CHAPTER VII

Katarungang Pambarangay

Section 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. -

(a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, hereinafter

referred to as the lupon, composed of the punong barangay, as chairman and ten (10) to
twenty (20) members. The lupon shall be constituted every three (3) years in the manner
provided herein.

(b) Any person actually residing or working, in the barangay, not otherwise expressly
disqualified by law, and possessing integrity, impartiality, independence of mind, sense
of fairness, and reputation for probity, may be appointed a member of the lupon.

(c) A notice to constitute the lupon, which shall include the names of proposed members
who have expressed their willingness to serve, shall be prepared by the punong
barangay within the first fifteen (15) days from the start of his term of office. Such notice
shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay continuously for a period
of not less than three (3) weeks;

(d) The punong barangay, taking into consideration any opposition to the proposed
appointment or any recommendations for appointment as may have been made within
the period of posting, shall within ten (10) days thereafter, appoint as members those
whom he determines to be suitable therefor. Appointments shall be in writing, signed by
the punong barangay, and attested to by the barangay secretary.

(e) The list of appointed members shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous places in the
barangay for the entire duration of their term of office; and

(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous cultural
communities, local systems of settling disputes through their councils of datus or elders
shall be recognized without prejudice to the applicable provisions of this Code.

Section 400. Oath and Term of Office. - Upon appointment, each lupon member shall take an
oath of office before the punong barangay. He shall hold office until a new lupon is constituted
on the third year following his appointment unless sooner terminated by resignation, transfer of
residence or place of work, or withdrawal of appointment by the punong barangay with the
concurrence of the majority of all the members of the lupon.

Section 401. Vacancies. - Should a vacancy occur in the lupon for any cause, the punong
barangay shall immediately appoint a qualified person who shall hold office only for the
unexpired portion of the term.

Section 402. Functions of the Lupon. - The lupon shall:

(a) Exercise administrative supervision over the conciliation panels provided herein;

(b) Meet regularly once a month to provide a forum for exchange of ideas among its
members and the public on matters relevant to the amicable settlement of disputes, and
 to enable various conciliation panel members to share with one another their
observations and experiences in effecting speedy resolution of disputes; and

(c) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be
prescribed by law or ordinance.

Section 403. Secretary of the Lupon. - The barangay secretary shall concurrently serve as the
secretary of the lupon. He shall record the results of mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay and shall submit a report thereon to the proper city or municipal courts. He shall also
receive and keep the records of proceedings submitted to him by the various conciliation
panels.

Section 404. Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. -

(a) There shall be constituted for each dispute brought before the lupon a conciliation
panel to be known as the pangkat ng tagapagkasundo, hereinafter referred to as the
pangkat, consisting of three (3) members who shall be chosen by the parties to the
dispute from the list of members of the lupon.

Should the parties fail to agree on the pangkat membership, the same shall be
determined by lots drawn by the lupon chairman.

(b) The three (3) members constituting the pangkat shall elect from among themselves
the chairman and the secretary. The secretary shall prepare the minutes of the pangkat
proceedings and submit a copy duly attested to by the chairman to the lupon secretary
and to the proper city or municipal court. He shall issue and cause to be served notices
to the parties concerned.

The lupon secretary shall issue certified true copies of any public record in his custody
that is not by law otherwise declared confidential.

Section 405. Vacancies in the Pangkat. - Any vacancy in the pangkat shall be chosen by the
parties to the dispute from among the other lupon members. Should the parties fail to agree on
a common choice, the vacancy shall be filled by lot to be drawn by the lupon chairman.

Section 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members. -

(a) The lupon members, while in the performance of their official duties or on the
occasion thereof, shall be deemed as persons in authority, as defined in the Revised
Penal Code.

(b) The lupon or pangkat members shall serve without compensation, except as
provided for in Section 393 and without prejudice to incentives as provided for in this
Section and in Book IV of this Code. The Department of the Interior and Local
Government shall provide for a system of granting economic or other incentives to the
lupon or pangkat members who adequately demonstrate the ability to judiciously and
expeditiously resolve cases referred to them. While in the performance of their duties,
the lupon or pangkat members, whether in public or private employment, shall be
deemed to be on official time, and shall not suffer from any diminution in compensation
or allowance from said employment by reason thereof.
Section 407. Legal Advice on Matters Involving Questions of Law. - The provincial, city legal
officer or prosecutor or the municipal legal officer shall render legal advice on matters involving
questions of law to the punong barangay or any lupon or pangkat member whenever necessary
in the exercise of his functions in the administration of the katarungang pambarangay.

Section 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. - The lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding
Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
Justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under
this Code are filed may, at any time before trial motu propio refer the case to the lupon
concerned for amicable settlement.

Section 409. Venue. -

(a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought
for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay.

(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the
respondents actually resides, at the election of the complaint.

(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay
where such workplace or institution is located.
 Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may
confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be
submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated representative, whose ruling
thereon shall be binding.

Section 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. -

(a) Who may initiate proceeding - Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee, any
individual who has a cause of action against another individual involving any matter
within the authority of the lupon may complain, orally or in writing, to the lupon chairman
of the barangay.

(b) Mediation by lupon chairman - Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman
shall within the next working day summon the respondent(s), with notice to the
complainant(s) for them and their witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their
conflicting interests. If he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first
meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the
pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses - While the dispute is under mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action
under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing the complaint with the punong
barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the
complainant or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by
the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not
exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.

(d) Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for disqualification - The pangkat shall
convene not later than three (3) days from its constitution, on the day and hour set by
the lupon chairman, to hear both parties and their witnesses, simplify issues, and
explore all possibilities for amicable settlement. For this purpose, the pangkat may issue
summons for the personal appearance of parties and witnesses before it. In the event
that a party moves to disqualify any member of the pangkat by reason of relationship,
bias, interest, or any other similar grounds discovered after the constitution of the
pangkat, the matter shall be resolved by the affirmative vote of the majority of the
pangkat whose decision shall be final. Should disqualification be decided upon, the
resulting vacancy shall be filled as herein provided for.

(e) Period to arrive at a settlement - The pangkat shall arrive at a settlement or

resolution of the dispute within fifteen (15) days from the day it convenes in accordance
with this section. This period shall, at the discretion of the pangkat, be extendible for
another period which shall not exceed fifteen (15) days, except in clearly meritorious
cases.

Section 411. Form of settlement. - All amicable settlements shall be in writing, in a language or
dialect known to the parties, signed by them, and attested to by the lupon chairman or the
pangkat chairman, as the case may be. When the parties to the dispute do not use the same
language or dialect, the settlement shall be written in the language known to them.
Section 412. Conciliation. -

(a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. - No complaint, petition, action, or

proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or
instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there
has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat,
and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless
the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

(b) Where Parties May Go Directly to Court. - The parties may go directly to court in the
following instances:

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for
habeas corpus proceedings;

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite;
and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.

(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. - The customs and
traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes
between members of the cultural communities.

Section 413. Arbitration. -

(a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing that they shall
abide by the arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat. Such agreement to
arbitrate may be repudiated within five (5) days from the date thereof for the same
grounds and in accordance with the procedure hereinafter prescribed. The arbitration
award shall be made after the lapse of the period for repudiation and within ten (10) days
thereafter.

(b) The arbitration award shall be in writing in a language or dialect known to the parties.
When the parties to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the award shall
be written in the language or dialect known to them.

Section 414. Proceedings Open to the Public; Exception. - All proceedings for settlement shall
be public and informal: Provided, however, That the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman,
as the case may be, may motu proprio or upon request of a party, exclude the public from the
proceedings in the interest of privacy, decency, or public morals.

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings,

the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except
for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.
Section 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award. - The amicable settlement
and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the
expiration of ten (10) days from the date thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been
made or a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court.

However, this provision shall not apply to court cases settled by the lupon under the last
paragraph of Section 408 of this Code, in which case the compromise or the pangkat chairman
shall be submitted to the court and upon approval thereof, have the force and effect of a
judgment of said court.

Section 417. Execution. - The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by
execution by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of
such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.

Section 418. Repudiation. - Any party to the dispute may, within ten (10) days from the date of
the settlement, repudiate the same by filing with the lupon chairman a statement to that effect
sworn to before him, where the consent is vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation. Such
repudiation shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of the certification for filing a complaint as
hereinabove provided.

Section 419. Transmittal of Settlement and Arbitration. - Award to the Court. - The secretary of
the lupon shall transmit the settlement or the arbitration award to the appropriate city or
municipal court within five (5) days from the date of the award or from the lapse of the ten-day
period repudiating the settlement and shall furnish copies thereof to each of the parties to the
settlement and the lupon chairman.

Section 420. Power to Administer Oaths. - The punong barangay, as chairman of the lupong
tagapamayapa, and the members of the pangkat are hereby authorized to administer oaths in
connection with any matter relating to all proceedings in the implementation of the katarungang
pambarangay.

Section 421. Administration; Rules and Regulations. - The city or municipal mayor, as the case
may be, shall see to the efficient and effective implementation and administration of the
katarungang pambarangay. The Secretary of Justice shall promulgate the rules and regulations
necessary to implement this Chapter.

Section 422. Appropriations. - Such amount as may be necessary for the effective
implementation of the katarungang pambarangay shall be provided for in the annual budget of
the city or municipality concerned.
 ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 14-93

TO: ALL REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
SUBJECT: GUIDELINES ON THE KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY
CONCILIATION PROCEDURE TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION OF THE
REVISED KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW [SECTIONS 399-422,
CHAPTER VII, TITLE I, BOOK III, R. A. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991].

The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R. A. 7160, otherwise known as

the Local Government Code of 1991, effective on January 1, 1992 and which
repealed P. D. 1508, introduced substantial changes not only in the authority
granted to the Lupong Tagapamayapa but also in the procedure to be observed in
the settlement of disputes within the authority of the Lupon.cralaw

In order that the laudable purpose of the law may not be subverted and its
effectiveness undermined by indiscriminate, improper and/or premature issuance of
certifications to file actions in court by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretaries, attested
by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairmen, respectively, the following guidelines are hereby
issued for the information of trial court judges in cases brought before them coming
from the Barangays:chanrobles virtual law library

I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised

Katarungang Pambarangay Law [formerly P. D. 1508, repealed and now replaced
by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991], and prior recourse
thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government
offices, except in the following disputes:chanrobles virtual law library
[1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
[3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and
municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree to submit their difference to
amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
[4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities,
since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as
complainants or respondents [Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules];
[5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
Lupon;
[6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment
exceeding one [1] year or a fine of over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
[7] Offenses where there is no private offended party;
[8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being
committed or further continued, specifically the following:chanrobles virtual law
library

[a] Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention [See Sec.
412 (b) (1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law];
[b] Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his rightful custody
over another or a person illegally deprived of or on acting in his behalf;
[c] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property and support during the pendency of the
action; and cralaw
[d] Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

[9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice;
[10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) [Secs. 46 & 47, R. A. 6657];
[11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations
[Montoya vs. Escayo, et al., 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended,
which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over conciliation and mediation of
disputes, grievances or problems to certain offices of the Department of Labor and
Employment];
[12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in
court [See Sanchez vs. Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459].cralaw

II. Under the provisions of R. A. 7160 on Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation, as

implemented by the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of Justice, the certification for filing a complaint in court or any
government office shall be issued by Barangay authorities only upon compliance
with the following requirements:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[1] Issued by the Lupon Secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman (Punong
Barangay), certifying that a confrontation of the parties has taken place and that a
conciliation settlement has been reached, but the same has been subsequently
repudiated (Sec. 412, Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 2[h], Rule III,
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);
[2] Issued by the Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Pangkat Chairman
certifying that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[a] a confrontation of the parties took place but no conciliation/settlement has been
reached (Sec. 4[f], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); or
[b] that no personal confrontation took place before the Pangkat through no fault of
the complainant (Sec. 4[f], Rule III, Katarungang pambarangay Rules).

[3] Issued by the Punong Barangay as requested by the proper party on the ground
of failure of settlement where the dispute involves members of the same indigenous
cultural community, which shall be settled in accordance with the customs and
traditions of that particular cultural community, or where one or more of the parties
to the aforesaid dispute belong to the minority and the parties mutually agreed to
submit their dispute to the indigenous system of amicable settlement, and there
has been no settlement as certified by the datu or tribal leader or elder to the
Punong Barangay of place of settlement (Secs. 1,4 & 5, Rule IX, Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules); and
[4] If mediation or conciliation efforts before the Punong Barangay proved
unsuccessful, there having been no agreement to arbitrate (Sec. 410 [b], Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 1, c. (1), Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules), or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation proceeding before
the Punong Barangay (3rd par. Sec. 8, a, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules), the Punong Barangay shall not cause the issuance at this stage of a
certification to file action, because it is now mandatory for him to constitute the
Pangkat before whom mediation, conciliation, or arbitration proceedings shall be
held.

III. All complaints and/or informations filed or raffled to your sala/branch of the
Regional Trial Court shall be carefully read and scrutinized to determine if there has
been compliance with prior Barangay conciliation procedure under the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations as a
pre-condition to judicial action, particularly whether the certification to file action
attached to the records of the case comply with the requirements hereinabove
enumerated in Par. II;

IV. A case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation which is
a pre-condition for formal adjudication (Sec. 412 [a] of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law) may be dismissed upon motion of defendant/s, not for lack of
jurisdiction of the court but for failure to state a cause of action or prematurity
(Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470; Gonzales vs. CA, 151 SCRA 289), or the court
may suspend proceedings upon petition of any party under Sec. 1, Rule 21 of the
Rules of Court; and refer the case motu proprio to the appropriate Barangay
authority applying by analogy Sec. 408 [g], 2nd par., of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law which reads as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
"The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the Lupon
under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer case to
the Lupon concerned for amicable settlement.
Strict observance of these guidelines is enjoined. This Administrative Circular shall
be effective immediately.
Manila, Philippines; July 15, 1993.

CASE DIGESTS

NAVALES V ABAYA
Facts: Last July 27, 2003 more than 300 junior officers and enlisted men mostly from the elite units of the AFP quietly entered
the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier
Apartments (Oakwood). The soldiers then made a statement through ABS-CBN News network that they went to Oakwood to air
their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo such as graft and corruption in the military,
sale of arms and ammunition to the enemies of the State, etc. They declared the withdrawal of support from the chain of
command and demanded the resignation of key civilian
and military leaders of the Arroyo administration. After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the Government team
led by Ambassador Cimatu an agreement was forged between the two groups.
Subsequently DOJ charged the 3221 soldiers who took part in the Oakwood incident with violation of Article 134- A coup d
etat of the RPC. Thereafter several of the accused filed in the RTC (branch 61) an Omnibus Motion praying that the RTC assume
jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military tribunal. While such motion was pending, DOJ issued a Resolution finding
probable cause for coup d etat against only 31 of the original 321 accused and the charges against them were dismissed. RTC
(branch 61) admitted the Amended Information charging only 31 of the original accused with the crime of coup d etat defined
under Article 134-A of the RPC. However, 1Lt. Navales, et. al who were earlier dropped as accused in the crime of coup d etat
were charged before the General Court Martial with violations of the Articles of War. At this point the RTC acted on the
Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the original accused declaring the petition for the court assume jurisdiction over all charges
filed before the military court and requiring the prosecution to produce evidence to establish probable cause as MOOT AND
ACADEMIC. Furthermore, it declared that all the charges before the court-martial against the accused are hereby declared NOT
SERVICE CONNECTED BUT IS ABSORBED AND IN FURTHERANCE TO THE ALLEGED CRIME OF COUP DETAT. March 1, 2004, the
General Court-martial has set the arraignment/trial of those charged with violations of the Articles of War. Petitions for the
issuance of temporary restraining order were filed and the court directed that parties to observe the status quo prevail before
the filing of the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.
Ruling: No. The Order of the RTC declaring that all the charges before the court-martial against accused were not service-
connected but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d etat, cannot be given effect. When RTC resolved the
Omnibus Motion to assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal had already been rendered moot
and academic when the RTC accepted the Amended Information under which only 31 of the accused were charged and
dismissing the case as against the other 290. It has become moot against those charges that were dismissed. However in said
order it further declared that all the charges before the court-martial against the accused and former accused are not service-
connected, believing that the crimes defined in and penalized by the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup
detat and thus absorbed by the said crime. Thus, insofar as those whose case against them was dismissed, there was nothing
left to be resolved after the Omnibus Motion was considered moot and academic. This dismissal made the petitioners no longer
parties to the case and no further relief could be granted to them. 1Lt Navales, et al. since they are strangers to the proceedings
in the criminal case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court, thus they cannot find solace in the declaration of
the RTC that the charges filed against them before the General Court-Martial were not service connected.
In view of the clear mandate of RA 7055 that military courts have jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to
70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered service connected crimes. It even
mandates that it should be tried by the court martial. The RTC thus has no legal basis to rule that the violation of the following
Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup d etat and as such absorbed by the latter crime. In making such a
declaration the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and is NULL AND VOID. The writs of prohibition and habeas corpus
prayed for by the petitioners must fail. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by a court with jurisdiction and that the writ should
not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body. Thus, the rules
apply to petitioners who were detained under Commitment Order issued by the Chief of Staff of the AFP. On the other hand,
the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. In this case, the General Court Martial has jurisdiction over
the charges filed against 1Lt. Navales, et. al under RA 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from exercising
its jurisdiction.
Cubero vs Laguna West
Facts: Cubero along with some other folks enter into a JVA with Belle Corp to develop severalhectares of CARP land owned by
Cubero and folks in Tanuan Batangas. Upon learning of thisdeal, Laguna West files 9 ex parte motions to have
adverse claims attached on the subjectlots, claiming that LW had a prior JVA with the predecessors in interest of Cubero
and folksand that these same JVA's were registered as adverse claims over the previous titles of thesubjects lots. Belle for
its part alleges that the JVA between LW and the predecessors ininterest are void ab initio since they
were executed within the 10 year prohibitory periodunder RA 6657 (CAR law of '88). RTC dismisses the
case, holding that the matter must be brought before the DARAB first since it involves a question over
which DARAB has primary jurisdiction. The MR is rejected hence the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Does DARAB have original jurisdiction over this matter?
Held: Yes. In the recent case of Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries Multi-
P u r p o s e Cooperative Development, Inc. v. Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corp.,23 this Courtelucidated on the
scope of an agrarian dispute, viz:The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with primary jurisdiction
to determineand adjudicate agrarian reform matters, with exclusive original jurisdiction over all mattersinvolving the
implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Environment
and NaturalResources.T h e D e p a r t m e n t o f A g r a r i a n R e f o r m A d j u d i c a t i o n B o a r d ( D A R A B ) h
as jurisdiction todetermine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the i
m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Included in the definition of agrarian
disputesare those arising from other tenurial arrangements beyond the traditional landowner-tenantor lessor-lessee
relationship. Expressly, these arrangements are recognized by Republic
ActN o . 6 6 5 7 a s e s s e n t i a l p a r t s o f a g r a r i a n r e f o r m . T h u s , t h e D A R A B h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r disp
utes arising from the instant Joint Production Agreement entered into by the presentparties.I n c a s e s
w h e r e a l l e g a t i o n s o f v i o l a t i o n o r c i r c u m v e n t i o n o f l a n d r e f o r m l a w s h a v e b e e n raised, this
Court has declined to address them, it stating that petitioners must first pleadtheir case with the DARAB. There
is no reason why this Court should now hold otherwise
AQUINO VS AURE

FACTS: Aure Lending filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino. In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that
they acquiredthe subject property from a Deed of Sale. Aquino countered that the Complaint lacks cause of action for Aure and
Aure Lending do not have any legal right over the subjectproperty.MeTC rendered in favor of Aquino and dismissed the
Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance withthe barangay conciliation process, among other
grounds. Te MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no showing that any attempt
has been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay
level.RTC affirmedCA reversed the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding the case to the MeTC for further proceedings and
final determination of the substantive rights of the parties.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IS AJURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT WARRANTS THE
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT.
HELD: NOThere is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before
Aure and AureLending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of such barangay conciliation proceedings was
made in Aure and Aure Lendings Complaint before the MeTC.It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with
the requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5
of Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced bynon-exhaustion of administrative remedies -- the
complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the controversythere alleged is not ripe for judicial
determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
Nevertheless, theconciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the
jurisdictionwhich the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court
:Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
causeof action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity;
but the same wouldnot prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case
before it, where thedefendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and
even during the entireproceedings a quo .While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction
over the case by seasonably taking exceptionthereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer
and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, theyparticipated in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent
Planas.
Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now beallowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking
the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submittedthemselves voluntarily.
x x x (Emphasis supplied.)Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as
these allegations demonstratea cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Thisprinciple holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus
alleged, in which instance the court-- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of
evidence. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the question of possession cannot be resolved
withoutdeciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Onits face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment
caseswhich likewise involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue
of ownership in ejectment suits has been thus conferred on the inferior courts.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED
The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 October 2001 and itsResolution dated 8 May 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby
AFFIRMED . Costs against the petitioner.

PALOMA vs MORA
G.R. No. 157783 September 23, 2005470 SCRA 711

Facts: Petitioner was terminated from his appointment as General Manager of the Palompon, LeyteWater District. By reason thereof,
petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with prayer to be restored tohis former position and for preliminary injunction with damages before
the RTC. Unable to obtain afavorable ruling with the RTC, petitioner filed a complaint with the Civil Service Commission
for alleged Violation of Civil Service Law and Rules and for Illegal Dismissal. The CSC, however,dismissed the
petition for lack of merit, which was likewise affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issues: I. Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the Board of Directors of Palompon, LeyteWater District to reinstate the General
Manager thereof II. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has primary jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal of petitioner
Held: I. No. Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District to reinstate
petitioner because the Board has the discretionary power to remove him under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. No.
768.Moreover, Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus. ' When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or personunlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy inthe ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding therespondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to bedone to protect the rights of the petitioner and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner byreason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not tocompel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review theexercise of discretion of a public officer
where the law imposes upon said public officer the right andduty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.II. Yes.
As a general rule, no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law as provided in Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the 1987Constitution. As exception to this, P.D. No. 198, a special
enabling charter of Local Water Districts,categorically provides that the General Manager shall serve 'at the pleasure of the
board.Water districts are government instrumentalities and their employees belong to the civilservice. Thus, the
hiring and firing of employees of government-owned or controlled corporations aregoverned by the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations.In
cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannotarrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodgedwith an administrative body of special competence. Quasi-judicial
bodies like the CSC are better-equipped in handling cases involving the employment status of employees as those in the Civil Servicesince it is within
the field of their expertise. This is consistent with the powers and functions of theCSC, being the central personnel agency of
the Government, to carry into effect the provisions of theCivil Service Law and other pertinent laws, including, in this case, P.D. No. 198

Cang vs Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three children. During the early
years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed.
Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie
subsequently filed a petition for legal separation which was granted. They had an agreement for support of the
children and that Anna Marie can enter into agreements without the written consent of Herbert. Petitioner left for the
US. Meanwhile, the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children. Upon
learning of the adoption, Herbert went back to the Philippines to contest it, but the petition for adoption was granted
by the court.

Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the
latter has abandoned them?
Held: Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory
provision on consent for adoption now reads: Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be
necessary: (2)the parents by nature of the chil, the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality.Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written
consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. As clearly inferred from the
foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensablefor the validity of the decree of
adoption. Nevertheless, therequirement of written consent can be dispensed with if theparent has abandoned the
child or that such parent is "insaneor hopelessly intemperate."In the instant case, records disclose
that petitioner'sconduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego allparental duties and relinquish all parental claim
s over hischildren as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in
the United States, he was not remissin his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children.
He maintained regular communication with hiswife and children through letters and telephone. He used tosend
packages by mail and catered to their whim.