GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs. RTC OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR.

, PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO

December 18, 1992 (216 SCRA 692)

FACTS: October 25, 2012 Leave a Comment The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.

FACTS: Guerrero and Pedro are brothers in law , their respective wives being sisters. Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.

ISSUE: WON brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family.

HELD: Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word No, the requirement is mandatory 4 that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that *i+f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. No. The court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon 6 that the enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend sisters-inlaw ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.

HELD: The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living together because that was our agreement. It held that a agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse.

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO v. CA and HO HANG a.k.a. JOSE JO, CONSING

September 26, 2012 Leave a Comment The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who declared under oath that she left

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO v. CA and HO HANG a.k.a. JOSE JO, CONSING

Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living together because that was our agreement. It held that a agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse.

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. MAR TIERRA CORP

Under the Art. 128 of Family Code, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse.

September 26, 2012 Leave a Comment

SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. MAR TIERRA CORP, WILFRIDO MARTINEZ, MIGUEL LACSON, and RICARDO LOPA November 29, 2006 (508 SCRA 419)

Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for ones family although able to do so. 5 There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.

FACTS: Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.

The private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent corp and individual respondents.

Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, providing as follows: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:

RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.

Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC decision. Petitioned to SC.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party

which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latters benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.

TODA, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS HELD: No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. September 26, 2012 Leave a Comment

TODA, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS March 26, 1990 (183 SCRA 713)

The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.

FACTS: Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two children. Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, as Civil Case No. 35566, a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno.

In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.

In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under

After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid further disagreeable proceedings, filed on April 1, 1981 a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 9478, which was consolidated with the aforesaid civil case. This petition which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981, embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the said Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP of the Court of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121 of this Court. The said petition and the compromise agreement therein were approved by the trial court in its order of June 9, 1981.

HELD:

We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the compromise agreement became effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved by the trial court, and not on March 30,1981 when it was signed by the parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, 14 (i)n the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval, without which it is void. 15 Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property. ERLINDA A. AGAPAY vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ

Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: WON the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.

HELD: The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.

October 25, 2012 Leave a Comment

FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.

The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda failed to prove that she actually contributed money for the said property, so, the court found no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the

same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.

that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint.

With respect with the house and lot, the transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.

GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the property

October 25, 2012 Leave a Comment

HELD: No. As correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code.

FACTS: Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants. They have demanded several times that the defendants vacate the premises, as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building.

Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. It is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. Art. 148 needs actual contributions. Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez.

Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated

Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any

event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of coownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents.

property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.

EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR. vs. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO

The provisions of Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code, then are no longer material since a trust relation already inheres in a co-ownership which is governed under Title III, Book II of the Civil Code.

October 25, 2012 Leave a Comment

JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA, RTC, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondents name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. October 25, 2012 Leave a Comment

FACTS: Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

ISSUE: Can the parties be considered as co-owners of the properties, under the law, considering the present status of the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each other, even assuming that they lived together as husband and wife

ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties

HELD: it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same

HELD: Family Code, in addition to providing that a coownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money,

married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions Proof of actual contribution is required.

alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio.

Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.

The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code

In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code

HELD: The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.

ALAIN M. DIO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void

October 25, 2012 Leave a Comment

FACTS: January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on coownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, *p+artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.