Markov Model-Based Reliability and Safety Evaluation for Aircraft Maintenance- System Optimization

Galina M. Susova Aviation Register of Interstate Aviation Committee 0 Moscow Andrei N. Petrov M.Gromov Flight Research Institute Zhukovsky
Key Words: Arcraft, Reliability, Flight safety, Latent failure, Scheduled maintenance, Markov model, Maintenance system, Maintenance effectiveness, Optimization.

SUMh.t4RY AND CONCLUSION

Redundant aircraft systems are intended for operation under established flight missions and maintenance programs. Systems may have latent failures and their reliability may vary, depending on previously made scheduled checks and repairs. System failure modes are a basis for assessing failure effect on flight safety, and are determined by the components' failure modes and their sequence of occurrence. Using a model of Markov homogeneous process it is s h o w that probabilities of the aircraft system states can be presented as a product of two multipliers. The first of them depends on a components failure rate and flight duration under condition of serviceability of all the components at takc-off. It may be determined by known methods using the Markov processes and Boolean logic. The other one depends on the check and repair intervals for the components and system states, as well as the flight phase limits. The practical calculation formulae are presented. The proposed method presents a new practical approach for aircraft systems analysis and may be used for a wide range of complex systems with latent failures. The analytical model may be used for solving a number of practical tasks: redundancy optimization, determining check intervals, optimizing aircraft Minimum Equipment List, etc. - in order to minimize operation cost and ensure flight safety. Practical application of this technology to modern aircraft has shown good results.
1. INTRODUCTION

Aviation development over the last 15 years has shown a growing interest in aircraft technical operating capabilities (flight safety, reliability, testability, and maintainability). The aviation industry became involved in the development at all stages of the life-cycle besides high aircraft performance to achieve an economical efficiency of operations, a high level of safety, and complete system reliability. This can be confirmed by a classical optimization interconnections chain. Indeed, a growth of requirements to the composition and quality of the tasks performed by an aircraft--andeconomic efficiency of its operations complicates the aircraft and its systems' design,

and influences the failures rates and effects. To maintain the required reliability and safety levels measures should be taken to enhance the system components reliability, redundancy, warning means, and special safety systems (both, forewarning the critical flight modes, and predicting the hazardous conditions). These measures directly affect the aircraft life-cycle cost (through the systems costs, aircraft weight, etc.), and on the other hand, they stipulate new requirements to an aircraft maintenance system, ground support and test equipment. New requirements cause challenges within aircraft maintainability and testability that have to be solved. Some of these challenges are: new or improved ground support equipment; on-board and ground test equipment; non-destructive inspection techmques; and the elaboration of more effective maintenance programs to reveal hidden failures of redundant components and prevent aircraft system failures evident to the crew. This helps to ensure the required reliability and safety of the aircraft, though it considerably affects the dispatch reliability and operating cost due to increase in labor spent for troubleshooting complex redundant systems, probable human errors, and "Re-test OK" events, - and finally results in lifecycle cost increases leading to new advanced requirements for the aircraft characteristics. One of the key tools for optimizing operating cost, safety, and reliability is an analytical "reliability maintenance policy" model whch allows the calculation of systems reliability taking into account different kinds of maintenance checks and their intervals. There have been a number of different models proposed in the past two decades, but most of them are not really suitable for practical aerospace applications ([I]...I 41). Some of them are too simple to adeqwtely represent complex aerospace systems. Others are too sophisticated to be correctly used in every-day engineering. The proposed Markov-based reliability and safety evaluatim method is based on mathematically correct, but simplified, quantitative relations between aircraft safety, reliability, and maintenance parameters and provides promising results. The following notation appears in this paper: H system state (depends on components states),

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Ho- systcm state with fully serviceable components, ( H , ) - state to which the system transits after occurrence of a,P,...,p, o failures in the specified sequence, H G (FIT state to which the system transits after occurrence, in any sequence, of a series of a,p,. .. , p p failures, z )- designations for a specified sequence of failures and a random combination of failures respectively, r system state index equal to the number of failures which moved the system from a serviceable condition to the given state HZor H; , h, rate of the p-th mode of the element failure, tn- flight duration, (ti-l,ti) - i-th phase of flight limits, Qap...pa (ti-l , ti), QZ(ti-l til probability of the state l%p...po (Hz) occurrence on the i-th flight phase, Qup...pa (ti-l ,ti), Q; (ti-, ,ti> - probability of the state H,p...po ( H ; ) occurrence on the i-th flight phase, upper index, denotes a probability of a system state under condition of serviceability of all system components before next flight, I(ap...po; , ,K ap...pa ;i (K,i , K;. 3- coefficients of the system maintenance policy effect on the system failures probabilities Qoap...pa;i, Qoup...pa ;i on the i-th flight phase, Oj, -j-th form of maintenance actions, Tj - j-th scheduled maintenance check and repair interval, T, - individual maintenance task interval that is equal Tj interval at which state H, is checked and restored, C, - the overall aircraft specific maintenance cost.

Has,, ,,

>-

. " A
ti
tit1

(z

L l

t,

"'" -

2. BASICS OF THE MATH MODEL

2,l. Maintenance System and Mission Parameters
An aircraft operation can be realized by a series of typical flights. Each flight includes a number of phases with specific limits for each phase. It is shown in Figure 1.
I

The failed components of the aircraft systems may not be restored in-flight. The maintenance system provides for scheduled tasks on the system condition monitoring, and unscheduled tasks on repair of the failed system components according to the maintenance schedule established for an aircraft type. As a rule; the maintenance schedule involves performing j = 1,2,...7J, and several forms of maintenance actions 0,. each form (maintenance check) has its own tasks scope V,, and interval T,, over the entire aircraft service life. Maintenance intervals and tasks are related by following rules: T i < TI < ... < Tj; VI cv2 c...cVI; where TI = tn is a maintenance check of minimum volume; M = Tj/T1 is a number of flights between full system restoration at the J-th maintenance check; m = TJ/IJ-l are positive integers. It should be mentioned that separate components failure modes monitoring and repair at different times is typical for most aircraft systems. Hereafter any "component" means replaceable aircraft unit and mathematically will be referred as an "element" of the system model. Maintenance scheme for case of J=3 is shown in Figure 2.

v 3 0 3

v 1
v 2 0 1 T ,
c

#2
a 1 T1 0 1
0 1

0 2
01 T l a 1 T 1
1 I

T1 T2

--4

T 1

T 1
T2 1 3

T 1

_ _- T 1
TZ

--

Fig. 2 . T y p i c a l A i r c r a f t M a t n f e n a n c e S y s t e m w i t h T h r e e S c h e d u l e d C h o c k s .

possible states. The process of the system transition from a without restoration serviceable state Ho to a state In general terms, a system may be regarded as consisting of the failed elements, is charactenzed by the transition of a number of I elements with the i-th element having 1, sequence failure modes (i=1,2,...I), i.e. the i-th element is having (Ii+l) Ho+Ha+Hafl+ ...+Hap ...p+ Hap..pa. (1)

2.2. Aircraft System

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1997 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium

These transitions occur at random instants of time due to the element failures. The trajectory (1) may be used as a base for particulare cases. Thus, for example, the process of the system transition from the serviceable state Ho to a state H,P...po (none restored Boolean model ) features a combination of possible transition sequences: Ho -+ H a -+ Hap +... -+ Hap..+ + Ha p...pcr Ho -+HP + HJ3a +... -+ Hpa..p + Hpa ...po
Ho -+ Ho -+Hop +... -+ Hop...p + Hop...pa Otherwise, restoration policy should be taken into account for calculating a math model.

...............................................................................

(2)

whcrc t, random time of the p t h failure origination, cpz minimum time for H, state restoration (depends on TI). 4) Simplify the formula for Qap...pa (0,t) using (3), (4). and then estimating errors. Resulting formula is Qz(O,t) = Q ~ P . (o,t>= . . ~ hAp...Apha Ir(t), (5) t % W Q43-P where Ir(t) = 1 ... 1 dt, dtp ...dt, dt, (6)

O b $

tp

2.3. Reliability Assumptions Basic system reliability assumptions are as follows: * Element failure rates are constant A , = const (3) * For highly reliable aircraft systems the following inequalities are true: Apt << 1, and Aot =C k,t < 1 (4) P * System elements fail in flight only. * Element failures are detected in flight and on the ground but are corrected only during ground maintenance. * System failures are detected in flight only and corrected before the next flight. * The inspections are perfect and essentially hundred percent of the failures are detected and fixed. No new failures are introduced as a result of the maintenance. These assumptions are usually used for analysis of aviation system reliability.
2.4. Math Model

If in equation (6) all variables 9, = t (no restoration is performed) the equation (5) agrees with a well-known formula for the Markov process theory u p...hph, t ! / d (7) Qap...pa(O,t)=
3. GENERAL CALCULATION FORMULAE

The probability Q2(tl,t2) of the system state H, occurrence varies from flight to flight since beginning of operations till the full restoration of the system after the appropriate check TJ.=Mtn. The probability of system failure in any flight during this period can be determined from the formula
M

QAO, tfl) = ( 1 W

{ Q,(O, j t d Qdo70'-l) GI))

j=l

(8)

The expression derived with due regard to ( 5 ) can be presented in the form Q2(0,tn) = Q o z (0, tn) Kz (9) if the designations are introduced Qo, (0, tn) = hahp...hph,tn/r! (10)
M

K, = (r!/ tn)(l/M)

j-l

C {Ira tn) - Ir((j-1) tn)}

(11)

Usually recursive model is employed in complex maintanability scenarios, but the method does not lead to analytical formulae. TheMarkov model (differential mode) leads to analitycal formulae (regarding inequalities ( 4 ) ) , but it is employed in simple cases only. The proposed approach suggests both methods to get the analytical formulae for the complex scenarios by using Markov model (process trajectories mode). On the basis of the above-mentioned assumptions the Markov homogeneous process may be used as a math model for the aircraft system reliability if the coqelation can be established between: aircraft system states, their probabilities, element failure rates from one hand, and Markov process states, state probabilities, and process transit rates - f r o m the other hand. Besides, check and repair intervals have to be taken into consideration. To determine the formula for Qap...F (t) the calculation process will be as follows: 1) Compose the process trajectory AT for transit (1). 2) Determine the probability Q(AT) of trajectory realization using Markov process formulae. 3) Determine the recursive probability of transit (1) integrating Q(AT) within limits (t,,,qQ,

The first factor (10) in the obtained expression (9) defines the probability of the in-flight system failure state H , ,that occurs under a condition of restoring the serviceability of all the failed elements before the take-off. The second factor (I 1) does not depend on the element reliability h, and shows how many times the probability Q2is increased with actual values of the check intervals for the corresponding system states. The value K, can be termed as the coefficient of the adopted maintenance system effect on the aircraft reliability. In many practical cases the system failure effects depend on a flight phase where the failure occurred. The engineering formula for this case can be easily determined using proposed assumptions. Coefficients K , , for any unserviceable state can be theoretically formulated. However, the higher system state index is, the larger are the calculation tasks. But the experience of practical aircraft reliability analysis shows thai possible systems failure modes are usually. defined by combination of failures of not more than four elements. The transformation results are given in Table 1. In the given equations n,=T,/ttr; = (tit',,>/ , (12) Table 1 formulae are based on universal math model and may be used for reliability and maintainability analysis of a

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broad range of aviation systems considering their specific scope and design, maintenance check and repair intervals. Table I Formulae for probabilities Q, and coefficients K, , K,;i

In practice, it often appears that the system unserviceable ...p,o element state is defined only by the modes of a,@, failures and does not depend on their occurrence sequence as shown in transits (2). The probability of this system failure mode will be QG (ti-l,ti)= Qap ...pu(ti-l,ti) + Qpa..po(ti-l,ti) +*.0 + Qop ...pa(ti-,,t;)=QO,p ...po(O,tn)I(,9...po; i+ Q pa...po(07tdKpa..po;i+ (13) ... + QOap ...p a h p ...pa; i = Qo up...p u ;i(07hW up...p o ; i 7 where Qoap...pa ;i(O,tn) = (r!) LAp... hph,td/r! , (14) K =;i= (1/r!)&...pu; i+ &a ...po;i+ ... + Kop...pa;i)- (15)

QRJ (ti-l,ti)= C
IHzlj

Qz(tl-l)ti)

(16)

where Q& ,ti ) is the probability of the unserviceable state

H ,on the i-th phase of flight. In case when the state of the system output characteristics
(and the system failure mode) depends on the failed element compositim, but not of their sequence, the design formula is For particular z and failures combinations, the probabilities of the failure modes are found from equations (9) and (13) using Table 1 formulae. 4.2. Initial Data

4. RELU BILITYAND SAFETYASSESSMENT

APPLICATIONS
Initial data to calculate the probabilities of the system failure modes for the established maintenance policy are as follows: 1) list of the system element failure modes and failure The basis for a design evaluation of flight safety and effectiveness measures are aircraft system failure modes and Occurrence rates; 2) list of the system failure modes, and the system state probabilities of failure occurrences in Werent phases of flight. Methods of calculating the measures provide for sets which define each system failure mode; 3) flight duration, and time limits for the phases which the engineering analysis of the element failure mode and failure combination effects upon the system output characteristics flight is divided into; 4) data on the system unserviceable states (system failures) and, hence, upon the system serviceability as ii whole. As a result of the analysis a set of the unserviceable system states rates. {H,} is determined. To generate a list of possible system 4.3. Process failure modes based on the engineering analysis the set of (H,} is divided to compose a group of J disjoint subsets The calculation procedure for the probabilities of the {H,}!, {H,}2, ... {H,}J in such a way that the system transition from the serviceable state to any unserviceable one system failure modes estimation includes the following steps: belongs to the same subset result in equal variations in the , are found from 1)Dimensionless parameters 0i and n system output characteristics set. Transition to any subset of formula (12). the system unserviceable states {H,}, means the system 2) Probabilities Q,and Q; are determined from equations failure of R* mode. (10) and (14). ~ of the system failure occurrence The proiability Q R (ti.l,t;> 3) Coefficients K,i or K;;i are calculated from the Table 1 of R , mode in the i-th flight phase is determined from the formulae using the n, values, formula: 4.1. Approach

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4)ProbtAties Q z,l or Q, ,, are obtained by formula (9) or

( 13), respectively;

4.5. Rcliclbili(v nnd Sclfit?,i4.ssess~~ient Tasks

The effect of each ~YYtem failure mode on flight Safety and effectiveness is ~vahated b Y the engineeringanalysis. For esample. the probability of a catastrophic effect Qcand departure failure Qdshould be given in the form of Qc= C C aj;iQRj(kl,ti)=Qc(LTj, fi-lrfi ,tn ,aj;i) (1s)
{Hz}j
,

5) Using formulae (16), (17) the occurrence probabilities QRj (ti-, ti) of the system failure modes on the i-th phase of an arbitrary selected flight are respectively calculated.

4.4. Exanrple

TO illustrate the method for calculating the probability of Q F r _ Z , 5: bj;iQRj(fi-l,ti)= Qd(%Tj, ti-l,ti ,tn ,bj;i ) (19) ~ H z ~ J an aircraft system failure during typical flight let us evaluate where aJs1 and bJ,lare the coefficients for the probability of a simple system with scheduled maintenance (Fig. 3) in accordance with procedure recommended in par. 4.2 and 4.3. an accident or departure failure due to a system failure RJ. Suppose Qreqland Qreqz are the quantitative requirements ,@3 placed to flight safety and dispatch reliability. Transformation of the relations (lS), (19) leads us to inequalities: 1 0 2 Q&,Tj, fi-l,fi 9aj.i ) < Qmql (20) I Qd(J-,Tj,ti-l,fi ,tfl ,bj.i < Qeq2 ,(2 1) which allow to estimate (using Table 1 formulae) the @I dependence of the system failures probabilities on its element 2 failure rates and associated check and repair intervals to be found for the arbitrary (up to the 4-th order) system states.
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S.MINTENANCE OPTIMIZATION APPLJCATIONS

5.1. Approach Fig. 3 . S a m p l e System The last two decades of severe competition at the air transportation and military aircraft market have shown that the development of the maintenance program which provides for optimization of the aircraft components primary maintenance processes (PMPs), scope of maintenance and repair tasks, and their intervals is one of the rational ways to reduce the aircraft operating cost, maintaining at the same time its airworthiness and competitiveness. The experience of the aircraft operations shows that maintenance costs can be reduced (while maintaining the necessary level of flight safety) through wide implementation of the on-condition maintenance. But there is a need for a good solid based math model to describe the system reliability and safety under certain maintenance modes. Generally, with all the necessary initial information available, the problem of quantitative substantiation of the effective maintenance schedule consists of ensuring the required probability levels (20), (21) for safety and dispatch (or effectiveness of operations) while minimizing the aircraft maintenance specific cost C,: Cs3 MIN; Qc(~,Tu, ti-1,tl ,tfl <a e q l Qd(h,Tu,ti-1,ti ,bj,i ) < Qreq2 , where Tu -unknown individual maintenance interval. With this approach, the main difficulty is a quantitative validation of meeting the requirements at the aircraft development stages because of the deficiency in simple but. accurate analytical models of the PMPs and the maintenance tasks influence on the safety and eflectiveness criteria. The alternative for the accurate quantitative approach to solving the problem is the rational combination of the qualitative engineering analysis, to select the PMF's and maintenance tasks, and the qualitative methods to develop the
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maintenance tasks, and the qualitative methods to develop the maintenance intervals for those tasks which are covered by the proposed mathematical model of scheduled check tasks frequency influence on functional system reliability, safety, and aircraft effectiveness. The methodology which was used to develop some aircraft maintenance programs combines the task - oriented qualitative engineering analysis for PMPs and
5.2. Maintenance Intervals Optimization Process

mainteiiance tasks selection (known as RCM principles [7]) with quantitative methods of rational scheduled tasks interval evaluation using the proposed math model. It allows formal analyzing of the influence of possible systems and components failure modes on aircraft s a f ~ t y ~ dispatch reliability, and economical efficiency. 5.3. Example o f Practical Implementation o f the Method

The Ilyushin Company of Russian experience shows a Maintenance intervals optimization process includes three good example of practical implementation of the proposed math model and associated techniques. The first experience of main stages. 1. Determination of the unreliability functions (20), (21) a new reliability model application was acquired on the IL-86 and cost function C, in terms of system failure modes with airplane which was thoroughly analyzed by "IL" reliability associated safety and mission completion effect, and engineers together with M.Gromov Flight Research Institute requirements Q values for each system failure under specialists to assess systems reliability and safety. Also there consideration uS%g the following data: component failure was an attempt to realize ATA MSG-2 document logic modes and their probabilities; typical flight and its phases analysis for the IL-86 maintenance program development but duration; unknown parameters of maintenance tasks intervals without a close relation to the results of failure mode and to be optimised; scheduled and unscheduled maintenance effect analysis based on the proposed reliability model. Failure mode and effect analysis, system safety assessment, tasks cost (man-hours or money values). 2. Optimization of the individual maintenance tasks and development of a maintenance program for the next intervals Tu using Lagrange's method for convex functions generation IL-96-300 airplanes were carried out completely case. The only problem in this step is to how implement Table based on the above-mentioned methodology starting from the 1 formulae in case of unknown maintenance intervals (means early stages of the airplane design. All the system components without division into "significant" and 'hon-siflcant" as it unknown sequence of failures restoration). A method is proposed for ranking the Tuvalues using the is prescribed by the well-known ATA MSG-3 [SI were criteria % , = Lg (C/QU), where rank SUfor the U-th analyzed in accordance with the special Manual [6]. About maintenance task is a function of the task cost C, and sum of 800 types of maintenance objects (assemblies, parts, and the possible components failures probabilities Qu which have components) were considered. A Final substantiation to be checked during this task. This assumption allows to documents set exceeds 3,000 pages. The analysis results permitted to reduce the IL-96-300 establish which maintenance task should be performed earlier maintenance volume by 30% compared to that of the IL-86 , < %( than others, so if % then Tu < Tu+, . 3. Estimation of rationa;) maintenance task intervals by to comply with the world level of parameters under integration of tasks with 'optimum values into appropriate consideration, that is reflected in Table 2 [ 5 ] . scheduled maintenance checks with the known base T, intervals using rank values. Then T, values are determined. Table 2 Basic Parameters of the IL-96-300 Airplane Maintenance Program and the airplane analogies

I 12.3 134.5115 11.2 Estimaited 1230.0 10.75 IL-96-300 1230.0 10.75 17.1 I25.0[*]/12 I1.7[*] Notes: 1. Sign [*I shows the estimated values. The values Lf overhaul maintenance man-hours per flight hour (MMH/FH) are calculated for the Russian and foreign airplanes with the same technique using the data of airlines (except for the 11-86, for which the estimated value for the out-of-service plant overhaul is shown) 2. The line before the 11-96-300 shows the estimated parameters for its project analogue, which are based on the factor analysis of a number of foreign airplanes.

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This has bccii achieved not only by the riiaintcriaiicc arid the iniplcmentation of tlic on-condition niaintcnancc tlic program optimization. but due to the earlier rectification and specific labor rates for all basic systems wcrc sulficieiitly cliiiiiiintioii of iiiaintaiiiability rind testability deficiencies. reduced (Fig. 5 ) . The iiiost airplane coniponents (about 100% of Q ~ e s and But tlic share of avionics and fire supprcssion systems i.11 iicarly 90% of the total number of the components) can be this reduction is n.=: so visible. which is mostly due to low inaintaincd on-condition and operated without any lifc tinie components reliability and necessity of frcqucnt checks of limitations. these systems. Numerous false alarm signals (Re-test OK I n this way the airplane compares favorably ibitli its events) are also typical for this class of systems. predecessors (Fig. 4). As a result of the analysis performed

N,%
~~ ~ ~~~ ~

1 0 0
9 0 8 0

( O N O .

of c o m p ~ n e n t s t y p e T ~ m ~ o f - .c o m p o n e n t s

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n
1

IL - 6 2
IL - 8 6

IL - 9

6-3 0 0

Fig. 4 . The S h a r e o f the O n - c o n d i t i o n Maintained C o m p o n e n t s f o r the I L - 9 6 - 3 0 0 S y s t e m s C o m p a r e d to o t h e r IL A i r p l a n e s

(IL-62 and IL-86).

MMHlFH x 1000
0,17
011 0,09

0.63

16

0,08
0,07

0,06

0,05
0,04 0,03 0,02
0,Ol

0
22 38 23, 31, 34, 77, 110, 113, 114

28

32

27

76

21

26

24

29

35

30

ATA 1 0 0 Number
Systems

Fig. 5 . Distribution o f the P e r i o d i c Maintenance Specific L a b o r f o r the IL- 9 6 - 3 0 0 C o m p a r c d to IL-86 S y s t e m s .

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6 .POTENTIAL OUTLOOK

BIOGRAPHIES

Galina M. Susova, DR. SC. The future activities of niodel inwrovement are focused on Chief Specialist, Aviation Register, Intentate Aviation Committee, implementation of the digital system reliability assumptions 7, Krjijanovsky St., bldg 1, Moscow, 117875 RUSSIA and possible in-flight repair opportunity. Another model Fax: (095)125-5195 enhancement is the development of Minimum Equipment List E-mail: root@makniias.msksu optimization technique and ETOPS (twin engine airplanes Galina M. Susova received her MS in Mechanics f r o m the Moscow State over ocean with a probable one engine failure allowed) r . Sc. in Engineering f r o m the M. Gromov Flight Research operations certification procedures. There is also a University and D n 1974. Since 1991 Mrs. Susova is a Chief spcialist at the Aviation Institute i technological problem of method automation realizing a Register of the Interstate Aviation Committee. She delivers lectures on systematic approach to safety, reliability and maintainability reliability for students at the Moscow Aviation Institute. Prior to this assignment ensuring and evaluation. The methodology can easily be used Mrs. Susova accrued for two decades at the M.Gromov Flight Rwearch Institute in other industries also. It can be applied to reliability and of Russia, working her way h m M Engineer up to the Chief of the Relinbility n reliability nnnlyair of a number of both civil end safety assessment of most complicated systems (power units, Laboratory. She took part i military aircratl, testing and operating data. MIS. Susovn's research interests ships, locomotives, etc.) with a cyclic operation, allowing a include reliability, safety and maintainability methods for complex systems, formal description of system potential failures and associated based on Markov models, aircraft reliability growth m e n t , data bases, and risks to be made. expnt systems design. On the subject she participated in turning out more than
25 papers and several Industry standnrds. She is a member of SAE.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors express their deep gratitude to all specialists of M. Gromov Flight Research Institute and Ilyushin Design Bureau who gave us a helping hand in refining and implementation of the proposed method into engineering Andrei N.Petrov entered Rursia State Flight Research Institute nnmed after practice. Dr. Valery K. Tomich also did much and indeed M. Gromov (Russian abbreviation - M.Qromov LII) upon grnduation &om the shall be regarded as one of the authors. Unfortunately he Moscow Avidon Institute with a MS degree in &eraft Mechanical passed away in 1993 and we will always keep him in our memories.
Engineering, were he worked since 1980 to present time on engineering and managerial positions. Since 1993 he is a Chief of the Safety, Reliability, e s t Research Division in the Institute. He was closely Maintenance , and T involved in development, testing and certifcation of a number of both civil and military aircraft (SU-27, Yak-42, IL-96-300, IL-114, Tu-204, etc.) with the m a i n activity in maintenance progradmaintainability OptimiLation and certification. He adso participated M n working group m m b r or *e projoct manager in the development of many tochnicd and regulatory documents (specifications, natiod/indu&y stmd.rb, nnd replntions) on nn aircraft technical opentiag capabilities (flight safety, reliability. mnintninnbility, r .Petrov received his Dr. Sc. degree teatability) evaludon and ccrtifcntion. M in AircrafWSystmu T e s t i n g and evnuation f r o m the Flight Research Institute in 1989. He has some educational experience teaching the m e t h o d s of maintenance program development and cdication. Mr. Petrov is an author of a number of publications (standards,handbooks, printed pnpcrs). He is a member of Society e s t Engineers. of Flight T

Andrei N. Petrov, DR. SC. Chief of Division 4, M. Gromov LII/Flight Research Institute Zhukowky-2, Moscow Region, 140160 RUSSIA F a : (095) 556-5334 E-mail: poatmaste@flyim.mclktu

REFERENCES
1 . T .C. Sharma, B.Zilbermnn, "Reliability Analysis of Redundant Aircrali Systems with Possible Latent Fdlures" Proc. AM. Reliability & Maintainability Symp., 1990, JM, pp 303-308. 2. A K. Somd., S. Pahitknr, T. C. Sharmn, "Reliability Modeling of Systems with Latent Failures U s i n g Markov Chains ",Proc. Ann. Reliability & Maintainability Symp., 1993, JM, pp 120-125. 3. A K Somnni, T.C. S h q Ph. H.Nguyen, "Reliability Computation of Systems with Latent Failures and Monitoring", Proc. Ann Relinbility P Maintaihbility Symp., 1994, Jan, pp 195 200. 4. L . . Garbelhi, A Altavilla, M. Fenante, "Availability Technique8 and Approach fora Manned Re-entry Vehicle", Proc. Ann. Reliability & Maintainability Symp., 1994, JM, pp 222-229. 5. A N. Petrov, V. A Karpmko, "Experience of Development and Certification of the IL-96-300 Maintenance Program", Proc. of the ALcraft Flight Safety Intl. Cod., 1993, Sept,pp 676481. 6. "Manual for the Designers and Operators on the Civil Aviation Aircraft Maintenance Program Development and C d i c a t i o n (RDK-E)".M. Gromov LII, GosNII GA, 1993. 7. F. S. Nowlnn, "Rehbility-Centercd Maintenance", 1978. 8. "AirIineManufactum Maintmsnce Program Development Document" (ATA MSG-3). Revision 2, 1993.

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