CIR vs PRIMETOWN

FACTS: On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap (vice chair of PPGI) applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to revenue district officer Parcero, he explained that while PPGIs business was doing good the first quarter, respondent suffered losses that year and so it was entitled to a tax refund. PPGI was required by revenue officer Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim and PPGI complied but its claim was not acted upon. PPGI filed a petition for review in the CTA. However, it was dismissed as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. CTA invoked 229 of the NIRC1. Respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998 and its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code2. Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. Respondents MR was denied. It filed an appeal in the CA and reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year. Petitioners MR was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not PPGI filed its claim within the reglementary period? RULING: YES. CA correctly concluded that respondent filed its petition in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period. However, its basis is not. The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return. APPLICABLE LAWS: Two laws provide for computation of legal periods: (a) Article 13 of the Civil Code and (b) EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 19873. There exists an incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under both laws. However, 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Although 27 (Repealing Clause) of AC1987 did not expressly identify laws to be abolished, the provision impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the AC1987.

 LEGAL PERIODS: (a) YEAR 12 calendar months; (b) CALENDAR MONTH a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain.

TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAO

FACTS: In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American. In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar. Whether or not the divorce and the second marriage of Escao were valid. Whether or not sexual infidelity of Escao may beinvoked by Tenchavez as a ground for legal separation. HELD: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez: His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents.

On the part of Escaos parents: It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only. The Supreme Court held that the divorce is notvalid, making the second marriage void since marriageties of Escao and Tenchaves is existing.Tenchavez can file a petition for legal separationbecause Escao committed sexual infidelity because ofthe fact that she had children with the American.Sexual infidelity of a spouse is one of thegrounds for legal separation.

TAMANO vs ORTIZ
FACTS: Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death. Prior to his death Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites. Private respondent Zorayda, joined by her son, filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent. Zorayda alleged that Tamano never divorced her and that Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with a certain Llave never became final and executory. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the case. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse, hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their marriage. She likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the Shari'a courts pursuant to the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. The RTC of Quezon City denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly cognizable by it since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil

Code, and not exclusively in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The MR was likewise denied, hence, Estrellita filed a petition with the SC seeking to set aside RTC denying her motion to dismiss. The case was referred to the CA. Zorayda and Adib however filed a motion to resolve the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other cases, which the CA granted. The CA ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of Shari'a courts only when filed in places where there are Shari'a courts. But in places where there are no Shari'a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the RTC. Estrellita is now before the SC reiterating her earlier argument that it is the Shari'a court and not the RTC which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. ISSUE: Whether or not the Code of Muslim Personal Laws divests the RTCs of its jurisdiction to try cases regarding Declaration of Nullity of Marriage where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites such as in the case at bar? HELD: NO. Petition is DENIED. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED RATIO: Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, RTCs have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Zorayda and Adib, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration. Nevertheless, the RTC was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the MR that Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. Estrellita argues that the Shari'a courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title, II, PD No. 1083, which provides

Art. 13. Application. (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. (2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply. xxx As alleged in the complaint, Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of Estrellita, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of RTC. Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the Shari'a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the RTCs are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions . . .

CARPIO v. VALMONTE
G.R. No. 151866; September 9, 2004; Tinga, J. FACTS: Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding. On that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel to where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at the Suite, several persons were already there including the petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion. After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She went back to the suite after, and found several people staring at her when she entered. . It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.

Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmontes bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry, which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag, were lost. A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioners imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus, on 20February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against petitioner. ISSUE: W/N respondent Valmonte is entitled to damages RULING: Valmonte is entitled to damages. In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act, which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner, which is contrary to morals and good customs. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES
FACTS: In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, respondent was invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in celebration of the birthday of the hotels manager. During the party and when respondent was lined-up at the buffet table, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the party. Shocked and embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was herself a guest. Not long after, a Makati policeman approached him and escorted him out of her party. Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstances painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and discreetly. Mindful of the wish of the celebrant to keep the party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when she saw him by the buffet table with no other guests in the immediate vicinity. She

asked him to leave the party after he finished eating. After she had turned to leave, the latter screamed and made a big scene. Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that she invited Mr. Reyes to the party. Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages and attorneys fees. The lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, consequently imposing upon Hotel Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant petition for review. ISSUES: Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited by the celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel Nikko, as the employer of Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable with her. RULING: The Court found more credible the lower courts findings of facts. There was no proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose him to ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes version of the story was unsupported, failing to present any witness to back his story. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employees. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Article 21 states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act cannot amount to abusive conduct. The maxim Volenti Non Fit Injuria (self-inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court, that is, to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury, that consent to injury precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.

GELUZ vs CA
. Facts: - This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same. -Nita Villanueva knew defendant Geluz for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. To conceal her pregnancy from her parent, she had an abortion, which was performed by the defendant. Again, Nita has undergone the same procedure by the defendant in her succeeding pregnancies. -The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion Issue: Whether or not an action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child? Held: NO Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

QUIMIGING vs ICAO
FACTS: Icao, a married man, impregnated Quimiging, a minor. As a result, she had to pay for hospitalization and stopped studying. The latter claimed damages Php 120 a month. Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. The trial judge sustained defendant's motion and

dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. The plaintiff appealed directly to this Court. ISSUE: Is a conceived child entitled to support? HELD; Yes. Petition granted. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors. It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). Auxiliary reason: A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code: ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts Hence, the girl has a cause of action.

De Jesus vs Syquia
FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonia and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila. After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time. It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned. ISSUES: 1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity. 2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco. HELD: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status. Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in

civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.

Continental Steel v. Montao

Doctrines: Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. In case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. Facts: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. Petitioner immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits. It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides: Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mothers womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. Labor arbiter Montao argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiters resolution. Hence this petition. Issues: 1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die 2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent 3. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be settled in favor of the employee Held: 1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case. The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation

thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. 2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb. 3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. As decided by this Court, any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy. (Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)]) Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently

Limjuco vs Pedro Fragante

FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality. HELD: The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public

convenience before the Public Service Commission. Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

Dumlao vs Quality Plastics

FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security under the bond. Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Orias death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants. Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of Orias testate estate. ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity. HELD: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Orias death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.

However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death. The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorneys fees against the corporation. WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void.

Marcos v Manglapus
Facts: In February 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was removed from his position as President and was forced to exile through the people power revolution. Thereafter, Cory Aquino was declared the President. This ascension to the said position was challenged by many events and controversies like the failed Manila Hotel coup by the political leaders of Marcos, the takeover of Channel 7 TV station with the support of Marcos loyalist and the failed return of the Marcos spouses from Hawaii. These were just some of the events that happened under the presidency of Cory Aquino. In addition, Marcos and his cronies left the economy greatly devastated. With all these things that happened, the Aquino administration worked hard to stabilize the condition of the Philippines. In the case at bar, former President Marcos wishes to return to the Philippines to die. However, Aquino stood on her decision not to allow the Marcos family to return in the Philippines considering the abovementioned events that challenged the Aquino administration. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not President Aquino may prohibit the Marcos family to return to the Philippines Held: Yes. President Cory Aquino may prohibit the Marcos family to return to the Philippines. Under Section 1 of Art VII of the Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. This executive power merely means the power to execute or enforce the law. However, this is not only the power of the President. And, it would be inaccurate for the head of the State if his power would be limited only to the execution of laws. The power of the

President is not only to execute laws but to make sure that he does his duties and he makes decisions taking into consideration the welfare and the national interest of the people as this is under the Constitution. In the case at bar, the problem was the balancing of the rights of a person and the welfare of the people. However, with the Presidents decision of prohibiting the Marcos family to return to the Philippines, President Aquino upheld his duty to serve and protect the people by considering the national interest. As explained by the Court, this power of the President to protect the general welfare of the people is founded on the residual power the duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. In the case at bar, the President exercised her power as protector of the peace as this power is not limited to cases of emergency. This power must be exercised in day-to-day problems. Even though the violence was not yet present then, the President should not wait for it to happen. Also, the president did not act arbitrarily as she gave factual basis to her decision. With the foregoing violence in attempt to destablilize the country, the return of the Marcos would exacerbate the violence as it was described be the proverbial final straw that would break the camels back.

JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO

Facts: Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building. Building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didnt want to leave so he left with his son, his sons wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez . As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days. Feb. 10, 1945: on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled that son outlived his mother. Issue: Order of death of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.

Held: Reversed. Art. 43 civil code: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or more persons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place. In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died before his mother. The presumption that AJ died before her son was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.

MERCADO v ESPIRITU
FACTS: This case is about the signing of a deed of sale in which two of the four parties were minors with age 18, and 19. On the date of sale, these minors presented themselves that they were of legal age at the time they signed it, and they made the same manifestation before the notary public. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that they were of legal age. RATIO: The courts laid down that such sale of real estate was still valid since it was executed by minors, who have passed the ages of puberty and adolescence, and are near the adult age, and that the minors pretended that they had already reached their majority. Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil- interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations,

such as easements. Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. This is in accordance with the provisions of the law on estoppels. This is in accordance with the provisions of the law on estoppel. Art 1431 of Civil Code. Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. This is also in accordance with the provisions of Rule 123, Sec 68, Par. A Rule 123, sec 68, Par. A...Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, cannot be permitted to falsify it.

BAMBALAN v MARAMBA
FACTS: Bambalans parents Paula Prado and her first husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura received a loan from Genoveva Muerong and German Maramba in 1915. Calcotura died leaving Bambalan as the sole heir of his estate. In 1922, Muerong and Maramba forced Bambalan, who was at that time, a minor, to sell their land as payment for the loan. Bambalan signed, but said that he was forced because they were threatening his mother with imprisonment. Muerong and Maramba bought Bambalans first cedula to acknowledge the document. ISSUE: Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid. RATIO: The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution. The Doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not applicable to this case, because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him as a minor. Important Statutes: Civil Code, Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from

certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. Civil code, Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract: (1) Unemancipated minors; (2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a) Civil code, Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties: (1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract; (2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.

BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE

FACTS: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have no paid, Abrille sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according to the contract they signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of the CA whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the Braganza sons when they signed the contract. ISSUE: Whether the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the contract of loan they have signed. RATIO: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in the contract because the minority of her sons does not release her from liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest. However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which found them similarly liable

due to their failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained previous sources in Jurisprudence in order to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit. The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money is equivalent to P1,166.67.