Republic SUPREME Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

L-47521

of

the

Philippines COURT

Acting upon petitioner's request for reconsideration, the GSIS, on April 11, 1977, reiterated its previous denial of her claim. On April 14, 1977, treating the request for reconsideration as an appeal, the GSIS forwarded the records of the petitioner' claim for review by the ECC. On October 26, 1977, respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS' action of denial and rendered its own decision dismissing petitioner's claim (ECC Case No. 0509). Respondent ECC's decision was anchored upon the findings that the ailments are not listed as occupational diseases; that there was no substantial evidence of causal connection; and that, in fact, the evidence was that the deceased had already contracted the Hansen's disease before his employment. In the exact words of the ECC: In the case at bar, since the deceased's ailments are not listed as occupational diseases, appellant herein must prove that such ailments were caused by deceased's employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by his working conditions in order to be compensable. A mere cursory reading of the evidences on record, however, will disclose that appellant failed to submit the required proof of causation. There is no substantial proof in the record from which we could draw the conclusion that indeed the nature of deceased's employment as Janitor of Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic could be traced as the direct cause of his ailment. Hence, in the absence of such evidence, we are not disposed to disturb on appeal the findings of the respondent System. On the contrary, we find the records that the deceased, prior to his employment in this office, was already suffering from his ailment of Hansen's disease. This proves that his working conditions did not increase the risk of his contracting the same. If at all, his employment merely aggravated his ailments. Unfortunately, however, aggravation of a preexisting illness, a rule under the old law, is not anymore a ground for compensation under the new law. Thus, the cases cited by the appellant cannot be raised as authorities to support her claim. Petitioner now seeks a review of the ECC decision. (pp. 76-78, Rollo) There is no question that the claim falls under the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended. Under Article 167(L) of the Labor Code and Section 1 (b) Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the conditions therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease

July 31, 1987

CAROLINA CLEMENTE, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM Department of Health (Dagupan City) and EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0509 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and denied the claim for death benefits filed by Carolina Clemente, widow of the late Pedro Clemente, The undisputed facts of the case are summarized in the memorandum for the respondent Government Service Insurance System, as follows: Petitioner's husband, the late Pedro Clemente, was for ten (10) years a janitor in the Department of Health (Dagupan City), assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Laoag City. He was hospitalized from November 3 to 14, 1976 at the Central Luzon Sanitarium, Tala Sanitarium, Tala, Caloocan City, due to his ailment of "nephritis," as per medical certification of his attending physician, Dr. Winifredo Samson. He was also found to be suffering from such ailments as portal cirrhosis and leprosy, otherwise known as Hansen's Disease. On November 14, 1976, Pedro Clemente died of uremia due to nephritis. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the GSIS a claim for employees' compensation under the Labor Code, as amended. On February 4, 1977, the GSIS denied the claim of the petitioner because the ailments of her husband are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of his work and/or (sic) or were not in the least causally related to his duties and conditions of work. On March 9, 1977, petitioner requested for reconsideration of the GSIS' denial of her claim, stating that the ailments of her husband were contracted in the course of employment and were aggravated by the nature of his work. Petitioner alleged that her husband, as janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic (Laoag City), worked in direct contact with persons suffering from different skin diseases and was exposed to obnoxious dusts and other dirt which contributed to his ailment of Hansen's disease. Citing further the cases of SevenUp Bottling Co., of the Phil. v. Rimerata, L-24349, December 24, 1968 and Avana v. Quisumbing, L23489, March 27, 1968. Petitioner stated that her husband's ailment recurred in the course of employment presumably due to his direct contact with persons suffering from this ailment.

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is increased by the working conditions (De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92, 96). As the illnesses of the deceased are admittedly, not listed under Annex "A" of the Rules as occupational diseases, the petitioner bases her claim under the theory of increased risk. She alleges that the deceased, as janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, was exposed to patients suffering from various kinds of skin diseases, including Hansen's disease or leprosy. She avers that for ten years, the deceased had to clean the clinic and its surroundings and to freely mix with its patients. She claims that it was during this time that he was attacked by other dreadful diseases such as uremia, cancer of the liver, and nephritis. On the other hand, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission contends that the petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that the deceased's ailments were indeed caused by his employment. It maintains that the deceased merely had a recurrence of a pre-existing illness aggravated possibly by the nature of his employment and that there is no evidence on record showing that the nature of the deceased's employment was the direct cause of any of his illnesses. The respondent Government Service Insurance System concurs with the views of the respondent Commission. It, however, argues that it should be dropped as a party respondent in this case. It claims that the petitioner has no cause of action against it, the subject of judicial review being the adverse decision of the respondent Commission. We rule for the petitioner. In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (144 SCRA 421, 46) we held that: Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation (San Valentin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 160; Better Building, Inc., v. Puncan, 135 SCRA 62). There are no stringent criteria to follow. The degree of proof required under P.D. 626; is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra, citing Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635; and Acosta v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 109 SCRA 209). The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra; Sagliba v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 723; Neri v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 127 SCRA 672; Juala v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 462; and De Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685). It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a workconnection (Delegente v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 67; and Cristobal v.

Employees' Compensation Commission, supra). Probability not certainty is the touchstone (San Valentin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra). In this case, we find sufficient evidence on record to sustain the petitioner's view. The records disclose that in resisting the petitioner's claim, the respondent Commission cited the following medical authorities: Uremia refers to the toxic clinical condition associated with renal insufficiency and retention in the blood of nitrogenous urinary waste products (azotemia). Renal insufficiency may be due to (1) nephritis, bilateral pyelonephritis, polycystic kidney disease, uretral or bladder obstruction, SLE, polyarteritis, amyloid disease, or bilateral cortical necrosis; (2) acute tubular necrosis resulting from transfusion reaction, shock, burns, crushing injuries, or poisons; (3) sulfonamides precipitated in the kidneys or ureters; (4) nephrocalcinosis resulting from extreme alkalosis, diabetic acidosis, dehydration, or congestive heart failure may result in azotemia, or may predipitate (sic) severe uremia in the presence of already damages kidneys. Reference: Lyght, Charles E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy; M.S. & D. Research Lab.; 11th Edition, 1966, pp. 257-258. Portal Cirrhosis: A chronic disease characterized by incresed connective tissue that spreads from the portal spaces, distorting liver architecture and impairing liver functions. Etiology, Incidence and pathology: Portal cirrhosis occurs chiefly in males in late middle life. Malnutrition is believed to be a predisposing if not a primary etiology factor. The role of alcohol is not clearly established. Alcohol probably exerts a direct toxic effect on the liver, and also increases malnutrition by providing calories without essential nutrients. Cirrhosis has been produced in animals by diets low in protein and specifically low in choline. The addition of choline to these diets prevents cirrhosis. Chronic poisoning with carbon tetrachloride or phosphorus produces changes similar to those from portal cirrhosis. The liver is diffusely nodular, scarred and dense. Microscopic section shows parenchymal degeneration cellular infiltration, proliferation or scar tissue and areas of regeneration. Fatty changes are present in the early states. Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy: M.S. & D. N.J. 11th Edition, 1966, p. 928. Hepatoma (Liver cancer) refers to malignant primary tumor of the liver destroying the parenchyma arise (sic) from both liver cell and bile duct elements. It develops most frequently in the previous cirrhosis liver. A higher fraction of patients with post necrotic cirrhosis develop hepatoma than those with portal alcoholic cirrhosis. This may reflect the more active necrotic and regenerative processes in the post necrotic cirrhosis liver. Most large series indicate that 60% or more of hepatomas develop in a previously cirrhotic liver. The cirrhosis of hemochromatosis seems particularly liable to

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hepatomas as high a fraction as 20% of patients with hemochromatosis die from this cause. Reference: Harrison, T.R.: Principles of Internal Medicine; McGraw Hill; N.Y., 5th Ed.; 1966, p. 1072. Leprosy is a chronic, mildly contagious, infectious disease characterized by both cutaneous and constitutional symptoms and the production of various deformities and mutilations. The causative organism is an acid fast rod. Mycobacterium leprae, first described by Hansen in 1874. The mode of transmission is obscure, although infection by direct contact appears likely. The disease is found predominantly in tropical and sub-tropical Asia, Africa, and South America. It is endemic in the Gulf States of the USA, Hawaii, the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merk Manuel of Diagnosis and Therapy; " M.S. & D.; 11th Ed.; 1966, p. 847. The nature of nephritis, however, was discussed by Mr. Daniel Mijares, GSIS Manager, Employees' Compensation Department, in his letter dated February 4, 1977, denying petitioner's claim, as follows: Nephritis is an acute, diffuse inflammation of the glomeruli or kidneys. It usually follows previous streptoccocal infection mostly in the upper respiratory tract. Because of this, it is always thought that nephritis is the result of an auto-immune or allergic reaction to infection, usually streptococcal. (Rollo, p. 20) The foregoing discussions support rather than negate the theory of increased risk. We note that the major ailments of the deceased, i.e. nephritis, leprosy, etc., could be traced from bacterial and viral infections. In the case of leprosy, it is known that the source of infection is the discharge from lesions of persons with active cases. It is believed that the bacillus enters the body through the skin or through the mucous membrane of the nose and throat (Miller and Keane, Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, (1972), p. 530). On the other hand, infectious diseases which give rise to nephritis are believed to be as follows: Table 294-1 Causes of acute glomerulonephritis Infectious diseases A. Post streptococcal glumerulonephritis B. Non-Post glumerulonephritis streptococcal

2. Viral: Hepatitis B, infectious menoneucleosis, mumps, measles, varicella, vaccinia, echovirus, and coxsackievirus 3. Parasitic: Malaria, taxoplasmosis (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 10th edition, p. 1633) The husband of the petitioner worked in a skin clinic. As janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Mr. Clemente was exposed to different carriers of viral and bacterial diseases. He had to clean the clinic itself where patients with different illnesses come and go. He had to put in order the hospital equipments that had been used. He had to dispose of garbage and wastes that accumulated in the course of each working day. He was the employee most exposed to the dangerous concentration of infected materials, and not being a medical practitioner, least likely to know how to avoid infection. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Clemente's working conditions definitely increased the risk of his contracting the aforementioned ailments. This Court has held in appropriate cases that the conservative posture of the respondents is not consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee embodied in the Constitution in favor of the workers (Cabanes v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., L-50255, January 30, 1982; and Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., supra). It clashes with the injunction in the Labor Code (Article 4, New Labor Code) that, as a rule, doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimantemployee (Mercado, Jr., v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 270, 277). The respondents admit there may have been aggravation of an existing ailment but point out that aggravating is no longer a ground for compensation under the present law. They contend that the compensable factor of increased risks of contracting the disease is not present in this case. The fallacy in this theory lies in the failure to explain how a sick person was able to enter the government service more than ten years before he became too ill to work and at a time when aggravation of a disease was compensable. There is no evidence to show that Mr. Clemente was hired inspite of having an existing disease liable to become worse. The petitioner's arguments of recurrence of an already cured disease or the contracting of the disease due to increased risks become more plausible. When there are two or more possible explanations regarding an issue of compensability that which favors the claimant must be chosen.1avvphi1 We also do not find merit in the respondent GSIS' contention that it should be dropped as a party in this case. This Court has passed upon this issue on several occasions. Thus, in the case of Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413, 419), this Court citing Lao v. Employees' Compensation Commission (97 SCRA 782), held: xxx xxx xxx

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1. Bacterial: Infective endocarditis, "Shunt nephritis," sepsis, pneumococcal pneumonia, typhoid fever, secondary syphilis, meningococcemia

... This Court is of the opinion that respondent System, as the ultimate implementing agency of the ECC's decision, is a proper party in this case. The fact that this Court chose to require respondent GSIS to comment is an indication that it is a necessary party.

It must be noted that the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation (including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules.) (at p. 793). WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to pay the petitioner: 1) The sum of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) as death benefits; and PESOS

had its principal offices at 20 Gov. Pascual Street, Malabon, Rizal. A notice dated June 21, 1974, was sent to the manager of the school concerning the filing of the claim, and copy of 1 this notice was received on July 17, 1974. On August 7, 1974, the employer's report was filed, and in Item 8 thereof which reads: "State whether you controvert employee's right to compensation (yes or no)' the answer was left blank, while in Item 17 which reads: "Was she injured in regular 2 occupation" the answer was "yes". On November 14, 1974, acting chief of section E.M. Cayapas issued an outright award in favor of the claimant, Mercedes Ollero and against the respondent employer Central Luzon Mission of Seventh Day Adventists. For the temporary total disability and permanent partial disability suffered by the claimant, the employer was directed to pay the maximum allowed by law in the amount of P6.000.00 plus the sum of 3 P61.00 as administrative fee. On November 27, 1974, the respondent employer filed a "Motion for reconsideration/petition for review" with prayer to reinstate its right to controvert the claim alleging as principal reason that the claim is not compensable because the vehicular accident arose not in the course of employment 4 as it took place far away from the place of work of claimant. This motion for reconsideration was denied by the Hearing Officer Cayapas. Upon elevation of the records of the case to the Commission En Banc, the latter in its decision of September 30, 1975, set aside the award reasoning as follows: We find on review that the determination of the compensability of the present claim should be governed by the law in off-thepremises injuries is appearing that at the time claimant met the accident, she was already on her way home from school after school hours and that the accident occurred very far from her place of employment. Since the accident happened in a public highway common to the public as a thoroughfare and it was not attended by any special circumstance related or incidental to her employment as teacher of respondent or that it falls under any of the exceptions to the general rule in off-thepremises accidents, we are of the opinion and so hold that claimant is not entitled to the benefits provided for under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The rule referred to is stated as follows 'In the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in going to, or coming from, his place of work is excluded from the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act.' At the time of the accident claimant was already off-duty and at a place very far from her place of employment, where she had to be exposed to the hazards of traffic common to the public and no longer traceable to the demands or nature of her employment as a teacher of respondent. (p. 21, Ibid.) Hence, this petition for review. The issue posed in this petition for review is not new; it concerns what has been termed as the "proximity", the

2) The sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED. Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. Republic SUPREME Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-41742 August 23,1978 MERCEDES OLLERO, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and CENTRAL LUZON MISSION OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS, respondents. Saturnino L. Mayor for petitioner. Enrique V Espanol & Rodolfo M. Cornejo for respondent WCC. Alberto B. Guevara for private respondent. of the Philippines COURT

MUOZ PALMA, J.: Mercedes Ollero is a teacher by occupation. Since the school year 1969-1970, Ollero was employed by the Central Luzon Mission of Seventh Day Adventists (SDA Mission for short) as a teacher in the Philippine Union College Annex at Baesa, Caloocan City, where she was residing at the time. For the school year 1973-1974, Ollero was given an assignment at the SDA Mission's Elementary School in Galas, Quezon City, with the school shouldering 75% of Olleros transportation expenses from her residence in Caloocan to Galas and back. On December 11, 1973, after her afternoon classes, Ollero boarded a passenger jeep at Galas, bound for home. At the junction of Quezon Boulevard Extension and Roxas District, Ollero alighted from the jeepney to take another vehicle bound for Baesa, Caloocan City, and while alighting she was bumped by a speeding car which threw her to the ground. Ollero was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital where she was treated for a fracture of her "right femur and tibia." As a result of that accident, Ollero was unable to continue with her teaching from December 12, 1973 to October 24, 1974, and suffered partial loss of the use of her right leg. On February 22, 1974, Ollero filed with Regional Office No. 4, Department of Labor, "Notice of injury and claim for compensation" against the SDA Central Luzon Mission which

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"going to and coming from", or the "off-premises" rule. In other words, is the place of occurrence of an injury suffered by an employee an essential factor in determining its compensability that is, whether or not the injury occurred in the course and by reason of the employment? It is now the settled principle in this jurisdiction that for an injury to be compensable it is not necessary that the cause therefor shall have taken place within the place of employment for so long as the worker acted within the scope of his employment, performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto, the injury sustained by reason thereof falls within the protection of the law regardless of the place 5 of injury. The situation of the petitioner herein, Mercedes Ollero involves more particularly the "going to and coming from work" or what has been referred to also as the street-peril principle. Under American Jurisprudence, the general rule is that the hazards encountered by employees while going to or returning from their regular place of work, before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises, are not ordinary incident to the employment, and for this reason injuries resulting from such hazards are in most instances held not to be compensable as arising out of and in the course of the 6 employment. The aforementioned general rule however admits various exceptions in most of the States of the Union, and among these are: where the employer provides transportation remunerates the employee for the time of expense involved, where the employee performs same task in collection with his employment at home or en route, or is a special mission 7 at his employer's behest, and so on. Following American Jurisprudence, in the early case of Afable et al. vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 1933, this Court in a decision penned by Justice James C. Vickers, denied compensation to the heirs of Leopoldo Madlangbayan a collector of defendant company who was run over and fatally injured in one of the streets in the city of Manila while returning home after making his collections in San Francisco del Monte. The Court inter alia held: The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment. At the time that he was run over by the truck, Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to make collections for the defendant. The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule, an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does not arise out of and in the course of his employment. (58 Phil. 39, 4 1, citing Mueller Construction Co. vs. Industrial board, 283, III., 148; N.E., 1028;

Indemnity Co. vs. Dirikins 211 S.W., 949; In Re Peter S. Winchester, 2nd A.R. U.S.C.C., 262; In re Julius Rosenberg 2nd A.R.U.S. C.C., 263; Kirby Lumber Co. vs. Scurlock, 229 S.W., 975, among others) In the later case of Philippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S. Martin & WCC, 1962, per then Justice later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, this Court applied one of the exceptions above enumerated. In the Martin case, Aurelio Martin was employed by the Philippine Engineer's Syndicate as a plant operator in its project in Benguet, Mountain Province. Late in the afternoon of December 2, 1957, after coming from work Aurelio Martin was standing together with other co-workers by the roadside near his place of work waiting for the truck of the company that would convey them home. When the service truck arrived Martin clung to the truck and in doing so he slipped and fell and a result he sustained fatal injuries. The Court affirmed the award of compensation to the heirs of the deceased worker, ruling that the accident arose out of or in the course of employment because the truck involved in the accident was the service truck of the employer furnished by the latter to convey its workers home from work, citing the following: ... Off Premise injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer's street car) or private conveyance. ... (Workmen's 8 Compensation Laws, by Hororitz p. 162) On January 21, 1977, this Court following its continued trend of liberalization of the application of the Workmen's 9 Compensation Act, promulgated its decision in Bael vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission et al., thereby once and for all clearing the judicial atmosphere of any uncertainty on this "going to and coming from work" rule. In that case, Lourdes Vda. de Bael was employed by the Bureau of Public Schools as an elementary grade school teacher in Dipolog City and after her classes in the afternoon of July 26, 1975, she took a jeepney to return to her home and on the way the jeepney rammed against an electric post, turned turtle, resulting in her death. The Workmen's Compensation Commission set aside the referee's award granted in favor of the heirs of the deceased teacher. On appeal to this Court, among the issues raised was whether or not the death of an employee occurring on her way home from work outside the employer's premises entitled said employee to compensation. The Court through Justice Ruperto Martin set aside the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and held: In the case before Us, the circumstances attending the death of the deceased constrain Us, to hold that the accident of the deceased comes within the 'going to and coming from rule.' The records show that right after her work at school she immediately proceeded to go home by

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taking a jeepney. In going home, she has still other school work to do, like preparing lesson plans for the next day, correcting papers and preparing school projects. When she therefore took a jeepney on her way home, she was merely commuting to another place to continue with her work. Her taking the ride in that fatal vehicle can be treated as a necessary incident to her school work. The very nature of the work of the deceased, the time required of her after class hours created that special circumstances that qualify her heirs to the 10 benefits arising from her death. Similarly, in this case of Mercedes Ollero, there are special circumstances present which reinforce Our ruling that her accident is compensable. Claimant Ollero was a regular teacher since 1969 of the SDA Mission in its school at Baesa, Caloocan City, but for the school year 1973-74 she was given an assignment in Galas, Quezon City, to take the place of another teacher, and because of the distance of the school from her residence in Baesa, the employer agreed to shoulder 75% of her transportation expenses. On that particular afternoon of December 11, 1973, Mercedes took the only available means of transportation a jeepney from the school bound for her home in Caloocan City, and she followed the ordinary route from Galas to Quezon Boulevard Extension where she had to transfer to another public utility vehicle which makes a regular trip to Baesa, Caloocan City. It was at Quezon Boulevard Extension where she was bumped by a speeding car. Under the foregoing circumstances Mercedes Ollero is entitled to a disability compensation for she was injured while performing an act travelling home from her school - which We hold was a necessary incident to her employment. Finally, mention is to be made that the referee's outright award was justified by the non-controversion of the claim of petitioner. The accident of December 11, 1973, was known to the school authorities for Mercedes Ollero was unable to resume her teaching on the following day, December 12; that notwithstanding, the school failed to comply with Section 37 of the Workmen's Compensation Act when it did not file with the Workmen's Compensation Commission a notice of accident stating therein, among other things, the date and hour of the accident, the nature and cause of the injury, and whether or not the liability was being admitted or controverted. Having failed to file said notice on or before the 14th day of disability or within 10 days after it had knowledge of the injury, pursuant to Section 45 of the same Act, respondent school renounced its right to controvert the claim and ultimately admitted the latter's compensability. In fact, in the employer's report submitted before the Workmen's Compensation Commission on August 7, 1974, almost eight months after the accident, the school did not controvert or oppose the claim. The employer's "Motion for Reconsideration" with prayer to reinstate its right to controvert filed on November 27, 1974, was therefore too late, not to mention the fact that said motion failed to allege under oath any circumstance showing fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or other reasons which resulted in its failure to timely controvert the claim. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of respondent Commission is set aside. The hearing officer's award of November 14, 1974, ordering respondent employer to pay:

1) claimant Ollero the amount of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as maximum compensation for her temporary total, as well as, permanent partial disability; and; 2) the Workmen's Compensation Fund the amount of P61.00 as administrative fee is hereby revived and reinstated Respondent employer is likewise ordered: a) to reimburse claimant's expenses for medical and hospital services duly supported by receipts; b) to provide claimant with such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of her disability and the process of her recovery may require and 'hat which will promote her early restoration to the maximum level of her physical capacity,: and c) to pay attorney's fee's for both instances in the total amount of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00). SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fenandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-14827

of

the

Philippines COURT

October 31, 1960

CHUA YENG, petitioner, vs. MICHAELA ROMA, and her minor children GUADALUPE, PILAR, ROSARIO, CORNELIO and GERARDO, respondents. Pedro B. Uy Calderon and A. Marigomen for petitioner. D. V. Nacua and J. D. Palma for respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, dated September 17, 1958, and its resolution en banc, dated December 4, 1958, awarding compensation for the death of Santos Romeo. The appeal raises issues facts and of law, but since findings of the fact by the Workmen's Compensation Commission are final, if supported by substantial evidence mission are final, if supported by substantial evidence, (Batangas Transportation Co., vs. Galicano Rivera, et al., supra., p. 175; Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., vs. Consuto, et al., 108 Phil., 62, and since the record shows that such evidence is not wanting, the Court will consider the case on the facts as found by the commission. Santos Romeo was, on May 16, 1956, working for petitioner as cargador in loading and unloading copra at the former's warehouse at C. Padilla Street, Cebu City. In the morning of that day, after asking permission from his employer, Santos Romeo went to petitioner's house just across the street from the warehouse to get a drink of water, the water pump in the warehouse being out of order and no supply being available.

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Reaching the kitchen of said house and while he was drinking, he saw a puppy eating some fried fish inside an open cabinet. He tried to drive away the puppy by saying "tse", but as the puppy still continue to eat the fish, Santos made a motion with hand to drive it away, in the course of which his right hand was bitten by said puppy. On June 26, 1958, Santos Romeo died of hydrophobia from the dog bite. It appears that the puppy was not owned by petitioner. Appellant contends that, under the circumstances narrated, the death of the laborer can not be considered to arise "out of and in course" of his employment. We find no merit in this contention. The rule is well established that Such acts as are reasonably necessary to the health and comfort of an employee while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other physical demands, or protecting himself from excessive cold, are nevertheless incidental to the employment, and injuries sustained in the performance of such act are generally held to be compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment. (58 Am. Jur., sec. 236,p . 742, citing numerous cases.) That Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of appellant's house and not at his usual place of work does not bring the case out of the operation of the rule previously quoted, for the reason that the laborer was practically driven to that place through the appellant's fault in not providing an adequate supply of drinking water at the warehouse. Appellant urges that the dog bite was provoked by Santos' trying to take the fish away from the puppy and hence, while he was engaged in an independent activity. We do not regard such act as voluntary deviation from his duties, considering that the act of the deceased was practically an instinctive one, that would naturally be expected from any person in his position. Moreover, it was motivated by a sense of loyalty to his employer, a desire to protect the latter's property, that can not be deemed wholly foreign to the duties of the laborer as such (71 C.J. 675). In fact, it has been held that the act of saving the employee's own property from an apparent danger, is compensable (in re Brightman, 107 N.E. 527, cited in 71 C. J. 670). There, is was said: the standard to be applied is not that which now, in the light of all that has happened, is seen to have been directly within the line of labor helpful to the master, but that which the ordinary man required to act in such an emergency might do while actuated with a purpose to do his duty. Compensation has been granted, even if the injury occurred while the order was not performing acts strictly within the scope of his duties, but engaged in an activity either related or incidental to his duties, or doing an act in the interest of his employer. Thus, injury to an employee of a bus firm, occurring outside of assigned territory, in undertaking to retrieve personal belongings of a passenger, was compensable (Vergoza vs. Arnaz Vda. de Cruz, L-7305, December 15, 1953); so was that of a laborer who, trying to alight from a truck to pick up a sack which had fallen, belonging to his employer, was caught between the wheels (Ramos vs. Poblete, 40 Off. Gaz., 3474); likewise, the death of a worker who tried to recover a price of board which had fallen into a molasses tank, and died from the deal fumes

therein (Estandarte vs. Phil. Motor Alcohol Corp., G. R. No. 39733, Nov. 1, 1933). In the foregoing, an impelling factor considered by the court was the fact that the employee was acting in the interest of the employer. To the argument that the employee sustained the injury not from drinking water but from driving away the puppy, suffice it to say that under the circumstances that impelled him to act without opportunity for deliberate reflection, we are not prepared to say that his act was unreasonable or negligent. Driving away a puppy is not so fraught with potent danger as to deter every man possessed of reasonable disposition. As has been said . . . he was doing a thing which a man while working may reasonably doa workman of his sort may reasonably smoke, he may reasonably drop his pipe, and he may reasonably pick it up again. (Ramos vs. Poblete, supra., citing M'Lauchan vs. Anderson, S.C. 529.) By analogy, the deceased in this case may reasonably get a drink of water to satisfy his thirst; while drinking, he may reasonably see a puppy eating some fried fish belonging to his employer; and he may reasonably be expected to make a motion with his hand to drive said puppy away. At any rate, the resulting injury is not without causation in the conditions under which deceased was required to perform his work. It appears that there were no adequate and sanitary means of water supply in the place of work; that petitioner's workers used, for drinking purposes, water from a well at the back of the warehouse; that this well was out or order at the time of the incident, so that the deceased had to cross a wide public street to petitioner's house just to get a drink, thereby exposing himself to hazards which may well have been avoided if there were drinking facilities at, or more proximate to, the place of work. Finally, the Workmen's Compensation Act being a social legislation, and in line with the intent of the law to effect social justice, the provisions thereof should be liberally construed in favor of the workingman (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc., vs. Dayao, et al., 106 Phil., 525; Madrigal Shipping Co. vs. Baens del Rosario, et al., L-13130, October 31, 1959). Wherefore, the decision and the resolution appealed from are hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner. Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Gutierrez David and Paredes, JJ., concur. Republic SUPREME Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990 SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES), respondents. Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner. of the Philippines COURT

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PADILLA, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883 which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim for compensation against the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice. On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986. For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS for the reason that It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from your superior you were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter that of bringing home a sack of rice and that, while on your way home, you met a vehicular accident that resulted to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident that you were not at your work place performing your duties 1 when the incident occurred. It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied. Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter. Hence, the present recourse. The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the vehicular accident on his way home from work should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus, compensable. In support of his prayer for the reversal of the decision, the petitioner cites the case of Pedro 2 Baldebrin vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, where the Court awarded compensation to the petitioner therein who figured in an accident on his way home from his official

station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident, petitioner's left eye was hit by a pebble while he was riding on a bus. Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from cases earlier decided and hence, not applicable to the present case. The Court has carefully considered the petition and the arguments of the parties and finds that the petitioner's submission is meritorious. Liberally interpreting the employees compensation law to give effect to its 3 compassionate spirit as a social legislation in Vda. de 4 Torbela u. ECC, the Court held: It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. Again in Alano v. ECC, it was reiterated: Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A-M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. ... In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC, this Court, applying the above quoted decisions, enunciated: Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31, 1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following day, Monday. As they were
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approaching Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage. We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two (2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband in the case at bar was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is compensable under the law as an employment accident. In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In the case at bar, petitioner had come from work and was on his way home, just like in the Baldebrin case, where the employee "... figured in an accident when he was ping home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of 7 residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur ...." Baldebrin, the Court said: The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment.'(Section 2, Workmen's Compensation Act). In Philippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S. Martin and Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 SCRA 356, We held that 'where an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of the company near his place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may be said to have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death is compensable. The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent, where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.'And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey. While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act (under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been 8 abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the accident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.' The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of 9 the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching 10 or after leaving the employer's premises. If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way from home to his work station one day before an official working day, there is no reason to deny compensation for accidental injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour after he had left his work station. We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee because the Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our society. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition in accordance with this decision. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Regalado, JJ., concur. Paras, Sarmiento and

Footnotes 1 Annex "B" Rollo at p. 7.

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Republic SUPREME Manila THIRD DIVISION

of

the

Philippines COURT

happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school. The case, therefore, was dismissed. The petitioner then went to this Court on petition for review on certiorari. He alleges that the deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her employment." The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and is "ategorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44) The Government Service Insurance System which received a copy of the Court's resolution requiring the parties to submit their memoranda, however manifests that it does not appear to be a party to the case because it had not been impleaded as a party thereto. We rule in favor of the petitioner. This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar factual background, this Court held: It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early as the case of La O v. Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing agency of

G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988 GENEROSO ALANO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.: The only issue in this case is whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident. The facts as found by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission are as follows: Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter. On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant claim for in come benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children. The claim was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the system's decision, but the same was denied and the records of the case were elevated to this Commission for review. (Rollo, p. 12) The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System. It stated that Section I (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation specifically provides that: "For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions (1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official functions." (Rollo, p. 13)

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According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's accident did not meet any of the aforementioned conditions. First, the accident occured at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the deceased's working hours. Second, it

the Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules)." WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED. Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. HIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 136200. June 8, 2000] CELERINO VALERIANO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: To be compensable, an injury must have resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. It must be shown that it was sustained within the scope of employment while the claimant was performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto or while following the orders of a superior. Indeed, the standard of "work connection" must be satisfied even by one who invokes the 24-hour-duty doctrine; otherwise, the claim for compensability must be denied. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the January 30, 1998 Court of Appeals1[1] (CA) Decision,2[2] as well as the September 25, 1998 Resolution3[3] in CA-GR SP No. 31141. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:4[4] "WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Employees Compensation Commission dated April 1, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto." The September 25, 1998 Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are summarized in the assailed Decision as follows:5[5] "Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at the San Juan Fire Station. Sometime on the evening of July 3, 1985, petitioner was standing along Santolan Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend by the name of Alexander Agawin. They decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for dinner. On their way home at around 9:30 PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in figured in a head-on collision with another vehicle at the intersection of N. Domingo and Broadway streets in Quezon City. Due to the strong impact of the collision, petitioner was thrown out of the vehicle and was severely injured. As a result of the mishap, petitioner was brought to several hospitals for treatment. "On September 16, 1985, he filed a claim for income benefits under PD 626, with the Government Security Insurance Service. His claim for benefits was opposed on the ground that the injuries he sustained did not directly arise or result from the nature of his work. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial by the System but the same was turned down on the ground that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied. Petitioner then interposed an appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC for short). In a decision dated April 1, 1993, the ECC ruled against herein appellant, the pertinent portions of which are stated in the following wise: After a study of the records of the case under consideration, we find the decision of the respondent System denying appellants claim in order. Under the present compensation law, injury and the resulting disability or death is compensable if the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. It means that the injury or death must be sustained while the employee is in the performance of his official duty; that the injury is sustained at the place where his work requires him to be; and if the injury is sustained elsewhere, that the employee is executing an order for the employer. The aforementioned conditions are found wanting in the instant case. The accident that the appellant met in the instant case occurred outside of his time

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and place of work. Neither was appellant performing his official duties as a fireman at the time of the accident. In fact, appellant just left the Bonanza Restaurant where he and his friends had dinner. Apparently, the injuries appellant sustained from the accident did not arise out of [and] in the course of his employment. Considering therefore the absence of a causal link between the contingency for which income benefits [are] being claimed and his occupation as fireman, his claim under PD 626, as amended, cannot be given due course." The CA Ruling The Court of Appeals agreed with the finding of the Employees Compensation Commission that petitioners injuries and disability were not compensable, emphasizing that they were not work-connected. "Turning to the case before us, the evidence on record shows that herein petitioner was injured not at the place where his work required him to be. Neither was he executing an order from his superior, nor performing his official functions at the time of the accident. It must be recalled that at the time of the accident, petitioner was already dismissed from his regular 8-hour daily work. He was walking along Santolan Road when he met his friend and they decided to go to Bonanza Restaurant for dinner. Notwithstanding his claim that he can be called to report for work anytime in case there is a fire, or that his position is akin to that of a military man, a contention we cannot support, still the circumstances leading to the accident in which he was injured reveals that there is no causative connection between the injury he sustained and his work. Petitioners invocation of the ruling in Hinoguin vs. ECC, 172 SCRA 350 is misplaced. In that case, petitioner Sgt. Hinoguin was a member of the Armed Forces and soldiers are presumed to be on official duty 24 hours a day. In the case at bar, petitioner is a fireman with a specific tour of duty. To sustain petitioners contention of compensability would, in effect, make the employer, in this case the State, the insurer against all perils. That is not the intendment of our lawmakers in enacting the Workmens Compensation Act." 6[6] Hence, this Petition.7[7] The Issues

In his Petition,8[8]Petitioner Celerino Valeriano urges the Court to resolve the following questions: "I WHETHER PETITIONERS WORK-CONNECTED. "II WHETHER PETITIONER FIREMAN, LIKE SOLDIERS, CAN BE PRESUMED TO BE ON 24HOUR DUTY."9[9] These questions point to the sole issue of the compensability of Petitioner Valerianos injuries and resulting disability. The Courts Ruling We find no merit in the Petition. Main Issue: Compensability of Valerianos Injuries and Resulting Disability Disability benefits are granted an employee who sustains an injury or contracts a sickness resulting in temporary total, permanent total, or permanent partial, disability.10[10] For the injury and the resulting disability to be compensable, they must have necessarily resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.11[11] Were Petitioners Injuries Work-Connected? Citing Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. v. Workmens Compensation Commission,12[12] the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners claim on the ground that he had not been injured at his work place, executing an order of his superior, or performing official functions when he met the accident. We agree. In Iloilo, the Court explained the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" in this wise: "The two components of the coverage formula -- "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" -- are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied; however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "workconnection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can, in INJURIES ARE

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certain cases, exclude clearly workconnected injuries. The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. "As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably x x x be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto."13[13] Thus, for injury to be compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be substantially satisfied. The injury and the resulting disability sustained by reason of employment are compensable regardless of the place where the injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the time of the injury, the employee was acting within the purview of his or her employment and performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto.14[14] Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social function -- having dinner with some friends -- is clear from the records of the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that his injuries and consequent disability were not work-connected and thus not compensable. Applicability of Hinoguin and Nitura Petitioner debunks the importance given by the appellate court to the fact that he was not at his work place and had in fact been dismissed for the day when he met the accident. He argues that his claim for disability benefits is anchored on the proposition that the exigency of his job as a fireman requires a constant observance of his duties as such; thus, he should be considered to have been "on call" when he met the accident. He underscores the applicability of Hinoguin v. ECC15[15] and Nitura v. ECC16[16] to his case. In Hinoguin and Nitura, the Court granted death compensation benefits to the heirs of Sgt. Limec Hinoguin and Pfc. Regino Nitura, both members of the Philippine Army. After having gone elsewhere on an overnight pass, Sgt. Hinoguin was accidentally shot by a fellow soldier during the formers return trip to their headquarters. Pfc. Nitura, on the other hand, died after falling from a bridge during his trip back to his camp. At the time of his death, he had just

accomplished his commanders instruction to check on several personnel of his command post who were then at a dance party. Both cases espoused the position that the concept of "work place" cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status who, to all intents and purposes, is on a 24-hour official duty status, subject to military discipline and law and at the beck and call of his superior officers at all times, except when he is on vacation leave status.17[17] This ratiocination, later applied to police officers in Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,18[18] was dissected in the more recent GSIS v. Court of Appeals.19[19] In the latter case, the deceased police officer, SPO2 Florencio Alegre, was moonlighting as a tricycle driver at the time of his death. The Court reviewed Hinoguin, Nitura and ECC and noted that in each case death benefits were granted, not just because of the principle that soldiers or policemen were virtually working round the clock. More important, there was a finding of a reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased from his assigned place of work and the incident causing his death. The Court explained: "In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was assigned and the place where he was accidentally shot was the permission duly given to him and his companions by the camp commander to go on overnight pass. According to the Court, "a place [where] soldiers have secured lawful permission cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer" and hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the performance of his official functions. "The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his station on permission and directive by his superior officer to check on several personnel of his command who were then attending a dance party. "As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees Compensation Commission case, although he was not given any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at the Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by the peacekeeping nature of the matter he was attending to at the time x x x he was attacked and shot to death, that is, [while] bringing his son to the police station to answer for a crime [--] a basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform."20[20]

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Ruling that the death of SPO2 Alegre was not compensable, the Court pointed out that the 24-hour-duty doctrine should not embrace all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer, but only those that can be categorized as police service in character. It further held: "Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegres widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peace-keeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at anytime to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at[,] considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one[,] pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than [as] a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character." 21[21] We recognize the importance and laud the efforts of firemen in our society. Indeed, the nature of their job requires them to be always on alert, like soldiers and police officers, and to respond to fire alarms which may occur anytime of the day. Be that as it may, the circumstances in the present case do not call for the application of Hinoguin and Nitura. Following the rationalization in GSIS, the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to petitioner's case, because he was neither at his

assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more important justification for the Courts stance is that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. We cannot find any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a firetruck driver. While we sympathize with petitioners plight, we cannot grant his Petition. True, the policy is to extend the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 626 to as many qualified employees as possible,22[22] but this must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation.23[23] Considering the circumstances in petitioners case, he cannot be deemed qualified for disability benefits under the law. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Vitug, J., abroad on official business. Republic SUPREME Manila FIRST DIVISION of the Philippines COURT

G.R. No. 90267 December 21, 1993 PERLITA LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents. Bernardo M. Norada for petitioner. The Legal Services Group for respondent GSIS.

QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Article 181 of the Labor Code and Section 16 of the Interim Rules of 1983 of the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) dated June 28, 1989 in ECC Case No. 4331 entitled "Perlita Lopez v. Government Service Insurance System," which affirmed the denial by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of the claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, to claimant-petitioner, Perlita Lopez.

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Petitioner's late husband, Pedro Lopez, was employed as a public school teacher at the Urdaneta National High School, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, from July 1, 1973 until his untimely demise on May 27, 1987. On April 27, 1987, a memorandum was issued to Pedro Lopez by the head of the school's Science Department and noted by Lino A. Caringal, Sr. the principal, which reads: In view of your long and competent teaching experience as a PHYSICS Teacher and in anticipation with (sic) the forthcoming Division Search for Outstanding Improvised Secondary Science Equipment for Teachers to be held at the TAP Bldg. in Lingayen, Pangasinan on October 8 and 9, 1987, you are hereby designated to prepare the MODEL DAM, UNHS official entry to said contest. In this connection, you are further advised to complete this MODEL DAM on or before scheduled date of the contest (Rollo, p. 54; emphasis supplied). Lopez complied with his superior's instruction and constructed an improvised electric micro-dam, which he took home to enable him to finish it before the deadline. On May 27, 1987, at around 6:30 A.M., while he was engrossed in his project, he in contact with a live wire was electrocuted. He was immediately brought to a clinic for emergency treatment but was pronounced dead on arrival. The death certificate showed that he died of cardiac arrest due to accidental electrocution. Petitioner then filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS, which was denied on the ground that her husband's death did not arise out and in the course of employment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. She then elevated the case to the ECC for review, which affirmed the decision rendered by the GSIS and dismissed the same. The sole issue for us to resolve is whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the cause of death of petitioner's husband is not work connected and therefore it is not compensable under P.D. No. 626. Respondent ECC argued that based on the certification issued by the school principal, Lopez at the time of the accident was supposed to report for duty to help in the enrollment of the 4th year class, but he opted to remain at his house to finish the project. Hence, respondent ECC contends, that the claim for death benefits failed to satisfy the conditions set forth under Sec. 1 (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. Said rule states: For an injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident, satisfying all the following conditions:

2. The employee must have performing his official functions; and

been

3. If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order from its superior. The Employees Compensation Act is a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide amelioration of the working class of our society. As held in the case of Nitura v. Employees Compensation Commission, 201 SCRA 278 (1991): As an official agent charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection with the incident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor. In the case of Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. v. Quiroz, 16 SCRA 784 (1966), we held: xxx xxx xxx An injury or accident befalls a man "in the course of" his employment, if it occurs while he is doing what a man may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during the time, 13 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 28-29, And it "arises out of" the work of the employer, when it results from a risk or reasonably inherent in or incidental to the conduct of such work or business. "In the course of" points to the place and circumstances under which the accident takes place and the time when it occurs. Of the two phrases on work connection, "in the course of" is deemed broader than "arising out of" (Fernandez and Quiason, Labor Standards and Welfare Legislation, 1964 ed., pp. 563-564). While the death of Pedro Lopez took place in his house and not in his official work station, which is the school, he was still discharging his function as the one in-charge of the project. He was constrained to finish the project within a specific period of time and he could only do so if he worked overtime in his house. The death of petitioner's husband is service-connected even if it happened during the summer vacation. He was still under the employ of the government and there still existed an employer-employee relationship although teachers do not report for duty during that period (Pepito v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 78 SCRA 35 [1977] ).

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1 The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;

It can even be said that the conditions set forth under sec. 1, par. (a), Rule III of the amended Rules on Employees Compensation, have been complied with. The said rule requires that the injury must have been sustained by the employee at "the place where his work requires him to be" and if the injury is sustained elsewhere the employees "must have been executing an order from his superior." Inasmuch as Lopez had to finish the project on the time for the contest scheduled on October 5 and 9, 1987, it can be implied that Lopez was given permission, if not direction, to perform his work at his house. Respondent ECC cannot rely on the fact that Lopez had been ordered by the school principal to report for duty to assist in the enrollment of the fourth-year students on the day of the accident. Lopez was electrocuted at 6:30 A.M. while he was working on the model he was asked to build. To claim that he should have been in school at the time he died in order to entitle his widow any compensation benefits, is to strain good sense and logic. For an injury to be compensable it is not important that the cause therefor shall have taken place within the purview of his employment, performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto, the injury sustained by reason thereof falls within the protection of the law regardless of the place of injury (ECC Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule III, Sec. 1; ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984; Enao v. Employees Compensation Commission, 135 SCRA 660 [1985]). The thrust of social justice is compassion for the poor. By denying under the peculiar circumstances the claim of the petitioner for benefits arising from the death of her husband, public respondents ignored this public policy and committed a grave abuse of discretion. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission is REVERSED. The Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to pay the death benefits to petitioner, with legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid, attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the award and costs of suit. Republic SUPREME Manila FIRST DIVISION of the Philippines COURT

This is a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which denied petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. I Norma Peralta Corporal was employed as a public school teacher with assignment in Juban, Sorsogon. On November 28 to November 30, 1977, she was confined at the Esteves Memorial Hospital for acute coronary insufficiency and premature ventricular contractions. On June 30, 1983, she was assigned to the Banadero Elementary School in Daraga, Albay. Norma had to walk three kilometers to and from said school as no transportation was available to ferry her and other teachers from the national highway to the school. During her fourth pregnancy, Norma suffered a complete abortion and was hospitalized for two days at the Albay Provincial Hospital. After her maternity leave, Norma reported back to work. In March of 1984, she again conceived. However, in September of the same year, she was transferred to the Kilicao Elementary School, where she had to walk more than one kilometer of rough road. On December 2, 1984, she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a "hilot." An hour later, she was rushed to the Immaculate Conception Hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. She underwent a hysterectomy but unfortunately, she died on the same day due to "shock, severe hemorrhage" resulting from a "prolapse(d) uterus post partum." Norma was 40 years old when she died. Her husband, Ramon Corporal, petitioner herein, filed a claim for compensation benefit with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The GSIS denied petitioner's claim thus: Please be advised that on the basis of the proofs and evidences (sic) submitted to the System, the cause of death of your wife, Shock secondary to Severe Hemorrhage, Uterine PROLAPSE is not considered an occupational disease as contemplated under the above-mentioned law (P.D. No. 626). Neither was there any showing that her position as Teacher, MECS, Albay had increased the risk of contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 23). Petitioner filed several motions for the reconsideration of the denial of his claim to no avail, because a re-evaluation of the claim by the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Group of the GSIS showed that there was "no basis to alter its previous action of denial for the same reason . . . that her cause of death is non-work-connected as contemplated under the law" and neither did her job as a teacher increase the risk of contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 25). Petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC). The ECC requested the GSIS to re-evaluate petitioner's claim and to finally determine compensability, with instruction that in case the claim is denied once more by the System, the entire record of the case be elevated to the ECC. The GSIS reiterated its denial of petitioner's claim. On September 7, 1988, the ECC rendered a decision also denying petitioner's claim. It said:

G.R. No. 86020 August 5, 1994 RAMON CORPORAL, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents. Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

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QUIASON, J.:

Medical studies show that Prolapsed Uterus may occur in infants and nulliparous women as well as multiparas. Defects in innervation and in the basic integrity of the supporting structures account(s) for prolapse(d) in the first two and childbirth trauma for the latter. The cervix usually elongates because the weight of the nagging vaginal tissues pulls it downward, whereas the attached but weak cardinal ligaments tend(s) to support it. In third degree or complete prolapse(d) both the cervix and the body of the uterus have passed through the introitus and the entire vaginal canal is inverted. (Obstetrics and Gynecology, Wilson, Beecham, Carrington, 3rd Edition, p. 585). On the other hand Acute Coronary Insufficiency are terms often used to describe a syndrome characterized by prolonged substernal pain, usually not relieved by vasodilators of a short period of rest due to a more severe inadequacy of coronary circulation. The symptoms in this condition are more intense and prolonged than in angina pectoris, but abnormal ECG and other laboratory findings associated with myocardial infarction are absent. The syndrome is covered by a temporary inability of one's coronary arteries to supply sufficient oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. (Merck, Manual of Diagnosis & Therapy, pp. 100-101). Based on the above medical discussion of the subject ailments, we believe that the development of the fatal illness has no relation whatsoever with the duties and working conditions of the late teacher. There is no showing that the nature of her duties caused the development of prolapse of the uterus. The ailment was a complication of childbirth causing profuse vaginal bleeding during the late stage. We also consider Acute Coronary Insufficiency as non-work-connected illness for the reason that it is caused by temporary inability of one coronary arteries (sic) to supply oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. There is no damage to heart muscle. In view thereof, we have no recourse but to sustain respondent's denial of the instant claim (Rollo, pp. 29-31). Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition, asserting compensability of the death of his wife. II Petitioner contends that although prolapsed uterus is not one of occupational diseases listed by the ECC, his claim should proper under the increased risk theory. He anchors such claim on the fact that as early as January 1984 or before Norma's fifth pregnancy, he had noticed a spherical tissue which appeared like a tomato protruding out of Norma's vagina and rectum. He avers that such condition was attributable to Norma's long walks to and from her place of

teaching Banadero Elementary School, which is situated on the side of the Mayon Volcano. Moreover, the roads leading to the school are full of ruts and rocks, and, during the rainy season, are flooded and slippery. Petitioner asserts that inspite of these, Norma continued to discharge her duties as a public servant, notwithstanding her pregnancy and her prolapsed uterus. Petitioner also contends that the findings of the respondents contravene the constitutional provision on social justice. He alleges that since the workmen's compensation law is a social legislation, its provisions should be interpreted liberally in favor of the employees whose rights it intends to protect. Under P.D. No. 626, as amended, for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (a) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (b) that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (Santos v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 221 SCRA 182 [1993]; Quizon v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 203 SCRA 426 [1991]). Clearly, then, the principle of aggravation and presumption of compensability under the old Workmen's Compensation Act no longer applies (Latagan v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 213 SCRA 715 [1992]). Since petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment which is not listed as compensable by the ECC and he merely anchors his claim on the second rule, he must positively show that the risk of contracting Norma's illness was increased by her working conditions. Petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge the onus imposed by law. The fact that Norma had to walk six kilometers everyday and thereafter, a shorter distance of more than one kilometer just to reach her place of work, was not sufficient to establish that such condition caused her to develop prolapse of the uterus. Petitioner did not even present medical findings on the veracity of his claim that Norma had a tomato-like spherical tissue protruding from her vagina and rectum. Norma developed prolapse of the uterus because she was multiparas, or one who had more than one child, and quite beyond the safe child-bearing age when she gave birth to her fifth child she was already forty years old. Novak's Textbook on Gynecology describes prolapse of the uterus (descensus uteri) as follows: An extremely common condition, being far more frequent in elderly than in young patients. This is explained by the increasing laxity and atony of the muscular and fascial structures in later life. The effects of childbirth injuries may thus make themselves evident, in the form of uterine prolapse, many years after the last pregnancy. Pregnancies in a prolapsed uterus may lead to numerous complications, as noted by Piver and Spezia. The important factor in the mechanism of the prolapse is undoubtedly injury or overstretching of the pelvic floor, and especially of the cardinal ligaments (Mackenrodt) in the bases of the broad ligaments. Combined with this there is

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usually extensive injury to the perineal structures, producing marked vaginal relaxation and also frequent injury to the fascia or the anterior or posterior vaginal walls, with the production of cystocele or rectocele. Usually, various combinations of these conditions are seen, although at times little or no cystocele or rectocele is associated with the prolapse. Occasional cases are seen for that matter, in women who have never borne children, and in these the prolapse apparently represents a hernia of the uterus through a defect in the pelvic fascial floor (Emphasis supplied). The 1986 Current Medical Diagnosis & Treatment also describes the condition as follows: Uterine prolapse most commonly occurs as a delayed result of childbirth injury to the pelvic floor (particularly the transverse cervical and uterosacral ligaments). Unrepaired obstetric lacerations of the levator musculature and perineal body augment the weakness. Attenuation of the pelvic structures with aging and congenital weakness can accelerate the development of prolapse. The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma's uterus developed before or after her fifth pregnancy is therefore immaterial since this illness is the result of the physiological structure and changes in the body on pregnancy and childbirth. With the evidence presented in support of the claim, petitioner's prayer cannot be granted. While as a rule labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, (Tria v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 208 SCRA 834 [1992]), there is also the rule that such liberal construction and interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and P.D. No. 626, as amended, are clear and leave no room for interpretation. The Court commiserates with the petitioner and his children for the loss of a loved one. We also recognize the importance of the services rendered by public elementary school teachers inspite of their meager salaries which are not proportionate to their immense responsibility in molding the values and character of the youth in this country (De Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685 [1984]). But under the legal milieu of the case, we can only suggest, not mandate, that respondents grant ex gratia some form of relief to their members similarly situated as petitioner's wife. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED. Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE, respondents. DECISION ROMERO, J.: May a moonlighting policemans death be considered compensable? This is the crux of the controversy now at bar. The recordsi[1].1 disclose that private respondent Felonila Alegres deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On that fateful day of December 6, 1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of duty. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer. On account of her husbands death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, however, denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegres death, he was performing a personal activity which was not work-connected. Subsequent appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) proved futile as said body, in a decision dated May 9, 1996, merely affirmed the ruling of the GSIS. Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when on February 28, 1997, the appellate court reversedii[2] the ECCs decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegres death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable. Citing Nitura v. Employees Compensation Commissioniii[3] and Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,iv[4] the appellate court explained the conclusion arrived at, thus: [T]he Supreme Court held that the concept of a workplace cannot always be literally applied to a person in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. It is our considered view that, as applied to a peace officer, his work place is not confined to the police precinct or station but to any place where his services, as a lawman, to maintain peace and security, are required. At the time of his death, Alegre was driving a tricycle at the northeastern part of the Imelda Commercial Complex where the police assistance center is located. There can be no dispute therefore that he met his death literally in his place of work. It is true that the deceased was driving his tricycle, with passengers aboard, when he was accosted by another police officer. This would lend some semblance of viability to the argument that he was not in the performance of official duty at the time.

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THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 128524. April 20, 1999]

However, the argument, though initially plausible, overlooks the fact that policemen, by the nature of their functions, are deemed to be on a round-the-clock duty. Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegres death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected. We grant the petition. As stated at the outset, the sole issue for the Courts resolution is whether the death of SPO2 Alegre is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations. Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, it is provided that for the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: (1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; (2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.v[5] Actually, jurisprudence is rather scant with respect to the above rules application in the case of police officers. Nevertheless, owing to the similarity of functions, that is, to keep peace and order, and the risks assumed, the Court has treated police officers similar to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with regard to the compensability of their deaths. Thus, echoing Hinoguin v. Employees Compensation Commission,vi[6] a case involving a soldier who was accidentally fired at by a fellow soldier, we held in Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,vii[7] that members of the national police are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day because policemen are subject to call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community. Upon examination of the Court of Appeals reasoning, we believe that the appellate court committed reversible error in applying the precepts enunciated in the cited cases. While we agree that policemen, like soldiers, are at the beck and call of public duty as peace officers and technically on duty round-the-clock, the same does not justify the grant of compensation benefits for the death of SPO2 Alegre based on the facts disclosed by the records. For clarity, a review of the cases relevant to the matter at hand is in order. In Hinoguin, the deceased Philippine Army soldier, Sgt. Limec Hinoguin, together with two other members of his detachment, sought and were orally granted permission by the commanding officer of their company to leave their station in Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya. As they were returning to their headquarters, one of his companions, not knowing that his M-16 rifle was on semi-automatic mode, accidentally pulled the trigger and shot Sgt. Hinoguin who then died as a result

thereof. Ruling for the grant of death compensation benefits, this Court held: The concept of a workplace referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a compensable one. Then came the case of Nitura, likewise involving a member of the Philippine Army, Pfc. Regino S. Nitura, who was assigned at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. At the time he met his death, he was instructed by his battalion commander to check on several personnel of his command post who were then attending a dance party in Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. But on his way back to the camp, he passed, crossed and fell from a hanging wooden bridge which accident caused his death. Reversing the ECC which earlier denied death benefits to the deceaseds widow, the Court ruled: A soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the case at bar, Pfc. Nituras station was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was with the permission of his superior officer having been directed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. In carrying out said directive, he had to pass by the hanging bridge which connects the two places. As held in the Hinoguin case (supra.), a place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official function at the time of the incident, it has been held that a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on approved vacation leave. The more recent case which was cited by the appellate court in support of its decision is Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals. This time, the claim for

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death compensation benefits was made in behalf of a deceased police officer, P/Sgt. Wilfredo Alvaran, who, at the time of his death, was a member of the Mandaluyong Police Station but assigned to the Pasig Provincial Jail. Findings showed that the deceased brought his son to the Mandaluyong Police Station for interview because the latter was involved in a stabbing incident. While in front of the said station, the deceased was approached by another policeman and shot him to death. Both the GSIS and the ECC denied the claim by the deceaseds widow on the ground that Sgt. Alvaran was plainly acting as a father to his son and that he was in a place where he was not required to be. The Court of Appeals reversed said denial which decision was affirmed by this Court, declaring that: But for claritys sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to call at anytime and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community. xxx xxx xxx

basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform. Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegres widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail.viii[8] At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 42003 dated February 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Republic SUPREME Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 185035 July 15, 2009 of the Philippines COURT

We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P. D. No. 626, as amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers. While it is true that, geographically speaking, P/Sgt Alvaran was not actually at his assigned post at the Pasig Provincial Jail when he was attacked and killed, it could not also be denied that in bringing his son --- as a suspect in a case --- to the police station for questioning to shed light on a stabbing incident, he was not merely acting as father but as a peace officer. From the foregoing cases, it can be gleaned that the Court did not justify its grant of death benefits merely on account of the rule that soldiers or policemen, as the case may be, are virtually working round-the-clock. Note that the Court likewise attempted in each case to find a reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased from his assigned place of work and the incident that led to his death. In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was assigned and the place where he was accidentally shot was the permission duly given to him and his companions by the camp commander to go on overnight pass. According to the Court, a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer and, hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the performance of his official functions. The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his station on permission and directive by his superior officer to check on several personnel of his command who were then attending a dance party. As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees Compensation Commission case, although he was not given any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at the Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by the peacekeeping nature of the matter he was attending to at the time that he was attacked and shot to death, that is, bringing his son to the police station to answer for a crime, a

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs. SALVADOR A. DE CASTRO, Respondent. DECISION BRION, J.: Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to seek
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the reversal of the decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100375 entitled "Salvador A. De Castro v. Government Service Insurance System and Employees' Compensation Commission." THE ANTECEDENTS Respondent Salvador De Castro (De Castro) rendered service in the Philippine Air Force (PAF) from April 1, 1974 until his retirement on March 2, 2006. On December 22, 2004, De Castro was admitted at the V. Luna General Hospital, AFP Medical Center due to chest pains. He underwent on January 21, 2005 a 2-D echocardiography which revealed that he had "dilated left atrium eccentric left ventricular hyperthropy and left ventricular dysfunction." His full diagnosis consisted of hypertensive cardiovascular disease, dilated atrium, eccentric left ventricular hypertrophy and left ventricular dysfunction, and old anterior wall myocardial infarction. He also underwent coronary angiogram procedure which showed that he had significant simple vessel coronary artery disease (CAD). On August 15, 2005, De Castro was confined in the same hospital and was diagnosed to be suffering from (1) 41X-D21 Coronary artery disease and (2) 400-533 Hypertensive cardiovascular disease. De Castro retired from the service on March 2, 2006 with a 4 "Certificate of Disability Discharge." On this basis, he filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits with the GSIS. In a decision dated June 20, 2006, the GSIS denied De Castros claim based on the finding that De Castro's illnesses were non-occupational. De Castro appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). THE ECC DECISION At its meeting on June 11, 2007, the ECC Board affirmed the 5 GSIS ruling and dismissed De Castro's claim for lack of merit. The ECC, however, also held that, contrary to the ruling of the GSIS, CAD is a form of cardiovascular disease included in the list of occupational diseases. The ECC still denied the claim despite this observation because of "the presence of factors which are not work-related, such as smoking and alcohol 6 consumption." It likewise noted that manifestations of Cardiomyopathy in De Castros 2-D echocardiography examination results could be related to his drinking habits. De Castro sought relief from the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Relying on 7 Dominga A. Salmone v. ECC, De Castro argued that the causal relation between his illness and the resultant disability, on the one hand, and his work, on the other, is not that essential; it is enough that his illness is listed as an occupational disease. He disputed the findings of the ECC that hypertension or high blood pressure (which causes CAD) may have been caused by his cigarette smoking and drinking habits. He posited that other factors, such as stress brought about by the nature of his work, could have caused his illness. He claimed that the positions he held in the PAF, the last being First Sergeant, were comparable to a managerial position in the civilian business community because it served as an extension of the office of his commanding officer in the management, administration, and supervision of his fellow enlisted personnel within the unit.1avvphi1

In response to the petition, the GSIS maintained that hypertensive cardiovascular disease and CAD are not inherent occupational hazards, nor are they concomitant effects of De Castros employment with the PAF. It argued that there was no significant causal or contributory relationship between De Castros duties as a soldier and his ailments. THE CA DECISION The CA granted the petition. It noted that, as found by the ECC itself, De Castros illnesses are listed as occupational diseases in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules of the Employees Compensation Commission (Amended ECC Rules). It explained that under the same rules, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease under Annex "A" in order for the illness and the resulting disability or death to be 9 compensable. The CA further explained that it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness 10 which resulted in De Castros disability. Citing GSIS v. Baul, it held that in general, a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. While it noted that the exact etiology of hypertension which led to De Castros cardiovascular ailments cannot be accurately traced, it stressed that medical experiments tracing the etiology of essential hypertension show a relationship between this illness and the nature and conditions of work. The CA found significant the statement in De Castros Certificate of Disability Discharge that his CAD and hypertensive cardiovascular diseases were aggravated during active service; were not incurred while on AWOL; did not exist prior to entry into service; were incident to service; were not incurred by private avocation; were not due to misconduct; and, were incurred while in line of duty. The appellate court, therefore, brushed aside the findings a quo that De Castros illnesses might have been caused by his smoking and drinking habits. THE PETITION GSIS present petition presents the following issues: (1) whether the CA erred in reversing the decisions of the ECC and the GSIS that denied De Castros claim for disability benefits; and (2) whether De Castro proved that his heart ailments are work-related and/or have been precipitated by his duties with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The GSIS asks for a reversal of the CAs July 16, 2008 11 decision, arguing that it is not enough that a disease or illness is listed as compensable under Annex "A" of the 12 Amended ECC Rules. Other than the listing, the conditions/requisites specified in No. 18, Annex "A" of the rules must be complied with for De Castros heart ailment to be compensable. These conditions/requisites are: 1. If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work. 2. The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.
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3. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subject to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship. Given the above conditions, the GSIS posits that it is incumbent on De Castro to prove that there was an unusual and extraordinary strain in his work when his chest pain developed, or that there was causal connection between his working condition and heart ailments. The GSIS then submits that De Castro failed to discharge the burden of presenting evidence that his heart ailments were caused by his work. It brushes aside De Castros reliance on his certificate of 13 disability discharge, contending that it was issued relative to his separation from the AFP; the tests and findings on which the certificate was based are not conclusive or binding in the determination by the GSIS and the ECC of the compensability of De Castros illness under the law Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, and the ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of Employees Compensation claims. It maintains that under Rule 2, Section 1 of these rules, the GSIS (in the public sector), and the Social Security System (in the private sector) have original and exclusive jurisdiction, and the ECC, the appellate jurisdiction, to settle any dispute with respect to coverage, entitlement to benefits, collection, and payment of contributions and penalties. The GSIS further argues, relying on GSIS v. CA, that the proceedings in the AFP and the administrative machinery tasked by law to handle the governments employees compensation program are separate and distinct from one another; thus, the AFPs conclusions may not be used as basis in the determination of the compensability of De Castros ailments. It thus objects to the CAs rejection of the ECC's findings of fact on the nature of the heart ailments of De Castro, stressing that the decision of the ECC clearly elaborated on what CAD is and why De Castro is not entitled to the employees compensation. The ECC decision, it explains, was based on well-respected and often quoted 15 medical references; its medical evaluations revealed that De Castros heart illnesses were related to his drinking and smoking habits. Finding further support in the declarations of 16 the American Heart Association, it maintains that the ECC is correct in taking into consideration De Castros lifestyle, particularly his smoking and drinking habits, in denying his claim for compensation. The GSIS concludes that based on the findings of the ECC, De Castros ailments were not acquired by reason of his employment with the PAF and were, therefore, not work-connected. THE CASE FOR DE CASTRO In his March 9, 2009 Comment, De Castro asks the Court to deny the petition for lack of merit. He presents the following arguments: 1. No further proof of work connection is necessary since his illnesses are listed as occupational diseases. 2. There is substantial evidence to prove the work connection of his illnesses.
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De Castro submits that under Annex "A" of the Amended ECC Rules, CAD and essential hypertension are listed as 18 occupational diseases; once an ailment is so listed, the causal relation between the ailment and the resultant disability and his work is not essential to declare his disability compensable, citing in this regard the Courts ruling in 19 Dominga A. Salmore v. ECC. Further, De Castro contends that the GSIS theory that his drinking and smoking habits must have caused his hypertension is unwarranted; this theory conveniently and arbitrarily disregarded other factors or causes that might have contributed to his illnesses, such as the stress brought about by the nature of his work. De Castro posits that as the 20 Court held in GSIS v. Baul, the presence of other factors that are work-related makes his ailments compensable; what is required is reasonable work connection and not direct causal relation. De Castro stresses that the conditions laid down under Item No. 18 of Annex "A" of the Amended ECC Rules, are alternative, not concurrent, pointing out that the caption of the rule states: "Any of the following conditions," meaning, any one of the conditions mentioned in the rule. He argues that the diagnosed ailments that resulted in his separation from the service never existed prior to his entry into the 21 service (as indicated in his certificate of disability discharge), and were, therefore, incurred while he was in the military service; the same document also states that his illnesses were incident to and aggravated by the service. He claims that the circumstances under which he incurred his illnesses satisfy the requirements under No. 18a of the cited rule. De Castro posits that substantial evidence exists to prove that his ailments were caused by his employment with the PAF. He reiterates that the duties he performed at the PAF as noncommissioned officer-in-charge for operational security, Asst. First Sergeant, and ultimately, as First Sergeant, contributed to the progress of his ailments and, eventually, led to his separation from the service. He contends that the CA upheld his position when it ruled that he contracted CAD and hypertensive cardiovascular diseases in the course of his employment with the PAF, and these were brought about by the stress and the nature of his work. While De Castro does not dispute that the GSIS has original and exclusive jurisdiction and the ECC has appellate 22 jurisdiction over disputes on compensation benefits, he stresses that neither the GSIS nor the ECC subjected him to any separate medical examination. He argues that the GSIS and the ECC only made a paper evaluation of his condition, based on the medical findings and diagnoses of the V. Luna General Hospital, AFPMC. These hospital findings underwent review by the AFP Disability and Separation Board (DSB) before his discharge for disability was approved. The GSIS and ECC did not take into account his service with the AFP and the nature of his assignments which greatly contributed to the development of his ailments. Finally, De Castro argues that, procedurally, the CAs findings that his ailments are service-connected are no longer reviewable. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the petitioners 23 chosen mode of review, only allows a review of legal issues. THE COURTS RULING We first resolve the procedural question De Castro raised on whether the present petition is appropriate; De Castro alleges

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3. The factual findings of the CA are not subject to review.

that a Rule 45 petition should involve only questions of law, while the present petition places in issue the CAs factual findings. In effect, De Castro claims that the present petition should be dismissed outright under the terms of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. De Castros procedural objection has no merit. A question of law is involved when a doubt or controversy exists on what the law is or how it applies to a given set of facts; a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises on the truth or falsehood of given facts, or on the existence or non24 existence of claimed facts. In this case, the set of facts on which the CA decision is anchored is largely undisputed. De Castro experienced chest pains while on duty; he was medically examined and diagnosed to be afflicted with CAD and hypertensive cardiovascular disease. For this reason, he was separated from the service and given a certificate of disability. The findings and evaluation of the military physicians, while indicating that De Castro smoked and drank, showed a work connection with De Castro's ailments. These findings were 25 affirmed by the AFP's DSB. The GSIS and the ECC refused to be bound by the findings of the military physicians, invoking in this regard their exclusive jurisdiction over employees compensation cases. They ruled out compensation for De Castro on the ground that his ailments were not work-related because of De Castros drinking and smoking; the CA held otherwise. The issue before us is whether, under our present laws and jurisprudence, the conclusions of the CA on compensability are correct, based on the facts before it. In other words, the facts of the case are given and laid out; our task is to determine the validity of the conclusions drawn from the given facts from the point of view of compensability. This task involves a determination of a question of law and is appropriate for a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We find no merit in the petition. Other than the given facts, another undisputed aspect of the case is the status of the ailments that precipitated De Castros separation from the military service CAD and hypertensive 26 cardiovascular disease. These are occupational diseases. No less than the ECC itself confirmed the status of these ailments when it declared that "Contrary to the ruling of the System, CAD is a form of cardiovascular disease which is included in 27 the list of Occupational Diseases." Essential hypertension is also listed under Item 29 in Annex "A" of the Amended ECC Rules as an occupational disease. Despite the compensable character of his ailments, both the GSIS and the ECC found De Castros CAD to be non -work related and, therefore, non-compensable. To use the wording of the ECC decision, it denied De Castros claim "due to the presence of factors which are not work-related, such as 28 smoking and alcohol consumption." De Castros own military records triggered this conclusion as his Admitting 29 Notes, made when he entered the V. Luna General Hospital due to chest pains and hypertension, were that he was a smoker and a drinker. As the CA did, we cannot accept the validity of this conclusion at face value because it considers only one side the purely medical side of De Castros case and even then may not be 30 completely correct. The ECC itself, in its decision, recites that CAD is caused, among others, by atherosclerosis of the

coronary arteries that in turn, and lists the following major causes: increasing age; male gender; cigarette smoking; lipid disorder due to accumulation of too much fats in the body; hypertension or high blood pressure; insulin resistance due to diabetes; family history of CAD. The minor factors are: obesity; physical inactivity; stress; menopausal estrogen deficiency; high carbohydrate intake; and alcohol. We find it strange that both the ECC and the GSIS singled out the presence of smoking and drinking as the factors that rendered De Castros ailments, otherwise listed as occupational, to be non-compensable. To be sure, the causes of CAD and hypertension that the ECC listed and explained in its decision cannot be denied; smoking and drinking are undeniably among these causes. However, they are not the sole causes of CAD and hypertension and, at least, not under the circumstances of the present case. For this reason, we fear for the implication of the ECC ruling if it will prevail and be read as definitive on the effects of smoking and drinking on compensability issues, even on diseases that are listed as occupational in character. The ruling raises the possible reading that smoking and drinking, by themselves, are factors that can bar compensability. We ask the question of whether these factors can be sole determinants of compensability as the ECC has apparently failed to consider other factors such as age and gender from among those that the ECC itself listed as major and minor causes of atherosclerosis and, ultimately, of CAD. While age and gender are characteristics inherent in the person (and thereby may be considered non-work related factors), they also do affect a workers job performance and may in this sense, together with stresses of the job, significantly contribute to illnesses such as CAD and hypertension. To cite an example, some workplace activities are appropriate only for the young (such as the lifting of heavy objects although these may simply be office files), and when repeatedly undertaken by older workers, may lead to ailments and disability. Thus, age coupled with an age-affected work activity may lead to compensability. From this perspective, none of the ECCs listed factors should be disregarded to the exclusion of others in determining compensability. In any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as important as raw medical findings and a claimants personal and social history. This is a 31 basic legal reality in workers compensation law. We are therefore surprised that the ECC and the GSIS simply brushed aside the disability certification that the military issued with respect to De Castros disability, based mainly on their primacy as the agencies with expertise on workers compensation and disability issues. While ECC and GSIS are admittedly the government entities with jurisdiction over the administration of workers disability compensation and can thus claim primacy in these areas, they cannot however claim infallibility, particularly when they use wrong or limited considerations in determining compensability. In the present case, they should at least have considered the very same standards that they stated in their own decisions, and should not have simply brushed aside as incorrect the basis for disability that the AFP, as home agency, used in passing upon De Castros separation from the service and discharge for disability. In saying this, we are not unmindful that neither the GSIS nor the ECC conducted a medical examination of De Castro on their own; they merely relied on

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the results of De Castro's medical examination conducted at the V. Luna General Hospital, a government military hospital. It was from these same medical findings that the GSIS and ECC derived their conclusion that De Castro's drinking and smoking habits and personal lifestyle caused his ailments. We are aware, too, that De Castros discharge based on disability was not the sole result of the AFP medical findings; the medical findings were further reviewed and deliberated upon by the AFPs DSB which certified on the causes of De Castros separation from the service and his disability. The militarys disability certification clearly states that De Castros ailments were: (1) aggravated by active service, (2) incident to service, (3) not incurred while on AWOL, (4) never existed prior to entry to military service, (5) not due to misconduct, (6) not incurred by private avocation and, (7) in line of duty. De Castro further stated in the course of this case that the positions he occupied as the PAF-NonCommissioned Officer-in-Charge for Operational Security, Asst. First Sergeant and First Sergeant of the 577th CS, 570th CTW stationed at Puerto Princesa, Palawan were positions comparable to managerial positions in the private business sector; he served as the extension of his commanding officer in the management, administration, and supervision of the activities of his fellow enlisted soldiers within the unit tasks whose urgency and sensitivity resulted in job stress. While the task before the GSIS and the ECC was to determine compensability, not merely the fact of disability that justifies a separation from the service, still, these agencies should not have simply glossed over the findings of the military on the matters they certified to, as these are the same facts that are material to compensability. The health of De Castro upon entry into the service and how his work affected his health are very relevant facts that should not have been disregarded in favor of singled out facts that the GSIS and the ECC considered as conclusive indicators of incompensability. The ECC and the GSIS, in short, did not seriously look at all the relevant factors determinative of compensability and thereby decided De Castros case based on incomplete, if not wrong, considerations. This is a reversible error that requires rectification. In contrast, the assailed CA ruling was sensitive to all these concerns and found reasonable work connection between De Castros ailments and his duties as a soldier for 32 years without at all disregarding De Castros drinking and smoking habits that could have contributed to his afflictions. On the latter concerns, we quote with approval the following CA observations: Intoxication which does not incapacitate the employee from following his occupation is not sufficient to defeat the recovery of compensation, although intoxication may be a contributory cause to his injury. While smoking may contribute to the development of a heart ailment, heart ailment may be cause by other factors such as working and living under stressful conditions. Thus, the peremptory presumption that petitioners habit of smoking heavily was the wilfull act which causes his illness and resulting disability, without more, cannot suffice to bar petitioners claim for 32 disability benefits. We consider it significant that De Castro entered military service as a fit and healthy new soldier. We note, too, De Castros service record and the medals, awards, and 33 commendations he earned, all attesting to 32 years of very active and productive service in the military. Thus, the CAD and the hypertension came while he was engaged in these endeavors. To say, as the GSIS and the ECC did, that his

ailments are conclusively non-work related because he smoked and drank, is to close our eyes to the rigors of military service and to the demands of De Castros specific positions in the military service, and to single out factors that would deny the respondents claim. This is far from the balancing that the GSIS invokes between sympathy for the workingman and the equally vital interest of denying 34 underserving claims. Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding De Castros case, we are convinced that his long years of military service, with its attendant stresses and pressures, contributed in no small measure to the ailments that led to his disability retirement. We, therefore, agree with the CA when it concluded that De Castro's "illness was contracted during and by reason of his employment, and any non-work related factor that contributed to its aggravation is immaterial." We close by reiterating that what the law requires is a 35 reasonable work connection and not direct causal relation. Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of 36 proof in compensation proceedings. For, in interpreting and carrying out the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the primordial and paramount consideration is the employee's welfare. To safeguard the worker's rights, any doubt on the proper interpretation and application must be resolved in favor of 37 labor. We reiterate these same principles in the present case. Accordingly, we hold that De Castro's ailments CAD and hypertensive cardiovascular disease are work-connected under the circumstances of the present case and are, therefore, compensable. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The challenged decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100375 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 146494 July 14, 2004

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GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner, vs. MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated 13 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 2 CV No. 48784. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cebu City ("trial court"), which held that Milagros Orbiso Montesclaros is entitled to survivorship pension. The Facts Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros ("Nicolas") 3 married Milagros Orbiso ("Milagros") on 10 July 1983. Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married Milagros who was then 43 years old. On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") an application for retirement benefits effective 18 February 1985 under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 ("PD 1146"). In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole 4 beneficiary. Nicolas' last day of actual service was on 17 5 February 1985. On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas' application for retirement "effective 17 February 1984," granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five 6 years and a monthly annuity thereafter. Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within 7 three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on "17 February 1984." On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension. On 9 November 1994, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship pension. The trial court ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due including 8 9 interest. Citing Articles 115 and 117 of the Family Code, the trial court held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed through monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits are conjugal property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights.
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In the meantime, in a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted GSIS' decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and that 10 she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Commenting on Milagros' letter, GSIS asserts that the Court 11 must decide the case on the merits. The Court will resolve the issue despite the manifestation of Milagros. The issue involves not only the claim of Milagros but also that of other surviving spouses who are similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the proviso. Social justice and public interest demand that we resolve the constitutionality of the proviso. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the retirement benefits are onerous and conjugal because the pension came from the deceased pensioner's salary deductions. The Court of Appeals held that the pension is not gratuitous since it is a deferred compensation for services rendered. The Issues GSIS raises the following issues: 1. Whether Section 16 of PD 1146 entitles Milagros to survivorship pension; 2. Whether retirement benefits form part of conjugal property; 3. Whether Articles 254 and 256 of the Family Code 12 repealed Section 18 of PD 1146. The Court's Ruling The pertinent provisions of PD 1146 on survivorship benefits read: SEC. 16. Survivorship Benefits. When a member or pensioner dies, the beneficiary shall be entitled to survivorship benefits provided for in sections seventeen and eighteen hereunder. The survivorship pension shall consist of: (1) basic survivorship pension which is fifty percent of the basic monthly pension; and (2) dependent's pension not exceeding fifty percent of the basic monthly pension payable in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the System. SEC. 17. Death of a Member. (a) Upon the death of a member, the primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to: (1) the basic monthly pension which is guaranteed for five years; Provided, That, at the option of the beneficiaries, it may be paid in lump sum as defined in this Act: Provided, further, That, the member is entitled to old-age pension at the time of his death; or

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GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review.

(2) the basic survivorship pension which is guaranteed for thirty months and the dependent's pension; Provided, That, the deceased had paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions within the five-year period immediately preceding his death, or a total of at least one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to his death. (b) At the end of the guaranteed periods mentioned in the preceding sub-section (a), the survivorship pension shall be paid as follows: (1) when the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he shall receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he remarries; (2) when only dependent children are the survivors, they shall be entitled to the survivorship pension for as long as they are qualified; (3) when the survivors are the dependent spouse and the dependent children, they shall be entitled to the survivorship pension so long as there are dependent children and, thereafter, the surviving spouse shall receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he remarries. (c) In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the secondary beneficiaries designated by the deceased and recorded in the System, shall be entitled to: (1) a cash payment equivalent to thirty times the basic survivorship pension when the member is qualified for old-age pension; or (2) a cash payment equivalent to fifty percent of the average monthly compensation for each year he paid contributions, but not less than five hundred pesos; Provided, That, the member paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions within the five-year period immediately preceding his death or paid a total of at least one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to his death. (d) When the primary beneficiaries are not entitled to the benefits mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section, they shall receive a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent of the average monthly compensation for each year the member paid contributions, but not less than five hundred pesos. In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the amount shall revert to the funds of the System. SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a pensioner, the primary beneficiaries shall receive the applicable pension mentioned under paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner

qualified for the pension. When the pensioner dies within the period covered by the lump sum, the survivorship pension shall be paid only after the expiration of the said period. This shall also apply to the pensioners living as of the effectivity of this Act, but the survivorship benefit shall be based on the monthly pension being received at the time of death. (Emphasis supplied) Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are (1) the dependent spouse until such spouse remarries, and (2) the 13 dependent children. The secondary beneficiaries are the dependent parents and legitimate descendants except 14 dependent children. The law defines dependent as "the legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted, acknowledged natural or illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age or is over twenty-one years of age but physically or mentally incapacitated and incapable of self-support." The term also includes the legitimate spouse dependent for support on the member, and the legitimate parent wholly dependent on the 15 member for support. The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146, which proviso prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension ("the proviso"). We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros' claim, is unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause. The proviso is also discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law. Retirement Benefits as Property Interest Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee to pay monthly contributions. PD 1146 mandates the government to include in its annual appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the contributions. It is compulsory on the government employer to take off and withhold from the employees' monthly 16 salaries their contributions and to remit the same to GSIS. The government employer must also remit its corresponding 17 share to GSIS. Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation. In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the 18 terms of employment. The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government. Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service. Retirement benefits to government employees reward them for giving the best years of their lives 19 in the service of their country. Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is 20 protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to 21 immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of the public

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employees' pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that 23 is, without notice and opportunity to be heard. In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also provides for benefits to survivors of deceased government employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A widow's right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husband's contractual 24 compensation. Denial of Due Process The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouse's claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the government employees. The "whereas" clauses of PD 1146 state: WHEREAS, the Government Service Insurance System in promoting the efficiency and welfare of the employees of the Government of the Philippines, administers the laws that grant to its members social security and insurance benefits; WHEREAS, it is necessary to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System; to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and to expand and increase the benefits made available to him and his dependents to the extent permitted by available resources; WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws have impeded the efficient and effective discharge by the System of its functions and have unduly hampered the System from being more responsive to the dramatic changes of the times and from meeting the increasing needs and expectations of the Filipino public servant; WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that have prejudiced, rather than benefited, the government employee; restricted, rather than broadened, his benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the payment of benefits, must now yield to his paramount welfare; WHEREAS, the social security and insurance benefits of government employees must be continuously reexamined and improved to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance programs that will provide benefits responsive to their needs and those of their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, retirement, and

22

other contingencies; and to serve as a fitting reward for dedicated public service; WHEREAS, in the light of existing economic conditions affecting the welfare of government employees, there is a need to expand and improve the social security and insurance programs administered by the Government Service Insurance System, specifically, among others, by increasing pension benefits, expanding disability benefits, introducing survivorship benefits, introducing sickness and income benefits, and eventually extending the compulsory coverage of these programs to all government employees regardless of employment status. PD 1146 has the following purposes: a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System; b. to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and c. to expand, increase, and improve the social security and insurance benefits made available to him and his dependents such as: increasing pension benefits expanding disability benefits introducing survivorship benefits introducing sickness income benefits extending compulsory membership to all government employees irrespective of 25 status The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the deceased member or pensioner to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic effects resulting from the death of the wage earner or 26 pensioner. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivor's benefits under a pension system. However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married the employee for a certain period before the employee's death to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain. One example is the Illinois Pension Code which restricts survivor's annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was married to a state employee for at least one year before the employee's death. The Illinois pension system classifies spouses into those married less than one year before a member's death and those married one year or more. The classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of deathbed marriages where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries another so that person becomes eligible for benefits. In Sneddon v. The State 27 Employee's Retirement System of Illinois, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that such classification was based on difference in situation and circumstance, bore a rational

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relation to the purpose of the statute, and was therefore not in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the 28 law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must 29 apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to 30 distinguish one class from another. The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before 31 the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioner's death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent "deathbed marriages," then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits. Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason Congress deleted the proviso in 32 Republic Act No. 8291 ("RA 8291"), otherwise known as the "Government Service Insurance Act of 1997," the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the member immediately before the member's death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage 33 solely to receive the benefit. Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the member's retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states that "the dependent spouse shall not be

entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension." The Government Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros for survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila

EN BANC

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CARMELITA LLEDO, Complainant,

A.M. No. P-95-1167 May a government employee, dismissed from the service for cause, be allowed to recover the personal contributions he paid to the Government Service Insurance Present: System (GSIS)? This is the question that confronts this Court in the PUNO, C.J., instant case, the factual antecedents of which are as follows: CARPIO, CORONA, On December 21, 1998, this Court promulgated a CARPIO MORALES, Decisioniv[1] in the above-captioned case, dismissing from the service Atty. Cesar V. Lledo, former branch clerk of court VELASCO, JR., of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94. Cesars

- versus -

NACHURA,

wife, Carmelita, had filed an administrative case against him,

charging the latter with immorality, abandonment, and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, During the investigation, it was established that conduct unbecoming a public official.

Cesar had left his family to live with another woman with DEL CASTILLO, whom he also begot children. He failed to provide support for ABAD, his family. The investigating judge recommended Cesars from the service. The Office of the Court VILLARAMA,dismissal JR., PEREZ, and ATTY. CESAR V. LLEDO, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City, Respondent. February 9, 2010 x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x WHEREFORE, Cesar V. Lledo, branch clerk of court of RTC, Branch 94, Quezon City, is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including any government-owned or controlled corporation. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.iv[2] Administrator (OCA) adopted the recommendation.

MENDOZA, JJ. The Court, in its December 21, 1998 Decision, disposed of the case in this wise: Promulgated:

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

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In a letteriv[3] dated January 15, 1999, Carmelita and her children wrote to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., begging for humane consideration and asking that part of the money due Cesar be applied to the payment of the arrearages of their amortized house and lot then facing foreclosure by the GSIS. They averred that Cesars abandonment had been painful enough; and to lose their home of 26 years would be even more painful and traumatic for the children.

Cesar Jr. wrote the Court again on November 27, 2006, expressing his gratitude for the Courts consideration of his request for his fathers leave credits. He again asked for judicial clemency in connection with his fathers claim for refund of the latters personal contributions to GSIS. iv[8]

The Court directed the GSIS to comment, within 10 days from notice, on Cesar Jr.s letter. iv[9] For failing to file the required Comment, the Court, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2007,iv[10] required the GSIS to show cause

The Court directed the OCA to comment. The OCA recommended that the Courts December 21, 1998 Decision be reconsidered insofar as the forfeiture of Cesars leave credits was concerned, underscoring, however, that said benefits would only be released to Carmelita and her children.iv[4]

why it should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution directing it to file its Comment. The Court reiterated its December 11, 2007 Resolution on June 17, 2008, and directed compliance.

In a letteriv[11] dated April 16, 2009, Jason C. Teng, Regional Manager of the GSIS Quezon City Regional Office, In a Resolution dated August 3, 1999,iv[5] the Court resolved to deny the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. explained that a request for a refund of retirement premiums is disallowed. He explained:

On April 3, 2006, Cesar L. Lledo, Jr., Cesars son, wrote a letteriv[6] to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban. He related that his father had been bedridden after suffering a severe stroke and acute renal failure. He had been abandoned by his mistress and had been under Cesar Jr.s care since 2001. The latter appealed to the Court to reconsider its December 21, 1998 Decision, specifically the forfeiture of leave credits, which money would be used to pay for his fathers medical expenses. Cesar Jr. asked the Court for retroactive application of the Courts ruling subsequent to his fathers dismissal, wherein the Court ruled that despite being dismissed from the service, government employees are entitled to the monetary equivalent of their leave credits since these were earned prior to dismissal.

The rate of contribution for both government and personal shares of retirement premiums was actuarially computed to allow the GSIS to generate enough investment returns to be able to pay off future claims. During actuarial computation, the expected demographics considered the percentages of different types of future claims (and non-claims). As such, if those that were expected to have no future claim (e.g. those with forfeited retirement benefits) were suddenly allowed to receive claims for payment of benefits, this would have a negative impact on the financial viability of the GSIS.

Even as the Court noted the letter in its June 30, 2009 Resolution,iv[12] it further required the Board of

Directors of the GSIS (GSIS Board) to file a separate Comment within 10 days from notice. Treating the letter as a motion for reconsideration,

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the Court, on May 3, 2006, granted the same, specifically on the forfeiture of accrued leave credits.iv[7]

In its Comment,iv[13] the GSIS Board said that Cesar is not entitled to the refund of his personal contributions of the retirement premiums because it is the policy of the GSIS that an employee/member who had been dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits cannot recover the retirement premiums he has paid unless the dismissal provides otherwise. The GSIS Board pointed out that the Courts Decision did not provide that Cesar is entitled to a refund of his retirement premiums. Section 9. Effect of dismissal or separation from service. Upon dismissal for cause of a member of the System, the benefits under his membership policy shall be automatically forfeited to the System, except one-half of the cash or surrender value, which amount shall be paid to such member, or in case of death, to his beneficiary. In other cases of separation before maturity of a policy, the Government contributions shall cease, and the insured member shall have the following options: (a) to collect the cash surrender value of the policy; or (b) to continue the policy by paying the full premiums thereof; or (c) to obtain a paid up or extended term insurance in such amount or period, respectively, as the paid premiums may warrant, in accordance with the conditions contained in said policy; o[r] (d) to avail himself of such other options as may be provided in the policy.iv[16] Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 186 states:

There is no gainsaying that dismissal from the service carries with it the forfeiture of retirement benefits. Under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, it is provided that:iv[14]

Section 58. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.

In 1951, Commonwealth Act No. 186 was amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 660. R.A. No. 660 amended Sections 2(a), (d), and (f); 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14; 15; and 16 of Commonwealth Act No. 186. R.A. No. 660 likewise

However, in the instant case, Cesar Jr. seeks only the return of his fathers personal contributions to the GSIS. He is not claiming any of the benefits that Cesar would have been entitled to had he not been dismissed from the service, such as retirement benefits.

added new provisions to the earlier law, one of which reads:

Section 8. The following new sections are hereby inserted in Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred and eighty-six: II. Retirement Insurance Benefit

To determine the propriety of Cesar Jr.s request, a reexamination of the laws governing the GSIS is in order.

The GSIS was created in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 186. It was intended to promote the efficiency and welfare of the employees of the Government of the

Philippines and to replace the pension systems in existence at that time.iv[15]

Page

Section 11. (a) Amount of annuity. Upon retirement a member shall be automatically entitled to a life annuity payable monthly for at least five years and thereafter as long as he live. (sic) The amount of the monthly annuity at the age of fifty-seven years shall be twenty pesos, plus, for each year of service rendered after the approval of this Act, one and six-tenths per centum of the average monthly salary received by him during the last five years of service, plus, for each year of service rendered prior to the approval of this Act, if said service was at least seven

31

years, one and two-tenths per centum of said average monthly salary: Provided, That this amount shall be adjusted actuarially if retirement be at an age other than fiftyseven years: Provided, further, That the maximum amount of monthly annuity at age fifty-seven shall not in any case exceed two-thirds of said average monthly salary or five hundred pesos, whichever is the smaller amount: And provided, finally, That retirement benefit shall be paid not earlier than one year after the approval of this Act. In lieu of this annuity, he may prior to his retirement elect one of the following equivalent benefits:

centum per monthly.iv[17]

annum,

compounded

Thus, Section 11(d) of R.A. No. 660 should be deemed to have amended Commonwealth Act No. 186.

In 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146, an act Amending, Expanding, Increasing and Integrating the Social Security and

(1) Monthly annuity during his lifetime;

Insurance Benefits of Government Employees and Facilitating the Payment thereof under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as

(2) Monthly annuity during the joint-lives of the employee and his wife or other designated beneficiary, which annuity, however, shall be reduced upon the death of either to one-half and be paid to the survivor; (3) For those who are at least sixty-five years of age, lump sum payment of present value of annuity for first five years and future annuity to be paid monthly; or "(4) Such other benefit as may be approved by the System. "(b) Survivors benefit. Upon death before he becomes eligible for retirement, his beneficiaries as recorded in the application of retirement annuity filed with the System shall be paid his own premiums with interest of three per centum per annum, compounded monthly. If on his death he is eligible for retirement, then the automatic retirement annuity or the annuity chosen by him previously shall be paid accordingly. "(c) Disability benefit. If he becomes permanently and totally disabled and his services are no longer desirable, he shall be discharged and paid his own contributions with interest of three per centum per annum, compounded monthly, if he has served less than five years; if he has served at least five years but less than fifteen years, he shall be paid also the corresponding employer's premiums, without interest, described in subsection (a) of section five hereof; and if he has served at least fifteen years he shall be retired and be entitled to the benefit provided under subsection (a) of this section.

amended, and for other purposes.

Section 4 of P.D. No. 1146 reads:

Section 4. Effect of Separation from the Service. A member shall continue to be a member, notwithstanding his separation from the service and, unless the terms of his separation provide otherwise, he shall be entitled to whatever benefits which shall have accrued or been earned at the time of his separation in the event of any contingency compensable under this Act.

There is no provision in P.D. No. 1146 dealing specifically with GSIS members dismissed from the service for cause, or their entitlement to the premiums they have paid.

Subsequently, R.A. No. 8291 was enacted in 1997, and it provides:

"(d) Upon dismissal for cause or on voluntary separation, he shall be entitled only to his own premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three per

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Section 1. Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, is hereby amended to read as follows:

32

xxxx

SEC. 4. Effect of Separation from the Service. A member separated from the service shall continue to be a member, and shall be entitled to whatever benefits he has qualified to in the event of any contingency compensable under this Act.

laws, rules and regulations vested upon or acquired by an employee who is already in the service as of the effectivity of this Act shall remain in force and effect: Provided, further, That subsequent to the effectivity of this Act, a new employee or an employee who has previously retired or separated and is reemployed in the service shall be covered by the provisions of this Act.

This Court has previously determined the nature of similarly-worded repealing clauses. Thus: It is noteworthy that none of the subsequent laws expressly repealed Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended. In fact, none of the subsequent laws expressly repealed the earlier laws. Be that as it may, we must still resolve the issue of whether the same has been impliedly repealed. The holding of this Court in Mecano vs. COA is instructive: The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, s. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.iv[19]

We answer in the negative.

As a general rule, repeals by implication are not favored. When statutes are in pari materia, they should be construed together. A law cannot be deemed repealed

unless it is clearly manifested that the legislature so intended it.iv[18] There are two accepted instances of implied repeal. The first takes place when the provisions in the two acts on The repealing clause of P.D. No. 1146 reads: Section 48. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts of law specifically inconsistent herewith shall be considered amended or repealed accordingly. the same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, in which case, the later act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second occurs when the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute; thus, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
iv[20]

On the other hand R.A. No. 8291s repealing clause states:

Addressing the second instance, we pose the question: were the later enactments intended to substitute the earlier ones? We hold that there was no such

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SEC. 3. Repealing Clause. All laws and any other law or parts of law specifically inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, That the rights under existing

substitution.

33

P.D. No. 1146 was not intended to replace Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 660, but

to expand and improve the social security and insurance programs administered by the Government Service Insurance System.iv[21] Thus, as the above-quoted repealing clause indicates, only the laws or parts of law specifically inconsistent with P.D. No. 1146 were considered amended or repealed.iv[22]

We again quote Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended:

In fact, Section 34 of P.D. No. 1146 mandates that the GSIS, as created and established under Commonwealth Act No. 186, shall implement the provisions of that law. Moreover, Section 13 states:

(d) Upon dismissal for cause or on voluntary separation, he shall be entitled only to his own premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three per centum per annum, compounded monthly.

Compare this with Section 4 of P.D. No. 1146, to wit:

Section 13. Retirement Option. Employees who are in the government service upon the effectivity of this Act shall, at the time of their retirement, have the option to retire under this Act or under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as previously amended.

Section 4. Effect of Separation from the Service. A member shall continue to be a member, notwithstanding his separation from the service and, unless the terms of his separation provide otherwise, he shall be entitled to whatever benefits which shall have accrued or been earned at the time of his separation in the event of any contingency compensable under this Act.

Accordingly, Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, had not been abrogated by P.D. No. 1146.

and Section 1 of R.A. No. 8291, which amended Section 4 of Meanwhile, R.A. No. 8291, although enacted to amend P.D. No. 1146, did not expressly repeal P.D. No. 1146 and the law in force at the time of Cesars dismissal from the service:

Commonwealth Act No. 186.

Under the first instance of implied repeal, we are guided by the principle that in order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent with and repugnant to the existing law that they cannot be reconciled and made to stand together. The

SEC. 4. Effect of Separation from the Service. A member separated from the service shall continue to be a member, and shall be entitled to whatever benefits he has qualified to in the event of any contingency compensable under this Act.

clearest case of inconsistency must be made before the inference of implied repeal can be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed.iv[23] There is no manifest inconsistency between Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 8291. The latter provision is a general We now examine the effect of the later statutes on the provision specifically dealing with employees dismissed statement intended to cover members separated from the service whether the separation is voluntary or involuntary, and whether the same was for cause or not. Moreover, the same deals only with the benefits the member is entitled to at the time of separation.

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for cause.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Government Service Insurance System is hereby For the latter law to be deemed as having repealed the earlier law, it is necessary to show that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnance, clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.iv[24] SO ORDERED. DIRECTED to return to Atty. Cesar Lledo his own premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three per centum per annum, compounded monthly.

As mentioned earlier, neither P.D. No. 1146 nor R.A. No. 8291 contains any provision specifically dealing with employees dismissed for cause and the status of their personal contributions. Thus, there is no inconsistency between Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, and Section 4 of P.D. No. 1146, and, subsequently, R.A. No. 8291. The inevitable conclusion then is that Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, continues to govern cases of employees dismissed for cause and their claims for the return of their personal contributions.

Finally, it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the nature of social legislation, to be liberally construed in favor of the government employees.iv[25] The money subject of the instant request consists of personal contributions made by the employee, premiums paid in anticipation of benefits expected upon retirement. The occurrence of a contingency, i.e., his dismissal from the service prior to reaching retirement age, should not deprive him of the money that belongs to him from the outset. To allow forfeiture of these personal contributions in favor of the GSIS would condone undue enrichment.

Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, Cesar is entitled to the return of his premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, with interest of three per centum per annum,

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compounded monthly.