CASE DIGEST #1 TITLE OF THE CASE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY G.R. No.

152577, September 21, 2005 RELEVANT FACTS: This case is a petition for review on certiorari, by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage between Crasus L. Iyoy (respondent) and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, in the same year, she sent letters to Crasus requesting him to sign divorce papers. Sometime in 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an American and had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children in which she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation. On March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation wherein Fely used her new husbands last name as evidences. Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and that since 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the CA. ISSUE: Whether abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife per se constitute psychological incapacity.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. It is important to note that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. Also, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

CASE DIGEST #2 TITLE OF THE CASE: JAIME F. VILLALON vs. MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005 RELEVANT FACTS: This is a Civil case filed on July 12, 1996 by petitioner Jaime F. Villalon asking for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon, before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. As ground therefore, petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage. According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab initio. The RTC granted the petition; it was reversed and set aside in the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court has ruled that the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners personal history. In an earlier case, the court has cited in its ruling that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. The evidence on record fails to convince us that petitioners marital indiscretions are symptomatic of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the evidence reveals that petitioner was a good husband most of the time when he was living with respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good provider.

CASE DIGEST #3 TITLE OF THE CASE: MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS vs. BRIX FERRARIS G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006 RELEVANT FACTS: This is a resolution of the Supreme Court on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner, Armida Perez-Ferraris, regarding the dismissal of her petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to the respondent, Brix Ferraris. Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couples relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix. She even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when Armida started doubting Brixs fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women, that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armidas lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brixs leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family. The RTC denied the petition, noting that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his defects were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in the case at bar. RULING: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The Court finds that respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and these do not constitute psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the expert was not able to prove her findings. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder can be part of his family upbringing She stated that there was a history of Brixs parents having difficulties in their relationship- this is of course inconclusive for such has no direct bearing to the case at bar. The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Courts rely heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained in court.

CASE DIGEST #4 TITLE OF THE CASE: BERNARDINO S. ZAMORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND NORMA MERCADO ZAMORA G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007 RELEVANT FACTS: Bernardino and Norma were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. Their union did not produce any child. In 1972, Norma left for the United States to work as a nurse. She returned to the Philippines for a few months, then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic visits to Cebu City until 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. Bernardino filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged "psychological incapacity" of Norma. To support his position, he alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not borne petitioner a child. He also alleged that she abandoned him by living in the United States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived together for not more than three years. On the other hand, Norma denied that she refused to have a child and also faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he begot at least three children with them. The RTC dismissed the complaint; the decision was affirmed in the CA. ISSUE: Whether there can be a declaration of nullity of the marriage between Bernardino (petitioner) and Norma (private respondent) on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING: No. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered in totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned. Bernardino (petitioner), however, failed to substantiate his allegation that Norma (private respondent) is psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the acts and behavior of Norma that Bernardino cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no proof that the former exhibited a similar predilection even before or at the inception of the marriage. Thus, based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the findings and conclusions reached by the trial court and the CA.

CASE DIGEST #5 TITLE OF THE CASE: ROSA YAP PARAS vs. JUSTO J. PARAS G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007 RELEVANT FACTS: On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They had four (4) children. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: (a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction; (b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children; and (d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. The RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In the interim, Rosa filed with the Supreme Court a petition for disbarment against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised on the same charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. On October 18, 2000, the Supreme Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosas signature in bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was suspended from the practice of law.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the factual findings of the Supreme Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case. 2. Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of Justos alleged psychological incapacity is necessary. 3. Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo. RULING: 1. No. Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. Accordingly, ones unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean ones unfitness as a husband or vice versa. The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosas charges sufficiently proved Justos unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, "the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this case, Justos acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer 2. No. There is no reason to remand it to the trial court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient evidence to establish the psychological condition of Justo.

In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos, this Court clarified that the Guideline, set forth concerning the presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity, does not require that the respondent should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of the nullity of marriage. What is important is "the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition." In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court categorically explained that under the New Rules, a petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity or on its root cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of said incapacity. In Pesca v. Pesca the Supreme Court opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. The Court then concluded that "emotional immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. 3. No. While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. There is no evidence that Justos "defects" were present at the inception of the marriage . His "defects" surfaced only in the latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost 30 years of their marriage. Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justos "defects" are incurable or grave.