard mechanism even in more complex societies (though such processes may occur in relatively simple societies). But I think that such evidence would support a group-level selection of cultural traits. The transmission of cultural traits within groups that reproduce endogenously would imply that the human species is divided into groups that are both culturally distinct and reproductively discrete. If language is taken as a key marker of culture, then it should be possible to detect groups that are both linguistically and genetically distinct. Recent work in molecular genetics and comparative linguistics seems to show that there is indeed a significant correlation between genetic and linguistic classifications of the human species.14 It is important to realise that nobody is claiming that these genetic differences between peoples are causally related to the linguistic (and any suggested cultural) differences. In other words, these are not races. The genetic differences are simply markers of a relatively distinct reproductive history. But if leftist readers are still inclined to regard this evidence as suspect, tainted by some form of biological determinism, let me quote a commentary on it by someone who I hope will reassure them a little. Discussing the work of Cavalli-Sforza and his team, the late Stephen Jay Gould (1992, 39) said:
12

I would define groups loosely, including anything from hunting-gathering bands of a few dozen people, to state-level societies of thousands or millions of people, to perhaps even larger groups (such as, for example, Europeans or Native Americans). I see no reason, in principle, why such group selection could not take place simultaneously at several of these levels. 13 It is perhaps also worth pointing out that orthodox historical materialism, all other social theories with which I am familiar, and even historians who regard themselves as unburdened by theory also implicitly assume that cultural inheritance takes place largely within societies (or other social entities). If this did not occur, societies would not have the relatively coherent histories they are usually depicted as having. 14 The classic source here is Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994). For popularisations of this work, see Cavalli-Sorza and Cavalli-Sforza (1995) and Cavalli-Sforza (2000). Jared Diamond (1998) has used the work of CavalliSforza and his team in his superb Guns, Germs and Steel. For a review of Diamond, and an attempt to relate his work to Darwinian historical materialisms, see Carling and Nolan (2000).

I find the linguistic [and genetic] correlations more exciting than anything else in the work of Cavalli-Sforza and his colleagues. Language is so volatile. Conquerors can impose their language as well as their will. Tongues interpenetrate and merge with an explosive ease not granted to genes or morphology One might have anticipated very little correlation between language and the tree of human ancestry. Yet the mapping of linguistic upon genetic tree is remarkable in its degree of overlap. Exceptions exist, of course, and for the reasons mentioned above The correlations, however, are striking. Each genetic group also defines either a single linguistic phylum or a few closely related phyla. So how could this natural selection of cultural traits be used to underpin historical materialism? A Darwinian Historical Materialism Some would perhaps regard the natural selection of cultural variation outlined above as a theory of history in its own right. But it has nothing to say about how the elements within human society might, in general, be analysed and related. It lacks a sociology, so to speak. I think that historical materialism can provide that materialist sociology. So, although I think that historical materialism needs a natural selection of cultural variation in order to provide it with a robust, general mechanism, I also think that any natural selection of cultural variation needs historical materialism as its materialist and historical sociology. So how can we combine the two theories? Remember that, in natural selection, there is a tendency for behaviours to change towards those that enhance reproductive success. Historical materialism, for its part, claims that there is a tendency for social phenomena to change towards those that enhance productive power.15 Clearly, the crucial link that I need to make is between production and reproduction. I must claim that variations in reproductive success are largely explained by variations in production per producer, such that there is a strong correlation between those groups with higher production and those groups with higher average reproductive success. Higher levels of production per producer can best be achieved, other things being equal, by higher levels of productivity per unit labour input. Given cultural inheritance within reproductively discrete groups, higher levels of production and productivity (and the productive techniques that bring them about) will tend to spread through human populations and the human species (in the direction, at the rate, and to the extent that the environment allows). Insofar as social relationships (and other cultural traits) affect levels of productivity and production (and therefore reproductive success), then they, too,
15

Obviously I am formulating the two theories here in a way that emphasises a structural analogy between them. For an exchange on this topic, see Levine and Sober (1985; Forthcoming) and Nolan (2002b; Forthcoming).

10 should change over successive generations to those that (given the existing nature of productive power) better enhance productivity and production (and therefore reproductive success). (Insofar as some cultural traits simply make use of existing levels of productive power, then these should change to those that better utilise the existing level of production to enhance reproductive success.) It might be useful if I specify the explanatory structures that I am suggesting a little more precisely (or merely a little differently), in order both to show the structural similarity between them, and to show why productive power maintains its explanatory primacy within this Darwinian historical materialism.16 Natural selection claims that those inherited variations that enhance reproductive success will be the variations that are (naturally) selected, and will thus spread within the population. The relationship of the organisms to their environment determines which of the available variations will enhance reproductive success, and thus be selected. It follows, therefore, that the relationship of the organisms to their environment explains which variations will be (naturally) selected, and will therefore spread. The philosopher of biology Peter Godfrey-Smith has said that the genes are the channel through which the environment speaks (quoted in Dennett, 1996, 395), and this way of outlining the explanatory structure of natural selection captures that idea well. The natural selection of cultural traits outlined above has the same explanatory structure, but substitutes cultural variations for genetic variations. Historical materialism (more or less as presented by Cohen) claims that those social relationships that enhance productive power will be the ones that are (rationally) selected (because they enhance productive power). The existing level and kind of productive power determines which social relationships will enhance productive power, and thus be selected. Thus the nature of existing productive power explains which relationships will be (rationally) selected and will therefore spread within human societies. Darwinian historical materialism claims that those social relationships (and other cultural variations) that enhance reproductive success will be the ones that are selected (through differential reproductive success, which is what makes the theory Darwinian). But it is the nature of productive power already available that determines which of the available social relationships will enhance reproductive success, and thus spread within the population.17 So, the nature of productive power already available explains which social relationships (and other cultural variations) will spread (which is what makes the theory a version of historical materialism).18
16

This way of formulating the explanatory structures is based upon the approach developed by Cohen (1978, 160-3; 1983, 201-3; 1986, 219-22; 1988, 10-1; see also Cohen and Kymlicka, 1988, 83-4). 17 This involves treating the nature of the existing productive forces as an aspect of the place of the human population within its environment, the aspect emphasised by Darwinian historical materialism that distinguishes it from a natural selection of cultural traits. This seems to me to be entirely consistent with how Cohen conceives productive forces (1978, 22-5, 96-8, 103-5, 248, 345-6). 18 It seems to me that the account of the development of agriculture given by Jared Diamond (1998) comes very close to exemplifying this explanatory structure.

11

This way of formulating a Darwinian historical materialism reconciles differential reproductive success as the mechanism of historical change with the explanatory primacy of productive power.19 And it is because variations in reproductive success are largely explained by variations in productive power that the nature of productive power available determines which social relationships will most enhance reproductive success, either because the relationships most enhance that productive power or because they better utilise that productive power (and therefore most enhance reproductive success). Evolutionary and Historical Tendencies In 1930, R. A. Fisher, one of the founders of the Modern Synthesis, formulated what he called the fundamental theorem of Natural Selection (Fisher, 1930, 35): The rate of increase in fitness of any organism at any time is equal to its genetic variance in fitness at that time. As this implies, natural selection predicts that, in the absence of any forces other than selection acting upon a population of organisms, the average level of reproductive success of the members of that population will increase over evolutionary time (Levine and Sober, 1985, 307-8, 309; Nolan 2002a, 77; or see my discussion of L and S). This is because reproductively more successful traits replace reproductively less successful traits in the population over successive generations. So members of later generations will have, on average, more offspring than members of earlier generations. This will lead, not simply to population growth (a constant rate of reproductive success could lead to that), but to an increasing rate of population growth. In reality, there are always countervailing forces acting upon a population. All environments are finite, and they cannot indefinitely accommodate the increasing rate of population growth that results from the tendency to increasing reproductive success. Environmental limits will eventually, therefore, halt the realisation of the tendency. Moreover, environments often change, either physically or biologically. Sometimes the biological changes might be a result of the evolution of the relevant population, sometimes they might be a result of other, competing populations undergoing selective evolution. Whatever the cause, the population will have to track these changes, and this could interfere with the tendency to increasing reproductive success. And, of course, environments are differentially resourced, so some environments will enable the tendency to be realized to a greater extent, or more quickly, than others. The result of these countervailing forces is that reproductive success is unlikely to increase for most species most of the time, and may well be constant, roughly equal to the
19

Cohen (1988, 29) says that an emphasis upon the historical importance of military conflict poses a problem for historical materialism. I suspect that the above way of formulating a Darwinian historical materialism may, together with the observation that weapons need to be produced, allow us to reconcile a selection of the more productive groups/societies through differential survival and reproduction due to military conflict, with an explanatory primacy of productive power.

12 replacement level of the population, for much of the time. And, of course, when the countervailing forces prove too powerful, reproductive success declines and the population moves towards extinction. If anything like a natural selection of cultural variations occurs among human populations, then, proceeding by analogy with the natural selection of genetic variation, we can also apply the prediction of increasing reproductive success, and therefore an increasing rate of population growth, to human populations and the human species over the long term. There will also, of course, be the same countervailing forces as those encountered in the genetic theory: finite and changing environments, which include competing species. But perhaps our intellectual and cultural capacities have given the human species an advantage that may have allowed us to at least temporarily overcome some of these countervailing forces. It is not hard to see that, as Fisher suggests, the more variation there is, then the faster the selective process itself can be, and the faster the population can evolve. Because the raw material for this process in human history is provided by cultural variation, and cultural variation can be generated faster than genetic variation, this may increase the speed of historical change in the human species compared to evolutionary change in other large, long-lived species (to the extent that these are commensurable). This increased speed of change may reduce the countervailing impact of environmental forces, as human populations can adapt much more quickly to environmental change. The tendencies to increasing fitness and an increasing rate of population growth are perhaps, therefore, more likely to be realized within human populations and the human species than in otherwise similar species. So a natural selection of cultural traits implies that, depending upon environmental resources, history might, at least for a time, involve a trend of increasing reproductive success and an increasing rate of population growth. And, indeed, there does seem to be some evidence that this has occurred. Not only has world population grown over the last 50,000 years or so, it has grown at an accelerating rate (Harris and Ross, 1987, 21).20 The basic claim of historical materialism, that social phenomena change to those that will enhance productive power, similarly implies a tendency (and, again, one that may or may not be realized) for productive power to increase historically. Levine and Sober (1985, 307-7, 310-2) pointed out that the tendency to increasing fitness entailed by Fishers theorem is analogous to the tendency to increasing productive power in historical materialism. But I think that the relationship between the two tendencies is deeper than a mere analogy. Given a natural selection of cultural variation, the postulated explanatory connection between productive power and reproductive success would provide a Darwinian basis for this historical materialist tendency. Insofar as higher levels of production (and therefore
20

This has not, of course, been without many significant regional demographic fluctuations, and it has been at the expense (sometimes to the point of extinction) of some human groups and of many other species.

13 productivity) enhance reproductive success, then differential reproductive success will select, not only for increasing reproductive success, but also for increasing productive power.21 It should be clear, then, what long term trends the theory that I have presented would predict for human history: increasing reproductive success, and therefore an accelerating rate of population growth; and increasing production per producer, and therefore increasing productivity per unit labour input.22 Remember that these are very tentative predictions, in that they assume that countervailing forces are absent, or at least not powerful enough to overwhelm the postulated tendencies. This does not, therefore, preclude periods of more or less constant, fluctuating, or even declining levels of population, productivity, production, or military power. Nevertheless, these tendencies do seem to have been realized over the long-term.23 And, although all of these trends have accelerated over the last few centuries, as capitalism has developed, they all occurred long before capitalism, and cannot be associated with any particular social form. They seem to be due to fundamental tendencies of human history. Not only are these tendencies not inevitable, they are also not necessarily associated. Increasing productivity, if it does occur, could lead to increasing levels of production per producer or to increasing leisure per capita. History could go either way, but the theory would predict a bias towards increasing production. Increasing production could lead to increasing reproductive success, that is more babies, or to increasing consumption per capita. Again, history could move in either direction, but the theory would predict a bias towards increasing reproductive success rather than increasing consumption. Orthodox historical materialism claims, not only that productive development can be predicted, given the right circumstances, but also that, if productive development occurs, a particular kind of social development can also be predicted. Now, it is surely obvious that the truth of historical materialisms fundamental claims does not depend upon the truth of this further claim. Whether it is true depends upon how significant similarities in

21

In Cohens account, the development thesis, the claim that there is a usually realized tendency for the productive forces to develop through history, is a premiss of his argument for the explanatory primacy of productive forces over production relations. My account establishes primacy by arguing that variations in reproductive success are explained by variations in productive power, and then inferring productive development on the basis of increasing reproductive fitness. 22 Other directional trends might also be predicted. For instance, if military competition has been an important selective mechanism between groups, the groups with the greatest military power tending to outsurvive and out-reproduce other groups, then we would expect a tendency towards increasing military power. That tendency has surely been realized. As Will Rogers once said, We know that civilization progresses, because every new war they invent a better way of killing you. 23 However, as a corollary of Fishers theorem, larger populations can generate more variation, and this may increase the rate at which larger populations can develop their productivity and production, and enhance their reproductive success, other things being equal. See Diamonds (1998b) discussion of differences in the rate of productive development in Eurasia, the Americas, Sub-Saharan Africa and Australia.

14 social form due to similarities in levels of productive power are, compared to differences in social forms due to differences in kinds of productive techniques. Nevertheless, I think that this claim is defensible. It is standard among cultural anthropologists and archaeologists to see a relatively common pattern of social development: from more or less egalitarian bands and tribes to incipiently stratified chiefdoms to fully stratified states (Diamond, 1998, 265-281; Harris, 1993, 289-324).24 It is not difficult to match these to Cohen's (1978, 197-9) social "epochs." Bands and tribes are pre-class societies; chiefdoms are probably best regarded as transitional between preclass and class societies; and states are class societies. Orthodox historical materialism makes the further claim that major historical changes are brought about by class struggle (Cohen, 1978, 292-3; 1988, 14-20). At least, historical materialism makes this claim if we do not trivialise the sentence that begins the first section of the Communist Manifesto: The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles (Marx and Engels, 1968, 35). I think, however, that it would be truer to say that the history of all hitherto existing populations has been a history of competition (direct or indirect) and conflict between culturally distinct and reproductively discrete groups.25 It is possible that these competing groups could sometimes be classes within a society, with distinct, if linked, modes of production, endogenous reproduction and within-class cultural transmission (perhaps as the bourgeoisie developed within the interstices of prebourgeois society). Another possible role of class struggle lies in generating the variation that selection subsequently acts upon, increasing or reducing the competitive advantage of one society vis-a-vis other societies (Carling, 1993). This would retain a role for class struggle in the origin of new economic structures, but their subsequent history would be explained in a Darwinian manner. It seems to me highly likely, though, that a Darwinian historical materialism would make a much reduced (or very different) claim for the role of class struggle in human history than does orthodox historical materialism.26 Though I regard the Darwinian elaboration presented above as the fundamental mechanism of historical materialism, I do not regard it as the only possible mechanism. Although we need to avoid the error of postulating several uncoordinated reasons for productive development and changes of economic structure, I think that we also need to develop an historical conception of historical materialisms mechanisms.27 How did mechanisms of change involving differential social reproduction emerge from and, to
24

Harris, in common with many anthropologists, does not use the term tribe, preferring instead terms such as village societies. 25 Engels (Marx and Engels, 1968, 35-6) later reduced the scope of the original claim to written history rather than pre-history. I do not restrict the scope of my claim in this way. 26 Reducing the historical significance of class struggle does not, of course, reduce the sociological (or moral) significance of class division, nor does it entail that class struggles will play little or no part in any future social changes. 27 One reason why we need to do this is that the demographic transition has fundamentally (although very recently and only for some societies) altered the connection between productive power and reproductive success that has (I would claim) prevailed for most of human history. This would seem to preclude the use of the Darwinian mechanism for these societies.

15 some degree, supersede the mechanism of differential biological reproduction? To what extent can we realistically, and consistently, attribute an increasing role to rational choice as a mechanism? Conclusion Lack of space prevents me from giving these arguments the elaboration and qualifications that they need. However, I think that I have said enough to give a sense of the conception of history that I am trying to develop. Historical materialists have traditionally detected trends and patterns in human history. More conservative historians, in seeming contrast, have often seen history as, in the words of Gibbon (1972, 4), little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind. And Cohens rational-choice account of historical materialism does indeed seem to embody a view of history that is incompatible with that expressed in Gibbons statement. But I think that historical materialisms emphasis upon trends and patterns and Gibbons view both embody part of the truth about human history, though they involve a different focus. Any relatively small portion of human history, examined closely, can seem like a record of crimes, follies, and misfortunes. If we look at the overall course of human history, however, long-term trends and large-scale patterns are discernible. But this raises the obvious question of how the short-term crimes, follies, and misfortunes can result in the long-term trends? The only thing that could answer this question, I think, is a selection mechanism that could filter out the less adaptive behaviours and preserve the more adaptive. Just as natural selection can produce longterm trends out of random short-term variations, I think that the Darwinian version of historical materialism that I have outlined here and elsewhere provides that historical mechanism. REFERENCES Carling, Alan. 1993. Analytical Marxism and Historical Materialism: The Debate on Social Evolution. Science & Society, 57:1, 31-66. Carling, Alan. 1998. A Question of Attitude: Marcus Roberts on Analytical Marxism. Res Publica, 4:2, 211-28. Carling, Alan and Paul Nolan. 2000. Historical Materialism, Natural Selection and World History. Historical Materialism, 6, 215-64. Cavalli-Sforza, L. Luca, Menozzi, Paolo and Alberto Piazza. 1994. The History and Geography of Human Genes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cavalli-Sforza, Luigi Luca and Francesco Cavalli-Sforza. 1995. The Great Human Diasporas: The History of Diversity and Evolution. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Books.

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Cavalli-Sforza, Luigi Luca. 2000. Genes, People and Languages. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Cohen, G. A. 1978. Karl Marxs Theory of History: A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen, G. A. 1983. Reply to Four Critics. Analyse und Kritik, 5, 195-222. Cohen, G. A. 1986. Walt on Historical Materialism and Functional Explanation. Ethics, 97:1, 219-32. Cohen, G. A. 1988. History, Labour, and Freedom: Themes from Marx. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cohen, G. A. 1996. Self-Ownership, History and Socialism: An Interview with G.A. Cohen. Imprints, 1:1, 7-25. Cohen, G. A. and Will Kymlicka. 1988. Human Nature and Social Change in the Marxist Conception of History. In G. A. Cohen 1988. Dawkins, Richard 1989. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dennett, Daniel. 1996. Darwins Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Diamond, Jared. 1998a. Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years. London: Vintage. Diamond, Jared. 1998b. The Evolution of Guns and Germs. In A. C. Fabian, ed., Evolution: Society, Science and the Universe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fisher, R. A. 1930. The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gibbon, Edward. 1972. The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. London: Chatto and Windus. An Abridgement by D. M. Low. Gould, Stephen Jay. 1992. Bully for Brontosaurus. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Harris, Marvin. 1993. Culture, People, Nature: An Introduction to General Anthropology. New York: Harper Collins. Harris, Marvin and Eric B. Ross. 1987. Death, Sex, and Fertility: Population Regulation in Preindustrial and Developing Societies. New York: Columbia University Press.

17 Levine, Andrew and Elliott Sober. 1985. Whats Historical about Historical Materialism? Journal of Philosophy, 82:6, 304-26. Levine, Andrew and Elliott Sober. Forthcoming. A Reply to Paul Nolan. Historical Materialism. Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1968. Selected Works. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Nolan, Paul. 2002a. A Darwinian Historical Materialism. In Paul Blackledge and Graeme Kirkpatrick, eds., Historical Materialism and Social Evolution. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Nolan, Paul. 2002b. Whats Darwinian about Historical Materialism: A Critique of Levine and Sober. Historical Materialism, 10:2, 143-69. Nolan, Paul. Forthcoming. Levine and Sober: A Rejoinder. Historical Materialism. Shennan, Stephen. 2002. Genes, Memes and Human History: Darwinian Archaeology and Cultural Evolution. London: Thames and Hudson.