THE WHITE HOUSE

} Office of the Vice President

Internal Transcript December 14, 2001

INTERVIEW OF SCOOTER LIBBY

BY
BOB WOODWARD, THE WASHINGTON POST

Q I'm interested in the period, September llth to the

20th, 10 days that shook the world; decisions, emotions and words
-- focusing on the President's decision. You know, I said to
Mary, I only have one question: what -- if you were sitting down
writing your memoirs in 20 years and said this is what's
important, these are the five or six decision points that were --
where are they in that period?
MR. LIBBY: I'd say, on December 14th, Bob Woodward wanted
to interview me. I'd call home.
I believe the most remarkable thing about the President's
decision making was how insightful and decisive it was right off
the bat, in the first 24 to 36 hours, the first day-and-a-half or
I so.
I
By the end of day one he had set a course which included
most of the major themes, and he had done it decisively and
thoughtfully. He had given his Cabinet directions to go off and
do work for the next bit. It's not that there weren't many
decisions to come, but there were many major decisions made in
that point ojf time.
Q Can you say what they were and then what the
instructions were to the Cabinet to go off and do?
MR. LIBBY: Within the first 24 hours -- so by the time he
headed off to bed that night and the Vice President got in the
helicopter to head out of Dodge, he had decided that we had a war
on terrorism; he had decided that it was not just against whoever
might have perpetrated it, but against states that sponsor it and
against terrorism, more broadly. Those were --
Q States that might harbor terrorists?
MR. LIBBY: The states that might harbor terrorism, right.
And this was a -- and you're right to pick on the word "harbor,"
because it was a carefully drafted word. But these are broad
themes that you could easily imagine someone not reaching ever,
let alone in so decisive a fashion.

000203
 I believe that his leadership on this -- that this is a war,
that we're going to win it, that we've been attacked, that this
is my top priority, those types of priorities -- led not only the
country, but also were influential to even the well-seasoned
members of the Cabinet.
Q And what were the instructions that were left with --
now, you're talking about from the attacks to maybe the first NSC
-- or, no, the second NSC meeting here in Washington, which was
the morning of the 13th.
MR. LIBBY: That's actually the third. There was an NSC by
teleconference the afternoon of the llth.
Q Right.
MR. LIBBY: And then there was --
Q One that night.
MR. LIBBY: Two sessions that night; one was a larger
session, one was a more restricted session. And then there was a
Cabinet -- an NSC meeting in the Cabinet Room on the morning of
the 12th, and they were all important.
Q Okay. What happened at those meetings? That would
really be helpful, because that first day is critical to -- I
mean, you could write a whole multi-volume set, boxed set on that
period.
MR. LIBBY: Right. On the afternoon of the llth, a certain
amount of time was spent with sort of status reports going around
-- you know, what are we doing domestically to protect ourselves.
So there was a report there was a carrier battle group had been
put to sea; there were FAA steps to bring the planes down;
immigration and border control; Coast Guard boarding vessels.
Those types of reports about Cabinet members saying the things
they had done.
There were reports from probably the Secretary -- from the
State Department about what activities State might be engaging in
and what we were receiving. Definitely reports from the Agency
about, you know, initial intelligence, indications of what -- who
was behind the attack. Also whether the attack was over or not,
because, you know.
Q What was the answer to that?
MR. LIBBY: There was a sense that the profile of the attack
was such that by the time -- by mid-afternoon people thought the
attack was probably over, with the possibility that there might
be another, you know -- it was possible a plane might be flying
j
000204
 around as early as early afternoon. But I think by the time of
the meeting, which was probably 3:30 p.m. or so, there was a
'i sense that we had probably -- probably -- seen the end of that
first wave of attack. But no one knew for sure.
Q What was the most important decision the President made
in that first NSC meeting, by SIVITS?
MR. LIBBY: Well, let's see. One decision was, of course,
that he was coming back -- whether he made it in that meeting or
just announced in that meeting, I don't know. But he did hear,
he heard opinions from the Vice President that he thought at this
point it was safe to come back or it was wiser to come back,
although earlier in the day it was more of a question.
The Secret Service was still advising against returning> as
of that afternoon session. But the President was certain that he
was coming back and that he would address the nation that night.
But I think, historically, the more important decision would
relate to the notion that this is a war on terrorism and -- I
have to think about exactly what came in at any one meeting --
Q Does somebody have notes of that meeting or is there a
transcript of it or something?
MR. LIBBY: I don't know what the Sit Room does, you'll have
1 to check with the proper authorities as to whether they took a
* transcript.
Q One of the people present said Bush said, somebody has
declared war on America, this is an attack on America and we're
at war. Does that sound right?
MR. LIBBY: Sounds perfectly right to. me, yes.
Q And, we're going to have the support of the world, he
said, I want to be ready to make a statement when I come back so
I want that worked while I'm getting back there; I'm going to get
back there as fast as I possibly can.
MR. LIBBY: All sounds about right.
Q President Putin called me immediately because he
understands that if this can happen to us, it can happen to him.
Does that sound right?
MR. LIBBY: Yes.

Q Is there any way to get some, you know, those are

little -- the whole thing, the essence of it, somebody go reduce
it -- you know, this is what we can say about what exactly took
\.

000205
 MR. LIBBY: Let me find out about that.
Q What do you think, Mary?
MS. MATALIN: Well, one of the things that -- and I only
remember this because I (inaudible) -- to pass on to the Congress
(inaudible) -- was that (inaudible). He was so resolute and he
leaned into the camera and he said, make no mistake --
(inaudible) brief the Congress later or something. He said, tell
them they should (inaudible) understand, this is the position of
this administration. And that tone that Scooter references --
which allowed nobody to be indecisive or to be timid in their
action (inaudible).
MR. LIBBY: I mean, you could imagine a very different kind
of meeting: who did this, do we have any evidence yet, what do
the Europeans think, should we'-- let's wait until the FBI pulls
things together; we've obviously been attacked, I'll tell the
nation that. Could it be domestic. You know, I mean, there were
all sorts of things that you might imagine could have happened.
Do we want to start off on a war when we don't know yet where it
will lead and how we do it.
All of those types of things and certainly the notion of
extending two big ideas: one, in that very first day he had
decided, as we've discussed, to go into this notion of states
that support terrorism. But another was, he was very clear --
and I believe this was from the evening session -- that he saw
this as an opportunity, this is an opportunity to re-shape
relations around the world.
When you think about it, it's rather remarkable sort of
insight and looking at -- he said, we can reshape our
relationship with Russia, for example. It's quite extraordinary
that he had that sort of insight as to where the problem was
going to lead so early.
Q And was this at the first meeting, or the smaller, just
principles, NSC meeting?
MR. LIBBY: I can't recall which of the two; I'll have to
think about it. I might be able to figure that out for you, but
I don't know as I sit here.
Q Okay. What else happened that day that was of
significance?
MR. LIBBY: A bunch of planes ran into the World Trade
Center. (Laughter.) It's a pretty open-ended question.

000206
 0 This business about the rules of engagement to bring
down any plane that would not respond - do you know exactly what
those rules were?
MR.. LIBBY: Well,, they weren't defined - in the time frame
that was available, which was minutes they were.n°* in
the way they might have been. I think the normal operating
procedure that certainly the Vice President understood "a
former Secretary of Defense was, there's an intercept --meaning
the plane, the fighter goes up and gets within ™sual rangeof
the other plane; and then, if there's time, you try and signal it
away or fly it away or bump it away by --
Q Or radio it.
MR. LIBBY: Or radio it. Any number of --
Q How many warnings would you —
MR. LIBBY: -- if there's time.
Q -- have to give?
MR. LIBBY: No, I think this is a question of if there's
time, you give as much as you can. But if at some point there s
no? time -- for example, during the afternoon there was a plane
coming in from --
Q The Korean.
MR. LIBBY: The Korean plane, right. And it was coming in
on the west coast. And a plane went up to intercept that and
they signaled it, the plane changed direction - af. ™* ^re
informed. So it was a number of things they went through, and
Jthen the plane took it all the way down and eventually it was on
the ground, and then it was considered off the --
0 And there was a moment when the Pennsylvania plane
crashed where you people didn't know whether it had crashed or
whether you had brought it down.
MR. LIBBY: That's correct. In fact, for several times I
asked people in the room, can you find out if we -- why that
plane went down or if we shot. At one point, I remember the Vice
President turned to me, and I think Eric Edelman, my deputy who
was with me, and said — when we thought it had not been shot
down and we were told no, nothing was shot — turned to us and
said, I think an act of heroism occurred on that plane. Quite
insightful.
At that point?
000207
 MR. LIBBY: At that point. His first words, once we knew we
had not shot it down.
Q How long was the period where you thought maybe it had
been shot down?
MR. LIBBY: It sort of depends on your constitution. Most
likely, if they had shot it down we would have heard it right
away. It wasn't until probably mid-afternoon, but before the NSC
meeting, that we knew none of the planes were shot down; knew in
the sense that somebody walked in and said, nothing was shot
down. So it sort of depends on how long your internal clock was
on believing that we would have heard it before that.
Q Was there a point that he felt, my God, you know, maybe
we have shot that down?
MR. LIBBY: Sure. I mean, we say -- we were told, there is
a plane 80 miles out; then we were told thr -n -•,__•.--•--.
miles out. And he gave the order to engag<
we were told the plane was down. Now, you
it's quite possible --
Q So he gave the order to engage?
MR. LIBBY: He gave the order to engac
discussion he had had with the President, c
so. So he did not go back to the President
Q Do you remember his words?
MR. LIBBY: I recall his words as -- t
should we engage. And fairly promptly he £
Q And who was he conveying that mes
MR. LIBBY: To the person who came int
there's a plane 80 miles out, there's a fighter in the area,
should he engage -- something like that.
Q And who was that? Was that somebody connected with the
NMCC?
MR. LIBBY: Yes, right, correct. Someone I did not know.
Q So he gave a direct order to engage?
MR. LIBBY: Correct. He had previously discussed it with
the President and gave the order, engage. And then they said,
the plane is 60 miles out, and they repeated the question and
then he gave the same answer .
And then it was that it's crashed?
000208
 MR. LIBBY: At that point. His first words, once we knew we
had not shot it down.
Q How long was the period where you thought maybe it had
been shot down?
MR. LIBBY: It sort of depends on your constitution. Most
likely, if they had shot it down we would have heard it right
away. It wasn't until probably mid-afternoon, but before the NSC
meeting, that we knew none of the planes were shot down; knew in
the sense that somebody walked in and said, nothing was shot
down. So it sort of depends on how long your internal clock was
on believing that we would have heard it before that.
Q Was there a point that he felt, my God, you know, maybe
we have shot that down?
MR. LIBBY: Sure. I mean, we say --we were told, there is
a plane 80 miles out; then we were told the plane Washington 60
miles out. And he gave the order to engage. And then eventually
we were told the plane was down. Now, you know, at that point,
it's quite possible --
Q So he gave the order to engage?
MR. LIBBY: He gave the order to engage based on a prior
discussion he had had with the President, authorizing him to do
so. So he did not go back to the President after each time.
Q Do you remember his words?
MR. LIBBY: I recall his words as -- the question was,
should we engage. And fairly promptly he said, yes.
Q And who was he conveying that message to?
MR. LIBBY: To the person who came into the room who said,
there's a plane 80 miles out, there's a fighter in the area,
should he engage -- something like that.
Q And who was that? Was that somebody connected with the
NMCC?
MR. LIBBY: Yes, right, correct. Someone I did not know.
Q So he gave a direct order to engage?
MR. LIBBY: Correct. He had previously discussed it with
the President and gave the order, engage. And then they said,
the plane is 60 miles out, and they repeated the question and
then he gave the same answer.
Q And then it was that it's crashed? AHAOnO
UuU^Uo
 MR. LIBBY: Well, no, it was down.
0 That it's down. And so the period from when it was
down to when it was reported that it doesn't look like we_shot
anything down, before he said we've seen this act of heroism,
how much time was that?
MR LIBBY: I think he made that comment actually before we
aot the final word, the official word somebody said we didn't
shoot at anything. And I think we all had a sense that since we
hadn't heard, we probably hadn't shot it down, before the --
that's why I said it depends on your constitution, it depends on,
you know, what level of certainty and how much you expect we
would have gotten a report.
My thought was if we had really shot it down, we would have
heard. But I kept asking, because I wanted to be sure. It seems
a relevant detail to know.
Q It's an interesting moment.
MR LIBBY- Yes. There was another moment when we were told
a plane was five miles out — five miles at, you know, _350 to 500
miles per hour is not a great deal of time. And then it went
below 500 feet, disappeared off the radar screen.
Q Where was this? Five miles out from Washington?
MR. LIBBY: Yes, from Washington, from where we were, in the
PEOC. But it turned to be -- it was either a phantom or it was a
helicopter or a misreading, but --
Q And there' was a report that a plane was heading for the
President's ranch in Crawford? ... .
MR. LIBBY: Correct, yes.
Q And what happened there?
MR. LIBBY: There were a number of false reports. There was
a report that a plane was headed toward the ranch. There was a
report that a plane had crashed near Camp David. There was a
report that a plane was headed at Air Force Two, or that there
was a threat to Air Force Two. There was a report that there had
been an explosion on the Capitol. There was a report that there
had been an explosion at the State Department.
If you actually place all those reports together — none of
which proved to be true, except for the fact there had been one
headed towards the White House and one had hit the_Pentagon
you've got a pretty thorough attempt at -- a decapitation
attempt, if you believed all of those. Although, I think

000209
everybody in the room knew first reports are always false and, in
fact, it was repeated often during the course of the day.
Q What a fascinating day. I mean, the question for us --
we want to do this as comprehensively as we can. I mean, there
must be logs or somebody who has the sequence or somebody who has
notes, which somebody could go through and say, you know, have
this part or get this sequence right. I almost feel on the edge,
you know, here's history and can you catch it -- catch it before
it kind of falls.
How about the -- just to jump ahead to the Camp David
meeting on Saturday, the 15th. Were you there for the whole
thing? What happened in the morning, that was before -- I guess
people, somebody kept coming in and saying, do you want lunch,
Mr. President. And finally he said, 12:45 p.m., and have lunch
and then he said, everyone go exercise -- I think I mentioned
this to you, or you said the deputies committee?
MR. LIBBY: Yes, in between.
Q Give me the longest version you can recall of that
Saturday, a very important day.
MR. LIBBY: Yes. There was a morning meeting, and then
there was this break in which deputies discussed a few issues.
There were, of course, some sidebars along the way, and then
there was this afternoon meeting, which I think began about 4:00
p.m.
Q What happened in the morning? What was the essence of
that?
MR. LIBBY: It was a fairly wide-ranging discussion based on
-- it was a broad range of Cabinet officers. It was not like a
normal NSC, in the sense that -- my reflection is that Ashcroft
was there, so there was discussion of domestic issues. There was
also -- Rumsfeld was there and the Vice President and Colin
Powell was there. So there was a -- I think Paul Wolfowitz was
there. There was a broad range of discussions as to what went on
in everybody's portfolio, in a sense. You know, sort of, where
are we, what are we doing.
But it was a session that had been set by the President, 'as
of Wednesday. He said, look, I want you all -- it was after the
morning session on the Wednesday morning Cabinet session.
Q The 12th?

MR. LIBBY: Yes.

Q He said?
000210
 MR. LIBBY: I think there was a smaller session there, too;
it was a large session and then a smaller session after. At the
smaller session he said, look, I want all of you to come to Camp
David Saturday, bring your wives and we'll have a -- I want you
to think about it and we'll have a broader discussion at that
point.
And so he had an interesting management style. This was
Wednesday. He had basically said, okay, I want to give people
time to think -- not, see me tomorrow morning and we'll evolve,
and see me the next day. He gave them a window to come in
through.
Q And then what did -- anything, if I was there at the
morning meeting, what would be the most important thing that
occurred or that he decided or said or reacted to?
MR. LIBBY: The major thrust of the discussion that might
have caught your fancy at that point was what should be the scope
of this war on terrorism. Some of it -- he had worked earlier in
the week to try and, first, he set broad directions, sort of
goals. And he had worked toward sort of defining those early in
the week.
I think the next phase of it was sort of more in the sense
of a broader strategic sort of approach, what are the -- how are
we going to do this. But not in the, down to the tactical sense,
| but in a broad sense.
Q What else happened at that? I mean, in the morning
part. I'm trying to separate it out and get a sense of the
phases of the discussion. Because then he said, we'll have lunch
at 12:45 p.m. Is that correct? And then did he -- was there --
he said, let's have everyone go rest or exercise and we'll meet
at 4:00 p.m., and I want to hear what the principles recommend.
Is that correct? ... -
MR. LIBBY: I don't recall the emphasis being "principles,"
as opposed to other people being present. But, yes, I want to
hear what you all recommend.
Q Okay. Do you remember what happened at 4:00 p.m., when
everyone came back; the sequence and the general points people
were making?
MR. LIBBY: I do.

Q Can you help me?

MR. LIBBY: Let me find out as to how much I can help you on
that.
\ Can you give me some general idea of --
000211
 MR. LIBBY: I'll find out and give you as specific an idea
as I can, but let me find -- you've got the time for me to find
out, so let me do that.
Q Okay, fine. And then at the end of that, he said,
thank you very much and -- I mean, from one of the people, I have
the exact language, he said, kind of, I'm going to think about it
and I'll let you know.
MR. LIBBY: Yes. I think he said, actually, he'd have a --
come back and give you some decisions on Monday, I think.
Q That he would give decisions on Monday?
MR. LIBBY: I think so.
Q Did, to your knowledge, he talk to -- and that session
ended about what time?
MR. LIBBY: I would say 6:00 p.m., maybe 7:00 p.m.
Q And did he talk to anyone that night, that you know of,
about the decision?
MR. LIBBY: You know, there were sidebars, but I don't know
of anything, sort of a formalized get-together that night.
Q Who were the sidebars with, do you know?
MR. LIBBY: I think, among others, with -- sort of, I think
everybody. And I don't know what they were talking about. So
whether they were sidebars on golf scores or sidebars on, you
know, the decision is hard to know.
He frequently talks to my boss. I wouldn't be surprised if
there was a discussion between the two of them.
Q That night?
MR. LIBBY: That night or the next morning.
Q Or the next morning. Because he called Condi Rice in,
in the morning — she stayed there that night, I think — and
said, here's what I want to do. And there were 11 or 12 points
that kind of got reduced to a one-page memo by Monday. Do you
recall that?
MR. LIBBY: I don't recall him — if he called Condi in
privately, I didn't --
Q And do you know what her -- what that - - d o you recall
seeing that memo, this is kind of the game-plane, the outlook?

000212
10
 MR. LIBBY: I don't. At least not then. Maybe I saw it
j later, not knowing what I was seeing.
Q And that that was given out on Monday. Going back to
Camp David --
MR. LIBBY: I saw whatever was given out on Monday, if
that's the case.
Q Going back to Saturday, or the beginning of that
meeting, do you -- apparently the CIA Director gave a long, kind
of, intelligence briefing at the beginning. And one of the
things he said is that al Qaeda operates in 60 countries. And to
some people that was, apparently, news.
MR. LIBBY: We. had been looking at al Qaeda through the
spring and into the summer. So it would not necessarily have
stuck with me if he said it, because it would not have been news
to those of us who had been participating in that.
Q What were you doing through the spring and the summer
to fit the contacts?
MR. LIBBY: Well, al Qaeda was clearly a threat. They had
attacked the Cole in the fall of 2000. They had attacked the
^ embassies in 1998. They had previously attacked the barracks in
I Riyadh in '95. They had previously done Somalia. They had had
Jr people planning hijackings. So it was clearly -- it was among
the national security threats that people have to discuss.
Q Was there a deputies committee meeting on terrorism or
al Qaeda?
MR. LIBBY: Sure.
Q There was, definitely. Do you remember when?
MR. LIBBY: It had been discussed at deputies on more than
one occasion through the -- in the spring, but even more so in
the summer.
Q And then there was a meeting, a deputies committee
meeting August 1st about, that I think focused on the Predator,
but it was also related to al Qaeda. Do you recall that?
MR. LIBBY: I don't recall. I'd have to go back for
specific dates. But there were -- there were meetings about al
Qaeda during the summer, for sure.
Q Someone said there was an action plan that might have
been actually on the President's desk September 10th, but it kind
\f got delayed in the -- maybe not a plan, but it was described
f

11 000213
 to me as a plan, but a kind of a, we need to get going on this,
because there had been a principles meeting September 4th.
MR. LIBBY: Yes. I've forgotten how far we had gotten on
something as a "plan." There were certainly options that were
being looked at.
Q From what to what?
MR. LIBBY: Options. What do you mean?

Q You know, options to do what?

MR. LIBBY: Oh, options for an effective strategy against al
Qaeda, which, given that they were imbedded inside Afghanistan,
which was a long way away, was not a trivial task. So there were
different ways of looking at the problem.
Q What was the most interesting emotional moment in this
period, the llth to the 20th, that you saw, particularly
involving the President? It's an important —
MR. LIBBY: I would say they were numbers of times --
including, as I mentioned, on the llth -- when he provided real
leadership in the sense of this is where we're going, this is how
we're going to -- we're in a war. He had a real sense of where
~ he wanted to go right from the start. And that --
\ Q So were we -- did he decide to go to war the first day?

MR. LIBBY: The war on terrorism is in his speech, his

address to the nation at 8:35 p.m. on September llth. So, yes.
Q So he —
MRr LIBBY: As is the notion of harboring terrorists, going
against those states that harbor terrorism. And in the
discussions that proceeded it was the notions that -- discussions
within that first 24 hours, was the notion of you are either with
us or against us.
Q And there is that statement in the address about war on
terrorism, but it did not say we were literally at war, this is
an act of war. He didn't say that until the next morning, I
think.
MR. LIBBY: Could be, but then --
Q Did that --
MR. LIBBY: Whether it were within 24 or 36 hours, I think
that's sort of -- it's a remarkable way of dealing with this
problem first off.

000214
 Q Emotional moments.
MR. LIBBY: Certainly, the death of Barbara Olsen, who we
all knew, and -- the sort of horrific detail that she had called
her -- was on the phone with her husband at the time.

Q And he called Ted Olsen that — on the llth, didn't he?

MR. LIBBY: I was not present for him doing so, but I
believe I've heard he did. I mean, we all knew Ted Olsen, so it
was a face among the many who died tragically that day. I was
not with him when the towers collapsed, but it was certainly an
emotional moment for those of us who were sort of sitting in the
PEOC hearing it, sort of trying to figure it out.

Q What did Cheney say when the first tower collapsed?

MR. LIBBY: I don't know of any -- couldn't quote him.

Q Pardon?

MS. MATALIN: No one said anything.

Q No one said anything. It's almost unreal -- like

Dallas, the shooting of -- you know --

MR. LIBBY: We had discussions during the --

Q Jack Ruby --

MR. LIBBY: -- course of the day about potential range of

casualties, about historical analogies -- Pearl Harbor, how does
this relate to it, about what all this might mean, about the
possibility of a connection between the attack on the United
States and the assassination of Massoud two days
before --

Q On the 9th, yes.

MR. LIBBY: So there were plenty of things --

Q Clearly they're related, don't you think?

MR. LIBBY: Oh, I believe so. I passed them a note that day

Q Passed --

MR. LIBBY: -- the Secretary, Vice President Cheney, a note

somewhere right around 1:00 p.m. or so that day saying, you know

000215
13
 Q What did it say? What did the note say?
MR. LIBBY: Something like, did the assassination of Massoud
pave the way for the attack on the United States, question mark.
It was one of those times, we couldn't just have a discussion of
it, it was in the course of a broader discussion, or maybe it was
during a television discussion, but I passed them a note, because

Q What did he say? Did he raise that then?

MR. LIBBY: He read it, nodded, and we talked about it
later.
Q What did he say afterwards?
MR. LIBBY: I know we had a discussion on the helicopter
about the implications of the assassination for going after al
Qaeda because, clearly, one of the levers against al Qaeda would
be the Taliban, or the Northern Alliance directly, depending on
whether or not you could coerce the Taliban into contributing.
And, clearly, the assassination of Massoud would complicate
that, given that he was the leader of the Northern Alliance. The
question was, well, how critical a loss is that to the Northern
Alliance, you know, if you kill some commanders in chief, there's
somebody right behind them to step in.
The implication of the note and some of the discussion later
on was that they might view him as being a particularly critical
guy to holding the Northern Alliance together. So that whatever
-- however deep the hold was on September 9, it was deeper,
harder to do on September 12.
Q Yes, that's right. I mean, clearly. One of the things
the President has said to various people" is that there was a
meeting -- and it maybe was that NSC meeting on the 12th -- that
something the CIA did about making the intelligence operations m
kind of mating -- I'm sorry -- mating an intelligence operation I
with special operations with the technology of the Predator to 1
enhance targeting so the military could really be lethal when the
war phase started, and that that was a moment he cited to a
number of people as significant. Do you recall that?
MR. LIBBY: I definitely recall discussions of putting these
technologies together. I would have to go, again, think about
it. I don't recall that as being so much on the 12th; it was
definitely before -- within the window between the llth and the
Presidential speech. Whether it was the 12th or not --
Q He said within the first 24 or maybe 48 hours,
but --

000216
14
 MR. LIBBY: The President had a definite sense that he
wanted -- he did not want to fight this as a remote control, fire
a few Cruise missiles war, and that was very early on.
Q He said that very early.
MR. LIBBY: He said it early on, and he said --
Q -- we're just not going to fire a bunch of Cruise
missiles in --
MR. LIBBY: It wasn't -- he didn't say it in quite those
terms, but that's what he was saying. And it came out and that
early on he knew we ought to -- it would be very important,
assuming it made sense, it would be very important symbolically
for there to be U.S. boots on the ground. We had gotten -- part
of the reason this had all happened -- I'm reading a little bit
into what his comments are about -- but it was important to get
U.S. troops on the ground, because the people we were dealing
with and other people in the region had lost the sense that we
were serious about defending ourselves, and they were going to
find out otherwise.
Q When did he say that?
MR. LIBBY: Again, this is very early on. It was in the
first few days, as I recall.
Q And a number of people had said, Scooter, that --
sitting around the meetings that, in a way, the ghost of Bill
Clinton sat at the table, and that there was a feeling that
Clinton's response to bin Laden had been so weak that it was
almost provocative.
MR. LIBBY: I mean, if you think about it, again, going back
to this history, we've been -- our fielded forces had been
attacked in Somalia in '93. Let me -- it's not -- the history of
what we did is not just al Qaeda. I think I had mentioned a
minute ago some of the al Qaeda incidents. But think about it,
the President of the United States is -- there's an attempt to
assassinate the President again in '93. And in neither case do
we --
Q The former President.
MR. LIBBY: The former President -- do we do anything
serious. In '94, '95 we catch some people -- well, '93 is the
World Trade Center bombing, where they tried to do a significant
bombing, and they killed some people, again nothing serious
happens to them. In '95 you get the Riyadh embassy, the Riyadh
barracks gets bombed. In '96 the Khobar. All through this
period, Iraq is shooting missiles at us, we're not paying
attention to inspectors. In '98, two embassies.

15
 So now we have, first military forces, then military forces
in barracks -- first fielded forces, then forces in barracks,
then an embassy --
Q Right. And then a ship.
MR. LIBBY: And then a ship. And these are all sort of --
okay, I'm not getting your attention with any of these, I didn|t
even get your attention when I attacked your homeland in '93 with
the World Trade Center. Now we're trying to do it better.
Q Did he say that? Did the President say that? I
understand there were discussions about just this issue — the
response was so weak and timid and inconclusive that it was
provocative, it invited --
MR. LIBBY: You know, the people sitting in the war council
are all people who, most of whom had been through parts of the
campaign and they'd all been through eight years of foreign
politics debate -- you know, the issue of how do we handle
ourselves in Somalia, in Haiti, in other places, were in
everyone's consciousness. I don't think anyone said or had to
say all of that. The reference to this is not just going to be a
few Cruise missiles, that was -- that's a pretty direct reference
in the sort of shorthand that people who work together --
Q It's kind of, if I can say this, Republican doctrine or
lore or mantra that --
MR. LIBBY: I wouldn't use it, I wouldn't use quite those
terms, but it is a — it's understood when you talk about not
just doing Cruise missiles that that's what we're talking about.
In fact, I think on the helicopter that night, in discussing it
with the Vice President, I mentioned --
Q The night of?
MR. LIBBY: Of the llth, as we were flying out, I mentioned
we can't just blow up a few huts this time, with a few Cruise
missiles coming and blowing up huts will not do it.
Q What did he say? What did the Vice President say?

MR. LIBBY: He nodded.

Q And you were flying out to where at this --
MR. LIBBY: An undisclosed location, which was then
disclosed. (Laughter.)

000218
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 Q Someone said -- is this the thing, what is it called --
Raven's Rock, or something like that? Raven Rock. We're not
going to disclose it, even if it's been disclosed. I'm
not --
MR. LIBBY: The first -- somewhere in that first -- was it
the first night that the President -- one of those first nights,
the President told the visiting delegation where we were, and
then it was announced on that particular night we were at Camp
David. And I remember this distinctly because -- I think it was
on the llth, I remember it distinctly because during the day I
called my wife and she said, well, where are you, and I said, I
can't tell you, because at that point I was in the PEOC,
everybody is. And then later in the day I called her and she
said, where are you, and I can't -- this is when we're already up
at the secure location. She said, where are you, and I said> I
can't tell you, and she said, well, I was just watching CNN and
they just told me you're at Camp David. (Laughter.)
MS. MATALIN: That was later.
MR. LIBBY: Was it later that week?
MS. MATALIN: (Inaudible.)
Q And someone said that when -- in some of these
undisclosed locations -- believe me, we don't want to disclose
them -- that there are hundreds, if not up to a thousand people
from the government at these places, kind of -- is it shadow,
skeleton government if something happens?
MR. LIBBY: I don't want to get into numbers and stuff like
that. There are places -- I'm not saying whether we go to them,
but there are places where there are people who are there to help
with continuity. There's a program for that sort of continuity.
It comes out of the Soviet era.
Q But does it involve hundreds or a thousand people? I
mean, is that --
MR. LIBBY: You'll have to talk to the security types about
what those numbers -- in our world, there aren't hundreds of
people, period. In our world, you know, in terms of the people
who are involved with the decisions, there are not that many.
Q No, no. I mean, but there's a full government, water
resources people and EPA people and --
MR. LIBBY: You'll have to talk to some of their folks.
Q It's kind of a note of curiosity. Other emotional
moments for the President. The Cathedral speech. We're trying
to use the line, "an hour of our choosing," as the title for

17 00'0219
 this, from that speech. A number of people have said that was
quite --
MR. LIBBY: Yes, he said in his speech to the nation, he
said something like, we have found our mission and pur moment, I
think. There are a number of very good lines in that address to
the Congress. I think that was a very emotional moment for him,
by the way. I believe, I'm not -- I'm not, you know, I wasn't
there, actually; we were undisclosed. But, you know, walking out
in front of the Congress to make an address to the nation about a
war that we were entering was a pretty big step.
Q Who had the most influence? What was the role, the
influential role of various people in all of this? Because, you
know, it's obvious he was decisive and he moved and did these
things. But what sort of moments might there have been where
somebody said, well, let's consider this, or, what about that.
For instance, on Friday night there was a dinner of your
boss, Rumsfeld and Powell and Condi Rice. And were you there at
that dinner, Friday night up at Camp David?
MR. LIBBY: No, I was there Saturday. Before the 15th?
Q Before the 15th.
MS. MATALIN: You were there.
MR. LIBBY: I was there, yes.
Q And they had a buffalo dinner?
MS. MATALIN: You were there.
Q And one of the things that came up was Rumsfeld was
saying, you know, we need to emphasize the other features, other
than the military, here.
MR. LIBBY: I think Rumsfeld throughout emphasized that
point. I don't think you have to go as late as the 14th or 15th,
whatever the date was, to get to that point -- that this was a
campaign that would have to be fought by many different elements.
Q Who decided that? Who did -- you want to go?
MS. MATALIN: -- do what you need to do, since he has to go.
He has to meet (inaudible), we'll keep working.
Q Okay. Look, I'm sympathetic to -- I don't want to --
you know, we're going to have to come back and there are many
days, many moments, many decisions, many --

,J
is 000220
 MR. LIBBY: It's a big topic and I will help you as I can.
I just can't do it in 30, 40 minutes.
Q No, you can't begin to do it. I mean, is there
anything you've written down? Is there a master chronology that
Karen has got or --
MS. MATALIN: Well, we'll have to ask Karen how she -- what
her presentation is going to be, how she's organizing her
thoughts.
Q Okay.
MS. MATALIN: So we'll have more time with the Vice
President. We'll (inaudible). I think everybody is committed,
at the President's direction, to helping you collect this history
before it smashes on to the floor.
Q Okay. Great. Good. That's the goal. And, obviously,
documents, times, time lines are, you know from your legal
background --
MS. MATALIN: Karen is the repository for all (inaudible).
Q She's got all of this stuff. And we'll talk to Jamie
at 2:00 p.m., and we have to do this by phone, we can't go --
I MR. LIBBY: What day are we doing this?
-.;•*
MS. MATALIN: Monday.
Q It has never -- I've heard this from other people, it's
never been published or broadcast that he ordered the downing of
the plane as a --
MS. MATALIN: (Inaudible.)

Q Pardon?
MS. MATALIN: -- it's one of those not the way in which
Scooter just told it, I don't think.
Q No, it hasn't. I mean, others had told me that he had
to -- you know, that he did and never said the details of it,
which, indeed, I did not know.

MS. MATALIN: Just hearing this -- and we can go back

(inaudible), because I want to take care (inaudible) be late.
But you jump to the Saturday, everyone seems to think the
Saturday is the date, but from hearing Scooter tell it, the
opening days were far more important and far more demonstrative
of the Bush —

,9 000221
 Q I just knew you had limited time and I wanted to get on
your list a -- you know, what happened that day, because that's
the formalized process, right, of I want to hear what you think,
let's get --
MR. LIBBY: I think if you ask the participants to sort of
graph out important days, I don't think they would graph out -- I
don't think you would have sort of an abnormal spike on that. I
mean, you'd have something, because we spent a lot of time,
compared to the normal day, so it definitely would be something.
But there was a -- that whole week was filled with progress, and
the week after. The week after and the week after that.
Q Right, up to the speech.
MR. LIBBY: Up to and past, yes, absolutely.
Q Up to this day.
MR. LIBBY: Up to and past. You know, there are certain
major moments, as you get -- you know, October 7 is a major
moment, we start the air war and you've got certain things
underway. But it continues.
Q September 27th, when you sent those CIA people had to
be kind of a lump-in-the-tummy moment.
MR. LIBBY: The moment when we sent the CIA people in was,
you know, an important moment. The exact date, I can't verify
for you.
Q Yes, we've got it elsewhere, and actually published it.
MR. LIBBY: Okay. I'm not doubting, I just don't -- I
didn't want to --
Q But that seems to be a kind of, you know, now we're
crossing the line --
(End of tape.)
END

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