1.

According to the the McKinsey report, the first helicopter

arrived at 8:52. The commission says the helicopter (called
Aviation 14) arrived at 8:58. All we want to know is how the
commission went about determining that time.

Review of Aviation Unit Flight Data Sheet shows 2 helicopters takeoff

from Floyd Bennett Field in Bklyn at 08:50hrs. Then a review of the SOD
radio tapes revealed the following.

08:58:30 Aviation 14 Be advised that we are 84 at this time we have people falling
out of the building at this time. It looks like all 4 sides are cut open. A lot of
flames we are going to be landing at the downtown heliport as soon as
emergency services are 84.1 don't believe at this time that we are going to be
able to land on the roof, central it's too engulfed in flames.
Central 10-4. (Radio code 10-84 or 84 to arrive at scene.)

2. Similarly, the McKinsey report has the first NYPD emergency

service unit, Truck 1, arriving at 8:52. The 9-11 Commission has
the time as 8:56. Again, what is the basis for which this time
determination was made.

Review of SOD radio tapes shows the following.

08:54:10 Unk Any 1 trucks at the scene.

Central Any 1 trucks available at the scene, at this time, any 1 trucks 84 at
the scene
Truck 1.... Was about 1 minuet out

08:56:22 Unk Adam/Boy is 84 central; we are going to go to Tack 2

Central 10-4 I have all available ESU responding there aviation and all
specialty units. Responding out their right now plus EMS, FD and everyone
else.
 August 19, 2002

RESCUE
On 9/11, the NYPD rescue function consisted of three primary components:
the rescue of civilians from inside the towers prior to the building collapses,
the post-collapse search for survivors, and the evacuation of civilians from
southern Manhattan. We found that the Department performed the pre-
collapse rescue and evacuation of civilians effectively; however, the post-
collapse search for survivors proved extremely risky given the lack of
equipment, training, and supervision among the hundreds of responders.

Tasks Assessment

• Pre-collapse rescue of civilians ESU and other first responders responded to site at 0852 hours and
in and around WTC effectively carried out rescue operations in WTC complex
- 5 ESU teams deployed into buildings and plaza; sixth team prepared for
helicopter rescue (which was ultimately deemed impossible)
- 40 ESU personnel on site prior to collapse of WTC2
- Many non-ESU MOS also assisted in pre-collapse rescue
Department demonstrated strong discipline, evidenced by measured
response
Post-collapse Hundreds of untrained, under-equipped, and unsupervised MOS (both on-
search for and and off-duty) formed bucket brigades on site which, while admirable,
rescue of survivors exposed large numbers to high level of risk
Estimated 600-700 NYPD officers searched for survivors each day for
several weeks following attacks
• Evacuation of all Thousands of civilians calmly and rapidly evacuated northwards, across
non-emergency personnel from bridges and by Harbor Unit boats and other vessels
southern Manhattan - As many as 5,000 civilians evacuated by Harbor Unit to New Jersey
and Staten Island

15
 August 19, 2002

CHRONOLOGY (1)
08:46 08:55 09:02
• 08:46 Right AA11
Events crashes into WTC1
between 85th and 90th
floors
• 08:52 Aviation 14 arrives * NYPD begins • 08:56 ESU sends team • 08:59 First
Rescue at scene and examines evacuating civilians to meet helicopters for ESU team
possibility ol roof rescue from WTC area possible roof rescue enters WTC1
* Main highways in lower • HOV lanes of major routes to
Transportation Manhattan closed except to lower Manhattan designated
emergency vehicles emergency vehicles only

Site security

Investigation

• 08:54 PAPD notified to

Citywide security shut down all PATH
tunnels and trains
* 08:52 Truck 1 establishes • Chief of Dept. * First Deputy Comm.
Operational ESU CP at Church/Vesey (CoD) arrives at (FDC) arrives at
command Church/Vesey Church/Vesey

* 30 extra Metrotech staff assigned to • 09:00 ESU ordered

911 calls. Many calls are received to go to Tactical
Communications from people trapped in WTC Channel 'G'

• 08:47 Level 1 mobilization • 08:54 All ESU units • 08:58 CoD • 09:01 1st and 5m Pet. XOs
called; Level 3 mobilization advised to respond calls Level 4 advise new mobilization
Personnel called 8 seconds later to Church/Vesey mobilization point at Vesey/West

• Responding ESU
Logistics/ units bring rescue
equipment equipment to WTC

Intelligence

Source: NYPD transcnpts; Operations log; McKinsey interviews; media reports 48

August 19, 2002

CHRONOLOGY (1)
08:46 08:55 09:02
• 08:46 Flight AA1 1
Events crashes into WTC1
between 85th and 90th
floors
• 08:52 Aviation 14 arrives • NYPD begins • 08:56 ESU sends team • 08:59 First
Rescue at scene and examines evacuating civilians to meet helicopters for ESU team
possibility of roof rescue from WTC area possible roof rescue enters WTC1
• Main highways in lower • HOV lanes of major routes to
Transportation Manhattan closed except to lower Manhattan designated
emergency vehicles emergency vehicles only

Site security

Investigation

• 08:54 PAPD notified to

Citywide security shut down all PATH
tunnels and trains
• 08:52 Truck 1 establishes • Chief ol Dept. • First Deputy Comm.
Operational ESU CP at Church/Vesey (CoD) arrives at (FDC) arrives at
command Church/Vesey Church/Vesey

• 30 extra Metrotech staff assigned to • 09:00 ESU ordered

91 1 calls. Many calls are received to go to Tactical
Communications from people trapped in WTC Channel 'G'

• 08:47 Level 1 mobilization • 08:54 All ESU units • 08:58 CoO • 09:01 1st and 5" Pet. XOs
called; Level 3 mobilization advised to respond calls Level 4 advise new mobilization
Personnel called 8 seconds later to Church/Vesey mobilization point at Vesey/West

• Responding ESU
Logistics/ units bring rescue
equipment equipment to WTC

Intelligence

Source: NYPD transcripts; Operations log; McKinsey interviews; media reports 48

LEXIS®-NEXIS® View Printable Page Page 1 of3

LexisNexis'

Copyright 2004 Newsday, Inc.

Newsday (New York)

May 23, 2004 Sunday

CITY EDITION

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. A02

LENGTH: 904 words

HEADLINE: When silence is deadly

BYLINE: JIMMY BRESLIN

BODY:

The five central communications offices are located in parks. The idea is to keep them isolated," the Fire
Department communications man was explaining.

"I know the dispatch center on Woodhaven Boulevard," I said.

"Woodhaven and Park Lane," he said. "That's a big difference from Giuliani's command center at 7
World Trade Center. Sure it blew up. I guess it was a real estate deal that put it there. Over a million in
rent. That had to be the reason. Why would you ever go there otherwise?"

"The commission didn't ask anything about it," I said. "He talked about how he had to walk the streets
looking for a new one. He made it sound like he was alone in the Sahara. They never asked him what
happened to the first command center."

"That's your politicians," my friend said. "I'm glad I've never been around them. What about all that
diesel fuel in the bunker. It came spilling down."

We were talking about the deaths of 343 firefighters at the World Trade Center because they couldn't
hear a police radio from a helicopter advising everybody that the north tower was unstable. Everybody
should get out.

"How did they miss the helicopter call?" I asked.

"Because they didn't use the radio that could let them talk to the police. In each of the five central
communications centers, there is a Motorola Transceiver, which operates on 470.8375 megahertz, used
by special operations such as police aviation. I could've picked it up and talked to the Aviation One up
there over the tower.

http://www.nexis.com/research/search/submitViewTagged 5/25/2004