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Philosophy of Space
Elisabeth Str6ker
translated by
Algis Mickunas
~ Ohio University Press
1 Athens, Ohio London
Translation Copyright 1987 by Ohio University Press
Originally published as Philosophische Untersuchungen
zum Raum. (Frankfurt Am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965)
Copyright 1965.
Printed in the United States of America.
All rights reserved.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Stroker, Elisabeth.
Philosophical investigations of space.
(Series in continental thought; v. 11)
Translation of: Philosophishe Untersuchungen zum
Raum.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Space and time. l. Title. 11. Series: Series
in continental thought ; 11.
BD632.S6513 1987 114 86-2410
ISBN 0-8214-0826-7
Table of Contents
Translator's Preface ................................................ ix
Preface ............................................................... xi
Introduction ............................................................. 1
1. The State of the Problem ................................ 1
2. The Aim of the Investigation ............................ 3
3. Preliminary Methodological Considerations ........... 7
Part One: Lived Space ................................................ 13
Section One: Contributions to the Phenomenology of
Lived Space ........................................ 14
Point of Departure and Statement of the Problem ........... 14
Chapter One: The Attuned Space ............................. 19
1. The Concept of Attuned Space ......................... 19
2. Characteristics of Attuned Space: Fullness and
Emptiness ................................................. 22
3. Place and Position in Attuned Space .................. 27
4. Nearness and Remoteness .............................. 29
5. Movement and Orientation in Attuned Space ........ 30
6. Attuned Space as Space-Time .......................... 36
7. Attuned Space and the Experiencing Subject ......... 43
Chapter Two: The Space of Action ........................... 48
1. Preliminary Remarks .................................... 48
2. Place and Regan. The Space of Action as a
Topological Manifold ................................... 52
3. The Locus of the Subject in the Space of Action ..... 57
4. Movement and Orientation. The Space of Action
as Oriented Space ........................................ 62
5. The Problem of the Way ................................ 71
6. Nearness and Remoteness in the Space of Action .... 75
7. Summary ................................................. 81
Chapter Three: The S pace of Intuition ....................... 83
1. Terminological Clarifications ........................... 83
2. The Space of Intuition as a Phenomenal Multitude
of Points ........... ~ ................................. .' ... 85
V
vi Table of Contents
3. The Lived Body as the Center of the Space of
Intuition .................................................. 89
4. The Oriented Space of Intuition ....................... 90
5. Spatial Depth and Perspectivity ........................ 93
6. The Finitude of the Space of Intuition ............... 109
7. The Other in My Space of Intuition. Questions of
Homogenization ........................................ 113
8. Open Questions ........................................ 118
Chapter Four: Modally Distinct Sensory Spaces ........... 120
1. Visual Space ............................................ 120
2. The Visual Field ........................................ 124
3. The Problem of Tactile Space ......................... 126
Section Two: Questions of Space Constitution ................ 138
Chapter One: Corporeity and Spatiality ..................... 138
1. Methodological Survey ............................ ' .... 138
2. The Lived Body and the Physical Body in their
Relationship to Space .................................. 140
3. The Lived Body and Consciousness .................. 148
Chapter Two: The Space of Movement and Objective
Space .......................................... 152
1. Spatial Structure and Corporeal Facticity ........... 152
2. The Problem of Empty Space ......................... 160
3. Concluding Observations on Lived Space ........... 169
Part Two: Mathematical Space ..................................... 173
Introductory Remarks ............................................ 174
Section One: Preliminary Phenomenological Observations . 176
Chapter One: Space as a Thematic Object of
Consciousness ................................. 176
1. The Space of Intuition as a Limit Case of Lived
Spatiality ................................................ 176
2. The Topological Structure of the Space of Objects . 179
Chapter Two: Basic Trends of Mathematization ........... 184
1. Morphological and Mathematical Determinations
of the World of Things ................................. 184
2. The Problem of Mathematical Ideation .............. 190
3. Symbolic Intuition (Pictorial Symbolism) ........... 194
4. Signitive Symbolization of Geometry ................ 200
5. The Constructive Character of Geometric
Objectivity. Geometry as a Demonstrative Science . 211
6. Summary ................................................ 221
Table of Contents vii
Section Two: Euclidean Space .................................. 225
Chapter One: Phenomenological Access to Metrics ........ 225
1. Formation and Relationship. The Primacy of
Relationships ........................................... 225
2. The Line Segment as a Fundamental Metric
Formation ............................................... 228
3. The Line Segmentas an Invariant of
"Movements" ........................................... 231
4. The Concept of Movement as a Leading Concept
of the Theory of Invariants ............................ 236
Chapter Two: Euclidean Normal Space ..................... 239
1. The Concept of Mathematical S pace (Preliminary
Conceptual Clarification) .............................. 239
2. Normal Space (Euclidean Space of the
Topological Type of the Open Plane) ................ 246
3. The Question of Intuitability in Euclidean
Geometry ................................................ 252
Chapter Three: Euclidean Spaces with Topological
Anomalies ................................................... 258
1. Extension of the Mathematical Concept of Space ... 258
2. Clifford-Klein Spaces .................................. 259
3. Clifford-Klein Spaces as Euclidean Normal Space.
Founding Relationships ............................... 260
Section Three: Non-Euclidean Spaces .......................... 265
Chapter One: Fundamental Questions of Non-Euclidean
Geometry .................................................... 265
1. The Parallel Postulate. Historical Origin and
Development ............................................ 265
2. Constitutive Problems of the Parallel Postulate ..... 269
Chapter Two: Foundational Problems of Hyperbolic
Geometry .................................................... 2 7 5
1. On the Metrics of Hyperbolic Geometry ............. 275
2. The Kleinian Model. Phenomenological Analysis
of the Model Conception .............................. 278
3. Hyperbolic Geometry and the Space of Intuition ... 281
Chapter Three: Riemann's Geometry ........................ 285
1. Riemann's Point of Departure. The Metric
Fundamental Form ..................................... 285
2. Riemannian Spaces. Brief Mathematical
Characterization ........................................ 287
3. Curvature and "Curved Spaces" ...................... 291
viii Table of Contents
4. The Question of the Existence of the Mathematical
Point ..................................................... 296
Concluding Observations ........................................... 304
Works Cited and Consulted ........................................ 309
Register . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Translator' s Preface
Professor Dr. Elisabeth Stroker is a noted philosopher of the
history of science and a leading thinker in the current development
of philosophy of technology, inclusive of ethical issues attendant
upon science and technology. I am grateful to Professor Stroker for
the trust and patience she maintained in me during the protracted
process of translation. This is more so in face of the importance of
her work in the philosophy of space. It contains the best possible
phenomenological and critical analyses of issues concerning the
"experience" and the "being" of space, and the most outstanding
and precise theoretical investigations of the problems in conceptu-
alizing space. Professor Stroker's theoretical investigations include
the development of the entire Western philosophical tradition
concerning the conceptions of space, ranging from Euclid all the way
to the geometric-mathematical problematics of Riemann. To say the
least, Professor Stroker's work is both and scientif-
ically fundamental. It sets the standard for any future investigations
in the philosophy of space.
The success of the translation must be attributed to Dr. Elizabeth
Behnke who, under the auspices of a copy editor, accomplished a
monumental task. Her indispensible cooperation, her inexhaustible
patience with every term and phrase, are completely intertwined in
the translation. Indeed, Dr. Behnke was part and parcel of making
the text intelligible toan American reader. Many thanks.
Preface
This investigation is m y habilitation work, revised for print, which
was presented to the philosophy faculty of the University of Ham-
burg in the summer semester of 1963. It was begun thanks to a
generous stipend from the German Research Society. Its preparation
was enhanced by professor Dr. Wolfgang Wieland of Hamburg
University. 1 am grateful for his interest and valuable suggestions. 1
also owe my gratitude to Professor Dr. Carl Friedrich Feiherr van
Weizsacker and, not the least, to Professor Dr. Gnther Patzig for
their enhancement of the work through their encouragement and
critical remarks.
The first conceptual inception of this writing reaches back toward
the years of my study at the University of Bonn. The lectures and
works of Oskar Becker impressed me by their masterful subtleties of
philosophical analyses of problems and pointed me, for the first time,
toward phenomenological questioning. Less obvious is the imput in
this work that was acquired from Theodor Litt. He has impacted and
swayed my first philosophical studies; he played a vital role in the
proposed investigation. While the path followed in this work re-
mained distant to him, this distance allowed him to survey the work
more intensely, allowing him unrestrained and open criticism.
Hence the will of a teacher to demand, in which the power of his
thought was most vital, became a most conspicuous part of this
work. His frequently expressed wish to see the work attain its
proposed aim, was not granted to him. As his last student, 1 dedcate
this work to his memory.
Hamburg, September 1964 Elisabeth Striker
Introduction
1. The State of the Problem
The philosophical treatment of space faces a problem whose
tradition is as old as the entire history of philosophy. As an object of
metaphysical and naturalistic philosophical speculation since the
pre-Socratics, space seems to offer an almost inexhaustible variety of
aspects throughout the historical changes of cosmogonies, systems
and conceptual positions. What is given in them to date as a
"theory" of space turns out to be a sublimated sediment of histori-
cally acquired concepts from whose entire intellectual content space
assu'mes its decisive outlines. This is true for the finite central-
peripheral spatial cosmos of antiquity and its modifications in high
scholasticism, as well as for the infinite, homogeneous space of
Renaissance philosophy; the same is true for the absolute space of
Newton no less than for the much acclaimed "renaissance" of the
Aristotelian conception of space in the field theories of modern
physics.
With the development of modern natural sciences, thinking con-
cerning space acquires new impulses from experimental research. 0\- eLt- _
Non-Euclidean geometries and their extension of the concept of
space have contributed to the discussion of the problem from the
mathematical side since the end of the eighteenth century. History
shows that from then on philosophy and the exact sciences not only
diverge, but also continuously confront one another in the contro-
versies concerning epistemic claims arising from the treatment of the
problem of space. The fact that since the beginning of the nineteenth
century this controversy has been oriented almost exclusively by
Kant's conception of space indicates, on the one hand, the extraor-
dinary fertility of the Kantian a priori and, on the other hand, has its
basis in the fact that the latter bears unmistakably within itself the
properties of the universal structure of Newtonian space whose
validity has become increasingly questionable. The most recent and
in tense encounter between philosophy and science was precipitated 1 [Aroi:J 1}-
by the theory of relativity at the' dawn of this century. It is { h1
revolutionary: it transformed the entire physical world image and )
1
rcW[\'Of\g'vv.-1['6.
<S fU U. , .. , "'f"fA .t( .
2 Introduction
renewed the demand for a reply to the philosophical question of
space.
Subsequently, it seems as though the problem of space has become
merely an occasion for a reciproca! glance across the boundaries
between philosophical and scientific research. Meanwhile, the phi-
losoiJhy of our day begins the discussion from another point of view.
With Jpward the world
prior to. gart __
things. .tbeir
their everyday--existence. Wherever existential philosophy deals
with space within the framework of it
only recognizes as philosophically significant the space of "Dasein"
---? experienced in its everydayness apart from scientific conceptions.
Heidegger's differentiation of "being in" from being "in" something
attempts to distinguish the traditional categorical conception of
space from space as existential; Merleau-Ponty's alternative concept
of a "troisieme spatialit", in contrast to physical and mathematical
spatiality, strongly suggests a domain of spatial research inaccessible
"$
)/;.(L.::
to the mathematical sciences. Perhaps the solution to the riddle of )!
space should be sought here, solution airead y clearly seen by Kant, V..?l
for in arder to eluciate the gossibility of things, he presented space
co1J.!!i1!2!1 for su eh -
Influences of existential-ontological and existential-phenomeno-
logical efforts are particularly obvious in the area of contemporary
psychology. Although the naturalistically oriented scientific psy-
chology had begun to investigate space perception experimentally
and genetically over a hundred years ago, more recent research
follows the various analyses of "space experience" under the aspect
of holistic psychology, phenomenological description, and method-
ological hermeneutics. In contemporary psychopathology there is a
notable emphasis on the abnormal experience of space, leading toa
multi-faceted analysis of "spatial disturbances." Such research is not
too encouraging, since during the last decades it has led to a
confusing multitude of various "spaces." Yet, at the same time, this
points to numerous efforts under various methodological aspects to
master the complex and multi-layered problem of space.
If the entire range of problems were finally surveyed, then imme-
diately specific questions would have to emerge. With what justifi-
cation does one speak of "spaces"? Kant was of the opinion that
space must be necessarily unitary, and that all talk of spaces made
sense only if they were parts of the same space. Has this claim lost
its validity today? The space of intuition and the space of mathemat-
Introduction 3
ics cannot be arranged next to each other and are not conceivable as
parts. If there were a more encompassing space containing them as
parts, then its structure should be accessible to investigation; if not,
then it would have to be seen as irrational, and the genuine, unitary
space would be inaccessible to thought. Or is it that the title "space"
can be genuinely claimed by only one of the regions currently called
spaces? Or perhaps in accordance with its meaning, space ought to
be sought and found apart from sciences in our direct presence to
and orientation toward the world. In this case, what is always present
in the pre-reflective, everyday consciousness, what is grasped
unthematically and understood as space befare the inception of
conceptual activity, would have to be elevated to reflective light by
philosophical investigation. Furthermore, the investigation would
have to justify to what extent any further talk of spaces is nonsen-
sical; it would have to decipher the source of error, expose the
speculative willfulness and inappropriate systematization where
thinking, too intent on a unitary vision, grasps aspects of a most
heterogeneous kind under the concept of space.
If the talk about spaces is valid, then we should ask about the
differences and commonalities of their structures. Furthermore, it
EJ.ight of does __
possess, /
:@!!.li!Y? Phosophy must not only seek an answer, it must also take //
a stand with regard to the sense of question itself.
2. The Aim of the Investigation
The ultima te aim of this investigation pertains to theory of science;
it purports to be a contribution toward a philosophical grounding of
geometry. The concept of the theory of science must nevertheless be
taken in a broader than usual sense. Since the end of the nineteenth
century, the theory of science has been understood predominantly as
methodology or as applied logic. Thus, it analyzes the modes of
operation of a science, observes its specific concept formation, and
investigates its conceptual assumptions, its modes of deduction and
the type of its laws. Ideally, each science regards itself as method-
ologically unified. That is to say it views itself as an embodiment of
statements whose interrelationship is based either on a finite, even if
numerically and typologically variable, quantity of irreducible prin-
cipies or on a limited number of distinct, although factually and
logically unifiable types of operations. The first is concerned with
axiomatic disciplines, the second with experimental sciences.
4 Introduction
Within each individual science, it is possible to investigate and
compare the structures of relatively closed partial systems of prop-
ositions, "theories," according to the type of their basic presuppo-
sitions and procedures. If the comparison of methods is extended to
different sciences, then we would devise a common methodology as
a theory for a specific group of sciences. It could function as a
methodological framework for such groups as natural or human
sciences. As a general and inclusive methodology of the sciences, it
is subsumed under the idea of the unity of all possible forms of
theory and thus under the essential explication of science in
general.
Yet a theory of science is not exhausted by pure methodology. As
a reflective effort toward the structural clarification of the sciences in
the broadest sense, it must remember that sciences are ultimately
sciences of beings, oriented toward what "is," what "exists." Indi-
vidual scientific questions asking what is, and how it is, are oriented
ontologically toward qualities, quantities, relations, and causal and
functional laws. In contrast, a theory of science requires another
position. This position is concerned with a factual area of research,
not taken in the simple objective sense of its immediate "being," but
in a mediated sense: something existent that is "on the way" to a
specific methodological exposition. Only in this modified sense
does this area become an object for the theory of science. The efforts
of a theory of science go beyond a mere methodology in yet another
respect. Method is not merely about something existent that is to be
known; it is equally a method of the interrogator who knows and
wishes to know more about what there is. Conceived in this manner,
a theory of science must take its point of departure from an entirely
different ground than from mere methodology. In contrast to meth-
odology, a theory of science assumes at the outset a more encom-
passing task in a twofold manner.
Taking science in its objective relationship to the subject matter as
well as in its relation back to specific forms of the activity of
subjectivity, a theory of science faces a problem that can be called
ontological in a specific sense of contemporary philosophical
thought. What we mean here is a problem emerging froma continu-
ing interrogation of the subject matter whose aim is a universal
explication of the "sense" of being. This process must pay constant
attention to the being of the interrogating subject (Husserl's transcen-
dental ego, Heidegger's Dasein). With regard to our present investi-
gation and its precise limitation to its thematic object, this means
that a theory of science is necessarily confronted by the questions as
Introduction 5
to what space might be and in what sense unqualified assertions of
its existence can be given.
Moreover, in contrast to methodology, a theory of science cannot
begin with the established sciences in arder to discover their
methodological structure. Rather, in its attempt to make the method
comprehensible, it must return to tl;w already given relationships
and states of affairs from which the scientific questions originate.
With specific regard to space, this means that its treatment in a
theory of science cannot begin with the abstract mathematical
spaces-assuming for the time being their plurality-but with the
spatiality given and experienced prior to all sciences. Thus this \lve-J
investigation begins with a detailed treatment of the "lived" space.
li)f(). ce._
lt is based on the view that a solution to the question of the meaning
a_QQEl.!t:lnce of the "abstract" spaces of the specjal sciences and
can be sought only on the grounds of a prior investigation
is_J;:Q:::given
an object of This corresponds to the "
late Husserl: all objectivity of science is
necessarily related to corresponding elements found in the "lived
world." This relationship founds the validity of the sciences. lt thus
remains to be explicated "how all the self-evidence of objective-
logical accomplishements, through which objective theory (thus
mathematical and natural-scientific theory) is grounded in respect to
form and content, has its hidden, source of grounding in the
ultimately accomplishing life, the life in which the self evident
givenness of the life world forever has, has attained, and attains
anew its prescientific, ontic meaning. "
1
The following work is justifiable only as an attempt to clase a gap
that has not yet been successfully filled, despite a series of valiant
attempts. lt propases to develop the problems of space under the
main notions suggested above. lt will provide a critica! illumination
and mutual evaluation of the many scattered concepts found in
diverse branches of research, without subsuming their heteroge-
neous results and diverse theoretical positions under a forced
unification.
The work does not make any claims to completeness. lt deliber-
ately limits its analyses to the problems of lived space and the spaces
of geometry, i.e., the mathematical spaces as free geometric mani-
folds. Thus it excludes an entire domain of questions concerning the
practica! use of geometric structures in physics. "Physical space,"
1. E. Husserl, Krisis, 34d; see also 38.
6 Introduction
which actually should be added, remains here only as a requirement
to be fulfilled by a subsequent and more exhaustive investigation.
Our work takes into consideration tasks whose complexities by far
surpass our efforts. At the very outset we are not certainvvhether and
The -free
ideal formations of geometry, with regard to their pure geometrical
existence, to be investigated in the second part of this work, are
extremely difficult to explicate, especially in their relationship to the
things of "real" space. This relationship is particularly difficult to
explain with regard to physical bodies and their spatial interaction
in physics. The term "application" not only does not explain this
relationship, but actually hides various problems. If geometry could
be equated with a tool of physics that is constituted and, so to speak,
prepared by the mathematician, then the problem could be resolved
quite readily. Yet the relationship between geometry and physics is
not that simple. The elucidation of such a relationship must remain
the task of a more specialized work.
Our investigation may be called systematic only to the extent that
it is not conceived as a history of problems and is therefore not to be
subsumed under the criteria pertaining to the latter sort of study.
While such a distinction is justifiable for science, we admit that it
may be dangerous and misleading in philosophy. To propase a sharp
separation between the systematic and the historical aspects of
philosophy would result in an obfuscation of the fact that each
"system" contains at least as much "history" as the conceptuality it
uses rests in historical origin and retains the heritage of a long
tradition. At the very outset, the systematic development of a
problem is not primarily determined by its historically evolved
status as a scientific problem; rather, it is already conditioned by a
situationally determined horizon of the pregiven comprehensibility
and unproblematic self evidence of everyday life. Though we may
not recognize or even admit such obvious and everyday intelligibil-
ity, it is no less historical and historically constructive.
This investigation intends to deal systematically with the problem
@ of space as it is articulated in contemporary views and made
accessible by current methods. Yet it is to be remembered that the
investigation does not merely rest "on the ground" of a tradition that
\:)(]IV\ is to be surveyed in its temporal unfolding, useful perhaps only for
dexographic interests; rather, the work is "taken up" with a tradi-
tion, to the extent that the tradition eifers- into ___ the )i()lJTms
fi1Ve-stigated, as is the case for the second part of this work, and to the
extent that the mode and manner of questioning are shaped by the
Introduction 7
tradition. After all, we raise questions about space not because we
know nothing of it, but because we always ha ve a prior acquaintance
with it. It is already grasped and laid out in sorne sense befare we
begin to ask questions about it. Its presence must be such that it is
open to our questioning. Although our effort fails to do justice to
history, it is aware of its indebtedness to history.
2
At this juncture we must briefly indicate a specific difficulty. The
plan of our investigation must be limited to space without due
consideration to time. At first glance, leaving out time seems to avoid
an unnecessary complication; yet a closer look reveals a genuine
lacuna. S_llilce and time constitute a unified whole and thus are
1
related essentially. Such-a relatl:msiifp-does--not appear siiiPTY
because both are "forms of intuition." Their relationship does not
become obvious by a simple declaration that space is "the arder of
one next to the other" and time is "the arder of one after the other."
This usual conception of SJ2!!Ce and
The unity does not lie in the simple fact that each case of one next
to the other includes a specific "temporal point." The language and
the aims of modern physics, expressed in Minkowski's space-time
continuum, has done proper justice to this unity. Yet the intertwin- ,()
ing of space and time is more intimate and fundamental in the
domain of daily life. Without going into greater depth, the present
work can only indicate the crucial domains of such an interrelation-
ship.
3. Preliminary Methodological Considerations
An investigation whose intent is to unfold the problem of space in
its entirety requires, first of all, methodological guarantees.
Though our endeavour will subsequently be delimited more
precisely, it can initially be characterized as phenomenological.
Today phenomenology flourishes in a multitude of trends, and no
"- - .-" -....._" ... -r--" ---
2. For the historical treatment of the problem of space, we can mention
the works of W. Gent, H. Conrad-Martius, K. Deichmann, H. Heimsoeth, A.
Koyr, and M. particular the latter presents an excellent
treatment of the physicalistic history of the problem, ranging from the
natural philosophy of the Greeks to the general theory of relativity. The work
of Koyr is limited to the historical period between Cusanus and Leibniz,
although it is most trustworthy for this historical period. The intent of E. y,))
Fink's worMs not primarily "historic-doxographic"; rather, it takes up the ---
entire ontd'(ogical tradition und_E)!'_ t_hg le_ading aspe_<_;t1; time, and
--- -
hf'k
8 Introduction
longer admits of a unitary procedure. Nowhere has it taken over the He_..,
1
conception of its celebrated past master Hegel. For Hegel, phenom- J
enology was a way of "apparent knowledge," comprising a prelim-
inary step with which philosophy should begin in order to attain
true knowledge as the end phase of a dialectical movement. But
Husserl did not follow in Hegel's steps. Since Husserl, phenomeno- Hv\\
1
logical philosophy considers its task to be "pure description" of a
"given." The given ranges from apure act phenomenon,. within the
framework of the Husserlian reductions, to the "being-in-itself"
within the unreflective attitude of naive realism. Even existential
ontology is concerned with seeing entities as they are "in them-
selves." The efforts of existential ontology are centered on "allowing
that which is to come to manifestation." In its "hermeneutic" }-).., l,
procedure it adheres consciously to the Heideggerian formulation of
"the tautology of a descriptive phenomenology."
3
To elucidate the value of phenomenological procedure for its own
sake would be like carrying coals to Newcastle. Certainly it has
established a method that is responsible for subtle analyses and far
reaching insights in all areas of contemporary philosophy. Yet this
; raises a serious question: can philosophy continue to use this
procedure without running the risk of eliminating the possibility of
self-critique as the fundamental element of its life? Philosophy
requires self-critique more than does science, for in contrast to many
of the individual sciences, philosophy does not have a constant
corrective for its statements in experience. Philosophy can realize
such a critique only if it elevates reflective thinking to its ultimate
possibilities. Thus it must continuously submit the capacity and
limits of its own method to the light of critical self-reflection. Even
if at the first glance the given seems indubitable and self-evident,
philosophy must admit at the very outset that its "given" is
completely conditioned by its formulation and thus exposed to
specific limitations, which are justifiable only by the choice of a
point of departure; the given can only be challenged at the point of
departure. Thus the Husserlian "principie of all principies" for
phenomenology, namely that "every originary presentive intuition
is a legitimizing source of that "everything originarily
... offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is
presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is
presented,"4 must not only be maintained most precisely while
3. M. Heidegger, 7c.
4. E. Husserl, Ideen I, 24.
Introduction 9
working with specific descriptive analyses, but must be respected
more precisely than was done by Husserl himself in the process of
his own phenomenological investigations. Moreover, a
lil!l:it1l .. ()f the same time the
limits of phenomenology itself? Since by its owitenets it is.orierite(f
''the thingstliemselves'r, and devotes itself entirely to indi-
vidual researches in accordance with the prescript of a science of
science, it is caught in the idea of a lineal progression toward the
given. Yet it easily becomes blind to the fact that by far not c2
everything belonging to its phenomenal region can be explicated ].5
completely in pure description. This is true precisely of those
analyses of phenomenology dealing with noetic-noematic clarifica-
Han of scientific modes of knowledge.
The difficulties emerging in this problematic area must be clari-
fied: the investigation will ha ve to begin with lived space, show that
the geometric spaces founded in it, and show how they
out of it in ATfn()'ligii ai first
ghinceNtliifi'"iiproich may- seem it
appears entangled when it is viewed by a thought that is required to
reflect u pon its own position. What must be kept in mind constantly
is that the subject, who faces the theme of space analysis in its entire
range of problems, can obviously only be a subject who is somehow
already in possession of all spaces. That mode and manner of
proceeding "from" the lived space "to" the geometric manifolds is
re-flexive in the literal sense, as determined by a retrogressive view,
does not present any special difficulties; in fact, it is the commonly
used method in phenomenological procedure. Yet this movement is
disrupted when we recall that the "way" of the subject through the
various spaces that we investigate is our own way, that the subject,
who is being viewed retrogressively in space, is in truth the observer
himself. While this revealing state of affairs may initially seem self
evident, its meaning must nevertheless be fundamentally rethought ,
in arder to surpass a merely lineal or progressive mode of phenom- V'
enological observation.
Thus it would be naive self-deception to "describe" the space of
sensory intuition while disregarding all determination of measure. lt
is indeed true, as will be explicated in a more precise sense, that
mathematical space has its foundation in the space of intuition. This
will be justified by our analysis insofar as it will deal with the space
of intuition prior to mathematical space. Yet as phenomenological, }
and mindful of a complete consideration of the "given," the analysis
must also mention that the space of intuition, in the only way it is
10 Introduction
) accessible, already contains aspects of mathematical space. After all,
the space of intuition is not merely a space of a sensibly intuiting
being; its investigation cannot be kept free from concepts whose
sense belongs to a "subsequent" context in which they can be
considered thematically and explicated more precisely. This is valid
mutatis mutandi for all "spaces" to be thematized. Thus the subjectl
does not traverse them as if they were a suite of
always be kept in mind that the subject, of whom we speak in the
third person for the sake of clarity and exposition, is in truth none
other than ourselves.
The investigation is placed in a difficult situation: on the one
harid, it must be to the factual necessity of proceeding
progressively from one spatial form to another; on the other hand,
from whatever vantage poirit has been reached, it is confronted by
factors that by their very nature can be made transparent only in
subsequent analyses. Yet such factors cannot be banned by any
decree from a particular moment of investigation. Our investigation
knows no other way to master these difficulties than by disrupting
the progressively advancing analytical work through self-reflection.
This would allow the incorporation of the results brought to the fore
into the next step of the process. Such a movement resembles a spiral
more than a straight line. The latter certainly remains in the
foreground of the work, yet it is not the sale constituent of our
method.
If by the term "phenomenological" one means all that is required
for the display and explication of phenomenal structures-i.e., the
"given," along with additional structures belonging to a specific
mode of access, and inclusive of the conceptuality required by such
a task-then our attempt can only conditionally be called phenom-
enological. The investigation intends to justify this characterization
in those parts dedicated to the descriptive and analytic work. Such
a point of departure, to be determined shortly with more precision,
will allow direct observation to speak for itself. lt will completely
avoid all constructions and derivations and will exclude all avail-
able scientific opinions "about" this area. This means no more and
no less than that the latter may .not function here with their
statements as necessary presuppositions; rather, they must attain
their meaning only within and "in the course" of the investigation.
Either they may be discussed for the sake of their own clarification,
or they may require phenomenological analyses to the extent that as
phenomena they belong within our framework. This would be the
case, for example, with geometry. This means at the same time that
Introduction 11
our investigation is exempt from any refutation by a theory that deals
with the problem of space constructively. Nonetheless, it remains
exposed to the possibility of missing the phenomena as well as to the
dangers of one-sided exposition of other opinions, and it obviously
remains open to critique concerning its own point of departure.
In what follows, the traces of Husserlian inflence will be manifest
only mediately. Yet the investigation is indebted to him even in
places where it is far removed from Husserl's phenomenological
position. Husserl himself had not thematically dealt with space
within the framework of his phenomenology. It was the merit of O.
Becker's work
5
to have applied phenomenology in an analysis of the
constitution of geometric objectivity. Our proposed investigation is
similar to Becker's in both theme and motive. However, our inves-
tigation differs from his in that it does not accept the Husserlian
brand of transcendental idealism as an incontrovertible assumption, .1(
as does Becker's.
To the extent that Husserl's own investigations-i.e., his analyses
of the spatial thing-have any significance here, they assume the
framework of his transcendental-phenomenological reductions and
serve to exhibit the constitution of a thing in pure transcendental
consciousness. Such analyses are based on the criterion of a process
of reduction whose sense and methodological correctness are based
on the display of objectivities in terms of the "how of their modes of
givenness" for pure consciousness.
For all that, the Husserlian transcendental reductions will not be
performed here. This does not imply a metaphysical presupposition,
one favoring realism. Rather, it primarily implies a
simple conviction that a dubious step can be avoided in Husserlian
transcendental phenomenology, a step that otherwise would be a
hindrance at the very outset to the mastery of the problem of space.
While the radical accomplishment of his reductions also leads to the
reduction of the factual-empirical ego to pure consciousness, we
shall counter this by pointing out that the subject, strictly under-
stood, resists in principie any reduction in the Husserlian sense. I.he .
subject must be reestablished in his full and concrete su]Jject_iv:ity ...
i.e., in Qisf(1SJ2!y .. iifll_,
for the phenomenology of It is justifiable and indeed neces-
. '''' --:..>-0'"''""- -
5. O. Becker (1). Numbers in parentheses after an author's name refer to
the works in the bibliography listed by such a number under each author's
name. Only the frequently cited works of Husserl will be given with the
standard abridged title for the sake of convenience.
12 Introduction
sary to exclude all that is "merely" factual and to disregard all that
is conditioned situationally by the individuallived body; neverthe-
less, it must be maintained that to neglect facticity and corporeity
entirely would mean a premature move toward metaphysics and
away from the methodological correctness of descriptive efforts.
Thus the subject after the reduction would not be grasped phenom-
enologically as a subject, since in Husserl it functions in the sphere
of pure transcendental consciousness as constituted in accordance
with the requirements of a spatial thing. Toward the end of his
works, Husserl noted these and related difficulties and recognized
the subject as something that cannot be included in the process of
reduction in the form in which the process was initially inaugurated.
Our arguments against Husserl are not in tended to be a destructive
critique of his phenomenology; due to an entirely different point of
departure, such a critique would be fallacious. A transcendent
position can serve only to confront two theoretical stances with the
aim of clarifying their own thoughts. Nevertheless, a critique of
specific Husserlian points is justifiable when we can take exception
to mistakes within his phenomenology, and specifically when such
mistakes could have been avoided in terms of his own point of
departure. Husserl himself would not have denied us this right.
PART ONE
LIVED SPACE
SECTION ONE
Contributions to the Phenomenology
of Lived S pace
Point of Departure and Statement of the Problem
The point of departure of this investigation is prior to any decision
J concerning the independence
1
of the external world, reality, or
being-in-itself from the subject. It begins with the observation of a
form of consciousness that as "natural" or "everyday" conscious-
ness it is nevertheless far removed from being realistic. Its position
toward the world is nothing other than one of being straightfor-
wardly given over to the world, of direct respect for the world in its
demands and assurances. Its statements contain neither realistic nor
any other kind of "istic" meaning; only reflective thought is exposed
to the danger of interpreting them in such ways. To grasp entities as
beings-in-themselves oras merely subject-related is to presuppose a
reflective attitude. This attitude requires that the subject extricate
himself from the stream of events and experiences and differentiate
himself from the world. However, the ontological sense of prereflec-
tive expressions is metaphysically indifferent. It consists in nothing
other than an immediate being "by" the things and being "in" a
world.
A spatial relation is therewith already expressed, although the
illumination of its nature is left for later pages. Here it cannot yet be
assumed in advance insofar as the subject, still to be considered,
does not yet grasp himself with respect to the meaning of this
spatiality. For him the living being is justas spatial as are things, and
like them, he too exists "in" space. If asked about the nature of space,
he takes it to be something empty that appears filled with worldly
things, events, and states of affairs, and thus to be simply a "world
space." Yet su eh a conception arises from a theoretical, even if
primitive, attitude; strictly speaking, it is an answer to an explicit
14
Contributions to the Phenomenology of Lived Space 15
question, but not a primordial relationship to space. To test this
answer in terms of its meaning and justification is reserved for
subsequent discussion. Of crucial importance here is only that such
a "position," based on a response to an explicit question, is clearly
removed from all immediate otientation to the world. In this latter c9W
case space is not thematized. It is pre-reflectively there in the
process of corporeal and intellectual activities without becoming an
object for consciousness.l
Our investigation ought to begin with the analysis of this pre-
reflective world-posture. The subject must not be interrogated pri-
marily in terms of his judgment "about" space, but in terms of his
comportment "in" it. Of course, the subject does relate to space by
making judgments "about" it. This constitutes his very being as a
subject: to know oneself in "opposition" to the world, to have space
objectively and to be able to express judgments about it.
This ambivalent awareness of space obviously plunges the inves-
tigation into inextricable difficulties at the very outset. How can it
adequately grasp the relationship of a being "in" space when this
being is essentially constituted by being "over against," outside of,
space?
The formulation of this question reveals at the same time another
problem. Even the notion of "over against" suggests a spatial
relationship, which, as one is apt to say, is nevertheless meant
non-spatially. A brief reflection on language readily shows that
thinking, regardless of its' efforts to escape the power of spatial
metaphors, can express itself only by succumbing to their
misleading force. This is not only the case when thought employs
them deliberately for the sake of vividness, but even when, with full
insight into the inadequacy of such images, it attempts to exclude
every spatial meaning transmitted by a word. It would require
far-reaching philosophical explications of language to develop the
problem of space from this viewpoint. Here we must forego such
considerations for obvious reasons. We are excluding this type of
semantic reflection and shall take extreme care to provide the
greatest possible clarity and terminological univocity.
1. This is why we speak here of lived and not experienced space,
specifically when the concept of experience is used in phenomenology in an
almost unlimited terminological sense without being appropriate for our
subject matter. The concept of lived space was already used by K. v.
Drckheim in 1932; however, our investigation follows different method-
ological principies and thus results in different formulations.
b lA-\ O.t
prv \vlr-\....
JY
16 Lived Space
The return to the question raised abo ve concerning the proper point
of departure requires a closer look at the constitutive relationship
between the subject and space. It is based on the subject'smode of
beingas a corporeal subject. 'I'he lived body must be understood in Le-
a strictly phenomenal sense. This means that it can be taken neither
asan organism nor as a physical body infused with a soul. As special K&
sciences, as methodologically established arrangements for research- .l
ing corporeity, physiology and psychology imperil the view of what \..et
is given directly and originally: primordially, corporeity is neither a
system of organic processes nor a body "inhabited" by a soul, nor
even a "unity"-regardless of how conceived-of body and soul. It is
also not primarily one's own lived body with specific sensations or
inner content ("states"); immediately and originally, the lived body
is presentas another living being and, more specifically, as the com-
portment in which this being's relationship to the surrounding world
is announced in both a sensorial anda senseful way. The lived body
always appears as lived body only in such comportment in a situation
and is understandable immediately from the situatwn; this
mode of understanding is prior to all scientific explanations. No
analogical inferences, empathy, or other auxiliary constructions of a
sensualistically oriented theory used to grasp the other are of value
herei Rather, corporeity is _ _given in a way that is indifferent to any
regional distinctions between the QYChic and the 12hysical, the inner
andthe outer. also quite accessible to the
either aspect- even if the conceptual structure of
this "also" need not concern us here- we must maintain a strict
distinction between the corporeal phenomenon given in immediate
presence and corporeity as determined by specific methodologies.
2
2. The anthropology of the twenties has insistently pointed to this
"psycho-physical indifference" of corporeity. See M. Scheler (2); see also
F.J.J. Buytendijk, H. Plessner (1), (2), andE. Rothacker. This anthropological
research has served well to rediscover an aspect of corporeity overlooked by
the special sciences ever since the Cartesian dualism of body and soul. If
anthropology insists that its position is prior to all specific researches,
nevertheless the ensuing conception of the neutrality of its point of
departure cannot be construed as indifference of philosophy toward the
individual sciences. In its own progress, philosophy must interpret scien-
tific results with its own possibilities of reflective thinking; it must la y open
their sense by introducing all the methodological precautions of the indi-
vidual sciences, which in their turn-as specific "aspects"-require
structural elucidation.
In the latter aim, anthropology is distinct from existential philosophy.
,....,.., .,_...,.., ..
a f\ eeJ .... \ur w
Contributions to the Phenomenology of Lived Space 17
Corporeity is understandable only frorn its cornportment toward the
world, and it lends itself to phenomenological observation only
when approached in terms of differing styles of its relationship to the
surrounding world. We can indicate three such styles: asan attuned
corporeity, it is a carri_er of expressive content; as a practica!
corporeity, it is a point of departure for goal-oriented activity; andas
a unity of senses, it is the center of perception. L
01
b e,kJ
It will become apparent that each mode of being of the corporea\
subject corresponds to a specific spatial structure, or, to be more
exact, that "the" one space is obtained, structured, and filled
differently depending on the cornportment of corporeity. It is quite
clear that we are not dealing with three separable forms or three
temporally and genetically distinguishable spatial steps or stages, as
if the homogeneous space of an objective space-consciousness were
capable of being deduced or developed from them. Rather, this
singular space presents a contingent presence in objective con-
sciousness that is completely unavoidable, given our point of
departure. The point of departure must be accounted for, although
its elucidation must remain a matter for subsequent considerations.
The following investigation of the three spaces is concerned only
with this: to elucidate and present the variously structured ways the
subject, as corporeal space in accordance with the ?
various corporeal
It is important to note that in this context the differentiations are (
ontological. The corporeal modes of comport-
rnent are not psychological. Although there is a psychology con-
cerned with the genesis, structure, and performance of expression, of
pragmatic processes, and of perceptual activity, this does not mean
that ontological questions concerning the nature of expression,
action, and perception and the understanding of their whence and
whither are superfluous. In fact, it is assumed that such questions are
already answered insofar as they provide clues for the proper
interpretation of the results of individual sciences. Modes of com-
portment are here not conceived as objects of investigation of an
While the philosophical by
in French existentialism the lived body assumes a
preeminent place as a theme of exhaustive structural analyses (see the works '52:
of J.P. Sartre and M. Merleau-Ponty; see also the survey by A. Podlech).
Their emphatic rejection of all efforts by the special sciences provides an
occasion for critical reflections to be offered later in an appropriate place.
)(, 1..-vC\<-"',;o;"
vJ ~ ( \ v J
v{- ~ \ ( _ W<\t
18 Lived Space
extremely broadened theory of behavior, but rather as a kind of
senseful relationship of corporeity to the world.
The differentiation suggested above is not episternological, just as
the relativity of lived space with respect to the corporeal subject is
not epistemological relativity, but a relativity of being. The three
emphases suggested have to do with the modes of being of givenness,
not with modes of givenness of entities. The latter might assurne that
within a particular position toward the world, entities could be
given otherwise than their type of being would require. This is
nevertheless excluded by the strictly correlative relationship be-
tween world and cornportment toward the world . .Thus in the
attitude of expressive understanding there are no things given "for
the sake of .... " Where expressive understanding suddenly "breaks
forth," then, taken frorn the side of the things, the thing is "given"
ontically otherwise than befare; yet the transformation of the rnode
of givenness is ontologically grounded in an altered orientation of
the subject. While such an orientation is comprehensible in terms of
an entity of a particular kind, the entity is only understandable frorn
the subject's comportment.
The relationship between space and subject cannot be sirnply
accepted as a reciproca! relationship without further reflection. The
old, enrooted-c-n.c;;ption of receptaculum rerum, assuming space to
be identical and indifferent with respect to the changes of its
contents, is contrary to such a relationship. A more detailed expo-
sition of this will be offered subsequently. With the proposed
division into three styles of corporeity, the investigation is forced
into differentiations that are justifiable only rnethodologically.
While our investigation separates the attuned space frorn the space
of action and the latter frorn the space of intuition within the lived
space, according to the three modes of corporeal cornportment, in
arder to show their characteristics and properties separately, we
remain cognizant that we have assumed separations and divisions
that are valid only if the analysis, with its increasing precision of
distinctions, is capable of adding to the clarity, visibility, and
cornprehensibility of the unity and intimate relatedness of what is
being analyzed.
Chapter One
The Attuned Space
Jl-v wt-k u.,M_
1. The Concept of Attuned Space
The attuned space is hardly accessible to conceptual thought.
Certain misunderstandings that could make such thought more
difficult must be avoided at the outset.
W e must first defend our thesis against the conception that space
is gr ven ly
a mere medium of
1
(Q)
measurement. In its most primordial ontological form, space is on -:>--
side of numerical and quantitative determination; its ,
primary characteristic lies in its being a quality and an expressive
fullness. Grasped in its unique immediacy, it is all enveloping and
Cinpromises the "atmospheric" dimension of an attuned being. It is
a space of labor, of leisure, of festivities, of devotion-a space that is
loved, hated, feared, and avoided. As a medium where human life is
realized, it has its own proper visage. It means calamity or seclusion,
a foreign place or a home, a place of transient residence or an
enduring stay. It is different in accordance with the differences in the
being who it. W '-" /)
The this space is not peri:eptwn, a.gd awareness 'tx-\-f<?f{.ettt-1.
of space is not cognition; it is rather a way moved and
affected. S pace indeed exercises an "effectivity," yet its relation to
1
W,
11
experience is not casual; rather it "addresses," "imparts." Space is
not primarily an object for a subject who performs acts of spatial
understanding. Rather, as space, an
of coexistence Such coexTsfence escapes all the
1
conceptua.Tdeterminations of a thought founded on the opposition of v'
object and subject as a "relationship" or "connection." All these in
their turn are founded on the primordial and intransgressible bond (}
between Thus lived experience here Sr
does not mean an oriented engagement in the sense of act phenom-
1
<oroTu{ ?
20 Lived Space
l
&- 't d' t' . h . lf f
eno ogy; as an ai uned llved' expenence, 1 1s mgms es ltse rom
oriented engagement by a lack of intentionality. Neither does it mean
a corporeal state within the subject; thus, strictly speaking, the
concept of sensation must also be avoided. Here lived experience
means a unique communication of the living- experiencing ego with
another, with an expressively animated space.
3
A further objection must be countered; namely that the attuned
space emerges only during a particular temporal phase, during the
"exuberant moment." When our subsequent discussion occasionally
touches upon such a moment, it will be for the sake of exemplifica-
tion, as an appropriate and powerful manifestation of salient fea-
tures. Yet such features are not restricted to these examples. Expres-
sive understanding is a unique mode of orientation toward the
world; expressive understanding has its own sense-context, and it
must be taken in this uniqueness and interrogated with respect to its
space.
This does not contradict the notion that "spaces" may appear to be
different. The transition from one to the other, from the space within
a church to the "animated" street, does not imply a dissolution of the
atmospheric space as such, but rather merely a change of the
expressive content. The difference between such "spaces" is itself a
- __ ..___ _____ .--------=.,. __________
positive determination of tb. attl1:Qe(LSI@_G!Lfl.S such.
---------- ----
Expressive Understanding is also not contradicted by the fact that
it is disregarded when the attitude of the subject is determined by
practica! or theoretical aims. Rather, having a purpose makes it
necessary for one to perform a specific shift, or-to speak metaphor-
ically-to step out of the attuned space into a space with a com-
pletely different structure, consisting of goal-oriented activity, of
sensory intuition, or of pure thought.
Attuned space is encountered in a pre-reflective orientation to-
ward the world. Such orientation to space is an immediate affinity
with the world. For an attuned being to be in another "space" and to
live in another "world" are expressions identical in meaning. They
testify, on the one hand, to the fullness of sense and meaning
characteristic of the space discussed here and, on the other hand, to
the specific difficulties involved in the conceptual determination of
attuned space. While at first the attuned space is bound to limited
spatial surroundings, it appears to be capable of multifarious exten-
3. Concerning the concept of attunement and its relationship to feeling,
see O.F. Bollnow, S. Strasser, and P. Schroder. The concept of sensation will
be discussed subsequently in greater detail.
The Attuned Space 21
sions. We speak of the space of our future and our past, of our wishes
and our hopes. Home and away are not only significant wholes, with
appropriate feeling and mood accents; they are at the same time
understood and differentiated spatially. Within them the human also
]
"moves," and things and events have their "place"; they are "near"
or "remate," getting in our way or lending us a free "way."
Seen from the vantage point of objective space, all these are
obviously mere metaphors, spatial images for relationships that "in
reality" are not spatial in kind. Yet this objection does not touch the
modes of ex eriencing such spaces; after all, our lives within them V
are not merely imaginistic. The objection cannot explain why space
plays such a preeminent role in lived experience and why specific
unities of meaning offer themselves spatially to lived experience. A
more exact investigation in this direction would lead us too far afield
from our present purposes. We shalllimit ourselves to attuned space
in a narrower sense.
4
4. It will be shown that this space includes temporal determinations. This
relationship between space and time is stressed by E. Straus (2)-at least
through an application of an ambiguous and misleading concept of sensa-
tion. Yet the relationship between space and time should not lead us to
encompass everything within attuned space, within whatever is designated
by "space" in the metaphorical use of the word. Phenomenologically, a clear
distinction must be made between the attuned space in a genuine sense, i.e.,
between a space given as "real" under specific and always freely actualiz-
able changes of attitude of the subject who can find himself in it as real
corporeality, andan attuned "space" in a transferred sense. The "transfer,"
in its turn, is a clearly demonstrable datum of lived experience; even when
we "live" in such spaces and have "resettled" ourselves in them, then, given
a corresponding attitude, the attuned space can become in principie a
specific datum of lived experience. This in turn is possible on the basis of an
already understood spatiality in the genuine sense as defined above.
The complex of phenomena constitutes a unique field of interesting and
specific analyses wherein it is possible to distinguish various types of
transfer. Here is not the place to investigate them further. Only different
metaphorical meanings of space should be mentioned: they are found in ?--
~ i o m s , in----peiry,nthe illusory spaces of drama and their
numerous realistic-spatial surroundings on the stage space of the theatre, in
the imagined and imaginable spaces of fictionalliterature, etc. It is remark-
able that the contemporary theory of literature pays specific attention to the
theme of space (see Bachelard, Blanchot). The motivation for a typological
reevaluation of the literary aspect of space stemmed from W. Kaiser. This
dissolved the traditional principies of articulation in the theory of fiction,
principies that previously pertained purely to the subject matter. See Kaiser
22 Lived Space
2. Characteristics of Attuned Space: Fullness and Emptiness
The primary access to attuned space is offered by the character of
Jhings_l!0.J;. This does not constitute a prejudgment concerning the
relationship between space and spatial things. No matter how this
relationship will be determined, it is in any case clear that space as}.
such is accessible only from its fullness. It is not readily obvious at{
the outset whether it is possible to investigate an empty space. What
from the spatiality of things. The characterization of space is
only through a delimitation of
various kinds of thingly attributes. But the notion of "thing" in
attuned space must be taken with a grain ofsaTf u pon
it, leaving our thought with its customary although insufficient
categorical distinction between things and properties. Yet strictly
speaking, it is precisely in the lived experience of expressive things
that such a distinction does not occur .
and object, _ which _ thj_s_ disti:qgtion presupposes, is a __ recent
thng as
lav prperties be perceived; .with - its
"character."
5
It is no accident that our attempts to describe the lived
--
experience of expression lead us to specifications suggesting, and
drawn from, the psychic domain. This implies neither a misuse of
language nor an inappropriate anthropomorphization, even when
we do not take things in their objective color- or form-
characterizations, but rather in their own unique and momentary
"toning." Exuberant or sad, hard or tender, soft or severe-these are
both sensory formations and sense-formations, symbols in Goethe's
sense, which lend us "specific dispositional moods" anl which at
the same time possess "sensible, moral, and aesthetic purposes";
one can "even employ them as a language when one wishes to
express primordial relationships."
6
Goethe's hesitation, his suspi-
cion of being exposed to the ecstatic, seems to be baseless. The lived
(1), pp. 360-65, and (2), pp. 24ff. See E. Stroker for an entirely different
typology of imaginative space in painting.
5. The distinction between property and character was first made by L.
Klages. Similarly, J. Konig, following the fourth of E. Husserl's Logical
Investigations, differentiates between determining and modifying predi-
cates (pp. 1-16). For a characterization of the latter and its specific kind of
relationship to the subject, see especially pp. 32-41.
6. J.W. Goethe, Sixth Section.
The Attuned Space 23
experience of attuned space expresses itself readily in such primor- S
dial relationships. Prior to objective recognition, its forms are 7
already understood "physiognomically."
In attuned space, therefore;teasfinction between primary and
secondary qualities does not exist. The form of things communicates
as expressively as does their color. Both are equivalent in their
relevance for mood; in their physiognomic content they are capable
of mutual support, enhancement, or dissolution, and of eliciting
dissonant experiences. Even the size of things is here far from being
a mere quantity. The experience of the powerful or the sublime, as
well as the graceful and elegant, belongs essentially to size. It reaches
complete fulfillment where its harmony is sustained and maintained
with the rest of the characters. Regardless of how it may be
determined, regardless of what aesthetic criteria may be sought for it,
it is decisive that even size remains incorporated as a moment of the
expressive totality, and thus it cannot be extricated and given an
independent character without the loss of its valence of mood. The
of .. _is .
espec1ally convmcmg m a trend of p1ctonal art that mcorporates m
0
'1t
its formation the effectivity of precisely these two momnts.
"Expressionism" owes its expressive power, not to mention its
sovereignity, to the presence of form and size factors not bound to
any objective attributes of a thing.
Form and size are constitutive factors by which we apprehend )-, . +,
generally n_ot o_nly the perspe?tivity of space: als_o all the rest of
the determmatwns related to It, such as centnclty, onentedness, and
finitude. What can be said about them with respect to attuned space? n
By raising this question, the subject betrays at the same time the fact
that he already belongs to another space; no other state of affairs
underlies the claim that the spatial perspective is conceivable in
terms of the size and form of things thaii that the size of things is
observed comparatively as greater or smaller in relation to others and
that their forms are consciously perceived in certain truncations and
intersections with others. But this means that they must be regarded
as purely quantitative determinations. As such they make their first
appearance in the space of intuition. is ')
tion. If we infer from this that "there is" no perspective in attuned
space, then we require additional explications in arder to preclude
closely related misunderstandings.
Indeed, in attuned space things are encountered in a specific order
of being behind one another. Yet while size and form vary in
accordance with perspectivallaws, the constitution of attuned space
24 Lived Space
does not depend on them. That the perspectiva! arder can become
physiognomically significant and participate to a great degree in
determining the spatial atmosphere is not contested here; this is in
accord with the functions of form and size as expressive characters.
Thus it is sought in pictorial presentations of this space for the sake
of its mood-bearing moment. Yet it is essential to incorporate this
phenomenally incontestable state of affairs appropriately. Attuned
space "is" perspectiva!, but not because perspective is a structural
property of this space; the claim is rather that the lived experience of
expression evoked in attuned space by the perspectiva! arder of
things can only be given because the experiencing subject in this
space does not live without the objective space. While living in
attuned space in a most primordial world-posture, prior to all purely
objective orientation, the subject already has the objective space
"behind his back."
Attuned space therefore bears determinations that allow it to
appear as profiled against the background of the pure space of
intuition; thus it is never free from the determinations of the latter.
Even the perspectivity of attuned space is a characteristic present by
virtue of the space of intuition. Yet perspectivity does not belong to
attuned space as such. The resulting consequences for the orienta-
tion1and centering of attuned space will be pursued in subsequent
paragraphs. Meanwhile it is essential to touch upon a phenomenon
that, along with the color, form, and size of things, possesses great
power with respect to atmospheric space.
Sound plays a uniquely significant role in attuned space. In
space-determining power it surpasses even color and form. At first
this appears dubious. After all, the arder of colors and form is an
arder of one next to the other, i.e., the genuinely space-constituting
arder, while sounds are present one after the other in time. More-
over, color and form can be more precisely located in space than can
sound, which only indicates a direction.
To counter the first doubt, it is necessary to become free from the
presupposition that every space must be defined as an arder of one
next to the other. It is not yet certain that the space investigated here
can be circumscribed by the classical Leibnizian definitin. If the
claim about the importance of sound could be confirmed, then there
would be an indication of a structure entirely different in kind.
Although it is a matter of gradation, localization is attained with a
differing precision for the colored object and for the source of sound.
In contrast, between color and sound there is a complete qualitative
difference that touches upon the spatial characters of both.
The Attuned Space 25
The color is attached phenomenaliy to an object, not only as a lc\or / ~ u
property, with all its nuances and differentiations of intensity, but
also asan expressive presence. Color can never appear except on a
colored object. It is otherwise with sound. Sound detaches itself
from its soun;e. It is not a property but an event; it is not attached to
something but draws nearer and recedes into the distance. It can
indeed be said that it is a sound of something, that points to a source.
But this character of originating with something is, strictly speaking, Souttdjflb,'i
not appropriate to sound but to noise. Noise is always noise of
something and is always perceived as such. Sound, in contrast, has
an existence that is detached from its source; it becomes a sound
precisely because it is capable of such detachment. This state of
affairs reaches its completion in music. Here it is the sound itself that
fades away and strikes up, not the cello or the first violin. Of course
sound can be heard as the sound of an instrument; but in this case we
are dealing with an entirely different mode of lived experience. Not
only does the expressive content attain a purer and more complete
presentation and effectivity in the lived experience of the pure tone
formation, the sound experienced in its free and appropriate exis-
tence has a different spatial character. It will be experiencel more
intimately than a sound of an instrument; it pervades space and
determines its atmosphere more completely than it would if it
were perceived in relation to its source.
The same process of detachment can be traced with extreme
clarity in spoken language. It too is primarily a sound formation
brought about by specific organs of the body. Yet the experienced
sound is not merely the sound of a speaker. By virtue of the sense
content of the word, the detachment occurs here so completely that
one requires a specific shift of attention in arder to grasp it as a word
of the immediate speaker. This shift will be spontaneous when
someone speaks a language of which we "do not understand a
word." Here the word will be come noticed as a word spoken by
someone, who emerges into the foreground with all his personal
accentuations. With the emergence of the shift of signification from
the spoken to the speaker, the experience, in its conceptual sense,
approaches noise. As a sensory formation, the word is subsumed
under laws, making possible a theory of language, just as sound
obeys the laws of harmony. The clatter of a motorcycle, however,
does not follow any musical syntax. Noises are not objectifiable; ~
their "sense" exhausts itself in being noise "of something." This is
not the p ace to ela orate furhher relationships and differences
between tone and linguistic s o n ~ d. We have memly suggested how
Cli ~ J
+/5
26 Lived Space
the sense-fulfillment of a sound formation goes hand in hand with an
emancipation from its source.
What sort of determining forces noise and sound have for space
becomes clear when the same space is experienced once as sound-
less and then as filled with sound. Colors and forms maintain the
same order and distance, remaining remate forms that change only
when dusk and night blend and dissolve their contours. The sound
i
coming toward us not only fills also contracts it. A distant
church moves closer wiTha resounding of its bells. lts inner
space becomes noticeably smaller as soon as it is pervaded by the
sounds of the organ; in a siient film, the screen attains a peculiar
distance.
A relationship of this kind between space and sound presents a
new problem. The sound formation taken in itself is a temporal
formation. What remarkable relationship exists here between space
and time? We shall return to this question in another context
(pp. 36 ff.).
The qualitative content of attuned space is not exhausted by being
an expressive content of color, form, and sound. lt is possible to
suggest a domain of lived experience in which the experience of
expression has remained in its purity. This purity must have
persisted not only across the objectified and reified world, but has
remained inaccessible in principie to any other apprehension except
the physiognomic. Literally speaking, animate creatures also belong
among the "things" of the attuned space; they constitute its atmo-
sphere more clearly than do inanimate things and their spatial
valence is easier to detect. From the standpoint of objective space-
consciousness it must be complete! y inconceivable that ill. J)}.I'J' . .
presence "space would become immense" for us, or "too
'(i
that they could allow us "leeway" or could squeeze us out of our
"place," compelling us to leave our location and to move away from
them spatially. This sphere of the expressive experience of fellow
creatures shows most clearly the remoteness of attuned space from
all measurable determinations. lts distances are other than measur-
able. the concept of. the
region of the measurable, then g_cag_be said that there are no
attuned space. ---
----Tlirough-Itsfil1ness, attuned space has become visible, at least
allusively. A question could be voiced concerning with what justi-
fication we infer space from fullness-what might space otherwise
be? The sense of such a question implies that space is something
other than its fullness. lt assumes an empty schema capable of being
The Attuned Space 27
seized in itself. Perhaps this question js influenced by conceptual
analogies of the space of intuition. Yet despite the manner in which
the relationship between space and thing may be structured in
intuition, the essence of attuned space excludes the differentiation
between empty and full space. To wish to extricate an empty form of
attuned space from its formations would be senseless. Indeed, it too
contains a lived experience of emptiness, the encounter of "noth-
ing," the dissolution of its formations, which "have nothing more to
say"; yet this emptiness, experienced as a mood, is not to be confused
with the empty form of space sought by abstract thought. Attuned
space is not merely given and lived in its fullness, but rather it is this
fullness itself. Its loss is the loss of attuned space. This is the reason
why we speak of fullness as we would of attuned space itself.
3. Place and Po sitian in Attuned S pace
Attuned space has its general characteristic in being a form of
expression. As such, it is nota manifold of positions, nora system of
dimensions. Place and position in it are not determined by an
assertion of quantitative relationships of a there to a yonder: Even
m y own place in it is never merely a point determined relative to the
place of things. I am in my workroom-this does not mean being 1
somewhere "next to" the chimney. 1 allow the inside of a
Romanesque church to affect me - yet my "place" in it is not at a
comer of the quadrature. Certainly, these positions belong to the
space in which 1 reside; its formation, its architectonic articulation,
are part of its fullness and shape its atmosphere. Yet they do not
determine my place in it; for my lived attunement, no tangible
relationship holds between the lived experience of space and the
position in which 1 find myself as a corporeal being. M y phenomenal
place in attuned space is not ascertainable. As an attlineabeing,I
have no determinable locatioln
Thus in attuned space my lived body cannot be a point of
reference for a relative determination of the position and the place of
things. Attuned space has no center of reference from which it would
be possible to arder and separate the experienced things and
determine them as there in relationship to a fixed here. lndeed, in
m y vision, hearing, and touch, things are constantly present and thus
are related to me in my corporeal organization; yet this relatedness
not only does not play a part in the actual experience of things but
even in reflection on experience it does not appear as a facet of
attunement. It is a relatedness of things as pure perceptual objects to
28 Lived Space
me as a corporeal-physical body, and this relatedness as such
belongs to another space. Relationships from the oriented space of
intuition reemerge here quite readily. Yet here this space is not yet
thematic; in attuned space it remains veiled in the sense described
above. Its perspectivity is present in attuned space without being
part of attuned space. That attuned space does not possess a center
must be taken in the same sense. The centricity of space requires its
relationship to a corporeity that is necessarily of a type that is
localizable, i.e., a corporeal-physical body. Indeed, as an attuned
corporeity I am not without location, yet it is not through location
that 1 am an attuned corporeity. Corporeity as a bearer of expression
has no spatial position.
Lack of orientedness is closely related to the absence of a center in
attuned space. More precise results will appear in the analysis of
expressive movement. In the attuned space "there are" no preemi-
nent directions to be taken in arder to attain something, as would be
the case in the space of action. When one follows directions of roads
on a map, one does so in arder to orient oneself-yet one does not
orient oneself in the mood space of the landscape.
Attuned space yields itself fully and completely first of all in a
purposeless lingeri;g
there Tii- spac ,-ai:bifiarlly and
externally interchangeable. The thing, as a bearer of expression, has
"its" place. The place belongs to its expressive power and accentu-
ates or diffuses the physiognomy not only of the thing but of the
space as a whole. An exchange of place of two things not only
abolishes their genuine expressive fullness but also noticeably
)
disturbs the atmosphere of the e.ntire spac.e. P. ieces do
(]!) not "belong" in the marketplace, nor church windows in an office.
7
It is precisely
clashes of style, that the place of the thing appears most strikingly;
on the one they reveal that __
-;
appropriate relationship is capable of transforming attuned space as
a whole and of disrupting its atmospheric unity. This shows clearly
how little it can be characterized as a mere proximity of places and
locations. Its structure deviates markedly from a mere manifold of
positions. Rather, it is given as a closed unity of expression that can
7. K.v. Drkheim, p. 406, already indicates these lived experiences of
"belonging there."
The Attuned Space 29
be affirmed or negated, accepted or overlooked as an inseparable
whole.
4. Nearness and Remoteness
Sin ce in a
iJLYiilid.iOL.its ... d i sta nces. In
attuned space there are no measurable distances. This is understand-
able from the qualification of things by place and from the holistic
structure of attuned space. In.metric space, distances between things
can be increased or decreased without incurring the same changes in
the things themselves. In contrast, in attuned space such changes do
involve the things themselves: their "in-between" is not a mere
relationship of arder to be considered apart from, and in comparison
with, other things; rather, it is a qualitative, expression-bearing
characteristic of the thing itself.
As such, it is related to the "place" of the experiencing subject,
i.e., to his being attuned here and now. The nearness and remoteness
of things open up to the subject. The difference between them is not
a mere matter of degree; nearness and remoteness differ qualita- <J
tively. A distance is composed of smaller segments. Yet nearness
does not consist of other nearnesses, and remoteness is not com-
posed from various remotenesses. Distance can be separated into
partial distances, but remoteness cannot be divided into remote-
nesses and nearness, into nearnesses. A remoteness does not contain
another remoteness, just as nearness does not contain another
nearness and an addition of nearnesses does not result in remote-
ness.8 Distances subsume things as perceptual objects, but not
nearness and remoteness. The latter are expressive phenomena,
although expressive in another sense than color, form, and sound.
The nearness of a thing in attuned space does not have its meaning
only because its content appears clearly, but because it is near tome.
Nearness and remoteness are not attributive determinations of the S
thing grasped, but of my mode of grasping. J
Nearness is pure being-present, lingering here and now or being
threatened or beset by things, which, by their irritation, intrusion,
and oppression, leave no "space" for one's own relations and
movements. This space can be established in two ways: in yielding,
fleeing, and removing oneself; or in surpassing, overpowering, and
8. In another context the irreducible characteristics peculiar to nearness
and remoteness are mentioned by E. Straus (2), pp. 288ff.
30 Lived Space
overcoming. The constitution of the remoteness of attuned space
takes place in this dual movement; thus remoteness is that which is
"no longer," it is "there" where I no longer am, where I have ceased
to be present- a limit of my attuned space. It lies "behind" me, it
has departed from my view and vanished from my actually present
lived experience. Yet it is also something else: what is "not yet,"
what is still veiled from my view, and sois also a limit of space that
lies "befare" me. It becomes an aim of my search, an orientation of
my departure. Nearing is not the dissolution of a remoteness.
Distances can be traversed, yet remoteness can never be reached.
With each nearness appears a new remoteness. It is only nearness as
an attained here-now in a coming from a no-longer and lingering
befare a not-yet, just as remoteness is only the surpassing of
nearness. Both are reciprocally related.
It is striking how spatial and temporal relationships pervade one
another here. Nearness and remoteness are spatio-temporal phe-
Q nomena and cannot be conceived without a temporal moment.
While yielding a horizon for attuned space, they also contain
another aspect of conceiving this space as "space-time." It is only
where nearness and remoteness are abolished-i.e., in metric
space-that space and time are sundered. Distance is a purely
spatial quantity.
------
5. Movement and Orientation in Attuned Space
Nearness and distance are relative toa motile living being capable
of approaching or distancing itself. It may seem that the problem of
motion is secondary iir significance. Since all motions . occur in
space, then obviously space must be assumed as the "play-space" of
motion. Hence the analysis of motion could be avoided for the
understanding of space. Space appears as a precondition of any
possibility of motion.
At the outset, the following investigation will be based on the
phenomena pure and simple, in a specific sense-i.e., we shall
observe the phenomenon of the self-movement of the subject.
Self-movement always served as a sign of the living: if something can
move "itself," can follow its own impulses and not mechanistic
causes, then it belongs to the living region. To the extent that life
articulates and unfolds itself in its richness of gradations, it also
grows in the richness of its forms of movement. The richness oflife's
growth and the increasing development of movement variations are
The Attuned Space 31
mutually implicatory movements of the same unitary development.
9
The bodily dynamics distinguish themselves from mechanical
motion by more than the vitality of inherent drives. Were this the
sale distinguishing characteristic, then the perception of movement
would be reduced to an organism traversing a basically meaningless
i
series of linear points. But in fact each apprehension of a bodily
movement is constantly transcended toward a specific intention: the
movement is a searching, defensive, furious, tired, happy movement
and hence is already grasped as a dynamic mode of relationship to
the world. It is understood from within and in relation to its
situation; both limit one another. Thus the question as to whether a
pre-given situation motivates the movement or whether the move-
ment constitutes the situation cannot seriously be asked.
This means that expressive movement unfolds itself and is com-
prehensible in its total fullness only in and from the space wherein
the attuned being lives. That one moves differently in a
than in a factory:, can
be understood solely by understanding the coordination of reflexes
ano muscularccmtfficfions. Tlis is not to deny the fact that such
coordii1at1oon1leinovient of parts may constitute a necessary
condition. Nonetheless, expressive movement must be grasped from
the experience of the space "in" which it takes place. But what is the
sense of this being-in?
In its singularity, attuned space is always a specific space of
motility. It allows and requires specific forms of movement and
excludes others. The movement of my lived body is a comportment
toward the expressive content of these spaces, and it either fulfills or ()
rejects their demands. At the same time, it is a space of movement in
another sense. If my attunement is created by the atmosphere of
space, then my movement appears to be formed by it and attuned
toward it; yet this is only one side of a reciproca! relationship. There
is also the other side. Space is not just a space
becomes a space, in its specific attunement through my movement.
Through m y movement 1 canegafe-If, atfeSlTo1T;'O'fCl'se mys8Ifoff
9. The contemporary theory of science of biology and physiology and its
"introduction to the subject" (J.V. Uexkll, A. Portmann, F.J.J. Buytendijk,
V.v. Weizsiicker) has freed itself from the path taken by a purely physical-
istic approach to physiology; it explicitly sees itself as an effort of "under-
standing," without devaluing the results of earlier researches. The work of
Buytendijk, in particular, is outstanding in its strictly delineated conscious-
ness of method.
32 Lived Space
\
from its content. Thus space no longer remains what it was, but is
immediately transformed. In a reverse manner, I am not only a
receptacle for its contents but a co-carrier, and first of all a shaper of
its atmosphere through my movements.
Attuned space is not just an expressive form "within" which my
movement occurs. lt arises as the space of my own movement. My
expressive movement is exactly what its spatial content is as mine;
in turn, the spatial content itself has a moment of my activity. If we
keep in mind this strictly reciproca! relationship between space and
expressive movement, then we have a principie for attaining a more
detailed exposition of the structure of this space. lt was already
noted that this space is not a pure manifold of positions, but a
formative whole. The phenomenon of movement allows further
determinations of space that are hardly graspable by any other
means. Here we are confronted specifically with the problem,
touched upon above, of orientation in attuned space.
First, a question emerges with regard to the lived body and its
expressive movements. What are its characteristic movements in
attuned space and what can be inferred from them for the body's
orientation?
Most decidedly this is not a question of how the lived body as
one's own is experienced in attuned space. In being attuned I am one
with things and with space. My lived body is included in such an
attunement without any intention on my part toward it, or without
its condition being somehow present thetically to my awareness.
Such an awareness can emerge suddenly with qualitatively unique
sensations-data characterizable in accordance with "postura! situ-
ation," "depth," and intensity as typical modes of the inner giveness
of one's own body.t
0
Yet in attunement as such there is no positional
consciousness of one's own body. lt is reflection that first places my
body, with its modes and manner of intertwining with the world,
back into the sphere of judgment. Yet the lived body of attuned space
is offered to reflection in a unique manner: here it is phenomenally
unarticulated. Torso and limbs constitute a complete unity in the
attuned body. They separate only in an oriented space where the
limbs assume specific functions. They can specialize themselves to
the extent that the limbs assume an almost independent role from
the trunk, which, determined by the limits, is as it were only set into
10. A bodily "inside" with "postural situation" and "depth" presents the
body itself as spatial. For the relationship between lived body and physical
body, see p. 52 of the present work.
The Attuned Space 33
motion by them. In expressive movement, however, limbs and trunk
are mutually interactive. In this mutual attunement and harmony of
the individual dynamic forms, we experience charm and grace.
These appear in walking, striding, and dancing, as well as in resting
and standing still. E ven pointing and grasping in attuned space is not
simply the protrusion of the arm from the trunk, as is the case with
the conscious intent of getting something in the space of action;
rather, the limb remains completely caught up in the dynamics of the
whole body.
If we consider such an undifferentiated body in its modes of
motility, we notice salient differentiations from its purposive move-
ments in the space of action. Buytendijk rightly criticizes Spencer,
pointing out that by equating charm and simplicity of effort, he
completely misses the essence of expressive movement.u Its unique-
ness and richness is precisely in the unintended power, with its
fullness of possibilities undetermined by any rational point of view.
When Schiller characterizes those movements that "correspond toa
feeling" as charming, he expresses precisely the effortless, aim-free
movements consisting of "the beauty of form under the influence of
freedom. ''
12
What does the absence of any economy in expressive movement
mean for attuned space?
We take a couple of steps back in arder to see something better,
turn around, move to the side in arder to allow something to have an
all-sided impact. In the space of action "there are" indeed such
movements and, seen from the side of an organism, there is no
difference between them. Expressive and purposive movements do
not differ in terms of their course but are distinct in sense. In the
space of action, a step back is an "unnatural," compelled movement;
a step aside to avoid an obstacle or to make room, or any turning
around, are avoided if at all possible. In attuned space all these
movements are noncompulsory, unintended, and yet obvious. This
is not because in our attunement we are not oriented toward our
movements- even in the space of action we are not explicitly turned
toward the activity of the body, but to our aims and the means
available to attain them-rather, it is the space that constitutes itself
without compulsion, while the space of action is experienced as a
demand.
Expressive movement offers an answer concerning the orientation
11. F.J.J. Buytendijk (1), Section F.
12. F. Schiller, p. 254.
34 Lived Space
of this space. Attuned space has no specific orientation. This does
not mean that it is completely without orientation; such a space,
as space of a lived body, is impossible. Yet it lacks a qualitative
differentiation of values among orientations. The movements all
essentially occur with the same spontaneity, equally effortless and
obvious. Attuned space is atropic.
This state of affairs is supported by yet another phenomenon. If
one assumes that the endless multiplicity of movement orientations
of an oriented space remains related to the triad of the elemental
pairs of opposites-up-down, right-left, front-rear-then it appears
that orientation can be differentiated only to the extent that the pairs
of opposites are differentiated. Yet just these differentiations slip
away in attuned space. The differentiations mentioned are, as
differentiations in orientation, primarily functional; they are condi-
tioned by the functional articulation of the lived body, which lends
space an asymmetrical appearance, We shall speak of this while
discussing the space of action. In attuned space the body is "prior"
to such articulations. This can be seen in the case of powerful
expressive movement and posturerevealing a high degree of sym-
metry.13 At any rate, what has too often been repeated is also valid
here: the experiencing subject observed by us can hardly discover
the atrophy of pure attuned space since other kinds of ontologically
grasped possibilities of comportment toward the world are already
accessible to him. Y et the attuned space as such do es not contain
differentiations of orientation.
In attuned space these differences contain another differentiation
of value, i.e., valence of mood. The elemental pairs of opposites are
qualitatively distinct as bearers of expression and significance.
Hence the opposition up-down is strongly pervaded by an atmo-
spheric and specifically religious difference, constituting a mythical
residuum carefully preserved in all cultural development. In the
early Christian form of life there were also magical meanings of left
and right. Thus the left side meant the honored, the holy, yet also the
demonic and despised. It had to be protected by adornments.l
4
13. In addition there are the conspicuous ethnological discoveries that the
known religious rituals of prayer, devotion, and contemplation are symmet-
rical in posture. Yet let us also recall the bodily posture in sudden fear, in
abrupt astonishment, the gesture of supplication, the gesticulation in doubt
or in sadness, the exuberant joy, the posture of staring off into space, etc.
14. See J.J. Bachofen. In expressive experience there is generally a
noticeable residuum of myth, to the extent that the mythical structure of
The Attuned Space 35
The relationships prevailing between the mode of movement and
the determination of orientation are particularly clear in dance. As a
paradigm of expressive movement, dance reveals in a greater relief
all the moments that are given only weakly in attuned space, since
they are intertwined with aspects of movement belonging to oriented
space and thus cannot be grasped in their purity.1
5
consciousness can be considered as an early form of historical conscious-
ness. As E. Cassirer has attempted to show, the space of the primitives
possesses its own arder and articulation solely within physiognomic char-
acteristics. Certainly for him mythical space is merely a primitive precursor
of scientific space; the modern consciousness of space is specified by its
total liberation from such mythical elements. For him the expressive
experience of modern consciousness remains limited solely to the sphere of
I-Thou encounters, and thus is inappropriately narrowed.
It would require an entire investigation to deal with the problem of the
space of primitive peoples living today. These issues must be avoided
precisely because it is questionable whether the phenomenological-
descriptive method is adequate for them. The old demand of Schelling to
understand the mythical world not "allegorically" but "tautegorically" is
being reassessed by ethnology. The world of the primitives cannot be simply
delimited as primitive in comparison to ours; rather, it must be interpreted
as a self-contained whole with its own structural regularities. The magic and
myth must be understood from "the presuppositions characteristic of
peoples of these times" in arder to acquire a categorical system befitting the
differing consciousness-structure of these peoples. This is the requirement
proposed by A. Gehlen (2), p. 10, who contrasts it sharply to the method of
"understanding" which merely "starts with the present and moves toward
the past." Undoubtedly, this demand is applicable not only to ethnology but
to all historical sciences which take history seriously as history and as such
manifestly present phenomenological description in the broader sense with
a diversified field of work.
Nevertheless, we must not overlook the limitations of phenomenological
description in the specialized ethnological areas. Our contemporary con-
sciousness of the primitive mentality is notably an alien consciousness,
which always arises in the medium of its own categories. Even where we
employ methodological procedures that take seriously "the presuppositions
of such a mentality ," these eo ipso en ter the "understanding" of a conscious-
ness that requires, according to Gehlen, a structural change of its own. It is
only with such an explicitly self-critical limitation of its claims that an
ethnographically oriented "phenomenology of space" would be justified. At
any rate, phenomenology today would find a rich accumulation of ethno-
graphical materials, especially in the areas of the pictorial arts (see the works
of E.v. Sydow, H. Tischner, H. Khn, H. Read, H. Werner).
15. P. Valery interprets dance poetically and F.J.J. Buytendijk (3), pp.
36 Lived Space
Dance is a motile and complete oneness of torso and limbs, a
playful exuberance of dynamics and a beautiful aimlessness of
specific movements for which there is neither a point of departure
nor an aim, neither a beginning nor an end. It is an entirety of
movement. Just as it is indivisible into parts and pieces, so also its
space is not graspable in terms of a series of points on a path and a
multitude of locations. That dancing lacks any fixed and determined
orientation is quite obvious: while turning we are moving forward,
while moving backward we are stepping onward, while moving
onward we are returning-all this appears "impossible" in an
oriented space. The movement continuously assumes its space and,
so to speak, tenses it anew with each phase.
The previously underscored state of affairs ppears here from a
novel side. Each movement occurs not only in a spatial, but also in
a temporal-rhythmic, succession of movement phases. If we remind
ourselves of the role that movements have for attuned space, if we
keep in mind that attuned space is accomplished as a movement-
space, then we are once again offered a reason to speak of it as a
space-time.
6. Attuned Space as Space-Time
There are three states of affairs pointing to an interconnection
between space and time: attuned space as a form of executing
139-49, analyzes it psychologically. Its relationship to space was first
emphasized by E. Straus (1). Straus takes the movement of dance to be
expressive movement as such and attributes to it a particular _"presenta-
tional space." Since he sees an essential relationship between dance and
music, he concludes that it is through music that the structure of space is
first "created." For him, the "presentational space" is one of sound and thus
has a structure determined by sound. Straus's treatise is distinguished by its
refined observations and nuances and appropriately shows the general
interrelationship between space and movement. Yet it lacks sufficient
methodological strictness and results, on the one hand, in an unclear and
unrelated multitude of "spaces," and on the other, in a premature
absolutization. Thus an independent audial space is not guaranteed just
because the space of tone and noise ca-determines the structure of such a
space. That Straus could attribute to them a space-constituting function lies
in his inappropriate narrowing of the space of expressive movement to
"presentational space." Only subsequently will it become clear wherein lie
the fundamental conditions of space-constitution (see Part One, Section II,
of the present work).
The Attuned Space 37
movements, theii co-determination by something temporal (sound),
and their horizonal limitation through nearness and remotness as
spatio-temporal phenonena.
In arder to examine this interconnection more closely it is neces-
sary to touch briefly upon the problem of time. Yet it must be
explicitly emphasized that within the framework of our problem we
offer only a rough survey, a few hints and nota complete presenta-
Han.
The interconnection between space and time is usually limited to
the notion that space, taken as a location of points next to one
another, is related toa now, a temporal "point." Conversely, space
belongs to time insofar as the "flow" of time is represented as a
one-dimensional formation, as a straight line, i.e., as a spatial
continuum. Yet so conceived, the relationship between space and
time is only a loase proximity, a mere "also." Space appears "in" the
temporal point only as a postulate of conceptual completeness. It
reminds us that "next" to space there is also time, to be thought of in
the mode of now. In any case, the now allows everything spatial to
remain as it is. Space "is," while time "flows," and in each temporal
point space remains the same. Things change in it with time, but
space itself remains timeless.
M. Palgyi can be considered to be the first thinker who has gane
into the problem of the interconnection between space and time in a
persistent and original way.
16
With his conception of the "flowing"
space where each temporal point has a corresponding world space,
and each spatial point a corresponding temporalline, there appears
a new point of departure for subsequent space-time researches. It is
remarkable that it was not philosophy but physics that took posses-
sion of it!
1
Palgyi sa:w such an appropriation of his conception as a
crude misunderstanding and turned against it with indignation. Yet
in fact the alleged misinterpretation of his "flowing space" into
Minkowski's space-time continuum was accomplished so easily
only because in truth even in Palgyi the space-time interconnection
is seen as nothing other than a mere coordination. His space is "more
flowing" only because it is in the flow of the "adjuncted" time.
Nevertheless, there is a difference whether space is more flowing
because of time or whether it is flowing of its own accord and thus
conditions the flow of time itself. Palgyi fails to notice that his
chosen point of departure for this question is conceptually unfavor-
able. Like the physicists, he begins from the assumption that space
16. M. Palgyi, pp. 1-20.
38 Lived Space
and time are mathematical manifolds of points, that they confront
the thinking subject as objects and can be coordinated one with the
other after they have been grasped separately.
But what if we are dealing with a space that is not merely a
manifold of points, and that is not merely posited as the object of a
judgment, but is rather lived? What if time is originally not a
homogeneous, mathematically differentiated series of points, but a
lived time, a present that binds future and past? Would space and
time be merely coordinated, or is there an entirely different kind of
connection?
If our investigation of time were to correspond with our planned
investigation of space, then, in accordance with our method, we
would first observe how time is possessed by th subject----rnot as an
objective thesis, an object for consciousness, but "ekstatically" in
his lived comportment toward the world. From there we would
move to the analyses of objective time. It will become clear in
subsequent contexts why we are following the reverse procedure. At
first we shall discuss briefly both the question concerning the mode
of givenness of time in consciousness and that of the constitution of
this time consciousness.
Time is experienced as flowing: all events, all changes, and all
duration, occur "in" it. "In" it the subject knows himself and the
beginning and end of his corporeal existence. As such, time is
primarily given not as a change of the contents of consciousness but
as a happening of the world. Everything happens, occurs, runs its
course in it; in it there is enduring, abiding, beginning, and end;
Time is originally given as being-conscious of an event in the world.
A momentary occurrence is able to show the flow of time more
clearly than an enduring one. Experienced as now, in the mode of
the now, in the privileged givenness of originary vividness "in
person," the now is already past and has become something that has
been sinking continuously and irrevocably into the "depth." Finally,
it is extinguished in a completely empty background, inaccessible to
consciousness. Consciousness is aware of this vanishing on the basis
of its capacity to follow the now in its modifications, to trace it
retentionally, although not as far as one would wishP What is it
here that persists, what is it that in a specific retentional phase does
17. See E. Husserl (4), # 77, for the distinction between retention and
reproduction. Subsequently we shall deal with Husserl's hyletic data.
Protention, for which there are essential analogues, must be left aside in this
brief sketch of the time problem.
The Attuned Space 39
not allow the now to change to another now but holds it as just
having been and thus as the having be en of a now? This persistence
in the stream of time would be incomprehensible if the simplest
world event did not have a specific sense-content, if the conscious-
ness of the now were not a being-conscious of a sense-bearing now,
understandable through all the phases of retentional changes. If the
now of the sound of a bell were to become the whistle of a
locomotive, and thus to be experienced differently in each point of
the retentional continuum, then it would not be something that has
been-it would not be the retentional modification of a now.
The identity of the sense guarantees the relationship toa now of
something that is passing and makes comprehensible the "now" and
the "having been." Furthermore, the identity of the sense-content
implies that the given time has a holistic structure even if it is
distended across the ekstatically lived time. Although distinguish-
able in terms of past, present, and future, this triplicity of temporal
modes is not separable; the just-passed and the just-coming are
co-determined by the now, and it by them. Moreover, the phenom-
enal now is not a discrete point; taken chronometrically, it can
persist. Further, there is another remarkable characteristic that
distinguishes the originally given time of consciousness from chron-
ometric time.
The previously observed singular event as something given is an
abstraction. Were we to follow a number of successive events in
retention, the su'ccession itself would also be obtained in retention,
and thus the originary time of consciousness would assume an
unequivocally directional determination. The latter event cannot
surpass the earlier (which can be the case, for example, in a
genuinely false reproduction). Earlier and later are retentionally
irreversible; time in its flow never reverses its direction. Neverthe-
less, outside the narrow sense of retentional modifications, its
temporal distance undergoes a specific change. With progressive
obscuration, the distance collapses toward an "infinitely remate"
nebulous point where all distinguishable contents vanish. The
originally given time is oriented, finite, and perspectiva!, as is
oriented space.
But does not the retentional continuum continuously lose its
orientation precisely because its point of orientation, the living now,
is itself in "flux"? Does it not require in turn an orientation toward
something that "holds" this continuum? This something as such
must have extremely contradictory characteristics: on the one hand,
it must necessarily be changeless, fixed, and identical; and on the
40 Lived Space
other, it must not remain outside of the temporal flow. Here appears
the riddle of what we call consciousness in the form of self-
consciousness. This consciousness does not vanish temporally with
the changing objects but maintains itself as the selfsame. 1t outlasts
all changes and retains its own identity in the flow of time. Yet it is
this very consciousness that can detect its own identity only in the
flux. This does not mean that self-reflection arises along with the
being-conscious of time, such that consciousness thereby gains
access to itself, but only that the conditions for the possibility of a
time-consciousness as such are constituted in it. Time can thus be
given objectively only to a being who knows itself.
Reproduction must be distinguished from retention. Reproduc-
tion, as a recollection, is the way that natural consciousness moves
as time-experiencing. While retention is a flowing after along what
was once present, reproduction is a representation of what has been.
lts self-orientation to the past is a spontaneous accomplishment of
consciousness. Consciousness is capable of "transposing" itself to a
locus or a duration of the past that is illuminated anew as if it were
in the modality of the now. Since we live "in" remembering, this
new now is neither the originally given now, present "in person" in
the lived experience, nor is it present as existent, since what is "in
person" is the now of a past. Meanwhile, this now has long since
been surrendered to the stream of the retainable; it is repossessed in
reproduction and through it "made" into a living present. Yet here
the retentional perspective undergoes a characteristic transforma-
tion.
Since recollection is phenomenally a fulfillment of the retentional
continuum, whose temporal stretches are seen perspectivally, it
seems that reproduction cannot give us any absolute size constancy.
Yet with representation as a spontaneous act of self-transposition
there appears a new problem. Taking the fact that in the act of
representation the newly attained now d o e ~ not have the mode of
givenness of originality, "perspectivally" then means: perspectiv-
ally to any re-presented now, i.e., in principie to any arbitrary point
of retentional continuum. Yet each duration in proximity to the now,
the "freshly" reproduced, points to a slight perspectiva! shift. If it
were possible to fulfill each position of the retentional continuum
with a "new" (re-presented) now, then the perspective would
thereby be removed, the "actual" duration of the individual tempo-
ral stretches would be regained in (re)experiencing, and time would
be homogeneous. lt would be necessary that any point whatsoever of
the retentional continuum be reproducible, whic;h in principie is the
The Attuned Space 41
case; yet, in addition, each of these positions would have to be
reproducible "now," which in essence is not attainable. Instead, it is
possible to repeat the recollection of a reproducible event an
arbitrary number of times; the reproduction can turn back at will to
the same event of the pastas often as it wishes. In such a repeatabil-
ity there is a corrective factor for the perspective of time. Since two
recollections are never the same, in that they are enacted from a
different now and are continuously motivated by diverse factors,
such repetition of reproduction offers the possibility of freeing an
event of the past from its perspectivity. Moreover, when an event is
reproduced, each of its recollected now-points can be rendered into
a new recollection and this in turn can be repeated. This means that
the structure of reproducible time is similar to that of homogeneous
time. Regarded phenomenologically, the free motility of the repro-
ductive glance prepares the ground for the construction of chrono-
metric time.
Despite the many simplifications of the states of affairs, the
discussion presented above should not deceive us concerning the
real complexity of the temporal problem. Essentially it had to do
with the modes of givenness of time in natural consciousness. It
remains in a sphere of temporal givenness that is not the most
original.
Time offers itself to reflective analyses in a mode in which it is not
"given," or consciously presentas flowing, but in a way in which it
is appropriated and lived, in the primordial sense of the word,
without thetic awareness of it. Heidegger developed this "ekstatic"
mode of time appropriation from the care structure of Dasein.ts Time
in this conception of an enraptured ekstasis is even farther removed
from the time of consciousness as a continuous, homogeneous series
of the one after the other. Unlike its appearance in objective
consciousness, where time is constantly related to the present in its
three modalities, time here is a unity of the three phases of
"ekstases." Here the future is not later and the past not earlier than
the present; rather "Dasein is temporality as past presencing future";
it is constantly "contemporaneous." As will become obvious, this
contemporaneous structure of lived time can be grasped only as the
"time of Dasein," but not as an inner-worldly time. It has its
ontological ground in the temporality of Dasein as the sense of its
being.
Undoubtedly Heidegger was able to articulate structural charac-
18. M. Heidegger, 65-71.
42 Lived Space
teristics of lived time that had to escape Husserl because of the
latter's orientation toward the constitution of objectively experi-
enced time in pure consciousness. But how is the temporality of
Dasein as contemporaneiety to be understood in relationship to the
inner-worldly time? What the latter means for the being of the
subject, and what it is in its own right, was never interrogated by
Heidegger. A more exhaustive investigation of this question would,
however, lead us too far afield.
After this digression into the question of the problem of time
we renew the discussion of the interconnection between space and
time.
If Palgyi's proposal turned out to be inappropriate for showing
structural unity between space and time, the analysis of time-
consciousness could only show that the "time of intuition" is
complete! y free from spatial moments. Its relationship to the space of
intuition was only one of analogy, implying a deeper layer of
interconnection that was not yet itself revealed. In arder to discover
a plausible interconnection between space and time, showing not
only that they have a relationship of coordination but that temporal
components are traceable in the spatial structure and spatial com-
ponents are traceable in the temporal, the interconnection must be
sought in the forms of lived spatiality and temporality. And these
cannot be grasped objectively but must be presented unthetically,
not known but lived or accomplished.
That such a search for space-time unity did not arise only from a
speculative need was evidenced by the phenomena in attuned space.
What leads further into the question raised above is precisely its
characteristic form of accomplishment in expressive movement. If
one seeks the mode and manner in which not only spa:ce but also
time is obtained "ekstatically," one finds it precisely in living
movement. While this is true of both expressive and practica!
movement, there is, nevertheless, a noticeable difference between
them. While the latter realizes the "ekstatic" unity of the three
phases of time in its accomplishment, in objectifying reflection it
allows this unity to be incorporated into objective time. The former
is completely incapable of such an incorporation. Even reflection
upon the expressive movement does not succeed in grasping it as
"occurring in" a specific time. Expressive movement is nota process
that begins and ceases, commences "now" and breaks off "then." It
is upsurging and resounding without fixed limits; it has no disrup-
tions in objective time. Even its stillness is an arrest in the whole of
movement, which not only contains or includes past and future in
The Attuned Space 43
the present, but is pure presencing, pure contemporanaiety. Subjec-
tively and objectively, expressive movement is the paradigm of an
"ekstatic" temporal wholeness to be thought prior to any differenti-
ation into temporal modes.
Any state of affairs must be grasped from its time characteristics in
such a way that attuned space, as a specific space of movement, is
constituted through something temporal. Temporality does not
mean here a process in an already present objectifiable time, but a
grounding of time, time as "ekstatic," projecting. Corporeal move-
ment can be formulated in total indifference to space-time. At the
same time, it is corporeal movement that first of all incorporates time
into space and the latter into the former. This is a highly inadequate
way of spmiking, stemming from a thought that is dominated by two
separate "forms of intuition." Yet in corporeal movement there
seems to be an ontological ground for an originary unity of space-
time (pp. 145ff.).
It is quite remarkable that the traces of time in space show up
much more clearly, phenomenally speaking, when the subject lives
in it more "timelessly." In attuned comportment toward the world
there is no time for the living subject; a being who is essentially only
an attuned corporeal being knows nothing of temporal flow. Time is
dissolved in the experience of attuned space--and in the reflective
analyses of this space, time will be grasped as a moment of space. It
is distance in particular that allows the cognition of the temporal
moment of space. As spatio-temporal phenomenon, distance
determines the motility of the horizons; as spatio-temporal, it is the
limitation of the "metaphorical" spaces. Distance delimits the
attuned space both as temporal space and as attuned time-space.
lt is on this account that in the nearness and remoteness of at-
tuned space, spatial and temporal determinations are mutually
pervasive.
7. Attuned S pace and the Experiencing Subject
The structure of attuned space appeared in our investigation of its
fullness and emptiness, of place and situation, of its nearness and
remoteness. Its essential characteristics presented themselves in the
reflective analyses of the experience of space.
At this point we can offer two valid objections. Philosophical
consciousness since Husserl has taken care to trace the distinctions
between something and the experience, perception, and cognition of
that something. We must not overlook that in our special problem we
44' Lived Space
are not concerned with noetic-noematic unity, insofar as attuned
experience is not an intentional orientation toward something. Still
the question could be raised concerning the relationship between the
experience of space and space itself.
Is space itself inaccessible to the analysis of the experience of
space? The answer to this question was already prepared in the
considerations of space and expressive movement; it requires com-
pletion and deepening.
lt appears that experience is here to be understood only with a
grain of salt. Attuned space does not confront the experiencing
subject as something independent, a being in itself that must first
opera te in arder that one may "react to it." S pace does not ha ve an
existence of its own, separated from the subject, to which the
subject should establish a relationship; as a space of my movement,
it is much more space through me than my experience is through it.
The strictly reciproca! implication prevailing here between space
and the experience of space can more easily be shown through its
characterization as an event than it can be subsumed under fixed
concepts. What can be grasped in immediate perception as an
encounter between subject and space appears all too easily to be a
paradox.
Attuned space offers itself in its fullness.lt appears that the fullness
is nota mere methodological expedient, a specific approach to space
that could be grasped on another occasion by other means; rather,
space is this fullness itself. Its vanishing is thus not the disappearance
of something in it but a loss of something as a whole. The phenom-
enon of disappearance best reveals the reciproca! relationship be-
tween space and the experience of space. While attuned space, with
its full physiognomic content, corresponds on the experiential side
to the uninterrupted fullness of psychological impulses announcing
themselves in the richness of expressive movements, the obliteration
of attuned space is only one si de of the reciproca! relationship. On the
other side, the loss of attuned experience extends all the way to the
"emptiness of heart" of which Scheler spoke and for whom it is the
"originary datum of all concepts of emptiness as such."
19
The indif-
19. M. Scheler (3), p. 298. In addition, see H. Tellenbach's report concern-
ing the spatiality of melancholy. According to him there is frequently found
with these patients a disturbance of the relationship to the space of action,
which Tellenbach, following Heidegger's Dasein-analysis, suggests is a loss
of "nearness" in the sense of making room for equipment (p. 292). However,
the "emptiness" of melancholy does not correspond in a phenomenologi-
The Attuned Space 45
ferent or callous person fails to notice anything that addresses him;
to the extent that he feels ernpty himself, he stares "into ernptiness."
With the phenomenon of absolute emptiness as well as with that of
concrete fullness, the reciproca! relationship between space and the
experience of space is visible, a relationship that can hardly be
thought in sufficient intimacy.
Unlike things, attuned space is not "outside" me. It "surrounds"
me, it is about me-this is its mode of givenness. But I am not in it
in the same way as things are in it. Through my experience, I am
spatial on the basis of my possibility of being an experiencing being
that is an expressive, motile, living being. Attuned space is with me
as an accomplishment of my attuned being, relating to it in mutual
conditioning and fulfillment-this is its mode of being. In this sense
its being exhausts itself in being a being for an experiencing subject
and above this it is nothing "in itself."
An immediate objection arises: attuned space must be "merely
subjective." The concept of subjectivity, as well as its correlate, is
engulfed in a multitude of meanings. Even if such concepts, are
gnosiological and not ontological, the purpose of our investigation
requires their brief discussion.
For one, subjective means that which is appropriate to the ego;
subjective is everything that is in me. This relationship is
determined and limited through the (unreflectively experienced)
relationship of my ego to my body. What is decisive here is not the
body itself but this relationship. Bodily possessioJ).s-limbs,
organs-are nothing subjective. Subjectivity requires a relationship
to an ego that is distinguished from its lived body even by a
non-reflective consciousness. That this relationship of the body
signifies essentially a subjectivity means only that the ego grasps
itself as an ego of a lived body. It is not that it is a lived body as
such, but that it is a lived body of an ego, of a self, that makes it
capable of distinguishing what, in an ordinary sense, is one's own
and what is alien. Subsequently it will be shown that the sense of
the relationships "in me" and "outside of me" is based on this
relationality of lived body to ego (See pp. 140 ff.). In this sense my
perceptions, surmisings, and stirrings of feelings are subjective; they
belong to me, they are my "own." The correlate to this subjective
cally precise way with the ernptiness we are refering to. Tellenbach's
observation that the inner ernptiness "corresponds" to the ernptiness of the
world and the ernptied space "intrudes into the inner ernptiness" (p. 16), is
nevertheless worthy of notice.
46 Lived Space
side is what is alien to ego, alien to me. Things and their
relationships do not belong to me; even "alien" persons are in this
sense not subjective.
Only that which is m y own can be "merely subjective." By this we
mean deceptions, errors that appear as such in the disruption of a
coherent understanding, in the cancellation of an experiential con-
text, of a continuity of sense. They can be discovered by me or by
others. Because of the possibility in principie of such a discovery,
there appears a further meaning of the subjective. What is subjective
is that which an ego calls its own, what is with me and m y ego. Thus
in a primary sense the other, the alien, ego is subjective; it is a
"subject." l':go-ownness is then not only my own but an ownness of
each ego, all egos. lts opposite concept is all that is aliento each ego,
the totality of the "objects."
This subjectivity is of a singular kind. Each ego is one by virtue of
its lived body; the Hved body is a mode of givenness of "my" ego as
well as of "another" ego. Another ego and my own ego mean
corporeal ego and nothing else. But as such, ego has surpassed its
own, and I have surpassed my own, corporeity. This transcendence
of the body grounds the subjectivity of the subject as universal. lts
correlative concept is objectivity as intersubjectivity. Language, art,
history, and science are objective in this sense.
What sense can then be attributed to the claim that attuned space
is subjective? lt cannot be subjective in the first sense; it is not "in"
me but "about" me. The serenity of a landscape is not that of my
sensations but is something in the landscape. I can experience it in
contras't to my own (ego-own) subjective sensations. In this sense
. attuned space is also objective.
Obviously this claim does not mean that attuned space jg objective
in the sense of intersubjectivity; it is not a homogeneous space that
is the same for all subjects. lt must be admitted that in its expressive
fullness the attuned space, with all of its specificity and uniqueness,
appears "always" as my own. Yet I know myself in it at the same
time with others-or without others-alone. Solitude is comprehen-
sible only as an absence of others. To become aware of solitude is in
its own way to co-experience the other. Thus attuned space is
comprehensible only as a possible space for the others. lt retains an
intersubjective moment and therefore an objectivity in the latter
sense indicated. lts relationship to an experiencing subject, which is
certainly its general characteristic, cannot be confused with subjec-
tivity in the sense described above.
What can appear as doubtful conc3rning the existence of at-
The Attuned Space 47
tuned space is, in any case, the fact that in experience it cannot be
grasped objectively. This is not due to attuned space, but to the
subject, which, in the mode of being of attuned experience, relates
itself sensibly to a world without standing over against it as a
"sub j ect."
J 1 {l \Q"'--\, !(
1
'v , (:J
1
\ '('
Chapter Two
The Space Of Action
1. Preliminary Remarks
Lived space is not exhausted in being solely an attuned space. This
does not yet encompass the totality f spatiality, which, as experi-
enced, has its specific characteristic of being related to a corporeal
subject. Attuned space turned out to be a space of expressive
movement. As such, it has the uniql.ieness of being free from
differentiations of orientation. This is its profound difference from
< both of the other forms of experienced spatiality.
The concept of orientation is characterized by two factors. Orien-
tation presupposes differentiatable zones, determinable loci, posi-
tions, a here and a there; orientation is always an orientation
from .... toward. Furthermore, it includes the possibility of move-
ment appearing as "directed" and oriented. Expressive movement
--l. has demonstrated that not all movement is oriented. It has also turned
out that this is closely associated with there being no point of refer-
ence in its space. Thus lived space can be oriented only to the extent
1/11\f,-that there is a formation of a center in it. Orientation and centering
of space are only two different terms for the same state of affairs.
If there is to be a form of lived spatiality manifesting a univocally
determined orientation, then the corporeal subject must exist in it as
a lived body that can be grasped univocally as located here in
distinction to each there. In this way the corporeal subject appears in
two respects: as acting body it is the point of departure of goal-
oriented activity; as unity of the senses it is the'point of reference of
sensory intuition. In accordance with these two modes of comport-
ment there appears a distinction between the space of action and the
space of intuition.
The primary formal determination of the space of action is the
"wherein" of possible activities. The concept of activity will be
understood as the realization of a project through the lived body and
48
The Space Of Action
1
49
.-/
its members. Thus we avoid the that the lived body is an /
implement, a means in order to .. : . This frequently employed
instrumental image is factually incorrect; the lived body is funda-
mentally distinct from all i:hstrtiments. It stands in an irreversible .,
relationship them by having and manipulating. ThiSISiOtThe
into the problems indicated. Yet at the outset the acting
body must be seen as capable of manipulating implements. Subse-
quent observations will consider the form of bodily activity employ-
ing certain tools as means. But is the way in which bodily activity is
understood of signifigance for its space of action? This question
introduces into our investigation a specific prejudice concerning the
relationship between the space of action and the acting subject. It is
the task of the subsequent analysis to take a stance toward this
question and to show what it means to say that all activities occur
"in space." It cannot be decided at the outset whether the en tire
structure of this space is indifferent to the fact that its center contains
a being who employs implements and instruments. .
But the subject does not merely employ the implements, which
leads us into a problem. The subject of this space understands the
use of equipment in whose manufacture the mathematical construc-
tion and the laws of exact science play a role. These instruments,
strictly speaking, "apparatus" presuppose the geometry of measure
and the theory of physics. It may be objected that this unexpected
intrusion of the natural sciences into the corporeal sphere of the
subject disrupts the basic methodological principie of this investi-
gation. This principie requires that the mode of comportment of the
lived body be the sale point of departure of our investigation.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the observed subject's behav-
ior does not differ phenomenally in the least when he handles a fS
constructed apparatus instead of a simple implement: in the actual
process of activity, both are equally means toward the attainment of
something. Otherwise he would not be an acting being oriented
toward the utilizability of things.
At first glance this may suggest that technical construction need
not be considered in the space of action. The silent assumption
would be that nothing is changed through its structure. This assump-
tion has been always made whenever the space of action entered the (
field of philosophical interests. Credit is due to existential philoso-
phy for having pointed out this assumption within the framework of
its problems. Yet its conception of the space of action does not
recognize an apparatus as a problem. Of course no methodological
inconsistency lies therein; the existential concept of being, i.e.,
50 Lived Space
"Dasein" (as Heidegger's "care" and Merleau-Ponty's "Etre engage")
and the limitation to the sphere of everydayness is sufficient for the
existential point of departure.
lt is different with us. Indeed, we retain our point of departure; we
observe the subject in the space of action, in which he comports
himself and understands himself in an unreflective attitude. Phe-
nomenological completeness requires that we consider his manipu-
lation of apparatus; this is no less a phenomenon than pre- and
extra-scientific praxis. That the active subject engrossed in the world
of work may have no insight into the specific mode of mediation
between the lived body and constructed apparatus does not justify
our discrediting it in philosophical investigation. Yet we face a
specific problem: the manipulation of apparatus suggests a state of
affairs whose signifigance can be understood only after the investi-
gation of geometry, i.e., its so-called application to lived space. The
appearance of fact at the head of our investigative progress intro-
duces factors of technology the comprehension of which assumes
that the aim of our progress has been attained. Moreover, the
clarification of such factors assumes that the investigation of the
lived spatiality as a whole has been completed.
This phenomenologically most disquieting situation places us
befare two alternativas: either we must curtail discussion of those
phenomena that can be sufficiently articulated in the attained level
of investigation or, while including all the phenomenal contents, we
must make anticipations of areas to be analyzed subsequently and
declare such anticipations explicitly through reflection. Previously
discussed reasons suggest the appropriateness of the latter course.
The access to attuned space turned out to be its fullness. The
expressive characters of its things constituted its atmosphere. The
expressive world dissipates in the space of action. Here the expres-
sive characteristics of things vanish into the qualities required for
their utility. Thus they lose their effective and communicative
physiognomy; now they reveal their suitability or resistance "in
view of " a goal. This is not to say that the glance now penetrates a
kind of expressive level of an entity and reaches its genuine
determinations, its "in-itself." Expressive characteristics and prac-
tical properties of an entity do not relate to one another as a surface
to a kernel. An entity is, in its mode of being, phenomenally whole
and complete in its determinations; it has them as a whole. Further-
more, they do not comprise its different "sides." This way of
j speaking obscures the fact that we are confrontad by determinations
of two distinct regions of sense, constituting themselves only in the
The Space Of Action 51
subject's orientation and perspective. The applicability and the
usefulness of entities are first given as such in a particular grasp;
they are opened in projects of activity, and apart from these projects
they remain incomprehensible. Furthermore, this is not to be under-
stood as if an entity were apprehended thematically as the being-
there of Dasein or the coming-before-us of things. Active engagement
with things has a specific mode of seeing, appropriately character- . . .. \
ized by Heidegger as "circumspection." Its discovery rests in the e 'f(' ~ \ ~ ' '
implement, whose mode of being is ready-to-hand.
20
The structural analysis of implements in the space of action,
nevertheless, runs up against sorne difficulties. This space is
ontologically relative to a temporary project, to a specific situation of
the acting subject. Thus it contains a temporal moment; the space of
action has a dynamic texture. Is it possible to discern anything about o
it? In its constant transformations, must it not continually escape
conceptual boundaries? It would be so if each project were an
absolute beginning, if each actual space were completely distinct,
and if between them there were no constant transitions and perva-
sive regularities. Asan acting being, however, the subject appears in
his historicity. He finds himself in an already formed world of work
that is not his own creation. Immersed in it, he also participates in its
constitution. While transmitting and at the same time shaping what
he has acquired, he realizes a relatively enduring project-such as in
his vocational decision-from which the actual attains sense and
meaning. The spaces of action of greater historical dimensions,
formed in common cultural labor, comprise at the same time the
framework for momentary individual projects and their "spaces"
which are neither rigid nor motionless but can be supported,
extended, or negated in actual activity.
It is not necessary to follow this problem any further; rather, we
must ask: how does a space of a historical being present itself, a
20. M. Heidegger, 15-16. We appropriate these differentiations without
following Heidegger's ontologicaL conceptions. Specifically, we do not
accept the validity of th![ bntol,o,gi_cal j)rirl!Y>of circumspection, in contrast
to Heidegger's notion of the"free comprehension" of pure sight The claim
that circumspection is more primordial and that sight is founded on it has
for us no sufficient phenomenological grounds. Heidegger overlooks the
fact that circumspection already implies sight, and that the latter is
co-constitutive of circumspection. Moreover, the comprehension of some-
thing as present at hand must place in brackets its qualities of being
ready-to-hand.
----
52 Lived Space
?
space that has in its content a being who is no immersed in
attunement but is oriented toward the world and strives toward
aims?
2. Place and Region. The Space of Action as a Topological
Manifold
Like attuned space, the space of action is not justa mere multitude
of points in three dimensions. Yet structurally the latter does not
conform to the former. It will be shown that the texture of the space
of action has become looser, that the role played by the part in the
whole has become different, less far reaching.
The space of action is articulated according to places and regions.
Place is thelocus of what is usable, discovered by the acting body. In
essence: H1ese delimiti:ions agree with Heidegger: place is the lo.cus
where implements belong. (Included are the privative modes of not
belonging there, lacking, being in the way.) In belonging thf)re, tl}e
thing possesses a relationship to "its" place. The same
appeared in it must be understood
differently. In attuned space the place. belongs constitutively to an
entity not only in the specific mode of being as a carrier of
-:: expression, but as an essential co-determinant of, space as a whole.
In the space of action this is true only in a very restricted sense.
That something ready-to-hand has "its" place is determined prima-
rily by a moment of its duration: it is found there "customarily,"
most of the time," and it has its "usual" place there in accordance
"t... S
with the requirements of the acting subject. Yet its belonging to a
place is not identical with its appertaining to a place and is not a
constituent of its utility as such. Its place is variable within a broad
limit, without a loss of its character as a specific instrument. Within
limits to be specified more closely, of the ready-to-haJJ.d
things can in with()l!t t}e lqss of!he mocie()f
being ofthe-ready-to-h'u.d. -This variability is rather a constituent of
the place of an instrument and opens the possibility for "dealing"
with things.
This comprises a fundamental difference from things as bearers of
expression. One may compare paintings in a gallery, arranged for
"proper viewing," with the same paintings in a workshop, merely
lying "to hand" for framing. Things that are bearers of expressive
a value receive fewer and less carefully selected places when they
become mere objects to be used for a purpose! Of course, the place of
the ready-to-hand is not sorne arbitrary location. In its mode as being
The Space Of Action
53
I
J)(ir v' {:lt\jr,
ready-to-hand it is relative to the subject's mode of being asan acting
subject and thus to a great extent independent from place; yet as
in an thuSit must
be handy.
Handiness can have two meanings. On the one hand, it means an
adaptability to the organization of the body. That which is handy in
this sense is what is "tailored to the body," such as hand tools and
instruments of daily practice. It is a handiness of means for the
realization of projects. On the other, handiness means "having in
hand" something light and comfortable, reaching for the useful in a
shorter way, with lesser hindrance, etc. It contains a specific
principie of economy that will be considered subsequently. Both
meanings must be separated: a thing that is handy in the first sense
\cv\ (
can be unhandy in the second sense, as being "there" at this _ _
moment. The handiness in the second sense is a function of place. ( ov..N) IC\
This of places; it is decisive for the \I'PI'
space-of action as a manifold of - ---- -- - - - --- - ,
For a thing to llave "its,; place ils-an instrument means that the
place is constitutive not simply for its mode of being ready-to-hand
per se, but for its handiness within a project. In order to be handy, to
refer to a profect, it must be by the choice of a subject.
Yet its place is notan arbitrary the ready-to-hand .
as such can in principie be anywhere, even if its whereabouts is not
an arbitrary place in a system of locations. Heidegger mentions that
the place of an implement is discovered when it is missing. In such
an "absence" the implement simply "comes before us" as it vanishes
from being ready-at-hand. Nevertheless, it is the place that becomes
obtrusive as having something missing, even if what is conspicuous
by its absence is something ready-to-hand. "Something missing" can
only mean a missing implement, the search for which is precisely a
search for it in its ready-to-handedness - a search motivated by its
having this mode of being as such.
21
The phenomenon of the search
reveals the "being somewhere else" of what should be ready-to-
hand. Even while missing it remains ready-to-hand with the possi-
bility of place variations; it will be missed precisely because its
handiness has assigned a specific place to it as its "there." It is
21. Heidegger does not distinguish between ready-to-handedness as a
mode of being of an implement and handiness as a characteristic of an '1 \.,
implement in an actual project;-thus the phenomenologically unjusti-(.---- e \
fied transition from ready-to-handedness to present-at-handedness in the \
1
_ \
"search." )''V<lO} tC!f
. \.A
54 Lived Space
prepared, placed appropriately, accommodated, misplaced-all
these characteristics which are not given for things in the attuned
space include a certain Qrovisionality of place.
An important note must be added. The place of an implement
. J,; 1 prescribed and determined by handiness in an actual project is
rc'""'!!'c '1 variable within specific limits, i.e., it cannot be precisely fixed. This
. \-1 of the region.
ot Until now the places of the ready-to-hand were seen in isolation as
individual there and yonder. The abstraction inherent in this view
must be revoked. In a project of action the individual implement is
always transgressed toward something further; it obtains its appli-
cability from a and in turn points to a
possible totality of involvement. The place of an implement in its
"there" is determined by the range of other places. Its "there" points
toa specific surrounding of other "theres." Its "where" is at the same
time "whence" and "whither."
and whither is the whole field of action; it is
__ It is possible to extricate relatively
independent areas from it, regions as entire places of relatively
closed connections. Each space of action is divisible into such
regwns. To demonstrate this more strictly would call for a more
exact analysis of the notion of a project than can be offered here. We
limit ourselves to thesuggestiorithafan activity presents itself in
terms of its stages of fulfillment, determined in accordance with
partial aims. This has todo with the manipulation and use of things,
building relatively independent and limited functional contexts
within a totality of instrumentalities of the entire project. Within the
entire space of action, these factors constitute relatively closed
1
space-manifolds, comprising what we have called regions. Their
relationship to the place of an individual thing leads to new and
important determinations that make the structure of the space of
action transparent.
The place of the ready-to-hand is determined through its regions,
although it is not precisely determined. It is not a punctiformal
1\) "where," but a somewhere within the limits of its region. The region
is the "leeway" for the free variability of place within which it
remains changeable in a restricted sense: it remains the same only
when it remains within the region. The ready-to-hand is allowed
certain displacements without its place ceasing to be the designated
one. Two things find themselves "in the same place" only when they
are found in the same region. Region is definable in this manner: a
place-manifold whose specification adequately satisfies the ques-
Cllv.A
,(1
1\W\N\
The Space Of Action 55 ,'e NL
tion concerning the whereabouts of an implement. "At the work
place," "in the desk," are such specifications, which are topograph-
ically exact as to the region of an implement in the space of action.
In principie, this includes the possibility for further specification
of any region. The extent of each region is relative to a project and to
the possibilities of activity Regions as such
natfrst eStaolisrum-ana opened but rather arise with what is
encountered in them. What is encountered determines the extent
and the limitation of their further articulation and
the possibility of j)f and thereby the
structuratwn of space. For a wanderer a sea 1s a smgle homogeneous
region confronting him as impassable, while the fisherman, the
swimmer, and the seafarer, in their differently motivated actions,
know how to discern its various regions; for them it is structured
differently. In addition, each individual project allows in principie
the nesting of regions through progressive articulation. Of course,
this articulation cannot be extended arbitrarily. The articulation
determines the degree of structuration. In this regard, different cases
must be distinguished.
In a fully structured space any region can be neste_d at will. We can
characterize such space by the fact that the nesting df regions can
continue in it without restriction. A thoroughlyiliuctured space
would be a space where each arbitrary sequence of nesting of regions
could converge toward a determnate place, and, conversely, where
every place could be reached through at least one such sequence of
nestings. In the thoroughly structured space, the process of nesting
determines place univocally as a point of this space.
22
Due to its
mode of establishment, it, too, is a region, although the smallest
region of this space. This do es not coincide with the definition of the
region as the "leeway" for the free variability of place. Yet it must be
that _a titQ!_D!lghly an
limit of the space of action. As a whole, it can never be completely
structured, but or less structured. We are talking about a
structured space that is neither completely structured nor totally
unstructured. This implies that it can have completely structured
parts and also totally unstructured partial spaces. The latter pre-
cludes distinguishable places and hence does sequence
22. As an extreme example one could think of a surface covered by tile.
Each tile in it has its place from which no shifting is possible. Each such
place is a "point" of the tile-surface, i.e., in its space there is no "there" to
be established with greater precision.
'V\()1
(/1
56 Lived Space
of nestings of regions. What is essentially unattainable is that the
space of action as a whole be completely structured or completely
unstructured. The latter is excluded due to its referential relation-
1 ship to the acting subject. As a bodily being in this space, he
understands his locus from other loci, his here from distinguishable
theres and yonders. This differentiability determines the orientation
of space. This means that the spce of -t!on, asoriented space, must
__ . - - -
It must be mentioned why the space of action is not completely
structured-more precisely, why at least one partial space must be
given in which the nestings do not converge toward fixed places.
Why must it have places that are not "firmly" established but, on
the contrary, can be determined only up to a space with leeway?
The basis for this was already suggested: the ready-to-hand attains
its place as required by our dealings with it. These dealings not only
allow but demand the inexactness of the locus given iritlie space o'
the of leeway is nota
topographical inexactude to by progressive activity;
rather, it is a positive determination accruing to the place of an
, , instrument. If leeway were lacking the things would be too dense;
'0J .. "'": (1 the acting subject would not be in full possession of his possibilities
8-f'r \ of action. Rather, he would object to the "overfullness"-without
\ the leeway of its place, the ready-to-hand would be completely
[L
0
unhandy! The variability of place within a region is constitutive of
the locus of the ready-to-hand. Place is thus topographically
graspable "only" up to a region-yet in the smallest region, the
space of leeway, place, can always be established with sufficient
exactness.
In any case, the leeway as such is not given thetically to conscious-
ness in activity. lt is co-posited circumspectively in the management
of so:r;nething without there being any intention expressly oriented
toward it. The acting subject is not primarily attending to a region,
,' (.vl of his project that
_the Only the encroachment of the too-dense
fl!\ revea1s the lack of leeway. Conceptually, this involves a view which
l\-.'-\\\