No 1/12 May 2012

Gas as a fuel for non-gas ships cause for concern?

By Alan N. Campion CEng CMarEng FIMarEST FHEA
ABSTRACT This paper relates to the current drive to use LNG as the main fuel for propulsion and auxiliary machinery on non-gas ships a move that has obvious benefits in both environmental and economic terms. The author examines whether there might be some serious cause for concern if this is carried out without proper management and control, given the vast differences between conventional fuels and LNG. It is based on a lecture delivered at Warsash Maritime Academy to a meeting of the Joint Southern Branch of RINA-IMarEST on 12 January 2012. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of either the IMarEST or Warsash Maritime Academy. CONTENTS Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 2 History ........................................................................................................................... 2 Benefit to the Environment? ....................................................................................... 2 Landmarks.................................................................................................................... 3 Regulation gas ships.................................................................................................. 5 Safety Record and LNG Shipping Incidents ............................................................. 6 Keeping it Cool ............................................................................................................. 7 Propulsion Systems ...................................................................................................... 7 Dual fuel boiler + steam turbine................................................................................. 7 Dual Fuel Medium Speed Diesel Electric .................................................................. 8 Slow Speed Diesel plus Reliquefaction and Dual Fuel Operation ............................. 8 HP Gas Supply ........................................................................................................... 9 Methane Slip? ........................................................................................................... 10 Recent Developments ................................................................................................. 11 LNG Expands ........................................................................................................... 11 Questions..................................................................................................................... 11 LNG and CNG............................................................................................................ 12 CNG and Temperature ............................................................................................. 12 Joule Thomson Effect ............................................................................................. 12 Release of Compressed Fuel Gas .............................................................................. 13 Comparing Fuels ........................................................................................................ 14 -1

Regulation ................................................................................................................... 14 LNG Cargo: LNG Bunkers ....................................................................................... 15 Training? .................................................................................................................... 15 Training Gas Ships ................................................................................................ 15 Draft IGF .................................................................................................................. 15 Specialised Training ................................................................................................. 15 Training Delivery ..................................................................................................... 16 Training: Draft IGF .................................................................................................. 16 Training Seafarers Only? ...................................................................................... 16 Assessment ............................................................................................................... 16 Training: Summary .................................................................................................. 17 Outcomes? .................................................................................................................. 17 Conclusion: Prevention is Better Than Cure ............................................................ 17 Bibliography: .............................................................................................................. 18 CONCLUSION Never one to be conventional, I am going to start with a conclusion. Not mine I hasten to add this is part of the conclusion to the 1997 Presidential address to the IMarE (as it was at the time). The address was entitled The development of Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers a Marine Engineering Success and was given by the then president, the late David Cusdin: The ships have earned themselves an excellent safety record and it is of the utmost importance that it is kept that way. Much of the improvement in the performance of the ships has been as a result of the work of the seagoing and ex-seagoing marine engineers who have been and are working on all aspects of the many gas projects. The LNG shipping business is, I believe, a success story for marine engineering and the seafarer. (Cusdin 1997) I intend to explore whether or not the same conclusion might be drawn 25 years later in 2022 regarding the use of gas as fuel in non-gas ships, bearing in mind that 2022 is now only 10 years away. HISTORY To be fair to those with limited knowledge of LNG and its transport by sea I will start with a brief history and overview of LNG, LNG ships, and the development of the different modes of propulsion before examining LNG as a fuel for propulsion of nongas ships. Fig 1: Methane Pioneer (1959) Benefit to the Environment? Much is said about the environmental benefit of using LNG as a marine fuel; Table 1 summarises the main ones, based on a vessel with a nominal daily consumption of 100t HFO. Due to LNG having a heating value (or calorific value) about 28% higher than HFO the fuel consumption could be reduced by as much as 22% per day. That said, over twice the volume of LNG will be required due to the low density of the liquid typically below 0.44.

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Table 1: Environmental Benefit

Each tonne of LNG burnt will produce 0.4t less CO2 than each tonne of HFO; the overall result of the reduced consumption and reduced CO2 resulting from combustion is a decrease in CO2 emissions of up to 31%. LNG contains no sulphur, so there can be no sulphur oxides produced; also particulate emissions due to ash etc. are negligible when using LNG as fuel. NOx emissions are also reduced, and no sludge is produced through fuel oil treatment. LNG may contain between 65% and 99.5% methane, the remainder being a mixture of ethane, propane, butane and nitrogen, in differing proportions depending on source and the production process. It is normally carried at a little over atmospheric pressure and 1m of liquid methane will expand to form about 630m of gas. Methane is a colourless, odourless, hydrocarbon with 1 carbon and 4 hydrogen atoms, the lightest compound in the paraffin (alkane) series. It has a boiling point at atmospheric pressure of 163C where the liquid density is 423kg/m. At this temperature most normal shipbuilding materials will become brittle, and may crack. The actual boiling point and density of an LNG cargo will vary with the constituents. The temperature is maintained by allowing the cargo to boil, and removing vapour from the tank to maintain the pressure just above atmospheric. This vapour is commonly burned in the ships boilers instead of fuel oil, and originally any not required for the ships use was vented to atmosphere. Since that time methane has been identified as the second most abundant greenhouse gas after CO2 1t methane having the same environmental effect as about 21t CO2. When burnt, however, each tonne of methane only produces 2.75t CO2, so venting is avoided wherever possible. The different options for burning the boil off gas will be examined later. LNG vapour is flammable when mixed with air in the ratio 5-15% v/v, and requires around 0.3mJ ignition energy to start a flammable mixture burning. This is a little less than would be experienced due to a static discharge from a hotel room door after walking on a nylon carpet, but, to put it in perspective, it represents 17 the energy required to ignite the hydrogen given off during battery charging (flammable range 4-76% v/v). Acetylene requires about the same ignition energy as hydrogen and has a flammable range 2 100%. LANDMARKS Transport of LNG of on river barges in the US to the cattle markets in Chicago for use as a cooling medium was initially proposed in 1915, but the first seaborne cargo of LNG was carried from Lake Charles, La, to Canvey Island UK in 1959 by the converted cargo ship Methane Pioneer which had conventional diesel propulsion (Nordberg 2000bhp); the pressure in the vertical cylindrical cargo tanks was controlled by venting vapour. Six further trips followed the initial trial. Building on the experience gained from this the Methane Princess and Methane Progress were delivered to British Gas in 1964 to carry LNG from Arzew (in Algeria), also to Canvey Island, on a 15 year contract. These 26 500m3 ships were finally -3 Fig 2: Methane Princess

scrapped in 1986 and 1997 respectively a considerably longer life than the original 15 year contract indicated. They were fitted with Conch prismatic tanks and 12 500shp steam turbine propulsion; they were the first to use boil-off gas from the tanks as fuel, on-board reliquefaction being regarded at that time as uneconomic. Simultaneously with the development of Methane Princess and Methane Progress French companies were developing a range of cargo systems for carrying LNG from Algeria to France; three of these were trialled in 1962 in Beauvais, a converted liberty ship. Following these trials the Jules Verne was built, and delivered in 1965; a similar size to the Methane Princess and Methane Progress, she was built to a Gaz de France design with seven 9% Nickel steel cylindrical tanks using PVC and Perlite insulation, and propulsion power was developed by a Parsons 15 000shp steam turbine plant. Re-named Cinderella in 2004 she was finally scrapped in 2008 a 43 year commercial lifespan. The next significant step was the delivery in 1969/70 of the 71 500m3 Polar Alaska and Arctic Tokyo for trade between Alaska and Japan. Still trading over 40 years later as the SCF Tokyo and SCF Alaska, they feature the Gaz Transport Invar and Perlite NO82 containment system, and steam turbine propulsion. Hard on the heels of the Alaska-Japan project came the building, between 1972 and 1975, of seven 75 000m3 near sister ships in France for the Brunei-Japan trade. Due to the location of the loading terminal the ships were fitted with the means to load via a platform at the stern, with a linked ship-shore shut-down and emergency release system; something now common in virtually all LNG terminal operations. Five of these ships had the stainless steel and balsa wood Technigaz Mk1 containment system; two had the Gaz Transport NO82 system. All were Stal-Laval steam turbine propulsion, 20 800shp, and five are still trading some 40 years later. The next noteworthy development, in 1973, was the 87 000m3 Norman Lady, the first vessel to feature the Moss type spherical tanks, closely followed in 1975 by the Hilli also with Moss type tanks, however Hilli was the first LNG ship to have a capacity of over 100 000m3. Before long the standard size for an LNG ship was in the range 135 000m3 to 145 000m3; only a few smaller vessels being built. In 1993 the 89 880m Arctic Sun and Polar Eagle entered service on the Alaska to Japan route. These vessels had IHI type B self-supporting aluminium tanks the only ones to see service in the LNG trade and 21 000shp steam propulsion. They are still trading as Arctic Spirit and Polar Spirit. The next major step, in 2002, was in fact two steps taken concurrently, so arguably this constituted a leap; the Gaz de France energY featured not only the new GTT CS1 cargo containment system, but was also the first to feature a Dual Fuel Diesel Electric (DFDE) system that supplied all the ship electrical power including 26 000hp for propulsion; the boiloff gas was now being disposed of in more efficient medium speed diesel engines rather than the thermally inefficient boiler/turbine arrangement. The CS1 containment system never caught on, though large numbers of DFDE vessels have been built since. A further giant leap took place in 2007 with the entry into service of the first Q-Flex vessel Al Ruwais, with a capacity of 210 000m3, propulsion by highly efficient twin slow-speed diesels developing a total of 50 000hp, and with on-board LNG reliquefaction capability. Al Ruwais was followed in 2008 by the similar in concept, but much larger, Q-Max vessel Mozah boasting 60 000hp total from twin slow speed diesels. As of August 2011 there were 30 Q-flex vessels in operation, and 14 Q-Max with more to come. These landmarks in the development of LNG ships are tabulated below:

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Year 1959 1964 1965 1969/70 1972 1973 1975 1993 2002 2007 2008

Ship(s) Methane Pioneer Methane Princess & Methane Progress Jules Verne (Cinderella) Polar Alaska & Arctic Tokyo (now SCF Alaska & SCF Tokyo) Gadinia & 6 sisters Norman Lady Hilli Arctic Sun & Polar Eagle (now Arctic Spirit & Polar Spirit) Gaz de France energY Al Ruwais Mozah

Size (M) 5000 26 450 25 500 71 500 75 000 87 600 126 227 87 500 74 100 210 000 266 000

Power (PS) 2030 12 673 15 200 20 280 21 090 30 000 40 000 21 300 26 000 50 000 60 000

Table 2: LNG Ship Development REGULATION - GAS SHIPS Gas ships in general and LNG ships in particular have an exceptional safety record, and this is not just by chance. In October 1976 a Code for Existing Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk, plus a Code for the Construction & Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk for ships built after that date came into effect; they were originally published by what was then IMCO the body that later became the IMO; these are known respectively as the EGC and GCC codes. Compliance with these was voluntary, but operators of LNG ships at that time tended to comply. In 1986 the GCC was superseded by the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk, commonly referred to as the IGC Code as otherwise it is a bit of a mouthful! This was published as volume III of the 1983 amendments to SOLAS; and the link to SOLAS now made it mandatory for ships in international trade to comply. In 1993 the code was updated and the second edition published. Currently under review, the next edition of the IGC Code is expected to be ratified by 2014. The IGC code has been developed through the use of advanced hazard and risk analysis techniques rather than representing retrospective controls implemented following incident or disaster, Fig 3: IGC Code and includes, for example, a requirement to site cargo containment

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a minimum distance from the ships side; all cargo pipes must be in the open above the weather deck and enter the tank from the top. The accommodation may not be situated above the cargo area, and there are strict controls over many other matters, but all are based on the degree of hazard posed by the cargo. In conjunction with this there are comprehensive minimum requirements for training of personnel operating gas ships, particularly management level Officers; these are detailed in STCW, and the IMO publish Model courses for guidance. There is also a lot of guidance regarding best practice that has been collated from the industry promulgated by independent organisations such as the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and SIGTTO, the Society of International Gas Tanker & Terminal Operators, who have also produced a suggested competency standard for officers on LNG ships that exceeds the minimum requirement set out in STCW; training to this enhanced standard is required by many charterers. SAFETY RECORD AND LNG SHIPPING INCIDENTS The combined result of all this is an enviable safety record for LNG shipping: as of the 45 years LNG service to December 2009, LNG ships had carried in excess of 59 000 cargoes across over 150 million nautical miles without loss of life or vessel due to a cargo related incident. Despite this record, the public perception is that LNG ships are extremely dangerous. It would be wrong, however, to say that there have been no incidents whatsoever! Over the same 45 year period referred to above there have been 41 reported incidents involving LNG ships including 8 collisions; 4 of these involving contact with other vessels, 2 were jetty contact incidents, plus one where an LNG ship alongside was hit by a passing vessel and one where a submarine tried to extend its periscope through the ship. There have been 4 cargo-related fires two of which were vent mast fires where venting vapour was ignited by lightning, one insulation fire during building, and one fire due to vapour ignition during disconnection. In total there have been 13 liquid releases, most of these extremely minor, some resulting in small cracks to strength parts of the vessel, or significant cracking to non-strength parts; others have caused no structural damage at all. During this period there have also been Fig 4: El Paso Paul Kayser 5 grounding incidents, none of which led to any cargo release and this includes the1975-built El Paso Paul Kayser, shown here in dry-dock after she had grounded at 17kts fully loaded near Gibraltar in 1979. Even here there was no cargo release, although the containment system suffered some damage; in fact the cargo was successfully transferred to a sister ship using the Paul Kaysers own pumps before preparing for docking, and the Paul Kayser continued trading for another 10 years until she was scrapped in 1985. I am not of the opinion that these statistics indicate that LNG ships are intrinsically safe; the record is due to the high standards of regulation and training extant in the industry, and the engineering excellence that has prevailed over many years. It is worth considering that during same period there were over 100 major oil tanker incidents that resulted in 700 fatalities and the spillage of over 1m tonnes of oil.

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KEEPING IT COOL Keeping any low pressure gas cargo cold is quite simple: the tanks are heavily insulated to limit heat ingress, and to compensate for the small quantity of heat energy that does inevitably pass through the insulation the cargo is allowed to boil; by extracting cargo vapour the added energy is removed, thus keeping the cargo tank thermodynamic energy level constant, and hence the pressure and temperature stable. With LPG cargoes the gas that is removed is re-liquefied and returned to the tanks; with LNG cargoes (until recently, that is) the easiest way of utilising the boil-off gas was as fuel in the ships boilers, hence the use of steam turbine propulsion. Part of the rationale permitting the use of LNG vapour as fuel in this way is that, if heated to above 100C, LNG vapour becomes lighter than air, making any potential leak into the engine room easier to trap, detect, and extract. Recent advances have meant that options other than boilers are available for the disposal of boil-off gas; however even including new-buildings yet to be delivered, almost 70% of LNG vessels utilise steam based propulsion. PROPULSION SYSTEMS For many years, it seemed that, so long as there were LNG ships in service, there would always be a home for the dyed-in-the-wool steam engineer. Boilers raising steam for propulsion and power generation were the obvious way of disposing of the gas; despite the low efficiency of the boiler/steam turbine system about 29% this was offset by the low heavy fuel oil consumption (possibly as low as zero), and the need to dispose of the boil-off gas safely. Dual fuel boiler + steam turbine So, here we have the classic LNG vessel fuel gas supply system ... the BOG is taken from the tanks by a small, single stage high speed centrifugal compressor referred to as the Low Duty or Gas Burning compressor delivering low pressure gas to the boiler burners via a heater that raises the temperature to between 25C and 45C. As the machinery spaces are to be maintained safe from the entry of gas gas safe in other words the safety barrier between the gashazardous and gas safe areas is extended to the boiler, and a gas master valve, shown in green, acts as an Fig 5: Steam plant with gas automated safety shut off device (see Fig 4). Before burning and after each gas burning session the pipeline between this gas master valve and the boiler is purged with nitrogen, and gas burning can only be initiated on a register already burning fuel. If the gas master valve should close in response to a safety trip, fuel oil burning will be automatically reinstated. If more gas is required than can be provided by the naturally occurring boil-off, liquid is pumped from the tanks through a vaporizer and the extra gas that is created added to the boiler supply. It therefore seemed, for many years, that this system would ensure that LNG ships would always provide a potential berth for the steam engineer. However, this was not to be!

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Dual Fuel Medium Speed Diesel Electric In or around the year 2000, engine manufacturers developed what was marketed as a new system for gas ship propulsion; dual fuel medium speed engines driving alternators in a diesel electric propulsion and power generation system (DFDE) achieving a propulsion efficiency of 43% rather than the 29% achieved when using steam turbine plant. Actually this was nothing really new dual fuel medium speed diesels have been in use in the on- and off- shore petroleum industries for many years, utilising, for example, well-head gases for fuel. Equally, diesel electric propulsion systems had been in use for many years on cruise and container vessels all it really Fig 6: DFDE Schematic needed was the vision to put the two together. As large quantities of effectively free electricity were now available it was suggested that some of the excess power might be used for partial reliquefaction and this paved the way for the next development, Slow Speed 2 Stroke Diesel propulsion with full reliquefaction of the cargo boil-off gas. In the dual fuel medium speed engine the fuel gas is injected into the air stream at each cylinder inlet, compressed along with Fig 7: Gas injection to a the air charge, and ignited by a pilot injection of fuel oil either medium speed engine HFO or MDO. Compared with the boiler system this requires a slightly higher fuel gas pressure in the region of 4 6 bar(g). As this pressure cannot be achieved with a single stage centrifugal compressor two stage centrifugal compression is generally fitted, sometimes with pre-cooling. Slow Speed Diesel plus Reliquefaction and Dual Fuel Operation It was calculated that, especially with the new generation larger LNG vessels the so-called Q-Flex & Q-Max types developed for the Qatar project delivering the full cargo as loaded by fitting reliquefaction and conventional slow speed diesel engine propulsion with efficiency around 50%, would more than offset the cost of running the reliquefaction plant. The ships were therefore built with twin slow speed diesel main engines and medium speed generator engines all running on HFO, plus a reliquefaction plant that featured two stage compression for the gas process so about 4 6bar(g) again and a nitrogen gas charged reverse Brayton cycle cooling system. This was fine, and several ships were delivered, until increasing fuel prices upset the balance, so that the value of the extra cargo delivered no longer outweighed the fuel cost; this resulted in a drive to operate the slow speed two stroke engines on dual fuel, which was not a new concept; in fact David Cusdin referred to it in his 1997 presidential address, and the manufacturers already had experience with land-based plant. The ships delivered with two stroke diesel propulsion and reliquefaction plant are now scheduled for conversion to dual fuel operation, and I understand that any remaining new-buildings will be delivered with this option. One of the major concerns here, however, is the gas supply to the engine: because of the way a two stroke engine operates taking the fuel gas in with the combustion air is not an option -8

and direct injection to the cylinder is required. To get the appropriate quantity of gas into the cylinder in the required time at the correct part of the cycle a higher pressure is required than for boiler, DFDE or reliquefaction systems: the figure generally quoted at present by many sources is 150-265bar, but I have also seen reference to pressures as high as 360bar. HP Gas Supply There are two main options for producing gas at these high pressures. The first is to take LNG vapour from storage, and compress it which requires a large compressor, probably 6-cylinder, 5-stage. If there is insufficient vapour supply from natural boil-off then a vaporiser would be used to augment the supply. Removing just the vapour will also lead to a slow change in the constituents of the liquid & hence its characteristics, and the characteristics of the associated vapour a process known as weathering. The second alternative would be to compress the liquid by using a multi-stage HP pump, and then to vaporize the high pressure liquid. At first glance there seems little to choose between these two alternatives until one considers both the total work that must be done on the gas, and how this is achieved. In option 1, vapour compression, assuming the starting position is just above atmospheric pressure, there would need to be several stages of compression typically 5 with intercooling, to achieve the final result. The total work required to be done on the gas by the compressor would be of the order of 540kJ per kg gas passing through. If the vaporizer were required the latent heat energy input to turn liquid to vapour would be 645kJ/kg; a total heat + compression energy requirement of 1185kJ/kg. On the other hand, if we were to use liquid compression + vaporizing, based on the same starting pressure, the energy added to the liquefied gas during pumping is around 100kJ per kg, leaving 655 to be added in the vaporizer total energy requirement 755 kJ/kg.

Fig 8: Comparing Compression and Pumping

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The major difference between these alternatives? In the compressor-based system energy addition is mainly by way of mechanical means; the liquid compression + vaporizing option adds most of the energy by using static heat exchange equipment. The vaporizer requirement for both systems would be about the same, utilising heat energy from the steam produced by the waste heat recovery system which can therefore be ignored. The major difference would be in the power requirement for the compressor, being over 5 greater when compared with the pump not to mention maintenance considerations. Methane Slip? You may have heard the expression Methane Slip; if not you probably will before long! This refers to unburned fuel gas that might be released to atmosphere with the exhaust as part of the combustion process. In a well managed boiler installation or a direct injection two stroke slow speed diesel engine plant this will be zero. However the four stroke medium speed engine where gas intake is with the combustion air, may present a problem due to the scavenging overlap that is a normal part of the cycle. It is the part of the cycle highlighted in red where the intake air is used to expel the remaining exhaust gas that is the main concern. Because methane has 21 the Global Warming Potential of CO2; methane slip is often quoted in arguments against LNG fuel in general, although it only affects the 4S engines; engine designers are making huge reductions to the amount of gas expelled in this way, although in some older engines it is possible that methane slip could negate the environmental advantage of the reduction in CO2 emissions achieved. Methane slip is highest at low loads. Fig 9: Four Stroke Cycle Propulsion Summary To summarise the different propulsion options: There are four options available for propulsion of LNG vessels: dual fuel steam or medium speed diesel power plant, or slow speed diesel plant with reliquefaction; these all feature low or moderate gas supply pressures. Then there is slow speed dual fuel operation with a significantly higher gas supply pressure. Regarding propulsion efficiency, either form of diesel plant has significant energy savings compared with steam, although methane slip may reduce the environmental advantage of the medium speed diesel solution, especially where conversion from conventional fuel is concerned. Regarding the steam option, not only is it inefficient, but there is a great deal of difficulty in recruiting engineers with appropriate qualifications and experience. The technology, however, exists to use LNG as a fuel source for virtually any type of merchant vessel whether using slow speed or medium speed diesels for propulsion.

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS So far I have related everything to ships designed and operated within the strictures of the IGC code, and STCW training requirements. However, recent environmental and economic pressures have resulted in a massive interest in LNG as fuel outside this carefully managed and regulated situation. It should be mentioned here that some vessels are already running with LNG as fuel on coastal routes where international legislation is not necessarily a major influence. LNG Expands When LNG is turned from liquid to vapour the volumetric expansion will be anywhere between 600 and 630 times, and since 2009 interest in the use of LNG as fuel for propulsion outside LNG ships has expanded in much the same way, and some interesting proposals have resulted, some of which, it must be said, show a lack of basic understanding of how the cargo is used as fuel in existing LNG carriers. Concept designs have included the prospect of fitting the LNG fuel tanks immediately below the accommodation which I would suggest is a proposal that can only be based in economics, rather than being on risk and hazard analysis of safety considerations. Much continues to be written about LNG for propulsion in the maritime press, with reference to, and quotes from, engine manufacturers, ship operators, ship builders, and Classification Societies, along with a great deal of comment relating to emission control areas and the need to reduce SOx, NOx and Fig 10: LNG fuelled CO2 all more easily achieved when using LNG as fuel. Container Vessel Concept Even LPG (which is heavier than air) has been mooted as a possible fuel, and more and more publicity was given to the potential for the new, green ships with concept designs, and reports of orders being negotiated and placed for new-buildings and conversions. The one aspect that seemed to cause little concern, only meriting a passing mention (if indeed any mention at all) was the matter of training for the crew operating the vessel. But it is not cargo, is it? It is only bunkers. Not the same, surely? In fact it appears that having the bunkering infrastructure in place has now become the major talking point, so that LNG is readily available as fuel; it therefore seems that the concept of utilising LNG as fuel is now accepted to the point where it is not really even newsworthy only the logistical problems in achieving that end create headlines. QUESTIONS To my mind this, now inevitable, expansion of the use of LNG fuel to non-gas ships where the IGC code and STCW requirements regarding carriage of gas as cargo do not apply raises several questions. The first, and most obvious to me, is this: is any training in operations with this new bunker fuel necessary? If so, why? If it is required, then to what level should it be given? Assuming training is to take place what about assessment or is knowledge transfer just to be assumed to take place? Who should supply the training the employer? The equipment manufacturer? A training establishment?

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Is it only the shipboard personnel that will need training? What about others involved in the overall operation of shipping charterers, agents, and so on? I would like to briefly explore various aspects of these questions, based in both the technology concerned, and current draft proposals soon to go before IMO, and offer some possible answers. But first, a few more facts about the use LNG as a fuel in the ways already discussed, and as proposed for non-gas ships. LNG AND CNG LNG = Liquefied Natural Gas that is natural gas that has been cooled sufficiently to become liquid. It is therefore below the critical temperature of 84C, and for low pressure storage is more likely to be below 160C. At these very low temperatures, of course, most engineering and shipbuilding materials become brittle. Above the critical temperature the product becomes natural gas just as you get from the distribution system to your home if you have mains gas. If it is not liquid, it is not LNG! When it is compressed, it becomes compressed natural gas, or CNG, allowing a greater mass to be stored in the same volume, although the scantlings of the containment will need to be significantly heavier. When natural gas is stored in this compressed state, even at ambient temperature, the potential for low temperatures and brittle fracture is not removed, however. CNG and Temperature Some reports have suggested that natural gas for ship propulsion could be stored as CNG at pressures up to 275bar; this is also the pressure generally quoted for the supply of fuel gas to a slow speed diesel engine on full load, although higher pressures have also been proposed. Depending on the vessels trading area this CNG could be at 37C, 25C or even 0C. How can this cause concern regarding low temperature? Even when not doing work in the process, most gases exhibit a fall in temperature when expanded; this phenomenon is referred to as the Joule-Thomson or sometimes Joule-Kelvin effect. If CNG is expanded from 275bar it does not matter whether it is to 6bar, or to atmospheric pressure, the effect will be virtually the same. Joule Thomson Effect The Joule Thomson effect relates to the temperature change in a fluid when it undergoes isenthalpic expansion ie expansion with no change in enthalpy, the thermodynamic energy level; in other words without performing work. This temperature change may be positive or negative, and at low pressures the change is often negligible and the effect is best illustrated by use of a Mollier Diagram. On the next page is the Mollier diagram for methane the major constituent of natural gas. Included are lines that indicate constant pressures of 1bar(a) (ie atmospheric pressure, 7bar(a), and 275bar. Also shown are the lines of constant temperature for +37, +25, 0, -50, 75 and -100C. If CNG at 275bar(a) is expanded from +37C to atmospheric pressure, the temperature will fall to around -50C cold enough to cause physical harm to unprotected personnel, and, assuming sufficient mass, to cool steel to the point where brittle fracture is possible. From the same pressure and +25C the temperature would fall to below -75C with an even greater likelihood of embrittlement or personnel injury, and from 0C to below -100C where the gas is now not just cold, but heavier than air.

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Fig 11: Cooling effect of expansion Compare this with expansion from 6 bar(g) to atmospheric pressure, where there is very little temperature change at all only a few degrees. Release of compressed fuel gas There are many incidents that could cause release of fuel gas into the machinery space potentially resulting in gas contamination of a space nominally safe from such an event. Although any limited release due to pipe fracture, flange gasket failure etc. should be contained within the negative pressure ventilated protective double-wall pipe system or trunk-way, other causes of failure are possible. For example injudicious movement of large engine spares (pistons, liners for example) could carry away the pipe system completely, as could support system failure due to fatigue resulting from vibration. Whatever the cause, if we consider 20m of 150mm pipe containing CNG at 275bar suffering a catastrophic failure so that the contained gas was released to atmosphere it would create, at ambient temperature, a gas cloud of about 100m3 the initial temperature would be much less of course, probably about 50C but it would rapidly warm. This 100 m3 of gas when mixed with air could create up to 2000m3 of flammable mixture at the LFL of 5% by volume. Not only is this a large cloud of flammable vapour, but such an event would also rapidly displace a lot of air, reducing the oxygen available to support life, not to mention the possible effect on a running internal combustion engine. Whilst the likelihood of this type of event might be low, the consequence would be extremely high, so this is something I believe worth including in risk assessment procedures! Conventional diesel engine design ensures that rupture of a high pressure fuel pipe results in release of a minimal quantity of flammable material; one that is liquid and significantly more difficult to ignite than gas.

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Comparing fuels Having looked at some of the possible hazards of LNG as a fuel, I would like to summarise what I see as the main differences between the main fuel types distillate, residual and natural gas.

Table 3: Fuel comparison Apart from cryogenic LNG at 160C, most fuels will be stored at or above ambient temperature; similarly service temperatures will vary for all these fuels between ambient and +140C depending on the machinery design requirement. The limited vapour resulting from use and storage of conventional fuels is heavier than air; natural gas vapour below 100C is also heavier than air, but above this temperature the vapour becomes lighter than air. The flashpoint of conventional fuels for marine use is regulated by SOLAS, and must be greater than +60C unless for engines in lifeboats, emergency generators etc, when flashpoints down to +43C may be permitted. The flashpoint of LNG is significantly lower at 221C, although the auto-ignition temperature is high at 535C 595C. The main non-fire issue with conventional fuels is, of course, pollution not a problem with natural gas as it will vaporise and disperse quickly. However the large liquid-to-vapour expansion ratio (1:630) will rapidly result in a large gas cloud with the potential to displace air resulting in asphyxia, and anywhere from low to extremely low temperatures. This indicates that there will be significant differences when handling, storing and caring for these new age bunkers. REGULATION I have already mentioned regulation regarding the construction and equipment of ships carrying liquefied gases in bulk, and the training requirements for the officers and crew. Does the fact that natural gas, in whatever form, is being used as bunkers make any difference?

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LNG Cargo: LNG Bunkers If we were to compare the potential risks of LNG as bunkers, or as cargo, we would, of course, find no difference at all: it is the same product, merely different quantity and purpose. However, none of the regulations that apply to gas ships are applicable; they are specific to gas carried as cargo. At present the only training requirement other than individual flag state regulations is in the Draft Code on Safety for Gas Fuelled Ships or Draft IGF Code as it is currently known. A lot of work by a number of people has been put into this document to get to the present position, though there still remains much to be done. TRAINING? The Training requirement that may (or may not) end up in the finalised IGF is a matter that is still under discussion at IMO and by the BLG correspondence group to which I am a recent recruit. It is fairly obvious that, given the huge differences between handling HFO and MDO bunkers with >60C flashpoint and handling LNG as fuel that some form of adequate training is essential, always remembering that formal training regarding operations with oil fuel bunkers and the relevant regulations is included in both deck and engineer officer certification to augment the experiential learning that occurs naturally during on-board service: neither form of training is available for gas as fuel at present. Training Gas Ships For service in gas ships STCW 95 requires advanced training leading to the issue of a tanker endorsement for all personnel who have ... immediate responsibility for loading, discharging and care in transit or handling of cargo ... (IMO, 1993); however it is not uncommon to find on LNG ships that many more than just the specified officers (Master, C/E/O, ChOff, 2/E/O, Cargo Eng. for example) have completed this training. For issue of a Tanker Endorsement (Liquefied Gas) it is necessary that those concerned receive training in handling all the gases covered by the IGC code, and there are over 30 at present. Training for those on non-gas ships using gas as fuel will obviously not need to cover all of these, but I see no reason for it to be less detailed in respect of those gases that are proposed for use as fuel. Draft IGF So, what does the draft IGF code say? When I first read it the proposal was that: ... crew members with direct responsibility for the operation of gas-related equipment on board should receive special training. The company should document that the personnel have acquired the necessary knowledge, and that this knowledge is maintained at all times. (IMO, 2009) The code then outlines the training requirements: firstly for all members of the operational crew, who should receive basic safety training, which was designated Category A. Specialised Training Following category A training comes categories B and C training for deck and engineer officers respectively. What constituted this training would be decided by the Master and Company, who would arrange the training level: based on an evaluation of the concerned crew members job instructions/area of responsibility on board. (IMO, 2009)

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With all due respect I would question the competence of, for example, a container ship operating company, in consultation with its Masters, to reach a realistic and informed decision without specialised training themselves which receives no mention. If retained, this wording could also potentially lead to different training being required when an officer moved from one ship to another, even in the same fleet, depending on the individual Master! A less than satisfactory solution, and very ship specific rather than generic. Training Delivery There is also the matter of the delivery of the training; training leading to issue of a Tanker Endorsement must be carried out in accordance with the requirements of STCW which includes recommendations on the qualifications and experience of instructors; this type of training must be approved by the flag state issuing the seafarers qualifications, so in the UK this is the MCA. The draft IGF suggested that training should be carried out by: suppliers of equipment or other specialists with in-depth knowledge of the gas in question and the technical gas systems that are in use on board (IMO, 2009) This would presuppose repeat training every time a new or different system was encountered, and equipment suppliers with competent training departments. There is no mention of assessment. Training: Draft IGF So, to summarise, the draft IGF left training requirements to the Company and the Master; one having budgetary constraints as a major influence, the other with little enough time already. With the best intentions in the world, neither is likely to possess the requisite experience to make an informed judgement, so I would venture to suggest that a global solution is required, not a ship-specific one such as the current proposal. Many equipment suppliers admit that their training package, should it exist, is concentrated totally on their own equipment rather than the entirety of an installation, and this may not necessarily include generic safety training for the product handled. There is no clearly defined requirement as to breadth or depth of training, nor an identified requirement for assessment. Training Seafarers Only? As well as training seafarers I believe that there is also a good argument for mandatory training for operating company superintendents and procurement staff, agents, port personnel and so on to ensure that errors that may be costly in terms of injury to personnel or damage to assets can be avoided. I would argue that if a vessel designed to operate on LPG fuel at a minimum temperature of 42C was supplied with LNG at 160C the results could be somewhat more catastrophic than loading 460cSt fuel into a ship designed to run on 180cSt, or to ISO specification RMK380 rather than RMG380. This will become especially important as different containment systems having different limitations are developed. Assessment I have mentioned assessment several times, and you may ask why? Most education and training professionals agree that any teaching and learning experience requires assessment in order to support the learning, demonstrate that learning has taken place and inform the development of the process leading to the learning experience. Here are some comments by teaching and learning experts: - 16

 ... assessment is an integral component of the teaching and learning system and ...to be effective assessment should be valid, reliable and fair (Wakeford, 2003) Assessment should ... require an active demonstration of the knowledge in question (Biggs, 2003) Assessment can and should support student learning in a number of ways (MacDonald, 2008) Put simply, without assessment how can we be certain that the teaching is effective and that learning has occurred? Training: Summary I was concerned when I first read the IGF Code proposals regarding training as I questioned whether or not they had definition, transparency, or were robust enough to promote safe operation. I also felt that there was little evidence of accountability or comparability between suppliers in other words the proposal as it stood was unacceptable. The final decision on this is yet to be taken; one current suggestion is that the IGF code is not the rightful place for training requirements, rather that these should be in STCW, which I believe is a fair comment. However, if that idea was to be carried, it could well be at least another two years before any regulation is in place following adoption of the IGF code, and a lot could happen in the interim period. OUTCOMES? Remembering that LNG is viewed by many outside the industry as highly dangerous my fear is that, without training backed up by adequate and robust regulation and direction, there will, inevitably, be an incident resulting in loss of life or assets that could easily elicit a disproportionate political response leading to imposition of unworkable requirements that totally disregard the standards current in LNG ships. This could even compromise the existing safety record of LNG ships if decisions are taken by those who are uninformed, badly informed or have purely political gain as motive. An example of this relates to the steering gear regulations for tankers that followed the Amoco Cadiz grounding in 1978: despite the official flag-state enquiry identifying the main cause of the steering gear failure that led to the incident as incorrect procedures regarding the bolting of hydraulic flanges, regulations were established for redundancy, alarms and auto-change-over for tanker steering gears. The first vessel I sailed on that fully complied with the new regulations had such a complex system that it was easy for a bridge watch-keeper who failed to follow the motor change-over procedure exactly to end up with no operational steering at all until the duty engineer had been called to reset and restart the system; a somewhat disconcerting experience when transiting the Dover Strait. CONCLUSION: PREVENTION IS BETTER THAN CURE I believe that all maritime industry professionals have a responsibility to ensure that all of those who may be involved in the operation of non-gas ships using gas as fuel in the future receive appropriate, assessed, training; the regulation governing this should will need to start in the IGF code, and should be based on the current proven training required for service on gas ships, but restricted to the products concerned. David Cusdin was posthumously awarded the Merchant Navy medal in 2011, partly for services to marine engineering and partly for his charity work; if economic grounds are allowed to outweigh technical safety in the design, development, and operation of future gas- 17

fuelled merchant ships, then when we reflect, in 10 years time, on the use of gas as fuel in non-gas ships I consider it doubtful that we will be echoing his words regarding a Marine Engineering success story, which will be a sad reflection on the way the technical management of ship operations and safety has been eclipsed by relatively uninformed economics. BIBLIOGRAPHY Biggs, J. (2003) Teaching for quality learning at university, Open University Press, Maidenhead Campion, A. (2011) Fuel gas on non-gas ships, In: Proceedings of Gastech 2011, Amsterdam, March 2011 Cusdin, D.R. (1997) The development of liquefied natural gas carriers a marine engineering success, London, IMarEST IMarEST: MER & Shipping World & Shipbuilder, various editions IMO (1993) International code for the construction and equipment of ships carrying liquefied gases in bulk, Second Edition, London, IMO IMO (1996) International standards for training certification & watchkeeping for seafarers 1978 as amended 1995, London, IMO IMO (2009) MSC.285(86) including draft code on safety for gas fuelled ships, London, IMO MacDonald (2008) Blended learning and online tutoring, Gower, Aldershot McGuire and White (1986) Liquefied gas handling principles on ships and in terminals, London, SIGTTO/Witherby Nautilus International, Telegraph volume 44, edition 11, December 2011 Riviera Maritime Media LNG world shipping, Various editions Tradewinds shipping news, various editions, including lngunlimited.com Vaudalon, A. (2000) Liquefied gases marine transportation & storage, London, Witherby Wakeford, R. (2003) In: A handbook for teaching & learning in higher education (Eds: Fry, H., Ketteridge, S., Marshall, S.,) RoutledgeFalmer, London Woodward J. & Pitblado R. (2010) LNG risk based safety, Hoboken, Wiley/ AIChE www.coltoncompany.com www.dnv.com www.imo.org www.lloydslist.com www.SIGTTO.org www.wartsila.com About the Author Alan Campion joined Warsash Maritime Academy as a Senior Lecturer in 2004 where his specialist area is safe and efficient cargo management on gas tankers. This followed 35 years working deep sea as a Marine Engineer, starting out as an apprentice on passenger ships before an early move into tankers initially crude oil and products, but later (and for a total of over 25 years) on to gas ships, both LNG and LPG, much of the time as Chief Engineer Officer. As well as normal work onboard, he has also spent time in various company offices involved with docking specifications and new-building projects as well as work on early ISM initiatives.

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