Paul Raas

The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing. Edmund Burke (m271-203)

Ms vale morir en pie que vivir de rodillas. Rigoberta Mench (m41-)

A Refutation of the Christian Love Principle

Contents
Example 1: From New Zealand............................................................................................12 Example 2: Bonhoeffers `Account on New Year 1943......................................................15 Example 3: Sandro Pertini....................................................................................................27 Example 4: Odyssey, Ulysses Revenge...............................................................................37 Example 5: Samson...............................................................................................................38

s Figures immediately following `p refer to pages in this paper. `Ex followed by the numbers 1 5 refers to the Five Examples in Chapter Two. `COM, following `Ex 1-5 refers to the COMMENTS that follow the Five Examples in Chapter Two. `COM, following `Chapter Four to `Chapter Eleven refers to the respective COMMENT at the beginning of those Chapters. `C refers to a comment given to a quotation. `f never means `following, but refers to a paragraph. `Y followed by a number indicates a year after the second millenium, for instance, `Y12 means 2012. If there is the letter `m in front of the number, it indicates a year before 2000, which is defined `Year nil (`Yn). For instance, `m8, pronounced `minus eight, means 1992. The intention is to replace the Christian calendar. The number of centuries and millenia in the past are also subtracted from 2000. For instance, the 14th century is called `7th bn (`seventh before nil, which can be shortened to `seventh bn); the old and the new counting of centuries always add up to 21. Consequently, the 1 st century AD is `20th bn. This rule applies to the centuries AD. Then, counting backwards, the 1 st century BC is `21st bn. The 2nd century BC is `22nd bn. The years BC are added 2000. For instance, 480 BC is `m2480. At first, the new numbers of the centuries seem difficult, but they are easier to handle than the current ones. For instance, the years 1300-1399 are called the `14th century , which is awkward. The new calendar calls those years `7 th bn, in fact adding up to 20. Introductory note: Behavioural, constitutional, legal, penal, and juridical aspects do not make part of this investigation, which restricts itself to philosophical deductions and conclusions; the former are only referred to, if they possibly interfere with the philosophical argument (Hegel 2a).

Chapter One: Presentation of the Love Principle

1) Christian theology owes its considerable repute and appeal mainly to the love theory, which has never been properly refuted for want of a valid doctrine of responsibility. What has been abundantly developed in psychologies (Jung, Frankl, Fromm), philosophies (Plato, Aristotle, English and German philosophy), and theologies (Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin) are morals. Morals always include the notion of duty, as though we were obliged to act according to certain rules and principles. The doctrine of responsibility, however, teaches that the wish to act responsibly comes naturally to a logically thinking being ( Mackintosh 27-28) and cannot otherwise be defined by rules. Aristotle, I 3 was already aware of the fluctuating nature of ethical decisions. He stated, We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true

2) It has to be notified that responsibility wants to adjust its decisions to whatever has come to knowledge and is, therefore, fluctuating. However, responsibility itself is always and everywhere, not `only for the most part true. For instance, nowadays, it would not refrain from taxing hard natural resources that need preserving at all costs, although nobody likes to be charged. Certainly, one could dispense with such inadequate measures, if people were taught a valid doctrine of responsibility. Unfortunately, people are taught to love they really love to wash their cars with hectolitres of freshwater, and unnecessarily take a shower twice a day because they love to be clean and follow the rules. In terms of water preservation, most people and politicians still act in a way that was adequate in the 2 nd bn. There is no law that forbids doing so, but all those resources are far too cheap. 3) The love principle has had a devastating influence on how human behaviour and the conduct of the other mammals has been classified. It has become a very popular idea, also with scientists and philosophers, that humans Christians in the first place are able to love, whereas the other mammals are thoroughly selfish and brutal. This is totally incorrect. As a matter of fact, social behaviour is a necessarily innate quality with all mammals; unless it were, the litter could not be nurtured. 1 In terms of infants, the bond between mother and child is so obvious that the American school of Mahler mistook it for a symbiotic relationship ( Mackintosh 11, 168, 223). Mammals have always been more sociable than our thinkers theories suggest. The fact of innate social behaviour concerns aetiology and does not need further discussion in this place. One can, however, find philosophical statements which confirm the fact, for instance Spinoza III PROP. XXX, If anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain. Innate social behaviour was also confirmed by Shaftesbury 70b-71a and Shaftesbury 74-75a. 4) Therefore, the classical philosophers efforts to develop ethical and moral principles were useless and unnecessary. In the view of social behaviour, innate in all mammals, Hume II 1g is questionable, when he states, The idea of justice can never be taken for a natural principle, capable of inspiring men with an equitable conduct towards each other. That virtue, as it is now understood, wou'd never have been dream'd of among rude and savage men. The existence of those rude and savage men is a strange myth. While it is common to elderly people to praise the moral qualities of the past, philosophers of all persuasions have yielded to the theological and historical errors of most religions which proclaim that our forefathers were monsters. The almost unreadable (Chapter Ten COM 10-11) sophisms of Habermas labour under the same error. In terms of that criticism, experience teaches, whoever writes in a way almost no-one is able to understand, tries to prove a thing which is not true. Such teachings never had an effect on human behaviour anyway. Unless social behaviour were innate with mammals, all teachings, parenting efforts, laws, punishments, and controls would never be able to produce it. In addition, communal life in a herd of elephants or a
1

http://www.csus.edu/indiv/L/lancasterw/bio168/Lecture%20notes/Lec10%20BIO168-05.htmh

school of dolphins exhibits at least the average standard of any community of humans without philosophical doctrines and deductions. Shaftesbury 81 correctly states that creatures of prey who live the farthest out of society, maintain, we see, such a conduct towards one another as is exactly suitable to the good of their own species. Whilst man, notwithstanding the assistance of religion and the direction of laws, is often found to live in less conformity with Nature, and by means of religion itself is often rendered the more barbarous and inhuman. Typical of the philosophical incongruence is Hume II 1a, where it is stated that our sense of every kind of virtue is not natural; Of this kind I assert justice to be The strong sense of justice in children is so manifest that justice can be considered a very natural gift. Hume I 1b, however, states correctly that the measures of right and wrong are eternal laws, obligatory on every rational mind. Not only, however, on rational minds, since, for instance, lions know their exact rank within their pride, a knowledge without which the pride would not be able to survive. The sense of justice in children also results from the necessity to adjust to their communities. 5) The most devastating effect of the aetiological error, however, was the one it has had on parenting; parents were made to feel obliged to create social behaviour in their offspring. It is understood that psychology is on the wrong track as well. Freuds superego theory, Jungs sublimation doctrine, the American school of Kohlberg, and many others have to be rejected as being based on erroneous assumptions, as if the newborn child was looking for pleasure exclusively and had a zero moral (Chapter Six COM 1). Those matters will be dealt with in Mackintosh 62, 72-82, 123. In terms of parenting, neither thinking, nor social behaviour, nor responsibility want to be taught, but lived, by parents respecting their children and caring for them, and the children will take responsibility according to the challenges they are confronted with. Help is only needed, when the challenges are disproportionate. 6) In terms of `love, it was an error to transplant the essential quality of our erotic powers which has to create life, but is not able to sustain it from the biological domain into the realm of logical thinking and spirituality. In other words, the invention of agape as a higher form of love was erroneous and inappropriate. Love culminates in the mating of the couple. It is selective. It features some qualities highlighted in 1 Cor 13.4-8 (a-f). The presented analysis of this important text will demonstrate that the qualities which characterise love contradict the principle of responsibility. Vice versa, where they apply to responsibility, they are opposed to love. a) 1 Cor 13.4a reads, Love is patient and kind Comment: This is true. Responsibility, however, can be very impatient and unkind, as the Five Examples (Ex) in Chapter Two will demonstrate. In terms of parenting, there is hardly a thornier subject than patience. It is true that impatience is the worst enemy of progress. But an immediate and possibly violent answer to aggressive violence does not aim at progress, but the maintenance of normality, credibility, and dignity. Thus, it is irresponsible to refrain from it. It is simply impossible that there will be any progress, unless the normal relationship has first been re-established. b) 1 Cor 13.4b it is not jealous or conceited or proud; Comment: The sheer contrary is true. The qualities mentioned are part of responsibility, not however of love. It is correct and positive for lovers to be jealous,

in the sense that it is natural to dislike the interference of other people with the loving relationship. It also strengthens the relationship, if the lovers feel proud of the fact to have won their partners sympathy. Paul, therefore, introduces contradictory parameters. The avoidance of jealousy and pride is a typical to a wise and dignified attitude, which characterises responsibility. c) 1 Cor 13.5 love does not keep a record of wrongs; Comment: It is, indeed, typical of lovers to forgive disturbing habits or wrongs in the past and the present of the other. It is necessary in most cases, since everybody has shortcomings. Unless this kind of tolerance exists, the loving relationship is not likely to succeed. However, one would not hire a lover for a job he has proved unable to do, even if he wants it and needs the money. (One would be better to give or lend him the money.) Therefore, that quality of love is contrary to a responsible way of dealing with others. d) 1 Cor 13.6 Love is not happy with evil, but is happy with the truth. Comment: This applies to responsibility, but not to love. If someone other tries to win the beloved ones favours and fails to do so, it is normal and appropriate to be pleased. Lovers also have a natural tendency to ignore the truth with regard to negative details about their partners, so as to stop someone from spreading rumours, although they might be true. That does not mean that responsibility would always demand or allow honesty. Those ministers and priests who gave the Nazi officials wrong information about the baptisms of Jewish ancestors and saved lives by such actions were heroes, risking their own lives. Kant C, Appendix I, cannot bring himself to concede that one is better to consider the consequences of ones truthfulness, because the liar does wrong to men in general in the most essential point of duty. He claims that We should rather say, a man has a right to his own truthfulness (veracitas), that is, to subjective truth in his own person. Kant is prepared to sacrifice both responsibility and common sense on the altar of a monstrous `pure moral. Kant 29 admits that it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action, however right in itself, rested simply on moral grounds and on the conception of duty. The doctrine of responsibility, however, could fill thousands of books with examples of indubitable heroic deeds of both women and men, old and young. The question arises why Kant did not refer to his own philosophical efforts. The answer is simple, because it cannot be his `duty to write a Critique of Practical Reason. Why then did he do it? Because he felt that he was the only man able to do it, and, in order to be happy, he set to work, because it was the wisest and most dignified way of life for such a gifted person. What then would have been wrong, if he also enjoyed his hard work? Finally, he is not able to give an example, because that `pure moral is an irrelevant, (but not totally harmless) conception. In terms of Pauls argument, it mixes points of love with points of responsibility. e) 1 Cor 13.7 Love never gives up; and its faith, hope, and patience never fail. Comment: Such is true. However, it is irresponsible to never give up. For instance, if a customer cannot afford to purchase an article, it is irresponsible to insist until he buys it. It is also irresponsible to believe things that cannot be true, have unrealistic expectations, and be too patient. For instance, one does not tolerate aggressive violence, threats, nor mischievous and disrespectful behaviour. f) 1 Cor 13.8a Love is eternal.

Comment: This is not true, because love ought to finish with the demise of the beloved. Unfortunately, it happens ever so often that parents continue loving a dead child. This is detrimental to the relationship with the surviving siblings. They feel neglected and put behind. It is them who are challenged by the necessities of life and need all the more assistance after the traumatic loss of their sibling. In fact, it is wise and dignified to mourn a dead child and accept the end of both life and love. The mourning that lasts more than six months indicates feelings of guilt in the mourner, implying the need for therapy. Responsibility, however, is eternal, since it is wise and dignified to care about what will happen to all the future generations, animals, plants, resources, air, water, forests, soil, and everything. That is why people are very right to concern themselves with genetic engineering and whatever scientific and technical achievements might result in long term hazards. The analysis of Pauls text can help to understand that it is not possible to define a term that includes both love and responsibility. One would, in fact, have to recur to paradoxes, such as Tough Love2, that do not deserve further philosophical attention. 7) Historically (a-e), however, the origin of that higher form of love is much prior to Paul. It originated simultaneously with Judaism (a), Confucianism (b), Greek philosophy (c and d), and Buddhism (e) at about m2500. a) In terms of Judaism, the love of God is defined in Deut 6.5, the love of the neighbours in Lev 19.18. The two laws were then combined by Jesus in Mt 22.37ff and Mk 12.30f. The love of neighbours represents a somewhat generalised and idealised conception of innate social behaviour. Therefore, its origin is sufficiently explained. It is much more difficult to determine the origin of the love of God. Possibly much older than the more or less peculiar teaching of Judaism is the typical Hindu emotional, semi-erotic love of God, which was later celebrated in the Bhakti-literature (Michaels 283). It is helpful to imagine the situation of the Jewish priests during the Babylonian captivity. Unless they succeeded in having their people return to Palestine, they could not have maintained monotheism and their priestly positions. The Jewish populace, however, was not willing to return. That is why the priests resorted to create the myth of the Jewish exile in Egypt, which almost certainly never took place.3 It is sufficiently rejected as a historical fact by the following consideration. The Egyptians were not able to forget ( Spengler 16-17). In fact, their art is all about remembrance and documentation of historical facts and persons. For instance, the four huge figures at the entrance of Abu Simbl present the face of Ramses II in order to conserve his traits for ever. A presence of Israel that lasted more than four centuries (Ex 12.40), the figure of Moses, the plagues, and the events at the Red Sea would have left their distinct marks. In contrast to the Egyptian approach, the history of Rome, presented in Livius `Ab urbe condita, was totally faked in terms of the time prior to Hannibal; the names of the Seven Roman Kings were coined after the names of aristocratic Roman families, living at Liviuss time ( Spengler 14).

J. Dobson, Love Must Be Tough, Baker Publishing Group

3

http://www.bartleby.com/65/je/Jericho.html

The invention of Moses person and history can be considered the very beginning of hagiography in the form of historical narratives, whereas the creation of religious myths by priests (Who else would have been able and willing to create them?) must have started hunreds of years prior to the Torah, for the myths of Jason, Oedipus, the Tantalides, Theseus, and others were popular already by the time Homers works originated. The Torah, the first real Jewish writing, was presented as the word and revelation of the God of Israel and the return to Jerusalem as a necessity, by defining Palestine the `promised land. In order to strengthen their authority and chances to totally dominate their people, they suggested that the faithful should `love God, which is the strongest type of bondage. It appealed to the peoples deepest feelings. Moreover, the idea connected with archetypical mother complexes, father complexes and superego complexes (Fromm 17). Such resulted in the most powerful means to influence people. The creation of the Moses myth in a written form also presented the origin of creeds which were supposed to be met by the faith of the Jewish people, and the creation of the Jesus myth in the 20 th bn (Chapter Twelve 9, p193) was meant to be the divine message addressed to the dispersed Jews after the destruction of the Temple. At that point in time, the object of faith was transferred from the terrestrial domain into the imaginary sphere of transcendence. Those priests in Babylonia succeeded, and monotheism and the Jewish priesthood survived the predicament. This process can be considered the very origin of religious faith altogether. People were supposed to believe in stories, whose correctness they had no means to verify. Fromm 88-89 points out that the creation of creeds is definitely a Western way of religious indoctrination, while Hinduism and Buddhism do not try to create myths that explain the origin of the conundrums of life and existence. With regard to such demythification, one can spare ones efforts to incriminate those gifted people. History teaches that people usually act in certain ways, because they deem them to be the best ones in the given conditions. In fact, unless the Jewish priests in Babylon had applied such ingenious means, the Jewish people would have vanished altogether. The priestly domination of the people was, indeed, the only way to unify the nation in those difficult circumstances. Kings ask people to obey them, but their authority has always been questioned. Priests do not ask to obey them, but God, whose authority is unlimited. Ancient Greece also was only unified by the Olympic Games and the Oracle of Delphi, which were definitely religious institutions. Except for sheer force, spiritual leadership that is based on superior principles is the safest, fastest, and most elegant way to guide masses of people. All the same, it is not the most dignified way, because it implies elements of seduction. The most dignified way is to persuade people by sensible arguments. All the same, Themistocles, had to use the Oracle of Delphi in order to convince the Athenians to build a fleet able to defend Athens against the Persians in m2480. 4 Exactly the same argument is valid in terms of religious moral doctrines. It seems a dignified and suitable way to teach the masses morals. Nonetheless, it is neither necessary nor sustainable. Russel 11 correctly states, Morality seems incapable of being taught by presents methods; at any rate, I have never noticed any beneficent effect upon those who are exposed to frequent exhortations. ( John Paul 71C)
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http://www.pbs.org/empires/thegreeks/characters/themistocles_p8.html

All these suggestions are not presented as immediately provable, but as the most likely conclusions. Unfortunately, it will never be possible to deliver enough evidence to consider them verified. They just seem to be the most intelligible way to explain the course of those affairs. They have to be addressed in other places. The question is not whether or not one likes them, but what the historical truth is. It is convenient to historical science not to withhold them. b) Simultaneously to the Jewish teaching of mutual love, Confucius considered it the basic principle of the wise one ( Darga 36-37). He also recommends to conform to

traditional rites and customs, if it facilitated a peaceful living together ( Darga 37). On the other hand, one was better to shun the Gods and Spirits ( Darga 34). He aspired a harmonious and peaceful society, which compared with the heavenly way (Darga 35). One should support the sovereign, but not be afraid to criticise him if he failed (Darga 43).
c) In Greek philosophy, Plato (m2427-2348) also developed the teaching that there was a higher, celestial and a lower, vulgar variation of love ( Plato B 25-38 / Plato R III 21f). The celestial love (between males) was considered spiritual and aimed to teach or to learn from the friend, so as to increase ones spiritual excellence. The vulgar love (between the opposite sexes) pursued indiscriminate pleasure, power, wealth, and procreation. Socrates, however, made a great point of denying the divinity of Love (Eros), attributing him the nature of a daemon (Plato B 91-92). Later, he explains, Love is the child of Poverty and Plenty, his nature and fortune participate in that of his parents. He is for ever poor, and so far from being delicate and beautiful, as mankind imagine, he is squalid and withered ; he flies low along the ground. He is for ever poor, and is homeless and unshod ; he sleeps without covering before the doors long the ground , and in the sheltered streets; possessing thus far his mother's nature, that he is ever the companion of Want. But, inasmuch as he participates in that of his father he is for ever scheming to obtain things which are good and beautiful; he is fearless, vehement, and strong; a fearsome hunter, for ever weaving some new contrivance; exceedingly cautious and prudent, and full of resources; he is also, during his whole existence, a philosopher, a powerful enchanter, a wizard, and a subtle sophist. And, as his nature is neither mortal nor immortal, on the same day when he is fortunate and successful, he will at one time flourish, and then die away, and then, according to his father's nature, rise again. All that he acquires perpetually flows away from him, so that Love is never either rich or poor, and holding for ever an intermediate state between ignorance and wisdom. ( Plato B 94-96) The passage brilliantly describes some positive and negative qualities of love. d) Similarly to Plato, Bruno, in an effort to top the Christian agape doctrine, defines the poets enthusiasm as a higher form of love ( Bruno I 1), since the poet is completely consumed and dissolved by the effort and he has a divine object to guard the memory of so many great soldiers, men of wisdom, and heroes of this world, so that they are raised to the stars and deified by the sacrifice of praise upon an altar enkindled in the hearts of poets and other illustrious seers, a sacrifice which raises to the sky the celebrant, the victim, and the divine hero, canonized by the masses and vow of a legitimate and worthy priest. ( Bruno II 1 III). The poets enthusiasm, however, is hindered by the lower appetites, which need to be met as well. That obstacle can be overcome by `heroism ( Bruno I 5 IX). Bruno failed to allocate the correct place to heroism, which, in fact, wants to be involved in the

challenging decision-making. All the same, his approach to what it means to be happy deserves respect, because it relates to the critical parameter of human dignity; it is convenient for logically thinking beings to act according to their insights, in the light of possible consequences of both their positive and negative decisions. For instance, without Pertinis (Ex 3) and other heroes resistance, Mussolini might have followed Hitlers heinous antisemitism. All the same, Bruno is wrong to define the heroism of the artist a higher form of love, which manifests itself as a heroic frenzy (Bruno II 1 II), For I am sure that nature, having put this (corporeal) beauty before my eyes and having endowed me with an interior sense through which I can discern the most profound and incomparably superior beauty, wishes that from here below I become elevated to the height and eminence of that most excellent species. Nor do I believe that my true divinity, inasmuch as it is shown to me in its vestige and image, would be offended if I happened to honour it in its vestige and image and to offer sacrifices to it, provided the impulse of my heart remained, ordered and my affection remained intent upon the higher good; . e) With regard to the love principle in Buddhist teachings, Osho 285 may be quoted, Never care about the relationship between love and responsibility; there is none. The question of responsibility arises only because there is a lack of love. No sooner has love gone amiss, than you start worrying about duties. If love is there, love itself presents responsibility. Comment: The statement reflects the sympathetic, however contradictory approach, which has now been the epitome of Buddhist, Jewish, and Christian teaching for some 2,500 years. Oshos definition also coincides with the teaching of Adidam 1516. It cannot be doubted that during the twelve years of Nazi-regime the people of Great Germany were able to and did love. However, very few managed to get rid of the love principle and proceed to the wise and dignified decision to eliminate the dictator. Consequently, Oshos equalisation of love and responsibility does not make sense. Summarising the criticisms of the Buddhist approach, it seems that it represents a quest to feel happy all the time and in an unlimited, divine manner. Thus, it constitutes a sort of mental drug. It is as though a soldier, during the battle, drugs himself and is feeling happy, while the others struggle to survive. The mental kind of drug seems sustainable because it does not damage any organ. In many cases, Buddhism provides some relaxation to the nerves, which means that it can be beneficial, favouring concentration, stimulating the activity of the right half of the brain, and improving all the physiological processes in the body, especially if combined with gymnastic practices. Buddhism is right, in so far it denies categorical conclusiveness to our unilateral way of logical thinking, which is always directed forward. However, moving in the opposite direction does not warrant a safe way to correctness. Life is a question. The responsible wants to answer it. Together, they form the trinity of happiness. We are not God. We want to respond to the challenges of our mammalian existence by responsibility, so as to act in the best way possible, despite the countless restrictions and handicaps of our essence as mammals. It is prayer, religion, and culture altogether which allow for mental relaxation, without denial of responsibility in all our decision-making. In a nutshell, the Buddhist approach tries to overhear the question. Such equals desertion and cannot make us happy, as one can hear from their sombre cult songs and see in the impassive faces of Buddhist monks. Ultimately, it is an attempt to eliminate the ego altogether and vanish into an existence where there is neither responsibility nor individuality

anymore. The Buddhist approach to life is too negative, stern, and extremely boring, while the responsible persons life means to permanently face the ultimate and most demanding challenges, that provide permanent excitement to his life, be they gratifying or terrifying. As mammals we have multiple needs which are difficult to satisfy. There is nothing wrong about that. Boddisatva, however, teaches that those needs are the problem and ought to be eliminated. 8) In order to maintain the love principle, Fromm 77 resorts to a completely absurd statement. Talking about promiscuity, he claims that promiscuous affairs are the result of being afraid of love. Adultery and promiscuity, if one wants to criticise them, are possibly irresponsible and disrespectful, especially if families with children are involved. But they obviously result from being very fond of love. Love, however, does not warrant a wise and dignified approach to others, even if it is sincere and mutual. 9) An extremely thorny historical conundrum is presented in the prosecution, torturing, and killing of witches and warlocks, which was rife throughout the whole of Christianity from Russia to Mexico over a period of some 400 years ( Rueb 294-314). The historical difficulty in explaining those abominable, despicable, and absurd, but very popular (Rueb 252-273) movements seems to result from the fact that the distance between their cause and their effect seems almost immeasurable. Many logical steps are required in order to understand that the ultimate cause was the Christian love principle; step one God is good and almighty and loves us; step two Christian people obey His numerous wishes, pay the tithe, erect cathedrals and altars, make donations, go to church, pray, fast, and live impeccably; step three Christ has provided sacraments, rituals, and blessings, which are able to further purify, fortify, and sanctify us; step four all the same, we are constantly troubled by mishaps, eploitation, hunger, warfare, poverty, tempests, quarrels, and diseases; step five those totally undeserved sufferings cannot be caused by God, who loves us, but the devil, who hates us; step six the devil, whose power has been broken by God, can only operate by employing corrupted people, witches and warlocks, which function as executors of his obnoxious powers, for humans are the only beings able to choose between good and bad; step seven the Bible (Ex 22.17) and the Church ( Rueb 94-114) command to kill the warlocks and witches; this order confirmed their existence. The complete extinction of witches was hoped to create a painless world, which fact would definitely confirm that God was good and loved us. step eight the devil is a compulsive liar (Jn 8.44) and will make his followers deny their mischievousness; step nine torture is the only means to make them confess their crime; step ten no sooner have they confessed, than they are tortured again in order to get information about accomplices (who will be accused and tortured, too). Then, they may repent and be executed to make sure that the devil cannot use them again. Most of them were burnt alive for them to expiate their sins and get eternal salvation. That is why the confession is indispensable, because if they were executed as liars and deniers, they would go to hell;

step eleven once such a more or less congruent paradigm (the arbitrariness of step six is evident) is established and approved of by the authorities, it gains momentum, and, by a public syndrome, it becomes itself a creed which is not allowed to be questioned, lest one takes the risk to be prosecuted and executed on account of the denial (Rueb 165, 296, 297, 304). step twelve the vicious circle of absurdity has become unsurpassable, except by heroic deeds of martyrs (Rueb 269) and great monarchs (Rueb 298, 302, 309-310). In this series of steps, only step six was arbitrary and, in fact, the most absurd and devastating one. Suppose Christianity had been philosophically correct, it would have taught that God or Life is neither a just nor loving entity. Then, it could have dispensed with the absurd theory of the devil, and the whole theological syndrome of the witch-hunt would have collapsed.

Chapter Two: The Five Examples

The doctrine of responsibility is illustrated by the following examples, which are also able to disprove the Jewish, Christian, and Buddhist love principle.

Example 1: From New Zealand5

Once, a Maori tribe was on a journey, when they unexpectedly caught sight of a hostile tribe roaming the territory. As they had not taken their weapons, they had no other option than to hide in the bush, hoping that the enemy would pass without noticing them. Then and there, a baby girl started crying. The Chief approached her father and ordered, `You must strangle her, because this baby is me! (When talking about their tribe, Maori chiefs use the terms `I and `me.) The father obeyed and the tribe was saved. COMMENT: 1) The Chief addresses the girls father. In doing so, he behaves socially, respecting the fathers position. Had he chosen to kill the girl himself, the father would have been excluded from the gruesome decision-making and would have felt that the Chief would not have killed his own child. It is understood that the Chief would have strangled the girl himself, if the father disobeyed. 2) The Chiefs decision, however, cannot be justified by any morals, since the killing of the innocent goes against all the rules ever developed (with the exception of Nietzsche, who praises it as the ultimate virtue of the Superman). Moralists might
5

After J. Patteron, Maori Values, Palmerston North 1992, p. 117-118

even teach that it was immoral to order the father, while it was correct social behaviour. In fact, all the morals proved perfectly useless in this situation. 3) By no means has the tribe the right to kill the baby, who is totally innocent, whereas the Chief himself had possibly made a mistake by travelling outside the safe territory without weapons. If the tribe could be saved by sacrificing the Chief, one could possibly reason that it would have the right to do so. Responsibility, however, transcends the legal categories of right and wrong. 4) In terms of heroism, it is helpful to think of its possibly negative quality in this story. On an impulse, most people will feel that the Chief, the father, and the tribe were cowards to kill the innocent girl and save themselves. One cannot disprove such a view. Heroism, therefore, is an absolutely secondary quality of responsibility, which may even ask for cowardly decisions ( Hume II 1fC). It is important to see that responsibility holds a higher position than the question of virtue and vice. It would, in fact, have been more virtuous for the tribe to perish, rather than kill the girl. Notwithstanding that, the decision was wise and dignified. Nietzsche would have liked the story and concluded that it is the most heroic attitude of Superman, the hero of heroes, to disregard social behaviour altogether. It is to notify that the distinction between the doctrine of responsibility and Nietzsches approach is subtle. The difference is that Nietzsche would declare the tribe heroic, while the doctrine of responsibility admits that they were not. It is also doubtful, whether or not one wants to give credit to the father for executing the revolting action himself. The problem is not worth discussing, because heroism is not the decisive factor in our responsible decision-making, whereas Nietzsche would conclude that heroism is the crucial aspect in the life of Superman. The only things to warrant a responsible decision-making are wisdom and dignity, in as much we want to act in a way that compares with both our knowledge and our quest for happiness. 5) If one would ask for a justification of the horrendous deed, Aquinas II 8.3 correctly states, Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can be moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end. It is obvious that the childs death is not wished for. 6) While only responsibility can justify such a decision, it is on the other hand not true that the father, the Chief, or the tribe were obliged to kill the baby. It was, in fact, their free decision to do it. The decision was taken out of wisdom and dignity the crucial points with regard to responsibility. It would have been, indeed, foolish to let the baby live and then lose all their lives, including that of the baby; and it would have been undignified to avoid the terrible action on account of the hurt caused to both everybodys feelings and every law in the book. 7) Making responsible decisions, therefore, means happiness. In fact, a logically thinking being wants to act in a wise and dignified manner. This can normally be seen with people who become parents. It is not true that parents look after their children because there are laws that demand so. Those laws would never be able to make careless parents look after their children in an appropriate way. Unless taking responsibility comes naturally to parents, it cannot be imposed. In fact, respective laws serve to protect the children, so that, in a worst cases scenario, the authorities can intervene, since society proves unable to teach people wisdom and dignity. Punishment, however, has always been counterproductive.

8) It is also evident that the Chiefs and the fathers decision contradicts all the love parameters. Although the father most probably loved his child, responsibility demanded the revolting action. The action also opposed the fathers love of himself, as he certainly loathed doing it. In addition, the girls mother was sure to be deeply hurt by it, too. So were all the other members of the tribe. 9) There is one phrase in Locke 8, which wants to be corrected. His statement reads, But if it shall be concluded that the meaner sort of people must give themselves up to a brutish stupidity in the things of their nearest concernment, which I see no reason for, this excuses not those of a freer fortune and education, if they neglect their understandings and take no care to employ them as they ought and set them right in the knowledge of those things for which principally they were given them. The term excuses not seems to refer to a moral obligation. It ought to be replaced by `would not make sense to or `would not seem wise and dignified to, for neither father nor Chief are obliged to kill the girl. They do it, because they want to act responsibly, which is to say, correctly. 10) The Chiefs argument, however, is not quite correct. He somehow argues that the tribe is more important than the child. One can find the same argument in Shaftesbury 35, When in general all the affections or passions are suited to the public good, or good of the species, as above mentioned, then is the natural temper entirely good. If, on contrary, any requisite passion be wanting, or if there be any one supernumerary or weak, or anywise disserviceable or contrary to that main end, then is the natural temper, and consequently the creature himself, in some measure corrupt and ill. The phrase all the affections and passions ought to be replaced by `all the responsible decision-making. However, the statement is still incorrect on account of the term public good. It is not necessarily true that the father would want to kill the child, if he had a chance to escape with the child. He would not be corrupt and ill, if he did so, even at the risk that the rest of the tribe perished, for the child can correctly be considered his first responsibility. The fathers decision is merely unquestionable, because the child would die anyway if the enemies became aware of the tribes presence; he does it, because it would be absolutely foolish and undignified not to do it, rather than for the sake of the public good. Likewise, if a queen saved her family by abandoning her country, she could not be considered irresponsible. However, she is supposed to resign her throne on account of her desertion (Chapter Five COM 7). Shaftesburys argument would lead to the consequence that people who are unable to work are supposed to kill themselves or that the community was wise and dignified to murder them. Samson (Ex 5) also would act responsibly, if he chose to conceal his strength and try to escape and save himself at an opportune moment. 11) The conflict of responsibilities was addressed by Sartre. He criticises Kants Categorical Imperative as useless, since it would not be able to decide the question whether a son should look after his sick and desperate mother or rather volunteer to join the army in the case of war ( Schmid 101-102). It is true that it is a question of wisdom rather than an `Imperative as to how to take the right decision. The mother is undoubtedly the sons first responsibility, and if he is the only person available to look after her, he will choose to do so, because his volunteering is not as essential to his countrys destiny. It is different, however, if he is a General; suppose he is

irreplaceable, he will choose to join the army and the wise mother will also encourage him to do so. Thus, the correct decision will be the result of reasoning. The conflict of responsibilities is the thorny problem of both Sartre (Les Mains Sales, Le Diable et le Bon Dieu) et Camus (Les Justes) and causes their pessimistic views on the human situation, which cannot escape the dilemma. It is suggested that wisdom and dignity, as well as the consultation of both friends and enemies, enable us to decide correctly. In fact, those conflicts often have their origin in the secret wish to avoid unpleasant consequences of our choices. For instance, numerous people drive to work, although public transport is available. If public transport takes too much time because of inconvenient timetables, one can suggest improving them, or the employer might agree to flexible working hours. The author remembers a seventyyear-old neighbour of his, saying that he had never ridden a bus all his life, although he lived in a city with excellent public transport. Unnecessary private transport results from the fact that it is too cheap and covers less than fifty percent of its real costs, to say nothing of the long term damage to humans, plants, animals, air, and water. Avoidance of private transport does not make sense to those who want to have a car anyway. That is why public transport remains inappropriate, the fares too high, and its costs not covered. 12) The argument in favour of the doctrine of responsibility can also be confirmed from a negative point of view. Shaftesbury 90 states, There are two things which to a rational creature must be horridly offensive and grievous, viz. to have the reflection in his mind of any unjust action or behaviour which he knows to be naturally odious and ill-deserving; or of any foolish action or behaviour which he knows to be prejudicial to his own interest or happiness. The first point refers to indignity, the second to foolishness. If those mistakes make us most unhappy, then the application of their opposites, which is to say dignity and wisdom, will make us most happy. 13) Love can never be unconditional, since conditions may arise in which we have to destroy the lives of loved ones. For instance, one would not tolerate aggressive violence of a lover, because such tolerance would go against the reason and dignity of both the aggressor and the victim. Consul Manlius Torquatus had his son executed (Chapter Five COM 5), in order to sustain law and order in the Roman army. As a consequence of this, the unconditional parameter of decision-making is responsibility. 14) The situation of the tribe can be compared to the one in which someone is arbitraily held captive by a mentally disabled person. It is evident that the captive would be correct in killing the captor, if there is no other means available to escape. Likewise, the tribe was hold captive by an innocent crying girl, and the only means to avoid the extermination of the tribe was to strangle her. Such was all the more the case on account of the fact that the girl could not have been saved anyway, whereas the killing of a disabled captor would lack this additional point of view.

Example 2: Bonhoeffers `Account on New Year 1943.

After joining the conspiracy of Admiral Canaris, he was employed in the High Command of the Wehrmacht.6 He was also a member of `The Brethren of the
6

www.dhm.de/lemo/html/biografien, Bonhoeffer Dietrich

Confessing Church (Bonhoeffer 244). In m58, the Lutheran minister was incarcerated under priviledged conditions, since he was related to a General, who was Berlin City Commander (Bonhoeffer 180). In captivity, he wrote the treatise `An Account of New Year 1943, in which he developed a valid teaching of responsibility, without noticing that his argument overpowered the Christian love principle. He became a martyr, when he was executed in April m55 ( Bonhoeffer 8). Bonhoeffer 10 In a major crisis, the responsibly thinking ones always felt like being without footing. Comments: 1) Such is actually the case, and that is due to the lack of a proper teaching of responsibility. Christianity teaches `obedience, in the first place. It is to notify that the elite of the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research M. Horkheimer, Th. Adorno, E. Fromm, O. Kirchheimer, L. Lwenthal, H. Marcuse, F. Neumann, F. Pollock, all of Jewish extraction emigrated early to the USA and returned to Germany in m50 (Dubiel 12). It means that there was not a teaching of responsibility established yet in the Jewish community either, since responsibility would mean that they would want to stay, resist the Nazi persecution, and organise the necessary resistance. Bonhoeffer, however, returned to Germany from the USA in order to fight Hitler. 7 It is understood that he was not obliged to do so. In terms of the Frankfurt School, only at a later stage, in the m32 student revolt, Marcuse took a stand in support of the students 8, without, however, developing a correlated philosophy. 2) In terms of the Frankfurt School, those Marxist thinkers were disappointed in the masses that had failed to erect Communist regimes after they had won the right to vote in the early 1st bn. Then, the philosophers developed the very pessimistic teaching that humans were not able to appropriately handle their own destiny ( Dubiel 41f); while Marx optimistically expected the masses to succeed, the Critical Theory criticised the masses for their yielding to authoritarian systems and to capitalism; Nazism was then considered the ultimate consequence of capitalism ( Dubiel 47). They overlooked that the establishment of state regimes which are artificial, too influential, and clumsy was counterproductive in the first place ( Mackintosh 200201). Secondly, it never occurred to them that humans were taught inappropriate moral principles, which would not allow for responsible decisions ( Bonhoeffer 13a). At a later stage, in m63, Adorno and Horkheimer changed the historical paradigm and explained, in `The Dialectic of the Period of Enlightenment, that not capitalism, but the authoritarian bureaucracy, the segregation from and the exploitation of nature (Dubiel 88), and a mentally perverted, exploitive approach to reality ( Dubiel 89), led to the complete domination of the masses as exhibited in the numerous autocratic systems in Europe of that time Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Austria, Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Russia ( Dubiel 67-70). It is suggested that, in those times, the countries were not able to cope with the new democratic systems and, once a dictatorship was established, it was almost impossible to overcome it, for dictatorships rely on suppression rather than bureaucracy. All those socio-historical considerations, however, were not helpful in
7

http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/biografien/BonhoefferDietrich/
8

http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell12.htm

Bonhoeffers quest for a `footing in his treatise. After the war, the philosopher to take over from the Frankfurt School, Habermas, turned the scientific paradigm upside down; he abandoned the question what and who caused the misery of the masses; he joined ranks with psychologist Kohlberg and supposed that people were born amoral and asked the question how it could come to pass that, at later stages, people usually learn to act morally (Kohlberg 226-238). This means that the old school asked why things went wrong, while Habermas wondered why they usually or quite often came right. What Kohlberg thought a sound development in each normally gifted person, Habermas sought to apply to society. It is suggested that the constitutional systems in Western democracies feature a very high standard, but will always be unable to satisfy our psychological needs in term of social life. Consequently, society cannot be substantially improved, but needs a thorough transformation, as suggested in Chapter Twelve 22, p203. 3) This and Kohlbergs teaching absolutely contradict this doctrine of responsibility and has to be refuted (Aristotle II.9C). It is necessary to demonstrate that social behaviour cannot originate from the `Communicative Acting (Chapter One 3). Therefore, in terms of the Frankfurt School, this paper will refer to Habermas and Fromm exclusively. At all times, both individuals and society did not develop in a moral sense; people always behaved socially and took responsibility. What constantly changes are the disturbances and challenges, and nothing has had a greater impact on the history of humans than the sheer increase in their number on our planet. For instance, it is absurd to explain the modern Green Movement as the consequence of any other previous fashionable thinking, since it is the consequence of the new threats to air, water, and soil by the existence and demands of billions of people. 4) The great thing in the approach of the Frankfurt School is the fact that it echoes the doctrine of responsibility, since it considers `The Welfare of the Masses as the starting point of their philosophical efforts. Today, the welfare of all living beings and the natural resources of the planet would definitely want to be included in the critical theory. 5) Unfortunately, Habermas still adheres to the old Frankfurt creed that history consists of a logical sequence of cultural progress ( Dubiel 108). That is absolutely incorrect. For instance, nothing has contributed more to the collapse of Communism in m11 than Western television; when those viewers saw what kind of lifestyle capitalism offered to ordinary people, their system became untenable. However, the invention of television and satellites that offered worldwide access to it was not a logical consequence of the Western civilisation. Likewise, in the late m20s, the dissolution of the Soviet totalitarianism by Gorbachovs wisdom and courage came as a perfect surprise. That history is not logical can also be seen in the completely different ways in which East and West Germany developed between m55 and m11. Other than that, one could predict the future course of history, whereas we know nothing about our personal future, let alone the future of humanity. 6) Another peculiar creed of Habermas is his divinisation of democracy, which he considers the decisive factor in terms of correctness ( Dubiel 116). Democracies can go wrong. For instance, Hitler had the majority of votes in the Reichstag ( Geissler W 136). In addition, the Chiefs correct decision in Ex 1 was thoroughly autocratic. The same applies to the Ex 2-5. Democracy needs handling responsibly, too. It is also very clear that a wise and dignified monarch would warrant the best way of political

ruling by far (Plato R VII 7a and b). Unfortunately, it seems impossible to evaluate such monarchs. Democracy does not warrant correctness, but correctness is possibly warranted by innate social behaviour and by people who take responsibility. On the other hand, no-one is so wise as to devise a constitution and laws that do not lead to countless frictions with what is wise and dignified for everybody, if they are applied indiscriminately and irresponsibly. In addition, todays democracies presuppose the existence of independent countries within a defined territory. This fact is the result of arbitrary decisions, which, by definition, are questionable, too. Bonhoeffer 11, If we restrain our actions to the mere fulfilling of duties, we will never take the risk of actions that are based on purely personal responsibility, which alone is capable of striking the centre of evil. Comment: The statement elucidates that responsibility has a higher position than the `duties. The statement includes an unnoticed doctrine of responsibility, as well as a refutation of the love principle. Bonhoeffer 12, Some people, in order to escape the dilemma of responsibility take refuge in their private righteousness. This can lead to a pharisaic attitude. Only the responsible one exhibits stability. Where are those responsible ones? Comment: This is an important and correct criticism of an attitude that puts ones holiness and perfection above or in place of ones responsibilities. Bonhoeffer, however, fails to recognise that the teaching of Christian love and obedience has incapacitated people from taking responsibility. In fact, dictatorships would be impossible in the first place, if the majority of people were taught correctly, so as to take care to act responsibly in political matters, too. Paul, erroneously, in Rom 13.1-5, refutes resistance to the existing authority. Bonhoeffer 13a, explains that the shortage of people who act responsibly is due to the fact that the Germans have imbibed the teaching of obedience, taught for hundreds of years. Comment: Such is also true for all those who have undergone the teachings of whatever dogmatic religion, since they all miss the point of responsibility. The Koran, at least, allows fighting the oppressors (49:9). Bonhoeffer 13b, Germans lack the fundamental wisdom to recognise the necessity of free, responsible action that may deny the professional and general code of conduct. Comment: The reference to professional duties highlights the recognition that Bonhoeffers creed forbids engagement in violence at all. He, however, fails to draw the conclusion that that teaching is incompetent and incorrect. The term free is not specified. However, it correctly refers to autonomy, which is an essential quality of responsibility as opposed to morals (Chapter Eight). Bonhoeffer 13c, Civic courage (courage of ones convictions) can only grow in the free responsibility of a free man. Comment: `Civic courage does not necessarily involve violent actions, but the statement compares with a correct attitude that does not exclude them, either. Authorities are not normally inclined to promulgate that kind of autonomy. Bonhoeffer 13d, God commands so.

Comment: Little wonder Bonhoeffer fails to quote the Bible passage that corresponds to this statement. Secondly, no-one has to demand anything of the `free man. This is the very place where Bonhoeffer should have stated, `I want it, because it is the only wise and dignified way to act; although Christianity teaches otherwise. Bonhoeffer 13e, God, however, comforts and pardons those who are irresponsible. Comment: The statement is absurd, as though God would comfort and pardon parents who do not take care of their children. Secondly, God is not in the position to pardon the masses that obeyed Hitler, because the opposition to it is all Bonhoeffers risk. Then, it is his job to pardon them. Likewise, the children and other people involved are entitled to forgive the parents negligence. Bonhoeffer 13f, A good goal does not necessarily justify the means, but it is also impossible to completely ignore the moral significance of the outcome. Comment: This is a superfluous distinction, because those who are responsible want both the goal and means to be the result of a wise and dignified choice. A mutual justification of the one by the other is unnecessary. It is clear that it is wise and dignified to minimise the application of violence as much as possible. Bonhoeffer 13g, explains that both the quality and quantity of the goal have to exceed those of questionable means. Comment: Naturally, Bonhoeffer is thinking of the fact that the elimination of Hitler would finish or shorten the war, which would mean the protection of countless lives. However, the parameters of quality and quantity are applied.very often in our judicial and penal systems, but are inapplicable to the philosophical debate. It is certainly a very wise and dignified goal to end the war. If the elimination of Hitler is the most appropriate way to achieve it, then it is the only wise and dignified decision to pursue it. With regard to quantity and quality, if a dictator exploits his people without killing them, he is all the same eligible for elimination by force, if it is the only means to stop the exploitation, despite the fact that poverty and death have different qualities. Such is also the case, if he exploits a single person, because it is not wise and dignified to tolerate exploitation. If Samson (Ex 5) had managed to escape from the destroyed building in which he had killed the Philistine Princes, he would have done the right thing. Moreover, a person or a group of persons that keep one arbitrarily incarcerated is eligible for killing, if it is the only means to escape. In addition, the quantification of goals and means leads to wrong choices, since, for instance, a father might thrash his son half-dead in the noble intention of avoiding any further punishment. It is obvious that our legal systems, in their clumsiness, operate with qualifications and quantifications. So they provide themselves with an artificial, seemingly untouchable objectivity. Bonhoeffer 14, It represents a short-cut of people who lack a sense of historical responsibility to totally ignore the ethical significance of the outcome. Comment: It is true that `the ethics of consequences has absolute priority over the `ethics of attitude, as defined by Weber 235, since responsibility wants to act according to ones wisdom and dignity. It is, therefore, suggested that the philosophically cryptic expression to totally ignore the ethical significance of the outcome ought to be replaced by `to not consider the consequences of our decisions . As a matter of fact, we want to take into account the consequences of our decisions in the first place, since it is not good enough to consider them, too, as

though they were secondary to any other. Bonhoeffers reference to the consequences of actions is, therefore, too weak. To make things worse, the teaching of Aquinas III 39.1 proves very disturbing, in the moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and that which results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental. This means that it is good enough to obey and have good intentions, while the rest is secondary. Responsibility, however, considers the results, including the accidental ones, the substantial point of view in terms of our decision-making. Bonhoeffer 15a, We do not want and are not allowed to play the sulking critic, or a mere opportunist, but to participate in the shaping of history, everywhere and always, be it as winners or losers as the jointly responsible ones. Comment: The brilliant argument does not need the addition `and are not allowed, because things we do not want cannot be and do not require to be forbidden. For instance, it is farcical to forbid people to keep their eyes open during their sleep, for nobody wants to do that. Equally, the plot does not need anybodys command or permission, since it is a consequence of the conspirators wisdom and dignity, and that is why they want to do it. But they do not have to do it, since they could not be punished or blamed if they did not plot against the dictator; they would blame themselves. Likewise, the killing of the baby in Ex 1 was not mandatory, either (Ex 1 COM 6). Bonhoeffer 15b, explains that this kind of responsibility is imposed by God. Comment: It is wanted by the wise and dignified personality. However, if God is considered the very origin of wisdom and dignity, the statement is absolutely correct. It is a shame that Bonhoeffer could not avail himself of the Book of Judith 9 where he could have found a perfect Biblical justification of self-defence. Luther, unfortunately, excluded that masterpiece of literature. It reports that Holofernes besieged the Jewish stronghold of Bethulia and cut off their water supply. The city elders decided to surrender unless there was help coming within five days (7.25). Judith rebuked the elders for their decision, You have set a time for the mercy of the Lord, and you have appointed him a day, according to your pleasure. (8.13) Concealing her plans, she admonished the elders, So that which I intend to do prove ye if it be of God, and pray that God may strengthen my design. (8.31) She won the Generals confidence by lying to him in the following way, For this reason I thought to myself, saying: I will go to the presence of the Prince Holofernes, that I may tell him their secrets, and show him by what way he may take them, without the loss of one man of his army. (10.13) Before Judith kills Holofernes, she prays as follows, Strengthen me, O Lord God of Israel, and in this hour look on the works of my hands, that as thou hast promised, thou mayst raise up Jerusalem thy city: and that I may bring to pass that which I have purposed, having a belief that it might be done by thee. (13.7) Consequently, it was her decision to lie, possibly commit adultery, and to murder, but she deemed it Jehovas deed. The Book of Judith could also have taught the German conspirators that the arrangement of an attempt on a dictators life has to be warranted by success (Chapter Three 16, p45), because, if it fails, the dictators position is but strengthened more by it, which was definitely the case with Hitler in the aftermath of the failed Stauffenberg attempt on July 20 th m56.

http://st-takla.org/pub_Deuterocanon/Deuterocanon-Apocrypha_El-Asfar_El-Kanoneya_ElTanya__2-Judith.html

A rather remarkable and correct statement is found in Hobbes II 20c, Slaves have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master, justly. In terms of self-defence, Hobbes I 14a is right, A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd. Hobbes I 14b is also correct, A Covenant to accuse ones selfe, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalide. For in the condition of Nature, where every man is Judge, there is no place for Accusation: and in the Civill State, the Accusation is followed with Punishment; which being Force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the Accusation of those, by whose Condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a Father, Wife, or Benefactor. It means that responsibility does not want to blame us, if innocent people are threatened to be punished in our place. One would then try to expose the errors in the measures taken by the authorities, for instance, by way of anonymous letters, containing relevant details to the authorities and mass media. In this context, Catholic priests who hear confessions are requested to withhold absolution if, for instance, a murderer confesses his crime, unless he promises to surender to the authorities. This request is incorrect. First, no-one is obliged to surrender himself to any authority. Secondly, the priest is forbidden to accuse him. A correct procedure would look as follows; the priest requests the penitent, for the absolution to become valid, to confess the crime to a person that is not involved in the case and can decide for himself whether or not to inform the police. In that way, the repentant one would have to take the risk of being charged, putting his destiny, in a religious sense, into the hands of God. The addressed person will try to take a responsible decision as to how to react. A valid philosophy of self-defence has been developed in Mackintosh 222-223. Finally, Bonhoeffer cannot quote the Bible passage which would confirm his statement. Bonhoeffer 15c, The ultimate question of responsibility is not whether I get out of all that as a hero, but how future generations shall live. This sole historically responsible question will generate fruitful although sometimes very humbling solutions. Comment: This substantial statement highlights the long term consequences of our decisions, which present the crucial factor in our considerations. The reference to `humbling can be meant politically in the sense that it would have been more dignified to have Hitler eliminated by vote. It can also be meant socially, since to become a conspirator is usually shameful. Psychologically, therefore, the expression is appropriate. It lacks, however, philosophical evidence. In addition, for Christians, the plot violates Gods commandment not to resist the political authority and not to kill. The uncertainty in Bonhoeffers way of arguing is exposed by the perfectly controversial feelings involved in it. Here, he feels humiliated, while, in 21a and 21b, he is very proud of his involvement in the cause. Pride seems a psychological, rather than philosophical parameter. Those feelings are addressed by Aquinas II 11.4, an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly, when it is possessed not only in intention but also in reality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment, therefore, is of the end already possessed: but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed in reality, but only in intention. The philosopher wants to prove that one can enjoy an imperfect happiness in life by hoping to once achieve the vision of God. Both points, however, are irrelevant in terms of Bonhoeffers decision; neither does he enjoy the plot nor would he enjoy its success. In fact, Marlene

Dietrich10, who has witnessed a great deal of warfare, confirms, Victory is only enjoyable back home. Up front it is joyless. The same applies to the other heroes. Samson (Ex 5) certainly did not enjoy the destruction of the Philistines. Responsibility is a question of wisdom and dignity, but not of joy. Bonhoeffer, not recognising that, felt humbled by realising that his decision violated the love principle. Thus, it becomes evident how unwise and misguiding the love principle has been, while it is considered by Christians and others the epitome of wisdom. Bonhoeffer 15d, Stupidity is a more dangerous enemy of the good than malice. Comment: `Stupidity, as the lack of wisdom, indeed prohibits acting responsibly and `malice, as a psychogenic disease, is also a hindrance to it. Bonhoeffer fails to signal that praises of stupidity were sung by Jesus and Paul (Mt 11.25 / Lk 10.21 / 1 Cor 1.21-25). Bonhoeffer 18a, explains that none but the wise is able to act in a good way and only the good ones act wisely. Comment: Mere intelligence does not warrant responsible action if, for instance, there is a lack of dignity, or a distortion of social behaviour, or a misguidance by incompetent moral teachings. Dignity means the readiness to take unpleasant and hazardous actions, if they are necessary. There were certainly hundreds of thousands of people in Germany who were intelligent enough to see that Hitler was a disaster for the whole planet. At least, about two hundred persons joined the Stauffenberg plot and were executed after it failed. 11 This does not mean that all the other `wise ones were cowards at all. They were misguided, from birth to death, by the religious love principles interference with their wisdom they thought that such an action, how ever wise it might be, would still be despicable and sinful. That is why tyrants, who have caused thousand fold misery as compared to natural disasters in history, can remain in power for far too long. Psychologically, the failure to act responsibly although wisdom would teach to do so has its cause in fear; whoever acts against better knowledge fears to commit a sin, be blamed by others, miss a unique opportunity, and so on. That is why irresponsible behaviour is never dignified, although it might bring along general agreement. Bonhoeffer 18b, Responsibility may include the rights of life being ignored, but only as an exception. Comment: Ex 1, 4, and 5 definitely confirm so. It also cannot be wise and dignified to violate human rights without necessity. All the same, one cannot define a human right that might absolutely never be violated. Bonhoeffer 18c, states that the one who makes the violation a rule is a criminal. Comment: Indeed, Nietzsches `Superman is nothing but a criminal ( Bonhoeffer 21aC). Bonhoeffer 20, If we, for the sake of material advantages, tolerate agression, we have yet resigned and let the flood of chaos invade, where we should have stood as guardians, and thus we will end up as the guilty ones.
10

M. Dietrich, Marlene Dietrichs ABC, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York 1962, p. 174
11

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pers%C3%B6nlichkeiten_des_20._Juli_1944

Comment: `Guilt is not a philosophical, but psychological, social, judicial, and religious parameter. According to this theory of responsibility, the term `guilty should be replaced by the word `irresponsible. The statement suggests that the tolerance of violence is generally due to greediness. Bonhoeffer ignores that the tolerance of violence is highly recommended in the Christian teaching (Mt 5.38-42). Bonhoeffer 21a, suggests that this struggle of the few faithful creates a new sort of nobility. (15cC) Comment: With this statement, Bonhoeffer almost adopts the superman doctrine of Nietzsche, which culminates in what is nothing other than the definition of criminality, which is to say, Oh my brothers, smash and shatter the stone tablets of old! (Nietzsche 295) Nietzsche, too, understands the total elimination of social behaviour as nobility, in fact, as the most important quality of Superman. Nietzsches teaching was fully adopted by Himmler in his clandestine SS-speech, where he stated, Most of you know what it means to see a hundred corpses lying together, five hundred, or a thousand. To have gone through this and yet - apart from a few exceptions, examples of human weakness - to have remained decent fellows, this is what has made us hard. This is a glorious page in our history that has never been written and shall never be... Altogether, however, we can say, that we have fulfilled this most difficult duty for the love of our people. And our spirit, our soul, our character has not suffered injury from it."12 It is true that it is noble to take responsibility, but it is absurd that the very elimination of social behaviour is in itself the thing that establishes nobility. The nobility of taking responsibility is the result of wisdom and dignity. The edge between the doctrine of responsibility and Nietzsches superman theory is, indeed, very clear (Ex 1 COM 4). As a conclusion, one can say that Bonhoeffer is right and Nietzsche is completely misguided; he has gone to extremes. This terrible philosophical error, however, was the result of his psychological or pathological revulsion against the Christian love principle, which, in his youth, he had experienced as thoroughly mendacious ( Khler 35ff). It seems to be true what is stated on Nietzsche in Khler 9, Nobody has managed to catch that exotic creature. The reason for this interpretative failure seems to be that, on the one hand, every serious reader cannot help acknowledging that Nietzsche is very right and powerful in his categorical refusal of the typical Christian hypocrisy as though life could be perfectly ruled by love and self-denial. On the other hand, one is terror-stricken by Nietzsches extremism which eliminates social behaviour altogether. Had he developed a valid doctrine of responsibility, he could have had both the fundamental acceptance of social behaviour and the absolute priority of responsibility, which does not annihilate, but transcend love and social behaviour. What a blessing it would have been to read a Zarathustra that promotes responsibility rather than outright criminality. However, Bonhoeffers phrasing of `a new sort of nobility is inappropriate. History teaches that there were always people who took responsibility and were ready to risk their lives for a good cause. He would have been better to talk of a new Practical Philosophy.

12

http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/holocaust/h-posen.htm

Bonhoeffer 21b, Nobility originates from sacrifice, courage, and true knowledge of what is due to oneself and the others, by demanding absolute respect of oneself and all the others, be they higher or lower. Comment: Those qualities are neither `due nor `demanded, but wanted by those who are responsible, because it is the only way for the logically thinking being to be happy. It is obvious that Bonhoeffer never refers to the argument of the `conscience, which is not a definable category of Practical Philosophy. In fact, the treatise constitutes a thoroughly philosophical, not a religious, approach to correct decisionmaking. The seriousness of Bonhoeffers approach contrasts with Schopenhauers 495 attitude, when the latter states, In general, it is a strange demand upon a moralist that he should teach no other virtue than that which he himself possesses. It is suggested that it is strange not to impose that demand. Bonhoeffer 22, suggests that Christ has made the ultimate sacrifice for all of us. We should, humbly following His path (we are not Christ), execute the responsible action, which has its origin in His freedom-giving and redeeming love of the sufferers. Comment: The reference to Christs love is artificial, in order to unnecessarily introduce a religious justification of the plot. The argument is invalid (Ex 3 COM 2), for, if Christ had not given his life, it would not matter to those who plotted; they would still have wanted to act responsibly. The responsible action, by definition, justifies itself. Moreover, it is not sensible to introduce classes in the qualification of responsibilities, as though Christs death was superior to Bonhoeffers. This is the very moment in which Bonhoeffer could have explained that he joined the plot because he autonomously wanted it. However, such a statement would have included the admission that he abandoned Christian moral teaching as invalid and heteronomous. In fact, Bonhoeffers scrupulous reasoning was the result of his being aware that the plot violated the rules of social behaviour and Christian love. In addition, love is never freedom-giving. It wants to exclude decisions that are unpleasant to the loved ones. One could suggest that Bonhoeffer conspired against Hitler because he loved the future generations. Whether or not he did is irrelevant; he decided to conspire because he recognised that the political situation was untenable and there was not another way to change it. In terms of freedom, both politicians and philosophers are far too careless in its usage. It is, in fact, the most abused term in Western philosophy since the French Revolution in m211. First, `freedom is a negative concept that needs the additional definition of `freedom from what? No sooner is it used as a positive term, than it serves political propaganda. Such can be seen in the terrible abuse of the term `Religious Freedom. The positive usage of the term presents a complete conversion of its original meaning. Originally, `religious freedom gave everybody the right to live without religion. The positive usage, however, accounts for the right of the religions to do and teach what they like. In no way can there be such a religious freedom, for religions are supposed to follow the rules of normality, decency, and caution (Chapter Twelve 10, p194). Secondly, we have multiple needs that restrict our freedom and there is nothing wrong with those needs. Thirdly, social behaviour and innumerable laws want us to accept boundaries. Fourthly, most people have multiple responsibilities that restrict their freedom; for instance, it is absurd to claim that parents and other members of families are free. Fifthly, if `freedom is mistaken as a positive concept, the philosophical argument is turned upside down, as in

Rousseaus statement, obedience to a law one has prescribed for oneself is freedom (Schneewind 500). The correct argument goes the other way round, which is to say, `Apart from all the above mentioned restrictions, we can possibly impose additional laws on ourselves, as if someone decided to live on a dollar a day for food and drink. Such a law would not affect his freedom substantially. However, if someone decided not to pay taxes anymore, he would soon realise that his freedom to impose laws on himself has limits. As a consequence, the term `freedom is used so ambiguously, that we are better not to use it in the philosophical debate. The abuse of the term freedom can result in bewildering confusion. The author used to be acquainted with a 19-year-old man, who once complained to him that he was flabbergasted when he was sent a military booklet by the authorities, including the order to keep it under threat of severe punishment in the case of its destruction or loss. He had been given several books in his life and the givers had never obliged him to keep it. That is why he lamented, How can those people who taught me that they defended my freedom, all of a sudden, impose such an undignified obligation on me? In fact, he felt deeply hurt. The correct answer would have been, the freedom promised by superficial politicians usually means only `freedom from slavery and their own `independence from foreign powers. Bonhoeffer 23a, complains that, in the hopeless conditions of New Year m57, most people resigned to a factual passivity, which is totally irresponsible and frivolous, others stuck to keeping their fanciful dreams about a better future and tried to forget the present. Comment: The negative judgement is not to the point. The responsible one does not ask whether or not the others act responsibly too. The point is that a valid teaching of responsibility has never been developed by any religion or philosophy. Christianity teaches to love God, ourselves, and others. This is unnecessary and insufficient. 1. If God exists, He is responsible and human responsibility becomes secondary, if not irrelevant. 2. It is not sufficient to love ourselves. To be happy, we have to respect ourselves, which means to acknowledge the findings of our experiences and thoughts, even if they make us feel unhappy. Bonhoeffer certainly felt unhappy about the conspiracy, otherwise he would not have had to fill seventeen pages (9-25) with his brooding over it. Had he been able to have access to a correct doctrine of responsibility , he would have been happy with his decision. The incriminated fanciful dreams are commented on below. Bonhoeffer 23b, We cannot relate to either of those attitudes (23a). Ours is nothing other than to choose the very narrow and sometimes almost invisible path of taking every day as if it was the last one and, all the same, keep to the faith and responsible confidence in a great future. Comment: What Bonhoeffer has just dubbed `dreams in others (23a), here he praises it as `faith and responsible confidence. For a Christian theologian, it is also awkward to define the right path as ` almost invisible, if God has given us infallible directions. Suppose one follows the directions of Christian theology, the path of responsibility is not `almost, but completely invisible, although the Book of Judith or the story of Samson (Ex 5) would have offered ample opportunities to develop a correct doctrine of responsibility that would restrict the love principle. Bonhoeffer 23c, Every day, one ought to be fearlessly and carelessly prepared to die.

Comment: The meaning is that responsibility can result in the ultimate sacrifice. But it is wise and dignified to fear death and take utmost care to avoid it. Responsibility is not a question of bravery. We choose to risk our lives despite our fear of death, not because we are fearless. Courage is not a virtue, but a gift and a very doubtful one. Aristotle III 6 also is wrong in stating that poverty and disease we perhaps ought not to fear It is irresponsible to be careless in terms of ones assets and health. Bravery in battle, praised by Aristotle, wants to be questioned, too. Many responsibly thinking people refused to join the army. Bonhoeffer 24, explains that there is a hazard in taking refuge in theories of disaster. They start believing that chaos, shambles, catastrophe are the very purpose of current affairs and, thus, retreat from their responsibility for the future, the renewal and the future generations. Comment: The latter points are indeed the crucial ones as to why the wise and dignified ones wanted to fight against the dictator at the risk of their own and other peoples lives, despite the violence they would possibly have to apply and the offence against the normal code of conduct. The term `theories of disaster possibly refers to Spenglers `The Decline of the West. Confucius also taught that, despite the ideal of mutual tolerance, one ought to criticise the ruler when he was unjust (Darga 43). It is, however, an impossible undertaking to find out why people refrain from taking responsibility. It is as though one would try to make an exhaustive list of all the reasons why people become ill and sick. It is an overbearing scholastic attitude to accuse others of malice, negligence, and weakness. So, Aquinas makes stilted and laborious efforts to determine the nature and causes of sin, as from II 71-89, which include several hundred articles. Bonhoeffer 25a, Death by free consent is more desirable than death by accident, sudden and without relevance. Comment: The meaning seems to be that Bonhoeffer ought to feel privileged in comparison to the millions of soldiers who died in the trenches for nothing. However, the statement as such is invalid, as though suicide were a more dignified way to die than fighting in battle. The statement also fails to honour the soldiers tremendous sacrifices and heroism. Bonhoeffer 25b, suggests that the main thing is to be humble, simple, and straightforward. Do we still have the inner strength to resist the thrust and are we still honest enough with ourselves, to be unbiased and find the way back to modesty and righteousness? Comment: The question seems to be addressed to the German nation as a whole. It shows that Bonhoeffer was well aware of the disintegrated state of the nation at this stage. History has it that up to twelve months after the war (the suicide rate was horrendous)13 the German people were unable to work the ruins and start the reconstruction.14
13

H. Knabe, Tag der Befreiung? List Taschenbuch, 2008, 8

14

Alfred Dblin, Schicksalsreise, DTV 1996, 317

This paragraphs title reads, Are we still usable? Consequently, responsibility is truly and essentially our sole dignified way to act, and the irresponsible ones will never be happy. COMMENT: 1) The whole document mentions `love but once (22), while the terms `responsible and `responsibility are used twenty-eight times. It presents an unadmitted refutation of the Christian love principle, which is overruled by the principle of responsibility. Thus, it is among the most useful and impressive documents in terms of this teaching of responsibility. Bonhoeffers intensive and extensive ruminations also indicate that a correct doctrine of responsibility has never been properly developed. His discourse cannot be considered a clear and irrefutable presentation of such a doctrine, either, but seems to be the most serious approach to it ever. A presentation of a valid teaching of responsibility is impossible without the refutation of the love principle, which constitutes a divinisation of social behaviour (Chapter Six). 2) Another impressive witness to the lack of a valid doctrine of responsibiliy is presented in Schillers `William Tell IV 3; the hero ponders whether or not he is entitled to kill the bailiff (Ex 5 COM 3). He finds four reasons to do it. 1) Bailiff Gessler is a criminal (verses 9-17). 2) Tell has to protect his family (18-30). 3) Gessler deserves to die; There is a God to punish and repay. (31-37) 4) The shooting was the most important and noble one, he ever executed. (76-91) Reason 1) is not convincing. That is why Schiller added scene 4 in which Gessler again proved a ruthless tyrant, who threatened to ride over helpless petitioners. Reason 2) is sufficient; the killing is the only dignified option. Reason 3) is invalid, since the Christian God forbade to kill. Reason 4) highlights the importance to resist tyranny. While Bonhoeffers family was not directly threatened by Hitler, he insists on this kind of general relevance of his decision. Tells second reason, yet, accounts for a sufficient argument.

Example 3: Sandro Pertini

On New Years Day m20, Italys charismatic President Sandro Pertini made his traditional speech on television to the people of his country. After some encouraging words for everybody, he finally addressed the young people, who were challenged by multiple obstacles such as unemployment, drugs, criminality, terrorism, and corruption. His final statement was most impressive. It ran as follows, Look, I was in prison for ten years, but I never had a day that I was miserable because I was totally convinced that I was fighting for a good cause. Therefore, wherever you are, whatever setbacks and trouble you might be up against, however difficult it may seem to you to proceed do believe in a great idea; get involved in an ideal cause you feel worth standing for, no matter whether it has a religious, social, or political goal. It is always worth fighting and trying our best. It gives us power, courage, and pride to overcome failures and disappointments. This is my wish for you in the new year. COMMENT: 1) In fact, Pertini was a socialist and offered outspoken and unyielding resistance to Mussolinis fascist regime. In m71, he was handed out a life sentence in prison. He was in prison and confinement from m71 to m57. He sustained extreme

hardships, torture, and serious diseases during that time. When the Germans took over in Italy, he was brutally tortured, but did not yield any information. His brother perished in a German concentration camp in m55. Sandro was President of the State from m22 to m15.15 2) Pertinis heroic deeds do not need further comments. The unique quality of the example is that it illustrates the crucial difference between feeling and being happy, a difference it seems all philosophers and psychologists (possibly with the exception of Frankl) have failed to point out so far. The difference consists in that it would not be believable if Pertini claimed that during all that time he never felt miserable, considering the squallid conditions, the torture, disease, and the terrible repercussions on his family and friends. Pertini said that he was never miserable, and this, indeed, is the decisive factor in all our lives; it is not a dignified goal to avoid all hardships in order to permanently feel good, but to act in a responsible way makes us happy, even if we feel very unhappy it is, in fact, the only way for a logically thinking being to be happy. However, such is not a duty, Pertini was not obliged to suffer all that. He did it, because he could not stand the idea of surrender to a criminal regime. He wanted to resist. He chose so, because he knew that any other decision would not allow him to be happy. Aristotle, however, conceives happiness as the ideal of developing virtues that allow to feel good as a citizen, enjoying the acknowledgement of everybody ( Schmid 59). None of this is wrong, but definitely secondary. In addition, Aristotle III 2 seems mistaken about the difference between being and feeling happy, claiming that we wish to be happy and say we do, but we cannot well say we choose to be so; for, in general, choice seems to relate to the things that are in our own power. The philosopher is completely mistaken. It is not in our power to feel happy, but it is our sole choice to be happy by living and acting in a responsible way. The classical theory of virtues basically coincides with the Christian love principle, which asks us to love ouselves and the others, make them and ourselves feel good as best and as long we can. Pertini, like everybody, would have liked that, too. It is not that we wish to suffer horrendous hardships and act in a way others cannot relate to. What we want, in the first place, is to act responsibly, despite the possibly dire consequences and general disapproval. It is clear that Brunos theory of heroism comes closest to this teaching. However, he states, that the human heart contains two summits, which rise progressively from one root; and in the spiritual sense, from a single passion of the heart proceed the two opposites of love and hate. For Mount Parnassus has two summits rising from the one foundation. (Bruno I 1) The expression `the human heart definitely stands for feelings, which indeed are either good or bad; the good ones are loved, the bad ones hated. For instance, if we love someone, we hate to lose him. The point is that our decision-making cannot be reduced to the level of feelings, but wants to be guided by logical thinking, no matter whether we feel good or bad, because thinking is about what is true and untrue. On the other hand, if `the human heart stands for `will, even poetry (Mount Parnassus) has two other summits, which is to say, feelings and thoughts. 3) The term `want in the above sentence seems to include the notion of `love itself. For instance, Bonhoeffer joins the plot, because he `loves peace and `hates the atrocious effects of Hitlers dictatorship. However, he obviously hates to kill someone.
15

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alessandro_Pertini

The objection is artificial, as though it was claimed that a sadist `loves to make other people suffer. `Will and `love are not identical. `Will is identical to `life, since every living being wants to maintain, defend, and reproduce itself. With humans, that means that `will includes both feeling and thinking. `Love is a matter of feelings, whereas `responsibility is a matter of thinking, and, as such, it has superiority in our decision-making. Furthermore, the love principle cannot explain why long term advantages possibly justify negative and cruel means in the present to reach them. 4) The teaching of morals (which is but the resumption of the moralists experiences of bad parenting) has spoiled the whole philosophy of `will. `Will is a synonym of `life, considered under the aspect of self-preservation. On account of a distrustful approach, moral teaching has criticised `self-preservation as `resistance to obedience. Thus, `will became the force of `non-submission and `egotism, as opposed to social behaviour. However, `will and `social behaviour are perfect gifts in all healthy mammals. Those gifts are correlated, but not opposing principles social behaviour is not affected by self-preservation; `social can only mean that there are fellow living beings that are able to both look after themselves and relate to others. All the same, responsible decisions can oppose social behaviour, but are not egotistic because of that. The term `freedom of will confuses those aspects. `Life cannot be qualified as `free, since it includes countless conditions and restrictions, which are both known and unknown. For instance, we cannot know whether or not our seemingly autonomous decisions are in fact steered by unknown alien forces. Nevertheless, we would still want to be happy by making responsible decisions, for the intellect is our most valuable endowment. The philosophical error is visible in Aquinas II 8.1, The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is only of something good. The philosopher is wrong; `will is not an appetite, but a synonym of `life under the aspect of self-preservation. It is nobodys business to determine whether this is good or bad. For instance, Drrenmatt claims that man is the cancer of the earth (The Meteor II.9). It is impossible to prove the contrary (Aristotle VII.13C). The doctrine of `free will leads to absurd conclusions in Descartes 4f, Free will is in itself the noblest thing we can have, since it makes us in a way equal to God. 5) There is only one thing in which we are free; we can choose to draw or not to draw logical conclusions. Descartes 3b, therefore, is completely wrong in stating, When presented with a clear and distinct perception of what is true, the will is compelled to assent to it. (John Paul 112C) 6) The confusion of `will and `love (point 3, above) can have tragic consequences in intelligent infants and result in criminality ( Mackintosh 237); the mother is afraid of her babys excrements and treats him inappropriately, and the boy thinks she acts in that way because she loves him and that making others feel bad is a critical quality of true love. The error can be compared with Nietzsches superman philosophy (Bonhoeffer 21aC). 7) In this context, the main error of Stoicism16 can also be determined. The Stoics teach that of the four passions desire, joy, fear, and sorrow the last is to be avoided as undignified, unwise, and useless ( Augustine CoG XIV 8). Thus, the wise
16

http://www.iep.utm.edu/stoicism/

were supposed to always be serene, invulnerable, impertubable. It is true that it is possible to be happy all the time, but it is impossible to permanently feel so, and those feelings need to be recognised, their causes found, and a search for solutions instigated. If there are no remedies, psychology suggests mourning and prayer (Mackintosh 246f). Sorrow is neither unwise nor undignified. People who are unable to mourn either despair or become cynical. In addition, they have difficulty in relating to saddened persons. Some of them are also boring, when they conceal their problems and make inappropriate soothing comments to every complaint, as though there was never anything to worry about. Stoicism seems a somewhat misguided male approach to the challenges of life. Self-respect wants to cope with, rather than suppress bad feelings. All the same, responsibility can make us happy despite good and bad feelings, as it is confirmed in Pertinis statement above. Descartes approach to the challenges of life also reveals a somewhat contradictive stoicism, when he states, One of the main points in my ethical code is to love life without fearing death. (Schneewind 184) One cannot love without fearing the loss of the beloved thing or person, as it is brilliantly expressed in the last lines of Shakespeares sonnet `Time and Love where he thinks that he is going to lose his lover. This thought is as a death, which cannot choose but weep to have that which it fears to lose. It is also very important to avoid death, the fear of death being a most valuable gift. 8) Descartes 5a fails to distinguish between feeling and being happy. His statement reads, it is certain that, provided our soul always has the means of happiness within itself, all the troubles coming from elsewhere are powerless to harm it. Such troubles will serve rather to increase its joy; for on seeing that it cannot be harmed by them, it becomes aware of its perfection. And in order that our soul should have the means of happiness, it needs only to pursue virtue diligently. For if anyone lives in such a way that his conscience cannot reproach him for ever failing to do something he judges to be the best (which is what I here call pursuing virtue), he will receive from this a satisfaction which has such power to make him happy that the most violent assaults of the passions will never have sufficient power to disturb the tranquillity of his soul. The terms that refer to feelings joy, satisfaction, tranquility are not applicable to our heroes. The quest for responsibility cannot warrant those feelings. Their mention seems utterly absurd, as though the father (Ex 1) could `enjoy himself, feel satisfied and tranquil, while strangling his daughter. 9) Epicurus (24th/ 23rd bn), also erroneously, teaches that the complete virtue of strength and constancy is not the constancy which resists discomforts and puts up with them, but the constancy which takes them upon oneself without feeling them. He does not hold perfect, divine, and heroic the love which feels the spur, the bit, remorse, or pain caused by that vulgar kind of love, but heroic that love which abolishes any sense of other affections, so that he attains the degree of pleasure which has no power to annoy him by diverting him or by making him stumble upon some obstacle; and this is to reach the highest beatitude in this state, to have desire and not to have any sense of pain ( Bruno I 5 IX). This error results from the lack of insight into the functions of our mammalian and spiritual dimension. Although the latter eventually dominates the former in our decision-making, it does not want to eliminate the former, so that we might feel unhappy, but be happy on account of the fact that our decision compares with our wisdom and dignity. Bruno I 5 X

inappropriately calls that dominance the vindicator of the intelligence, as though intelligence wanted to kill the affections. 10) It is of great relevance whether or not `happiness is considered achievable. Aquinas II 5.3 states that perfect and true happiness cannot be had in this life, because in this life every evil cannot be excluded and we cannot enjoy the vision of the Divine Essence, yet. The existence of evil evokes fear, but does not destroy our capacity to take responsibility, and the vision of God is a creed. 11) Aquinas (point 10 above) mistook the beatific vision of God in Heaven for happiness. Happiness, however, wants to be achieved in this life. In Aquinas II 35.5, he takes a correct philosophical approach to his Christian view, The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate something harmful and sorrowful, as it is to contemplate something suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. The philosophers argument can be transferred to a correct doctrine of responsibility and could present a plausible explanation of what is meant by the distinction between being and feeling happy. If the term contemplation is replaced by `responsibility, the following definition will result, `The pleasure of responsibility can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that responsibility is the cause, but not the object of pleasure: in the latter, pleasure is taken not in taking responsibility but in the thing executed. Now it is possible to execute something harmful and sorrowful, just as to execute something suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of taking responsibility be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the pleasure of responsibility. Indeed, the causes of responsibility are wisdom and dignity, which present the most perfect capacities in logical thinking beings and cause us to be happy, whereas the action resulting can be both pleasant and unpleasant. The latter necessarily makes us feel unhappy. All this is evident from the Five Examples. 12) Hobbes I 6d, Continuall successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, Felicity. Continuall prospering, is that men call Felicity; I mean the Felicity of this life. Thus, felicity equals feeling good, while happiness refers to being happy as the consequence of taking responsibility. Hobbes I 11a correctly refers to the instability of felicity, Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. Therefore, `happiness is an ambiguous term, which wants to be specified whether we conceive it in the psychological or philosophical sense; they co-exist, since we can feel happy, but be unhappy, as well as be happy and feel unhappy. 13) One cannot agree to Hobbes, Review and Conclusion, Passions and Interests of men are different, and mutable. Although, at first sight, the statement looks reasonable, Hobbes wants to prove that the State is necessary because of those differences. In terms of social behaviour, however, peoples Passions and Interests are rather congruent. Therefore, the State is a consequence of the equality and steadiness of peoples interests. In fact, it would not be able to survive without that. The combined efforts of people, united in a

state, aim to improve and enrich our lives. States, however are not philosophically necessary. 14) Descartes 1a cannot be agreed with, either. He suggests that Practical Philosophy aims at finding the best means to provide the comforts of life and the pleasure to be gained from contemplating the truth, which is practically the only happiness in this life that is complete and untroubled by pain. In terms of the latter point, himself being an ingenious mathematician, the philosopher certainly enjoyed numerous happy hours in finding new solutions for difficult problems. The true aim of Practical Philosophy, however, wants to find the principles of our correct decisions, which are able to make us happy, regardless whether or not they are `comfortable and untroubled. In order to have a comfortable life, people can dispense with philosophy; one needs health, peace, money, occupation, friends, imagination, and independence. 15) One can agree with Descartes 1b, True philosophy teaches that even amidst the saddest disasters and most bitter pains we can always be content, provided that we know how to use our reason. The statement is correct, if the term content exclusively means `firmly decided, `unrelenting. 16) In terms of a responsible approach to the challenges of life, Locke 38-39a is worth quoting, a) Presumption. The variety of distempers in men's minds is as great as of those in their bodies; some are epidemic, few escape them, and everyone too, if he would look into himself, would find some defect of his particular genius. There is scarce anyone without some idiosyncrasy that he suffers from. This man presumes upon his parts that they will not fail him at time of need, and so thinks it superfluous labour to make any provision beforehand. His understanding is to him like Fortunatus's purse, which is always to furnish him without ever putting anything into it beforehand; and so he sits still satisfied without endeavoring to store his understanding with knowledge. It is the spontaneous product of the country, and what need of labour in tillage? Such men may spread their native riches before the ignorant; but they were best not come to stress and trial with the skillful. We are born ignorant of everything. The surfice of things that surround them make impressions on the negligent, but nobody penetrates inside without labour, attention and industry. Stones and timber grow by themselves, but yet there is no uniform building with symmetry and convenience to lodge in without toil and pain. God has made the intellectual world harmonious and beautiful without us; but it will never enter our minds all at once; we must bring it home piecemeal and there set it up by our own industry, or else we shall have nothing but darkness and a chaos within, whatever order and light there be in things without us. b) Despondency. On the other side there are others that depress their own minds, feel despondant at the first difficulty, and conclude that the getting an insight in any of the sciences or making any progress in knowledge further than serves their ordinary business is above their capability. These sit still, because they think they have not legs to go, as the others I last mentioned do, because they think they have wings to fly and can soar up on high when they please. To these latter one may for answer apply the proverb, `Use legs and have legs. Nobody knows what strength of body parts he has until he has tried them. And of the understanding one may most truly say that its force is greater generally than it thinks until it is put to it and therefore the proper remedy here is but to set the mind to work and apply the thoughts

rigorously to the business; for it holds in the struggles of the mind as in those of war, dum putant se sincere vincere (as long as they honestly think that they will win). A persuasion that we shall overcome any difficulties that we meet in the sciences seldom fails to carry us through them. Nobody knows the strength of his mind and the force of steady and regular application till he has tried. This is certain, he who sets out upon weak legs will not only go further but grow stronger too than one who, with a vigorous constitution and firm limbs, only sits still. (Chapter Twelve 17, p198) 17) The Christian and Muslim teaching (Koran 55:56-78) about the promised happiness in Heaven suggests that the redeemed will be able to enjoy the lusts and pleasures which they have, notwithstanding their strong appeal, avoided in this life. Calvin III 7.3 explains, But as nothing is more difficult than to bid adieu to the will of the flesh, subdue, nay, abjure our lusts, devote ourselves to God and our brethren, and lead an angelic life amid the pollutions of the world, Paul, to set our minds free from all entanglements, recalls us to the hope of a blessed immortality, justly urging us to contend, because as Christ has once appeared as our Redeemer, so on his final advent he will give full effect to the salvation obtained by him. It seems that the promise of heavenly happiness envisages a status of feeling happy and enjoying oneself for ever. 18) The approach of Leibniz 391 is also insufficient. He defines happiness the state of permanent joy and joy means that our mind is charmed by pleasant thoughts. None of this is true in terms of the Five Examples. Leibniz 395-399 concludes that the permanent love of God, the most perfect of beings, which wants to and will be permanent also after this life, is both the philosophical and religious consequence of our quest for happiness. It is true that we would like to feel happy permanently. However, without feeling hungry it is not possible to enjoy food. Feelings necessarily include the alternation of desire, which is unpleasant, and satisfaction, which is enjoyable. 19) The pursuit of happiness is also addressed in Goethes poem `The Gold Digger, which concludes as follows, Work all day, have guests to night, sour weeks and feasts delight, so all things will be alright! (Gedichte 346) Such an approach to what it means to feel happy in an ordinary citizens daily life seems reasonable. It is, however, not quite good enough in order to be happy. Therefore, it is a rather questionable thing to define that all things will be alright. 20) Kant U 136 also states that happiness is not achievable, but we want to be worth it. This teaching does not coincide with what is meant by `dignity in the definition of `responsibility (p40), since Kant thinks that we have to act socially and impeccably although it will not make us happy, but make us feel as though we deserved happiness. That is an artificial approach. All the same he is right in saying that acting socially cannot make us happy. This, however, is not because happiness is unachievable, but because acting socially is not good enough, for only acting responsibly will make us happy. Horaces intelligent question, How is it, Maecenas, that no-one in the world seems happy with the lot he has chosen or that heaven reserved for him? (Horace, Satires I 1) can only be answered by `because they fail to distinguish between being and feeling happy. Similarly, Kant C 12 is insufficient, a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness. The statement needs

correcting as follows, `responsible decision-making constitutes the indispensable condition of being happy. Kant C 13 reveals that he sometimes has a very restricted idea of happiness, in a being which has reason and a will, if the proper object of nature were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. The truth rather is that a Practical Philosophy that does not want to tell us how we can be happy is completely useless. This is contradictorily admitted a few lines later, when he states that intelligence was given to us in order to break forth into practical exercise with its weak insight, to think out for itself the plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. ( Kant C 14). A few lines later, he again uses the term happiness in the restrictive sense, stating that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended (Kant C 15a). It is obvious that the term `happiness is not philosophically usable, unless one distinguishes between feeling and being happy. Very correct is Kant C 15b, that reason is capable of a satisfaction of its own proper kind, namely, that from the attainment of an end, which end again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination. The phrase satisfaction of its own can only mean `being happy. Quite contrary to Kant C Appendix I (1 Cor 13.6C), the statement correctly alludes to the taking into account of the consequences, in the phrase the attainment of an end. It is also signalled that one might feel unhappy when making responsible decisions. Schopenhauer 506 and 513 resign to saying, no-one can have lasting peace upon earth. True salvation, deliverance from life and suffering, cannot even be imagined without complete denial of the will. Similarly, Wohmann 146 advises, Just refrain from teaching me that happiness can be achieved in this life. 21) Plato R IX 16f, masterly explains that knowledge, wisdom, and reason are the most desirable things in life, leaving riches and honour far behind. Therefore, the responsible decision is taken for the sake of being happy. The instability and relativity of feeling happy is also masterly explained in the following passage, You remember what people say when they are sick? What do they say? That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill. Yes, I know, he said. And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain? I have. And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them as the greatest pleasure? Yes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest. Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be painful? Doubtless, he said. 22) Aristotle I.4, seems to notice that happiness is an equivocal notion, but fails to determine in what sense. He states that happiness is

the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from one another -- and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well. 23) All the same, it seems that philosophy and theology have failed to envisage the very difference between being and feeling happy. In terms of philosophy, it was always hindered by the quest for perfection, which is unattainable and makes happiness an illusion. Goethe also defines the quest itself as the cause of happiness, Whoever strives can be redeemed. (Faust II, Act V, Scene 3). In terms of theology, the teaching of eternal beatitude wants to define a permanent state of feeling happy. Since such a state is unachievable in this life, there must be another life where it is achieved or missed for ever. Buddhism, for its part, defines the quest itself as the cause of all unhappiness; no sooner was it abandoned than we would always feel totally happy (Adidam 15-16). 24) The latter point is also clearly addressed in the Buddhist Palicanon, where it talks about the three degrees of consideration. Pali 1.4.5 reads, If the Self manages to get rid of the desires and the unhealthy greed for things, and is able to remain in its quiet and soulful absorption of mind, then it receives the blessing of the first consideration and attains the level of perfect happiness If the Self manages to get rid of its concerns and ponderings, and is able to dwell in the inside sea of calm and unity of the soul, then it receives the blessing of the second consideration and attains the level of perfect happiness If the Self manages to stay in its serene calm and more and more becomes aware of its blessed existence in the body, then it is said about the Saint, `The composed wise lives happily and it receives the blessing of the third consideration and attains the level of perfect happiness Responsibility takes into account many more `considerations than the ones recommended in those sentences. One cannot say that they are wrong, however insufficient. We want to take care of ourselves, the others, our planet, and the future generations. 25) In fact, the difference between feeling and being happy is not definable without a valid doctrine of responsibility. Psychologically, the personality is full-grown when it reaches the top of nationwide and worldwide responsibility without losing its Ego and the previously established relationships (Mackintosh 28). Morals are not required, since we want nothing better than to act in a responsible way. We want it because it is appropriate to our capacity to think logically. This capacity constitutes the very essence of our Ego ( Mackintosh 83-84). It transcends the psychological category of feelings. Aquinas II 3.4 tries to define the fact of feeling good a necessary consequence of being happy. He states that two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight

connected with it. `Delight is certainly a misleading term, since it refers to feelings. In Ex 5, the hero died in the very act of taking responsibility. In Ex 1, the father took the risk of feeling remorse for the rest of his life. Therefore, Kants definition of a satisfaction of its own (point 20, above) seems more appropriate. Nevertheless, to feel happy is not a necessary consequence of being happy. Happy people can be very sober and unexciting. 26) To put it in a nutshell, what makes the Christian love principle so seductive is the fact that love makes us feel happy, whereas but responsibility can make us be happy. 27) There is also a historiographic aspect to that topic. Schiller17 states, Greatness of deeds, it seems, is in the thought of those who think them great; it cannot in the deeds themselves be caught. The poet is right. Only the heroic deeds which aim at a good cause in the observers view gain acknowledgement. Therefore, heroism in terms of challenging decisions is motivated by the wish to be happy, rather than by ambition ( Bonhoeffer 15c). Other heroes, as in sport, seek fame in the first place. Fame, however, will only make them feel happy for some time. 28) In terms of historiography, responsibility is even more underrated in the consideration of macro-history. It has become a widespread conviction in Western countries that, after the elimination of Nazism and Communism, obedience and following the rules of Capitalism and Christian morals is a perfect way to lead a dignified and wise existence. More and more nations develop the habit to put the right palm upon the heart when the national anthem is sung or played, as though there was nothing dearer to their hearts than their nations welfare. This seems a symbol of a short-sighted approach to the challenges we face. We are better to leave that naivity behind. 29) This is also the place to define the philosophical domain which this research refers to. It is the Practical Philosophy. The Theoretical Philosophy concerns itself with the nature and the limitations of knowledge ( Mackintosh 45-113), while Practical Philosophy investigates the question how happiness can be achieved. 30) It is definitely patronising, when practical philosophers and psychologists declare responsibility a duty. Their conceited and overbearing attitude is the result of wrong parenting; all their life they have been taught that they were obliged to fulfil someone others wishes. 31) The question of happiness can also be addressed from its opposite, which is to say, unhappiness. For instance, a sailor on leave will not be unhappy, when the boat on which he is employed sinks, but he may still feel saddened by the thought that he could have saved it, had he been there. 32) Schopenhauer 406 confirms that it is impossible to constantly feel happy, For all human life is tossed backwards and forwards between pain and ennui.
17

R. Schneider, Macht und Gnade, Droemer Knaur 1964, p. 98

Schopenhauer 411, continues the argument, For we unwearingly strive from wish to wish; and although every satisfaction, however much it promised, when attained fails to satisfy us, but for the most part comes presently to be an error, of which we are ashamed till we reach a wish which is not satisfied, and yet cannot be given up. This can be understood as a hidden responsibility doctrine, for responsibility goes on to challenge us every day and in every moment and makes us happy. The philosopher, however, concludes the opposite, stating, In that case we have, as it were, found what we sought, something that we can always blame, instead of our own nature, to be the source of our suffering. A correct transcription of this sentence would read, `In that case, we have, as it were, found what we sought, something that we can always praise, according to our nature as thinking beings, to be the source of our happiness. 33) Russels 90-91 description of a happy life also misses the crucial point of responsibility, the ends of human life as a whole: art and history, acquaintance with the lives of heroic individuals, and some understanding of the strangely accidental and ephemeral position of man in the cosmos all this touched with an emotion of pride in what is distinctively human, the power to see and to know, to feel magnanimously and to think with understanding. It is obvious that the philosopher struggles for a plausible definition of happiness. Aldous Huxley18 also concluded that there were only two ways to be happy, There are people who are able to create works of art and there are others who can talk about the arts.

Example 4: Odyssey, Ulysses Revenge

In Books XIV to XXII, Ulysses has returned to his kingdom, where he finds his household and his wife besieged by dozens of reckless suitors, who illegally woo her. As custom and the unwritten laws of hospitality oblige her to accommodate them as guests, Ulysses possessions have dreadfully diminished. To make things worse, the suitors dispatch a boat to catch and kill Ulysses, when they learn that he is approaching his homeland. They also plan to kill his only son, Telemachus. Moreover, the suitors cause mischief all over the place and behave scandalously towards the servants and beggars that ask for food. Ulysses has first to keep his return a secret and only his father, son, herdsman Eumaius, and the loyal maid Euryclea are informed. Ulysses has no other option than to eliminate all the suitors, almost singlehandedly, in a one and only fight, with no chance for any of them to escape. With the help of Athenas acumen, he manages to have all of them gathered in the hall of his residence, with no weapons in the room, but the bow in his hands, and all the doors shut by his helpers. Then, he shoots all, except two of them, whom he pardons at Telemachus intervention, despite the fact that they have collaborated and continued wooing his wife after learning that the hero was alive. Ulysses also kills the maids who have collaborated with the suitors. COMMENT: 1) Although the account is considered a literary artefact, it offers a range of relevant moral subjects which are to the point of this investigation. The comment

18

A Huxley, Brave New World 1932, last sentence

to these narratives by Tyson on the internet19 begins with the sentence, The Greeks, as portrayed by Homer, are a very vengeful people.
The innuendo in Tysons comment is that a civilised Christian would never have done what Ulysses did. However, revenge was not the essential point in the heros actions, but unavoidable self-defence and defence of his essential rights. The threat to kill him and his son they had sent out a boat left him no other option. The cunning and almost impracticable scheme was the only wise and dignified way to deal with this baneful situation .

He had to lie and to cheat constantly. Morals and the love principle are perfectly impracticable and even the most pious Christian should not have decided to act differently. All the same, the killing of the maids seems questionable. However, Ulysses had to consider that, after the suitors death, their influential relatives might try to take revenge on him, and the treacherous maids they had known that he was alive might join their plot and kill him. 2) Habermas W 333 states that collective rights have no priority over individual rights. Ex 2-4 seem to illustrate that, while Ex 1 illustrates the complete opposite. Ex 5 is not relevant for either of those so-called rights. In fact, there are no such rights at all. Other than that, one could just as well stipulate the right that every person ought to be given a million dollars at birth. The soldier is supposed to sacrifice his health and life for his country. Thus, he is supposed to ignore his individual rights in favour of the collective ones. On the other hand, the community has not the `right to ask for that sacrifice. In fact, responsibility is not a question of `rights and duties. The responsible decision correctly seeks the short and long term consequences of an action and its omission. Ulysses wants to save himself, his son, father, wife (who would be forced to marry an unloved suitor, who probably was to become a ruthless tyrant), and the loyal servants. Unless he kills all the suitors, people will never be safe in his country. No-one does have the right to feel safe in their country. The suitors do not have the right to threaten him and their fellow citizens, either. Ulysses wants for his people to feel safe. If the suitors are a threat to his life, he has only two options; to kill them or leave the country. The latter would be unwise and undignified. It would be foolish to yield to the suitors aggression. 3) Ulysses responsible action disqualifies Kant C Appendix II, which claims, To save the State from harm is an unconditional duty; to save an individual is only a conditional duty. If Kant were right, Ulysses would have to leave his country and let the suitors have their way. Bonhoeffer (Ex 2) also took the risk of destroying his nation by his resistance. Likewise, Pertinis resistance (Ex 3) threatened to damage the State. 4) The Example can be useful to discard quantitative arguments in the controversy. It seems that the hero destroys many more lives than he saves by his action. No-one is able to devise a law that would allow for such an action. Therefore, Ulysses does not have `the right to kill the suitors. He still acts responsibly. For instance, a war pilot cannot balance how many lives he is going to destroy against the number of the ones he saves. The following Example also gives evidence of the fact that responsibility cannot be quantified.

Example 5: Samson
19

http://classics.mit.edu/Homer/odyssey.1.i.html

Although it would be preferable to refer to the Book of Judith ( Bonhoeffer 15bC), which gives an excellent example of a woman who took responsibility, the story of Samson in Judg 13.2-16.31 was chosen, because the Book of Judges is acknowledged by all Christian denominations as being divinely inspired. All the same, it is understood that taking responsibility is not only a characteristic attitude of males, but it is equally accorded to both sexes. However, after the drastic example of Ulysses revenge, which might be put down to barbaric heathen characters, a Biblical example was desired for. The passage reports as follows; After Samsons hair, which his treacherous wife once cut to eradicate his strength, has grown back, he is as strong as before, without the Philistines knowing about that fact. At a ceremonial event, where the five Kings and numerous Philistine officials are present, they have the blinded prisoner called in order to make a fool of him. Then the hero prays, Sovereign Lord, please remember me; please, God, give me my strength just once more, so that with this one blow I can get even with the Philistines for putting out my two eyes. (Judg 16.28) Standing between the two central pillars of the building, he stretches out his arms and makes it collapse at once, so as to kill himself and the enemies. COMMENT: 1) Although Samsons prayer refers to revenge, his action is the one and only thing that is able to deliver his people and has been the purpose of his divine strength in the first place. It was not a good idea for the writer to mention the secondary and insufficient motive of revenge. He would have been better to highlight the political and religious importance and urgency of the heroic deed. On the other hand, Samson is not obliged to destroy the building. He does it, because he wants it as the most wise and dignified thing to do, making the ultimate sacrifice himself. All the same, if he had managed to escape, his action would still be correct. 2) The story is popular in Christian instructions and often appreciated by children. There can be no doubt that they feel totally enthusiastic about Samsons courage and, most of all, the ruin of the Philistines, which definitely appears to them the relevant issue in the account. And they are perfectly right in their judgement. Our moralists were better to ask normal children about what is a wise and dignified approach to our challenges and capacities. It can be helpful to seriously discuss this point of view, although it is a psychological, rather than a philosophical way of arguing. 3) In terms of the latter point, the classic German playwright, F. Schiller, has his hero, William Tell, in a long soliloquy, ponder about his intention to kill the malicious and tyrannical bailiff. (Wilhelm Tell, IV 3) After giving some plausible reasons (Ex 2 COM 2), he admits that his children would not understand his decision, although he takes it to protect them, too (verses 63-75). Thus, it is Schillers opinion that the average childrens capacity to think correctly is small. He is absolutely misguided in that. His conjecture, however, is very popular with adult people. The fact is that normal children would not need all that pondering to justify the tyrants elimination. To the contrary, they would wish that Tell shot the bailiff right away at the beginning of the whole altercation, when the latter demanded that father Tell shot from a long distance an apple placed on his boys head. 4) Ex 5 also proves that it is not possible to devise rules as parameters of which decisions are responsible. For instance, the rule given in Shaftesbury 77 is invalid. It

reads, 'Tis thus we say of a creature, in a kind way of reproof, that he is too good, when his affection towards others is so warm and zealous as to carry him even beyond his part. Although the statement compares with a responsible way of caregiving, following this rule, Samson was wrong to kill himself for the sake of Israel. Bonhoeffer and Pertini also risked their lives without knowing whether they would be able to save any other one. 5) (a-f) One big objection to the conclusiveness of the Five Examples will be that they refer to extreme cases, which should not allow for general conclusions, and that, in normal conditions, general rules, duties, and morals are applicable and sufficient, all the same. It has to be admitted that the examples indeed refer to extreme cases. However, they were chosen in order to facilitate the argument, not because it would be impossible to demonstrate the validity of the principle of responsibility with examples taken from our every-day life. In fact, the principle is adopted permanently in our (a) personal, (b) parental, (c) marital, (d) social, (e) economical, and (f) political activities, in the meaning that it would be absurd to consequently adopt the love principle in the so-called normal conditions. a) In terms of personal activities, it is not wise and dignified to strife for success, riches, and pleasures, because all those things are secondary and, if pursued at all costs, will rather ruin our lives than make us happy. Consequently, it is not good enough to love ourselves, we also want to respect ourselves, which means to act according to what our brain judges to be the wise and dignified way of action, even if we do not like doing so. For instance, a smoker may decide to get rid of his handicap by abstinence. b) We cannot be wise and dignified parents, unless we take responsibility and are prepared to take measures that neither we nor the children like. c) A marriage cannot be sustained, unless the spouses do much more than love one another, but respect and constantly take care of one another and accord each other the number-one position, although the original sympathy for one another may have dwindled (Chapter Five COM 4). Unfortunately, no valid philosophy of marriage has ever been established. d) We expect socially that other people deal with us in a dignified and civilised way and we would not accept being attacked, exploited, threatened, or offended by them. e) The economy could not work, if consumers adopted the love principle in the first place. It would be stupid and silly to have a bad dentist look after our teeth, even if he goes bankrupt and we love him. We might marry him, but still have someone else work on our mouth. f) In terms of politics, it is foolish to elect an unqualified person to a political position because we like him and he is presently jobless and poor. 6) As a consequence of all this, the vast majority of relevant human activity is the result of responsibility and in all our activities we want to take responsibility, which does not mean that there is no room for fun and humour ( Calvin II 8.22C).

Chapter Three: Definitions

1) The following definitions result from the Five Examples; `Responsibility = the constant awareness and willingness to answer the question, `Why are you doing this and, `Why are you not doing that? As far as possible, it wants to take into account the short and long term consequences of our decisions. It wants us to act in a wise and dignified manner. Responsible decisions are made for the sake of happiness. `Social Behaviour= all mammals innate ability and desire to adapt themselves to the necessities of living in and belonging to a community. `Moral = a comprehensive theory on how people are supposed and asked to act. `Love = the strong feeling of affection that has various degrees, but culminates in the mating of the couple. `Agape = an erroneously stipulated higher variation of erotism, proper to humans, including all of them as both subjects and objects. With Aquinas, it is compared with `charity. `Knowledge = the amount of information that has been acquired by experience, education, and logical thinking. `Respect = each thinking beings wise and dignified attitude of humbleness towards everything and everybody. It is possible that the German language has the most appropriate term for what is meant by `respect, the compound `Ehrfurcht, which combines the words `honour and `fear. 2) It seems that Aristotle VI.12 (4) is not too far from a correct doctrine of responsibility, when he states, Now virtue makes the choice right, but the question of the things which should naturally be done to carry out our choice belongs not to virtue but to another faculty. We must devote our attention to these matters and give a clearer statement about them. There is a faculty which is called cleverness; and this is such as to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark we have set before ourselves, and to hit it. Now if the mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere smartness; hence we call even men of practical wisdom clever or smart. The first sentence is almost correct. The Five Exemples give evidence of the fact that responsibility makes the choice right, while virtue only enables us to live sociably, which is very good, but insufficient. Thus, the philosopher is right to ask for another quality, which he calls cleverness, while he had been better to use the term `intellect . Mere intelligence, however, does not warrant a responsible decision-making. There must be an additional inspiration to make those heroes act responsibly. This inspiration is the wish to act in a dignified way in order to be happy , while, in many cases, cleverness would suggest to abstinence from the responsible action (Ex 2-

5). The philosopher also fails to refer to the fact that the responsible decision takes into account the `consequences of our actions and non-actions. In addition, the statement is cryptic, as it is not clear whether or not cleverness is a virtue; if it is a virtue, the phrase, another faculty which is called cleverness, is disturbing. If cleverness means a higher ranking faculty than the `virtues, the philosopher fails to signal that the virtues do not warrant the `right choice. 3) Aristotle VI.12 (2) erroneously suggests that philosophic wisdom produces happiness; for, being a part of virtue entire, by being possessed and by actualizing itself it makes a man happy. In the following chapter, he corrects himself, saying that it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom. Such is, indeed, true. Logical thinking is a gift that hopefully enables us to act in a generous way. It may cause both pleasure and feelings of unease. Thinking at a high philosophical level may be pleasant for some people, but cannot warrant happiness (Ex 3 COM 14). 4) `Wisdom is not a moral virtue, but a gift to remember the positive and negative consequences of past decisions, made by both ourselves and others. It enables us to use `prudence with regard to future decisions. The question arises whether or not responsibility is a gift. Aquinas II 68.1 was unable to answer the question. He comes to the astounding conclusion that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher than acts of virtue. In fact, responsibility is the gift that exceeds all the other virtues. For instance, there are few people able to grasp the fact that their spare money is urgently needed by others. When thinking about their money, they stop at the point of their personal financial long term safety and decide to accumulate their assets. This is not irresponsible, but they fail to recognise that that accumulation necessarily results in a global danger of epic proportions. The gift of thinking things through is rare, because we are wont to listen to the wrong parental, political, and religious advice, which presents itself as the epitome of wisdom. For instance, homosexuals have been prosecuted for thousands of years on account of foolish teachings, although they have not done any harm to anyone and homosexuality is also practised in the animal kingdom. People who think they can achieve happiness by accumulating material pleasures also follow the respective foolish teachings of publicity, friends, and advertising. On the other hand, moralistic admonitions which suggest that money, fame, and pleasure will not make us happy are never convincing, unless an intelligible explanation is added as to what makes us happy. 5) In terms of the spare money, referred to in the previous paragraph, modern approaches to the morals of economy are contradictory. W. Pareto (m152-77) suggests that the optimal way of economic activity does not improve the conditions of one to the detriment of the other ( Nickl 179). However, this ideal cannot be achieved, since the seller has no control of the buyers economic conditions, goals, and potential. The seller will also take into account the appropriate price segment in terms of general market conditions ( Aristotle IV.6bC). Likewise, the buyer does not know, whether or not the seller is selling too cheaply. Consequently, morals cannot solve the dilemma, while responsibility definitely would donate the spare money to the needy, where it necessarily belongs ( Aristotle IV.1bC).

This attitude, however, will only be tenable after real communities, that are able to warrant the support of everybody, are established. Appropriate additional suggestions and references are presented in Chapter Twelve 22, p203. 6) Likewise O. Nell-Breunings (m110-9) view is unsustainable. He refutes an economy which aims at mere bargains ( Nickl 179). Developed forms of the economy originate from the correct effort to provide storage for the future. It can only do so, if it is profitable. Wherever the economy is too successful in that, it is not to be blamed at all. The responsible businessman, however, will be happy to share those bargains with the needy ones. It means that the economy itself is not able to produce a sensible balance of goods, as it is envisaged by Nell-Breuning. The controversy between Habermas and Luhmann ( Horster 32-42, Bruno II 2 XIIIC, Nickl 184aC) originates from a lack of distinction between the two aspects of correctness. For instance, Habermas wants democracy to increase the freedom of the individual (Horster 17). However, if governments notice that some individuals make excessive use of that freedom, responsibility would have restrictions to be put on it. On the other hand, it is normal to develop ones potential to the full within the natural limits of social behaviour. 7) Kant claims his Categorical Imperative to be universal. He explains that only a strong feeling of universal affection can control more specific generous feelings and thus enable us to act justly, as it is due; and as soon as this feeling has risen to its proper universality, it has become sublime, but also colder ( Schneewind 502). It is true that universality is characteristic of responsibility, which is not a feeling, but the consequence of reasoning and dignity. Its colder nature results from its essence, not from its universality. The lesser warmth is also blamed on the principle of respect (Chapter Ten COM 2). 8) Hume III 4a, Note 21 seems to make a mess of these terms. He states, Love and esteem are at the bottom the same passions, and arise from like causes. The qualities, that produce both, are agreeable, and give pleasure. But where this pleasure is severe and serious; or where its object is great, and makes a strong impression; or where it produces any degree of humility and awe: In all these cases, the passion, which arises from the pleasure, is more properly denominated esteem than love. Benevolence attends both: But is connected with love in a more eminent degree. Comment: Love and respect have different origins. Love is an innate, necessary capacity in all mammals. Respect is a consequence of logical thinking, which is able to take into account that persons and things which we do not and cannot love are none the less valuable, unique, and precious, neither does it matter whether or not they are pleasant or admired. For instance, it is both foolish and undignified to give more respect to a queen than some lazy, poor, and jobless citizen. 9) Locke 43 cannot be agreed with, either, Our Saviour's great rule, that we should love our neighbour as ourselves, is such a fundamental truth for the regulating human society, that, I think, by that alone one might without difficulty determine all the cases and doubts in social morality. The Five Examples would not allow for the agape principle to determine all the cases and doubts in social morality. Bonhoeffer (Ex 2) certainly knew about the agape principle, but was not able to adopt it in his situation.

10) Every philosophy that fails to qualify life as a challenge to every living being moves in a theoretical no-mans-land. Therefore, Spinoza II PROP XLIXc is unacceptable, we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles. 11) In terms of the innate social behaviour, Fichte (m238-186) is right in asserting that it is innate in infants. He is wrong when he states that this is not the case with animals and primitive man, and that they only followed their instinct, whose sole quest was power and supremacy. The philosopher is also wrong in claiming that only modern man developed knowledge, art, and culture ( Hosang 9-10), for the highest cultural achievement is language, which must have developed ten thousands of years ago. Geissler O 44 is also unacceptable. He suggests that morals would vanish unless the religions imposed commandments. Fact is that people have lived sociably before there were preachers. Moreover, children who have been raised with respect, yet no religion whatsoever, may show good social behaviour. Consequently, Geissler O 49 is also wrong to suggest that the idea of God as a moral authority is indispensable. 12) Frankls quest to discover `the purpose of life and his inadequate proposals 20 are contradictory. The question itself is philosophically unanswerable, as one cannot answer the question, What is the purpose of the alphabet? The alphabet has no purpose whatsoever, only the letters have a purpose, which is to say, to represent sounds. `Alphabet is just a term which includes all the letters. `Life also is just a term which contains all the functions in a living being, and one can only define what their respective purposes are. Likewise, if one asks, What is the purpose of the universe? no philosophical answer is possible, since the term `universe, by definition, includes all the purposes. Whether or not life has a purpose is irrelevant. The only thing that counts is that we want to be happy, and happiness can only be achieved by taking responsibility. Psychology, let alone psychotherapy cannot find the distinction between being and feeling happy. Psychology evolves around the question in what way we can achieve a balance between feeling good and feeling bad. Its very purpose is to teach us how we can feel happy, overcome setbacks, and enjoy relationships. Psychotherapy, on the other hand, addresses the hidden feelings of guilt in the patient. Only philosophy can proceed to the question of how we can be happy. Frankl erroneously hoped that it should be possible to develop a psychological theory which included responsibility. Logotherapy, therefore, seems contradictory, in that one cannot expect to cure a patient by making him find a purpose of life, while the complex feelings of guilt exist. In order to determine what the purpose or meaning of life could be, he concludes, If there is a meaning in life at all, then there must be a meaning in suffering. 21 Suffering should be avoided. It is only acceptable, if responsibility calls for it. For twenty centuries, the Jewish people have been taught to tolerate Christian
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discrimination in order to become worthy of the Messiahs arrival. Thus, religion deserted that people. Philosophy also failed it by not developing a valid doctrine of responsibility (Bonhoeffer 10C). The world does not improve, if people tolerate discrimination. Rigoberta Menchs motto, quoted at the beginning of this paper, is very true, It is better to die standing on our feet than to live on our knees. The aspect of non-action is alluded to in the motto by Edmund Burke, The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing. Bahro R 93 unilaterally praises Laotses maxim that non-action is preferable to action on account of the fact that the latter disturbs the balance of the world, as though parents would be better doing nothing for their children. In addition, if Frankl were right in his theory of suffering, we would be better to torture ourselves all day long. That his philosophy is shaky can be seen in a previous statement, which reads, I saw the truth as it is put into song by so many poets, proclaimed as the final wisdom by so many thinkers. The truth that love is the ultimate and the highest goal to which man can aspire. Then I grasped the meaning of the greatest secret that human poetry and human thought and belief have to impart: The salvation of man is through love and in love. I understood how a man who has nothing left in this world may still know bliss, be it only for a brief moment, in the contemplation of his beloved. In a position of utter desolation, when man cannot express himself in positive action, when his only achievement may consist of enduring his sufferings in the right way an honourable way in such a position man can, through loving contemplation of the image he carries of his beloved, achieve fullfillment. For the first time in my life I was able to understand the meaning of the words, `The angels are lost in perpetual contemplation of an infinite glory. " It makes more sense to suppose that Frankl was able to sustain his spiritual freedom, because he, as an outstanding character and excellent doctor and psychiatrist, took responsibility for his fellow prisoners as best he could in the desperate conditions of the concentration camps. Nobody denies those facts. One can hear an allusion to an essential point of this doctrine of responsibility in his insertion, in the right way an honourable way. Our question, however, is whether or not he somehow misunderstood the real source of his mental strength. It does not make sense that remembering beloved ones or acceptance of suffering is the source of sustainable happiness. 13) Aquinas II 1.4 also takes a too theoretical approach to the critical points of Practical Philosophy. He states that it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends. It is true that our way of logical thinking (that understands reality as a continuous sequence of causes and effects) cannot dispense with the idea that there is a first cause and a last effect. However, it is not possible to attribute to them any other quality than that they are the first and the last. Practical Philosophy is concerned with neither of them, but wants to answer the question how we, as logically thinking beings, can be happy. Nevertheless, Aquinas is right, in so far our capacity to foresee the consequences of our decisions is limited. 14) With the help of the above definitions, it seems possible to disprove all the former moral teachings that have been presented by philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, English and German philosophy, modern authors), theologians (Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Bruno), and psychologists (Confucius, Laotse, Buddha, Jung, Frankl, Fromm, Kohlberg, Meves). Their principal conclusions will be presented in a concise manner

and it will be pointed out in what way they proceed from erroneous definitions of the above terms. 15) The Koran hardly ever mentions love in a positive sense (Koran 5:54, Abdullah 88). It usually refers to our inappropriate love of worldly goods (ex gr 2:216 / 89:20 / 100:8). There is, however, a remarkable verse (33:72, Abdullah 356) in which responsibility (`Trust) is mentioned in the sense that humans are the only creatures on earth who are able to reason, while the earth and the mountains refused to take that task. It would mean that responsibility is a necessary consequence of our ability to think logically. Responsibility, however, is conceived as a punishment for human arrogance, whereas, in fact, it is the dignified answer to our capacity to think logically and make wise decisions, and it is meant to make us happy rather than punishing us. Other than that, the Koran mentions responsibility in the context of our final salvation several times (ex gr 24:54 / 74:38, `pledge, Abdullah 512); in those places, it refers to our obligation to follow Islam. 16) It is important to see that responsibility cannot be defined by a formal goal other than happiness. Throughout history, the material goals of responsibility were different in the various cultures. For example, the classic Roman citizen considered the glory of the Empire his main responsibility, whereas, since Augustine, the Christian ideal consisted in the effort to establish a City of God, both a terrestrial and celestial one. It is only today that, for the first time in history, the material goal of responsibility can be determined; it is the quest to save our planet and life itself. That kind of responsibility concerns humanity as a whole and each individual alike. Consequently, the unification of humanity in a one and only culture and religion is absolutely necessary. Although Marx correctly states that the cultures leave deserts behind (Bahro R 34), we want a World Culture which is sustainable and can even further the planets potential. Further suggestions are presented in Chapter Twelve 5, 6, 8, 1215, 21-23, 25, 28-31, p191-207. 17) In the course of the many centuries, Christian theology has developed a theory of the four conditions that would allow for the killing of a tyrant ( Geissler 47); One, the just cause (the tyrant is absolutely criminal); Two, the last resort (the only route left); Three, the right intention (the action helps the community); Four, minimal lateral damages (excluding genocide and crimes against humanity). These conditions compare with a responsible decision-making and that means that responsibility prevails over the love principle at any rate. Bonhoeffer never ponders on any of those conditions. The first condition is questionable anyway. Who is entitled to declare a cause to be juste? Moreover, justice must be done. Consequently, the killing of the tyrant would become a duty for everybody, which is absurd. The categorical exclusion of genocide is also questionable, in so far as the dropping of nuclear bombs on two Japanese cities was a genocide that cannot be proven to have been irresponsible. All the same, Bonhoeffers and our problem is whether or not the love principle is absolute, although the hero was not quite aware of the crucial point he was dealing with (Bonhoeffer 11, 13b, 13d, 15c, 18a). Bonhoeffer 22 even makes an attempt of justifying his decision by the love principle. The sheer existence of the above list makes obvious that Christian theology also had to admit that the love principle might be overruled.

Moreover, the classic list of the conditions above is not exhaustive. For instance, the attempt on a tyrant wants to be warranted by success ( Bonhoeffer 15bC), executed as soon as possible, eliminating also possible successors that might be worse, prearranging safe measures in terms of what happens to the country after the attempt, involving the smallest possible number of persons who are in the know, and so on. The establishment of such a list may be helpful for all those moralists, journalists, and historians who want to judge the moral quality of a tyrannicide. It is, however, impossible to legally and morally define the right to kill a tyrant. In fact, the establishment of such lists is not a dignified undertaking for a philosopher; rather it presents the old overbearing moralistic attitude of bad parents who teach others what they have to do and not to do. 18) Nickl 63-64 correctly notices that German literature of the 1 st bn has addressed the moral problem of modern sciences and given both symbolic and factual evidence of a responsible decision-making. It seems that German Philosophy has not quite arrived there yet. Literary examples of scientists who chose to boycott scientific services can be found in Das kalte Licht by C: Zuckmayer (m45), Die Physiker by F. Drrenmatt (m38), and In der Sache Robert Oppenheimer by H. Kipphardt (m36). Those scientists withdrew from collaboration out of responsibility. The withdrawals were neither due nor were they ordered by anyone. The decision was made, because of the scientists maturity and dignity. As a matter of fact, if people decided in a congruent way, they would give up smoking, donate the money they do not need, respect animals, plants, water, air, soil, reduce consumption of energy, contribute to the unification of humanity. There is no authority which is competent enough to demand such efforts. 19) That is why one cannot agree to Nickl 65a, where `responsibility is defined as follows; A person is held responsible by an authority for a thing that has been imposed on him as a duty. The definition needs correcting; `As logically thinking beings, we want to take responsibility for whatever we choose to do or not to do, according to our maturity and dignity. Nickels definition only covers what is meant by agreements and contracts, where control and sanctions are further requirements. Moreover, such contracts also generate privileges, rights, and authority. Such is not the case in terms of responsibility (point 20o, below). 20) A list of final remarks (aff) to the Chapters One to Three may be added. a) Probably the wisest German poet of all times, M. Claudius (m260-185), wrote his son a farewell letter in m201.22 Its most apodictic statement reads, Nothing is great unless it is good, and nothing is true unless it is consistent.
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This can be compared with a valid doctrine of responsibility. Responsibility should support life and existence, which is the wisest and greatest thing we can do, and it wants to tackle all the hardships encountered, including legal, moral, and social points of view, and it proves the sustainable principle of our decision-making everywhere and any time. b) Calvin I 6.3 is very wrong in stating, For if we reflect how prone the human mind is to lapse into forgetfulness of God, how readily inclined to every kind of error, how bent every now and then on devising new and fictitious religions, it will be easy to understand how necessary it was to make such a depository of doctrine as would secure it from either perishing by the neglect, vanishing away amid the errors, or being corrupted by the presumptuous audacity of men. It being thus manifest that God, foreseeing the inefficiency of his image imprinted on the fair form of the universe, has given the assistance of his Word to all whom he has ever been pleased to instruct effectually, we, too, must pursue this straight path, if we aspire in earnest to a genuine contemplation of God;we must go, I say, to the Word, where the character of God, drawn from his works is described accurately and to the life; these works being estimated, not by our depraved Judgment, but by the standard of eternal truth. Comment: Calvins God did something much better than giving written advice. He made all healthy mammals naturally inclined, willing, and able to act in a social way, since it is for them the only chance to lead good lives. In II 8.36 Calvin concedes that Nature herself should in some measure teach us to honour our parents. In addition, Gods written messages, unfortunately, failed to teach responsibility which overrules social behaviour. For instance, Bonhoeffer certainly was well acquainted with the messages Calvin refers to, but was not able to quote a passage from them that would have justified his decision ( Bonhoeffer 10-25). It is very likely that Bonhoeffer was too humble to compare himself to Samson (Ex 5) or thought that his friends would not understand the comparison. In terms of innate social behaviour, Calvin II 3.4 is also wrong. After admitting that there were impeccable heathen people, he states, those are not common endowments of nature, but special gifts of God, which he distributes in divers forms, and, in a definite measure, to men otherwise profane. It is understood that parents want to appreciate, enjoy, and support those precious gifts in their infants. Damage, however, is done by the undue interference with them and the parental disrespect (Mackintosh 34-36, 121-124, 140-142, 191-192, 210). Moreover, Calvin II 8.1 contradicts himself, saying that the very things contained in the two tables are, in a manner, dictated to us by that internal law, which, as has been already said, is in a manner written and stamped on every heart. For conscience, instead of allowing us to stifle our perceptions, and sleep on without interruption, acts as an inward witness and monitor, reminds us of what we owe to God, points out the distinction between good and evil, and thereby convicts us of departure from duty. The statement seems to confirm that social behaviour is innate and the `tables are nothing other than its reflection. c) Heidegger 193 may be quoted with possibly one of the most wrong statements found in any philosophical paper; The conscience is the worrying call that emerges from our feeling homeless in this world and urges our existence to develop itself into its very proper essence. Comment: `Conscience is a far too complex, half-religious, half-psychological term as to be useful in a philosophical debate. However, in some contexts its meaning can

be considered as coming close to `responsibility, in as much as it is attributed to complete or partial autonomy (John Paul 34C / 56C). It is more or less replaceable by `responsibility in this, Heideggers, sentence. If one chooses to do so, almost every word in the sentence is completely wrong. It is suggested that he had been better to write, `Responsibility is the essential wish in humans, which results from their feeling at home in this world and makes them take their best efforts to be and act in the wisest and most dignified way, even at the cost of their personal development . In fact, Heideggers existentialistic pessimism qualifies us as pitilessly thrown into this hostile world and, to make the best of that desperate situation, we are held to develop our personal potential, becoming a perfect star in whatever capacities we are given. The latter point has been very popular in our cultures, indeed, and has led to the most irresponsible, exploitive, ostentatious, and necessarily suicidal egotism of all times, which is bound to destroy itself, humans, and the whole planet, without making people happy at all. We can only be happy by taking responsibility for everything and respecting everybody and everything. d) This unifying doctrine of responsibility, that exceeds all the moral teachings of all religions and philosophies, is able to be the practical foundation of the future World Religion, which will not be based on revelations and creeds, but on the acknowledgement and veneration of everything existing. e) The doctrine of responsibility can also be helpful in the search of qualified historical judgements. Hegel raises the question whether or not Socrates death sentence was just (Schmid 33f). He is right to blame the superficiality of the populist approach that incriminates the judges and praises Socrates heroism. Hegel offers the solution that there was a conflict of justified interests; Socrates insisted on his right to question everything and the judges felt obliged to support law and order in the city. Hegels typical way of Theses-Antithesis-Synthesis thinking, however, should be corrected by the doctrine of responsibility. It is true that there was a conflict of responsibilities. However, only the judges responsibilities were `justified (based on the laws), while Socrates responsibility was above the law and he is rightly considered a very great hero. f) In that context, numerous pieces of poetry also fail to give an adequate judgement of historical facts. For instance, R. Browning, in the last verse of `Love among the Ruins, incriminates Roman history altogether, saying, Oh heart! Oh, blood that freezes, blood that burns, earths returns for whole centuries of folly, noise, and sin! Shut them in, with their triumphs and their glory and the rest! Love is best. It is obvious that Browning feels as though Roman history was nothing other than an accumulation of slaughter, fornication, and cruelty. Such is a completely misguided judgement that denies our forebears every sense of responsibility and fails to acknowledge their heroic deeds and the cultural progress made in those times. The last line resigns itself to a self-comforting praise of love, which bears the wholly

inadequate innuendo that Christianity finally brought love in this world. One would not guess that Browning was able to read the pre-Christian writers Homer, Vergil, Ovid, Horace, or Cicero. His view coincides with the old (but still popular), biased view of the Roman Empire by Augustine CoG II, whereas even the Apostles in the Gospel could have been taught by the heroes in the Odyssey about how to honestly, respectfully, and generously communicate with both friends and strangers. In fact, those people usually behave more humanely then their gods and godesses. Augustine projected his own ruthlessness 23 and wickedness, prior to his conversion, onto the whole Roman Empire. He has done a thorough job in falsifying the history of the pre-Christian times, creating the stupid European pessimism about man, even mammals in general; to this very day, most Christians, psychlogists, and historians adhere to his foolish bias, as though they had never read the verses Odyssey XIX 328-334, Men live but for a little season; if they are hard, and deal hardly, people wish them ill so long as they are alive, and speak contemptuously of them when they are dead, but he that is righteous and deals righteously, the people tell of his praise among all lands, and many shall call him blessed." Another example of failed historiography can be found in Schopenhauer 443, where he claims that, before the formation of states, people either lived in anarchy or despotism. The truth, however, is that they lived sociably in well-organised tribes, and the state originated when people began to settle in cities for practical reasons (Mackintosh 200). g) Equally inadequate is Drewermanns otherwise ingenious `The Sixth Day when he claims that the history of human evolution was a history of reckless survival, elimination, and cruelty, and, unless Jesus had come to tell us that God was good, we would never have found out about. Both points have to be rejected, since there are countless pre-Christian testimonies declaring that God is good (ex gr Ex 20.6 / Deut 7.9 / Ps 16.2), and there was never a period in which the mammals and our forebears were less caring and loving than today. h) Drewermanns error is also a result of Darwins insufficient theory of the survival of the fittest. Those reptiles in Galapagos lived under extreme restraints and struggled for survival. Under normal conditions, however, evolution is not only a consequence of selection and survival of the fittest, but also and in the first place of the tendency towards beauty and perfection; no sooner have the conditions of life improved, than life seizes the opportunity to progress. Evolution remains inexplicable, unless one supposes that whatever happens has the tendency towards beauty and perfection (Mackintosh 178). For instance, while this author tries his best to communicate his ideas, the readers try their best to recognise the truth and the errors in what is presented, and unless both conditions are implemented, this is neither a book nor is the readers effort a lecture. i) In addition, Fromm 73 is very wrong in claiming that our forebears harboured an incestuous bond with their tribes, which abused the moral feelings of their members and permanently supported a hostile attitude towards all the other tribes.
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http://classics.mit.edu/Homer/odyssey.19.xix.html

Apart from being wrong (those men usually took their wives from other tribes), such claims slander our forebears and overestimate the quality of the present humanity. Moreover, Fromm 74 suggests that all the prominent teachers of morals have devised the order to love and the order was considered necessary, because it is very difficult to love everybody. The truth is that the Buddhist, Jewish, and Christian love are not only difficult, but impossible to perform, and history teaches that those orders were not very successful. j) In terms of slandering our forebears, there is a Christian testimony to the contrary in Rom 2.14-15, The Gentiles do not have the Law; but whenever they do by instinct what the Law commands, they are their own law, even though they do not have the Law. Their conduct shows that what the Law commands is written in their hearts. Their consciences also show that this is true, since their thoughts sometimes accuse them and sometimes defend them. (BIBLE 1249) Comment: The whole chapter wants to prove that God will also judge the gentiles, since they know the Law by instinct (). The passage even contains a hint at responsibility, since after unreasonable behaviour they feel remorseful. The creation of the Christian paradigm will be addressed in Chapter Twelve 9, p193. There will be a reference to this comment. The passage above helps to understand that it and the whole Letter was written in Rome by Roman theologians and preachers, for Paul, as a Jew, would never have thought that the Gentiles could be saved unless they converted to Judaism. This is evident from Acts 16.3, which reports that Paul circumcised Timothy. The intelligent Roman priest, who wrote this chapter, however, knew and liked so many correct heathen people that he developed the wonderful and absolutely correct teaching of this chapter. He could have correctly concluded that the Law and all the moral teachings were superfluous altogether, since the basic rules were innate. It is obvious that the Israelite Christians urged the converted gentiles to be circumcised. Why should Paul write so extensively to the Romans about the Jewish insistence on that point? This is as though a letter had been written to the black population of South Africa during the period of apartheid, explaining that the Blanks did not grant them equal rights and apartheid was unnecessary. It is suggested that all the Letters which are addressed to cities or regions were written in those places. After the Christians of Rome had developed that teaching method, other communities imitated them. Never would any person write such letters and who would ever read them? If such suggestions make sense, the history of early Christianity should be rewritten. Although they go beyond the terms of this investigation, they are of some relevance to the futuristic suggestions in Chapter Twelve, where the urgent creation of a new religious paradigm is envisaged. k) Although aetiology is asked to prove that social behaviour is innate in mammals and birds, Aristotles (II.1) contradictory way of arguing against those findings may be added in order to demonstrate how misguided and misguiding philosophers can be, From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature

do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit. The thus suggested comparisons (stone and fire) prove exactly the contrary of what the philosopher claims. If it is impossible to train a stone to fly and a fire to fall (which is correct), how could amoral infants be trained to behave socially by habit? If we were born criminals, as it is implied in the statement, neither parenting nor teaching, let alone compulsion, would be able to produce social standards. In fact, parenting is not asked to produce, but maintain and support innate social behaviour (Mackintosh 166-204). Hume I 1a is correct in stating, The rules of morality are not conclusions of our reason. As a matter of fact, identical to social behaviour, they pre-exist and influence our reasoning, however, without being rules, but endowments. Responsibility, on the other hand, is a consequence of our reasoning. The latter point was denied by Hume in the completely nonsensical claim that reason has no influence on our passions and actions actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it. If Hume were right, then Bonhoeffers resistance to Hitler would have been the consequence of a mere natural feeling which referred to an emotional ideal, possibly of justice. It is obvious that such is not the case. In fact, the responsible decisions taken in all the Five Examples are a consequence of logical thinking contrary to their natural feeling. In terms of justice, Bonhoeffer never claimed that Hitler deserved to be eliminated. In addition, the infant in Ex 1 certainly did not deserve to die for crying at the wrong moment. Otherwise, a few paragraphs later, Hume contradicts himself by stating, Reason and judgment may, indeed, be the mediate cause of an action, by prompting, or by directing a passion. In fact, Hume reduces reasoning to mathematical calculation that may be brought to an equal certainty with geometry or algebra. It would then mean that Bonhoeffers decision was indeed influenced by the number of people afflicted by Hitlers politics, but that the calculation could not be considered the very cause of action. In Ex 1, however, the number was not the decisive factor, but that there was a choice to lose either one person or the whole tribe, including the crying girl (Ex 1 COM 10). Similarly, in Ex 5, the death of the Philistine Princes ended the war. However, Samson could not be sure whether he saved more lives than he destroyed by his action. On the other hand, in Ex 4, Ulysses certainly destroyed more lives than he saved. Humes argument, therefore, does not make sense at all. Mathematical calculation, in fact, does not necessarily influence responsible decision-making (Bonhoeffer 13gC). Humes prevalent intention is to prove that there is a genuine moral feeling in humans. Since he fails to distinguish between social behaviour and responsibility, he entangles himself in a web of contradictions. Such becomes evident when he concludes that the measures of right and wrong are eternal laws, obligatory to every rational mind. If those eternal laws refer to social behaviour, they are common to all mammals (Chapter Four COM 1). If the term refers to a responsible decision-making, it is very inadequate, since the latter is neither eternal nor regulated by laws (Chapter Eight COM 1). As an example of such an eternal law, Hume suggests, Of all crimes that human creatures are capable of committing, the most horrid and unnatural is ingratitude, especially when it is committed against parents, and appears in the more flagrant instances of wounds and death. This is acknowledg'd by all mankind, philosophers as well as the people All mammals respect the lives of their species. The Ex 1, 2, 4, and 5, however, prove the suggestion invalid. Ex 1, where a father strangles his child, even contradicts Humes injunction that refers to parents.

l) The doctrine of responsibility somehow restores the thinking beings humane dignity, for it can dispense with all those indoctrinations and sophistries of thousands of moralists. It is not the philosophers task to develop moral systems. It was also unnecessary and disturbing that priests offered advice and rules how to behave. One would be better to leave that teaching to psychology. The philosophers only concern ought to be to scrutinise the truth of knowledge and answer the question of how humans can be happy. Religion, for its part, is called to offer a home to our spiritual needs, which are comprehensive and infinite. A religious service should absorb all our attention by concentrating on the sheer presence of beauty, solemnity, and totality. Those highest demands have been and will be the foundation of all high cultures, stimulating the arts to their utmost achievements (Chapter Twelve 13, p195). The sermons that manipulate our attention to focus on things outside the temple are bound to destroy what constitutes the essence of the whole exercise. For instance, it is undignified, if during a divine service people are given information of money being collected for an ideal cause, and they grab their purses like at the checkout of a supermarket. Music, nowadays, plays such a great part in our emotional and spiritual lives that no religious service is acceptable in which words are spoken by anyone; they want to be sung. No wonder, there is such a nostalgia for the Latin High Mass in the Roman Catholic Church. 24 It was Ambros of Milan, who introduced the Greek scales into the Christian services in about m1600. The Ambrosian Chant became one of their most attractive features and contributed substantially to the promulgation of the Christian paradigm. Classic music emerged from the Chant and presents the appropriate form of a liturgy that compares to the new paradigm. If only they would omit the sermons, the undignified collection of money, and the notices at the end of the service! We are here in order to be here, and we are here now, not next week. There is hope that in a future World Religion the creation of which is indispensable a liturgy will be developed according to these suggestions. Other than that, the world community will never be unified, but remain in its deplorable, dangerous, and untenable ideological segregation. It is understood that that religion cannot be based on creeds. There has never been anything to believe and nothing has ever been revealed. We still know nothing, we still have not found out a way to reconcile our religions and nations. At one stage, it seemed wise and dignified to promote beliefs. It is all the more irresponsible today. Those are things of highest priority, if we want to create a world in which we and future generations can lead fulfilled and dignified lives (Chapter Twelve 28, p206). m) Aristotle III, 1 explains that everything that is done by reason of ignorance is not voluntary; the problem concerns involuntary actions which produce pain and repentance. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary does not suffice to explain the correctness of our heroes actions. In fact, the distinction is rather a juridical than a philosophical parameter. For example, it is not precise to claim that the killing of the innocent baby (Ex 1) was involuntary. In order to explain its correctness, it is necessary to introduce the higher principle of responsibility, which indeed allows for actions that contravene both the love principle and the principle of social behaviour. It is obvious that the killing is voluntary, although it is horrible. It is understood that all the actions which are followed by bad consequences will be
24

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-religion/2090804/posts

questioned in order to avoid or minimise them in the future. Thus, the Chief will not leave the secured territory without weapons anymore (Ex 1 COM 3). n) Four Chapters, concerning `Love as a biological principle, have been omitted. Responsibility - Love Love Social Behaviour Morals Love Love Agape They are included in the Chapters Ten and Eleven. o) Bruno II 4 highlights nine impediments that hinder people in proceeding in their quest for happiness. He uses the allegory of blindness. Addressing the eighth impediment, he states, With regard to the meaning of the eighth blind man, as he has lost his sense of sight by the impact of a visible object [the sun], so has his intellect been blinded by the excellence of the intelligible object [God]. Thus it happens that he who sees Jove in his majesty loses his life, and consequently loses his sense. So does it occur that he who so gazes on high sometimes becomes overwhelmed by majesty. Besides, when he would penetrate the divine species, it pierces him like an arrow. Comment: Transferring this allegory to the doctrine of responsibility, it is true that the dimension of a worldwide responsibility exceeds all measures and, thus, makes us believe that most of us have little responsibility and need not worry about the immense ones, which are better left to the United Nations, high-ranking politicians, or the Church to deal with, since we can do nothing about them at all . This blindness, however, is the very reason why those people and institutions are helpless themselves; without our commitment to those causes, their decisions are not worth the paper they are written on. All the same, there is no guarantee that this planet can survive, even if the vast majority takes a responsible approach for their decisions. However, it is the only way to be happy, which is to say, the only wise and dignified way of life. Thus, Bruno is right in suggesting that we should not be blinded by the sheer dimension of the task (Chapter Twelve 17a, f, and g, p198). p) In terms of responsibility, there is no difference between action and non-action. Aquinas II 72.6 is right, supposing the term sin is replaced by `irresponsibility. He states, Omission and commission are found in the same spieces of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and commission do not differ specifically. q) A discussion of Hegels approach is necessary (q-w). Hegel 2a, The science of right is a part of philosophy Philosophy forms a circle. Comment: 1) The science of right is a part of jurisprudence. It cannot be a part of philosophy, since `rights do not form a circle, as it is evident from the examples given in Plato R VII 30C. 2) In addition, philosophy has only two parts, which is to say the Rational and the Practical Philosophy; the former defines the quality of our recognition, while the latter defines how we can be happy. 3) `Rights are defined by communities. 4) They have very different and opposing forms in various political unities. 5) They may all be overruled by responsibility.

The point is of some relevance in terms of this paper, because one could conclude that, since everybody wants to be loved and respected, everybody has also a right to be loved and respected, which would mean that it is our duty to offer love and respect to everybody. In other words, if `right presents a conclusive philosophical term, `duty necessarily has the same quality. Likewise, since everybody wants to live, a theory of an `absolute right might conclude that everybody has the duty to preserve everybody elses life, so that even self-defence would become incorrect. The error also concerns the published definition of Human Rights ( Bonhoeffer 18bC) and Human Responsibilities by IAC. r) Hegel 2b, takes a biased approach to legality, saying that, like philosophy, it must regard the peculiar internal development of the thing itself. Thus, the philosopher stipulates that legislation be derived from independent philosophical principles. He criticises those who define social behaviour as the foundation of legislation, saying that it is wrong to presume that the idea of right in all its aspects, is to be directly apprehended as a mere fact of consciousness, and that natural feeling or that heightened form of it, which is known as inspiration, is the source of right. This method may be the most convenient of all, but it is also the most unphilosophical. It is suggested that society has no other option than the one Hegel censures, if it wants to establish sensible laws ( Kant C 47C). It seems that Hegel wants philosophy to do better than Moses on Sinai. In addition, responsibility would overrule the most perfect and logically conceived legislation. All the same, responsibility does not create rights (Ex 1 COM 3), and innate social behaviour does not present a sufficient parameter of a valid decision-making. Hegel, however, thinks that society can develop a perfect legal system. It is the same error that parents and Aristotle seduce us into thinking that one can produce perfect children by a perfect doctrine of virtues. s) Hegel 3a also stipulates untenable principles of legislation, On the side of content this right receives a positive element [a] through the particular character of a nation, the stage of its historical development, and the interconnection of all the relations which are necessitated by nature: [b] through the necessity that a system of legalised right must contain the application of the universal conception to objects and cases whose qualities are given externally. Such an application is not the speculative thought or the development of the conception, but a subsumation made by the understanding: [c] through the ultimate nature of a decision which has become a reality. In terms of point [a], if the particular character of a nation is critical to legislation, then a Philosophy of Right is impossible. The philosopher fails to conclude so. In terms of point [b], a system of legalised right does not necessarily, but hopefully correspond to what a nation conceives as rightful. It is, however, good enough for laws to be agreed to by a nation, even if they contradict social behaviour. In terms of point [c], it is true that the established laws primarily and exclusively need the approbation of the legislative body. Legislation hopefully will be the result of responsible approaches taken by the legislator. t) Hegel 3c is partly true, but does not fit into the philosophers own system; A phase of right may be shown to rest upon and follow from the circumstances and existing institutions of right, and yet may be absolutely unreasonable and void of right. The term right is used in two senses, as `valid body of laws and `social behaviour. The philosopher alludes to the Roman law that allowed the head of family to

sentence his children to death. The parameter that possibly qualifies that law as absolutely unreasonable can only be social behaviour. u) It is difficult to accommodate statements like Hegel 4b, the system of right is the kingdom of actualised freedom. A system of right necessarily constitutes a codex of written and unwritten laws. Laws are meant to provide security to larger communities. They hopefully compare with social behaviour and they restrict freedom. Such is also the case for laws that apparently define permissions. For instance, in several countries people are allowed to walk through farmland in winter as they please. Since all the land is owned by someone, the law restricts the owners usual right to decide who is permitted to enter his property and who is not. The mentioned `usual right, for its part, is a restriction which forbids trespass. The law which apparently allows something only restricts the trespass laws. The philosopher seems to roam in an idealistic no-mans-land a land everybody is free to move where he pleases at any time of the year. v) In terms of Hegels quest for a perfect system of right, it is to notify that the doctrine of responsibility does not account for a perfect system. First, our wisdom is limited, since it is impossible to foresee with certainty the complete series of consequences. Secondly, our dignity is fragile, in so far as it might be tampered with by hidden motives of vanity and ambition. Thirdly, responsibilities of different levels may accidentally interfere with one another (Ex 1 COM 10-11). The same restrictions apply to the theory of respect. It is impossible to acquire an adequate idea of all the perfections that constitute the essence of objects, let alone living beings. w) Hegels assumption that a generally valid system of rights can be defined is questioned by Rousseaus I 5 statement, The law of majority voting is itself something established by convention, and presupposes unanimity, on one occasion at least. As a matter of fact, it is not provable that the majority has the right to rule the minority, so that even the most fundamental principle of democracy is arbitrary. Moreover, even the unanimous decision by whatever body may be ignored by responsibly acting people. x) Schopenhauers 454 presentation of an eternal justice cannot be agreed with, either. If we could lay all the misery of the world in one scale of the balance, and all the guilt of the world in the other, the needle would certainly point to the centre. One would presume that animals cannot become guilty, but they suffer all the same. Thus, responsible people will try and help them, which would not be `just if their suffering compared with eternal justice (Chapter Twelve 7, p192). Schopenhauer 457 pushes the absurd idea further, The inflicter of suffering and the sufferer are one. The former errs in that he believes he is not a partaker in the suffering; the latter, in that he believes he is not a partaker in the guilt. y) The American Communitarism, developed by Rawls in the m20s, makes an unnecessary effort to reconcile the individual with the community. Nickl 80 explains, The state withdraws as much as possible. The individual feels like a member of a limited community that cannot prosper unless people are able to overcome their egotism and agree to being altruistic. Social behaviour makes for an essential part of our mammalian existence. The legendary egotism that results in a-social or criminal behaviour is a disease produced by inadequate parenting (Mackintosh 237). On the other hand, it is true that our reflexes relate to a limited community and states are not able to replace them.

Those limited communities, unfortunately, do not exist yet, but could be developed as artificial tribes in a future World Culture (Chapter Twelve 22, p203 / Mackintosh 199-201, 265-276), involving a complete transformation of society. y) Nickl 85, Responsibility is in need of an authority that is entitled to judge our actions. It seems that each word in this statement is wrong. It should be corrected as follows, `Responsibility needs a logically thinking being that wants to act according to its maturity and dignity. z) Nickl 86, The conservation of the planet and the preservation of the godlike quality of man can only be asked for, if one accepts the existence of a Creator outside the universe. The presumed godlike quality of man never stands the test of reality; our challenge is to live as mammals, which, however, is the highest level of existence in the universe. In terms of the conservation of the planet, one cannot find in any theology, let alone revelatory scripture of old, a clear reference to the topic, because this is a very new aspect of responsibility. Unless we want to do that in order to be happy, no authority or idea of a Creator can help our case. Moreover, the idea of a Creator is often used as an excuse to exploit the planet (Gn 1.26), because, if there were such a Creator, he could replace this planet after we have destroyed it. All the same, without the support of a future World Religion, we will not succeed in saving it (Chapter Twelve 29, p206). aa) The problem of the suicide terrorism should be addressed, since the doctrine of responsibility could be abused to justify it. In several respects, suicide terrorism compares with it; if it is presumed that those terrorists act for the sake of their creeds and ideals, one cannot deny them the quality of heroism. Moreover, in Calvin III 19.4bC, it is stated that Samson (Ex 5) did not know whether or not innocent people would be killed by his action. Likewise, pilots who drop bombs and soldiers who fight ignore the question of whether the enemies deserve to die and how many civilians will lose their lives. It is obvious that responsibility will act in such a way only if the war is defensive. The suicide bomber who kills innocent people, however, is aggressive. In the situation, he or she might choose to kill themselves in a public protest, which would be also much more effective, because the killing of innocent people is sure to provoke horror and a fiercer resistance. For instance, the Buddhist monks who burnt themselves in Saigon 25 and the student, Jan Zajic, who shot himself in Prague in protest against the Russian invasion in 1969, were eventually vindicated.26 bb) Bahro R 159 is critical of modern applied technologies, which have developed into machines of global destruction and do not integrate into a humaine, manageable, adaptable, and truly social context anymore. Responsibility would have all those technologies being sustainable and reversible ( Nickl 89).

25

http://www.vietnampix.com/fire1.htm
26

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Zaj%C3%ADc

cc) Nietzsche, in `The Gay Science, indirectly confirms that social behaviour is innate, however does not acknowledge it as a great gift, Morality is the herd-instinct in the individual. (COLLINS p. 662) dd) In numerous Christian prayer books one can find the following prayer, which is presented as among the best, God, give me the will to change the things I can change, and to accept the ones I cannot change. And give me the wisdom to discern between the two. This is asking God to make sure that I never fail, whereas responsible effort takes the risk of being unsuccessful. Bonhoeffers resistance made sense, although he did not succeed. Such sophisticated prayers ask for being delivered from our responsibility, putting someone else in charge. ee) Love and responsibility differ in terms of their permanence. The myth of Amphitryon teaches that love is replaceable, whereas responsibility remains constant; we remain the parents of our children as long as we live, although they might not love us and we might be unable to love them. In addition, responsibility would be extended to our grandchildren by the demise of our children. It would be unwise and undignified to neglect our grandchildren, while continuing to love our dead children (Chapter One 6fC, p6). It is also disturbing to listen to widowers and widows who remain in love with their deceased spouses. Experience teaches that any mourning which lasts more than six months is the result of feelings of guilt in the mourner; such happens with widowers who used to cheat their wives, as though they wanted to make up for lost time by their faithful mourning. Nowadays the number of divorces and remarriages also give dreadful evidence of the replaceability of love. ff) The following Chapters proceed by discerning the above defined philosophical terms. By using the logical square, it is possible to precisely locate the points of view in question. It also allows the attribution of unequivocal positions to the critisised teachings of other theories. It is understood that the upper terms are considered as contrary, the lower terms as subcontrary, and the diagonal terms as contradictory. For example, the following Chapter defines `Social Behaviour and `Morals as totally opposed. The qualities `innate and `taught are subcontraries which do not totally exclude one another (some teachings might correspond with innate capacities). To `teach and `Social Behaviour are considered contradictory, in that it is neither possible nor useful to teach Social Behaviour, nor has `Social Behaviour ever needed to be taught. Vice versa, `Morals are by no means an `innate quality of humans and they define themselves as exceeding all `innate qualities. Those distinctions are a consequence of the above definitions.

Chapter Four: Social Behaviour and Morals

Social Behaviour Morals

Innate

Taught

COMMENT: 1) It seems that neither philosophies nor psychologies have to date developed the teaching that Social Behaviour is innate in mammals, although the fact is in aetiological evidence.27 Such failure has occurred because of those researchers experiences in terms of bad parenting, that was full of disrespectful corrections, admonitions, and rebukes. The result was a certain neurotic greediness, which they decide to define as their natural and innate defect, whereas it is the result of unnatural distortions, inflicted on them in the course of their upbringing and education. Criminality (which is very inadequately handled by laws and punishments) is a psychogenic disease that does not occur in animals, although sometimes there are behavioural distortions that result from external or organic defects. All these matters are to be dealt with in parentology (Mackintosh). 2) Since social behaviour is innate, most of the traditional moral theories represent compilations of truisms, in that they force open doors. In fact, they derive from logical principles about how humans are supposed to behave. Such is just as impossible and unnecessary as it would be to define, by way of logical deduction, that humans must have two legs. Thus, the philosophies of morals are as useless as a philosophy of bipedalism would be. Furthermore, what has been praised as the Golden Rule (Tob 4.15) corresponds to the natural endowment of healthy mammals, since they all depend on communities which cannot function otherwise. It has already been pointed out (Chapter One 3) that aetiology has failed to promulgate these findings. Moreover, the author has always felt annoyed by the foolish comments in documentaries about animals, whenever animals were described as ruthless and cruel while hunting; hunting is their way of doing business. One cannot unite humanity by promoting a World Ethos as proposed by Kng28 (Chapter Twelve 21-22, p201). Those rules present trivialities people have been familiar with for hundred thousands of years. One could just as well look for a general agreement that humans should usually walk forward or breathe through their noses (Calvin I 17.1C). 3) One can agree with G. E. Moore (m127-42) that goodness is intuitively known by humans (Schmid 141), although all mammals are supposed to have the gift of social behaviour. This intuition and social behaviour, however, is controlled by responsibility, which possibly, not certainly, is proper to humans. A. J. Ayer (m 90-m11) positions goodness into natural feelings exclusively, denying Moores intuitive knowledge (Schmid 142). The philosopher is right, since infants smile at their mothers and friendly people without knowing that it is good to do so. R. M. Hare (m81-2) suggests that goodness is not definable, but is the usually chosen way of living by most people ( Schmid 143). Such is certainly the case. However, the distinction between social behaviour and responsibility defines both goodness and common human behaviour. One cannot agree with J. Searle (m68-), who claims that no objective definition of goodness is available, but it to be the result of culture and social communities. This

27

http://www.csus.edu/indiv/L/lancasterw/bio168/Lecture%20notes/Lec10%20BIO168-05.htmh
28

http://www.weltethos.org/

would mean a return to Freuds theory of the Super-Ego, which is insufficient (Mackintosh 10, 17, 71, 74, 88, 121). 4) Moralists under the matrix of `virtues would still pretend that their teaching reaches a higher level of behavioural conduct than animals would ever be able to achieve. Such inappropriate tendencies have to be addressed and unmasked. In addition, moralists who define those virtues and social behaviour to be duties need correcting. 5) Hobbes I 4a is completely mistaken when he praises `speech to be the origin of social behaviour. He states that without conversation there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The philosopher certainly had never realised the affectionate relationships between those animals. Equally untrue is Hobbes I 11b, So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination a restlesse desire of Power, in all men of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. Some 250 years after Hobbes, Freud will claim his equally wrong pleasure principle. 29 No wonder, morals or the Superego was needed to explain how social behaviour was able to develop in humans. The question would then be where those morals and the Super-Ego might have emerged from. 6) What is correctly called `innate social behaviour may be compared with the classic Christian theory of `natural law. Aquinas II 91.2 and 94.4, however, erroneously explains its existence by the human capacity of reason. Mammals obviously do not exhibit social behaviour on account of reasoning, but by instinct, and social behaviour is not a law. The philosophers argument reads, the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law. Reason hopefully results in responsible behaviour, which differs from social behaviour and may outmanoeuvre both the natural and eternal law, if one chooses to distinguish between the two. There is only one kind of law, which is to say, human law. It consists of obligations that communities impose on themselves and their members and whose violation will be sanctioned. The Five Examples give evidence of the fact that responsibility may not abide by them, either. Some controversial judicial questions involved are discussed in Plato R VII 30C (below) and John Paul 34bC. 7) Laotses 18th maxim seems to prefigure this chapters teaching, which clarifies the difference between social behaviour and morals, a) The great Dau was lost thence did goodness and righteousness arise b) Man grew smart thus did the great flattery arise c) The kin was torn
29

C. G. Boeree, Sigmund Freud

http://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/freud.html, The Id, The Ego, and the Superego

whence the paradigm of the family arose d) The state decayed through rioting then the stubborn administration developed ( Bahro R 102). To a), the great Dau presents innate social behaviour, which, according to Laotse, was lost and replaced by morals. This is not a correct picture of the history of morals. First, social behaviour still exists. Secondly, morals could only develop, after humans started to feel guilty (Mackintosh 69). Nevertheless, Laotse is right in terms of the artificial nature of morals and their recent origin. To b), animals flatter, too. Flattery is a consequence of fear rather than intelligence. Nevertheless, humans use means of deception unknown in the animal kingdom. To c), this is a very important point that will be dealt with in Mackintosh 265-287. The issue is also hinted at in Chapter Twelve 22, p201. To d), whatever is organised needs some kind of administration, which, however, should be handled responsibly rather than stubbornly. Laotse is correct in blaming overblown administration and the condescending attitude of some officers. Similar to the Frankfurt School ( Bonhoeffer 10C 2), Laotse disagrees with specific developments in history and longs for the idealised past. Finally, the doctrine of responsibility agrees with Laotses criticism of morals; the foundation of responsibility, however, is logical thinking rather than the Dau, the kin, or the state.

Topic History and Comments Plato R VII 30, when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to their consummation; the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also; making philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty; and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there; and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and honour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demi-gods, but if not, as in any case blessed and divine. Comment: It is true that the persons who are given political power do have corresponding `duties. However, they may or may not include or lead to `heroic action and, secondly, are never absolutely binding, but may be overruled by responsibility. For instance, the officers who were sentenced in Nuremberg had certainly fulfilled their political duties. The Judges, however, all of a sudden applied the legally irrelevant, indefinable parameter of `responsibility. 30 The Italian Judges, in the trial against Herbert Kappler and the five German soldiers who had to shoot the 335 hostages in m56 were much more correct; they there was a storm of protest from the relatives acquitted the soldiers and Kappler was sentenced only for the
30

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg_Trials

killing of the ten added hostages he had not been directly ordered to execute, which, however, was rather a political and artificial than a judicial decision. 31 On the other hand, it is not true that only elderly people want to take responsibility. The vast majority of young parents want to do their best in looking after their children. Nevertheless, it is convenient for the elderly to proceed in their wisdom and be ahead of the young in terms of taking responsibility. In terms of the post-mortem glorification of those successful philosopher rulers, it seems inappropriate, since there is nothing `heroic in their activity, but simply `a matter of duty. Moreover, every heroic responsible decision definitely merits to be honoured during the respective heroes lifetimes. As a negative example, the Swiss police Commander, Paul Grninger, who had illegally saved the lives of 3,600 Jews lost his position and was handed out a substantial fine, and was only illegally acquitted twenty-three years after his death. 32 The three legal cases mentioned demonstrate that no judicial system will ever be adequate in handling our decisionmaking. John Paul 34bC explains in what way the judges could have avoided that miscarriage of justice. (It was not formally a miscarriage of justice, but the case exceeded the competence of any formal justice.) Responsibility is autonomous and may overrule and violate all the social and legal regulations. In a positive sense, responsibility will overrule them by possibly going far beyond the legal and social demands. There is no law that orders the donation of ones spare money or to consequently preserve natural resources, nor to avoid the exploitation of animals, nor to care for the transformation of society or the overcoming of religious creeds. The only effort that is striving for all these things is responsibility, for it presents the only wise and dignified way of existence to a logically thinking being. In that sense, those who are responsible can dispose of acknowledgement and approval. The retarded political acknowledgement of those heroes for instance, the monument honouring Giordano Bruno, who died at the stake (Chapter Twelve 21, p201) cannot make up for lost time and fails to teach people that they would be better to take political responsibility for the urgent problems of their own era. Plato, however, liked to have both looking modest during ones lifetime (whereas responsible people may not always look modest) and being honoured after death (which can only be an aspiration of fools). Aristotle I.7 asks what the very purpose of life is. He suggests as follows, we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete. But we must add `in a complete life. For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy. Comment: It is impossible to apply the logical parameter of `purpose (which includes the parameter of cause and effect) to `life, `the universe, or `existence. Those terms transcend in their universality the distinction between `purpose and `being. For instance, if the universe had a purpose, the purpose would be something outside
31

G. Gerosa, Il Caso Kapler, Sonzogno Milano, 1977

32

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Gr%C3%BCninger

or other than the universe, which does not make sense at all. And if, indeed, there was something outside the universe, we could not find a position from which we could discern between the two, and that imaginary position would then be something outside of both of them. Our way of logical thinking imposes a structure of causeand-effect on certain series of experiences, but we cannot have the certainty that reality functions in that way. Even less does it make sense to impose that structure of cause and effect on the total of possible existences. Therefore, the question whether `life or `man has a purpose is pointless. The question is also dangerous, since every answer to it is available and, indeed, given. The Nazis, for instance, answered that all people were there to serve their purposes. Even philosopher Heidegger agreed with them.33 Another example is given in point 4), below. Aristotle suggests that we are here to become paragons of virtue. He skilfully uses the parameters of the creation of a work of art. It is helpful to thoroughly scrutinise and refute this argument. 1) It is true that a work of art strives to be as beautiful and perfect as possible. It is also true that a work of art takes time and effort to be created. However, the transfer of these principles to what our life is all about is perfectly arbitrary and inconclusive. For instance, Aristotle claims that boys cannot be happy, since they lack several virtues. Such is an absurd rejudice based on that arbitrary parameter. One could perhaps presume that a block of stone cannot be considered perfect before it is carved (which is an arbitrary presumption, too). However, it can be taken for granted that there are a thousand times more happy boys in the world than happy philosophers. It is helpful to scrutinise those philosophers untenabe rejudices. They give evidence of their less obvious prejudices. 2) Even if the parameter of the arts were applicable, it would not be possible to derive from it the principles of our decision-making ( Aquinas II 71.3C). 3) Despite Aristotles socratic precision, his argument does not carry any more evidence than the following persiflage that intends to prove that the purpose of religion consists in the creation and perfection of shrines and churches. It is true that the shrines are the most spectacular, wonderful, and precious consequences of the city religions. It is also true that it takes a long time and the greatest architectural effort to erect them. All the same, the shrines are not the purpose of city religions. The purpose of religion is to embrace the spiritual needs of logically thinking and notion-forming beings. The fact that city religions use the most admirable buildings cannot prove that we undergo, let alone ought to undergo, a development towards behavioural perfection and, as a consequence of this, it would be necessary to conclude that perfection itself is the very purpose of our existence. Whether or not great people grow into a benign old age, popularity, and tolerance is irrelevant, and those are great who take responsibility, even if they remain stubborn, irascible, and intolerant up to the time of their death. Indeed, Nietzsche was very right to feel disgusted at all those moralistic approaches to what life is all about. It is most deplorable, however, that he dropped himself into the hell of sheer negativity and failed to develop a valid doctrine of responsibility ( Bonhoeffer 21aC). 4) By Aristotles way of arguing, one could also prove that the purpose of everybodys life is to write a book, to find out everything about ones ancestry, or to plant a thousand trees, or all the three of them.
33

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Heidegger#Nationalsozialismus

5) What is deemed `perfection of character is, in fact, an extreme and questionable form of social behaviour. Such an extreme form is neither necessary nor to be recommended. It is completely irrelevant whether or not the heroes of the Five Examples were generous, or friendly, or reliable. In that context, a frivolous, although very substantiated, saying comes to mind, Saints are people who strive for perfection, and martyrs are those who live around them. 6) We are all disabled in many ways. The author is aware of his incapacity to write in a way that does not hurt so many readers feelings. However, it would not make sense for him to strive to overcome this handicap in order to eliminate the unnecessary aggressiveness. In fact, he is perfectly aware of the fact that people are not guilty of whatever they fail. The handicap is caused by his somewhat childish fear of the aggressiveness of successful, yet misguided, preachers, moralists, and psychologists. Unfortunately, he always feels himself being in a defensive position. The decisive factor in all that seems to be the determination to proceed in ones aims despite all ones shortcomings. Aristotle II.9 suggests that our inclination to specific extremes ought to be overcome. We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for we shall get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent. Comment: It is suggested that the example of the `bent sticks be used in the opposite sense, to illustrate a responsible, not a moralistic, approach to our shortcomings. Rather than trying to straighten them, one wants to recognise, accept them, and use them as such. Consequently, our decisions will wisely take into account our shortcomings, so as not to venture into things that are unsustainable. For instance, the Germans who plotted against Hitler were overrating their own shrewdness, when they thought of a method to achieve both the elimination of Hitler and the escape of the one who was supposed to execute the attempt. Their failure teaches that nobody is so clever. In that sense, we cannot straighten our intelligence, but are better to adjust to its limits. To make things clear, in order to eliminate a dictator, one has to put everything on the line, for a failed attempt is bound to strengthen his position (Bonhoeffer 15bC / Chapter Three 17, p45). Aristotle III.1a deals with the difference between voluntary and involuntary actions. He claims that involuntary actions cannot be blamed. Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take place under compulsion or owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or is feeling the passion, e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him in their power. But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (e.g. if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one's parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Comment: It is a very popular mistake to excuse our and other peoples involuntary failures. Socrates already was aware of that involuntary failures may be worse than voluntary ones, because the latter are easy to correct, while the former can possibly never be corrected. The judicial and common sense distinction between voluntary and involuntary failures was already correctly and ingeniously rebuked in Platos

`Hippias Minor 14-19.34 A very late and also ingenious confirmation of Socrates findings was found in the discovery of the `Freudian Slip. 35 Aristotle however, applies the method of common sense, so as to excuse involuntary failures. As well as this, jurisdiction also is unable to value and question the excuses based on involuntariness. Indeed, the involuntary neurotic habits of people are much more troublesome than what they fail on purpose. If they have been taught to apologise, their constant apologies are bound to make things worse. To forgive oneself or others is not a wise and dignified action. It is wise and dignified either to rebuke those involuntary actions or understand that the person in question would have done better if he had been able to. Our jurisdiction, however, largely depends on the artificial distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions. This is not a responsible approach to the problem. The Freudian Slip informs the wise that they ought to pay attention to neurotic reactions they did not know before. Then, they want to get rid of the disease. Whenever the author bangs his head, drops a book, breaks a glass he wants to find out what he just has been thinking about and decides never to think in that way again. It makes things much better for everybody. Thus, the popular judicial approach to what is fair and dignified in our activities is perverted by wrong parenting and teaching. Such a judicial approach makes parenting a nightmare for everybody; the excuse, `I didnt do it on purpose, would be better to be replaced by, `Thats a shame. I should have been aware of that. In this context, one also deplores that God was ever given the attribute of a `Judge (HERDER IV 727-737). Furthermore, the brackets in Aristotles text give an example of an excusable mistake. It implies that parents should possibly be pardoned if they followed the illicit demands of their childrens abductors. Such is not a responsible approach to the dilemma in question. It is, indeed, both unwise and undignified. It is foolish to give in to any demands of abductors, unless one makes sure that one will both catch them and save the children. Thus, Aristotles example gives further evidence of the untenable judicial approach to the qualification of actions. Aristotle III.1b seems to make a total mess of what could have become a valid teaching of responsibility It is difficult sometimes to determine what should be chosen at what cost, and what should be endured in return for what gain, and yet more difficult to abide by our decisions; for as a rule what is expected is painful, and what we are forced to do is base, whence praise and blame are bestowed on those who have been compelled or have not. Comment: The first sentence is very true in terms of a responsible decision-making. The second, however, is both irrelevant and untrue. First, it is, by definition, irrelevant whether or not a responsible decision earns acknowledgement from others. It was possibly Aristotles main handicap in terms of practical philosophy that he was focussing too much on what it takes to be popular among ones fellow citizens. The responsible one ignores whether or not his decisions will be applauded. Secondly,
34

http://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/greek-texts/ancient-greece/plato/plato-hippiasminor.asp? pg=19
35

http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Freud/Psycho/

none of our heroes in the Five Examples were neither `compelled nor obliged to do what they did and they are very much and derservedly `praised as great heroes. Aristotle III.5 The end, then, being what we wish for, the means what we deliberate about and choose, actions concerning means must be according to choice and voluntary. Now the exercise of the virtues is concerned with means. Therefore virtue also is in our own power, and so too vice. For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa; so that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will be base, will also be in our power, and if not to act, where this is noble, is in our power, to act, which will be base, will also be in our power. Now if it is in our power to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this was what being good or bad meant, then it is in our power to be virtuous or vicious. Comment: The classical virtues are not chosen, but represent endowments. There are people who adapt easily to what is considered an agreeable conduct. They are the ones whose original gift of social behaviour has not been damaged by negative parenting. They are rare, so that humans developed laws, controls, and punishments. In terms of responsibility, however, those virtues are only relevant in the sense that one avoids violating them whenever possible. Furthermore, in the next but one paragraph, Aristotle puts his theory of virtues on a par with legislation. That legislation, unless it is illicit and arbitrary, indeed follows some basic parameters of social behaviour with the exception that modern legislation tolerates adultery, which accounts for an extremely disturbing action opposite to social behaviour. Aristotle says, Witness seems to be borne to this both by individuals in their private capacity and by legislators themselves; for these punish and take vengeance on those who do wicked acts All the same, social behaviour, virtues, and legislation may be overruled by responsibility. Lastly, Aristotles theory of virtues almost coincides with the Christian love principle and also with what, unfortunately, in Christian societies has become the most popular approach to a correct human conduct. The poor Swiss farmer and cotton weaver, Ulrich Brker (m265-202), a writer of Augustines level, confesses in his extraordinary autobiography that, In order not to be disturbed by the many conundrums of my life, I take greater care than ever to behave in a way that my conscience do not object, nothing be omitted by my fault and my conduct towards everybody, principally the loved ones, be such that not a soul should rightly hold a thing before me. So, for instance, I would, in all my doings, rather be taken advantage of than take advantage of the others myself, and so make all the others like to deal with me. 36 The statement reveals that the author, towards the end of his life, regresses to the somewhat helpless, insufficient, and undignified theory of Aristotelian and Christian provenance. The responsible always put the question whether or not their decisions are welcomed by others in a secondary position, and they do not tolerate being taken advantage of. As a young man, the author wondered why the majority of people were so conformist and eager to please; he felt that they behaved in a way which they were hoping to be praised in their eulogy.
36

U. Brker, Lebensgeschichte und Natrliche Ebentheuer des Armen Mannes im Tockenburg, Birkhuser, Basel Stuttgart, 1974, 221f

Aristotle III.7 The coward, the rash man, and the brave man, then, are concerned with the same objects but are differently disposed towards them; for the first two exceed and fall short, while the third holds the middle, which is the right, position. Comment: That courage holds the middle between temerity and cowardice is an arbitrary definition. It is as though `living in houses could be defined as the middle between `living in tents and `living in palaces. One could just as well define it as the middle between `living in trees and `living in temples. We want to make responsible decisions, and they always are in the middle of nowhere. Is `killing Hitler (Ex 2) the middle between `capturing and torturing him to death and `making him President of the World? Is `looking after our childrens safety the middle between `holding them in cages and `ordering them to sleep on railway sleepers? Is `asking for half the price the middle between `asking the full price and `paying the buyer? Is `writing the Nicomachian Ethics the middle between `erecting a moralistic dictatorship and `encouraging people to harm each other? In fact, the theory of the virtues middle position is nothing other than the divinisation of social behaviour, in that, unduly, it is accredited absolute correctness, whereas it always will be controlled by responsibility. Aristotles definition of the virtues middle position follows the same principle according to which most publishers of world maps position their home continent in the centre. The Five Examples demonstrate that all responsible decisions can be defined as extremes or as moderate. That parameter is neither helpful nor relevant. It feigns mathematical precision and geometrical evidence. This criticism is relevant for Aristotles theory of virtues altogether. Shaftesbury 113 calls the method a scheme of moral arithmetic. Aristotle III.8 (3) Passion also is sometimes reckoned as courage; those who act from passion, like wild beasts rushing at those who have wounded them, are thought to be brave, they are not brave because, driven by pain and passion, they rush on danger without foreseeing any of the perils, Comment: First, it does not make sense to belittle the lioness brave defence of her cubs or the bulls selfless protection of his herd. (The bull in Spanish bull fights acts in defence of his herd; before entering the showground, the bull passes a group of cows and calves which he feels threatened by the matador, and the spectators admire the bulls courage in the first place.) Secondly, the difference between mammalian and human courage, however, lies in foreseeing, which is an essential element of responsibility. The paragraph comes close to the subject of responsibility. Aristotle III.8 (4) Nor are sanguine people brave; (Drunken men also behave in this way; they become sanguine). Comment: All the same, those are the warriors who receive medals of honour. The example of the `drunken men also disproves that courage itself deserves approbation beyond question. Aristotle III.10 a certain gourmand prayed that his throat might become longer than a crane's, implying that it was the contact that he took pleasure in. Thus the sense with which self-indulgence is connected is the most widely shared of the senses; and self-indulgence would seem to be justly a matter of reproach, because it attaches to us not as men but as animals. To delight in such things, then, and to love them above all others, is brutish.

Comment: A gourmand who eats too much, spends too much money on food, or deprives by his excess others of the necessary food, acts irresponsibly. His fault, however, is nothing to do with animal behaviour. In addition, animals in the wild do not feed excessively. Thus, the term `brutish is inappropriate, too. In fact, Aristotle aims to intimate that virtuous humans are superior to animals and wicked ones like animals. Aristotle III.11 in the natural appetites few go wrong, and only in one direction, that of excess. Comment: Unfortunately, the philosopher is very wrong. Millions of people eat too little in order to look attractive. Most people drink too little, damaging their health. Countless people are too choosy and prefer starving to eating simple and less tasty foods. Countless humans fail to eat the food that supports their health, if they dislike its taste. That is all unwise and undignified behaviour. Aristotle IV.2a The magnanimous man is like an artist; for he can see what is fitting and spend large sums tastefully. Comment: The philosophers praise of the generous rich man who donates large sums for respectable causes does not present correct advice of how to deal with ones riches. Wisdom and dignity will make us live in the most unpretentious way and donate all our spare money to the ones who need it. Other than that, it is not possible to have a large income and be happy ( Aristotle IV.1bC). It is understood that the term `spare money excludes the sums needed to maintain and develop the sustainable enterprises that provide goods and work for oneself and others. Magnificence, in fact, is not a quality that befits single persons who have hoarded riches. Hoarding riches even falls short of the standard of social behaviour in the first place. Other mammals do not hoard provisions. If they did, the whole system of survival would collapse. Children also want to share their affluence with others. It is the communitys job to invest its spare money in great religious and cultural undertakings. The large sums donated by persons or firms consolidate their privileged positions and save them more in taxes than they spend on the donation. This leads to the ominous taxation and plunder of the middle classes. Therefore, Aristotles fulsome praise of that system is questionable. Aristotle IV.5 The man who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised. This will be the good-tempered man, then, since good temper is praised. For the good-tempered man tends to be unperturbed and not to be led by passion, but to be angry in the manner, at the things, and for the length of time, that the rule dictates; but he is thought to err rather in the direction of deficiency; for the good-tempered man is not revengeful, but rather tends to make allowances. Comment: This semi-psychological analysis of `anger seems incomplete. Anger results from fear. If that fear concerns a relevant cause, anger is a powerful means that enables the individuals to muster all their strength of resistance. All the same, angry persons are better to wonder about what exactly they are afraid of and adjust their emotions to the relevance of the cause. Other than that, anger is a handicap. If confronted with angry reactions, the wise, in the first place, want to appreciate which fear has caused them. In ever so many cases, those fears can then be dissipated. Answering anger with anger because one often is afraid of the angry opponent will lead to an escalation that is likely to develop into a lasting feud. Disrespectful

anger is unwise and undignified at any rate. In order to avoid aggressiveness, we would be better to inform the opponent straight away about what we are afraid of. Hobbes I 6b, erroneously too, compares anger with sudden courage. The important question, however, is whether anger is a vice. In fact, the Roman Catechism37 quotes from Gal 5.19-21, which offers the following list of vices; fornication, impurity, licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, jealousy, anger, selfishness, dissension, factions, envy, drunkenness, carousing, and the like. While most of the mentioned behaviours can be considered antisocial, neither `strife nor `anger and `factions are necessarily antisocial or irresponsible. The list seems to favour obedience, submission, and conformity. It also aims to demonstrate that humans have higher standards of conduct than animals, which is absolutely untrue. In terms of anger, Aristotles approach, which acknowledges justified anger and blames vengefulness, offers better advice, indeed. Augustine (m1646-1570), on his part, completely neglects the idea that social behaviour is innate. He presumes that the feelings of omnipotence, produced by the trespassing of the commandments, are so attractive that we would be unable to resist them, unless God, by an act of grace and forgiveness, supported us. He explains that our innate wickedness was the result of the original sin (Rom 5.12). Moreover, the trespasses would sympathetically connect us with our fellows ( Schmid 60-63). By his conversion, he became a citizen of the City of God (Civitas Dei), whereas, prior to that he used to be a townsman of the city of the earth and the devil (Schmid 70), which is to say, the Roman Empire. Comment: Augustines relationship to God seems to mirror his relationship to his mother. The complexes of anal, Oedipal, and puberty-related provenance are manifest. What he thinks to be the result of the original sin was obviously created by distortions of his innate social capacities by his too loving and too concerned mother in his early childhood, which led to a long term puberty. His conversion to Christianity was then a typical regression, a mere abandonment of his justified resistance to his mothers well-intentioned, yet overpowering dominance. It was not a real healing of the syndrome, for God and the Church became his mother. He then concluded that whatever God and the Church commanded was undeniable and should be imposed on all people. Other than that, he would not have become an extremely cruel persecutor of the Donatists (Deschner 562ff). Aquinas (m775-736) II 94.1 refuses to concede that natural law to be a habit. Comment: In terms of this doctrine of responsibility, the term `natural law can only make sense, if it means the same thing as `the innate social behaviour, which is a habit. The philosopher gives a very disturbing reason for his denial by saying, it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by it. One would not think that this unrealistic medieval view compares with the most modern approaches by Habermas and the Kohlberg School. They also claim that infants are unable to act sociably and that the mere existence of boundless criminality which compares with the damned is the result of the former handicap. Both claims are unacceptable ( Mandeville C). Cusanus (m599-536) correctly notices that the gifts and characters of people have different qualities. The ones that have difficulty in adjusting to a qualified behaviour

37

http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a8.htm#III

are invited to take a different approach to the challenges of social life in that they acknowledge their shortcomings and try to correct them ( Thurner D 206-210). Comment: It is true that gifts in people differ. However, shortcomings in social behaviour, unless caused by cerebral handicaps, are the result of wrong parenting and need psychological treatment, while Cusanus thinks that they can be outsmarted by a special cleverness. However, the teaching compares with a responsible approach to ones weaknesses. In fact, responsibility will take them into account and take appropriate measures to minimise their impact. Nevertheless, Cusanus approach aims at teaching people how they might become perfect and, thus, represents a moral, as though innate social behaviour was not good enough for humans. The latter is, however, true, because it will be controlled by responsibility, rather than `outsmarted by cleverness. Hobbes (m412-321) is concerned about whether humans are naturally good or bad. He concludes that they are bad and need controlling by society ( Schmid 72). Comment: How can a society whose members are wicked from birth ever establish a positive and sensible legislation? The Freudian pleasure principle and superego theory seems to labour under the same error. Its most regrettable influence is the one it has had on parenting. Hobbes ignores the fact that social behaviour is innate in all mammals. Moreover, Hobbes suggests that the instinct for survival, power, and profit leads to the establishment of law and order. The State, therefore, acquires the absolute monopoly of power. It substitutes God and becomes itself a Mortal God whose orders ought never to be questioned by the individual ( Schmid 73). Whatever the State commands is good. The conscience of the individual is secondary ( Schmid 74). Comment: The canis-a-non-canendo argument which stipulates that the latin word for `dog (`canis) was given because the dog cannot sing (`canere) is unacceptable. There can be no doubt that `the instinct for survival, power, and profit would never produce law and order, but sheer chaos and war. In addition, if the term `conscience somehow coincides with the term `responsibility, it is not secondary to the law, but has first priority and superiority. The Five Examples clearly prove so. All the same, Hobbes could argue that, for instance, modern traffic regulations were not innate, but established by the human faculty to think logically, while people naturally would prefer to drive how and where they please. It would mean that people, in terms of driving, are indeed `bad by nature. Traffic control would then be the result of both our instinct of survival and reasoning. It is not easy to unmask such very popular philosophical shortcuts. However, unless the `instinct for survival, power, and profit was corrected by the innate social behaviour, people would never have been able to produce reasonable traffic regulations. They would have decided to drive armed cars and enjoyed the opportunity to kill as many other people as possible in order to satisfy their aggressive instinct and increase their power. Traffic regulations, therefore, are the result of innate social behaviour we want to help rather than injure others and responsibility one wants to avoid the dreadful consequences of accidents. However, in a case of emergency, even traffic regulations may be deprived of effect. Hobbes confusion of parameters is the result of a point of view which has not been addressed in this paper as yet; if our basic instincts were indeed aggressive (they are social, although defensive), logical thinking in itself would not lead to the reduction, but sophistication of them, as it is exhibited in the sheer criminal mind that tends to elicit acknowledgement and sympathy from their tortured victims and act very

intelligently in most cases (Mackintosh 236ff). That is why `good and `bad are not philosophical parameters. They are essential in psychology, because only feelings can be good and bad. Hobbes I 6a correctly states that there is not any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Commonwealth,) from the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof. In terms of goodness and badness, distinctions as by Aquinas II 20.1 are secondary, if not irrelevant. He states that First, , the giving of alms, , is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for vainglory is said to be evil. Both points are questionable, because the giving of alms is neither good nor bad, but responsible or irresponsible. It seems there is nothing wrong about acting responsibly for vainglory. It cannot be qualified as evil. As a consequence of all this, the responsible, by nature, want to act sociably, but this wish, by definition, will be controlled and checked by the consideration of all the certified negative consequences of that social behaviour. For instance, unless Hitler was eliminated (Ex 2), World War II and the criminal Nazi regime was likely to last much longer. Consequently, Bonhoeffers antisocial decision to plot against Hitler was responsible. Hobbes I 10g, Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe; but rather a lawfull Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other Nations; as is manifest by the Histories of antient time. Comment: It is true that the notion of guilt developed after the Axial Period, about the 27th bn (Mackintosh 69). Nevertheless, humans behaved sociably and were supposed to do so for millions of years before that. Otherwise, the species would not have survived. Hobbes thinks that social behaviour resulted from the establishment of laws. Hobbes I 11d, Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or Promptnesse to hurt, from Fear, to seek ayd by society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty. Comment: The term `society refers to it as a `lawmaker. Hopefully, the laws secure the life and liberty of the citizens. However, the first factor in terms of security is innate social behaviour. The second factor is personal resistance to oppression. The aid by society comes definitely third. Hobbes II 20b, But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre, and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours, Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of Rewards, and Punishments, Honour, and Order. Comment: Hobbes fails to notice that only emergency laws, which have been defined by contract, would allow for those rights, and, secondly, those powers will be used responsibly. Responsibility, however, can also lead to the removal of an inept dictatorial sovereign by force (Ex 2 and 5).

Descartes (m404-350) 4a, The passions are domestic enemies with whom we are forced to keep company, and we have to be perpetually on guard lest they injure us. Comment: Parental distrust towards their offspring gives birth to such fearful considerations, as though people were born wicked, egotistic monsters. The sentence was addressed to a depressive princess. It seems that the philosopherdoctor thought it an encouraging statement. Descartes 4b advises against the harmful effects of the passions; so far as possible to distract our imagination and senses from them, and when obliged by prudence to consider them, to do so with our intellect alone Comment: This is classic advice of suppression that is likely to produce neurotic reactions in the patient. Morals, therefore, cannot be considered a viable therapy. Locke (m368-296), on his part, mitigates Hobbes absolutism, restraining the power of the monarch. In his view, society, not the monarch, is given the privilege to determine what is right and wrong (Schmid 74). Comment: Lockes more democratic approach makes sense. Society usually is able to establish and impose laws as well as to sanction the respective infringements. The primary parameters of those laws, however, have their foundation in the innate social behaviour and are supposed to compare with it. It is understood that responsibility is always the critical aspect in our decision-making. Furthermore, society is supposed to protect and favour those whose independence it restrains. Shaftesbury (m329-287) strongly objects to Hobbes. He disqualifies all religiously motivated moralistic pressure on people and considers the monarchistic regimes corrupt (Schmid 75). In fact, he teaches that people have a natural sense of what is right and wrong (Schmid 76). Comment: That `natural sense corresponds to the innate social behaviour with normally gifted mammals. Shaftesbury, however, failed to develop a doctrine of responsibility. With logically thinking beings, `the natural sense of what is right and wrong, which includes the drive to help ones fellows, will be controlled and corrected by responsibility. Shaftesbury 43a, If by temper anyone is passionate, angry, fearful, amorous, yet resists these passions, and notwithstanding the force of their impression adheres to virtue, we say commonly in this case that the virtue is the greater; and we say well. Comment: Impulsiveness, irascibility, anxiousness, and erotic greediness are diseases that are better to be cured than repressed. In addition, a thus handicapped person would still want to act responsibly guided by wisdom and dignity, but suffering from withdrawal symptoms. That suffering can be considered great, heroic, and virtuous. All the same, it is a consequence of handicaps which were better to be overcome. The popular approach to heroism is not sensible. For instance, it would wrongly rate a poor person who is generous as more virtuous than a rich one who helps the poor, while the former may be irresponsible. Later, Shaftesbury corrects himself, At the same time, there is nobody (that) will say that a propensity to vice can be an ingredient in virtue, or any way necessary to complete a virtuous character. So, the philosopher restricts his theory above. Shaftesbury 43b-44, There seems therefore to be some kind of difficulty in the case, but it amounts only to this. If there be any part of the temper in which ill passions or

affections are seated, whilst in another part the affections towards moral good are such as absolutely to master those attempts of their antagonists, this is the greatest prove imaginable that a strong principle of virtue lies at the bottom and has possessed itself of the natural temper. Whereas if there be no ill passions stirring, a person may be indeed more cheaply virtuous, that is to say, he may conform himself to the known rules of virtue without sharing so much of a virtuous principle as another. Yet if that other person, who has the principle of virtue so strongly implanted, comes at last to lose those contrary impediments supposed in him, he certainly loses nothing in virtue; but on the contrary, losing only what is vicious in his temper, is left more entire to virtue, and possesses it in a higher degree. Comment: It seems that the philosopher cannot come to terms with his own ranking of virtuousness; first (43a), he suggested that greedy people who restrain their greediness are more virtuous; then he praises the one who `lost his greediness altogether. The quantification of virtuousness does not make sense. For instance, whether to be helped by a doctor who likes surgery or by one who dislikes it, is almost irrelevant; the critical point is whether or not the surgery helps the patient. Moreover, responsibility may even mean lying, stealing, committing adultery, and killing an innocent infant (Ex 1). What degree of virtue would that compare with? Shaftesbury 47, offence and injury are always known as punishable by every one; and equal behaviour (which is therefore called merit) is rewardable and well-deserving from every one. Comment: Normal children, who have not been morally brainwashed by their parents, would never agree. They know that offence and injury may be correct in self-defence or defence of an innocent (Ex 5 COM 3). The Five Examples confirm their correct view. Shaftesbury 50, the wrong sense or false imagination of right and wrong can proceed only from the force of custom and education in opposition to Nature, as may be noted in those countries where, according to custom or politic institution, certain actions naturally foul and odious are repeatedly viewed with applause, and honour ascribed to them. For thus 'tis possible that a man, forcing himself, may eat the flesh of his enemies, not only against his stomach, but against his nature, and think it nevertheless both right and honourable as supposing it to be of considerable service to his community, and capable of advancing the name and spreading the terror of his nation. Comment: The example proves that one can teach the most atrocious kinds of morals to the majority of people, as long as they are taught to obey. History overflows with examples. Shaftesbury 53-54, nothing can more highly contribute to the fixing of right apprehensions, and a sound judgment or sense of right and wrong, than to believe a God who is ever and on all accounts represented such as to be actually a true model and example of the most exact justice and highest goodness and worth. Such a view of divine providence and bounty extended to all, and expressed in a constant good affection towards the whole, must of necessity engage us, within our compass and sphere, to act by a like principle and affection; and having once the good of our species or public in view, as our end or aim, it is impossible we should be misguided by any means to a false apprehension or sense of right or wrong. Comment: History fails to teach that the belief in a supreme entity leads to more responsible decisions. Dental care does not improve by the belief that one has the

opportunity to consult the best dentist. It can only improve, if we are clever and diligent enough to do so. The belief in God can even have negative effects ( John Paul 99C). Hutcheson (m336-254) returned to and intensified Shaftesburys positive teaching. He taught that everybody had an inner organ, a moral sense. This sense enables people to act in a profitable way (Utilitarism). Moreover, it makes people think that `the best action is the one that will make as many people happy as possible, and the worst action is the one that brings misery to the largest number of people ( Schmid 79). Comment: Hutchesons approach comes very close to this doctrine of responsibility. The blessed dualism of innate social behaviour and intelligence in humans is taken into account. However, the quantification of responsibility is incorrect. In fact, the quantification only makes sense in terms of Ex 1-3; in Ex 1, either the whole tribe is slaughtered or the infant is strangled; in Ex 2, if Hitler is eliminated, the war will hopefully be over and many lives saved; in Ex 3, if Mussolinis dictatorship is dispatched with, Italy is given a chance of recovering and joining the victorious Allies. However, in Ex 4, the eigthy or so suitors and the treacherous maids die and Ulysses is the sole survivor. A quantification of his responsibility is impossible. All the same, his action is responsible, since it represents an unavoidable act of self-defence in other words, he has no other dignified option. In Ex 5, Samson cannot calculate and compare the number of people he saves to the one he is going to kill by his action. In addition, who is arbitrarily made a captive will choose to kill as many oppressors as necessary in order to escape. Mandeville (circa m330-267) returned to and radicalised Hobbes teaching. He claimed that individuals were totally corrupt and society, out of necessity, developed rules that led to the general order and welfare. His teaching was as widely rejected as Hobbes (Schmid 77). Comment: It seems that most people felt disgusted at Mandevilles absurd pessimism. The totally unrealistic doctrine does not deserve further evaluation. Unfortunately, the very old error of incriminating the infants doctrine of the original sin haunts both philosophy and psychology even nowadays (ex gr Habermas, Freud, Kohlberg). Habermas concerns, in fact, are only understandable, if one supposes that he presumes that Hitler and Stalin represented the kind of humans that acted according to their natural impulses, which were totally untouched by social, let alone moral restraints. The atrocious actions by Hitler and Stalin, however, were not the consequence of their natural endowment, but of the psychological, historical, and political distortions they had undergone in the course of their upbringing, education, and career. Butler (m308-248) objected to Hutcheson that, by that argument (Hutcheson (m336254), even crimes could be justified. He suggested that moral conduct did not result from the actions utility, but from the `reasonable love of oneself ( Schmid 79f). Comment: The Five Examples prove that responsibility can indeed demand horrendous crimes. Thus, Butlers objection both honours and disqualifies Hutchesons approach, since Hutcheson was right in defining that the consequences of our actions will be taken into account. On the other hand, Hutcheson had failed to present a valid doctrine of responsibility that would have given sufficient evidence of crimes agreed to by responsible decision-making.

Furthermore, the `reasonable love of oneself is only the cause of responsible decisions, if it is equivalent to `the quest to be happy as logically thinking beings. Love, by definition, is not reasonable, but emotional. Butler seems also mistaken, if his `reasonable love of oneself equalled the cause of social behaviour. In fact, social behaviour results from a much higher principle, which is to say, the survival of the species; unless the parents of birds and mammals cared for their offspring, they could not survive, and if the young did not seek their parents help and protection by nature, then natural parental care could not function. Hume (m289-224) denied Hutchesons innate `moral sense. He suggested that there was an innate `sympathy between humans that favoured good behaviour. A moral sentiment, however, would be developed by unpleasant experiences (Empirism), as well as by the foreseeing of disastrous social consequences in the case of a general moral breakdown (Schmid 80f). Comment: Indeed, Hutchesons `moral sense seems to go too far, while Humes `sympathy seems closer to `social behaviour, which is innate in all mammals and birds. However, the empirism and the foreseeing of disastrous consequences in the case of a general decline of morals is not the cause of a `moral sentiment, but of legislation. If, on the other hand, Humes moral sentiment is considered identical to `responsibility, his definition is incorrect, for responsibility is caused by the wisdom and dignity of the logically thinking being, not by the fear of a moral collapse of society. For instance, the Maori Chief (Ex 1) did not have the infant killed because he was in fear of a moral breakdown, and Bonhoeffer (Ex 2) did not support the conspiracy because there was a general breakdown of morals in Germany, despite the fact that he seems to suggest so himself (Bonhoeffer 20 / 23a). Hume II 1h, Social behaviour can be done after no other manner, than by a convention enter'd into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry. Comment: How all the members of society (who Hume in the previous paragraph called rude and savage men) should be able to ever create such a convention remains a mystery. It is, however, true that laws are useful (although not required) to regulate the terms and conditions of property. Such regulations do not cause, but presuppose innate social behaviour. Hume II 1i, if men pursu'd the publick interest naturally, and with a hearty affection, they wou'd never have dream'd of restraining each other by these rules; Comment: If publick interest is a synonym of `social behaviour, the statement argues that the sheer existence of laws proves that it is not innate. The argument is vain. It is as though one would claim that the sheer existence of grammar rules proves that language originally was an unregulated, unintelligible compilation of sounds. One is better to argue the other way round. The philosopher, however, comes close to the correct teaching that laws and rules are secondary, since our ancestors proved sociable without them for hundred thousands of years. Hume II 5a, the rule of morality, which enjoins the performance of promises, is not natural. Comment: Mammals and birds warn each other, when danger is imminent; those warnings are meant to be true and real. Mothers would not call the family to the table, unless the meal was ready. If we ring someone, it signals that we want to talk to him;

it would be an insult to remain silent when the telephone has been answered. The keeping of promises comes naturally to normal mammals and birds. Other than that, communication would not work. Nevertheless, Socrates ( Plato R I 5) already alluded to responsibility overruling those `rules of morality, which, in fact, are endowments. Hume II 8a, The same self-love, therefore, which renders men so incommodious to each other, taking a new and more convenient direction, produces the rules of justice, and is the first motive of their observance. Comment: The term `convenient direction refers to the artificially established moral rules among humans. However, it remains a mystery how the same cause (selflove) can have opposite effects. Moreover, mammalian societies work without such rules (Chapter One 3, p4). Hume II 8c, wants to prove, from the universal consent of mankind, that the obligation of submission to government is not deriv'd from any promise of the subjects. Comment: This statement reflects the juvenile sentiment that one has to obey ones parents, although one has never promised to do so. Similarly, the citizen has to obey the authorities. The former attitude compares with social behaviour. Obedience to authorities, however, results from the consent of the majority and, in fact, can be considered an unexpressed promise by whoever chooses to live in a constitutional state (Chapter Eight COM 7). It includes the right for dissenters to emigrate. In addition, the universal consent of mankind does not matter in a philosophical debate, although Hume II 8d claims that the opinions of men, in this case, carry with them a peculiar authority, and are, in a great measure, infallible. It is understood that responsibility overrules social behaviour, governmental instructions, contracts (Chapter Eight COM 7), and the opinions of men, if need be. Hume II 8e, The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain, which results from the view or any sentiment of character; and as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows, that there is just so much vice or virtue in any character, as every one places in it, and that `tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken. Comment: It means that the morally `good and bad takes its ultimate parameter from common feelings. `Good and bad are, indeed, the crucial parameters of feelings. Responsible actions, however, take their parameters from wisdom and dignity, not from feelings, and it does not matter whether or not they cause good or bad feelings in anyone (Chapter Eight COM 4). The philosophers merely psychological approach to our decision-making is evident in Hume III 1, The chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain, as though thinking was not more important. Humes principle of pain and pleasure is also insufficient in terms of the innate social behaviour ( Butler (m308248)C) Hume III 2a, An excessive pride or overweaning conceit of ourselves is always esteem'd vicious, and is universally hated; as modesty, or a just sense of our weakness, is esteem'd virtuous, and procures the good-will of every-one. Comment: In this statement, the old Aristotelian idea of making a perfect citizen rises from the ashes, as though to please everyone was the ultimate factor in our decisionmaking. Although modesty is a valuable attitude, it is inappropriate in terms of our final decision-making (Chapter Twelve 17g, p200). For instance, young Judith

opposed the elders of her threatened hometown and took the affair into her own hand (Bonhoeffer 15bC). Hume III 2c, `Tis a trite observation in philosophy, and even in common life and conversation, that `tis our own pride, which makes us so much displeas'd with the pride of other people; and that vanity becomes insupportable to us merely because we are vain. Comment: Vanity results from feelings of inferiority, which are the consequence of incompetent parenting. We all have our emotional shortcomings. When they are considered as moral depravities, they generate a neurotic syndrome, constantly adding insult to injury. We are better to honestly address and possibly overcome them. Psychologically, the vanity of others is rather feared than envied by persons with a weakened Ego, for they feel that the vain might take advantage of them. All the same, those shortcomings are secondary concerns compared to the decision to take responsibility. Rousseau I 1a Man is born free; Comment: This powerful sentence is politically, not philosophically, correct, in as much as political power is only validated by the consent of free majorities, whereas hereditary monarchies claimed their power to be granted by God or their noble descent. Nevertheless, originally we are born into a tribe which protects and appreciates us, and, due to our innate capacity to act sociably, we want to be integrated into the tribal community rather than being free. As well as this, our total dependence on their assistance makes the philosophers statement completely absurd. Its absurdity emulates the ludicrousness of the hereditary monarchic claims. Rousseau I 1b the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights. Nevertheless, this right does not come from nature, and must therefore be founded on conventions. Comment: The social order is a result of our innate desire to integrate into the human community and is neither sacred nor a right. Rights can only be defined by written and unwritten laws, which indeed are established on conventions. Nevertheless, all of them and social behaviour might be overruled by responsibility. Thus, none of them is sacred. Rousseau I 2, The most ancient of all societies, and the only one that is natural, is the family: and even so the children remain attached to the father only so long as they need him for their preservation. As soon as this need ceases, the natural bond is dissolved. The children, released from the obedience they owed to the father, and the father, released from the care he owed his children, return equally to independence. If they remain united, they continue so no longer naturally, but voluntarily; and the family itself is then maintained only by convention. Comment: The passage is rife with basic historical and psychological errors. 1) The most ancient of all societies is the tribe. Such is brilliantly documented in the history of Israel. 2) Parents and children hopefully remain attached to one another throughout their lives; they do not return equally to independence. Psychologically, we remain parents for the rest of our lives. 3) They remain united by a natural, rather than a conventional bond; to dissolve that bond and abandon the mutual trust and responsibility presents an impoverishment of the Ego (Mackintosh 27-28).

4) Independence and freedom are neither the most original nor the highest values. The highest value is the community. Practical Philosophy has paid a high price for its erroneous divinisation of freedom in that it resulted in the lamentable self-pitying approach of both existentialism and the Frankfurt School (Chapter Eight COM 4). Hopefully, we want to take responsibility for the community, rather than deploring its shortcomings. 5) It is obvious that Rousseaus legitimate and successful quest to fight French absolutism inspired his subjective views. Rousseau I 6 The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. This is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract provides the solution. Comment: If someone joins a convent, she necessarily renounces a very great part of her freedom. However, such is already the case, if, for instance, we make an appointment with someone; either we meet at the right time or we are supposed to change the arrangement, and if we have been hindered by external causes, we will want to apologise to the person in question, who has been waiting in vain. Consequently, it is not possible to enjoy any community without restricting our individual independence. The community, therefore, presents a value superior to freedom. All the same, responsibility is autonomous and may overrule both freedom (Ex 3) and the social contract (Ex 1and 2). In fact, the doctrine of responsibility offers the solution of Rousseaus dilemma by its teaching of autonomy (Chapter Eight). Kant (m276-196) defines morals as the principle to never use another as a means to favour ones own purposes. This principle is defined a duty. That leads to the positive definition of the `Categorical Imperative, which reads as follows, Always act on a principle which you want to be the foundation of a general law (Schmid 91f). Comment: Firstly, duties can only be defined by laws and contracts and they always generate corresponding rights and sanctions. Since social behaviour is innate and responsibility is wanted by the wise and dignified ones, it is neither correct nor possible to define them duties and they do not create rights. For instance, in Ex 1, the father has not the `right to kill his daughter; he just has no other option. Ex 1 also proves Kant completely wrong; the infant is used as a means in that her death saves the rest of the tribe. In Ex 2, Hitlers elimination is meant to create peace. Thus, his death, which is to say he himself is used as a means. Ulysses, in Ex 4, kills the suitors in order to save his own life and dominion; if Kant were right, the hero ought to leave his country for ever and free his wife from bonds of marriage. Kants view was also refuted by Schopenhauer 450-451. Secondly, it is impossible to philosophically define any duty, be it in a general or special manner. In fact, Kants elaborate definition is able to be used as a justification for the most horrendous dictatorships. For instance, Hitler acted `on a principle which he wanted to be the foundation of a general law. In fact, the principle read that everybody, including himself, should do what he wanted them to do. Thirdly, the responsible do not at all want their actions taken as foundations of general legislation. In fact, he dislikes taking the action which is opposite to social behaviour. What he wants is to act in a responsible way, which may be totally illegal. Fourthly, the Five Examples demonstrate that responsibility may transcend all legislation.

Fifthly, there is no legislation definable that includes the absolute superiority of responsibility. Therefore, it would be illusory to want it to be the foundation of legislation. Legislation hopefully is based on social behaviour and contracts. (Unfortunately, many laws are based on authority and arbitrariness.) In fact, Aquinas II 95.2 correctly notes that every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. Sixthly, the most plausible argument against the Categorical Imperative is offered by Kant himself in the painstaking elaboration of this principle. Why did the philosopher care to produce the `Critique of Practical Reason? Was it because he wanted it to become a general law that everybody should publish such a clever paper? Was he obliged to write it? Was it his duty? None of these motives apply, since Kant created the ingenious work, because he wanted to write it. And why did he want to? Because he wanted to be happy by taking responsibility , since he was convinced that no-one other was able or willing to make such a philosophical exploit. Kant declares moral conduct a duty that is often hard to fulfil ( Schmid 100). Comment: The point of `duty has been addressed above. In terms of `hardship, it is obvious that Kant has not the least idea that social behaviour is innate. He presumes that we are born egotists and have to learn the hard business of normality and correctness. Such must have been the philosophical result of his personal upbringing. Unfortunately, in most cases, disrespectful parenting affects the innate gift of social behaviour and it is, indeed, difficult for those people to act sociably, let alone respect themselves and others. Morals that demand perfect behaviour, however, are not only hard, but impossible to fulfil to make things worse, they are irrelevant. In terms of responsibility, however, hardship is overcome by happiness. All the same, the Five Examples illustrate that responsible decisions may involve the most heroic deeds and risks. Kant, however, felt as though we were always falling short of the most desirable ideals. His is a far too negative approach to what it means to master, as a logically thinking being, the ultimate challenges of life. The hardships, however, do not affect the responsible persons happiness. It seems that Kant did not question the pietistic approach to parenting he experienced in his childhood. Such an upbringing is bound to create the neurotic greediness which is then re-projected onto ones original endowment. Psychology ( Mackintosh 226) and the traditional approach to parenting (Mackintosh 120-126) still adhere to that erroneous re-projection, which presents a rejudice. The whole philosophical and theological discussion has been spoiled by the prejudice that humans are born as socially inapt. I have been wicked since I was born. I have been sinful since I was in the womb. (Ps 51.5) In terms of the latter point, Hegel 18 turns the philosophical argument upside down by stating, The Christian doctrine that man is by nature evil is loftier than the opposite that he is naturally good, and is to be interpreted philosophically in this way. Man as spirit is a free being, who need not give way to impulse. Hence in his direct and unformed condition, man is in a situation in which he ought not to be, and he must free himself. This is the meaning of the doctrine of original sin, without which Christianity would not be the religion of freedom. Instead of proving that Christianity is the religion of freedom, the philosopher takes it as a premiss free of doubt; he totally overlooked the fact that Christianity does not accord to humans the mastery of their sinfulness with their own `free spirit, but only by believing the creeds, receiving the sacraments, paying tithes, and following all the rules established by the Churches. The philosophers principal argument is that it is easier to excuse our mistakes if we presume that we are born wicked. Such is possibly true. However, it results from a

psychological distortion, whereas a responsible approach does not seek excuses for our failures, but wants to correct them. Kant C 5, Everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i. e. to be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the precept, Thou shalt not lie, is not valid for men alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but priori simply in the conceptions of pure reason; Comment: Laws cannot be derived from absolute necessity or pure reason, but are the result of arbitrary and hopefully sensible legislation. Furthermore, the precept, Thou shalt not lie, does not have absolute validity ( 1 Cor 13.6C). In addition, the basis of social behaviour must be sought in the nature of man (Chapter One 3). In terms of Kants errors, one cannot refrain from suggesting that he, for one reason or another, felt impelled to try and defend his parents intrusive methods to teach him morality. Psychologically, his approach seems the result of a regressive rationalisation (Ex 3 COM 30). Hegel 211, it is only animals which have their law as instinct, while it is man alone who has law as custom Comment: The error is both aetiological (Chapter Four COM 1-4, 6) and historical. The philosophers untenable argument is unmasked a few lines later, which reads, Savages are governed by impulses, customs, and feelings, but they are unconscious of this. The high standard of social and reasonable behaviour of natives and our ancestors deserve better than that. It is as though one would claim that language was only formally developed when grammar books were produced. Legislation is merely the shortest way to achieve a consensus, without being the only, let alone the best one. Schopenhauer (m212-140) proclaims the old errors of Hobbes I 11b. The will of all life aims at the pitiless, egotistic self-preservation and, thus, the human will does also. By recognising that depressing fact, humans ought to develop an inner rebellion which delivers itself and proceeds to express itself in art, self-restraint, and empathy. In fact, empathy presents the core of all morals ( Schmid 104-107). Comment: The philosopher is right in that he, unlike Hobbes, does not bow to the power of the state (Hobbes II 20), Schopenhauer locates morality in the minds of individuals. All the same, reason is not a slave of self-preservation (Ex 2, 3, 5, John Paul 80C). Empathy, on the other hand, is controlled by reason as well. For instance, a teacher who wants to save his students the pain of learning, acts irresponsibly. In addition, respect stands far above pity. In fact, disabled people do not want to be pitied, but taken seriously. The wise will also approach everything and everybody with the greatest respect, regardless whether or not they suffer from a disability. Nietzsche, not incorrectly, criticises pity as haughtiness and D. Steinberger slams it as the sleeping-pill for delicately strung scoundrels ( Schmid 113). As a conclusion, it is intimated that pity is a wonderful gift, connected with social behaviour, but is not appropriate in all cases.

Schopenhauer 428-429, The chief source of suffering is Eris, the conflict of all individuals Wild-beasts fights are the most cruel means of showing this directly and vividly. In this original discord lies an unquenchable source of suffering, in spite of the precautions that have been taken against it Comment: By completely ignoring an aspect of innate social behaviour and exaggerating the necessary fights in the wild ( Mackintosh 124), the philosopher wants to prove that people need his teaching and ethics. The argument will be refuted in Aristotle II.9C. K. Marx (m182-117) suggested that humans were better to behave like man and wife; then they would achieve a true human existence ( Hosang 44). Comment: Suppose the most important qualities between spouses be respect and responsibility, the comparison possibly makes sense, but is misleading in a double sense. First, respect and responsibility are integral to all our relationships, be it with people, animals, plants, or things. Secondly, marriage has an exclusive quality and involves important responsibilities as well as distinctive affection. It is not necessary to like everybody in the same way, as one hopefully does ones spouse. Marx claims that human feelings are superior to those of animals; for instance, animals lacked strength of mind and magnanimity ( Hosang 46). Comment: When observing a female dog which protects her young and her owner to the risk of her own life, one might conclude otherwise. It is, however, true that only humans will take responsibility, because it involves logical thinking. Moreover, if one compares the behaviour of animals to that of humans, it is also obvious that criminal minds may develop into a cruelty unknown to animals; then one might come to the conclusion that the feelings of animals are superior to those of humans. The fact is that the feelings of all mammals, including humans, are identical. Nietzsche (m156-100) 13, Superman is the very purpose of the earth. Comment: World, life, and earth have no purpose, since those terms include all the possible und thinkable purposes. Without realising it, the philosopher develops yet another moral, a criminal one that asks us to eliminate social behaviour. All the same, responsibility will both respect and control it. Nietzsche 14 claims that man is dirt and needs a sea to be purified; Superman presents that sea. Comment: While ordinary morals suggest that we perfect our social behaviour, Nietzsche wants it to be overcome. This reversion is yet another moral that asks us to be pure and perfect in a negative sense. L. S. Wygotski (m104-66) claims that humans have attained a higher level of existence; this fact could not be explained by naturalistic theories ( Hosang 46). Comment: Such claims compare with the old dream of philosophers and psychologists to prove that humans differ essentially from other mammals, without clearly determining the very restricted way in which one can say so. In terms of feelings, humans, by very good luck, do not differ from and are not superior to mammals. Humans are only different on account of their capacity to form abstract notions. Although those notions are inadequate images of reality, they enable us to create language, science, and art ( Mackintosh 90-106), as well as to make responsible decisions.

I. von Eibl-Eibesfeld (m72- ) suggests that in the great moments of social evolution the conditions were created for a higher form of sociability which distinguishes humans in a positive sense (Hosang 46). Comment: It is the old longing for the warmth and security of the tribe, which pleasantly manifests itself in sociability. The same sociability can be seen in chimpanzees and gorillas without alcohol being involved. The statement seems to accord man a superiority, which is misleading; history has it that humans have hardly improved in terms of social behaviour. Eibl-Eibesfeld concludes that humans ought not to be conceited on account of their superior sociability, which expresses itself in loving communication, because such conceitedness would damage the very sociability; therefore, humility is an order of life (Hosang 48). Comment: Humility which accords equal dignity to everything and everybody is indeed the only wise and dignified attitude. Respect, however, is also accorded to ourselves. `Humility is a term which carries the connotation of putting oneself into an inferior position, which does not make sense. In addition, respect is not `ordered, but is the favourable attitude wanted by logically thinking beings. Horkheimer (m105-27) states that society has a tendency towards an ideal ( Hosang 13). Comment: Such is true for whatever happens, since evolution cannot be explained otherwise (Chapter Three 20h, p50). The questionable thing in such an idealised view of society is that it often leads to a disrespectful, patronising, and hypocritical parenting, with parents who want to produce virtues in their children, which they lack themselves. In addition, French writer Balzac (m201-150) noticed that society features none of the virtues which it expects its members to develop. 38. Meves 65 suggests that it makes sense to tell children stories about devils and witches, because children, at a very early stage, experience themselves as creatures that are driven by dark, untamed impulses, which are opposed to the orders and restrictions of society, Such impulses present the desire to be in exclusive possession of everything or to dominate all the others. Comment: Normal children can dispense with such absurd and damaging stories, and they do not feel driven by dark, untamed impulses, either. Innate social behaviour enables them to integrate into the community, which hopefully offers respect and affection, rather than moralistic orders and restrictions. The abovementioned impulses are the result of neurotic distortions; they require therapy. Therapy, however, focuses on normality, while stories about devils and witches are as useless as the presentation of horror movies would be in the therapy of criminals. The psychologist, in fact, seems to harbour a deep distrust towards the social competence and intelligence of children. Buber 32 claims that the early history of humanity was full of hate, fear, aggression, and cruelty. Comment: The idea, all for it being popular among psychologists and moralists, is completely absurd (Chapter One 4). Humanity could not have survived without innate
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social behaviour. In fact, the doctrine of love unnecessarily and incorrectly denigrates the character of our forebears. John Paul 12, faith teaches that normality itself bears the traces of a fall from man's original situation in other words, it is affected by sin. Comment: This teaching is philosophically and psychologically untenable. It means that man is born a criminal. However, social behaviour is an innate capacity in all mammals and many other species (Chapter One 3-4). John Paul 22: Humans cannot be happy and perfect, unless they accept the help of Gods grace, offered by the Church (Mt 19.26). Comment: Happiness is achievable by taking responsibility. It is not necessary, although it may not be unhelpful to some people, to resort to monopolist teachings of any kind. History teaches that the Church usually seeks its own advantages and to date has failed to develop, let alone adopt, a valid doctrine of responsibility. Therefore, it has not given any evidence of competence in moral matters. John Paul 25: The question, `Teacher, what good must I do to have eternal life? arises in the heart of every individual, and it is Christ alone who is capable of giving the full and definitive answer. Comment: In a certain sense, Habermas 329 unwillingly supports John Pauls claim, in as much as he suggests that we are unable to develop sound teaching about righteousness ourselves. Consequently, John Pauls conclusion that we need assistance by a divine, enlightened teacher like Jesus seems not unreasonable. Habermas claim, however, is untenable, for people have known how to behave sociably for millions of years. John Paul 59: But whereas the natural law discloses the objective and universal demands of the moral good, conscience is the application of the law to a particular case; Comment: This distinction is inadmissible, because laws have the purpose to be obeyed in all cases. In fact, there is a dogmatical agenda behind this artificial distinction, in that it allows for the conclusion that there cannot be a contradiction between the Law (which includes the teachings of the Church) and individual conscience. As a consequence, conscience that opposes the Law is arbitrarily defined as misguided. John Paul 64: Christians have a great help for the formation of conscience in the Church and her Magisterium. Comment: However, the Church has so far failed to develop a correct doctrine of responsibility. In addition, history teaches that misguidance of the masses by the Church led to countless wars and the persecution of Jews, dissenters, witches, scientists, children born out of wedlock, and others, to say nothing of the psychological terror inflicted on the believers. John Paul 99: If there is no transcendent truth, in obedience to which man achieves his full identity, then there is no sure principle for guaranteeing just relations between people. Comment: The judgement corresponds to Dostoyevskys erroneous theory, in `The Demons, that if God does not exist, everything is allowed. 39 However, nowadays
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fundamentalist terrorist crimes seem to indicate the contrary, which is to say, if God exists, everything is allowed ( Spinoza V PROP XXC). Moreover, countless wars and crimes were committed in the name of God and the Church. Above all, it is not demonstrable that responsibility will accept everything in the Bible, the teaching of the Church, the Koran, or any other religious document. The only wise and dignified approach to all teachings is to control and question whatever is relevant to our decision-making, in order to make sure that it corresponds to the best of our knowledge and sense of honour. It is irresponsible to accept things because they are expressed by specific persons or written in certain documents, if they contradict evidence and dignity (Chapter Twelve 11, p194). Jonas 23 states that prior to our age the ethics of love were sufficient. Comment: They were always wrong and insufficient (Ex 1, 4, and 5). Moralist prescriptions of social behaviour, however, were not sufficient, but superfluous (Chapter Three 20j, p50 / Kant C 4C). Hosang 50 states that friendship and love originated in this world, when the caring human relationship between mother and child was established. Comment: Since social behaviour is innate in all mammals, love is much older than humanity. In human relationships, love is insufficient. Respect and responsibility are more promising approaches to our children. Love without respect is inappropriate and will end in a disaster. Hosang 57, Understanding, acknowledgement and respect, the help of others and challenges are the most vital elements in terms of the development of our social, spiritual, and creative potential. Comment: Some gifted people may neither need help nor challenges. It is also questionable whether or not the development of our social, spiritual, and creative potential is the ultimate purpose of life. When Pertini decided to resist Mussolini (Ex 3), he deprived himself of his great potentials. In fact, he could have had a prominent position, if he supported the dictator. Likewise, when Nelson Mandela was imprisoned,40 he gave up on his career as a lawyer. The fact that both heroes became Presidents of their respective countries, cannot be interpreted as `development of potential. Moreover, the philosopher fails to point out that he is proceeding beyond the love principle by this statement. Understanding is more than love; love disregards the beloved ones errors, while understanding wants to correct them. As well as this, acknowledgement and respect have a general character, in that we want to offer them to both friend and foe. Habermas suggests that society is improving through the evolution of justice and moral principles (Hosang 88). Comment: History teaches that society can also degenerate through justice and moral principles, as Bhme F 15 complained, Ours is indeed a mere Christianity of word and name; the hearts are worse than in the time of paganism.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Possessed_(novel)#Synopsis / Kirilov The idea has been borrowed from Bernard-Henri Lvy
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The improvement of society is not the first priority to the wise; if it were, one would wish to try and exchange the human genome ( Sloterdijk 46). It is, however true that responsible people want to improve both themselves and society, and whether or not an improvement takes place, depends on the circumstances. Hope is the only virtue; it is critical to maintain it (Chapter Twelve 17a, p198). Habermas 321: If in liberal societies every individual has the right to choose and pursue their own way of leading a good and successful life, ethics has to restrict itself to formal points of view. Comment: The conditional clause in this very provocative sentence is disturbing, since every society presupposes social behaviour of its members. However, the main clause is very correct in the sense that there are not and were never definable morals, since morals that `restrict themselves to formal points of view (while it ought to define the correct way of action, and actions differ from one another, although they might appear identical) seem useless. Habermas 329: Within a legitimate ideological pluralism, where there is no metaphysical rationale, philosophers cannot establish principles that would advocate against personal choices in terms of ones characteristic way of life. Comment: It is certainly true that there is no metaphysical rationale to justify or discount human actions. However, social behaviour is innate in mammals, to naturally limit the freedom of choice, and whoever cannot accept such limits is emotionally damaged and needs therapy. The fact is that humans qualify their actions themselves and they want them to be social and responsible ones. Thus, a metaphysical rationale is unnecessary. Taking responsibility means to be happy, even though one might not feel happy. There is no obligation to do either of them. In fact, Hume already transcended Habermas scepticism when he explained that it was improvable that moral obligations could be derived from descriptive premisses (Schmid 53). As a consequence of this, even a metaphysical rationale could not be proven an authentic foundation of moral obligations. Bahro R 200-211 explains that the return to the old Indian teaching of the Kundalini, which comprises the solar plexus, spinal cord, and brain, could effectuate a change in the Western exploitive mentality. Comment: Such would not suffice in order to tackle the gigantic problems of the future. Bahro R 232 agrees to Schillers idea that everybody has an inner prototype of a superior, ideal ego, which they are supposed to emulate. Comment: Such might be an assimilated Super-Ego that asks us to be perfect, which is impossible, unnecessary, and simultaneously insufficient ( Bonhoeffer 12). Sloterdijk 7, From the time philosophy began to present itself in a written form, it has gathered its devotees by promoting, in a contagious manner, love and friendship. Comment: The criticism is justified for the overwhelming majority, considering that Socrates who thought differently (Chapter One 7c) did not write. All the same, the `weeping philosopher, Heraclitus (m2520-2460), did write, but his texts were lost; he thought that life was a game in which good luck and bad luck happened without any justification. He refrained from developing moral teachings ( Thurner D 193-196). Sloterdijks also ignores Nietzsches approach, which was based on Heraclitus idea.

Schmid 8 can only partly be agreed to, Although morals, every now and then, appear to be imposed on us from the outside in the form of duties, the fulfilment of those duties is not considered truly moral, unless they are done voluntarily and in emotional agreement. We should truly want the due actions, too. Comment: The truth is that social behaviour is not `imposed on us from the outside, but innate. In that respect, Freuds pleasure principle and Super-Ego theory is inadequate. Secondly, in many cases the responsible one does not want the action. Thirdly, those actions are never due. Fourthly, responsible ones want to act responsibly, even if they hate and the law forbids the action. The above definition would actually mean that an exhausted surgeon who saves the life of a patient she personally dislikes because he once tried to rape her would do something morally invalid. The important thing, however, is to act responsibly, regardless whether or not one likes doing so. Is there anything wrong in giving back lost property, although one would like to keep it. Do we have to learn to hate and eliminate from our mindset the wish to keep it. What for? The sheer opposite is true; to give back valuable things takes much more responsibility than giving back things that one does not want to have. In terms of love, however, will and duty hopefully coincide; if partners have intercourse only because they feel obliged to do so, it cannot be considered a dignified mating. On the other hand, the agreement to unloved intercourse can be a dignified and responsible decision, if, for instance, it looks as though the marriage would collapse without it or every effort to procreate seems necessary. But such intercourse is never a duty. All the same, a perfect mating of an infatuated, loving couple can still be absolutely irresponsible if, for instance, there is a definite risk of infection. This again proves that also in their erotic lives the wise want to act responsibly. Those are subtle differencies which cannot be comprehended without a valid doctrine of responsibility. The Five Examples are able to illustrate all that. Historically, Kants wrong definition of the Categorical Imperative ( Schmid 92), which defines that we should always act in a way that would allow it to be imposed on everybody, has also contributed to the above confusions. In fact, such approaches are the result of our almost incurable parental and educational perversions most of us were raised to both obey and love to obey. The television preacher, Charles Stanley from Atlanta, Georgia, never tires of promoting that disturbing doctrine of obedience.41 Whoever obeys wants to be obeyed, too. The responsible person, however, abhors being obeyed; he wants everybody to act and refrain from action according to their own responsible decisions. A responsible author, by definition, never wants to be believed, let alone obeyed (Chapter Twelve 17b, p198). He would, indeed, feel frustrated, if someone justified his decisions on the sole account of the formers definitions. Schopenhauer 109 also questions the validity of Kants approach. He ridicules the Categorical Imperative as fallen from heaven. It is, however, not fallen from heaven, but produced by a pedantry which receives and gives instructions. Schmid 9-10, there is an old controversy about what is the difference between `ethics and `morals. For instance, some authors define `ethics as the doctrine of how to choose ones optimal way of life, while `morals determines in which way we are called to correctly deal with others.
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Comment: Logically thinking beings want to act responsibly in every respect, whether the action or the non-action is related to themselves or to others. `Morals, in the above sense, could be considered identical to social behaviour, while `ethics, in the above sense, seems to equal `morals as defined in Chapter Three 1. If such is the case, it wants to be checked by responsibility. The stylite who constantly prays on a pillar (HERDER IX 1128-1129) is an impressive symbol of the questionability of `ethics in the above sense, as though one could be correct in deciding that this is ones optimal way of life. Geissler 49-53 defends Jesus extreme pacifism (Mt 5.43-47) and recommends the Gospel as the best teaching. The history of the cruel Crusaders, for instance, was due to their incorrect interpretation of those infallible texts. Comment:With that method, one can even defend the philosophy of Nietzsche and pretend that the German SS misunderstood it ( Bonhoeffer 21aC), whereas they were the ones who understood it. In terms of the Crusaders, the Gospel teaches obedience and Peter was accredited absolute infallibility (Mt 16.17-19). No wonder, the Crusaders obeyed the Pope. In order to corroborate Jesus commands, Geissler 53 explains that the resistance to extremists legitimises their aggression. This would mean that the existence of police forces legitimises criminality.

Chapter Five: Responsibility and Agape

Responsibility Agape

Thinking

Feeling

COMMENT: 1) The chapter aims to point out that `agape as a higher form of love is both farcical and insufficient. Moreover, in each final decision-making, it is overruled by responsibility. 2) The farcical nature of a universal, comprehensive love for all people (all creatures, all things) is evident in that it is unfeasible. For instance, we would not be able to love a person who abducts, or tortures, or injures, or kills our children. Thus, the order to love everybody is expecting too much of Christians. It is also bound to create guilt in all of them, since everybody will fall short of these demands. Then, again, the Church and Jesus will make up for lost time, if we believe and accept their teaching. This vicious circle of reasoning is unacceptable. It puts sensitive believers under constant pressure. Those who do not admit to being pressurised are not fully aware of their true feelings. It seems that many of them prefer being pressurised by the agape doctrine rather than take responsibility. Unfortunately, this is quite a common attitude among Christians.

3) The insufficiency of love can also be illustrated. Recreational enjoyment and use of water in our daily lives is all very well but insufficient. The responsible ones respect and preserve it as best they can, for they know that, in a case of emergency, they would give away their whole intellect for a glass of water. It is also evident that those who hate all the above activities are still better to respect and preserve water, taking a responsible approach to how to treat it. 4) With regard to the insufficiency of love, it is helpful to appreciate the fact that nowhere it is the first priority, not even in marriage and parenting. The approach to the partner and the children wants to be supported by the much higher principles of respect and responsibility, which also allow for decisions that go against love. The damage done to parenting by the love principle cannot be overestimated. It has led to the most dreadful indignities between parents and offspring. The love principle is also bound to practically destroy marriage altogether in Western civilisations, in that, no sooner the feelings of love have weakened, than the partners divorce. So, they miss the opportunity to talk things over and make true progress in their spiritual development. As a rule, second marriages will fail, too. The tiring, repetitious texts of modern Western pop-music also bear witness to the childish and unreal approach to the challenges of love and life. 5) While thinking and feeling do not necessarily exclude one another, responsibility holds a position absolutely superior to love, as is best illustrated by Ex 1. One of the most puzzling and illustrative historic examples of this fact was the execution of Roman Consul Manlius Torquatus Fortunatus son, who, serving as a soldier, disobeyed the Consuls strict order and killed an enemy who was jeering at the Romans. He was triumphantly received by the troops, when he returned to the camp with the enemys armour. It is important to see that responsibility asked the father to necessarily have his son executed, while he might have been tempted to pardon another soldier who neglected the order. Such a pardon, however, would have been utterly foolish, because the Romans could never have succeeded in arranging a truce with any enemy again, unless the punishment of the breach was handled in the strictest manner possible. Therefore, the Consul could not have chosen to pardon his son and then resign his consulate. Moreover, it seems that the Consul had to kill his son himself (even Livius almost felt like concealing this horrible fact), since no-one other was willing to execute the Consuls son. It is also useful to consider the indignant reaction to Manlius due intransigence by the Roman troops; since then, harsh orders were dubbed `Manlian orders. 42 The reaction gives evidence of the fact that responsible decisions, notwithstanding their correctness, might be unpopular. 6) Calvins approach to responsibility (which definitely defies his teaching of Divine Providence) is untenable and obsolete. He states, The Christian, then, being most fully persuaded, that all things come to pass by the dispensation of God, and that nothing happens fortuitously, will always direct his eye to him as the principal cause of events, at the same time paying due regard to inferior causes in their own place. It does not make sense that Bonhoeffer (Ex 2) should have fathomed that Divine Providence was the cause of Hitlers crimes. Such a thought would have hindered
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him in joining the conspiracy. Thus, we want to take responsibility for all the causes, be they inferior or superior. 7) Those Royals who left their country when it was taken by Hitler (Ex 1 COM 9) certainly continued loving it. Christian X from Denmark, however, took royal responsibility, stayed, and did an excellent job. 43 8) The misguided Christian emphasis of love frequently has a psychological fallout in that many who act responsibly, violating the love principle, develop feelings of guilt. Such is a result of intrusive parenting that wanted us to never act against love. While it is natural to be saddened by such decisions, feelings of guilt (Mackintosh 141-142) are inappropriate. Such principles also apply to decisions taken in macro-history. It is, in fact, disturbing to listen to journalists who blame the US for dropping the nuclear bombs in World War II (Nickl 65dC). It is not wise nor dignified to take a superficial approach to such historical facts. We were better to keep quiet and presume that those people wanted to do their best to save as many lives as possible. It is not our task to give them post-mortem instructions as to how they should have decided. 9) It seems inappropriate, when Fromm 74 claims that agape includes to take care of, responsibility for and have respect and informed appreciation of others, and to cherish the best wishes for their development. The claim exactly includes the contradictions of 1 Cor 13.4-8 (Chapter One 6). 10) Locke 45 correctly suggests, Those as who find themselves apt to be carried away with the spontaneous current of their own thoughts, not excited by any passion or interest, must be very wary and careful in all the instances of it to stop it and never humour their minds in being thus triflingly busy. Men know the value of their corporal liberty and therefore suffer not willingly fetters and chains to be put upon them. To have the mind captivated is, for the time, certainly the greater evil of the two and deserves our utmost care and endeavors to preserve the freedom of our better part. And in this case our pains will not be lost; striving and struggling will prevail, if we constantly in all such occasions make use of it. We must never indulge these trivial attentions of thought; as soon as we find the mind makes itself a business of nothing, we should immediately disturb and check it, introduce new and more serious considerations, and not leave till we have beaten it off from the pursuit it was upon. This at first, if we have let the contrary practice grow to a habit, will perhaps be difficult; but constant endeavors will by degrees prevail and at last make it easy. And when a man is pretty well advanced and can command his mind off at pleasure from incidental and undesigned pursuits, it may not be amiss for him to go on further and make attempts upon meditations of greater moment, that at the last he may have a full power over his own mind, and be so fully master of his own thoughts as to be able to transfer them from one subject to another with the same ease that he can lay by anything he has in his hand and take something else that he has a mind to in the room of it. This liberty of mind is of great use both in business and study, and he that has got it will have no small advantage of ease and dispatch in all that is the chosen and useful employment of his understanding. The philosopher correctly addresses the issue of that it is also undignified to use our thinking capacities irresponsibly. In fact, the abuse of them degenerates to an agape
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of oneself, in that one thoroughly indulges in an peculiar pursuit of religious preferences by, for instance, adherence to a guru or a fundamentalist movement, that allows our mind to dwell happily in idle and idealistic thoughts. 11) Nietzsche criticises modern democracies as decadent relicts of the Christian love-mania (Thurner U 161-162). He would prefer countries to be ruled by ruthless Supermen. Both claims are historically untenable. However, the philosopher is right in that even democratic decisions want to be questioned by responsibility and cannot be considered as sacrosanct (Bonhoeffer 10C 6 / Chapter Three 20w, p55). 12) The mystic idea of the Spanish saint Juan de la Cruz (HERDER V 1053-1054) that the soul is Christs bride also takes eroticism to the highest level of existence. Topic History and Comments Aristotle IV.1a the liberal man is easy to deal with in money matters; for he can be got the better of, since he sets no store by money Comment: Responsible people can also be hard to deal with in money matters and never tolerate to be got the better of. The latter would encourage exploitation. The question is not whether one is easy to deal with, but whether one is correct and reliable in economical matters. In the long run, it is more rewarding to deal with correct than generous people. Aristotles suggestion compares with the Christian love principle (1 Cor 4a). Aristotle IV.6 blames the people who think it their duty to give no pain to the people they meet . Comment: The philosopher is very right in his judgement. The attitude which aims to please everybody at all times compares with agape rather than responsibility (Bonhoeffer 12). Aquinas II 65.1 no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice Comment: `Prudence (looking ahead) and `wisdom (looking back) are essential ingredients of responsibility, but not of moral virtue. For instance, `kindliness is certainly a moral virtue that can be exaggerated and, thus, irresponsible. Aquinas philosophy was corrupted by the love principle. He was forced to combine principles that belong to different levels of our existence. So, he erroneously states in II 65.3, It is clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues. The truth is that prudence always will overrule love in our decision-making. The philosopher himself confirms so in II 66.1, prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues . It is evident that he is inconsistent. This resulted from his ambitious quest to co-ordinate the thinking of Aristotle and the teaching of Christ. Aquinas II 77.4, the fact that anyone desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin. Comment: Even if sin is replaced by the phrase `irresponsible decision-making, the statement will still be questionable, since we may fail to act responsibly out of

obedience, or a confusion of priorities, or other handicaps. For instance, if Bonhoeffer (Ex 2) had thought that the Christian love principle was superior to the parameter of responsibility, this thought would not have been the result of an inordinate love of self. In fact, it is neither possible nor necessary to determine the causes of other peoples failures (Bonhoeffer 24C). The critical point to address in this statement is that it admits that agape is not the highest principle in our decision-making, since it wants to be `ordinate, which means that a higher order is wanted to control it. Consequently, responsibility wants to check our agape, and if that be so, the former is of a higher order than the latter. Calvin III 7.4, The Scripture enjoins us, in regard to our fellow men, to prefer them in honour to ourselves, and sincerely labour to promote their advantages (Rom 12.10; Phlm 2.3), he gives us commands which our mind is utterly incapable of obeying until its natural feelings are suppressed. For so blindly do we all rush in the direction of self-love, that every one thinks he has a good reason for exalting himself and despising all others in comparison. Comment: This type of psychological analysis reveals the writers neurotic approach, which fails to appreciate that social behaviour is innate and we do not need to `suppress our natural feelings in order to behave sociably. Moreover, the inferiority complex, which results in the neurotic reaction of despising others, is produced by disrespectful parenting (Mackintosh 140-142). In addition, the philosopher would have been better to reject the biblical teaching that we should prefer our fellow men in honour to ourselves, because no preference in honour makes sense, since everybody and everything merit to be respected in the same way. Bruno Argument of the Nolan 1, Finally, I mean that these heroic frenzies have a heroic subject and object, and therefore can no more be esteemed as vulgar and physical loves than one can see dolphins in the trees of the forests or savage bears under the rocks of the sea. Comment: If the heroic frenzies stand for the heroic responsible decision, the philosopher is right, but not because love is vulgar and a dishonourable thing. The reason is that love cannot be the critical factor in our decision-making. Bruno II 2 XIII, The higher form of love is not accessible to artisans, mechanics, farmers, servants, pedestrians, the ignoble, the base, the poor, the pedants, and others of the sort, but only to the philosophers, saints, educators, lords, captains, noblemen, illustrious men, wealthy men, wise men, and others who are as heroic as are the gods. Comment: The statement unmasks Brunos lack of respect and an elitist, poor approach, which is very foolish, indeed. Responsibility is wanted and found everywhere. Other than that, the elite would have miserable lives. The statement, however, serves to highlight the democratic quality of the doctrine of responsibility. This is a very important point of view, because modern moralists (ex gr Schmidt, Jonas, Kng) also take an elitist approach to the topic of responsibility, as though the leaders, CEOs, and politicians were called exclusively to take it, while other people were supposed to love and obey. There is not a qualitative, but quantitative difference in various responsibilities. If, for instance, all the farmers (whose responsibilities admittedly differ from the ones of a Prime Minister) were irresponsible, the best king and his nation would be unable to survive. Therefore, it does not make sense to qualify a farmers responsibility as inferior to the one of a king. Later, Bruno even

states, Therefore the sursum corda is not meant for everyone, but only for those who have wings. In that context, the controversy between Habermas and Luhmann ((Horster 32-42) makes sense; Habermas stipulates that there are general, absolute moral principles, while Luhmann objects that those principles change according to the domain in which they are applied. The doctrine of responsibility agrees with both teachings; Habermas is right in that responsibility is wanted in everybodys decisions (although it is not a duty), and Luhmann is right in that the practical actions resulting from a responsible decision can be opposite. For instance, a merchant wants to sell his goods at a reasonable price, whereas the producer, at one stage, might order him to sell them at half price, because he has developed a new model whose production and promotion has already started. The absolute priority of responsibility is not compromised by such discrepancies. In terms of Brunos elitist approach to heroism, he corrects his theory in the passage below. Bruno II 4 The Ninth Blind Mans Guide Speaks, scholars and philosophers are not more apt to receive this light than the ignorant are, (but) it does not appear to everyone, nor can it appear to anyone unless he seeks it. Comment: The passage clearly contradicts the previous one and merits agreement. It is a fact that most parents, preachers, and teachers still teach their children to obey and follow rules in preference to trusting and respecting their normality and encouraging them to seek their own way of life ( Mackintosh 166-205). The misguided teaching of the Jewish, Christian and Buddhist love principle has been a major stumbling block to the development of both a valid responsibility and parenting doctrine. Other than that, more people could have learnt to be happy and proud of taking responsibility. In that sense, it is true that responsibility wants to be `sought. The most ingenious of Brunos thoughts seems to be his suggestion that it is possible to act in a wise and dignified way, so as to be happy as a human being in this life. In that sense, he was not a believer anymore. He died on the stake in m400. Spinoza III PROP. XXV, We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. Contrariwise, we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object. Comment: This is a correct observation. It makes clear that love cannot be the parameter of our decision-making. Responsibility may want to favour the ones we hate. Shaftesbury 21, there is no such thing as real ill in the universe, nothing ill with respect to the whole. Comment: Although the statement does not refer to agape, it goes even further in declaring ill as philosophically nonexistent. Such claims include the idea that basically everything is lovely and lovable. The term ill, however, relates to a psychological category, and is not even an object of philosophy. Thus, the denial of its existence is philosophically irrelevant and psychologically nonsensical, for psychology is all about good and ill feelings. In terms of responsibility, it is also irrelevant, for, whether or not ill exists, we would still want to act responsibly. Shaftesbury 34b, Let him, in any particular, act ever so well, if at the bottom it be that selfish action alone which moves him, he is in himself still vicious.

Comment: The statement is a hidden agape doctrine, as though looking after ones health for the sake of enjoying life was vicious; only if we did it to save the insurance company money or be able to help others, we would be virtuous. Shaftesbury 36, it may be necessary perhaps to remark, that even as to kindness and love of the most natural sort (such as that of any creature for its offspring) if it be immoderate and beyond a certain degree, it is undoubtedly vicious. For thus overgreat tenderness destroys the effect of love, and excessive pity renders us incapable of giving succour. Hence the excess of motherly love is owned to be a vicious fond- ness, over-great pity, effeminacy and weakness Comment: Although the statement is too weak, it correctly wants love to be controlled. However, such is not just a question of degree, but of principle. Children, too, deserve a respectful and responsible approach by the parents; love is not good enough, even if it is moderate. Shaftesbury 64a, Whoever, therefore, by any strong persuasion or settled judgment, thinks in the main that virtue causes happiness and vice misery, carries with him that security and assistance to virtue which is required. Comment: It is not virtue, but responsibility which works to that effect, whereas irresponsibility makes us unhappy. Shaftesbury 67, Nothing indeed can be more melancholy than the thought of living in a distracted universe, from whence many ills may be suspected, and where there is nothing good or lovely which presents itself, nothing which can satisfy in contemplation, or rise any passion besides that of contempt, hatred, or dislike. Such an opinion as this may by degrees embitter the temper, and not only make the love of virtue to be less felt, but help to impair and ruin the very principle of virtue, viz. natural and kind affection. Comment: It is true that the general and social environment may lead to a merely negative attitude towards life and existence. As a consequence, it is not possible to love them in all their aspects. All the same, we can be happy by taking responsibility, even in the most dreadful situation (Chapter Three 12 and 18, p43), whereas the love principle may fail. Shaftesbury 74-75a, that natural affection may, in particular cases, be excessive, and in an unnatural degree. As when pity is so overcoming as to destroy its own end, and prevent the succour and relief required; or as when love to the offspring proves such a fondness as destroys the parent, and consequently the offspring itself. Comment: The statement compares with a valid doctrine of responsibility. It also disproves the agape doctrine (Shaftesbury 36). Shaftesbury 115, Thus the wisdom of what rules and is first and chief in Nature, has made it to be according to the private interest and good of everyone to work towards the general good, which if a creature ceases to promote, he is actually so far wanting to himself, and ceases to promote his own happiness and welfare. Comment: The statement compares with a valid theory of innate social behaviour, by stating that the promotion of the general good also furthers the private interest. However, Ex 2-5 demonstrate that responsibility will consider actions which may include the highest risk of both self-destruction and hazard for the loved ones. Therefore, the promotion of the general good is not necessarily identical to individual

welfare and the good of everyone. In addition, Ex 1 COM 10 makes evident that a private interest can be considered superior to the general good. Hume III 2f, the distinction of vice and virtue arises from the four principles of the advantage and of the pleasure of the person himself, and of others Comment: If the terms `vice and `virtue are replaced by `irresponsibility and `responsibility, none of those four principles is applicable to the Five Examples. The former can be considered a camouflaged agape doctrine; it reduces practical philosophy to the mere aspects of prosperity and feeling good. Rousseau II 6, The best kings desire to be in a position to be wicked, if they please, without forfeiting their mastery: political sermonisers may tell them to their hearts' content that, the people's strength being their own, their first interest is that the people should be prosperous, numerous and formidable; they are well aware that this is untrue. Their first personal interest is that the people should be weak, wretched, and unable to resist them. I admit that, provided the subjects remained always in submission, the prince's interest would indeed be that it should be powerful, in order that its power, being his own, might make him formidable to his neighbours; but, this interest being merely secondary and subordinate, and strength being incompatible with submission, princes naturally give the preference always to the principle that is more to their immediate advantage. This is what Samuel put strongly before the Hebrews, and what Machiavelli has clearly shown. He professed to teach kings; but it was the people he really taught. His Prince is the book of Republicans. Comment: This caricature of Christian kings demonstrates how ineffective the Christian love principle was in terms of responsible politics and the establishment of the democratic paradigm (Chapter Twelve 9, p193). To make things worse, the same hapless processes of power and submission are still rife with those parents and caregivers who teach the children to obey (Bonhoeffer 10C 1). Bonhoeffer 185, The shunning of comprehensive responsibility presents the citizens worst sin. Comment: The statement clearly and correctly, however unspoken, denies the priority of the love principle. Bonhoeffer 205, In meeting Jesus Christ, we experience a total reversion of our human existence, since Jesus is pure One-for-the-Others. This pure Being-for-theOthers contains the transcendental aspect of human existence. Comment: Responsibility also asks for a Being-for-Oneself; the pure Beingfor-theOthers leads to the helper syndrome 44, which is undignified by respecting neither its subjects nor objects. Bonhoeffers erroneous approach compares with Bubers (below). Buber 9-10, The fundamental word, `Me-You, can only be manifested in our complete personality There is not a real `Me, yet either a `Me-You or a `Me-It. Comment: All the same, the philosopher undertakes to teach us what he has found out for himself. In fact, Buber wants to save the love-principle by pushing it over the limit, so as to deny our feeling and thinking as individuals, as though we were
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symbiotic beings. The approach does not make sense. The challenges of life consist in the differences between beings, living beings in the first place ( Mackintosh 83-84). Buber 22 suggests that love is both metaphysical and meta-psychological. Comment: Love is definitely a feeling and part of the psychological domain. It is also common to birds and mammals. John Paul 16: "If you wish to be perfect, go, sell your possessions and give the money to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; then come, follow me." (Mt 19:21). Comment: It is undeniable that responsibility leads to the consequence of donating ones spare money for the needy. Unless this decision is made out of wisdom and maturity, Gods grace will not help us to make it, as one can see that the Christian nations dominate and exploit the poor countries, and have done so for hundreds of years. However, the advice to donate all ones assets to the deprived ones does not present a dignified approach to the challenges of property. It is, indeed, unnecessary, counterproductive, and unfeasible. Monks and nuns, who give up all the worldly goods, have to earn money, too, either by labour or acceptance of donations. The teaching also stipulates two classes of righteous people, which is untenable. The quoted passage of Matthew indicates that the figure of Jesus is an idealised version of the Teacher of Righteousness from Qumran, who would have added, ` joining the community of Qumran. But, since Qumran was destroyed before the Gospel was written, that addition would not have made sense anymore (Chapter Twelve 9, p193) . John Paul 22: To imitate and live out the love of Christ is not possible for man by his own strength alone. He becomes capable of this love only by virtue of a gift received . As the Lord Jesus receives the love of his Father, so he in turn freely communicates that love to his disciples: `As the Father has loved me, so have I loved you; abide in my love (Jn 15:9). Comment: This statement denies humans the capacity to take responsibility, unless they believe in God, the Gospel, and the Sacraments of the Church. In this way, the vicious circle of argument is perfectly rounded by introducing the Church and its operations as an indispensable link. History has it that the Church has been falling short of these demands itself. John Paul 35a, the power to decide what is good and what is evil does not belong to man, but to God alone. Comment: The Five Examples prove that the parameter of `good and evil does not apply to human actions at all. In fact, human actions are neither `good nor bad, but sound or sick, sane or insane, normal which for a thinking being includes `responsible or abnormal. Since feelings are the domain of psychology, both theology and philosophy were wrong in engaging in the qualifying of actions at all. It led to a very erroneous transfer in that actions that evoked bad feelings were counted as `bad and those which evoked good feelings were qualified as `good ( Mackintosh 125-127). The actions in the Five Examples were responsible thus sound and normal but certainly bound to evoke bad feelings. John Paul 35b, In fact, human freedom finds its authentic and complete fulfilment precisely in the acceptance of that law. God, who alone is good, knows perfectly what is good for man, and by virtue of his very love proposes this good to man in the commandments.

Comment: A freedom that consists of the mandatory acceptance of a law does not make sense. Such an abuse of language is unacceptable. In terms of the authors infamous intransigence in his papal performance, such abuse is not far from the Nazi sadism which produced the ironic scripture at the entrance of the unspeakably horrible concentration camps, `Work Makes Free. John Paul 50, While it is always morally illicit to kill an innocent human being, it can be licit, praiseworthy or even imperative to give up one's own life. Comment: Responsibility or self-defence can lead to the killing of an innocent human being (Ex 1) and it can never be imperative to give up ones own life, but both can be the result of a wise and dignified decision. Responsibitlity does not ask for `praise, either. Calvin II 8.45 is also imprecise when stating that all the arts by which we obtain possession of the goods and money of our neighbours, , are to be regarded as thefts. For instance, Robin Hood, who robbed the rich to feed the poor, has been pictured a great hero in the 2nd and 1st bn, and a mother who feeds her starving children with food illicitly taken from wealthy people who refused to help her, acts responsibly. The laws, however, cannot include such exceptions. In terms of jurisdiction, suggestions have been made in John Paul 34bC. In this context, a common prejudice has to be refuted. The majority of people fathom that humans are morally superior to animals on account of the fact that the latter are accustomed to steal from the others. The argument is not valid, since such is the mammals way of doing business. The regulated business of humans, also necessarily, has an egotistic aspect to it (Bruno II 2 XIIIC / Mackintosh 123-125). John Paul 67a, it is revoked when man engages his freedom in conscious decisions to the contrary, with regard to morally grave matter . Comment: The Five Examples give clear evidence that responsibility (not freedom) may ask for such decisions. John Paul 67b, the negative moral precepts, those prohibiting certain concrete actions or kinds of behaviour as intrinsically evil, do not allow for any legitimate exception. Comment: The so-called `negative moral precepts, as defined in Ex 20.13-17 (which are a rudimentary reflection of social behaviour) may be overruled by decisions of responsibility. Such has been demonstrated by the Five Examples. Such a superiority may also include adultery; Judith ( Bonhoeffer 15b) entered Holofernes tent without being married to him. John Paul 68: It is not possible that individuals could continue to be morally good, persevere in God's grace and attain salvation, even if certain of his specific kinds of behaviour were deliberately and gravely contrary to God's commandments as set forth by the Church. Comment: In the light of Ex 2 and 5, the statement is ludicrous. It seems historically evident that the authors secret, personal agenda concerns abortion, whose justification he wants to be defined as radically excluded, even in cases of rape. Responsibility, however, would teach that usually it has to be the mothers decision, exclusively, whether or not to keep the child. John Pauls methodological way of arguing has been decoded by Russel 9 as `irrationalisation many decades before this encyclical; rather than inform the reader of what it is all about, it (the encyclical is addressed to the Episcopacy of the Roman Catholic Church) presents a complicated

network of philosophical and theological arguments, which would finally lead to the conclusion originally intended. John Paul 80: The Second Vatican Council itself, in discussing the respect due to the human person, gives a number of examples of such acts: `Whatever is hostile to life itself, such as any kind of homicide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia and voluntary suicide; Comment: Homicide was necessary in the Ex 1, 2, and 4, while Ex 5 can even be deemed a genocide. Abortion can be necessary to save the mothers life. Euthanasia ought to be the patients free choice. Ex 5 presents a volontary suicide. It is also a dignified action to make the ultimate sacrifice for the sake of other people. Jesus literally stated so himself in Jn 15.13. The Polish priest Maximilian Kolbe chose to die for a father of two children and was canonised by the author of this encyclical in m18.45 John Paul 111, Moral theologians have the task, in close and vital connection with biblical and dogmatic theology, to highlight through their scientific reflection that dynamic aspect which will elicit the response that man must give to the divine call which comes in the process of his growth in love, within a community of salvation. Comment: The contradiction in terms is obvious in this affected passage; if man must give a response to a divine call, he cannot be free. In this context, it is important to be aware that humans do not need anyones order or call to act responsibly; responsibility is not a must, but a wish that comes naturally to a normal thinking being. If it were not for the inadequate moral teachings and the misguided parenting that teaches children obedience, humans would be able to find happiness in their responsible approach to whatever falls into the domain of their decisions. Jonas 35 states that one cannot prove that it is necessary to preserve the planet for future generations; such moral obligations would need a metaphysical foundation. Comment: Wisdom and dignity of logically thinking beings want to preserve the planet,not because its preservation is a necessity, but it is the only way to be happy; it can dispense with a metaphysical reason. A strange contradiction to this statement can be found in Jonas 95 (Nickl 156, below). In addition, one cannot prove either that we are obliged to enjoy our lives to the full by exploiting the planet to the detriment of later generations. The example allows for the dismantling of the concept of duty altogether; suppose someone could impose the duty to make sure that there will be future generations, one would decide to have as many children as possible. If, on the other hand, one thinks that there are already too many people, one would feel obliged not to have children at all. Thus, if one can derive contradictory conclusion from a premiss, the premiss itself is invalid. Consequently, by declaring responsibility a duty, duty is attributed the rank of a principle superior to responsibility, which lastly denies the term itself; true responsibility would only be accredited to the one who imposes the duty. Bahro R 85, Man as can be well observed with children necessarily traverses a stage of nave egotism.
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Comment: Children can be as helpful as adults. They are also able to take responsibility. Bahro wants to prove that adults are capable of and supposed to develop comprehensive love. Since he feels that children would disagree what they would be very correct to do he incriminates their nave egotism. He is wrong in that, too. We want to take responsibility of ourselves and our needs in the first place. It does not make sense to be too generous and loving. All the same, Ex 2, 3, and 5 illustrate that heroes are able to sacrifice themselves for others. Children are capable of heroism, too. Bahro R 86 suggests that the Ego ultimately presents the result of a faulty design and proves a rigidity of the soul that has its physiological repercussions. The latter are able to disable, if not destroy, the natural functions of our cerebral cortex. Comment: The neurotic Ego suffers, whereas the normal one wants to take responsibility, which is to say that there is nothing wrong with the Ego. The desire to accumulate ones assets, however, is not necessarily and exclusively neurotic. It is also caused by our inividualistic capitalist system, which fails to provide a certified security network for people in extreme conditions. In order to feel economically safe and independent, everybody would need funds of several millions of dollars. If people lived in adequate, cooperative communities, such concerns would vanish (Mackintosh 265-287). Bahro hopes that a Buddhist denial of the Ego ( Adidam 15-16) will lead to a socioecological attitude, which is able to care for others and the planet. Such is neither feasible nor necessary; as logically thinking beings, we find our happiness in caring for those principal causes. The incriminated capitalist over-reactions, however, can only be overcome by a transformation of society (Chapter Twelve 22, p203). Bahro R 73-91 suggests that egotism and the loss of the connection between man and God are the main causes of the environmental damages. Comment: The issue of egotism has been addressed in Bahro R 86, above. In terms of the second point, the majority of fundamentalist Christians do not protect the environment. Christian nations maintained anti-semitism, slavery and colonialism, and exploited the resources in the first place. In addition, a foolish interpretation of the Bible, which is alleged to confirm that the end is nigh 46 is bound to favour a negligence of the long term consequences of our decisions. Thus, `the connection between man and God does not warrant a socio-ecological attitude at all. Furthermore, the doctrine of eternal happiness in Heaven suggests that it is unnecessary to care for our planets long term safety. Bahro R 137, It is a scandal and perversion that economic interests prevail against the interests of mankind. Comment: It is not a perversion, but a natural consequence of our system, as suggested above (Bahro R 86C). H.-P. Hempel, in Bahro R 188, asks the decisive question how science and love can be combined again. Comment: It seems more appropriate to combine science with dignity and respect.

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Nickl 98, presents H. Kngs six rules concerning scientific and technical progress, according to `Das Projekt Weltethos, 1990. 1) Rule of balance; progress is allowed only if bad consequences do not prevail over good ones. Comment: Reason itself suggests so. Correctly, the love principle is overruled, since it supposes that progress is advisable if it is made out of love or to the advantage of others. All the same, nobody is able to foresee all the consequences of their decisions, but we want to take into account as many of them as possible. 2) Rule of onus provandi; prior to each innovation, evidence of its harmlessness has to be presented. Comment: This goes far beyond rule 1. It is unfeasible, for everything can be put to foolish usage, even theology as history has it (Chapter One 9). For instance, the inventor of the gunpowder was not able to prevent all the mayhem created by it in the last centuries. 3) Rule of common wealth; common wellbeing prevails over private concerns. However, personal dignity has to be respected. Comment: Those are contradictory rules and both are invalid (Ex 1 COM 10-11). 4) Rule of urgency; what is imminent prevails over what is agreeable, for instance, to help the poor countries. Comment: Responsibility definitely wants that (Chapter Three 4, p41). 5) Rule of ecology; the eco-system prevails over social aspects. Comment: The rule is invalid. For instance, one would shoot the last existing tigress, if she attacked people, or eat the last fruits in a case of starvation. Nevertheless, responsibility will consider the long term ecological consequences of our decisions. 6) Rule of reversibility; one has to prefer reversible to irreversible operations. Comment: Responsibility definitely suggests so. Nevertheless, it is an error to think that there are many completely reversible operations. Responsibility suggests minimising all the polluting operations. The latter effort mainly concerns the consumers. COMMENT: The rules 1, 4, and 6 compare with a responsible approach and neither need to nor can be imposed as moral laws. They are correct in that they overrule the love-principle. The six rules are incorrect on account of the fact that either the quest for happiness suggests them (1, 4, and 6), or they are false on account of the fact that they compare with the idealistic love principle (2, 3, 5). The main error lies in the attempt to philosophically define such rules. Nickl 99a suggests that bio-ethical legislation is urgent, for J. Watson, who discovered the structure of the DNA, asked, If it were possible to improve the DNA by adding some genes in order to improve the human race, why should we not do that? Comment: Legislation, although possibly helpful, cannot prevent such irresponsible experiments. Unless those scientists care about what wisdom and dignity suggest, the experiments will be undertaken. However, responsible parents do not want to determine their childrens destiny. Likewise, the responsible scientist refrains from interfering in such a disrespectful way. However, as long as animal experiments in the name of love for people are supported, those scientists will continue to act foolishly and in a disrespectful way, which is bound to produce possibly irreparable damage. Animals have a central nervous system which multiplies a thousand fold the hurtful stimuli, makes them suffer as intensively as humans, and they are not able to recur to logical reasoning that helps to cope with pain ( Mackintosh 219, 273). Humans will not obtain long term advantages by making innocent creatures suffer.

Moreover, scientists who have animals tortured for the sake of research are most unlikely to obey any law that restricts their research. In terms of the love principle, one would perhaps like to have people who are more balanced, reasonable, and happier. One can even argue that the teaching of morals and, thus, it unmasks itself as an inappropriate and undignified intrusion is nothing other than the attempt to produce ethical clones with perfect characters. All the same, it makes sense to eliminate genes that cause hereditary diseases. Further suggestions are presented in Sloterdijk 46C. Nickl 99b is concerned about R. Edwards suggestion that ethics have to adjust to science, not the other way round. Comment: Responsibility adjusts to whatever comes to knowledge. Consequently, it does not want to take future risks the effects of which are unknown. Edwards ranking of supremacies is misleading. The statement illustrates that ethics are futile anyway, because it would necessarily lead to the duty to improve the genome as best we can. Nickl 142-148a, The group of E. L. Winnacker, in 1997, developed a list of seven levels in which gene research can be taken advantage of, and indicates their moral qualities. 1) Production of proteins that guard against diabetes, haemophilia, dwarfism, etc. It is considered advisable. 2) Treatment of cancer, aids, etc. It is recommendable. 3) Elimination of genetic defects inside the womb, for instance cleft palate. It is acceptable. 4) Stem cell therapy of cancer, aids, etc. It consumes too many embryos and is not acceptable. 5) Introduction of genes to prevent diseases, for instance influenza. The procedure is likely to create classes of society and is refutable. 6) Intervention to guard against the risks of obesity, aggression, etc. The intervention is illicit, since the social preferences of slimness, gentleness, etc. might change in the future. 7) Change of the human species, for instance higher intelligence, higher stressresistance, slower aging, etc. Such interventions are illicit. Comment: The approach is correct in that it considers the long term consequences of genetic manipulation and does not recur to the love principle, which would welcome all those improvements. The list fails to address the question of animal experiments (Nickl 99aC, 148cC). Nickl 148c, The scientific limits have been arrived at and need respecting. Comment: Genetic research mostly relies on animal experiments and has passed the limits of respect and responsibility a long time ago. It is guided by the love-principle exclusively. Responsibility will take a dignified and respectful approach to the usage of people, animals, and things. Since one abhors cruelty to humans, cruelty to animals is unacceptable, too. Legislation, however, will be ineffective, unless philosophy promotes the principles of respect and responsibility. Nickl 155, H. J. Muller (m110-33), in m65, suspects that the genetic make-up of humanity is degenerating and urgently needs intervention. He considered eugenics a prominent duty. Comment: It is obvious that Darwins wrong conclusions in terms of evolution have contributed to such unilateral visions (Chapter Three 20h, p50). In fact, evolution

must be an absolute principle of life, and it does not make sense to try and interfere with it (Sloterdijk 46C). Nickl 156, Humans have dignity. Comment: The dignity meant in this statement, where it is defined in a passive sense, is a property of whatever exists. Human dignity, however, is very special in that it is an active principle, which wants to respect everything and take responsibility in terms of our decisions. Therefore, it is disrespectful to accord a special passive dignity to humans. In fact, the idea of a higher passive dignity of humans produces a lot of irresponsibility. Jonas 95 even suggests that Humans exist and will exist so that responsibility be maintained. In this statement, the snake bites its tail, for there is no philosophical position available that would allow claiming a thing to exist necessarily.

Chapter Six: Morals and Agape

Morals Agape

Perfection

Celibacy

COMMENT: 1) Morals suggest that humans ought to develop all the personal and social skills they can muster. There is hope that they will come closer and closer to perfection in all the desirable qualities of character and activities, including the suppression of natural which are considered brutish desires. It is also the meaning that such a development should make us happy. The philosophers then try to determine the safest way to achieve that goal. It is also the meaning that morals are specific to humans, while the other mammals are exclusively guided by instinct and lust. In terms of parenting, children would have a zero morality ( Kohlberg 26) and have to learn to master their innate covetousness. Their education would be done by example, teaching, and punishment. The latter point has already been referred to in Chapter One 4, p4). All the other points are unacceptable, too, in that they are totally misguided by an inadequate teacher mentality as though there were some people around who could tell the others what to do the usual parental negative prejudice whose bitter implications they have endured as children themselves. 2) Habermas, blindly following Kohlberg, has trouble explaining why people normally develop social behaviour. He resorts to language, defining it the decisive means to communicate it (Hoster 45-47). Infants, however, manifest social behaviour by smiling and affection, before they are able to understand and speak. Habermas is chasing a phantom. The phantom is the question, `How can the beast man become decent? The question is unjustified (Chapter Three 1, p40). Much more justified and important would be the question, `How does man become a criminal? ( Mackintosh 237). In addition, it is disturbing that psychologists and philosophers who think that infants have no morals whatsoever have failed to develop a valid parentology (Mackintosh 79-80, 104-105, 139-142, 153-155) in the first place.

3) It is true that we, children in the first place, with the spiritual development of the human species (which is, indeed specific), want to proceed in our spiritual skills and adjust to the ever changing challenges of progress. There, teaching is helpful. In fact, without help, only geniuses would be able to learn how to read. Such is not the case with social behaviour and the effort to develop ones capabilities. Politically, the danger of morals cannot be overestimated, for it allows for any ideology to develop its full potential. In fact, the most horrible crimes have been committed on moral grounds. Celibacy corroborates the allegedly higher aspirations of morals. 4) The main point, however, is that even the best morals are not provable, and if they were, they would still be secondary, because they neglect the topic of responsibility. For instance, it is foolish and irresponsible to develop ones altruism and generosity, if it results in becoming dependent on other peoples help. 5) Whether or not it is really possible to substantially improve our characters is doubtful. We are all disabled and are wiser to accept our emotional handicaps and make responsible choices in terms of the challenges we would like to tackle. This is probably the very thing in which we hopefully can learn and develop in our conduct which is all very well, but secondary all the same. In fact, the main point is to do our best in taking utmost responsibility of what we do and omit, while it is not worth developing a strength of character, which will always be very limited anyway. 6) The agape doctrine introduces erotic principles into morals and definitely makes them more attractive. It can be subsumed in Augustines ingenious sentence, Love, and do what you want. (Homily on 1 Jn 8) History has it, that, with the exception of Judaism, all religions that promote the agape teaching have developed monasticism. If agape is a higher form of love, it makes sense to develop it to the point where sexuality is eliminated altogether. In fact, John Paul II proposed the following three advantages of celibacy; the undivided love of Christ, complete service of the Gospel, and spiritual growth.47 Celibacy is considered a higher standard of life 48, whereas it is an irresponsible and disrespectful perversion, which stands in opposition to morals; morals aim at perfection, which includes a monogamous lifestyle and being a perfect parent, whereas agape intends to transform us into asexual angels. Where it encourages a voluntary lifelong sexual abstinence, it results in rapes and child abuse, not to mention the fact that it has never worked. All the same, the natural choice of celibacy, due to handicap, is perfectly justified. Employing Socratic dialectics, one can say that whoever deliberately suppresses their sexual needs is like someone who decides to keep their eyes constantly closed and receive the help and support blind persons are entitled to. In a similarly evasive way, deliberately celibate people leave the tremendous tasks of procreation and parenting for the others to master. They also refuse the blessings and challenges of a durable partnership. As Christians, they neglect Gods warning in Gn 2.18, It is not good for the man to live alone. They are also nave in terms of the long term overwhelming
47

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K. Himes, L. Sowle Cahill, a. o. Modern Catholic Social Teaching, Paperback Edition 364

power of sexuality (point 8, below). In terms of procreation, they also neglect Gn 1.28, have many children Last, but not least, celibacy is bound to hugely corroborate the dreadful genophobia in all those cultures. It seems that that sombre history of psychological terror has not been written yet. However, it is not suggested that celibacy has created the genophobia, but the other way round; celibacy is one of the disturbing results of genophobia. Last, but not least, the sexual partners of failing celibates usually suffer from disadvantages, and the totally innocent offspring of such illicit partnerships is in great danger of being at a social disadvantage, too. 7) Nietzsche correctly contradicts the absolute priority of both morals and agape. Instead of refuting them by a valid doctrine of responsibility, he develops a new Superman moral which defines that to have the strength and will to inflict greatest pains is the highest virtue (Thurner U 173). It was a nonsensical philosophic overreaction, as invalid as though one would suggest, since there are deadly foods, the safest way of staying healthy was to eat nothing. Nevertheless, without a valid doctrine of responsibility, Nietzsches theory cannot be disproved, since responsibility can lead to the most atrocious actions, for instance, the dropping of a nuclear bomb (Chapter Five COM 8). Such an unavoidable action, however, would be regarded as the last resort in an absolutely desperate situation, rather than a heroic deed; it never evolves from the will to inflict greatest pains ( Bonhoeffer 18c). 8) In serious literature, it is difficult to find a piece of poetry that honestly pays tribute to the power of sexual attraction and pleasure. All the more grateful can we be to R A K Mason (m95-m39), when he sings, Since flesh is soon as the spread dung and the soul no more than a song that is sung Toil and honour flee like driven sands: only my love is true and stands. Why should I care that my name then be known when at best Ill be a name alone? Is not all I was made for bright on her lips? Does not my whole purpose glow from her hips?

Should not my whole right be to kiss her eyes? Is not all good held in her thighs? If, indeed, love is the highest principle of action, it either becomes pure lust or it is transformed into total abstinence by celibacy. So, most Christian Churches forbid premarital sex, which means celibacy for several years at least. This leads to the cruel consequence that love, in the form of sexuality, becomes a trap, into which every believer is likely to fall sooner or later. The resulting feelings of guilt make the believers psychological victims of their respective Churches, which sell them forgiveness and redemption. All that does not stand up to a serious approach to what it means to be a mature person.

Topic History and Comments Plato R IX 13, The perfect State, which is governed by a philosopher king, will create the son of Ariston the best and justest also the happiest, who is the most royal man and king over himself; Comment: This idealistic view is untenable on two accounts. Firstly, even the best political order cannot eliminate the handicaps and fears of people. Secondly, the perfection of character is neither achievable nor necessary, since happiness can only be achieved by taking responsibility as best we can although everybodys capacities are limited in many ways. The politicians main purpose is to maintain order, safety, and prosperity. By any means, it is not necessary to produce perfect citizens. In terms of the philosopher king, Descartes 1c even suggests that only sovereigns, or those authorized by them, have the right to concern themselves with regulating the morals of other people. One would rather care to know who is entitled to accord such a right. Even democracies have only a factual, not a philosophical right to do so. That is why the wisest king and the most perfect democracy cannot overrule the individual responsibility. Aristotle II.9 concludes that it is no easy task to be good and explains later that we are best to aim for what is less pleasant, for if we dismiss pleasure thus we are less likely to go astray. Comment: The philosopher seems to suggest that the suppression of our natural sexual desires warrants virtuousness. The suggestion does not make sense, since, according to the philosophers own teaching ( Aristotle III.7), the virtuous are supposed to find the balance between excess and defect, as liberality is the balance between prodigality and miserliness. That middle is indeed very hard to find ( Aristotle III. 7C). And even if we find it, it is not a responsible approach to what money and assets are all about. The responsible do not want to be liberal, but to keep what they need and donate all the rest. In a case of emergency, they would certainly choose to impoverish themselves to a responsible extent. The parameter of `the middle, although suggestive, is totally misplaced. For instance, if someone concluded that obeying all the traffic laws is excessive and therefore chose to exactly follow half of them, it would not lead to responsible driving at all. There is no middle between responsible and irresponsible. It seems that the teaching of morals is a camouflaged attempt to clone the characters of people, so as to make them adaptable and submissive. Such is all the more the case, if the teaching of morals is intensified and totalised by the love principle as promoted by most city religions Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity. It usually leads to celibacy and monasticism. God is chosen as a virtual spouse, and the celibate ones form a new, higher class of believers (Mt 19.21). In two of those religions, formally celibate members enjoy high prestige and privileges. Judaism, however, avoided that trap of celibacy on account of the fact that procreation was considered a foremost religious priority (ex gr Gn 1.28 / 12.2 / 17.20). Despite their respectable intentions, both the teaching of morals and the love principle have been preaching to the converted, since innate social behaviour enables all mammals to adapt to their social environment. The question is why (1) and when (2) philosophers and theologians started feeling impelled to develop moral doctrines. Unfortunately, Spinoza III, Preface is not right in claiming that there has been no lack of very excellent men who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind.

Considering the countless errors of those men, women were right to never engage in moral studies. 1) Why? Both philosophers and theologians failed to recognise that both logical thinking and social behaviour are part of human normality and a natural endowment of their gifted and intelligent infants ( Mackintosh 45-133). Since philosophers and theologians were convinced that babies had to be taught how to think, they concluded that they needed also to be taught how to behave. That conclusion represented a rejudice, which was embraced fully by psychology in the last two centuries, since it has completely missed the point, too by form of projection. In fact, Freud, Jung, Adler, Kohlberg, and countless others projected their own neurotic shortcomings and greediness onto the infants, doing further damage to parenting (Mackintosh 62, 123, 226), to say nothing of Calvins revealing denigrations (Calvin II 4.3-4). Similar projections can be retrieved in Pauls revolting lists of vices (ex gr Rom 13.13 / Gal 5.16-21 / Tim 1.9-10) and in the moralising teachings of preachers and philosophers. In terms of judging children, Aristotle III 2 is also completely wrong when he claims that choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary; the latter extends more widely. For both children and the lower animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts done on the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary, but not as chosen. One has to belie such claims. Fact is that normal children make clever decisions and choices. 2) When? The inappropriate teachings may have begun in the Axial Period (Mackintosh 69). They probably became first manifest in the maxims (Honour the old / Know yourself / Restrain yourself) of the Seven Sages of Greece. 49 Earlier Egyptian inscriptions praise well-mannered conduct, which is considered a gift, not a goal, in the respective persons50, while morals, in terms of this paper, always include the idea of obligation and the necessity to be taught, if not forced on people. Aristotle IV.3c The difficulty of defining the perfect person can be seen in the following passage. He must also be open in his hate and in his love (for to conceal one's feelings, i.e. to care less for truth than for what people will think, is a coward's part), and must speak and act openly; for he is free of speech because he is contemptuous, and he is given to telling the truth, except when he speaks in irony to the vulgar. He must be unable to make his life revolve round another, unless it be a friend; for this is slavish, and for this reason all flatterers are servile and people lacking in self-respect are flatterers. Nor is he given to admiration; for nothing to him is great. Nor is he mindful of wrongs; for it is not the part of a proud man to have a long memory, especially for wrongs, but rather to overlook them. Nor is he a gossip; for he will speak neither about himself nor about another, since he cares not to be praised nor for others to be blamed; nor again is he given to praise; and for the same reason he is not an evil-speaker, even about his enemies, except from haughtiness. With regard to necessary or small matters he is least of all men given to lamentation or the asking of favours; for it is the part of one who takes such matters seriously to behave so with respect to them. He is one who will possess beautiful and profitless
49

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M. Karenga, The Moral Ideal in Ancient Egypt, Routledge, 2004, p. 82-110

things rather than profitable and useful ones; for this is more proper to a character that suffices to itself. Comment: Firstly, the passage is rife with contradictions. For instance, one should `be open in his hate and in his love, but `he will speak neither about himself nor about another; or `he is not an evil-speaker, even about his enemies, except from haughtiness. Secondly, these almost Christian perfections (1 Cor 13.4-8) do not compare with respect and responsibility, which constitute the principles of all our decision-making. Thirdly, the sentence, `he cares not to be praised stands in blatant contradiction to Aristotle IV.3a and IV.4. The latter reads, we praise the quality of the man who loves honour more than most people . `Cowardice is a handicap which possibly prevents us from acting responsibly. Therefore, Socrates was wrong in claiming that knowledge necessarily is followed by correct action (Aristotle VII.2). The real thing, however, which hinders responsible action is the wrong approach to parenting, education, and preaching. We are taught to adapt, be kind, obey, follow the rules, be perfect, and love. Those are capacities that come naturally to mammals, but ought not to be accredited highest priority in our decision-making. Aquinas II 65.3, All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. Comment: `Charity can be compared to `agape. Although the statement seems to confirm that social behaviour is innate, it compares with Augustines Love, and do what you want (point 6, above). Celibacy is not the most dreadful consequence of that agape doctrine. Its most devastating consequence is the parental error unfortunately supported by the vast majority of psychologists that if we love our children we cannot do any wrong ( Mackintosh 9-10, 79-80, 191-192). The same error concerns the rest of our relationships. Calvin II 8.6, But God, whose eye nothing escapes, and who regards not the outward appearance so much as purity of heart, under the prohibition of murder, adultery, and thefts includes wrath, hatred, lust, covetousness, and all other things of a similar nature. Being a spiritual Lawgiver, he speaks to the soul not less than the body. The murder which the soul commits is wrath and hatred; the theft, covetousness and avarice; and the adultery, lust. Comment: The statement reveals that the Christian agape doctrine requests us, on top of being perfect, to also distort and deny our bad feelings. This represents a mental rape and an attempt at brainwashing, and it results in a disturbing neurotic dishonesty (Chapter Seven COM 8). We are better to be fully aware of our bad feelings, appreciate rather than criticise and suppress them, investigate their origin, and take responsible decisions in order to cope with them. In terms of lust, which is a good feeling, it is a shame not to enjoy it in a convenient way. Why should a woman not enjoy talking to a charming gentleman? It is understood that mutual respect has absolute priority. This includes the consequence that it is also foolish to prefer and favour the attractive ones to the detriment of others. In addition, the numerous sexual crimes committed by celibate Catholic priests give evidence of the disastrous consequences which result from the suppression of sexual desires.51 There is no doubt that Nietzsches hostility to the agape doctrine targeted that undignified mental and spiritual indoctrination of people and their neurotic dishonesty.
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Moreover, the Roman Inquisition was also a result of an ideological dictatorship that wanted to dominate the most secret thoughts of everybody, in the name of God. Calvin II 8.50, God therefore commands a strong and ardent affection, an affection not to be impeded by any portion, however minute, of concupiscence. He requires a mind so admirably arranged as not to be prompted in the slightest degree contrary to the law of love. Lest you should imagine that this view is not supported by any grave authority, I may mention that it was first suggested to me by Augustine. Comment: The aspect of mental rape (Chapter Seven COM 2), so as to order ultimate surrender of ones thoughts and feelings, is obvious. It seems that one is supposed to live like an angel. Since this seems too difficult for ordinary humans, Calvin II 8.57 offers divine help, which reads, Christians are under the law of grace they are engrafted into Christ, by whose grace they are freed from the curse of the Law, and by whose Spirit they have the Law written in their hearts. ( John Paul 112C) This grace could only be acquired by the suffering God-man. An angel could possibly have mediated between God and man, but not completely erased sin and punishment. (Calvin II 12.1-3). Bhme F (m425-376) 49, If you help your brother but dislike to do so, you do not serve the Lord Thus your donation is given just half and you shall be rewarded but half. Comment: The very wrong idea is refuted in Schmid 8C. In terms of `reward, the responsible action rewards itself, because it accords with our wisdom and dignity. In the case of a disliked responsible action, it would deserve double the reward. That might lead to the absurd idea that celibacy also deserves double the reward in comparison to people who abide by a correct monogamy. Shaftesbury 114 claims that the mutual kindness or imagined love of others is the greatest test of all our pleasures. Comment: The statement would not be agreed to by Bruno, Schiller (Bruno II 1 XIC), and many other artists. Shaftesburys suggestion is a concealed, yet untenable, terrestrial agape doctrine, promising happiness on earth by giving and experiencing love. Schopenhauer 490b, we would like to destroy the sting of the desires, close the entrance against all suffering, and purify and sanctify ourselves by complete and final renunciation Comment: It is not true that our desires are the cause of suffering, as long as they are ruled by temperance and discipline. The Buddhist solution to eliminate and suppress them (Ex 3 COM 23) is neither wise nor dignified, for we are and remain mammals after all the most wonderful way of existence in the universe. Schopenhauers denial of this resembles the absorption sought in agape and celibacy. Schopenhauer 491, Voluntary and complete chastity is the first step in ascetism or denial of the will to live. It thereby denies the assertion of the will which extends beyond the individual life, and gives the assurance that with the life of this body, the will, whose manifestation it is, ceases. Comment: This is not a wise and dignified approach to sexuality, which presents one of the most important and precious gifts in life. It is obvious that the bachelor

philosophers teaching also culminates in the recommendation of celibacy like the agape doctrine. Nietzsche 78, Are we not better to fall into a murderers hand than those of a woman on heat? Comment: Although the slander reflects the philosophers homosexuality, its deeper meaning is a rejection of agape, which indeed is a transferred heat, a permanent spiritual rutting season. Nietzsche would prefer death to living in a Heaven where everyone loves everyone. In fact, the refusal of agape seems to make him even reject heterosexuality. Nietzsche 480, Since morals have proved contradictory and have dissipated, we now urgently need a new purpose, a n e w l o v e. Comment: The fact that the philosopher asks for a new love, reveals that he was not aware of what exactly he was fighting against, which is to say the agape principle. A new love is neither possible nor necessary. This ignorance made it impossible to him to discover the principle of responsibility, which does not produce a superman (which is both impossible and unnecessary), but accords with the wisdom and dignity of a logically thinking being and makes us happy. Russel 13, Our dealings with those whom we love may be safely left to instinct; it is our dealings with those whom we hate that ought to be brought under the dominion of reason. Comment: Neither love nor hatred present the correct criterion in our decision-making, for both might be misguiding. For instance, there is no doubt that numerous people loved Hitler and other dictators with disastrous results. In fact, love can cause as much damage as hatred (Chapter Ten COM 5). John Paul 71: It is precisely through his acts that man attains perfection as man, as one who is called to seek his Creator of his own accord and freely to arrive at full and blessed perfection by cleaving to him. Comment: The ideal of `perfection is a dreadful inheritance of Aristotelian philosophy (Aristotle II.9), which envisages it as the very goal of human development. He made a terrible comparison between the increase in virtue and the creation of a work of art that wants to be made with absolute perfection ( Schmid 53f). The doctrine of responsibility, however, can dispense with those highly questionable, unattainable, and in most cases sanctimonious ideals. In fact, the one who wants to be good desires sympathy and acknowledgement of the others or of God. How boring are those `nice, fine, and faultless characters! We want to act responsibly and the question whether or not we are the most courageous, most moderate, most generous, most helpful, most forgiving, most forthcoming ( Schmid 59), and what other becomes farcical. (Nietzsche was right to rage against such demands.) In fact, the question whether or not Bonhoeffer (Ex 2) was a paragon of virtue does not matter at all. The irrelevance of morality is expertly painted by Sartre in `The Honourable Prostitute. It is very important to see that the classical theory of virtues is bound to make us feel bad or good about ourselves and become either scrupulous or conceited. Its worst effect is the one it has had on parenting. As a matter of fact, countless parents, knowingly or unknowingly, violate their childrens integrity by pursuing their moral perfection; they understand parenting as shaping a work of art. Although it is unfair, in this context one cannot help referring to the fact that Aristotle was the appointed tutor of Alexander the Great, who murdered his father at the age

of twenty and became a ruthless conquerer. On the other hand, Aristotles theory of virtues is the result of the unconsciously traditional and very inappropriate approach lacking in respect to parenting, that presumes that children have to be taught social behaviour. Entitling his `Ethics as `Nicomachian, he demonstrates his being working rather as a father a bad one, who failed to notice that social behaviour was innate than a philosopher. So, Aristotle became the virtual father of all the philosophical `Ethics in the West. John Paul 73: As Saint Cyril of Alexandria writes, Christ `forms us according to his image, in such a way that the traits of his divine nature shine forth in us through sanctification and justice and the life which is good and in conformity with virtue... The beauty of this image shines forth in us who are in Christ, when we show ourselves to be good in our works. Comment: Even if Jesus, as a historical figure, was faultless and perfect (only so according to the Gospel of John), it does not mean that he can take responsibility for our decisions. In addition, the mimicking of other peoples character deforms our personality and is not a dignified way to face the challenges of our personal (all our characters are different), social, and political life (which also differ from each other). Moreover, Jesus knew nothing about the tremendous dangers to which our planet is exposed these days. He even failed to address the most dreadful plight of his time, which was slavery. As another surmise, he possibly shunned the responsibility to address the issue. The reference to Jesus, who was celibate, also seems to insinuate that celibacy is a recommendable consequence of the agape doctrine. John Paul 103: In order to keep the commandments, we need the assistance of Gods grace. Consequently, It is in the saving Cross of Jesus, in the gift of the Holy Spirit, in the Sacraments which flow forth from the pierced side of the Redeemer, that believers find the grace and the strength always to keep God's holy law, even amid the gravest of hardships. Comment: It is not only difficult, but impossible and irrelevant to be perfect and apply the love principle, which, by all means, is insufficient and secondary. Since the principle is wrong and inapplicable, everybody will fail to live up to its overtaxing demands. The teaching of `Gods indispensable assistance, offered by the Church, seems to be a logical sophism, in claiming that it is real, because it is needed. The argument presents a vicious circle of logics. Similarly, nuns, monks, and priests will be able to stand celibacy only with the help of sacraments. John Paul 111: moral theology will acquire an inner spiritual dimension in response to the need to develop fully the imago Dei present in man, Comment: God is celibate and the perfect `image of God cannot be married, either. However, one would rather hope that the experts of a worldwide body like the Catholic Church investigate how the most wise and dignified response to the challenges of globalisation, poverty, conflicts, genetic engineering, disintegration of society, and pollution can be faced. On the other hand, serious Catholic theology has developed brilliant, although still moralistic teachings which concern the true problems of modern world civilisation.52
52

Kng, Weltethos fr Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft

The latter point needs urgent considering, in that it is a very popular meaning in both believers and disbelievers that it helps general social behaviour, if people are admonished and ordered to `be good, although the teaching might lack a supernatural foundation. This is a complete socio-historical misconception. Those admonitions teach people that, if there is no admonition about some actions, they are correct to take them. Such does not make sense. Firstly, it is not possible to give a comprehensive list of responsible and irresponsible decisions. Secondly, no point in such a list can lastly be proven to be relevant in all circumstances. Thirdly, the challenges of new technology and sciences would need preliminary scrutiny by moral experts, and this is not possible. Unless people want to take responsibility, irresponsible decisions are unavoidable, even if they follow all the rules. In parenting, also admonitions not to lie, to kill, to steal are very disturbing and not helpful at all. If the children have been told the truth and their integrity and possessions have been respected, they know exactly that such presents normal social behaviour without which life becomes chaotic and unbearable. If they have been lied to, hurt, and dispossessed, such admonitions are useless, in fact, damaging. It teaches them that they are better to conceal such misdeeds, which leads to a vicious circle of deviation. In fact, a psychogenic syndrome is generated. A similar thing happened in the macrohistory of Christianity. In fact, the Christian nations created colonialism and an excessive capitalism, because it is not literally forbidden by the Bible and Christian morals. Christian hypocrisy in exploiting all the other peoples of the planet is still utterly disturbing. Todays fundamentalist mentality of Christians corroborates that boundless and deadly exploitation of soil, plants, animals, and people. It makes the Christians believe that, if they obey the Bible, they are perfect and without fault and entitled to practice economic colonialism, atrocious slavery, and the cultural destruction of all the other peoples, many of which have higher standards in terms of responsibility and respect. The whole procedure is camouflaged by minimal economic aid to developing countries and totally insufficient private donations. It is evident that there is no spare money on the planet and whatever is too much for some is urgently needed by the others. Thus, the responsible ones want to live as modestly as possible, cause as little pollution as possible, and donate all the money they do not need. It is not possible to be happy other than thus. In terms of the exploitation of animals, responsible people would never engage in research or production in which animals are deprived of well-being and dignity. Such would, in fact, eliminate the most useless and undignified medical experiments with animals that have led to the moral difficulties of modern medical science ( Nickl 99a, 99b, 142148a, 148c, 155, 169c-170). We are punished for this by the far too prolonged therapies, the unpayable cost of them, and interventions that prolong the suffering of dying people, and the undignified existence of living corpses in our homes and clinics, while the poor nations are unable to give medical assistance to their sick and disabled persons. As a consequence of all this, it is foolish to conclude that the teaching of Christian morals cannot be damaging. Furthermore, the lack of a valid doctrine of responsibility is the cause of the most destructive evils to modern society, which was already referred to by Socrates, Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved. What evils? Wealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent. (Plato R IV 4) John Paul 115, God asks us to be holy as he is holy (cf. Lev 19:2), to be in Christ perfect as he is perfect (cf. Mt 5:48).

Comment: Bonhoeffer 12 correctly unmasks the search for personal perfection as a refuge for those who do not want to take responsibility. The ideal of perfection has been rebuked above (John Paul 71). Bahro R 233-235 puts forward that the patriarchal society was the chief error of the occidental culture, and it produced slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and finally the erasure of life altogether. Comment: Such explanations violate the principle of responsibility, incriminating our forebears. They are also useless, for, no matter who or what caused the problems, logical thinking asks us to overcome them. Whenever we fall short of our responsibility, we lack either knowledge or courage; the former is immature, the latter undignified. In addition, the problems are little to do with patriarchy or matriarchy; such philosophies present hidden theories of celibacy by putting one gender in the wrong and the other in the right. It is also comparable with Goethes approach (Chapter Seven COM 1).

Chapter Seven: Social Behaviour and Agape

Social Behaviour Agape

Normality

Absorption

COMMENT: 1) It is obvious that the agape doctrine aims to ennoble social behaviour, as though it should allow us to achieve a divine standard, combined with feelings of infinite pain and bliss, as it is ingeniously pictured in Claudels `Le Soulier de Satin, where Prouhze says, A blade right through my heart. It accords with Brunos amorous martyrdom (Bruno I 4), suffered by men of heroic spirit ( Bruno II 1 II). It is also referred to in the last scene of `Faust by Goethe, which resembles a religious service; the suffering of the female redeems the male. The mental absorption results in a mystical orgasm. 2) The order to love equates with mental and spiritual rape. Numerous people that have been traumatised by early rapes are prone to promiscuity in later life. Similarly, people who have undergone spiritual rape unhealthily adhere to their gurus and scriptures, and can never get enough of gushing about their happiness to others, desperately trying to convert them, too. During their religious services, they often exhibit an orgiastic enthusiasm. As a rule, the gurus have sexual intercourse with their most attractive devotees. 3) The so-called Golden Rule in Tob 4.15 reads, Do that to no man which thou hatest: . Such makes good general advice in terms of social behaviour, not so in the responsible decision-making. It is not possible to formulate any rule concerning

behaviour that might not be constantly overruled. If the above rule was valid, the dentist would be supposed not to bill the patient. Instead of questioning the rule, Mt 7.12 confirms and enhances it by putting it positively, Do for others what you want them to do for you: this is the meaning of the Law of Moses and of the teachings of the prophets. The positive statement goes far beyond the negative one. The former would ask us not to steal from the others, while the latter would intimate to donate all our possessions. The positive statement, therefore, can be considered a short definition of agape. Augustine CoG XIV 8, referring to this passage, correctly states, who would deny that it were wrong to enjoin upon men that whatever they desire others to do to them they should themselves do to others, lest they should mutually please one another by shameful and illicit pleasure? The philosopher suggests that good will, which cannot have evil for its object is the indispensible presupposition of all our actions. This teaching comes close to the doctrine of responsibility and almost refutes the agape teaching, for it is undoubted that the agents in the Five Examples were of `good will, but acted against the love principle. The wording in the Gospel, however, tends to spell out the agape principle and is misleading. 4) Kosan 6-8 undertakes to transport the sexual principles from the biological to the spiritual level. It results in a kind of philosophical Buddhism with encompassing love of the earth, plants, animals, and people, usually practised with esoteric enthusiasm. The respective communities would like to engage in a spiritual intercourse by using a technique of mutual fondling and cuddling. Psychologically, the emotional absorption results in an attempt to crawl back into mothers womb, however, not as individuals, but as twins. The inadequate transposition of the biological principle of love to the level of spirituality can be illustrated by adopting the same method with regard to the physical and biological spheres. In the physical sphere, crystallisation is the most perfect informative principle. It means that the same molecules are able to assemble themselves and form homogenous bodies which exclude all the other types of molecules. For instance, ice includes in its crystalline structure only water molecules, although it is able to surround a piece of wood. The piece of wood remains wood. It does not become ice. It is as though the water molecules were able to recognise their counterparts and so crystallise into ice with those exclusively. If this principle of crystallisation is transplanted to the biological level, spouses, in an ideal marriage, would permanently stay as close to each other as the water molecules in a block of ice. Love, however, keeps the living creatures perfectly separated from each other, but unifies them for the moments of procreation. It is nothing to do with crystallisation. Similarly, it is not possible to adopt the biological love principle on the level of knowledge, spirituality, responsibility, and respect. The logically thinking being also wants to respect the things which it is not able to love, and it fights against friends, if necessary. 5) In terms of Christian theology, the undue transposition of the biological principle of love to the spiritual level is illustrated in Augustine CoG XIV 7. He explains that the Scriptures of our religion, whose authority we prefer to all writings whatsoever, make no distinction between amor, dilectio, and caritas; . `Amor means `love, `dilectio can be translated as `preference, while `caritas corresponds to `agape. The middle term, `dilectio (which means `selection), clearly includes the idea that `love is

selective by definition and thus belongs to the biological sphere, where the female chooses a convenient partner and shuns all the others. 6) While social behaviour is an incredibly wonderful endowment for all mammals and definitely is a part of normality, the agape doctrine is an undue enlargement that leads to distortions. It is unrealistic, unnecessary, untenable, and, while it defines itself the epitome of human existence, absolutely insufficient. Corresponding examples of this have been presented in Ex 5 COM 5. 7) The invention of the agape doctrine proves that `social behaviour, which was defined in the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament, appeared insufficient. Rather than developing a valid doctrine of responsibility, Christian theology chose to extend, idealise, and exaggerate the principle of social behaviour. Christ was the incarnation of love; he, who was innocent, died for our sins. 8) Countless mystic writings, prayers, and poems exhibit the fervour, intensity, and style of erotic poetry. In a spiritual context, the most voluptuous sensations become legitimate and hope to reach a mystical orgasm. The soul is Gods bride. Necessarily, she wants God all to herself. The brain is absorbed in a sea of feelings that would only be appropriate to a mating couple. In fact, the real mating hopefully results in an orgasm and the brain will be thoroughly relaxed, while the mystical trance constitutes an abuse of brain power. Many of those people become a burden on the others in their practical helplessness. Sometimes they develop disturbingly high levels of selfesteem. It is the psychologists task to exactly locate the mental position of such aberrations (Mackintosh 175-178). 9) This philosophical approach has to refute the moral presumption that such a mystical approach has absolute priority and superiority, as though it were the very thing God expects us to do. Such a definition is unfair on the believers, who have to struggle with their responsibilities and will always feel inadequate with such high demands. It provokes feelings of guilt and inferiority and absorbs spiritual resources that could be used in a better way. Moreover, it can also result in the conscious or secret contempt of oneself and, as a psychologically unavoidable consequence, of others. 10) A similar type of love doctrine was also developed in Hindu Bhakti literature, which originated from South India in the 13 th bn. It often promotes an emotional, semi-erotic love of God, which is symbolised in the love of the female guards of the holy cows for God Krishna. In fact, the major part of Bhakti literature consists of lovesongs and bridal hymns, combined with music and dance ... They venerate the Gods feet (a weirdness also practised by the devotees of Adidam) and engage in charitable services God is considered a saviour and redeemer, who descends from heaven, wants to be near to people to assist them. The love-making couple, eternal and inseparable in its love, is the preferably chosen metaphor of an ideal man-God relationship (Michaels 283-284).

Topic History and Comments

The teaching of Confucius (Darga 36) reveals a tendency of overrating the virtue of tolerance and mutual adaptation, which comes close to the agape doctrine. In fact, he praises solidarity as the highest of the values. He is not fond of religious rituals and traditions, but recommends for the sake of a harmonious living together to attend to them (Darga 37). Comment: This position is unacceptable, since many of those rites are cruel, misleading, and degrading, as are, for instance, circumcision, kosher slaughtering, celibacy, and the countless forms of psycho-terror and incrimination. Confucius misinterpreted the role of religion in terms of its spiritual, mental, and social relevance (Chapter Twelve 5, 8-15, p191); he actually considered it a burden on society. Plato R V 21, For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall maintain to be honourable and right; we shall make the protection of the person a matter of necessity. Comment: The statement confirms the correctness of self-defence. Unfortunately, the principle of defensive violence ( Mackintosh 222-223) has been more and more undermined by the love principle and has practically vanished from our fundamental rights, in that we are held to tolerate violence, lay charges against the offender, and have the judicial system deal with their punishment. The system furthers criminality and deprives people of dignity and independence. True Christians are even supposed to offer the aggressor additional opportunity of doing harm to them (Mt 5.39). Thus, Platos correct statement contradicts the agape doctrine. However, selfdefence has to be strictly distinguished from revenge. The latter is unwise and undignified. The same has to be said of judicial punishment. Aristotle VII.1a Let us now make a fresh beginning and point out that of moral states to be avoided there are three kinds -- vice, incontinence, brutishness. The contraries of two of these are evident, -- one we call virtue, the other continence; to brutishness it would be most fitting to oppose superhuman virtue, a heroic and divine kind of virtue, as Homer has represented Priam saying of Hector that he was very good, `For he seemed not the child of a mortal man, but as one that of God's seed came. Therefore if, as they say, men become gods by excess of virtue, of this kind must evidently be the state opposed to the brutish state; for as a brute has no vice or virtue, so neither has a god; his state is higher than virtue, and that of a brute is a different kind of state from vice. Comment: It is pleasant to fathom that we are superior to animals. In fact, there is a difference in our capacity to think logically without being stimulated to do so by hunger, thirst, or other needs ( Mackintosh 45-70), and thus religion, culture, and technology distinguish us from animals in a relevant way. However, in terms of behaviour, it does not make sense to attribute humans superiority, not even if it is qualified by responsibility. For instance, the elephant bull that defends his herd has to be granted the same appreciation as a human hero. The difference is that all of them do it, while people may fail to take responsibility. We then arbitrarily conclude that with animals that behaviour results from an instinct, while with humans it is caused by heroism. However, responsibility does have a somewhat divine quality in that it is autonomous (Chapter Eight). In addition, Aristotles statement indicates that `virtuousness may not be regarded as the most perfect state of humans. With regard to the aspect of heroism, refer to Ex 1 COM 4. Spinoza II PROP. XLIXb, we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us. Comment: The philosopher argues that the perfection of God, which is also present in all creatures, works to this effect. Although social behaviour is innate in mammals

as a somewhat perfect quality, the terms love and piety suggest a moral perfection which is neither real nor necessary. It is, however, true that responsibility allows for a somewhat perfect happiness (Ex 3 COM 2). Shaftesbury 70b-71a, there is a constant relation to the interest of a species or common nature. This has been demonstrated in the case of natural affection, parental kindness, concern for the nurture of the young, love of fellowship and company, compassion, mutual succour, and the rest of this kind. Nor will any one deny that this affection of a creature towards the good of the species or common nature is as proper and natural to him as it is to any organ, part, or member of an animal body, or mere vegetable, to work in its known course and regular way of growth. Comment: The statement is almost correct in terms of social behaviour, innate in all mammals. The philosopher, however, exaggerates; there are also fights within those species. The statement goes too close to the agape doctrine, while innate social behaviour includes competition and, with humans, wants to be controlled by responsibility. The correct teaching can be found in Shaftesbury 74-75a. Schopenhauer 489-490a, Man sees wherever he looks suffering humanity, the suffering of the brute creation, and a world that passes away Why should he now, with such knowledge of the world, assert this very life through constant acts of will, and thereby bind himself ever more close to it, press it ever more firmly to himself? that knowledge of the whole becomes a quieter of all and every volition. The will now turns away from life; it now shudders at the pleasures in which it recognises the assertion of life. Man now attains to the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true indifference, and perfect will-lessness. Comment: The statement indicates that the theory of commiseration (Schopenhauer 485a) also leads to an absorbing attitude that expresses itself not in celibacy, but the abandonment of every will to live, as though we would be better to disappear. The philosophers conclusion is comparable to the theory of celibacy in so far as it denies not only sexuality, but life altogether. Rather than questioning the absurd principles of his philosophy (how can will, which is a synonym of life under the aspect of self-preservation, turn away from life?), the philosopher concludes that our mammalian life and existence is absurd. In fact, no philosophy can prove that Life is good, because Life exceeds all such parameters. That shortcoming in recognition cannot justify the conclusion that life, volition, and pleasure are bad. Nietzsche 88-89, You covet your neighbour and give that desire a lovely name, but I tell you, your love of your neighbour is your bad love of yourself The `You is older than the `I and has been canonised; thus man clings to one another You invite others to listen to your admiration of yourself, and no sooner have they been seduced to think good of you, than you think good of yourself, too. Comment: In this way, familial and amicable sympathy is ridiculed. Likewise, love of oneself is derided. The unjustified and absurd rejection of these precious values (Nietzsche 27C) is caused by Nietzsches correct concept that love cannot be the ultimate principle in terms of our decision-making. Instead of developing a doctrine of responsibility, he throws out the baby with the bathwater and promotes a ruthless and remorseless heroism, for which exclusively the work counts (Nietzsche 472). It is obvious that he also wanted to contradict Schopenhauers theory of commiseration (Schopenhauer 485a).

Nietzsche 294, There is an ancient mania, whose name is Good and Bad. Comment: In terms of our decision-making, the philosopher is correct in refuting the parameters of good and bad and their excess in the agape doctrine, to which the term mania refers. Other than that, he is completely wrong, as though feelings and social behaviour were irrelevant. Moreover, the term Good would also include the absolute values of life and existence, which is absurd, since they exceed all the thinkable parameters. Nietzsche 295, `Thou shalt not rob. Thou shalt not kill. such words were sacrosanct; we went down on our knees, bowed our heads, and took off our shoes in front of them. The philosopher then explains that those laws would contradict the supreme principle of life, which is self-assertion which, as it were, was based on robbery and killing. Oh my brothers, pray destroy and delete the Tablets of old! Comment: Rejection of innate social behaviour also means refuting a basic law of our mammalian existence, not only the orders given by God. It is true that we feed on kill, but not on our own species. Moreover, responsibility may choose to risk our lives for a good cause (Ex 2, 3, and 5). Nevertheless, Nietzsche is right in asserting that social behaviour has to give way to a responsible decision (Ex 1, 4, and 5). Bahro R 44 suggests love to be the comprehensive discipline of the open heart. Comment: It is difficult to philosophically come to terms with such enigmatic statements. It seems, however, that it includes a glorification of love. The Five Examples, however, illustrate that neither social behaviour nor love is a valid parameter in a responsible decision-making. For instance, if one had spoken these words to the father (Ex 1) while he was strangling his daughter, he would have been bewildered. In addition, only responsibility is a comprehensive discipline. Bahro R 205 states that M. Gorbachovs love was the main motive behind the positive changes in the Eastern Bloc. Comment: It is more likely that innate social behaviour and a sense of responsibility initiated the changes in the repressive system ( Bonhoeffer 10C5). However, Gorbachovs decision to step down in m8 seems irresponsible; he behaved like a captain who deserts his ship, which he, after seventy years of sailing in the wrong direction, has reversed. It is true that he had no real mandate anymore and, therefore, unfortunately chose political correctness over responsibility. It is, however, not the philosophers thing to judge people, but ideas. H.-P. Hempel, in Bahro 175, suggests that man has a natural aggression, which made the atom bomb possible. Comment: The USA built the atom bomb in order to defend itself. Hitler wanted the weapon, too, and he would have dropped it on London. His was a perverse aggression, whereas the US defensive engagement was normal and responsible. Aggression is always sick, since it contravenes innate social behaviour; it is not a result of thinking, but of fear. Consequently, there is no such thing as a natural aggression which would be directed against the own species, whereas competition, which does not contradict social behaviour, is a powerful means to maintain and improve standards. Adidam 15-16 It is not true that wars are caused by the political and economic ambitions of states. Or by nationalistic pride. Or by ethnic and religious tensions. Or to maintain a ruling elite. Or to redress past humiliations. Or even to protect the

innocent from injustice. All of these along with innumerable other ambitions, needs, and injuries obviously have their role in conflicts of all kinds, including war. Nevertheless, the reasons and justifications humankind offers for war, however compelling or perhaps even apparently noble, are at their root simply pretexts and excuses. They mask something more fundamental. They mask the real cause of war. In the Essay `On Liberation from ego and egoic Society, or, Cooperation+Tolerance=Peace, the Divine World-Teacher, Ruchira Avatar Adi Da Samraj, calls humankind to understand that the root cause of not only war, but of every kind of collective human conflict, including crime, violence, exploitation, prejudice, and neglect, is something for which each one of us can and must become responsible. His argument is simple and straightforward: All destructive human conflict, of which war is the terrible epitome, is the inevitable consequence and expression of egoity itself. Just being `me, just being the separate, independent, and decidedly mortal person that each of us takes himself or herself to be in an underlying state of mortal fear of and therefore conflict with the total natural world, including ones fellow human beings. In other words, so long as we live and think and act as an ego-`I, we will despite our best intentions to the contrary behave as an aggressor. Perhaps we will not do this in an overtly destructive way. Nevertheless, no matter what we may think of ourselves, or how we may appear to others, as egos we are anxious, defensive, competitive (or uncooperative), intolerant, emotionally invulnerable, and always ready to lash out at whatever might appear to threaten our self-image, our pleasure, and our survival. Every ego-`I has these qualities. Human maturity comes from knowing this about ourselves and understanding that such behaviour is completely unacceptable. Comment: We are not plants that do not harm one another, but animals which have to fight, strive, compete, hunt, and kill. There is absolutely nothing wrong about that. It is only the neurotic aspect of our greediness which damages ourselves and others. Destroying the ego-identity is irresponsible in itself, since we have to firmly resist aggressive violence, even if this includes acting violently. If we would allow everybody just to take away all our assets, the whole system of property would collapse and life would become unbearable, in fact impossible. Even as vegetarians, we would still have to kill plants to survive, since we cannot feed on rocks and water. Adidams theory compares with a reversed celibacy, in that it wants us to become the infinitely loving spouses of one another in an absorbing permanent spiritual mating. Sexuality and love, however, are selective and include competition. Selection and competition are valuable characteristics of our mammalian life. Adidams teaching accords with Buber 10-11.

Chapter Eight: Responsibility and Morals

Responsibility Morals

Autonomy

Heteronomy

COMMENT: 1) In Ex 2, one can very well see that Bonhoeffers decision is perfectly autonomous. In fact, he does not quote anybody or any Scripture in order to justify his decision. His reference to Gods command ( Bonhoeffer 13d) is not relevant, because `God, in this context, is not an outer, but inner `authority, which is to say, the heros intellect. On the other hand, morals that define their standards as mandatory as duties need an outer justification. Duties are based on laws or contracts. They generate rights. For instance, the President of a State has numerous duties, but he is also granted all the rights and privileges necessary to fulfil these duties. Responsibility, however, does not generate rights. The conspirators in Ex 2 do not have the right to kill Hitler. Their decision is the result of their autonomous wish to act in the most wise and dignified way in the given circumstances. The complete confusion of those philosophical distinctions can be subsumed in the sentence, quoted below (John Paul 34b) The conscience has rights because it has duties. The fact that responsibility does not create rights also has a positive aspect in that we want to live in a humble, modest, and unpretentious way, although many highranking positions seem to include the `right or even the `duty to live in luxury. That is why Pertini (Ex 3) refused to live in Quirinal Palace, the luxurious official residence of Italian Presidents.53 2) Brunos doctrine of heroism is able to demonstrate the negative aspect of responsibility, which takes the most dreadful consequences into account. One would presume that those consequences ought to be restricted to ones own detriment, but such is definitely not the case. Except Bonhoeffer (Ex 2) and Samson (Ex 4), the protagonists in Examples 1, 3, and 4 escape, while their victims perish. In a strange, illogical way, `heroism which is a socio-political parameter is primarily attributed to the ones who suffered and died in the course of the events. How little an understanding of what responsibility is all about has been developed in Western society can be seen from the fact that ninety-nine percent of people reading Ex 1 react indignantly, as though the Chief, the father, and the tribe were cowards. The issue has been addressed in Ex 1 COM 4. At this point, it has to be recognised that, unless one is able to qualify positively the decision-making of those wise people, one has not managed to acquire an adequate idea of responsibility and its independence from morals, yet. The very numerous and, for want of a valid doctrine of responsibility, cryptic references to `freedom in John Pauls encyclical (ex gr 7, 13, 17) can only be applied to the responsible decision-making; it is indeed free and thoroughly autonomous. Brunos doctrine of heroism seems to indulge in a similarly unilateral populism, without being wrong for that matter. The term `heroism is ambiguous. Marathon runners can be given credit in terms of heroism, too. 3) Bonhoeffer 12 blames virtuousness as a psychological haven of refuge for the ones who do not take responsibility.

53

S. Caretti, M. d. Innocenti, Sandro Pertini - Combattente per la Libert, Casa Editrice Piero Lacaita, Roma 2002, p. 370

4) In terms of politics, Habermas criticises the `social state (which can be considered a consequence of political responsibility) for its intrusiveness into the privacy of its clients. He chooses to distinguish between the `lived reality and the `system. He stipulates a `public opinion-making (Oeffentlichkeit) in order to check the excesses of that intrusiveness (Dubiel 116-121). Public opinion would then be the highest moral watchdog. It seems that many modern politicians, indeed, check internet blogs to get information about how people feel about specific subjects. However, such informations cannot be the decisive factor in legislation. Unless it is done responsibly and possibly (if not usually) against that internet majority it will not make them happy. In addition, blogs can be manipulated and may tend to extremism. Therefore, only responsibility and respect, for that matter at all levels can check the intrusiveness each system is prone to. There is also social behaviour that wants to avoid unnecessary intrusiveness. In that sense, Habermas approach seems too pessimistic. There are millions of public servants who try their best, respecting their clients. The clients themselves can signal their amazement at any inappropriate behaviour. Therefore, the distinction between the `lived reality and the `system does not seem as critical as Habermas supposes; the `system makes an integral part of the `lived reality wherever and whenever, and it wants to be handled in a fair and responsible way. In addition, there cannot be a `system that outmanoeuvres responsibility. Developed in the first half of 1 st bn, which saw two World Wars, the Existentialist Philosophies and the Frankfurt School, took a self-pitying approach to the challenges of life; we want to be good, but there is always someone or something that undertakes to interfere with that. With the Existentialists, it is homelessness (Heidegger), nausea (Sartre), ignorance (Wittgenstein), death (Malraux), decay (Camus), economy (Fromm), absurdity (Anouilh), while the Frankfurt School incriminates the Enlightenment and Habermas the system. The fact, however, is the following; even if someone lived on an island all by himself, he is to confront a system that of loneliness. In addition, equal chances for everybody ( Horster 15) could only be achieved on that lonely island. Existentialism and the pessimism of the Frankfurt School are understandable in the view of the horrors of World War I and II, which those authors witnessed and in which the majority of them proved lacking in responsibility. ( Bonhoeffer 10C1). Historically, the biased approach can be traced back to Rousseau ( Rousseau I 2C4). In the context of this chapter, Habermas approach seems an inversion of what was considered one of the most important points in morals. For thousands of years, it was the job of the community to criticise and control the individual, whereas, with Habermas, the individual is called to criticise and correct the community. Both the traditional and Habermas approach lack conclusive evidence, for, where would either authority to rule the counterpart come from? In addition, both ways present heteronomous morals. In fact, if a system is appropriate, responsibility will want to maintain it. If it is inappropriate, responsibility will want to change it. So, the autonomy of responsibility is evident also in democratic politics. 5) The term `autonomy needs further clarification. Russel 24 is wrong when claiming, We may say that thought is free when it is exposed to free competition among beliefs i.e. when all beliefs are able to state their case, and no legal or pecuniary advantages or disadvantages attach to beliefs. This is an idea which, for various reasons, can never be fully attained. But it is possible to approach very much nearer to it than we do at the present.

Russell is referring to his personal negative experiences as a confessing agnostic in Britain in the early 1st bn. He is right in his criticism of that. All the same, one does not allow for anybody to venture extreme thoughts or molest others by inappropriate behaviour. We can eat what we like and when we like, but not when living with our family. It is a privilege to live in Germany, and if the vast majority of its population feels deeply offended by public denial of the Holocaust, it makes sense to forbid it. Who wants to have people walking the streets naked or driving in a city without respecting any traffic rules? Should they be allowed to try it for ten years in order to state their case? Autonomy, therefore, is only accounted for in terms of responsible decision-making. There is also a general misunderstanding in democracies. No sooner does the community endeavour to impose restrictions on the individual, than there is a loud outcry that democracy itself is threatened. Nowadays, smokers feel offended by regulations in terms of their loss of rights. They forget that their freedom to smoke wherever and whenever they liked was a system, too, which forced the non-smokers to leave the place or have no choice but to inhale the smoke. As a matter of fact, democracy will only be in danger, if citizens are not free to make political decisions. 6) Locke 37 addresses the question, whether or not we are obliged to become philosophers that scrutinise every aspect of reality. He concludes that one man's want of leisure is no excuse for the oscitancy and ignorance of those who have time to spare; and everyone has enough to get as much knowledge as is required and expected of him, and he that does not that is in love with ignorance and is accountable for it. The truth is that, fortunately, no one can make us accountable for not using our spare time in philosophical research. Moreover, to declare philosophical research a moral duty would fail to generate better philosophers. Philosophers want to find out the truth. It is, however, irresponsible to make decisions without the effort to acquire the necessary knowledge. Responsibility, on its part, is wanted by whoever wants to be happy. Nevertheless, it is not a duty to be happy. 7) Kant claims that morality centres on a law that human beings impose on themselves, necessarily providing themselves, in doing so, with a motive to obey. (Schneewind 483). The terms `law, `impose, and `obey are misleading. `Laws can only be established by formal or informal contracts and they generate duties and rights. Responsibility wants to be autonomous in terms of laws, contracts, duties, and rights. For instance, Bonhoeffer, by returning from USA in m61, entered an informal contract with Hitler to accept his leadership ( Bonhoeffer 10C1). However, he intended to fight the dictator. Kants autonomy seems artificial, whereas responsibility wants to be really autonomous, not following any sort of obligation, but choosing its decisions according to its wisdom and dignity. Kant actually asks us to make a psychological quantum leap, so as to freely and autonomously choose a moral life despite its restrictive implications, and thus become moral super-heroes who choose submission over freedom, or choose freedom in voluntary slavery. Such stilted arguments leave a didactical aftertaste, whereas Bonhoeffers (Ex 2) wrestling with himself reveals that philosophy had failed to establish a correct doctrine of responsibility. In fact, one would have difficulty in finding a sentence in Kants Critique of Practical Reason which could have helped Bonhoeffers philosophical effort. 8) Practical philosophy wants to teach how we can be happy. Schopenhauer 349-350 seems to reject this notion, when he states,

Virtue cannot be taught anymore than genius; indeed, for the concept is just as unfruitful as it is in art, and in both cases can only be used as an instrument. It would, therefore, be just as absurd to expect that our moral systems and ethics will produce virtuous, noble, and holy men as that our aesthetics would produce poets, painters and musicians. The argument is invalid. Aesthetics never aims to produce poets, painters, and musicians, but to help them to improve their performance; artists themselves like to take and give advice. Similarly, practical philosophy wants to teach everybody how to take another approach to their decision-making. If such a teaching were useless, as the philosopher claims, his raging against the Hegelians ( Schopenhauer XXVIXXVII) would also be pointless, for, if his teaching has no effect, Hegels errors can do no damage, either. As a matter of fact, Practical Philosophy can be very influential (Bonhoeffer 21aC). 9) Pertinis speech (Ex 3) also seems to disprove Schopenhauers 383-385 conclusions. Initially, he correctly states that man, as distinguished from the brutes, has a complete choice, and then he concludes that this power of deliberation which man possesses is one of those things that makes his existence so much more miserable than that of the brute which lives only in the present, and therefore in enviable carelessness Thus, the philosopher is far from a correct doctrine of responsibility, which considers responsibility the very cause of happiness, although it may sometimes make us feel unhappy. Schopenhauers teaching accords with the view in the Koran 33:72 (Chapter Three 15, p45). Pertini, however, knew and taught that responsible decisions make us happy. Topic History and Comments Plato R IV 11, And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just. Comment: The classical teaching of the four main virtues wisdom, courage, temperance, justice has to be refuted. They have different qualities and priorities in terms of the doctrine of responsibility. Wisdom has absolute priority. Courage, however, is only desirable as long as it is controlled by wisdom. And it is only required, if the consequences of the decision may be hazardous to the subjects wellbeing. Temperance and justice, on the other hand, cannot be applied to a responsible decision-making at all. They, at the most, present useful aspects of social behaviour, while responsibility may be absolutely intemperate and unjust. In Ex 1, there is no justice whatsoever in that the innocent infant should die and the killers survive. In Ex 2, temperance would ask for some soft, political resistance to the system rather than killing Hitler. Such is also the case in Ex 3. In Ex 4, Ulysses could possibly have succeeded in his quest by just killing half or less of the suitors, but it did not make sense to take that risk. There is neither justice nor temperance in Samsons (Ex 5) decision to kill all the Philistine Princes and himself. It is very important to see that the teaching of temperance and justice often hinders responsible decision-making. This can be seen from the moderate degree in which the rich practise their generosity, or from the cautious approach of most people to the resistance to terror and dictatorship, as it is denounced in Bonhoeffer 23a. The classical teaching of the four cardinal virtues concerns only social behaviour. Responsibility, respect, and hope definitely constitute better principles of correctness. However, it is neither possible nor necessary to define a catalogue of which qualities

are required for each concrete decision-making. The Indian Vetalapanshavinsati 15, for instance, counts discretion as the most desirable social quality ( Mackintosh 203); in fact, most relationship problems are produced by idle talk that provokes conflict. Finally, life is so rich and various that it is very strange to suppose that exactly four principles should cover all the aspects of our correct decision-making. The author himself has always been bewildered by this disturbing doctrine, because he thinks that there is either one or no principle at all. The doctrine of responsibility accounts for a single principle and certainly covers all the aspects of it. Plato R VI 2 suggests that philosophers ought to rule the States, because they have perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them Comment: It is obvious that social behaviour is considered a divinely pre-existing ideal, according to which human life is supposed to be lived. That idealistic view of social behaviour, which constitutes the sense of the Biblical and traditional moral behaviour of all times, unfortunately leaves no room for any transcending and occasionally opposite responsibility. Bonhoeffer (Ex 2) never mentions one of those divinely inspired philosophers, whose teaching could have supported his heroic decision. Moreover, all of them prove unable to correctly qualify such actions as mentioned in 1 Cor 13.7C. Still more regrettable, they fail to address the environmental and political responsibilities of humans. Plato R IX 27, Glaucon suggests that man ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant, but because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external authority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends and equals. `True, he (Socrates) said. `And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we exercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a state, and by cultivation of this higher element have set up in their hearts a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their ways. Comment: It is true that laws are the instruments which intend to enforce social behaviour. However, Plato denies that social behaviour is innate and precedes the laws. He is, therefore, unable to see that every external authority, including the one of parents, is secondary. All the less is he able to define that responsibility overrules both social behaviour and the laws. Plato, in his dual philosophical system, would have been right in stating that responsibility was ruled by divine wisdom, since, in fact, the responsible decision-making belongs to a higher-ranking category of conduct than social behaviour. The mere existence of laws, jurisdiction, and incarceration, however, seems to disprove the claim that social behaviour is innate in humans. However, those institutions are but insufficient and mostly ineffective attempts to correct the psychogenic disorders in humans, which, in their vast majority, were generated by the inadequate handling of children by their caregivers. Psychology has failed to determine the true origin of criminality in its various degrees. It is promised that Mackintosh 236-238 will make up for lost time. Philosophically, it is obvious that laws are based on social behaviour, not vice versa. It would be equally absurd to claim

that the mere existence of spectacles, magnifiers, telescopes, and optometrists proves that sufficient sight is not innate in humans. Therefore, the authority of the wise philosopher-king is not necessary, and parents are better to take care not to damage the innate social behaviour in their children, rather than teaching them obedience. Normally gifted children who have always been treated with respect and honesty by their caregivers will very easily outshine them in terms of social behaviour. Heteronomous morals, as though coming from a celestial domain, are not necessary. Responsibility is all the more autonomous and cannot be warranted by the ever so wise kingly decisions. Aristotle III.1c makes a valid approach to a definition of a responsible decisionmaking. But if some one were to say that pleasant and noble objects have a compelling power, forcing us from without, all acts would be for him compulsory; for it is for these objects that all men do everything they do. And those who act under compulsion and unwillingly act with pain, but those who do acts for their pleasantness and nobility do them with pleasure; it is absurd to make external circumstances responsible, and not oneself, as being easily caught by such attractions, and to make oneself responsible for noble acts but the pleasant objects responsible for base acts. The compulsory, then, seems to be that whose moving principle is outside, the person compelled contributing nothing. Comment: The rule is valid. For instance, survivors of a plane crash in the high mountains correctly started feeding on the frozen corpses of their fellow passengers.54 This was a responsible procedure. However, they were not compelled from the outside to do so, but from their hunger and their decision to survive without hurting anyone. Ex 1, 4, and 5 also indicate that the distinction between an autonomous decision and the outside compulsion cannot be essential. One cannot say that the tribe was forced to kill the baby (Ex1), and both Ulysses (Ex 4) and Samson (Ex 5) could have chosen to give in. Vice versa, if mountaineers caught in a severe storm and their rescue costs several more lives, they are not necessarily excused by the fact that the weather is an outside force. The question is whether they have taken due care to prepare for the expedition and examine the weather conditions. Consequently, responsibility wants to take into account all conditions, be they within (whether or not one has the strength to stand the expedition) or without (whether the weather, the temperature, etc. allow for it). In fact, the distinction between intrisic and extrinsic conditions is somewhat artificial. For instance, drug addiction seems a despicable habit coming from within. However, French singer Edith Piaf became addicted because a night nurse overdosed her with morphine to make her sleep.55 Our judgmental way of thinking about such conundrums is inclined to excuse Piaf. Young people, however, who started taking drugs out of frustration, maliciously drugged by dealers, or seduced by their best friends, will be accused and punished. Those judicial and common sense approaches are inappropriate and unwise. They are inconclusive and punishment is a hopeless answer to them. The passage is also correct in avoiding the term of `virtue. Aristotle III.7 What is terrible is not the same for all men; but we say there are things terrible even beyond human strength. These, then, are terrible to every one -- at least
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http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,910506,00.html
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2007/jun/20/worldmusic.biography

to every sensible man; but the terrible things that are not beyond human strength differ in magnitude and degree, and so too do the things that inspire confidence. Now the brave man is as dauntless as man may be. Therefore, while he will fear even the things that are not beyond human strength, he will face them as he ought and as the rule directs, for honour's sake; for this is the end of virtue. But it is possible to fear these more, or less, and again to fear things that are not terrible as if they were. Of the faults that are committed one consists in fearing what one should not, another in fearing as we should not, another in fearing when we should not, and so on; and so too with respect to the things that inspire confidence. The man, then, who faces and who fears the right things and from the right motive, in the right way and from the right time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions, is brave; for the brave man feels and acts according to the merits of the case and in whatever way the rule directs. Now the end of every activity is conformity to the corresponding state of character. This is true, therefore, of the brave man as well as of others. But courage is noble. Therefore the end also is noble; for each thing is defined by its end. Therefore it is for a noble end that the brave man endures and acts as courage directs. Comment: The passage contains several aspects of a responsible decision-making in terms of fear and courage. The philosopher, however, recurs to a cryptic and misleading term, when talking about what the rule directs. Wisdom and dignity are not rules, but the absolute which means unregulated principles of happiness. The complexity of the argument indicates that the philosophers unilateral project is to prove that humans ought to be brave. It is one of the countless attempts to clone the characters of people, the very thing that has caused the worst mayhem in history. We will only proceed wisely and be happy, if we learn to be more fearful of the coming disastrous possibilities and take all the care available to restrain them. It is foolish and undignified to be brave, considering the long term prospects of modern society and life on our planet. Thus, to be brave can be irresponsible. In addition, the phrase, the brave man feels and acts according to the merits of the case ought to be corrected, so as to read, `the autonomous man decides according to the merits of the case, although he might feel unhappy. Aristotle III.9 death and wounds will be painful to the brave man and against his will, but he will face them because it is noble to do so or because it is base not to do so. And the more he is possessed of virtue in its entirety and the happier he is, the more he will be pained at the thought of death; for life is best worth living for such a man, and he is knowingly losing the greatest goods, and this is painful. But he is none the less brave, and perhaps all the more so, because he chooses noble deeds of war at that cost. Comment: The former sentence corresponds to a valid theory of responsibility. The latter, perhaps, includes the distinction between feeling and being happy. In fact, the responsible fighter is happy, because his effort results from his definite decision. Nonetheless, he certainly feels unhappy because of the risk and infliction of death and pain. With the responsible person, the being happy overcomes the feeling unhappy. The question is how it might be possible to have them both, feeling and being happy at the same time. Such will be, whenever ones responsible activity is pleasant. It is, for instance, an extremely useful activity to tell children good stories and the narrator hopefully will both be and feel happy at the listeners spiritual progress and breathless attention.

Kant, however, is mistaken when he claims that people who are more intelligent are happier than others (Schneewind 500). Suppose more intelligent people are wiser which is not certain they are none the happier for that, for only a responsible decision makes us happy. There are no degrees in happiness, as there are no degrees in respect. Either we take responsibility and are happy or do not and are unhappy. Kants theory is totally contradicted by Schopenhauer 383-385 (point 9, above), whose teaching is also mistaken. The errors of both philosophers result from the fact that they failed to distinguish between feeling and being happy. Aristotle III.11 the temperate man is so called because he is not pained at the absence of what is pleasant and at his abstinence from it. Comment: The statement is completely wrong. For instance, the temperate man suffers from the loss of his partner or his child just as much as the intemperate one. However, he restrains his mourning in a way that allows him to take responsibility of whatever concerns him, for life continues with all its challenges and possibilities. This special case has already been referred to at 1 Cor 13.8aC. Aristotles `temperate man seems to have developed an absolutely stoic character that has eradicated the feelings. The philosopher leaves no room to cope with such difficulties in a humane and dignified, autonomous way, but develops a theory about how we ought to react in such a case. Aristotle IV.1b Now virtuous actions are noble and done for the sake of the noble. Therefore the liberal man, like other virtuous men, will give for the sake of the noble, and rightly; for he will give to the right people, the right amounts, and at the right time, with all the other qualifications that accompany right giving; and that too with pleasure or without pain; for that which is virtuous is pleasant or free from pain -least of all will it be painful. Comment: If `virtuous actions compare with `responsible actions, nobility is not a sufficient parameter. Wisdom in the handling of ones assets is also wanted. Wisdom, however, teaches that there is never too much money in the world. Therefore, the wise want to donate all their spare money to those who need it. They would not know any other way to be happy in matters of possession. Consequently, they can dispense with the above ruminations about `the right people (the poorest ones), `the right amounts (the total ones), and `the right time (at once). However, it is normal to sometimes feel unhappy, when the money could be used to provide oneself with expensive pleasures. This is the point, where dignity, heroism, and nobility sets in. The responsible person prefers to be happy rather than feeling happy. Here, Aristotle fails to distinguish between the two aspects of our decision-making. That is why he demands to be pleased by ones liberality. The wise and noble amongst us is well aware of his feelings, does not deny them, but prefers to act as a logically thinking being. Experience also teaches him that pleasures are only enjoyable, when they cost nothing. In addition, the responsible person is not asked and does not ask whether or not he loves the receivers of his donations. And he does not give to the poor on account of his pity, but because he wants to act in a wise and dignified manner. There is also an important psychological advantage in living in scarce conditions. It enables us to really and honestly enjoy even little donations from whoever, while they would annoy those living in affluence. All the same, whenever those countless moralists start to extol how happy they feel about being so virtuous, young readers feel bewildered, because they instinctively know that it can be very hard and unpleasant to take responsibility. The author

remembers feeling as though those authors and preachers were hypocrites. However, at times he felt guilty about feeling unable to relate to such sanctimonious ideas. The difficulty resulted from the fact that a valid doctrine of responsibility can only be established, if one discerns between being and feeling happy. Aristotle IV.2b the magnificent man will spend such sums for honour's sake; for this is common to the virtues. Aristotle IV.3a honour is the prize of virtue Comment: Responsibility is not a question of honour or acknowledgement by the community. It is autonomous. In Ex 1, the Chief cannot wonder whether or not his decision to kill an innocent infant will increase his prestige. The same impossibility applies to the other Examples. Aristotles teaching, therefore, wrongly defines correct behaviour as the one which is approved of by the community. The topic of magnificence has been addressed at Aristotle IV.2aC. Aristotle IV.9 we think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame because they live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by shame; Comment: That approach to parenting is both irresponsible and disrespectful. It is foolish and undignified to humiliate children in order to make them behave, for whoever feels guilty will also incriminate others. Thus, the incompetent procedure jeopardises childrens sociability. The statement indicates that the philosopher was a helpless father and teacher (John Paul 71C). Aristotle VII.5 Now of appetites and pleasures some belong to the class of things generically noble and good -- for some pleasant things are by nature worthy of choice, while others are contrary to these, and others are intermediate, to adopt our previous distinction -- e.g. wealth, gain, victory, honour. And with reference to all objects whether of this or of the intermediate kind men are not blamed for being affected by them, for desiring and loving them, but for doing so in a certain way, i.e. for going to excess. Comment: The categorising of appetites and pleasures is irrelevant. One cannot prove that it is generically noble and good to eat when being hungry; it is either wise or unwise. For instance, fasting is recommended before undergoing surgery. Likewise, excess is a matter of arbitrary definition. For instance, there is no objective parameter available to define how many cars someone is correct to own and which number of cars is excessive. What is available is probably the average opinion of that, or there might be laws limiting that number both heteronomous guidelines. If one can dispense with a car, responsibility would certainly want to do so, although such a decision would be thought excessive by countless people. Aristotle VII.7 the man who pursues the excesses of things pleasant, or pursues to excess necessary objects, and does so by choice, for their own sake and not at all for the sake of any result distinct from them, is self-indulgent; for such a man is of necessity unlikely to repent, and therefore incurable, since a man who cannot repent cannot be cured. Comment: `Repentance is asking for forgiveness. However, there is no-one who can forgive irresponsible actions. The useful approach to failures is to find out the reasons that led to them. Respect of oneself and others acknowledges that we and they would have acted in a better way if we had been able to. Such an acknowledgement may favour progress, and we will want to do our best to eliminate

the causes of failure. All the same, irresponsible behaviour is neither forgiven nor tolerated. History cannot forgive. Aquinas II 66.4, justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues Comment: `Justice can be considered the major principle of social behaviour. For instance, it is convenient not to prefer one child to an other. All the same, a disabled child may require much more time and care than others. Therefore, the question of justice is also secondary in social behaviour. In responsible decision-making, it is irrelevant (Schneewind 291C). Such is most clearly demonstrated in Ex 1. Aquinas II 71.3, it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to do evil. Comment: The philosophers view is correct. The decisive factor in correctness is responsible decision-making, rather than perfecting our virtuous character. Such is well pictured in Sartres `The Honourable Prostitute ( John Paul 71C). Aquinas II 71.6, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law which is God's reason, so to speak. Comment: If the term evil is replaced by `irresponsible, the statement can be scrutinised in the sense of this doctrine of responsibility. 1) The due measure of responsibility is to consider the long term and short term consequences of our decisions. 2) The Five Examples demonstrate that responsible decisions do not depend on a rule. 3) Responsible decisions will also overrule the eternal law of God, if one chooses to believe in its existence. 4) The mere existence of such a law leads to absurd consequences as presented by Duns Scotus (c. m735-c. m692). He concludes that Gods absolute power would enable him to lay down other laws than he did (paraphrased by Schneewind 24), as though God could also order to injure one another, commit adultery, lie, and steal. To make things worse, William of Ockham (c. m715-m651) suggested that God could even command that he not be loved. If he commanded that he be hated, he would not contradict himself, and hatred of God would be a virtue (paraphrased by Schneewind 25). Therefore, if obedience to God is considered the core of morality, morality will degenerate to foolish and undignified activity ( Schmid 9-10C). 5) Only responsibility wants to have that absolute power and autonomy, not to the effect that antisocial behaviour would become a virtue by its being used in a responsible action. Aquinas II 100.9, Virtues have a higher quality than lawfulness, since the virtuous should act from a firm and immovable principle: which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of human law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law, who gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of filial piety. Comment: The first sentence presents an almost correct teaching of responsibility, if the term virtue is replaced by `responsibility, which is not a habit, but the consequence of wisdom and dignity in our decision-making. The rest of the

statement, however, reflects the Aristotelian idea of the `nice and good man (Aristotle I.7), as well as the teaching of the Gospel in terms of perfection ( John Paul 16). The meaning is that the virtuous and the saint stand out from the crowd, which just abides by minimal laws. The doctrine of responsibiliy, however, first, does not want such distinctions and, secondly, wants to go beyond them. For instance, a responsible driver always takes the same care while driving and does not care too much about the laws. On the other hand, a driver who merely follows the laws is not a responsible driver, yet. In terms of ones parents, one will respect them in the first place, and suppose one enjoys their company, one will exhibit filial piety. The latter quality, however, is not a virtue, but a move that comes naturally to all friends. Filial piety towards parents whom we are not able to like is undignified. Responsibility will offer help to them, all the same, if need be. Thus, the lack of filial piety does not affect correct behaviour in responsible people, and one cannot say that it would be more correct to have the former; it would only be more pleasant. Aquinas II 19.6, when ignorance is in any way willed, either directly or indirectly, it does not cause the act to be involuntary. And I call that ignorance `directly voluntary, to which the act of the will tends: and that, `indirectly voluntary, which is due to negligence, by reason of a man not wishing to know what he ought to know, as stated above. Comment: The reasoning makes sense. The incriminating meaning is that involuntary actions that have bad effects are excusable and ignorance causes acts to be involuntary. However, if ignorance itself is inexcusable, the action is inexcusable, too. The question arises who can determine what and how much we ought to know. For instance, someone complained about products of questionable origin like child labour in atrocious conditions, which are offered at low prices. Are the purchasers, who possibly do not know the circumstances of their manufacturing, accomplices to the producers misdeeds? `Are we obliged to want to know about all that? The answer is that we are not obliged to, but we want to know about all that, because such considerations are the only wise and dignified approach of a thinking being to the consequences of the acquisition and consumption of goods. However, such is our autonomous decision. Whoever shuts his eyes to dreadful facts, by definition, chooses unhappiness over happiness. All the same, by not buying the products one will be likely to worsen those childrens situation. Such dilemmas can only be resolved by buying the cheapest and donating ones spare money to the most needy. Aquinas II 20.5, The consequences of an action are either foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the goodness or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom, this shows his will to be all the more inordinate. But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature of the action and in the majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action: for it is evident that an action is specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results. On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action. Comment: The teaching is correct. However, the philosopher, by using the weak term increase, fails to accord absolute priority to the issue of consequences in terms of a responsible decision-making (Ex 5 COM 5 / Ex 4 COM 2 / Descartes 4eC). Aquinas II 21.1 every good action is in accord with reason and the Eternal Law.

Comment: It is obvious that responsible actions may not be in accord with the Eternal Law. The incorrect teaching compares with John Paul 68. Calvin I 17.1 Gods principal purpose in the scriptures is to show that He takes care of the whole human race, Comment: Such is possibly the case, but history has it that His care does not include any kind of protection against hazards. In terms of the future, it is irresponsible to fathom that some superior power will intervene and save our planet. Calvins moralising approach has led to the careless and boundless exploitation, which is typical for Christian nations. It is understood that the promise of a future life in heaven (Ps 16.11, 1 Cor 13.12) is the main cause of that carelessness. Such a promise lastly relies on the agape doctrine; it teaches that Gods agape is infinite and prohibits His most beloved creatures to have just a temporary existence. Consequently, as long as the agape doctrine is not overcome and the hope for that eternal life survives, a proper doctrine of responsibility is ineffective. However, todays philosophy, psychology, and theology want to join ranks in the development of a World Religion that is dignified, abandons all untenable creeds and principles, and unites the whole of humanity in the effort to tackle the gigantic problems of the present and future (Chapter Twelve 2, 8, 19, p190) . There is no-one to come and save us and there is no escape route to some other place. Happiness cannot be built on hopes, beliefs, and love, but on taking responsibility. Calvin I 1.1, When viewing our miserable condition since Adams fall, all confidence and boasting are overthrown, we blush for shame, and feel truly humble. For as God at first formed us in his own image, that he might elevate our minds to the pursuit of virtue, and the contemplation of eternal life, so to prevent us from heartlessly burying those noble qualities which distinguish us from the lower animals, it is of importance to know that we were endued with reason and intelligence, in order that we might cultivate a holy and honourable life, and regard a blessed immortality as our destined aim. At the same time, it is impossible to think of our primeval dignity without being immediately reminded of the sad spectacle of our ignominy and corruption, ever since we fell from our original in the person of our first parent. In this way, we feel dissatisfied with ourselves, and become truly humble Comment: It is true that we are given the endowment of thinking logically and want to act in a way corresponding to it. As a consequence of this, Adam was right not to obey Gods arbitrary order, since it is irresponsible to let fruits perish for no other reason than someones order not to eat them. Thus, the teaching that we are corrupted from birth is untenable (Chapter One 3). Calvin I 17.1, When the sky is overcast with dense clouds, and a violent tempest arises, the darkness which is presented to our eye, and the thunder which strikes our ears, and stupefies all our senses with terror, make us imagine that every thing is thrown into confusion, though in the firmament itself all continues quiet and serene. In the same way, when the tumultuous aspect of human affairs unfits us for judging, we should still hold, that God, in the pure light of his justice and wisdom, keeps all these commotions in due subordination, and conducts them to their proper end. Comment: This approach to the challenges of life is praised the highest standard of moral attitude. It is identical with Epicures doctrine (Ex 3 COM 9). However, we have to provide for what happens under the clouds; parents would shelter their children and themselves in the basement, no sooner than a severe storm was predicted. Calvins moralising approach is futile and irresponsible, as though we need not to

fear and avoid bankruptcy on account of the fact that there is still plenty of money held in the banks. Calvin II 8.45 offers a contrary view when claiming, we must consider, that what each individual possesses has not fallen to him by chance, but by the distribution of the sovereign Lord of all If that were the case, it would be a duty to keep ones assets, and the above claim that we are wrong to care about them is false. This contrary view, however, is correct, but insufficient, as it does not take into account that responsibility wants to share the unnecessary assets with those who need them. The Catholic approach to the subject has been dealt with in John Paul 16C. In terms of assets, the doctrine of responsibility is more logical and far above all the former theologies and morals ever developed. It is able to make us happy, while Calvins advice is useless. The absurd distribution of capital is the most disaffecting factor in modern society. Such becomes obvious in modern capitalism, which never tires of advertising that our happiness depends on the amount of pleasures we can afford. All the same, Hume II 1e is not right in claiming that a rich man lies under a moral obligation to communicate to those in necessity a share of his superfluities. There is no such obligation at all. It is yet a consequence of our responsible approach to abundance, if we want to be happy. Calvin II 8.46a, let the people pay all due honour to their rulers, submit patiently to their authority, obey their laws and orders, and decline nothing which they can bear without sacrificing the favour of God. Comment: If God favours the autonomy of responsibility, the advice is acceptable. However, Calvin thinks that the killing of innocents (Ex 1 and 5) would never be approved by God. The phrase, without sacrificing the favour of God is cryptic, but indicates that the philosopher was aware of the fact that the authorities might give inordinate orders. The statement makes sense in terms of social behaviour, which suggests we follow sensible regulations given by the authorities. It fails to refer to everybodys responsibility to question and, if need be, counteract such orders. Calvin II 8.46b, if we have to do with the perfidious or crafty, let us rather be prepared to yield somewhat of our right than to contend with them. Comment: The advice does not make sense in terms of a responsible approach to doing business with people. In fact, it sounds lovely and is indeed a rather disturbing consequence of the love principle, but makes us feel helpless in our decision-making, since it is unknown what the term somewhat is supposed to mean. Calvins teaching accords with Aristotle IV.1a. Calvin III 7.3, Paul (Tit 2.11-14) enjoins us to lay aside our own mind, and renounce whatever our own reason and will dictate. Comment: The teaching categorically denies the correctness of autonomous responsible decisions as exhibited in the Five Examples. Calvin III 19.4a, consciences obey the law, not as if compelled by legal necessity; but being free from the yoke of the law itself, voluntarily obey the will of God. Comment: The Five Examples demonstrate that responsibility does not `voluntarily follow the law, but according to its autonomy stands above the law and, if necessary, acts against the law. In terms of responsible decisions, it is secondary whether or not one feels inclined or pleased to take them, while Calvin wants

Christians to feel enthusiastic about whatever religion imposes. The aspect of spiritual rape, hidden in this teaching, has been referred to in Chapter Seven COM 2. Calvin III 19.4b, For the law demanding perfect love condemns all imperfection, lest its rigor be mitigated. Let any man therefore consider his work which he wishes to be thought partly good, and he will find that it is a transgression of the law by the very circumstance of its being imperfect. Comment: It is true that laws want to be obeyed by the letter. Responsibility, which has absolute priority over the law, however, has no letters to be obeyed and it takes the risk of not being perfect. If Samson (Ex 5) had cared whether or not all the Philistine Princes deserved to die, he could not have acted. In Ex 2, the plot was discovered and several conspirators were executed 56; so, the plot not only failed, but cost the lives of many people. It means that perfection cannot be warranted in our decision-making. Calvin II 19.5, distinguishes between the services of servants and the ones of sons. While the servants services are supposed to be faultless, sons who are treated in a more candid and liberal manner by their parents, hesitate not to offer them works that are only begun or half finished, or even with something faulty in them, trusting that their obedience and readiness of mind will be accepted, although the performance be less exact than was wished. Comment: The ingenious distinction, which allows to disqualify Judaism of the Old Testament as the position of slaves to the Law while Christianity offers us to become children of God, is not applicable to responsibility. For instance, it would not make sense for parents to tolerate aggression or theft committed by their children. In terms of the Five Examples, all of them asked the heroes to make an unrestricted effort, even to the detriment of their families and friends. They also took ultimate risks (Bonhoeffer 15bC). Hobbes I 11c, Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them whose judgement they value; for of those men whom we contemn, we contemn also the Praises. Comment: The statement is unacceptable on account of two points. First, responsible parents look after their children in order to act in the best way possible, whereas the praise of friends can just as well dispose them to undignified actions. Secondly, it is foolish to contemn anyone or anything and the praise of ones enemies just as well merits to be valued. Hobbes II 20d, So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall Commonwealths, it ought in all Common-wealths to be absolute and as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. Comment: The statement does not take into account that humans have lived without laws for millions of years. Laws became necessary after the tribal communities lost their power and people started to live in artificial, large settlements. All the same,
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responsible people do not need and want to go far beyond the laws in both a positive and negative sense. For instance, parents want to take care of their children as best they can and never check the book of law whether or not they are obliged to do so. On the other hand, it is understood that responsibility also overrules all authorised decisions, as it may ask to free an innocent captive, for it does not make sense that someone should undergo an unjust and useless punishment just for the sake of maintaining `law and order. Therefore, it seems that Hobbes puts obedience above responsibility. Descartes 2b, our will tends to pursue or avoid only what our intellect represents as good or bad, we need only to judge well in order to act well, and to judge as well as we can in order to do our bestthat is to say, in order to acquire all the virtues and in general all the other goods we can acquire. And when we are certain of this, we cannot fail to be happy. Comment: The phrase good or bad introduces the parameter of feelings, while the intellect takes its parameter from truth and error ( Magee 2a). The responsible decision, therefore, includes actions that may cause both good and bad feelings. Nevertheless, it makes us happy. On the other hand, wisdom alone does not warrant responsible decision-making, since we may be hindered by the fear of personal negative consequences. Descartes 3a, if I always saw clearly what was true and good, I should never have to deliberate about the right judgement or choice; in that case, although I should be wholly free, it would be impossible for me ever to be in a state of indifference. Comment: If the phrase true and good is replaced by `the responsible approach, and if one adds that `one is not restrained by fear, the statement accords with a correct teaching of responsibility. It also correctly refers to autonomy. Bonhoeffers (Ex 2) philosophical difficulties in protesting the correctness of autonomous decisions resulted from the love principle, which he desperately, yet erroneously, tried not to contradict (Bonhoeffer 13dC). Descartes 4g teaches about the two fundamental truths which allow for a virtuous approach to the challenges of life. 1) The existence of an omnipotent, supremely perfect God, whose decrees are infallible. This teaches us to accept calmly all the things which happen to us as expressly sent by God. 2) The immortality of the soul and its independence from the body. This prevents us from fearing death, and so detaches our affections from the things of this world that we look upon whatever is in the power of fortune with nothing but scorn. Comment: If those truths were valid, Bonhoeffer had been better to accept Hitlers power as expressly sent by God and not care for the things of this world. With regard to such an inappropriate Christian approach to responsibility, refer to Calvin I 17.1C. The above passage ranks among the most absurd ever. In fact, Descartes accounts for yet another bachelor philosopher all of whom would have been better not to engage in Practical Philosophy (Schopenhauer 112C). Spinoza III, Preface, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation.

Comment: Reason wants to take correct decisions. It is not its function to dominate the emotions and transform us into angels, but to be aware of them, yet decide to take a responsible way of action despite their interference. 57 Shaftesbury 34a, Thus the affection towards self-good may be a good affection or an ill one. For if this private affection be too strong (as when the excessive love of life unfits a creature for any generous act) then it is undoubtedly vicious, and if vicious, the creature who is moved by it, is viciously moved, and can never be otherwise than vicious in some degree when moved by that affection. Therefore if through such an earnest and passionate love of life a creature be accidentally induced to do good (as he might be upon the same terms induced to do ill) he is no more a good creature for this good he executes than a man is the more an honest or good man either for pleading a just cause, or fighting in a good one, for the sake merely of his fee or stipend. Comment: The first paragraph compares with a correct doctrine of responsibility, in that love wants to be controlled by responsibility. The argument of the second paragraph, however, is not valid. One cannot argue against people earning money by fighting for a good cause. Shaftesburys philosophical mess in this argument arises from the fact that `good and bad are invalid parameters for both humans and their actions. Humans are either sane or insane, and actions are either responsible or irresponsible. In addition, in an emergency, the help of a notorious criminal would not be less welcome than the one of an angel, even if he helps for selfish reasons, for the help prevails over whether or not the helper is a good creature. Shaftesbury 45, Thus a ruffian who out of a sense of fidelity and honour of any kind refuses to discover his associates, and rather than betray them is content to endure torments and death, has certainly some principle of virtue, however he may misapply it. Comment: The example proves that morals do not warrant a responsible decisionmaking. The ruffians heroism is only responsible, if he knows that his betrayal would lead to inadequate measures. Any courageous action, although virtuous it may be, is irresponsible, unless it is guided by wisdom, which is to say, the evaluation of the long and short term consequences. Shaftesbury 64b, if he believes any supreme powers concerned in the present affairs of mankind, immediately interposing in behalf of the honest and virtuous against the impious and unjust, this will serve to preserve in him, however, that just esteem of virtue which might otherwise considerably diminish. Or should he still believe little of the immediate interposition of Providence in the affairs of this present life, yet if he believes a God dispensing rewards and punishments to vice and virtue in a future, he carries with him still the same advantage and security, whilst his belief is steady and nowise wavering or doubtful. Comment: It is true that Bonhoeffer 13d and 13e refers to God, but he was not able to quote an appropriate passage from the Bible to justify his decision. Certainly, Bonhoeffer was not hoping to be rewarded by God. In addition, Pertini and numerous other heroes were not believers. Responsible decisions are autonomous and do not need the approval of anybody. Moreover, there have been numerous unacceptable and undignified commands promulgated in the name of God, for which one would
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wish not to be followed by anyone (Chapter Twelve 11, p194). In addition, those who believe in Gods authority do not exhibit better characters than the others. Shaftesbury 70a, to deserve the name of good or virtuous, a creature must have all his inclinations and affections, his dispositions of mind and temper, suitable, and agreeing with the good of his kind, or of that system in which he is included, and of which he constitutes a part. To stand thus well affected, and to have one's affections right and entire, not only in respect of oneself but of society and the public, this is rectitude, integrity, or virtue. And to be wanting in any of these, or to have their contraries, is depravity, corruption, and vice. Comment: The statement contradicts the principle of responsibility, which may ask for difficult decisions to be made. In fact, the responsible man is independent from the system in which he is included. The last sentence is nonsensical, too; the heroes of Ex 2 and 3, who acted against the mainstream mentality, were certainly not `depraved, corrupted, and vicious. If they had acted according to the mainstream mentality, they would not have been `depraved, corrupted, and vicious either, but unhappy. The error concerns the essential object of Practical Philosophy, which consists of the question how we, as logically thinking beings, can be happy, whereas Shaftesbury analyses how we can be perfectly integrated in a perfect system of morals. Hume II 1f, Regardless of its motives, an action can be meritorious on account of its moral beauty. Comment: If `meritorious is a synonym of `responsible, the claim is wrong. The activities of a helpful criminal and a lawyer who works well to earn money (Shaftesbury 34aC) are not welcome on account of their moral beauty, but because they make sense. On the other hand, in Ex 1 it would be much more beautiful to soothe the crying baby than strangle her, or for the tribe to die heroically instead of killing the girl. However, the risk of failing in the attempt to soothe her would have been too high (Bonhoeffer 15cC) and it would have been irresponsible to take it, despite its moral beauty. Likewise, the decision to sacrifice their lives in order to conform to a heteronomous moralistic standard would have been absurd and undignified, although more meritorious, which is to say, meriting general approval. Thus, general approval is not a valid parameter in terms of any responsible decisionmaking. Hume II 1d, seems to look for the idea of responsibility, entangling himself in contradictions, when stating, 'Tis requisite, , to find some motive to acts of justice and honesty, distinct from our regard to the honesty; and in this lies the great difficulty. Comment: The statement as such is not intelligible, because it uses the term honesty in two completely different senses; in the phrase acts of justice and honesty, it means `correctness, whereas in the phrase distinct from our regard to the honesty, it means `generally approved social behaviour. Thus, the sentence could be rectified as follows, `It is necessary to find out how some acts can be correct, even though they contradict social behaviour; and in this lies the great difficulty. In fact, Bonhoeffers (Ex 2) treatise gives evidence of that difficulty. Humes statement reveals that the philosopher was close to a correct doctrine of responsibility.

Hume II 8b, there is nothing but a great present advantage, that can lead us to rebellion, by making us over-look the remote interest, which we have in the preserving of peace and order in society. Comment: The statement contradicts every aspect of Bonhoeffers argument. His resistance was not triggered by a great present advantage, and he exactly envisaged the remote interest of society. The same applies to the Ex 3 and 5. In addition, the preserving of peace and order in society is not necessarily the first priority in our decision-making. Hume III 2d, an excessive courage and magnanimity, especially when it displays itself under the frowns of fortune, contributes in a great measure, to the character of a hero, and will render a person the admiration of posterity; at the same time, that it ruins his affairs, and leads him into dangers and difficulties, with which otherwise he wou'd never have been acquainted. Comment: Responsibility never asks whether or not its decisions will warrant the admiration of posterity. However, in terms of heroism, Humes statement can be applied to the Ex 2-5. Unfortunately, as a consequence of the love principle, the majority of people undertake to acquire the admiration of posterity by being morally perfect at least in the eyes of society. Hume III 2e, Heroism, or military glory, is much admir'd by the generality of mankind. They consider it as the most sublime kind of merit. Men of cool reflection are not so sanguine in their praises of it. The infinite confusions and disorder, which it has caus'd in the world, diminish much of its merit in their eyes. When they wou'd oppose the popular notions on this head, they always paint out the evils, which this suppos'd virtue has produc'd in human society; the subversion of empires, the devastation of provinces, the sack of cities. As long as these are present to us, we are more inclin'd to hate than admire the ambition of heroes. But when we fix our view on the person himself, who is the author of all this mischief, there is something so dazzling in his character, the mere contemplation of it so elevates the mind, that we cannot refuse it our admiration. The pain, which we receive from its tendency to the prejudice of society, is over-power'd by a stronger and more immediate sympathy. Comment: The controversial aspect of military heroism is well presented. The statement fails to take into account that a soldier who disobeys the order to attack is shot by his lieutenant on the spot. The prospect of heroic fame is never strong enough to warrant the maintenance of an armys function. In order to conceal this fact, the politicians feel impelled to constantly stress the argument of heroism, whereas the aspect of heroism is definitely secondary in terms of our responsible decision-making. In addition, the official memorials of the Unknown Warrior reflect the lack of personal honour towards the war heroes. We were better to offer more help and justice to those people who really pay for the wars, which is to say, the wardisabled. Hume III 3a, the generosity of men is very limited, and that it seldom extends beyond their friends and family, or, at most, beyond their native country. Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibilities from him; but confine our view to that narrow circle, in which any person moves, in order to form a judgment of his moral character. Comment: It is obvious that responsibility wants to widen its concerns in this day and age. Such an attitude, however, is neither `expected nor a parameter of morality, but it makes us happy.

Hume III 6a, Since the virtue of justice is derived from a natural moral sense in man, any act of justice is beneficial to society. Comment: The statement takes into account that children develop a natural and very strong sense of justice. However, Ex 1 proves that an act of absolute injustice can be beneficial to society, too. It would have been an act of justice for the tribe to die rather than kill the innocent girl (Ex 1 COM 4) . Such an act of justice, however, would not have been beneficial to society. Kant C 4, Practical Philosophy aims to establish laws according to which everything ought to happen. Comment: Such is not a philosophical, but legislative goal. Practical Philosophy wants to establish the principles that allow us to be happy. Since social behaviour is innate, moral philosophies have been superfluous in the first place, and responsibility cannot be allowed or restricted by laws. Kant C 16-17, For example it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge an inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone, so that a child buys of him as well as any other. Men are thus honestly served; but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it; it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might besides have a direct inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one over another. Accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view. Comment: One has to be grateful, if a philosopher condescends to give an example of what he is talking about. It helps the reader to find out whether or not the claim makes sense. Kants claim is invalid. If the dealer knows that the purchaser is himself in a well-to-do position, but has taken advantage of people who suffered hard from their losses, he correctly overcharges the purchaser and uses the money to recompense those exploited, as it is manifested in the legendary deeds of Robin Hood. Thus, it is impossible to define any undisputed moral rules. Secondly, the additional considerations in terms of the dealers love for the buyer reveals the philosophers obsession with `pure morality. Why should the fact that the dealer loves the buyer be incriminated? Kant wants us to live like soldiers who hate their job, but are asked to like it, because they consider it `their duty. It is true that a responsible decision which is made with pleasure is less heroic than an unpleasant one. However, heroism, by very good luck, is not a critical ingredient of responsibility (Ex 1 COM 4 / Chapter Eight COM 2). For instance, if parents both take responsibility for and love their children, it is absurd to frown on the latter fact. Kant distrusts everything that provides satisfaction and pleasure. Kant, Morality is a matter not of external behaviour but of inner perfection, which must arise from the subordination of the totality of our powers and sensibilities under the free will. (Schneewind 487) Comment: One can make out an indirect approach to a valid doctrine of responsibility in this statement. However, the decisive factor is neither external behaviour nor inner perfection, but the responsible decision-making, which is indeed autonomous. The modal verb must is misleading, as though it were a duty to make responsible decisions. It can be replaced by `wants to. So, the tortuous argument wants to be

paraphrased as follows, `Correctness that makes us happy is a matter of responsible decision-making, which wants to arise from the subordination of the totality of our powers and sensibilities under the aspect of wisdom and dignity. There is no doubt that Kant recognised that correctness did not make sense unless it was the result of a free decision, so that the moral action was wanted. But he thought that it ought to be wanted on account of its perfection, while he completely missed the crucial point of the consequences of ones actions. Schneewind 487 puts it as follows, Awareness of the goodness of the will must therefore differ wholly from awareness of its good results. That is why Kant cannot admit the obvious fact that responsibility wants to tell lies if need be (1 Cor 13.6C). Kant C 47, There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law. Comment: Laws hopefully always accord with social behaviour. That is why one cannot include autonomous decision-making in the laws. It is also impossible to make a categorical imperative which reads, `Always act responsibly, as though the father was obliged to kill his daughter (Ex 1). We want to act responsibly, in order to be happy. It is neither possible nor necessary to devise an imperative, let alone a law, that reads, `Everybody is supposed to be happy. The political misunderstanding that can arise from Kants approach is referred to in Kant (m276-196)C . Nietzsche contradicts Kant. He thinks that life is not about fulfilling duties, but Superman will have a look at the game of life and take part in it. Superman speaks, `Im going to win, even when I loose. I play, because I enjoy playing, its fun, its regardless, its mercyless. (Thurner D 201). This idea was based on the view of Heraclitus (Sloterdijk 7C). Nietzsches Superman is a caricature of God comparable to the one in the Book of Job, which originally must have been a Babylonian satire on Jewish monotheism and was included in the Bible by error and slightly altered in the last scene of Jobs surrender (Job 42.1-6). Such becomes evident from the following facts: In the very moment the Devil appears, God asks him, `Where do you come from? (Job 1.7) This question is the basic joke of the work, because the Omniscient certainly should have known that. The joke wants to suggest that even God could not understand the theory of the Devil, because He would never have created such a monster. Then God plays a game with the Devil, makes innocent people suffer to the extreme for the sake of his bet and wins. Then, Job is given back his old life and the game can start again. Consequently, the Book of Job wanted to prove that monotheism is an impossible theory, because it cannot explain the existence of suffering, whereas polytheism includes the controversies and fights between the gods and goddesses, which leads to the negative consequences in our lives. For instance, Venus favoured Paris (he had voted her the most beautiful) and the Troians, while Hera favoured the Greek, defending the marital rights of Menelaus. Monotheism, on the other hand needed an artificial negative principle, whose origin is even a mystery to God. God then plays an absurd game, making people suffer for nothing but His pleasure. Likewise, Superman plays and enjoys playing, regardless whether he loses or wins. The original ironic ending of the Book must have read as follows, `Oh, now I see that You are so great and sublime, that I should adore You, although You make me suffer for the sake of Your bet with the Devil. I feel ashamed and sorry that I ever complained. Nietzsches godlike Superman also presents a caricature of the autonomous person who takes responsible decisions. In fact, Superman does not consider the

consequences of his actions, but takes them as he pleases, whereas the autonomy of responsible people results from their wisdom and dignity, which is independent from legal and moral restrictions, as well as permission. In terms of the latter point, responsible people do not keep their spare money to themselves while others suffer, although there is neither a law nor a moral teaching that imposes so. Kant would possibly agree to that. All the same, one cannot take such a decision as the base of legislation, since it must be an individual decision as to what is meant by the term `spare money, and this decision must be autonomous, for it is the owners responsibility to decide whether or not their donation will have beneficial long term consequences. For instance, responsible parents want to avoid their children becoming accustomed to luxury, although they might, on account of their neurotic greediness, protest that they need it to be happy. This correct approach must also be autonomous, since the final decision depends on the definition of the term `luxury. Therefore, it is not possible to devise a law which reads, `Parents have to keep their children to a modest lifestyle. Kants reference to legislation includes the idea of `duty. Duties, by definition, are always heteronomous (above, COM 1). Hegel 3b, It is an accident, external to the nature of positive right, when force or tyranny becomes an element of it. Comment: Unfortunately, the philosopher is quite wrong. Unless the legislative bodies are constantly and relentlessly questioned by people who take responsibility, tyranny becomes the main political feature. In fact, the vast majority of states are far from being democracies. Positive right cannot warrant the absence of tyranny. Hegel wants to prove that an absolute positive right can be established, whereas Rousseau I 5 correctly questioned even the basic principle of the majority vote, defining it a convention (Chapter Three 20w, p55). Moreover, if there were an `absolute positive right, it would still be overruled by the autonomous decision of responsible people, if need be. Schopenhauer 112, The idea explained in the Stoical philosophy is the most complete development of practical reason in the true and genuine sense of the word; it is the highest summit to which man can attain by the mere use of his reason, and in it his difference from the brutes shows itself most distinctly. For the ethics of Stoicism are originally and essentially, not a doctrine of virtue, but merely a guide to a rational life the end and aim of which is happiness through peace of mind. Comment: The parameter of being different from the brutes attributes morals a higher rank than responsibility and is, therefore, invalid. Moreover, happiness is the result of taking responsibility, rather than peace of mind which neglects their own and other beings feelings. Stoics would not be able to appreciate the correctness of the heroic decisions made in the Five Examples; they would tell Bonhoeffer not to care about what was happening in Germany and the world. In addition, Stoicism results in a passive autonomy which consists in living with a due knowledge of the transitory nature of the things of the world ( Schopenhauer 116). Responsibility, however, takes into account that the things of the world are not simply transitory, but want to be considered in their long term consequences. Those bachelors, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein, and John Paul are prone to conclusions that baffle every responsible parent, as though parents were better never to worry about what will happen to their children. For instance, Schopenhauer would advise Bonhoeffer not to care about the suffering and death of millions of people, since all of them will suffer and die anyway, some day;

history would even confirm his view, since Bonhoeffer had no success, caused a lot of additional mayhem, and perished. The latter facts, however, demonstrate that responsibility in people results from their quest for happiness, which does not depend on whether or not it succeeds. Furthermore, Stoicism does not accord with Schopenhauers theory of commiseration (Schmid 104-107). Bonhoeffer 119, It is not possible to perfectly determine the boundary between resistance and submission. Comment: The philosopher is right. This also means that it is not possible to make laws and rules that have absolute validity, while it is clear what can be regarded as virtuous behaviour the behaviour that causes ourselves and the others to feel good. Responsible decisions, however, are sometimes difficult individual choices that may be opposite to every rule, law, and virtue. Bonhoeffer 154, Far too late did it occur to us, that not the mere thought, but the responsible decision is the origin of acting correctly You are better to think of nothing other than the responsible act. Up to now, our thinking used to be a voyeuristic luxury; `Not everyone who calls me, Lord, Lord, will enter the Kingdom of Heaven, but only the o n e s w h o d o the will of my Father in Heaven(Mt 7.21). Comment: The philosopher admits that one can well imagine or enjoy the delusion of being a saint who loves everybody. Then he suggests that in terms of responsibility a correct teaching has not yet been presented by Christianity. All the same, Bonhoeffer wrongly defines thought and decision as opposite principles, for responsibility is a result of logical thinking. Bonhoeffer failed to clearly notify so. Fromm 99, The purpose of life is to become the spit and image of God. Comment: This is not what life is all about. The teaching coincides with John Paul 73. Moreover, why would God care to have innumerable spitting images of Himself? In addition, it is philosophically unacceptable to determine a purpose of life (Chapter Three 12, p43). John Paul 7 comments on Mt 19.16-21, For the young man, the "question" is not so much about rules to be followed, but about the full meaning of life . This is in fact the aspiration at the heart of every human decision and action, the quiet searching and interior prompting which sets freedom in motion. This question is ultimately an appeal to the absolute Good which attracts us and beckons us; it is the echo of a call from God who is the origin and goal of man's life. Precisely in this perspective the Second Vatican Council called for a renewal of moral theology, so that its teaching would display the lofty vocation which the faithful have received in Christ,[14] the only response fully capable of satisfying the desire of the human heart. Comment: `The full meaning of life wants to take into account that we are logically thinking beings who want to take responsibility for the consequences of our actions and non-actions. This is not merely something that goes beyond social behaviour, but it is absolutely autonomous and may overrule and contradict social behaviour and Gods commands. In addition, responsibility is a consequence of thinking and dignity, whereas `the human heart naturally opts for social behaviour and may lead to irresponsible activity or inactivity (Bonhoeffer 21b). The statement wants to picture a perfect relationship of love between humans and God, in which desire and fulfilment

perfectly correspond to each other. People would then be requested to follow the corresponding morals. Notwithstanding all that, the phrase the absolute Good which attracts us and beckons us could almost make sense within a valid doctrine of responsibility, for responsibility is indeed wanted, and it aspires to consider the positive and negative consequences of our decisions. Consequently, responsibility may include actions that neither attract us nor beckon us. John Paul 34a, there exists a prior moral obligation, and a grave one at that, to seek the truth and to adhere to it once it is known. Comment: It is no use to declare responsibility a `moral obligation, since we, as logically thinking beings, do not want anything other than to acquire knowledge and act accordingly. One could just as well define it a moral obligation to close the eyes when sleeping. Furthermore, a `moral obligation could only be imposed by some authority, which is neither necessary nor in existence. Lastly, the argument is mendacious; why on earth ought humans `to seek the truth, if it is freely available in the authors infallible teachings? The whole exercise presents a philosophical hide and seek; you are free to seek as long and wherever you like, but you have to find me. John Paul 34b, "The conscience has rights because it has duties." Comment: `Conscience is a half psychological and half religious concept which in this context possibly includes responsibility. There is no parameter of `right and wrong in terms of responsibility. It is not true that, in Ex 1, the father has `the right to kill his baby daughter. It is his free decision to do so, no matter whether it is `right or wrong, which are behavioural, social, and legal parameters. There is also no-one to decide whether or not Bonhoeffer (Ex 2) had `the right to join the plot against Hitler, or for Pertini (Ex 3) to resist Mussolini. The account of Samson (Ex 5) also excludes the parameter of `right and wrong. On the other hand, the Chief and the father in Ex 1 were not `obliged to kill the infant, neither were any of the other heroes obliged to act in the way they did. One could perhaps argue that Ulysses, in Ex 4, had the right and the duty to eliminate the suitors on account of his matrimonial rights and duties to his wife. Therefore, the usage of the above term `conscience is mystifying; it ought to be replaced by `the contractor. However, responsibility wants to doubt of all these `rights and `duties, in that it questions the decision to fulfil those `duties or make use of those `rights in each individual case. Responsibility is and has to be autonomous. During and after World War II, so many heroes were prosecuted and sentenced for illicitly helping refugees to escape from Nazism ( Plato R VII 30C). If those judges would have had a valid doctrine of responsibility, they could have chosen to discard the case by declaring themselves biased in favour of the accused and, if necessary, step down (all of them) and render the prosecution impossible. Such would have been the only wise and dignified way to act. History teaches that, unless all the judges step down, the most repulsive miscarriages of justice will occur (Plato R VII 30C). The fact that responsibility is above the law is corroborated by the fact that it is impossible to include it in the law. John Paul 35a: Revelation teaches that the power to decide what is good and what is evil does not belong to man, but to God alone . Comment: It is true that the Bible contains some acceptable rules that accord with social behaviour. However, the question is not whether or not there are books available which contain certain general rules, but if God, indeed, reveals in the very

moment of action the wise and dignified decision to make. Such is obviously not the case, since it took the Christian theologian Bonhoeffer (Ex 2) seventeen pages to explain to himself and everybody else why he decided to engage in the plot against Hitler. It is a pity that Bonhoeffer failed to notice that his argument overpowered the Christian love principle and the moralistic approach of the above statement. John Paul 36: the natural moral law has God as its author, and man, by the use of reason, participates in the eternal law, which it is not for him to establish. Comment: There is no `natural moral law, since nature cannot impose laws. Secondly, if man has been denied the knowledge of `good and evil ( John Paul 35a), he certainly is not able to `participate in the law-making. In fact, the contradictive claim to `participation aims to camouflage the fact that autonomy and heteronomy can only coexist in details, not in principle. John Paul 44: the natural law is written and engraved in the heart of each and every man, since it is none other than human reason itself which commands us to do good and counsels us not to sin But this prescription of human reason could not have the force of law unless it were the voice and the interpreter of some higher reason to which our spirit and our freedom must be subject. Comment: The `natural law must be identical to `social behaviour, which is innate in all mammals. (It is not engraved in the hearts, however. Such inappropriate idioms are not only an abuse of language and mystifying the truth, but also include double binds, as if to say, unless you agree to my teaching, you have `no heart.) Hence, it is neither a prescription of human reason nor a `law, but an endowment, without which the species cannot survive. It can also dispense with both `the force of law and the support of `some higher reason. Human reason, however, leads to responsibility, which can dispense with a law and higher reason as well. In addition, a freedom that must be subject does not make sense. Such contradictory definitions also present a terrible abuse of language. John Paul 51 In order to perfect himself in his specific order, the person must do good and avoid evil, be concerned for the transmission and preservation of life, refine and develop the riches of the material world, cultivate social life, seek truth, practise good and contemplate beauty. Comment: It is not provable that the person must `perfect himself in the first place. Thus, it is impossible to establish such a catalogue of duties. It is, in fact, a secondary and questionable goal to perfect oneself, while happiness is only attainable to a logically thinking being by taking responsibility. But it is not a duty to be happy, either. As to the question of perfection, the wish to perfect ourselves can even interfere with ones responsibility, for instance, if a father neglects his children while he is `contemplating beauty. The other items of that surprising, seemingly intelligent, and thoroughly Calvinistic ( Calvin II 8.45a) list of duties are equally arbitrary. They also contradict the Gospel, where we are told to sell all our possessions and give the money to the poor ( John Paul 16), while here we are asked to develop the riches of the material world. The term material world is in itself disrespectful, as though there were another, possibly higher and better one. Hopefully, one day religion will understand that there is no other and finer world (Chapter Twelve 1, 8, 13, 26, p189). John Paul 56: Those are wrong who think that by taking account of circumstances and the situation, the conscience could legitimately be the basis of certain

exceptions to the general rule and thus permit one to do in practice and in good conscience what is qualified as intrinsically evil by the moral law. A separation, or even an opposition, is thus established in some cases between the teaching of the precept, which is valid in general, and the norm of the individual conscience, which would in fact make the final decision about what is good and what is evil. Comment: If, in this context, the term conscience somehow coincides with `responsibility, the Examples 1, 4, and 5 demonstrate that the acting persons were very correct in going for what is qualified as intrinsically evil by the moral law. Selfdefence may ask for the killing of an innocent, and soldiers have to kill enemies who are innocent, too. It is obvious that responsibility may overrule the general rule. The statement is the clearest denial of our autonomous responsibility within the whole document. If the author ever read Bonhoeffers Account (Ex 2), he obviously failed to understand the heros argument. John Paul 58: Conscience and the Law of God cannot contradict one another. Comment: Here, the conscience is conceived as an `inner voice, only known to the person concerned. If this voice speaks the Law of God, which is already written in the Commandments, it is useless and is nothing to do with responsible decision-making. Paul, in Rom 2.14 correctly states that the lawless gentiles act morally. If he puts that down to an `inner voice in the ancient Greeks and Romans, he is quite wrong. They behaved socially, because it is an innate capacity in all mammals. Furthermore, the stipulated `inner voice that presents an infallible guide does not exist. If it did, Bonhoeffer (Ex 2) could have dispensed with his mental struggle. In fact, `conscience, as a psychological phenomenon, consists in the feeling of guilt and innocence with regard to certain decisions. It introduces an inappropriate judicial parameter into the domain of normality and reasoning. It is able to completely misguide, as was most horribly manifested in Hitler, who regarded it his divine call to eradicate the Jewish race.58 John Paul 102: Even in the most difficult situations man must respect the norm of morality so that he can be obedient to God's holy commandment and consistent with his own dignity as a person. Comment: Ex 1, 2, 4 and 5 illustrate that the statement is incorrect. In addition, a person who has been kept in arbitrary captivity is right in killing his captor, if it is the sole means available to gain freedom, even if the captor is mentally disabled and innocent (Ex 1 COM 14). John Paul 112, God also reminds sinners of the joy of forgiveness, which alone grants the strength to see in the moral law a liberating truth, a grace-filled source of hope, a path of life. Comment: The encyclical talks about freedom dozens of times, but it is restricted by countless laws and orders which is a contradiction in terms. It is only in the above statement that the `liberal truth is given clear evidence, however, by a Deus ex machina Who forgives the irresponsible activity. This results in the following vicious circle of argument; God gives us difficult tasks to master we fail them and deserve punishment God forgives us and sets us free this freedom is warranted by the sacraments of the Church.
58

A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Frz. Eher Nachf., Mnchen 1939, p. 70

Philosophically, we want to set ourselves the most reasonable and dignified goals. No outer authority is needed. Nobody forgives our irresponsible actions. In some cases, history forgets them after some time, but the planet neither forgets nor forgives us. Moreover, early infant traumas may ruin the whole life of a person, although they are thoroughly forgetful of them. The responsible ones themselves do not want to forget their irresponsible actions. Rather would they like to minimise their evil repercussions, no matter how long ago they might have occurred. The freedom of Gods forgiveness is treacherous. It seems a means to provide the Church with the psychlogical power to patronise and exploit the believers. In this context, it seems appropriate to question the approach taken by the Catholic Church to the horrors of Nazism. R. Friedrichs59, himself a former inmate, explained at the official meeting of expiation in Dachau on Good Friday 1960 that Christ on the Cross answered both the sufferings of the prisoners and the crimes of the SS. However, the answer to Dachau is that it should never have happened and should never happen again. As long, however, as people are given insufficient teaching of love, obedience, and forgiveness, Dachau is going to happen again and again. In terms of freedom, humans are free but in one thing; it is that they can choose whether or not to accept their logical reasoning ( Mackintosh 47). For instance, most people who drive idly, polluting the air unnecessarily, choose to ignore the results of a logical chain of reasons which suggests that the consequences will be disastrous to future generations. The irresponsible neglect of consequences is usually camouflaged by eliminating some crucial links in the chain of reasoning, so as to claim that they are untrue or not confirmed yet. John Paul 113, Opposition to the teaching of the Church's Pastors cannot be seen as a legitimate expression either of Christian freedom or of the diversity of the Spirit's gifts. Comment: The statement is philosophically absurd. Any serious teaching wants to be questioned. New challenges and responsibilities, by all means, need free discussion and debate. Thus, opposition to the teaching of the Church's Pastors can be seen as a legitimate expression of wisdom and dignity. John Paul 32 highlights the necessity of heteronomy exerced by the Church, without the help of which a radically subjectivistic conception of moral judgment would eventuate. Comment: It does not present a responsible way of action to base ones actions on the teaching of others. Bonhoeffer 10 correctly states that the responsibly thinking ones in a severe crisis always feel without footing, which means they have to decide for themselves the right action to take. Then, Brunos definition of `heroism (Thurner D 157) is appropriate. Both Bruno and Bonhoeffer were, in fact, put to death (HERDER II 734 and Bonhoeffer 8). Furthermore, people have acted sociably and responsibly for hundred thousands of years without the teaching of the Church. Such is correctly conceded in Rom 2.14-15 (Chapter Three 20jC, p50). John Paul 35, the power to decide what is good and what is evil does not belong to man, but to God alone.

59

J Neuhusler, Wie war das im KZ Dachau, 8th edition, Donau-Dillingen, p. 73

Comment: This again stipulates heteronomy. Bonhoeffer, however, could not consult the Bible or an ecclesiastic authority in terms of his decision to further the elimination of Hitler. Moreover, everyone can claim that they speak in the name of God. Bahro R 12 suggests that the reversion of the White Mans destructive approach is only possible by a new orientation towards a higher Self. Comment: The doctrine of responsibility suggests that a new definition of happiness (Chapter Three 1, p40) is more effective. The term higher Self is ambiguous in that it can be interpreted as moralistic or as a neurotic Superego. Bahro R 14 doubts that the homo sapiens can yet be saved, since he has proved unwise. Comment: First of all, it was not the homo sapiens who was unwise, but the teachings of philosophy, psychology, and theology. Philosophy teaches how we can be happy, rather than how our planet can be saved. However, wisdom and dignity suggest that we do everything possible to achieve the latter goal, regardless of whether or not it is achievable. For instance, parents want to try their best to help their children to become responsible people, without being sure they achieve this goal. The author himself did not succeed in that task, but has been a very happy father. Bahro R 28, We are allowed to make mistakes and, for once, indulge in a farcical cause. Comment: Such does not present a wise and dignified approach. The statement demonstrates how little valid teaching of responsibility has yet entered the minds of our philosophers. The statement reverses the whole aspect of making mistakes. One would be better to say that we always strive to learn and improve our teaching, although we know that we may be wrong again. M.-P. Hempel, in Bahro R 193, explains that we are responsible, thinking beings. Comment: We are also `feeling beings. All the same, our decisions want to be responsible in order to make us happy. Such is not a duty, and to fail it does not make us guilty. Duties create privileges and guilt wants to be sanctioned. Responsibility does not create privileges, and irresponsibility sanctions itself. Schmidt 262, Everybody has the duty to respect life. Nobody has the right to injure, torture, or kill someone. This does not exclude the right of individuals and communities to defend themselves. Comment: First, non-violence is defined a duty, whereas self-defence is conceded as a right. Self-defence, however could only be justified, if it were a duty, which does not make sense. For instance, the tribe (Ex 1) was not obliged to kill the infant, nor had any of the other heroes the duty to act as they did. Apart from the fact that Schmidts rule is contradictory, it also reveals that human actions can only make one happy if they are the result of a responsible decision. The principles of duty and right are insufficient. Schmidt 264, Everybody has the duty to talk and act honestly. Nobody, in however high and powerful a position, is allowed to lie. There is, nevertheless, the right to private and professional confidentiality. Nobody is obliged to tell the whole truth to everybody and all the time.

Comment: The first sentence violates the principle of responsibility. Language has a double function, so as to both reveal and conceal the truth. Responsibility may want to lie, for instance, in order to protect an innocent person from persecution (Chapter One 6dC). If our silence is likely to be interpreted as consent and the questioner does not deserve to be answered, it is correct to deny the truth. For instance, if a woman is asked whether or not she sleeps with her neighbour, she is correct to deny it categorically in order to make sure the questioner is not informed of things which are not his business, regardless of whether or not her answer is true. Consequently, the second sentence is untrue, too. The injunction in however high and powerful a position, is irrelevant, since responsibility is convenient to all humans. Therefore, truthfulness is not an absolute obligation, but we want to speak in a way that accords with responsibility. Sloterdijk 23-25 blames European philosophy for defining man a rational animal it looks as though we were closer to divinity than to the estranged fellow creatures, which we despise as growth and beasts. Comment: Like Nietzsche, the philosopher is right in unmasking the useless and helpless human superiority complex. It is wise and dignified to respect everything alike, since they merit nothing less, and our capacity to develop ideas does not want to make us conceited. Nevertheless, we want to make use of this capacity, for to feel good is not good enough for us. It seems that Sloterdijk is homesick for a merely mammalian existence. Nietzsche had chosen the philosophical path to a ruthless heroism (Nietzsche 205). After criticising our superiority complex, Sloterdijk 46, suggests to think about effective procedures to produce decent people, for instance, by prenatal selection, which does not make much sense unless we want to be superior to other mammals. Moreover, the most effective procedure of prenatal selection occurs at conception, in which dozens of millions of eager sperms are eliminated. It would be impossible to find intellects able to do better. The suggestion is absurd, because procedures to change the human race would require the depth of wisdom and responsibility no-one can muster, and for a scientist to accredit himself that wisdom would present the epitome of intellectual conceitedness. People have always taken responsibility for their decisions. History does not prove the opposite. Philosophy, however, was wrong in teaching morals and obedience. This resulted in numerous political catastrophies. A too negative view of human history is not convenient to a philosopher, who wants to avoid the unilateral journalistic approach to reality, which necessarily and very appropriately focuses on bad events. Similarly, the presentation of past politics usually also focuses on conflicts and wars and fails to picture the past in a realistic way (Chapter Three 20f-j, p49). Thus, it is neither necessary nor advisable to meddle with the human genome. Sloterdijk 46, The present civilisation represents a titanic battle between the moralising and brutalising elements in the mass media. A slight improvement of the genetic code could hardly manage to overcome the todays demonic wave of boundless exploitation and luxury In fact, an innovative procedure to reduce aggression and stupidity possibly also a human-engineering technology which allows eliminating biological risks is imminent. Comment: The very pessimistic view of the Western and the upcoming Eastern civilisations makes sense. However, it is not necessary to change the human genetic code. We are better to demonstrate that our genetic code enables us to take responsibility and that we want to face the challenge of the future, although it might reduce our enjoyments. Unfortunately, the mass media continue admiring stars and

rich people who, for all their unhappiness and neurotic greediness, seem to enjoy life to the full. This is all the more the case after the fall of communism, which is celebrated as a total victory of capitalism. Therefore, it is not the genetic code that needs correcting, but the philosophical approach to happiness. Moreover, it is important to see that Sloterdijks approach turns the bioethical discussion of genetic engineering (Nickl 99, 142-148, 155, 169, 170) upside down. While responsibility questions all such manipulations, Sloterdijk suggests to indiscriminately use it, if it promises positive results. Such is a disrespectful approach. Hitlers euthnasia programme also intended to improve the human genetic code.60 Again, it is suggested that the simplifying Darwinian approach to evolution be abandoned (Chapter Three 20h, p50). Evolution cannot be imitated, because we do not know its control mechanism that safeguards against detrimental long term developments. Hinnies and mules, for instance, cannot procreate. No sooner have we found out those mysteries, than we will probably recognise that artificial interventions are far too risky. Sloterdijk 48-54 assesses that since Platos Republic the moralists efforts resemble those of a zoo director who wants to keep his animals under control. Plato teaches people to resign themselves to obeying the sovereign, who should be able to perfectly unite power and wisdom. Sloterdijk asks if it was not necessary to breed such geniuses. Comment: Whether one leads or is led, both positions equally want to be supported by responsibility. There were never political geniuses who could dispense with control and consultations. It is also suggested that countries are not really governable (Mackintosh 200-201); if it was not for peoples common sense and innate social behaviour, no-one could devise rules able to produce law and order. Thus, Sloterdijks comparisons of Plato to a zoo director is totally inadequate, as though a zoo director would ever try to produce animals that remain within the boundaries by choice. Likewise, Plato would never be able to produce social behaviour by his teaching. All the same, Sloterdijk is correct in ridiculing the useless attempts of countless moralists to improve the characters of people. However, he also seems to use their errors as a justification of his own suggestion to improve the genetic code by scientific intervention. Nickl 65b deals with the question whether or not the successful researcher is responsible for his findings. The author comes to the conclusion that the discoverer is never responsible. Comment: It is not possible to make such acquittals. There are several further questions to be asked, for instance, what means were adopted to make the discovery, who should be given access to the new information, and which precautions want to be taken to make sure that an immediate abuse of the discovery be stopped. However, contrary to what Nickl 65a (Chapter Three 19, p46) stipulates, there is no authority to impose such conditions. Nickl 65c suggests that the producer of the nuclear bomb is responsible. Comment: Everybody wants to act responsibly in whatever they do, be it cooking a meal or producing a bomb. In addition, the criteria of duty and authority (65a) are
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lacking again. It is obvious that Nickl wants to suggest that the producer is guilty of its terrible effects. However, `guilt and `innocence are judicial parameters with no philosophical relevance. For instance, one could just as well argue that the existence of nuclear bombs has caused the longest period of peace in the West ever, and that their producers count among the greatest benefactors in history. As a matter of fact, such superficial journalistic approaches are philosophically useless and prove that a valid doctrine of responsibility has never been established. Nickl 65d questions her own statement by asking, Are the scientists and technicians of Los Alamos responsible of what they were ordered to do by the US-government? They built a functioning bomb, calculated how it would be most effective, and so on. What about their responsibility? Comment: It is wise and dignified to question our jobs. If someone wants to be happy, they will not produce weapons, unless they know that they will be used for defensive purposes exclusively. The question is not philosophical, because the weapons are not the problem in terms of war and peace. For instance, the author grew up near a huge arsenal packed with guns, but never experienced any harm from them. One could also ask whether introducing such journalistic, voyeuristic questions into the debate is responsible; the answer is that Nickl certainly made her best effort to present practical examples to her theory, and it is her business exclusively to judge her decision to present the example of those technicians of Los Alamos. Responsibility only makes sense, if it questions our decisions. Thus, the teacher using Nickls handbook will decide for himself if he wants a debate in class that possibly denigrates other peoples decisions ( Plato R I 5C). Does it make sense for German students to discuss the moral of the scientists and technicians in Los Alamos? Nickl 68, scientific findings should be published. Comment: It is not possible to make such rules. Even if there was a law which demands so, the responsible one might decide to withhold his knowledge. For instance, if a doctor finds out that a man is not the biological father of his wifes child, he is better not to broadcast that. Or, there are many people able to crack bank codes, but do not spread their knowledge. Nickl 69a, technical development can only be responsible, if it supports human life. Comment: Such a rule seems questionable, since cruel experiments with or the unqualified exploitation of animals contradict the principles of general respect (Mackintosh 273), but supports human life. In fact, the support of human life is a natural consequence of social behaviour, which is very good. Responsibility, however, suggests to develop only things that support life in general. Nickl 69b, Humanity has to learn that it cannot do whatever is technically feasible and restrain its effort to those techniques that serve humanity in the long run. Such is not difficult, since man has always been able to do inadvisable things as robbing and killing. He learnt to refrain from it on account of social interests and forbade it by law. Comment: The first sentence, apart from the moralising and unnecessary has to, makes sense; the responsible ones want to serve life in the long run by whatever they decide. The second sentence is not correct. As a matter of fact, it is not very easy to avoid irreversible negative consequences of our actions. For instance, more and more people, have to drive to their workplace, creating irreversible pollution, noise, fear, strain, cost, and danger for themselves, others, and animals, and it would

be very difficult to forbid that. The historical surmises given in the third sentence are unacceptable, since social behaviour is innate and humans, at all times, behaved well and took responsibility. Nickl 71a, The scientist has to hold himself accountable for the unwanted consequence of his research. Comment: The responsible scientist wants to do so. In terms of an important injunction, refer to Nickl 98C2. Nickl 71b, Galilei, being afraid of torture, acted irresponsibly when he renounced his findings. Comment: It is not wise and dignified to disqualify other peoples actions as irresponsible. Galileis case was not worth suffering and dying for. He lost a battle, but won the war. The question is whether or not Nickl approves of the actions taken by the Inquisition. This disturbing example proves that the philosopher was unable to put forward valid examples able to illustrate her approach. Nickl 72, The respect of human dignity presents the critical parameter in all our actions. Comment: Nickl defines human dignity as the object of our correct decisions. The responsible cannot follow this advice. Ex 1, 4, and 5 clearly illustrate so. Human dignity is the subject and cause of responsibility, which may decide to disregard the dignity and life of the object or victim. At war, soldiers have to eliminate the enemies; such necessary actions cannot be regarded as respecting human dignity. If one would try to define the object of responsible decisions, then, in this day and age, it would be the maintenance of life on our planet (Chapter Three 16, p45). Nickl 73, Responsibility originates from the acceptance of boundaries, modesty, and humility. Comment: These are elements of innate social behaviour, while responsibility may disregard all of them. Ulysses (Ex 4) and Samson (Ex 5) certainly overstepped all boundaries and acted without modesty and humility. Bonhoeffer 21a also refers to a new sort of nobility that is created by courageous responsible decisions. Nickl 74, Apart from the above-mentioned human dignity, prosperous techniques are also held to respect the dignity of nature. Comment: No sooner is dignity mistaken as the object of responsibility, than controversies and conflicts arise. Only if dignity is considered the subject of responsibility, it remains indivisible; the wise and dignified always wants to decide in a way that they honestly consider most appropriate and sustainable. Nickl 75, The scientist has to impose on himself a voluntary restraint, despite scientific freedom, which finds its boundaries in the human value and dignity In fact, freedom can also include the voluntary ignorance, as though one chose not to look into the cards of destiny. Comment: The first sentence is disturbing, because a voluntary restraint cannot be defined an obligation. The wise want to respect everybody and everything, but artificial boundaries of research do not make sense at all.

In terms of the second sentence, Nickl 71, requested the scientist to consider all the consequences of his research. How is that possible without trying to look into the cards of destiny? As a consequence, in terms of responsibility, no objective evaluation is available. Therefore, correct decisions have their foundation in the subject. Nickl 76-78, We have a global responsibility. Comment: It is, in fact, the only way to be happy. However, unless we want that, responsible decisions will not be taken, whenever they are likely to make us feel bad. Nickl 77, The conscience as a moral guidance is supposed to be of ever greater relevance The conscience makes us think twice. Comment: The philosopher names an authority (stipulated in Nickl 65a) for the first time and it is a completely subjective authority. One can agree to that, if conscience compares with responsibility. The term, however, includes the idea of guilt and obligation, which is unnecessary in the philosophical debate (Chapter Three 20c, p48). The origin of guilt is extensively dealt with in Mackintosh 118-132. Nickl 168-169a presents an intelligible interpretation of Habermas philosophy. She explains that he promotes an Ethics of Discourse which everybody would be entitled to contribute to. It is supposed to define generally advisable social rules. Comment: Such ethics have been followed by humans for millions of years. They accord with social behaviour innate in all mammals and do not require a discourse. Nickl 169b summarises Habermas approach, which culminates in the idea that morals have to protect humans, not vice versa. Comment: The idea presumes a passive human dignity that is superior to that of a system and other live beings. Passive dignity, however, is a property of all things. To make things worse, the principle turns the principle of responsibility upside down, as though there was no active dignity that wants to respect everything alike. Habermas self-pitying approach, typical of both existentialism and the Frankfurt School manifests itself again (COM 4, above); it is always the others who are supposed to improve their attitude. Most of Habermas, the Frankfurt Schools, and the existentialists arguments present a self-pitying approach to Practical Philosophy, as though we were most likely to go short of the love we deserve. If, indeed, we were born with a zero moral (Chapter One 5), our destiny would really be too hard to bear. However, we are born excellently gifted and equipped with social behaviour and logical thinking (Mackintosh 113-133). Nickl 169c-170 presents T. Engelhardts view on bioethical principles. He distinguishes between definite restrictions and recommendations. Definite restrictions; 1) Human dignity 2) No usage of embryos 3) No selective procedures 4) No eugenics 5) Only for therapeutic purposes Recommendation in terms of in-vitro fertilisation; only for stable, heterosexual couples, no older than 40 years, if they present sensible reasons for it.

Comment: If a consent to such principles can be found and legislation is developed accordingly, then responsibility will continue to question and may opt against them. For instance, (1) it may possibly make sense to destroy all the heavily handicapped embryos, (2) use spare embryos for therapy, (3) destroy the weaker embryo, (4) select the sperms and eggs with the highest potential. An important general injunction to all those thorny bioethical questions is presented in Nickl 99aC. Nickl 180a, The team B Gert J W Hennessey distinguishes between moral rules and moral ideals; Ten moral rules; not to kill, not to hurt, not to incapacitate, not to restrict freedom and opportunity, not to prevent pleasure, not to deceive, to keep promises, not to deceive, to abide by the law, to fulfil ones duty. Moral ideals; to save lives, to relieve pain, etc. Comment: Responsibility may want to trespass all those rules and ideals, and it does not distinguish between rules and ideals, since the responsible want to be happy, which is only possible by choosing the wisest and most dignified way of action. Nickl 185-186 presents a list of ethical norms that have to be fulfilled by the employer; 1) appropriate salary 2) respect of freedom, so as to open opportunities to develop employee potential. This can only be warranted by the accordance of private property. 3) equal chances of education 4) welfare, so as to secure the financial safety in sickness and old age 5) preservation of the environment, for instance, clean air Comment: The majority of those norms accord with a reasonable long term management of an enterprise and make sense in terms of the employers responsibility to secure the future of his business. All of them, however, are equally advisable to the employee, for instance, 1) an appropriate salary wants to be fought for by the employee as well, 2) the maintenance of private property also asks for the employees effort, 3) the chances of education want to be taken by the employee in the first place, 4) welfare makes sense to everybody, 5) the preservation of the natural resources presents definitely the most imminent of these responsibilities, which are wanted by the responsible, who can dispense with ethical norms. This criticism is meant to make sure that the employer be not imposed unilateral obligations in terms of morals, let alone love. Nickl 187, The future will reveal whether or not there is a responsible, eco-ethical approach to the new possibilities, offered by the bio-technique, which aims to maintain a balance between human dignity and the economic safety of the workers. Comment: The future will also reveal whether or not philosophy abstains from teaching other people what they have to do, for it would be better to teach how we can be happy (Ex 3 COM 2). Schneewind 291, Harringtons view of justice expands his thesis about the nature of virtue and vice. He does not think that justice poses any difficult theoretical questions. There is a simple procedure for procuring justice. If the aim is to divide goods so as to `give the upper hand in all cases unto common right or interest, nothwithstanding the nearness of that which sticks unto every man in private, consider that even simple country girls know how to do it. For example, two of them have a cake yet

undivided, which was given between them. `That each of them therefore may have which is due, >Divide<, says one unto the other, >and I will choose, or let me divide, and you shall choose. < That which great philosophers are disputing upon in vain is brought unto light by two silly girls: even the whole mystery of a commonwealth, which lies only in dividing and choosing Equal shares will result in this case, Comment: It is true that justice is easy to organise in that the partners get equal shares. However, justice does not warrant correctness at all. The responsible partition of the cake gives the partner who is more hungry or needs more food or has contributed more to the acquisition of the cake a greater share. It means that the one who cuts chooses first, regardless of whether or not the partition is just. Consequently, it is not true that the whole mystery of a commonwealth is resolvable by justice. For instance, a sick person may need much more care and money from the community than others. The Five Examples also give evidence of the irrelevance of justice in terms of a responsible decision-making. The infant (Ex 1) certainly did not deserve to die. Who would be able to prove that Hitler (Ex 2) deserved to die? Bonhoeffer, in his treatise, never refers to justice. Consequently, it is not the simple country girls who are silly, but the philosophers conclusions.

Chapter Nine: Responsibility and Social Behaviour

Responsibility Social Behaviour

Confrontation

Compromise

COMMENT: 1) `Responsibility is more or less identical to Webers `Ethics of Consequences (`Folgeethik), however, without being an ethic. The term `ethics or `morals is contradictory in itself. It has led to the confusion of legal and philosophical aspects. It is not philosophically fathomable that any authority is able to demand responsibility. Such is also unnecessary, since the responsible want it of their own accord. 2) `Social Behaviour wants to accept compromises, whereas `Responsibility always includes confrontation. For instance, a mother would never accept for her children to be hurt by an act of aggression and she would not tolerate to be hurt herself. While social behaviour has its limits, responsibility has no restrictions. Calvin II 8.16 suggests that The duties which we owe to God are innumerable, . God does not need anyones service, and duties must be defined by a contract and are numerable. The term `innumerable applies to our responsibilities, which means that we, within

the limits of our power, want to include in them whatever and whoever needs our care, and that it may lead to hostile, antisocial actions. 3) `Social Behaviour, on the other hand, coincides more or less with what Weber means by `Ethics of Attitude (`Gesinnungsethik), without being an ethic, either, since it is innate in all mammals. The definition of social behaviour as an ethic resulted from the confusion between parental and philosophical aspects. It is indeed true that wise parents want to take care that antisocial behaviour in their children is monitored. 4) Weber 233 erroneously initiates his studies with the notion of `power. `Responsibility or `Ethics of Consequences is not a consequence of power, but of logical thinking or wisdom. It is obvious that in all our decision-making the `Ethics of Consequences prevails against the `Ethics of Attitude (which more or less compares with innate social behaviour), but not because we have power, but on account of the fact that we want to act in a responsible way, as it is convenient for everybody. Weber argues as if only the Chief (Ex 1) was correct in having the infant strangled. Bonhoeffers (Ex 2) power, position, or profession is nothing to do with his responsible decision-making. The same applies to the other Examples; everybody would have been correct in resisting Mussolini (Ex 3), eliminating the suitors (Ex 4), and killing the Philistines (Ex 5). Weber was not able to define the precise positions of his two `ethics, but he correctly noticed that they might forever contradict each other. Both of these are not `ethics, because the `ethics of attitude is innate and the `ethics of consequences can be compared with a common and genuine desire with humans, because it is directed by wisdom and dignity. The fact that there have been so many dictatorships in history is due to prevalent erroneous parenting, which teaches obedience. All the same, people have always been wont to take responsibility. Bonhoeffer 13f also is unsure how social behaviour (it is not sociable to eliminate Hitler) and the considerations of an actions consequences relate to one another. He just feels very strongly that his decision is not virtuous (Bonhoeffer 11). 5) Habermas wrongly distinguishes `communicative acting from `purpose-oriented acting (Dubiel 103). All action is purpose-oriented. Likewise, all correct decisionmaking is responsible. However, not all responsible acts are sociable or `communicative, while Habermas attributes equality, if not superiority, to the `communicative acting (Dubiel 104). The above terminology of Weber is clearer. Habermas `purpose-orientated action has a somewhat negative connotation. His approach would definitely have difficulty in coping with the Five Examples. 6) It is, therefore, necessary to position the two principles in the following way; responsibility has absolute priority in our decision-making and is not restricted to the application of the innate faculty of social behaviour. It also prevails against the legally defined duties of authorities. For instance, a colonel might want to allow the withdrawal of troops without the consent of his commander even at the risk of being punished for his autonomous, responsible decision. In addition, responsibility may correctly breach contracts and commitments (Plato R I 5, below). 7) One can almost agree with Nickl 149 that our time asks for the responsibility of everybody in the view of tremendous global challenges. It is suggested that wise

and dignified persons want to try and tackle them, because confronting that ultimate challenge makes us happy, although we might not succeed ( Schopenhauer 112C, Bahro R 14C). 8) It is understood that wherever responsibility allows us to act according to the parameters of social behaviour, it will necessarily want to do so. Topic History and Comments Plato R I 5, Well said, Cephalus, I (Socrates) replied; but as concerning justice, what is it? -- to speak the truth and to pay your debts -- no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition. Comment: The Socratic dialectic is obviously but not knowingly based on the perfect doctrine of responsibility. It is, in fact, impossible to name any action that is good or bad in all circumstances. Such can even be said of the most atrocious decisions. For instance, the bombing of countless locations in Germany and the dropping of the nuclear bombs on Japan in World War II cannot be proven unjustified, since there was no other way to defeat the aggressors as fast as possible. Without a valid doctrine of responsibility, the political discussions about those atrocities are unfair and irrelevant. They are constantly confusing the principles of social behaviour and those of responsibility. Although they seem to discuss the basic matters, they move into the dark regions of the sub-contraries, which is to say, confrontation and compromise, as though both of them were valid options at any time. Socrates, however, is aware of the fact that, in terms of responsible decisionmaking, he is the wisest of man because `he knows that he knows nothing, while all the others think they know something. Indeed, Plato R I finishes with Socrates statement, And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy. This wonderful statement clearly reflects the lack of a doctrine of responsibility, but also the reasonable approach to such questions by those who lived 400 years prior to Christ. Socrates argument illustrates that they did not question the silent admission that people want to avoid violent actions, so as to illegally withhold deposited weapons. Plato R VII 7a, You must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after the own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State. Comment: The `better life than that of a ruler is conceived as the one of idealistic philosophers, who, according to Plato, are called to be the rulers of the State. Although that is not true, the rest of the ingenious sentences are perfectly applicable to the correct mentality in the responsible politician. If a politician is not guided by

responsibility, but by personal ambition of any kind, he will look for compromises in order to favour his career. Such is not a truly dignified approach to his profession and responsibility. Plato R VII 7b, And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight. Comment: It is, indeed, never the first priority in any responsible decision-making whether or not one likes it. It can also be that the responsible take on an unwelcome task in order to prevent some other from being appointed on account of the fact that he knows that his contestant would do a lot of damage. Love of power, money, and glory are, indeed, not the best reasons to embrace a political career. In other words, the responsible politician is preferable to the ambitious one. Aristotle III.1e Now every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that men become unjust and in general bad; but the term 'involuntary' tends to be used not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage -- for it is not mistaken purpose that causes involuntary action (it leads rather to wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men are blamed), but ignorance of particulars, i.e. of the circumstances of the action and the objects with which it is concerned. For it is on these that both pity and pardon depend, since the person who is ignorant of any of these acts involuntarily. Comment: It is not true that wisdom warrants responsible decision-making, for people may refrain from the latter out of fear, obedience, and other impairments. Furthermore, if a `wicked man is defined as one who behaves antisocially, it is nothing to do with ignorance, but handicap. Moreover, error and ignorance want correcting, not pity and pardon. In fact, countless people refrain from informing others of their mistakes. As a consequence of this, those others miss the chance to improve, although the improvement would benefit themselves and everybody else. Aristotles twisted approach is obscured by the tendency to justify judgemental attitudes and procedures, as though the validity of actions was dependent on the acknowledgement by others, whereas responsibility may want to make decisions noone else agrees to. Aristotle III.12 as the child should live according to the direction of his tutor, so the appetitive element should live according to rational principle. Comment: In both phrases the modal verb `should is inconvenient. First, it is disrespectful, irresponsible, and extremely detrimental to have children act `according to the direction of their tutors. The problem of obedience has already been addressed in Bonhoeffer 10C1 and 2, 12C, 13aC; John Paul 99C, 111C; Schmid 8C. The philosopher obviously takes an incompetent approach to parenting. Secondly, as logically thinking beings, we want our decisions to make sense, because only sensible decisions are dignified and make us happy. It is not necessary to define `rationality as an obligation. Aristotle IV.1c talks about the too generous man, he is thought to have not a bad character; it is not the mark of a wicked or ignoble man to go to excess in giving and not taking, but only of a foolish one. The man who is prodigal in this way is thought much better than the mean man both for the aforesaid reasons and because he benefits many while the other benefits no one, not even himself. Comment: The overly generous mans misconduct can be as disturbing as the one of a mean man. Those who are generous can do a lot of harm to their families, while

they enjoy popularity with their loved ones. Many marriages are destroyed by the excessive and compulsive habits of a generous spouse. It also encourages exploitation. In fact, in the following paragraph, the philosopher himself brilliantly describes the detrimental characteristics of prodigality. But most prodigal people, as has been said, also take from the wrong sources, and are in this respect mean. They become apt to take because they wish to spend and cannot do this easily; for their possessions soon run short. Thus they are forced to provide means from some other source. At the same time, because they care nothing for honour, they take recklessly and from any source; for they have an appetite for giving, and they do not mind how or from what source. Hence also their giving is not liberal; for it is not noble, nor does it aim at nobility, nor is it done in the right way; sometimes they make rich those who should be poor, and will give nothing to people of respectable character, and much to flatterers or those who provide them with some other pleasure. Hence also most of them are self-indulgent; for they spend lightly and waste money on their indulgences, and incline towards pleasures because they do not live with a view to what is noble. In terms of the correct handling of assets and riches, also refer to Aristotle IV.1bC. Aristotle IV.3b honours the proud man; he will face great dangers, and when he is in danger he is unsparing of his life, knowing that there are conditions on which life is not worth having. Comment: Such is, in fact, the attitude of responsible persons. The philosopher, however, fails to signal that responsible decision-making may also include the disregard of social parameters (Ex 1, 2, 4, 5). One would have trouble feeling proud of that (Bonhoeffer 15c). Aristotle IV.7 The boastful man, then, is thought to be apt to claim the things that bring glory, when he has not got them, or to claim more of them than he has, and the mock-modest man on the other hand to disclaim what he has or belittle it, while the man who observes the mean is one who calls a thing by its own name, being truthful both in life and in word, owning to what he has, and neither more nor less. Comment: A truthful approach to our strengths and weaknesses is indeed the only responsible way to come to terms with them. However, to be truthful does not lie between being boastful and too modest. Moreover, Samson (Ex 5) did not acknowledge his regained strength, Ulysses (Ex 4) did not inform the suitors that he and his helpers were the only people in the room to be armed, and Bonhoeffer (Ex 2) did not inform the authorities that he was joining the plot against Hitler. Responsibility, therefore, may require deceit. In that context, it becomes obvious that all the articles of the General Declaration of Human Responsibilities61 are incorrectly based on morals and violate the doctrine of responsibility. For instance, Art 15 guarantees religious freedom. However, religions that exploit people, indoctrinate children, or promote individualism do not deserve to be free. Or, Art. 8 wrongly stipulates honesty. Responsibility may require dishonesty (1 Cor 13.6C).

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Aristotle VII.11 The study of pleasure and pain belongs to the province of the political philosopher; for he is the architect of the end, with a view to which we call one thing bad and another good without qualification. Further, it is one of our necessary tasks to consider them; for not only did we lay it down that moral virtue and vice are concerned with pains and pleasures, but most people say that happiness involves pleasure; this is why the blessed man is called by a name derived from a word meaning enjoyment. Comment: The latter remark seems to refer to the word `bliss. Apart from this, everything in the statement is mistaken. The `political philosopher possibly compares with the Practical Philosopher, whose commitment, however, is to investigate the question of how we can be happy. The parameters of pleasure and pain, as well as the ones of good and bad prove secondary, since we want to act responsibly, which may include antisocial action. Those terms definitely refer to psychology, medicine and other sciences. The parameter of responsibility, however, claims superiority to those parameters of feelings. In that sense, the `political philosopher could be called `the discoverer of the end. However, it is obvious that both Plato and Aristotle overestimated the political aspect of philosophy ( Plato R VII 30C); they imagined that in a perfect state fully adapted people would permanently feel happy, while it is unrealistic to constantly feel happy. That is why in well-to-do countries the suicide rates are the highest; no sooner are people confronted with personal difficulties, than they despair, for they feel excluded from general welfare, the participation in which is mistaken for happiness. Aristotle VII.1b both continence and endurance are thought to be included among things good and praiseworthy, and both incontinence and softness among things bad and blameworthy; Comment: Those are parameters of social behaviour. Responsibility, however, may ask for incontinuity. For instance, one would slaughter kidnappers, if necessary, regardless of whether or not they have treated the victims well. In addition, softness makes sense in all the cases in which our or other peoples health would be affected by endurance. Thus, it is not possible to philosophically establish such rules. Augustine: Johannis Evangelium Tractatus 82, 3 claims, For the one who does not love has no reason for keeping the commandments". ( John Paul 22) Comment: The commandments five to ten (Ex 20.12-17) are identical to some consequences of innate social behaviour. The latter, however, is caused by a natural bond and differs from erotic love. Moreover, Augustine uses the term `caritas, which is that imaginary higher form of Christian love, taught by Jesus and Paul (agape) and other apostles. Humans have lived for hundreds of thousands of years exhibiting social behaviour (necessary for the survival of mammals) before the arrival of those teachers. Thus, `caritas is not needed to keep the commandments. Similarly, one cannot say that social behaviour is the cause of responsibility. In fact, responsibility requires the higher principles of wisdom and dignity. Aquinas II 8.2, it must be observed, , that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough for it to be good in one point only, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be good, both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that the external action is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the end, this is not enough to make the external action good: and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil.

Comment: The philosopher is mistaken. It is obvious that, in the Five Examples, the proper objects of the actions caused very bad feelings. Notwithstanding that, they were responsible. Responsibility wants to exclude a compromise, if need be. Aquinas error proves that `good and `evil are invalid parameters in terms of responsibility, for they refer to feelings. Feelings, in fact, in order to be good, want to be comprehensive, which is to say, without negative points ( Hegel 20C). Aquinas II 20.3, it may happen, in things that are subordinate to something else, that a thing is good merely from being subordinate; thus a bitter draught is good merely because it procures health On the other hand it happens sometimes that that which is subordinate to something else, has some aspect of goodness in itself, besides the fact of its being subordinate to some other good: thus a palatable medicine can be considered in the light of a pleasurable good, besides being conducive to health. Comment: Contrary to the previous paragraph, the philosopher is right. However, he only admits that `a bitter medicine can be good. He refrains from concluding that also a criminal act can be good. At this point, he could have developed a correct doctrine of responsibility, overcoming the Christian love principle. The bitter medicine is good because of its long term beneficial effect, the killing of the innocent infant (Ex 1) is good because of its reasonability. The same applies to the other Examples. It is understood that our heroes would have preferred to use a palatable medicine, too, which is to say, a sociable way to achieve their goals. Aquinas II 94.4 resumes the argument of Plato R I 5 and, unknowingly, includes a correct doctrine of responsibility. He almost literally repeats the Socratic irony in terms of what justice is (Plato R I 5). He explains, goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore. Comment: If Aquinas would have had the same predicament to deal with as Bonhoeffer, he would probably have produced similar misgivings as our hero, who was searching for a `justification for his decision to resist Hitlers regime. The hopelessness of such an attempt is blatant in the historical fact that Bonhoeffer was actually fighting against his country, a purpose which Aquinas also incorrectly absolutely refutes. As a matter of fact, many responsible people chose to fight against their country. As a conclusion of all this, one has to state that the passage presents the declaration of philosophical bankruptcy by a philosopher who seemed to know it all. He, unfortunately, ignored that both the Christian love principle and the Aristotelian moral system were untenable. Aquinas II 94.5, In terms of `natural law, the philosopher presents a strange and cryptic admission that it is not absolutely valid. He states, it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, Comment: The restriction, in some particular cases of rare occurrence, is not very correct; responsibility constantly wants to take care that social behaviour be

questioned, controlled, and corrected (Ex 5 COM 5), for it is not the highest principle in decision-making. The philosopher failed to signal that correct behaviour takes the consequences of our decisions into account. He is also a little insincere by only admitting that there might be exceptions to the natural law, whereas correct decisions may also oppose ecclesiastical, biblical, and divine laws. Aquinas II 96.6 presents a correct interpretation of a responsible approach to established laws, it happens often that the observance of some point of law conduces to the common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. Since then the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the law according to what happens most frequently, by directing his attention to the common good. Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the general welfare, it should not be observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an established law that the gates of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a general rule: but, it were to happen that the enemy are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would be a great loss to the city, if the gates were not opened to them: and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to the letter of the law, in order to maintain the common weal, which the lawgiver had in view. Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of the law according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk needing instant remedy, it is not competent for everyone to expound what is useful and what is not useful to the state: those alone can do this who are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to dispense from the laws. If, however, the peril be so sudden as not to allow of the delay involved by referring the matter to authority, the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law. Comment: If, indeed, necessity knows no law, our decision-making wants to be derived from a higher principle than all morals, social behaviour, natural, divine, and human law. It is, however, not good enough to define responsibility as a consequence of necessity. Only Ex 1 presents a case in which necessity seems a sufficient foundation for the correct decision which still does not exclude that the father might correctly choose to save his child and have the tribe perish (Ex 1 COM 10). All the other Examples, however, result from the positive aspects of wisdom and dignity, for neither Bonhoeffer nor the other heroes were forced to act in the way they did, but they chose to act so. This positive aspect of responsibility also results in positive choices, so as to give an account of ones decisions like Bonhoeffer, or accept, in old age, the duties of a presidency like Pertini, or to care for ones children every day like parents all over the world. Thus, responsibility goes far beyond necessity. Aquinas II 100.11, But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so many corollaries. Thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids the worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts forbidding things relating to worship of idols: thus it is written (Deut 18.10-11): `Neither let there be found among you anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . . . neither let there by any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead. The second commandment forbids perjury. To this is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Lev 24.15-16) and the prohibition of false doctrine (Dt 13.1-18). To the third commandment are added all the

ceremonial precepts. To the fourth commandment prescribing the honour due to parents, is added the precept about honouring the aged, according to Lev. 19.32: `Rise up before the hoary head, and honour the person of the aged man; and likewise all the precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed towards our betters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbour, according to Lev 19.16: `Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbour: likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother (Lev 19.17): `Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart. To the sixth commandment which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition about whoredom, according to Dt 23.17: `There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel; and the prohibition against unnatural sins, according to Lev 28.22-23: Thou shalt not lie with mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any beast. To the seventh commandment which prohibits theft, is added the precept forbidding usury, according to Dt 23.19: `Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury; and the prohibition against fraud, according to Dt 25.13: `Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag; and universally all prohibitions relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the prohibition against false judgment, according to Ex 23.2: `Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth; and the prohibition against lying (Ex 23.7): `Thou shalt fly lying, and the prohibition against detraction, according to Lev 19.16: `Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor a whisperer among the people. To the other two commandments no further precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all kinds of evil desires. Comment: No sooner does one start to enumerate all the compromises social behaviour and morals demand than the list risks to become both tiring and unworthy (despite its being compiled in a masterly way), remaining very questionable and incomplete, too. This vain effort compares with Habermas list of conditions that must be implemented, before one can discuss a serious issue (Chapter Ten COM 11). The responsible one, first of all, wants to act in a dignified way and adjust to acceptable social behaviour; then, he can dispense with all those precepts, and secondly might break all of them, if need be. Calvin II 8.45a, Thou shalt not steal. The purport is, that injustice being an abomination to God, we must render to every man his due. In substance, then, the commandment forbids us to long after other mens goods, and, accordingly, requires every man to exert himself honestly in preserving his own. For we must consider, that what each individual possesses has not fallen to him by chance, but by the distribution of the sovereign Lord of all, that no one can pervert his means to bad purposes without committing a fraud on a divine dispensation. Comment: The relativity of the Eighth Commandment was already noticed by Socrates (Plato R I 5). Calvins reference to the preservation of his own corresponds to a responsible attitude, but cannot be derived from the commandment and is the result of wisdom and dignity rather than of the distribution of the sovereign Lord, as though all our possessions were sacrosanct. His seems to be a biased capitalist approach, whereas responsibility wants to share the annual surplus with the needy. Calvin II 8.45b, If an agent or an indolent steward wastes the substance of his employer, or does not give due heed to the management of his property; if he unjustly squanders or luxuriously wastes the means entrusted to him; if a servant holds his master in derision, divulges his secrets, or in any way is treacherous to his

life or his goods; if, on the other hand, a master cruelly torments his household, he is guilty of theft before God; since every one who, in the exercise of his calling, performs not what he owes to others, keeps back, or makes away with what does not belong to him. Comment: These intimations are correct. They conform to a wise and dignified way of acting. However, they cannot be included in the Eighth Commandment, but are the result of a responsible approach to being a servant or a master. All the same, the application of common sense and responsibility in Calvins moral teaching coincides with a valid doctrine of responsibility in its conclusions, but not so in its foundation. Responsible behaviour justifies itself. It can dispense with commandments. Bruno I 1 the human will sits at the stern of the soul and with the little rudder of reason governs the affections of the inferior potencies against the surge of their natural violence. Comment: The `rudder of reason not only wants to govern the inferior potencies (which, in fact, are governed by innate social behaviour), but also the restrictions of social behaviour, which may be overruled by responsibility. Hobbes II 20a, The right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over his Children; and is called Paternall. And is not so derived from the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared. Comment: It seems that neither a philosopher nor psychologist has ever addressed the question of why parents are entitled to question and, should the situation arise, correct their childrens decisions. For want of solid arguments, it has been claimed that whoever supports the children is entitled to an appropriate reaction. That is not true. For instance, if someone is presented with a piece of cake, he is not obliged to express thanks for it, eat, or return the gift. Hobbes is right in denying authority to be a consequence of lineage, although many parents (and many laws) seem to harbour that conviction. However, the relationship is not defined by the childrens consent, either. Responsibility may want to take measures not agreed by the children. The consent of people may produce duties and rights, which may include family laws. The parent-child relationship, however, is not philosophically based on those categories. If one really takes care to think about the correct relationship between parents and children, the doctrine of responsibility emerges with absolute necessity, but it is more difficult to elaborate the logical steps to take than with the Five Examples, where the simple argument of wisdom and dignity suffices. It is, nevertheless, worth an attempt. First, parents and children have the same value and dignity. Mutual respect is assumed. Secondly, innate social behaviour warrants a lively, caring relationship within the family and beyond. It enables people to cope with controversies. Thirdly, parents concern to prepare their children for the challenges of life is met by the childrens desire to learn and integrate into society. School education is supposed to support those efforts. Fourthly, the mental development of children continually transforms the familial relationship into a partnership. The special bond between those partners wants to be preserved. It extends to the grandchildren. Fifthly, mutual responsibility presents the highest maxim at all times. It may overrule social behaviour and lead to conflict. Mutual respect accounts for a dignified answer to them.

Consequently, the familial relationship is neither symbiotic (a dreadful error, resulting from the love principle) nor juridical (which would be about rights and duties), but one of natural bonds and responsibility. It has its challenges, which hopefully the respective partners multiple abilities will be able to tackle. Those are the happy families Tolstoy refers to in the first sentence of `Anna Karenina, All the happy families look alike, while all the unhappy ones differ from each other. The differences result from which one of the above steps malfunctions. In most cases, however, the lack of respect (First, above) initiates the misery, so that one might conclude that all unhappy families are alike in so far as the members are unable to respect one another. Descartes 2a proposes a provisional moral code consisting of just three or four maxims: The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, holding constantly to the religion in which by God's grace I had been instructed from my childhood. The second maxim was to be as firm and decisive in my actions as I could, and to follow even the most doubtful opinions, once I had adopted them, with no less constancy than if they had been quite certain. My third maxim was to try always to master myself rather than fortune, and to change my desires rather than the order of the world. Finally, to conclude this moral code I thought I could do no better than to continue with the [occupation] I was engaged in, and to devote my whole life to cultivating my reason and advancing as far as I could in the knowledge of the truth, following the method I had prescribed for myself. Comment: The first maxim is philosophically irrelevant. In fact, Descartes stated so, because of people like the Schoolmen; otherwise, they would have said that he was a man without any religion or faith, and that he intended to use his method to subvert them (Schneewind 186). The second maxim contradicts responsibility in that one would prefer being careful with doubtful opinions. Descartes view, however, is comparable with an usually adopted political approach, in that democratic politicians are supposed to demonstrate a sort of stubborness in the pursuit of their projects, even if they are questioning the cause themselves. The third proposition sanctifies adaptation. The fourth one lacks a plausible reason as to why he has chosen to do so. It would have given him the opportunity to develop a valid doctrine of responsibility by declaring that he continued his philosophical effort because it made him happy. In fact, most philosophers take care to develop new doctrines because it makes them happy to take responsibility and reveal the truth (Chapter One 6dC). Descartes 4c, The difference between the greatest souls and those that are base and common consists principally in the fact that common souls abandon themselves to their passions and are happy or unhappy only according as the things that happen to them are agreeable or unpleasant; the greatest souls, on the other hand, reason in a way that is so strong and cogent that, although they also have passions, and indeed passions which are often more violent than those of ordinary people, their reason nevertheless always remains mistress, and even makes their afflictions serve them and contribute to the perfect happiness they enjoy in this life. Comment: While this statement, in some aspects, presents an almost correct doctrine of responsibility, it is hardly helpful to the depressed person it was meant to address. In addition, the final phrase the perfect happiness they enjoy in this life is misleading; the `perfect happiness is not necessarily `enjoyed, which includes the notion of feeling good. For instance, the question whether or not Ulysses (Ex 4) felt good during his atrocious feat is irrelevant. Moreover, the passage gives a folkloric

explanation of what causes criminality; the worst criminals like Hitler and Stalin were strong and cogent and did not abandon themselves to their passions. Criminality has usually to be explained as a psychogenic handicap, caused by incompetent parenting (Mackintosh 237). Descartes 4d, We cannot ever practice any virtuethat is to say, do what our reason tells us we should dowithout receiving satisfaction and pleasure from doing so. Comment: The emotional terms satisfaction and pleasure are inappropriate; suppose we had to bury our children that had been murdered, or killed in an accident caused by our own actions, we would certainly act in a responsible way, without experiencing those feelings. Descartes 4h explains that whenever we lack certain knowledge of how to act, we should defer to the laws and customs of the land. [O]ne must also minutely examine all the customs of one's place of abode to see how far they should be followed. Though we cannot have certain demonstrations of everything, still we must take sides, and in matters of custom embrace the opinions that seem the most probable, so that we may never be irresolute when we need to act. For nothing causes regret and remorse except irresolution. Comment: Social behaviour suggests that we should adjust to the customs of the places we live in. Descartes advice also signals that responsibility wants to question them, all the same. The permanent miseries in countries, ossified by customs and terrible traditions (Shaftesbury 81, Chapter Twelve 11, p194), owe their invincibility to a lack of people who take responsibility, and to those who prefer fitting in at all costs. Lastly, irresolution is indeed painful. As long as it lasts, it makes sense to wait and see. Regret and remorse, however, are caused by wrong decisions rather than irresolution. Spinoza III PROP. VI Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being. Comment: The sense of self-preservation comes naturally to every living being. Responsibility, however, may want to supersede this natural gift, as it is demonstrated in Ex 2, 3, and 5. Shaftesbury 27-28, Now if by the natural constitution of any rational creature, the same irregularities of appetite which make him ill to others, make him ill also to himself, and if the same regularity of affections, which causes him to be good in one sense, causes him to be good also in the other, then is that goodness by which he is thus useful to others a real good and advantage to himself. And thus virtue and interest may be found at last to agree. Comment: The statement is true in terms of innate social behaviour. The latter, however, is common to all mammals, whereas the natural constitution of any rational creature allows for responsible decisions that may be opposed to social behaviour. For instance, the elimination of the suitors by Ulysses, for all its being responsible, was only good in one sense, whereas it was ill for the others. Shaftesburys error concerns both aetiology and philosophy (Chapter One 3). In addition, the irrelevance of the parameter good and ill is evident in Bonhoeffers (Ex 2) resistance, which eventually proved useless to both the community and himself.

Shaftesbury 41-42, And thus we find how far worth and virtue depend on a knowledge of right and wrong and on a use of reason, sufficient to secure a right application of the affections; that nothing horrid or unnatural, nothing unexemplary, nothing destructive of that natural affection by which the species or society is upheld, may on any account, or through any principle or notion of honour or religion, be at any time affected or prosecuted as a good and proper object of esteem. Comment: The philosopher disregards that a responsible decision may include horrid, unnatural, unexemplary, and destructive actions. Shaftesburys approach is too aesthetic (John Paul 71). Unknowingly, it describes innate social behaviour. Shaftesbury 82, it is mans interest to be wholly good and virtuous, since in a whole-some and sound state of his affections, such as we have described, he cannot possibly be other than sound, good, and virtuous in his action and behaviour. Comment: It makes sense to suppose that the more sociable ones character is, the easier one can adjust to the many challenges of society. However, the Five Examples demonstrate that responsible decisions may ask for actions and behaviour that are neither good nor virtuous. Thus, goodness and virtue are secondary values, while responsibility is indeed whole-some. Shaftesbury 88, out of these two branches (viz. community or participation in the pleasures of others, and belief of meriting well from others) would arise more than nine-tenths of whatever is enjoyed in life. And thus in the main sum of happiness there is scarce a single article but what derives itself from social love, and depends immediately on the natural and kind affections. Comment: Since social behaviour is innate, experiencing the cheerful company of friends certainly counts among the greatest pleasures in life. It is, however, only able to create felicity, as opposed to happiness (Ex 3 COM 12). Experience also teaches that the maintenance of friendship asks for constant effort from both sides. Shaftesbury 92, if the chief happiness be from the mental pleasures, and the chief mental pleasures are such as we have described, and are founded in natural affection, it follows that to have the natural affections is to have the chief means and power of self-enjoyment, the highest possession and happiness of life. Comment: Successful social behaviour does not warrant happiness. Wisdom and dignity may require antisocial, utterly revolting decisions nobody else may be able to agree to (Ex 3 COM 2-19). Hume II 1c, In short, it may be establish'd as an undoubted maxim, that no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality. Comment: If translated into the terminology of the doctrine of responsibility, the statement is absolutely correct. It would read, `that no action can be responsible, unless it corresponds to human knowledge and dignity, regardless of whether or not it compares with social behaviour. In this way, the contradiction in Humes definition is eliminated, for, how can an action be morally good but not in the sense of its morality? Hume III 3b, merit is commonly ascrib'd to generosity, humanity, compassion, gratitude, friendship, fidelity, zeal, disinterestedness, liberality, and all those other qualities, which form the character of good and benevolent. A propensity to the

tender passions makes a man agreeable and useful in all the parts of life; and gives a just direction to all his other qualities, which otherwise may become prejudicial to society. Courage and ambition, when not regulated by benevolence, are fit only to make a tyrant and public robber. `Tis the same case with judgment and capacity, and all the qualities of that kind. They are indifferent in themselves to the interests of society, and have a tendency to the good or ill of mankind, according as they are directed by these other passions. Comment: The generally acknowledged `good qualities can be compared with the gift of social behaviour, which is innate in healthy mammals and deserves the greatest admiration, while responsibility is a consequence of judgment and capacity, and all the qualities of that kind. The latter definitely wants to have prevalence in our decision-making and may offend against social behaviour. Hume III 6b, The establishment of justice may help us to form a just notion of the happiness, as well as of the dignity of virtue, and may interest every principle of our nature in the embracing and cherishing that noble quality. Who indeed does not feel an accession of alacrity in his pursuits of knowledge and ability of every kind, when he considers, that besides the advantage, which immediately result from these acquisitions, they also give him a new lustre in the eyes of mankind, and are universally attended with esteem and approbation? And who can think any advantages of fortune a sufficient compensation for the least breach of the social virtues, when he considers, that not only his character with regard to others, but also his peace and inward satisfaction entirely depend upon his strict observance of them; and that a mind will never be able to bear its own survey, that has been wanting in its part to mankind and society? Comment: The statement reduces Practical Philosophy to a mere description of social behaviour and its very admirable benefits. However, Practical Philosophy wants to be able to demonstrate the correctness of the decisions taken by the heroes in the Five Examples. It also wants to apply the thereby found principles to all kinds of human actions (Ex 5 COM 5) . Rousseau II 2, Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable, is indivisible; for will either is, or is not, general; it is the will either of the body of the people, or only of a part of it. In the first case, the will, when declared, is an act of Sovereignty and constitutes law: in the second, it is merely a particular will, or act of magistracy at the most a decree. Comment: The general will, based on a majority vote, is not indivisible, since it may be overruled by responsibility (Ex 2, 3, and 4). Schopenhauer 380 suggests that the human decision wavers between egoism and sympathy. Comment: Since social behaviour is innate, sympathy itself presents a form of egotism (which also presents a positive aspect), whose main purpose is the preservation of the species. (Nietzsche 88-89 went as far as to reject it completely.) The most challenging human decisions, however, waver between sympathy and responsibility, as is demonstrated in Ex 2 and Weber 233, 235, 237, 238, 240, 241, 247, 250, below. Schopenhauer 412 suggests that it cannot be denied that the sight or description of sufferings of others affords us satisfaction and pleasure Comment: The statement rather reflects on the philosophers neurotic character than reality, as if parents would enjoy seeing their children suffer. In fact, social behaviour and responsibility want a different approach to the sufferings of other creatures. It is,

however, normal to feel relief, if one has succeeded in thwarting off an unjustified aggression. The philosophical agenda behind the strange concept seems to be that he can later demonstrate that commiseration is the greatest virtue (Schopenhauer m212-140 and 485a, below). Schopenhauer 415, It is really incredible how meaningless and void of significance when looked at from without, how dull and unenlightened by intellect when felt from within, is the course of life of the great majority of men. Comment: The philosopher was a rich bachelor, who had inherited a fortune and never had to work. Thus, he was unable to appreciate the challenges the great majority of men and women face in taking responsibility for themselves and their families (Schopenhauer 112C). In fact, the statement reflects more on the philosophers arrogance than in reality, since it is not true that people usually are dull and unenlightened. Schopenhauer 485a, we shall have no hesitation, in direct contradiction to Kant, who will only recognise all true goodness and all virtue to be such, if it has proceeded from abstract reflection, and indeed from the conception of duty and of the categorical imperative, and explains felt commiseration as weakness, and by no means virtue, we shall have, I say, in direct contradiction to Kant, in saying: The mere concept is for genuine virtue just as unfruitful as it is for genuine art: all true and pure love is commiseration and all love which is not commiseration is selfishness. is selfishness, is commiseration. Comment: The last sentence would mean that couples in love were better to `commiserate with their partner when having sex, in order to be virtuous. The contradiction to Kant does not give the right reason as to why Kants teaching is unacceptable (Chapter One 6dC, Kant C 47C). The theory of commiseration has been refuted in Schopenhauer (m212-140)C. Commiseration is a great gift which is part of innate social behaviour, but it cannot be the decisive factor in our decisionmaking. In terms of the latter point, Kant is more correct than Schopenhauer. Weber 233 suggests that political ethics, which include great power and potential has to follow other principles than sexuality, business, family, marriage, jurisdiction, friendship Comment: It is not necessary to divide the concept of `responsibility, which wants to be applied in all those domains of life, too (Ex 5 COM 5 / Chapter Three 5, p42 / Chapter Ten COM 5). Weber 235 explains that the Christian love principle requires the avoidance of all violent actions. The politician, however, has to use force in order to check the wicked. Comment: The Christian love principle is inapplicable in any domain of decisionmaking, not only in politics (Chapter Three 5, p42). Weber 237, It is obvious that all our ethical decisions will have to choose between two contradictory principles, which is to say, the `Ethics of Attitude and `Ethics of Responsibility. Comment: 1) Responsibility is a consequence of our wish to act in a wise and dignified manner, and it can dispense with an ethics. Weber also confuses the terms `responsibility and `consequences; he wanted to say `Ethics of Consequences. 2) The statement can be correctly paraphrased as follows,

`It is obvious that responsibility prefers wise and dignified decisions to the impulses of social behaviour. Weber 238, There are no ethics that are able to define which purpose justifies what means. Comment: This is true (Kant m276-196C). All the same, the goal of our decisions wants to accept a higher level of responsibility (Ex 1 COM 10-11). The last consequence of Webers correct statement is that there are no valid ethics altogether. Weber 240, Whoever advocates an ethics of attitude has difficulty in explaining the ethical irrationality of the world. Comment: It is not correct to incriminate reality as `ethically irrational; reality usually is rational, which is to say, that people want to act responsibly. In fact, ethics are irrational, in that it is not possible to define general moral rules that are always valid (Ex 1 COM 6). Weber 241 complains that ours is an irrational world of undeserved sufferings, unpunished injustice, and hopeless stupidity. Comment: The lecture was given in Germany about three months after the end of World War I. Webers pessimism is understandable. The world, however, is not irrational, but the excessive powers of the states are, which necessarily produce such unspeakable absurdities every now and then (Mackintosh 200-201). Weber 247, The genius or demon of politics is proven in the constant tension with the God of Love, as well as the Christian God as represented by the Churches; the tension may develop into full controversy. Comment: This controversy is also blatant in the bloody history of the Churches themselves. Weber fails to signal that political responsibility is correct in prevailing against the love principle. Instead of giving credit to the blessings of political responsibility, he questions its correctness by using the ambiguous term demon of politics. The `ethics of consequences ( Bonhoeffer 14C / Chapter Nine COM 1) is not demoniacal at all, whereas the power of the state is far too great, creates huge controversies, and leads to abuses and mistakes of all kinds ( Mackintosh 200-201). Weber 250, As a consequence of this, the Ethics of Attitude and the Ethics of Responsibility are not diametrically opposite to one another, but they complete each other with all the personalities that are called to become politicians. Comment: Responsibility is convenient to whoever is able to think logically. In Webers statement, it remains unclear which of the two principles holds the prime role in our decision-making. The correct paraphasing runs as follows, `Responsibility prevails against the principles of Social Behaviour in the cases of conflict. However, social behaviour is applied whenever possible. In addition, the statement contradicts Weber 237, where the two principles are considered contradictory. In fact, Webers approach was not able to develop a correct doctrine of responsibility, although being very close. It seems that Weber was aware of the fact that his philosophy was not conclusive, for it has been reported by witnesses that the lecturer did not feel at ease at the presentation of his ideas. Luhmann suggests that the character of people is merely a product of the social environment (Hosang 12).

Comment: The Five Examples, three of which refer to ancient times, prove that the responsible decision is independent and personal. Moreover, from the time that people could think, the vast majority of them acted responsibly. Responsibility does not depend on the system, but wants to control it. Bahro R 11 complains that the White Mans egotism destroys the world. Comment: `Egotism is not the appropriate term. White Man, for some 2500 years, has been taught that love is the crucial thing in life (Chapter One 6a, b, d). It is easier to love, if one can enjoy all that is on offer. Thus, both the planet and White Mans true chance of happiness are destroyed by `the White Mans lack of long term responsibility and the philosophers failure to develop a correct teaching of responsibility. H.-P. Hempel, in Bahro R 178, fears that mental distress has deformed our nervous systems, so that the self-destruction has become unavoidable. Comment: Whether humankind and life will become extinct by a cosmic, climatic, biological, chemical, genetic, electro-magnetic, nuclear, or environmental catastrophe within a short period of time or after a hundred million years, is irrelevant. Responsibility wants exactly to do the selfsame thing, which is to act in a wise and dignified way, so as to do our best to avoid such a catastrophe. This alone carries its immediate reward in itself. It is not dignified to put irresponsibility down to mental distress. H.-P. Hempel, in Bahro R 183-185, asks how the brain that has led us into the crisis might ever be able to deliver us from it. Comment: The crisis was caused by over-population and fear rather than thinking. Logical thinking wants to strive for the goal in overcoming these challenges. Such seems only possible by a total transformation of a Unified World Society, as proposed in Chapter Twelve 1, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 24-26, 28, 29, 33. The creation of such a society presents both an absolute necessity and a unique chance. Schmidt 5-6 gives the following titles to specific paragraphs; The Responsibility of the Class of Political Leaders The Moral Duties of the Political Class The Public Responsibility of the Churches Comment: The titles suggest that responsibility is a privilege of the leading class, while ordinary people are supposed to obey them ( Bruno II 2 XIIIC). Schmidt 45, General morals are the result of example and education, authority and leadership. Comment: The statement compares with Freuds insufficient Super-Ego theory. The fact is that responsibility comprises a part of normality and social behaviour has been innate for millions of years. History teaches that example, education, authority and leadership very often prove disturbing factors. Schmidt 210, Nature has programmed us to egotism, procreation, and defence of territory; our genes make us unfit to a peaceful living together. Comment: How could those leaders possibly have become so wise and excellent with all those aggressive genes in their cells? This is as though one would claim that medicine is the cause of our health or that trees can only grow straight when supported by struts. If, indeed, our genes were so antisocial, even the most rigorous

controls and sanctions could not produce gentleness, respect, and responsibility that can be seen in people all around the world. Kng 140 states that all the great religious and moral traditions Confucius, Rabbi Hillel, Jesus, Muhammad, Jainism, Buddhism, Hinduism purport the Golden Rule, which reads, `Never do to others what you would dislike to be done to you. Or, `Do to others whatever you would like to be done to you. Comment: The difference between the negative and the positive form has been pointed out in Chapter Seven COM 3. In both forms, however, the rule contradicts the principle of defensive violence (Bonhoeffer 15bC). Furthermore, it would make our judicial and economic systems collapse. The above congruent philosophical traditions are identical on account of the fact that social behaviour is innate, but they erroneously make it the basic tenet of all our decisions. The absurdity of its positive form can be demonstrated in the following way; all those who have attractive wives should allow all men who fall in love with them to have intercourse. The doctrine of responsibility, however, prefers monogamy which is selective, exclusive, and possessive to be respected, even in great parts of the animal kingdom. Kng 368 concludes his intensive and extensive paper, the crucial thing is to be clear about that both politics and economy afford a new approach that refers to responsibility, responsible politics want to find the balance between ideal and given facts; a responsible economy will combine the aspects of prosperity with those of ethical demands. Comment: The statement correctly defeats both the love principle and the traditional teachings above. The philosopher, however, fails to notice that responsibility wants to be applied to all our decisions (Ex 5 COM 5). The phrase ethical demands is also questionable. In fact, whoever undertakes to develop a new moral teaching does so because he thinks that he has availed himself of scientific knowledge others might not have yet, and because he has the courage to say things that may displease other people. However, there is no `ethical demand to publish a moral teaching; such a demand would also be superfluous, since responsibility is wanted and warranted by the authors themselves (Chapter One 6dC). Therefore, in terms of economy, the following wording is suggested, `a responsible economy will combine the aspects of prosperity with human wisdom and dignity. Nickl 180b-181a presents A. W. Tuckers Dilemma of the Captives; Two captives have been found guilty of illegal possession of weapons, which incurs a sentence of one year imprisonment for both. They are also suspected of a holdup, which would incur ten years of imprisonment. If one of them confesses to the holdup, he will be set free, whereas the other captive remains incarcerated for ten years. If both confess, they are sentenced to eight years each. Tucker recommends for them not to confess, because silence produces the best result, in that both will be sentenced to one year. Comment: Tuckers solution is not necessarily responsible decision-making. For instance, if one of the prisoners were unable to stand a year of captivity, while the other was able to cope for ten years, or if the family of one urgently needs his presence, while the other is independent, they may opt for a unilateral confession.

Moreover, if both feel that life in prison might be the better option for them anyway, they are correct to confess together. All the same, Tuckers approach highlights the fact that correct decisions are based on logical thinking and reasoning. Nickl 181b, The tit-for-tat strategy, developed by A. Rapoport, suggests that, if cooperation is refuted by the partner, then the best way is to pay him back in money, so as to make the partner recognise that cooperation was the more profitable option for both. Comment: The strategy is akin to the principle of defensive violence ( Bonhoeffer 15bC). All the same, both principles want to be controlled by wisdom and dignity. It is not a good idea to humiliate the adversary unnecessarily. The blatant way of military retaliation is bound to fail, if, for instance, prisoners of war are treated incorrectly. The responsible always want to ask themselves whether or not their decisions are wise and dignified. Nickl 184a complains about the average buyer who does not care whether the goods have been produced in a correct way, as long as they are cheaper. Comment: The wise customer usually chooses the cheapest product, supposing it has acceptable qualities. However, he might feel that goods produced by exploitation are disqualified by definition and, thus, is very correct not to buy them. For instance, the majority of vegetarians refuse meat because it is produced by exploiting animals. All the same, it is not possible to declare vegetarianism a moral duty. Thus, it does not make sense, either, to blame the customers who buy the cheapest. Nickls approach aims at a balanced and just world economy, which is an illusion, as though one would try to find a system that warrants equal wins and losses to all the football teams of a nation. Competition is an essential element of both sport and the economy. It necessarily produces winners and losers. The balance envisaged by Nickls statement, however, is established by the responsible ones who will share their bargains with the most needy ones (Chapter Three 4-5, p41, Aristotle IV.1bC). The effect would be that a reasonable balance of goods is established. Nickl 184b suggests that resistance against agricultural genetic engineering is not a consequence of moral conviction. Comment: Responsibility is free to question the possibly dangerous manipulations of genes. For instance, who would like to have a plant whose growth cannot be controlled by any means, and grows on our eyes, bodies, and organs and kills us? There seems to be a general error about the principles of evolution; it is true that changes of the genetic codes also occur in natural processes. However, we do not know all the principles that govern the evolutionary processes and make sure that they maintain the tendency towards beauty and perfection (Chapter Three 20h, p50). The detrimental changes of codes, which lead to congenital abnormailities, normally result in infertility. It seems that science is unable to guarantee the same biological control of errors.

Chapter Ten: Respect and Love

Respect Love

Comprehensive

Selective

COMMENT: 1) While in the Chapters Five to Seven `love and `agape have been considered under the aspect of principles of actions and decision-making, Chapter Ten and Eleven define their relativity and secondary positions in terms of the most wise and dignified attitude towards ourselves and other beings. Such, again, is something a logically thinking being wants to have, in order to make the best use of their most wonderful capacity of experiencing realistically, thinking logically, and behaving sociably. Methodologically, `love and `agape will not be distinguished anymore, since all the peculiarities attributed to `agape as a higher form of `love have been refuted in the former chapters. 2) Since love refers to feelings, it seems superior to respect, which refers to wisdom and dignity. That emotional aspect is the reason why love is much more popular than respect. All the same, we also want to respect the ones whom we are not able to love, a well as those who are not able to love us. 3) It is insufficient to love ourselves, because it would every so often stop us from responsible decision-making. The Five Examples give enough evidence of that. It is wise and dignified to respect ourselves, which means to follow up the findings of our brain, no matter whether we like or hate them. There is no other way to be happy. It is understood that it is unwise to neglect the needs of our body, unless responsibility requires to do so. Such should not be dubbed `love of oneself, since, if one `loves to drink and eat excessively, a higher principle is needed in order to overpower that love. Consequently, the reasonable response to our personal needs is not a result of love, but of respect and responsibility. 4) It is also insufficient, impossible, and unnecessary to love all things, although the attitude has great merits to it. It greatly benefits the person expressing love. For instance, someone who is able to love animals is rich. The author himself, by natural endowment, is able to love children. That makes him rich. But he is not able to love adults. (That is why this paper has a somewhat aggressive tone to it and fails to fully acknowledge the philsophical efforts undertaken by so many idealistic thinkers.) That makes him poor, but it is neither possible nor essential to change that. He has to recognise and accept that limitation. All the same, he wants to take responsibility to publish his ideas, although he is aware of the fact that, were he able to love his readers (what reader would care to be loved by the author?), he could do it in a much better way. Everybody has such limitations, and it does no harm, except to the one who lacks the wonderful capacity of love. All the more, however, we want to give a wise and dignified response to the dignity and perfection of people and everything, since they deserve more respect than we will ever be able to muster. Even Paul in Rom 12.10 asks Christians to respect one another. In Chapter Five COM 3, the example of `water gives evidence of that it is appropriate to have respect for all things. On the other hand, Christians, who pretend to love everybody, have failed to respect the beliefs and traditions of others, and that arrogant attitude has contributed and continues to do so to the global problems of our days. It is the disrespectful love principle that produces these distortions.

The absurdity of commanding love has already been referred to in Chapter Seven COM 2. 5) In marriage and parenting, love makes the lover rich, but it is secondary all the same. A marriage that is primarily based on love is unlikely to stand the test of time. Such is one of the main aspects of the Nibelung myth; Siegfried, instead of marrying Brunhild as the suitable match, is led by his infatuation to choose the beautiful Kriemhild, which eventuates in the catastrophe of the nation. In fact, the love principle is now systematically destroying monogamy altogether in modern societies, as has been referred to in Chapter Five COM 4. Parenting also wants to be based on the foundation of respect and responsibility. Very unfortunately, the dreadful repercussions of inappropriate parental love have not been adequately analysed by psychology, yet. At this point, it seems still impossible to find any paper about parenting, which does not proclaim that love is the most important thing in parenting. Psychology has also failed to recognise that Freud has made a huge mistake in his theory of the Oedipus Complex ( Mackintosh 79-80), in that he reversed it; it is not true that sons fall in love with their mothers and daughters with their fathers, but the other way round: Mothers fall in love with their sons and fathers with their daughters, and this perversion is most likely to produce the most unwanted effects in both. Philosophically, the perversion is a consequence of a lack of respect, which is absolutely the primordial requirement in all our relationships, while the love principle makes those adult lovers believe that their ridiculous affection presents the epitome of parental performance. In a vicious circle, the love principle has prevented psychology from unmasking the classic Freudian projection. Nurses who hug their patients also hurt both themselves and their patients. It seems that the teaching of respect (including self-respect) has not reached the curriculum of their education, yet. What a waste of spiritual power! Elderly fundamentalist Christian couples who walk to church with the conduct and faces of honeymooners are also disturbing. True respect of themselves, their partners, and the others could prevent them from flaunting their seemingly infinite happiness in love. 6) It is obvious that love is selective. Unless it were, a husband with an attractive wife would be supposed to allow intercourse to all men who fall in love with her ( Kng 140C). Parents grant their children favours which they are correct to refuse to other children, although they might have enough time and resources to support them, too. One would invite ones friends for dinner, although there might be other people in town who would possibly better enjoy a good meal. Respect, however, wants to be comprehensive. Nobody can proceed, unless they give respect even to their fiercest enemies or people they deem the lowest sort of miscreant. It is a remarkable fact that Bonhoeffers paper (p8-14) does not contain anything derogative about Hitler. Respect does not mean that one would tolerate to be hurt by ones enemies, support their projects, or refrain from fighting them. One of the most striking experiences with people (including politicians) is that the majority of them can only learn from people they like, whereas the best wisdom of their enemies is lost on them. The wise want to learn as much from their adversaries as from their friends. The fact remains, however, that the latter is more agreeable. Or is it? 7) Fromm 74f argues, love, on the strength of its nature, cannot be limited to a single person only. Whoever loves but one person, excluding all the others,

demonstrates that this exclusive love relies on a bond of submission and dominance And whoever loves his neighbour but not himself, also fails the ideal of love. The argument demonstrates that love always includes submission and dominance. It lacks the comprehensive quality of respect, and is selective. And whoever likes freshwater, but hates seawater, does not fail true love. We are also able to love others without loving ourselves. Fromms argument sounds very Biblical and inconclusive. 8) In terms of dealing correctly with others, Aristotle could have saved himself the trouble in establishing the following piece of advice, To be good means, at the right time, to be kind, in the relevant situations, and to the relevant people, and for the right reasons, and in the appropriate way such is the Golden Middle Way, the best, the very effort of true morality. ( Schmid 53) Such an advice invites a sardonic comment; it is not surprising then that the philosophers pupil, Alexander the Great, failed to understand that teaching and killed his father. In fact, the definition misses the mark despite its seemingly comprehensive length. The essential quality of a wise and dignified approach to all things is respect. And the reason for the respectful approach is not that it presents the most acknowledged sort of attitude, but because everybody and everything merits so. Disrespect is the result of sheer ignorance or some other impairment. Aristotles definition also fails to signal that responsibility may ask for being unkind towards others, as demonstrated in the Five Examples. 9) One cannot quite agree to Hobbes I 10a, To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour; for both to love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or feare, then he expects, is to Dishonour; for tis undervaluing. Love does not warrant respect at all and the lack of love does not account for a lack of respect, either. For instance, most parents love their children, but are unable to respect them. Likewise, one is better to respect ones husband, even though one might be unable to love him. Equally questionable is Hobbes I 10b, To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of opinion of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to Dishonour. If one recognises that someone is lying out of fear or in order to get an advantage, it dishonours him and the one believing and trusting him. Respect is not a consequence of faith, but of wisdom and dignity. It makes sense to respect a liar, although one does not believe and trust him. Hobbes I 10c is unacceptable, To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving his judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding of errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly. Equally irrelevant is Hobbes I 10e, Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and signe of Power. One would certainly respect a weak person, although he might be aggressive and offensive. To make things worse, Hobbes I 10f ventures, Good fortune (if lasting,) is Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God. Respect is comprehensive and has only one level, regardless of someones good fortune. 10) Habermas, unnecessarily, introduces cryptic terms like `communicative rationality or `forceless force (Dubiel 104) for what can be better defined as `respect. For instance, both self-respect and respect of partners forbid that, in a discussion, one would agree to incorrect statements, because they are made by a higher-ranking person. Respect and responsibility may also ask for decisions that are not `communicative and no-one else agrees to. To illustrate this, the difficult transport of the obelisk of some thirty metres (the only unbroken one in Rome) to the centre of St Peter Square in m403 may be mentioned. Pope Sixtus the Fifth ordered, with the

penalty of death, complete silence during its transport, in which hundreds of workers were involved. Suddenly a man shouted, Cool down the ropes with water! (Acqua ai funi!) because he noticed smoke climbing from them. They would have caught fire from the heat. After the work was successfully completed, the Pope very appropriately rewarded the man for his alarm. 62 Thus, the critical factor in our decision-making is not communication, but wisdom and dignity. 11) Since `respect has a comprehensive dimension, it does not make sense to distinguish between specific conditions that must be met in it, because that number is infinite. Habermas (Dubiel 105) mentions three main conditions of the `communicative rationality. Firstly, the cognitive dimension recognises that the participants are knowledgeable in the topics addressed. Secondly, the moral dimension respects the valid norms of conduct. Thirdly, the psychological dimension takes account of the opponents feelings. However, none of these conditions accounts for absolute validity. It is possible that the intervention of an ignorant person can have a positive impact in a philosophical debate; the violation of norms may be important in order to make a point; the hurting of feelings can also be unavoidable. The important factors are self-respect and respect of others, no matter whether or not one agrees with them. In terms of the infinite number of conditions, they may include everything from body language to the definition of terms; for instance, if a participator in a debate was suffering from terrible hiccups, the discussion would be unlikely to succeed, and if the opponent thought `communicative rationality to be a term related to the public rationing of supply in an emergency, the debate would be fruitless. But, first of all, where could a `communicative rationality originate from other than innate social behaviour. Habermas turns the logical sequence upside down; social behaviour is not the consequence, but the prime cause of any `communicative rationality. All the same, there is a basic agreement between Habermas and this approach, in that he, very realistically, does not recur to notions like `love and `agape. However, Habermas definition that `rationality is determined by valid social structures (Dubiel 102-103) has to be refuted. Unless `rational means that which is `reasonable according to the best of our knowledge, the debate becomes farcical. `Reason is not based on social structures, but realistic sensation and logical thinking. Both endowments have their limits and may go wrong. To make things worse, Habermas distinguishes four sorts of `rationalities; the discursive, scientific, teleological, and communicative one (Habermas W 105-112). Such sophistic, complicated splitting of basic terms is unacceptable. The same criticism applies to the distinction of the `communicative and `non-communicative use of language ( ibid 112-116); language is communicative by definition. The sophistication in Habermas arguments asks for a Socratic cynicism to state that there is, indeed, a non-communicative language, which is to say that of Habermas. The real predicament Habermas Practical Philosophy and most other philosophies suffer from has already been referred to in Chapter One 3 and Bonhoeffer 10C. His approach is not interesting in terms of philosophy, but offers a painstaking attempt at the establishment of a sociological psychology and pathology . It seems that Habermas considers society his patient, whom he wants to cure by analysing his handicaps. However, a psychologist who ignores the vital facts of innate social behaviour and responsibility is unlikely to ever be accurate in that attempt. It is
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suggested that Practical Philosophy take a more dignified approach to both the great positive qualities of life and existence and the challenges of life and society, rather than find fault with them. 12) `Respect also wants to be comprehensive in terms of its objects, in that it does not exclude anybody or anything. 13) All the same, love can possibly be comprehensive with regard to certain aspects of reality. The author is acquainted with people who love all animals. He himself loves all children. His respect for them is also comprehensive. However, in terms of decisions, he cares selectively in that he busies himself to provide for his own children and grandchildren in the first place. Thus, his comprehensive love for children has not a truly comprehensive quality. Its existence, however, can be mistaken for an emotional piece of evidence that love is not necessarily selective. Experience teaches that people who love animals usually do not love people, and the author is not able to love adults in the same way as he does children (point 4, above). The psychological aspect of a comprehensive love will be addressed in Magee 1bC. Topic History and Comments Aristotle IV.3b praises pride as a virtue. The goods of fortune also are thought to contribute towards pride. For men who are well-born are thought worthy of honour, and so are those who enjoy power or wealth; for they are in a superior position, and everything that has a superiority in something good is held in greater honour. Hence even such things make men prouder; for they are honoured by some for having them; but in truth the good man alone is to be honoured; he, however, who has both advantages is thought the more worthy of honour. the proud man despises justly Comment: Firstly, the philosopher would be better to find fault with those who make differences in giving respect, since it is wise and dignified to equally respect everybody and everything. Respect is comprehensive, not selective. It also displeases the wise to be preferred to others. Secondly, it is more important to the wise to be aware of both his limitations and capacities than being proud. Thirdly, responsible decisions do not make one proud, but happy. Aristotle IV.6b The correct man will behave so alike towards those he knows and those he does not know, towards intimates and those who are not so, except that in each of these cases he will behave as is befitting; for it is not proper to have the same care for intimates and for strangers, nor again is it the same conditions that make it right to give pain to them. Comment: This statement, which contradicts the previous one, presents a correct doctrine of respect. It makes sense to invite our friends for dinner rather than some strangers. But such results from the fact that the latter would feel embarrassed by the invitation. If, on the other hand, they were starving and an invitation was feasible, one would not distinguish between friends and foes. In terms of the final phrase about `giving pain, as shop owners we would rather concede a discount to a friend than to a stranger, although we feel the buyer is `given pain on account of the high price. Regarding correct prices, it seems that no convenient philosophy has ever been proposed. Are producers and dealers in the right to raise prices whenever there is a shortage of supply. Yes. If they did not, exploitation would take place; some people

would start buying the cheap goods and selling them at a high price themselves. The producers and dealers are correct in profiting from market conditions. The responsible ones will share the surplus with the neediest people ( Aristotle IV.1bC). Other than that, they might feel happy at becoming rich, but will be very unhappy because of their unwise and undignified decision to keep their spare money (Ex 3 COM 2-9, Chapter Three 6, p42). Aristotle IV.6c The good man will associate differently with people in high station and with ordinary people, with closer and more distant acquaintances, and so too with regard to all other differences, rendering to each class what is befitting, and while for its own sake he chooses to contribute pleasure, and avoids the giving of pain, he will be guided by the consequences, if these are greater, i.e. honour and expediency. For the sake of a great future pleasure, too, he will inflict small pains. Comment: The first half of this statement constitutes very bad advice. Respect does not differentiate, for all things and people deserve more respect than we are able to give (Chapter Five COM 3) The second half seems to contain a correct hint at innate social behaviour (for its own sake) and responsibility (guided by the consequences), if honour and expediency can be compared with `dignity and wisdom. Augustine X 29, Grant what you command and command what you will. Comment: The reciprocal nature of erotic love is certainly expected, since the copulation of the couple relies on the reciprocity of affection between the partners. Respect, however, is above reciprocity, in that it is the only dignified approach of a thinking being to whatever and whoever comprehensively, although they might not be able to respect us. This does not mean that we would tolerate aggressive violence or refrain from defending ourselves against dangers, for instance an aggressive animal that obviously is not able to respect us. Aquinas II 26.3, selection (dilection) is only in the rational nature. Comment: The philosopher is mistaken. Many female mammals submit only to the male who is unquestionably stronger than the competitors and many species of birds are monogamous. Aquinas II 35.4 from charity it happens that we `rejoice with them that rejoice, and `weep with them that weep (Rom 12.15). Comment: If the advice is followed from charity, the result is disrespectful. It would mean that one does not really respect the feelings of others, but indiscriminately adjusts to them out of agape, regardless of whether or not they are justified. Respect, however, wants to convey empathy if joy and sorrow are justified, but reject them if they are unwise and undignified ( 1 Cor 13.8aC). In addition, the ability to commiserate is part of innate social behaviour. Aquinas II 100.10, the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, that is to say that this commandment, `Honour thy father, does not mean that a man must honour his father from charity, but merely that he must honour him. Wherefore he that honours his father, yet has not charity, does not break this precept: although he does break the precept concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished. Comment: Respect (honour) is superior to love by all means (COM 3-8, above), and to order love equates to mental rape (Chapter Seven COM 2). However, the

philosopher is right in conceding that the familial bond does not oblige to love the loved ones, and the commandment seems to confirm so. Consequently, Aquinas would have been better to conclude that it is all the more unnecessary to love all people. By introducing the agape principle, he, all the same, finds fault with those children who honour, but do not love their parents. So, his criticism is inappropriate. Aquinas II 105.3, Man's relations with foreigners are twofold: peaceful, and hostile. Comment: Such is, indeed, the case. The philosopher fails to conclude that love usually is not comprehensive, and to command it presents an undignified and unnecessary approach. Humans are able to go beyond those categories, which refer to feelings. Wisdom and dignity require the relationship to be respectful, not because it is virtuous, but because everybody and everything deserves to be respected and it is expedient to a logically thinking being to respect them. Aquinas II 105.4a even defends the foolish prescription in Deut 25.5-6 that a man should marry the wife of his deceased brother when the latter died without issue, and this in order that he who could not have successors according to carnal origin, might at least have them by a kind of adoption, and that thus the deceased might not be entirely forgotten. Comment: This rule is disrespectful to both widow and brother-in-law. Moreover, it promotes unilateral polygamy. In this context, it makes sense to scrutinise the relationship between the agape principle and monogamy. In fact, the Biblical love principle impedes a presentation of a valid doctrine of monogamy, which relates to mutual respect in the first place. If love is the most important parameter in terms of our decision-making, a woman who loves five men would be better to marry them. Aquinas II 105.4b considers the following rules to be sufficient in terms of the parentchild relations, With regard to children, the Law commanded parents to educate them by instructing them in the faith: hence it is written (Ex 12.26-27): `When your children shall say to you: What is the meaning of this service? You shall say to them: It is the victim of the passage of the Lord. Moreover, they are commanded to teach them the rules of right conduct: wherefore it is written (Deut 21.20) that the parents had to say: `He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling and to debauchery. " Comment: The important issue of the unilateral Commandment to honour the parents is addressed in Mackintosh 276. Wisdom suggests to honour our children and not to impose our faith on anyone. It is obvious that the above rules are very poor ( Russel 11 in Chapter One 7a). In terms of history, the quoted passage illustrates that the Torah was written by Jewish priests, whose first priority was to promote their prestige among the Jews in Babylon (Chapter One 7a). Calvin II 8.22, explaining the third Commandment thou shalt not take the name of the lord thy god in vain suggests that it becomes us to regulate our minds and our tongues, . Comment: Indeed, the wise want to appreciate that everybody and everything deserves utmost respect and refrain from ever talking disparagingly of them, unless by way of an inspired joke. By no means do respect and responsibility exclude humour, nor does responsibility. It is extremely disturbing and undignified that one should not be allowed to include religious themes and the name of God or Allah in jokes. The law, however, may forbid for whoever uses public space to advertise

derogative or facetious statements of a religious nature. In the same way, we are not supposed to walk naked the streets. Laws can also protect the public from being assaulted by unwanted humour. However, a newspaper apart from the front page is not a public space, since everybody is free to read it or not, just as we may go naked in our bathrooms or in a reserved area. Bruno Argument of the Nolan 1, I mean that although there are cases when not even divine honours and adoration suffice for women, yet this does not mean that we owe them divine honours and worship. I desire that women should be honoured and loved as women ought to be loved and honoured. Loved and honoured for such cause, I say, and for so much, and in the measure due for the little they are, at that time and occasion when they show the natural virtue peculiar to them. That natural virtue is the beauty, the splendor, and the humility without which one would esteem them to have been born in this world more vainly than a poisonous fungous occupying the earth to the detriment of better plants, more odious than any snake or viper which lifts its head from the dust. I mean that everything in the universe, in order that it have stability and constancy, has its own weight, number, order and measure, so that it may be ordered and governed with all justice and reason. Therefore Silenus, Bacchus, Pomona, Vertunnus, the god of Lampsacus and similar gods of the drinking hall, gods of strong beer, and humble wine, do not sit in heaven to drink nectar and taste ambrosia at the banquet of Jove, Saturn, Pallas, Phoebus and similar gods; and their vestments, temples, sacrifices and rites must differ from those of the great gods. Comment: It is wise and dignified to offer divine honours and worship to everybody and everything. `Love, however, wants to be granted to the elected beloved ones and, in terms of a marital partnership, has an absorbing nature to it. It is very important that it be controlled by mutual respect (Chapter Seven COM 1 and 4). Bruno thinks that there are two levels of love, the venereal and the heroic one. He fails to distinguish between love and wisdom. In addition, the importance of love is overestimated. He defines, its dwelling is in the soul itself and its bed is the heart, and it resides in the composition of our very substance (Bruno II 1 X). Descartes 5b, Those who are endowed with generosity are thus disposed to overlook conventional distinctions of class and social status, and to focus on the true, intrinsic worth of each individual: Just as they do not consider themselves much inferior to those who have greater wealth or honour, or even to those who have more intelligence, knowledge or beauty, or generally to those who surpass them in some other perfections, equally they do not have much more esteem for themselves than for those whom they surpass. For all these things seem to them to be unimportant, by contrast with the virtuous will for which alone they esteem themselves, and which they suppose also to be present, or at least capable of being present, in every other person. Comment: The statement can be compared with a dignified approach to others and ourselves. The philosopher failed to signal that this attitude transcends the question of love. Moreover, the term generosity is very misleading, as though those objects of respect did not possibly deserve it, but were granted it by our virtuous generosity only. Thus, it is better replaced by `correctness or `intelligence, since things and people deserve nothing less.

Locke 44, if it be demanded whether the Grand Seignior can lawfully take what he will from any of his people, this question cannot be resolved without coming to a certainty whether all men are naturally equal; for upon that it turns, and that truth, well settled in the understanding and carried in the mind through the various debates concerning the various rights of men in society, will go a great way in putting an end to them and showing on which side the truth is. Comment: The statement confirms that respect for everybody is the only wise and dignified attitude. It is not sufficient, however, to respect every body, but everything. Shaftesbury 107, the self-passions, and what the consequence is of their rising beyond a moderate degree. These affections, as self-interesting as they are, can often, we see, become contrary to our real interest. They betray us into most misfortunes and into the greatest of unhappinesses, that of a profligate and abject character. As they grow imperious and high, they are the occasion that a creature in proportion becomes mean and low. Comment: The statement confirms that it is not good enough to love ourselves, but we want to take a reasonable and respectful approach to the decisions which concern ourselves (COM 3, above), although we may dislike them. Hume III 2b, The principle of sympathy is of so powerful and insinuating a nature, that it enters into most of our sentiments and passions, and often takes place under the appearance of its contrary. For `tis remarkable, that when a person opposes me in any thing, which I am strongly bent upon, and rouzes up my passion by contradiction, I have always a degree of sympathy with him Comment: It is true that one has the tendency to yield to the suggestions of a beloved person. It is still not respectful and fair to do so. Sympathy is not the decisive factor in terms of our approach to others. It can never be the foundation of correct human behaviour. However, the philosophers surprising admission that he feels sympathy with the contradictory partner, indicates that he is able to respect him at any rate. His erroneous conclusion, however, seems to suggest that the principle of love (sympathy) is the very basic point in terms of our relationships. Hume III 4b, good humour is lov'd and esteem'd, because it is immediately agreeable to the person himself. `Tis evident, that the conversation of a man of wit is very satisfactory; as a chearful good-humour'd companion diffuses a joy over the whole company, from a sympathy with his gaiety. These qualities, therefore, being agreeable, they naturally beget love and esteem, and answer to all the characters of virtue. Comment: Although those qualities have their great merit to them, they are secondary. The decisive factor in terms of relationships to whoever and whatever is respect. Humour can also be a nuisance and would be ill-mannered, if it were applied to those having suffered a bereavement. Schopenhauer 485b-486, genuine friendship is always a mixture of selfishness and commiseration; the former lies in the pleasure experienced in the presence of the friend, whose individuality corresponds to our own, and this almost always constitutes the greatest part; commiseration shows itself in the sincere participation in his joy and grief, and the disinterested sacrifices made in respect of the latter. Comment: The philosophers analysis makes sense. Nevertheless, the basic attitude in a friendship is respect. The very negative term, selfishness refers to the fact of enjoying pleasant feelings during an amiable encounter. It does not make sense to denigrate these priceless pleasures.

Schopenhauer 493, every suffering coming to the good man from without, through chance or the wickedness of others, is welcome to him, very injury, ignominy, and insult; he receives them gladly as the opportunity of learning with certainty that he no longer asserts the will, but gladly sides with every enemy of the manifestation of will which is his own person. Therefore he bears such ignominy and suffering with inexhaustible patience and meekness, returns good for evil without ostentation Comment: The teaching resembles the agape doctrine taught in 1 Cor 13.7, which is untenable. In the context of this Chapter, the philosophers promotion of disrespect towards oneself is also selective; while one would not injure and insult others, their disrespect of ourselves would be welcomed. It is true that responsibility may ask for decisions which others cannot relate to, so that one would have to choose to take the risk of being despised by them. Other than that, the teaching does not make sense at all. It presents a hidden agape doctrine which asks for self-destruction. Nietzsche 27, At once, a bell rang in my head; it is not Zarathustras thing to talk to the people, but to mates exclusively. Never is he to become a herds shepherd and sheepdog. Comment: This means that the theory of Superman cannot be understood by the majority of people. So, the philosopher chooses to address the elite. In addition, he obviously needs friends and disciples in order to develop his mission. His later slander of amiable affection, as in Nietzsche 88-89, therefore, does not make sense. Moreover, the contempt of the masses is utterly disrespectful, and a Practical Philosophy that the people cannot understand fails its main purpose. The devastating historical consequences of Nietzsches elitist approach have been referred to in Bonhoeffer 21aC. Bonhoeffer 210, If Jesus had not lived, our lives would be useless despite all the other people we know, admire, and love. Comment: The emotional statement is absurd. We want to care for and respect everything and everybody. Bonhoeffer confuses our lives with his profession as a preacher, which indeed is invalid (but not useless because of that) without Jesus redemptory deeds. The idea that somebody who lived two thousand years ago should be of absolute relevance results from a lack of self-respect, as though there were different levels of dignity in things and people. One would be better to turn the argument upside down; `If Jesus has done the relevant and decisive things, Bonhoeffers courage is wasted. In an ironic way, there could be seen a JesusChrist-Superstar63 prefigured in Bonhoeffers view. Hosang 61 suggests that without the love principle there cannot be communication that merits this name. Comment: A responsible doctor will give vital information to both the patients he loves and the ones he hates. If we chose to honestly `communicate only with the ones we love, we would not get very far. The love principle is essential in terms of `affection that merits this name; communication, however, has a much wider significance. In addition, communication is the transfer of thoughts, which may be both pleasant and unpleasant to our loved ones. In either case, it merits this name.
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Chapter Eleven: Knowledge and Love

Knowledge Love

Existence

Life

COMMENT: 1) Knowledge and Love are also to be considered as opposing principles. This seems to be the most difficult distinction to define, as is illustrated by the painstaking theological controversy between Thomism and Molinism in the Catholic Church. The two schools have not reached an agreement yet. The basic question of the discussion is whether God is light and intelligence or love. It is evident that Aristotle64 defined God as light and intelligence, as the Knowledge of Knowledge, since only the activity of the brain that concerns logical thinking seems encompassing, unlimited, and able to reach a true spiritual dimension. This is the only philosophically achievable definition of God as a person, and a serious theology of monotheism will necessarily adopt this ingenious teaching. And so it was done by Tomaso di Aquino, aka Aquinas, in the 8th bn.65 Aquinas II 5, 1 defines, man is capable of seeing God, in which vision man's perfect Happiness consists. Some three hundred years later, Molina developed the teaching that knowledge itself is granted to humans by an act of grace by God and consequently God must be Love in the first place.66 There is also 1 Jn 4.8 that defines God as love. The controversy needs further consideration since the mutual arguments of the two Schools coincide with the above distinction between `knowledge and `love. 2) The God of Aristotle and Thomism has never been popular and attractive, whereas Molinas God is much more appealing. The love of God is considered incarnate in Jesus who died for our sins. However, the first Christian theologian to understand Gods essence as love was Augustine (m1646-1570), and his ingenious teaching has led to a crucial change of paradigm, which, to the prersent day, lends a downright erotic attraction to the Christian creed. There is no doubt that it has generated instances of astounding heroism, most recently and most spectacularly exhibited by Mother Teresa (m90-m3).67

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65

HERDER X, 125-127
66

HERDER VII; 527-529

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D Scott, Revolution of Love: The Meaning of Mother Teresa, Chicago 2005

3) It is very useful to analyse historically Augustines mental development that led to his conversion. It was, in fact achieved by his mother who followed him over land and sea (Confessiones 6,1). In 10,27, he pronounces the moving prayer Late I loved Thee, beauty of old and of new. It is obvious that God takes the place of his mother, changing His gender from male to female. God becomes a Mother who gave us life (of old) and takes care of us permanently (of new). This has become the mental essence of that very special and attractive Christian monotheism. In fact, Augustines relationship to the Church coincides with his relationship to his mother (Confessions 9,11) and can be perfectly compared with a classic psychological regression. Luther also was most inspired by Augustines view. 68 And so was Molina.69 4) All the more did the Thomists try to take a stand against that powerful concept. The controversy culminated in the question whether the heavenly happiness of the Saints consisted primarily in the `recognition or the `love of God. 70 The Thomists fierce resistance to Molinism was motivated by the following five main objections. Firstly, happiness in heaven was conceived as the purely spiritual beatific vision of God where feelings and erotism were inappropriate. 71 Secondly, if God was Love in the first place, the eternal punishment of sinners became thoroughly inexplicable. 72 Thirdly, the heavenly knowledge of God was considered absolutely fulfilling. Augustines emotionality seemed to be too close to Platos idealism and too far from Aristotles realism. In addition, God was not a mother, but a father. 73 Fourthly, in Gn 3.14, God defined Himself as I am Who I am. This indicated that He was pure existence, which exceeded the quality of a lover and did not allow for further elaboration.74 Fifthly, Molinism, which defines that wisdom was Gods advanced gift to man, seems to compromise the concept of free will in man. Man could not have sinned, if he had been given divine wisdom in advance. 75 Thomism maintained the teaching that happiness reached a domain that transcended feelings, while Molinism wanted to keep the feelings in the Hereafter. In terms of the doctrine of responsibility, the essential difference between Thomism and Molinism can be compared with the
68

HERDER VI, 1223

69

HERDER VII, 529

70

F. J. Boudreaux, The Happiness of Heaven, Oxford University, 1881

71

http://www.dict.cc/?s=Anschauung+Gottes
72

http://socrates58.blogspot.com/2006/11/catholic-predestination-ludwig-ott.html
73

http://www.voiceoftheturtle.org/show_article.php?aid=124
74

http://www.realtime.net/~wdoud/topics/essence.html
75

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuscholastik

essential difference between feeling and being happy (Ex 3 COM 2, 7-9, 11-12, 1721, 23, 25-26, 31). In addition the gift of the human soul by the breath of God was not an act of grace, but creation; had God not given a spirit to man, the latter would have remained an animal.76 . 5) The above five points can be applied to this doctrine of responsibility. Firstly, responsible decisions are based on knowledge in the first place, not on love. Secondly, the love principle cannot allow for any kind of violent self-defence. This allowance, however, is necessary and inalienable to all mammals. Thirdly, emotions cannot present the critical factor in responsible decision-making. Fourthly, knowledge constitutes the essence of the spiritual personality, which, indeed, is special to humans, while other mammals have the same feelings and capacities of love as humans, but lack the gift of forming abstract ideas. Fifthly, if love was indeed the main principle in our decision-making, we would be overpowered by it, in that we would have to give away whatever we had, including our health and life, to the benefit of the others. Such is, in fact, the hypocritical self-denial the Christian saints are supposed to exhibit. This is not a wise and dignified way to answer the challenges of life and is always a choice that needs being supported by people who lead ordinary lives. There is a lot of disrepect and arrogance in those spectacular heroic attitudes. Although it is normal to want to help other people, it is not fair to humiliate them by excessive generosity of any kind, which they have no chance to repay. It is hurtful to experience others sacrificing themselves for us. 6) In terms of the opposition between `knowledge and `love as the essence of happiness in heaven, the average Christian believer cannot find any substantial conclusiveness in it. However, unless they try, they will have similar difficulties in discerning `knowledge and `love. `Love seems superior to `knowledge, because it is heartfelt. `Knowledge seems cold (Chapter Three 3, p41). Knowledge, however, does not touch the objects integrity, while love does, expecting some response and a positive change in the beloved one, without which love would be pointless. Likewise, respect is not based on and conditioned by emotion, but has its foundation in pure `knowledge, which is to say that it results from the recognition that everybody and everything existing has the same qualities of beauty and perfection that deserve more respect than any thinking being will ever be able to give. Such is a truly appropriate, unconditional, and intelligent approach to both the indivisible universe and the absolute divinity of God. It is the only dignified attitude that transcends the limitations of the biological principles. 7) The theological controversy between Thomism and Molinism is located in a divine domain, but the opposition of `knowledge and `love is of ultimate relevance to the human and humane domain of responsibility. In order to summarise the presented considerations, it can be said that the correct decisions in the Five Examples were based on and supported by knowledge, while love would have impeded them. Bruno II 4 also maintains the supremacy of the intellect over love. He states, the complaint of the seventh blind man, derives from the fire of the affection, from which some become impotent and incapable of apprehending the truth, inasmuch as their affection overcomes their intellect. Such are those who place love before
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understanding, so that everything appears to them coloured by their affection; for it is an established fact that for those who would attain the truth by way of contemplation a perfect purification of the thought is necessary. 8) In a spiritual domain, the biological principle of love is insufficient. Love is able to create life, but a higher principle is required to maintain it. Humans survive by using reason. Reason is above love. It can both include and exclude it. Thus, love is the highest biological principle, while knowledge is a spiritual means that transcends emotions and feelings and allows mutual communication without physical or sexual contact. Knowledge generates ideas which are the foundation of language, culture, art, religion, and independent, responsible decision-making. It refers to existence, while love refers to life. Life and existence are subcontrary, in as much life includes the dominance of entities that lose their independence. This independence, however, will be restored by death. 9) Psychologically, the controversy between Thomism and Molinism can only be appreciated, if one is able to differentiate between feeling and being happy, as presented in Ex 3 COM 2-9. The Molinists were looking for a state of constantly feeling happy, while the Thomists correctly deemed feelings to be inconsistent, and eternal happiness only achievable as a purely intellectual, spiritual fulfilment. If this argument is shortened to a terrestrial level, it can be said that the growing sense of responsibility also enriches and invigorates our old age, making it more and more challenging. It could mean that a dignified refusal of artificial measures to prolong ones lifespan is honestly wished for. Young is not quite right in his approach to old age; after a fascinating life as a mountaineer with just one leg, he seems to feel happy about remembering his glorious past. His poem `Envoy ends with the words, What if I live no more those kingly days? Their night sleeps with me still; I dream my feet upon the starry ways, my heart rests in the hill I may not grudge the little left undone. I hold the heights, I keep the dreams I won. We would prefer to take responsibility with all the strength we can muster, to the last moment of our lives. It is not good enough (and very boring to the potential listeners) to remember and remind others of ones achievements. Flaunting our great achievements may make us feel (with the hope of regaining the listeners acknowledgement) happy for a certain time, while it is more dignified to care about and speak of the upcoming challenges for both ourselves and society. 10) Lacking a doctrine of responsibility (although Frankl takes a remedial approach to it), philosophy has failed to devise a cogent gerontology, similar to its failure to provide a detailed valid doctrine of marriage (Ex 5 COM 5c). They left that thorny field to the theologians, who, knowingly or innocently, abuse it to further their own spiritual and material agendas. In fact, psychology cannot develop a valuable gerontology, for it is concerned with feeling happy, which, in most cases, is not possible in the last years of life, when perfect health, strength, and satisfaction cannot be taken for granted anymore. Responsibility, however, does not diminish, but grows and asks for the ultimate sacrifice, in which it also reaches the apex of dignity. It is not a dignified existence, as it is practised in our resthomes, to be a long term burden on society

without any prospect of ever recovering. It is the philosophers mission to deal with the issues of old and disabled age. It is suggested that the philosophical approach cover the following points; education and preparation concerning the specific challenges of old age, the integration of the abilities of the elderly into socially relevant activities, reduction of the costs of palliative care, avoidance of a long term merely vegetative existence, a dignified and wise approach to voluntary suicide. It becomes more and more evident that modern civic society needs a thorough transformation (Chapter Twelve 22, p203) if it wants to achieve sustainable solutions for those dramatically increasing problems, which cannot be handled by present communities (Mackintosh 269). Topic History and Comments Aristotle VII.13 it is agreed that pain is bad and to be avoided; for some pain is without qualification bad, and other pain is bad because it is in some respect an impediment to us. Now the contrary of that which is to be avoided, qua something to be avoided and bad, is good. Pleasure, then, is necessarily a good. Those who say that the victim on the rack or the man who falls into great misfortuness is happy if he is good, are, whether they mean to or not, talking nonsense. Comment: The statement confuses knowledge and love. Perversions apart, love naturally tends to avoid pain. The heroes in Ex 2-5, however, risk their lives and suffer from terrible consequences. All the same, they were happy. Therefore, human happiness may include both pleasure and pain. On the other hand, one could object that those heroes envisaged a long term good consequence of their decision and that they lastly supported life and existence. Such is certainly true, but one cannot prove that life and existence are good, since these categories transcend the parameters of good and bad. The only thing we know is that we want to be happy by supporting life and existence. Such is only possible by knowledge and corresponding decision-making. Aquinas II 34.3, Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of mans life. But Happiness is not without pleasure. Comment: The Christian doctrine of an eternal beatific vision is philosophically based on this logical shortcut. The Five Examples and the dreadful lives of countless female and male heroes demonstrate that pleasure is not an indispensable ingredient of being happy. The key ingredients of such happiness are wisdom and dignity. Aquinas 34.4, pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil , for Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as stated above (20, 1); and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works. Comment: The last sentence makes evident that pleasure is not a valid parameter of correctness, since one can have it in evil works, too.

Calvin I 2.1, no man will now, in the present ruin of the human race, perceive God to be either a father, or the author of salvation, or in any respect, until Jesus Christ interpose to make our peace; Comment: The statement seems to confuse knowledge and love. Knowledge suggests that this planet is a superb place for mammals to live in, as it is expressed in numerous Psalms (ex gr 8, 103, 148), which are pre-Christian documents. However, one cannot love it at the moment of experiencing a terrible earthquake. Gods perfect care for mankind is also confirmed in Psalm 23, which reads, The Lord is my shepherd; I have everything I need. Calvin also overlooked the fact that the Gospels present God as a father who is prepared to both reward and punish, and this concept was later transformed in a mother-child relationship by Augustine ( Augustine m1646-1570C). Calvin I 2.1, My meaning is: we must be persuaded not only that as he once formed the world, so he [God] sustains it by his boundless power, governs it by his wisdom, preserves it by his goodness, in particular, rules the human race with justice and judgment, bears with them in mercy, shields them by his protection; but also that not a particle of light, or wisdom, or justice, or power, or rectitude, or genuine truth, will anywhere be found, which does not flow from him, and of which he is not the cause; in this way we must learn to expect and ask all things from him, and thankfully ascribe to him whatever we receive. For this sense of the divine perfections is the proper master to teach us piety, out of which religion springs. Comment: Almost everything in this masterpiece of a paragraph is untrue. 1) It is not true that God once formed the world; the world is constantly developing. 2) History has it that the world is not governed `by His wisdom. 3) History has it that God does not rule `the human race with justice and judgment. 4) History does not bear with people `in mercy. 5) We are not shielded by his protection. 6) We are better to take responsibility ourselves, rather than expect and ask all things from him. 7) `Piety is a consequence, not the cause of religion; the cause of religion is the recognition that we cannot completely control substantial parts of our destiny, for instance our health, but we want to do our best to preserve it. Prayer makes part of normality, in that it allows for a dignified psychological approach of a logically thinking being to the complexities of life, which are not always logical ( Mackintosh 246f). The meaning of these criticisms is to refute the notion of a permanently caring and loving God-Mother (COM 3, above) whose protection would make our sense of responsibility both unnecessary and useless, if not illicit (Chapter One 7e). Bruno Argument of the Nolan 1 Do I perhaps wish to restrict men from gathering the sweetest fruit which the garden of our earthly paradise can produce? Am I perhaps for impeding nature's holy institution? Must I attempt to withdraw myself or any other from the beloved sweet yoke which divine providence has placed about our necks? Have I perhaps to persuade myself and others that our predecessors were born for us, but that we were not born for our descendents? No, may God not desire that this thought should ever come into my head! In fact, I add, that for all the kingdoms and beatitudes which might ever be proposed or chosen for me, never was I so wise and good that there could come to me the desire to castrate myself or to become a eunuch. In fact I should be ashamed, whatever may be my appearance, if I should desire ever to be second to any one who worthily breaks bread in the service of

nature and the blessed God Nor do I believe myself to be frigid, for I do not think that the snows of Mt. Caucusus or Ripheus would suffice to cool my passion. Comment: The emotional, sublime, and absorbing nature of love (Chapter Six COM 8) and its relevance for the survival of the species is highlighted. There is also an immoderate remark about castration. If, in fact, there was a higher form of love, physical love would become secondary. Wisdom and knowledge suggest that love is the highest biological principle and as such is second to none. Wisdom agrees to its praise in the `Song of Solomon. Unfortunately, Bruno misinterprets it by claiming that it under the guise of lovers and ordinary passions contains similarly divine and heroic frenzies, , whereas it is a marvellous, correct, and unique appraisal of erotic love. In addition, Brunos phrase, never was I so wise and good that there could come to me the desire to castrate myself or to become a eunuch is either ironic or very wrong and ought to be corrected to `never was I so foolish . Therefore, wisdom and biological love as such do not interfere with one another. They may interfere as principles of decision-making. The responsible decision-making in Ex 4 and 5 can, indeed, be taken as `heroic frenzies. It is understood that Bruno locates that higher form of love in the poets enthusiastic mind, which equally thrives on good and bad feelings and can change my death into life, my cypresses into laurels, and my infernos into heaven ( Bruno I 1). By absorbing both the good and bad feelings, poetry is heroic (Bruno I 2). One could say that liturgy and prayer are adequate places for that kind of heaven on earth, rather than art, since they include both happy and sad events. It is the arts most noble and challenging assignment to serve religion, rather than replace it. All the same, there are also dangers in religious and mystical absorption (Mackintosh 175-177). The topic of heroism has been dealt with in Chapter Eight COM 2. Bruno II 1 XI, in the state of heroic absorption, when all the affections are completely converted to God, that is, to the idea of ideas, by the light of intelligible things, the mind is exalted to the suprasensual unity, and is all love, all one, and it no longer feels itself solicited and distracted by diverse objects, but becomes one sole wound, in which all the affections gather to become a single affection. Comment: It is true that artists sometimes can feel those moments of absorption at work. However, intelligible things can evoke both good and bad feelings, and it is impossible to love the latter. Therefore, the equation of knowledge and love confuses recognition and feelings. On the other hand, Brunos higher love is all terrestrial and the transcendental paradigm of Christian teaching is overcome. The idea compares with Spinozas suggestion that intellectual love is the the most inspiring human emotion. A similar idea, perhaps expressed in a clearer way, can be found in Schillers poetry, `The Distribution of the World ; when the poet in his spiritual absorption misses the term in which God accords the goods of the world to different people, God allows him to enter Heaven and live with Him permanently.77 Both ideas, however, are not thoroughly convincing, since those moments of spiritual happiness are reserved to specific moments and people. The Thomistic idea of happiness in Heaven may be conceived or imagined in an analogous way and artificially relocated into an imagined domain outside space and time.
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Descartes 4e The true function of reason is to examine and consider without passion the value of all the perfections, both of the body and of the soul, which can be acquired by our conduct, so that we shall always choose the better. Comment: The true function of reason is to consider the short and long term consequences of our decisions, while the perfections, both of the body and of the soul are secondary. It is not wise nor dignified to permanently focus on how we can best love and please everybody. Descartes 4i, It seems to me that each person can make himself content by himself without any external assistance, provided he respects three conditions, The first is that he should always try to employ his mind as well as he can to discover what he should and should not do in all the circumstances of life. The second is that he should have a firm and constant resolution to carry out whatever reason recommends without being diverted by his passions or appetites. The third is that he should bear in mind that while he thus guides himself as far as he can by reason, all the good things which he does not possess are one and all entirely outside his power. Comment: These three conditions can be compared with a valid doctrine of responsibility. The first one refers to wisdom, the second to dignity, and the third to the limits of our intelligence (Mackintosh 94-105), which, however is not a question of Practical Philosophy; in order to be happy, we always want to act according to the best of our knowledge. Correctly, love does not constitute the philosophers argument. Spinoza II PROP. XLIXa, falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused. Comment: All our ideas are fragmentary and confused ( Mackintosh 93-100). Spinozas error is grave in that it suggests that perfect knowledge is necessarily followed by correct behaviour. Strong feelings may interfere with the most perfect knowledge. All the same, fragmentary as our knowledge may be, we want to act according to it. Spinoza III PROP. II, decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream with their eyes open. Comment: The decisions are, indeed, not free, since they depend on our wisdom and sense of dignity. However, they are autonomous and include a personal choice. Moreover, the mind is free to draw or not to draw logic conclusions ( John Paul 112C). Spinoza V PROP XV, He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions. Comment: Except in mystics, where it presents an aberration related to schizophrenia (Mackintosh 175-177), the love of God is not able to make us happy. Happiness can only be achieved by acting according to the best of our knowledge. The origin of the idea to love God has been presented in Chapter One 7a.

Spinoza V PROP XX, this love towards God is the most constant of all the emotions, and cannot be destroyed It is the perfect remedy against the emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Comment: Love is an emotion itself. Emotions constantly change and need to be kept in check and controlled by knowledge. It is irresponsible to do everything for the love of God, as the abominable misdeeds of religious terrorists give gruesome evidence of (John Paul 99C). Spinoza V PROP XXXVII, There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away. Comment: Knowledge and love are philosophical opposites. The term intellectual love is contradictory, as it is impossible that there is an `emotional knowledge, although too many mothers are convinced that they have it with regard to their infants (Mackintosh 11, 168). Locke 1, The last resort a man has recourse to in the conduct of himself is his understanding; for though we distinguish the faculties of the mind and give the supreme command to the will as to an agent, yet the truth is, the man which is the agent determines himself to this or that voluntary action upon some precedent knowledge or appearance of knowledge in the understanding. Comment: To this lucid statement could only be added, `if he wants to be happy. Such implies that love is not the last resort. Shaftesbury 84, it follows that, the natural affections duly established in a rational creature being the only means which can procure him a constant series or succession of the mental enjoyments, they are the only means which can procure him a certain and solid happiness. Comment: The error can be compared with Bruno II 1 XI, above. Happiness is the consequence of responsibility, not of a constant series or succession of mental enjoyments. The classic end of European fairy tales, and they lived happily ever after, also suggests that marriage presents an infinite series of mental enjoyments, which is neither necessary nor true. Shaftesbury 88, And therefore as natural affection or social love is perfect or imperfect, so must be the content and happiness depending on it. Comment: It would mean that someone who cannot constantly enjoy the cheerful company of friends must be unhappy. Ex 3 proves that such is not true. Hopefully, one feels happy while partying, and alcohol helps a good deal. All the same, unless we take responsibility for whatever we decide, we cannot be happy. Irresponsible partying makes very unhappy, because it is foolish and undignified. Shaftesburys error and the conception of a Molinist Heaven are extremely seductive, since it would allow for an eternal party with loved beings. The promise of such a Heaven is a treacherous drug. Schopenhauers 402 ironic remark is certainly justified, After man had transferred all pain and torments to hell, there then remained nothing over for heaven but ennui. Hume I 1b Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour. Comment: The statement is thoroughly invalid in terms of responsible decisionmaking, which is directed by knowledge rather than sentiments of pleasure and

uneasiness. In that sense, logical thinking in humans wants to be more real than our sentiments; the human Ego itself is defined by it ( Mackintosh 83-84). Hegel 20, In happiness, thought has already the upper hand with the force of natural impulse, since it is not satisfied with what is momentary, but requires happiness as a whole. Comment: The statement is correct. The philosopher, however, fails to recognise that the satisfaction that results from both considering the consequences and acting accordingly constitutes happiness, rather than requires it. Thought is required in order to be happy, while Hegels approach conceives happiness as an element referring to feelings. Feelings, indeed require happiness as a whole, but can never attain it. For instance, we may be in the best of moods, and then a sudden headache can make us feel very unhappy. Likewise, Vronskis toothache prevents him from taking care of Anna Karenina in the critical moments of her departure, which is to say that his relationship was not conducted with responsibility, but by mere love, which, however, was not able to get the better of his toothache. 78 Bahro R 109 criticises our unilateral way of thinking, which considers things as objects, which approach leads to the self-produced apolcalypse. Comment: The teaching can be compared with the approaches taken by Adorno and Horkheimer (Bonhoeffer 10C 2). Knowledge necessarily considers its content as objects. Moreover, the philosopher fails to understand that the difficulties of our civilisation are mainly caused by the increase in population, because the resources of the planet are limited. Consequently, the responsible want to address the issue. The lack of responsibility is produced by fear, as though one could not be happy without the consumption of whatever is offered. Kosan 2-3a suggests that the recognition of fundamental cosmic processes the origin of matter, life, and thinking allow for a new approach to ourselves, people, and things. Comment: The doctrine of responsibility relies on the mere fact that we are able to think logically and want to be happy; it can dispense with special cosmological insights. Kosan 3b explains the origin of matter as the amalgamation of two originally isolated forms, which is to say, electro magnetics and gravitation. Whenever such a new form was generated, it immediately led to a lateral dispersion, which organised itself in the form of stars and interstellar matter, which then opposed and supposed each other. Comment: Crystallisation, which is to say, the formation of homogeneous bodies, is indeed an absolutely essential and admirable process, which can be compared with the miracle of life. Kosan 4 suggests that life originated in the amalgamation of nucleic acids and proteins. This new form of existence also diversified and the answer was sexuality and procreation. In this way, the possibilities of information and the velocity of evolution increased thousandfold. Comment: The biochemical theories cannot be commented on. However, the conclusions about the possibilities are agreed with. Sexuality, however, differs from
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crystallisation (Kosan 3b, above), in that sexual partners remain individuals that can unite and separate, while the elements of a lifeless body are constantly connected. If Kosan transferred the principle of crystallisation from the formation of firm bodies to the level of sexuality, it would mean that the partners permanently stick like the water molecules in a block of ice. However, when the philosopher, in the two following paragraphs, develops his view on the origin of thinking, he transfers the biochemical principle of sexuality to the level of spirituality, calling it love. Such a transfer does not make sense, since thinking aspires to acquire knowledge of both pleasant and unpleasant facts. Kosan 4-5 explains that the human spirit and self-awareness originated from the amalgamation of the vital soul with a universal field of information which refers to the entire cosmos. Comment: Notion-formation has indeed a universal and infinite dimension and certainly presents an essential evolutionary step. However, it is not necessary to defer to a universal field of information in order to explain it ( Mackintosh 90-106). Kosan 6-14 suggests that the thinking beings are still in the stage of diversification, in that everybody understands themselves as isolated individuals, whereas they hopefully will once unite their spirits in a reciprocal information process, creating the new quality that enables them to tackle the seemingly unsolvable problems of humanity. There is a general longing for a totally absorbing, infinite love, which is to say, an amicality and perfect harmony between the Ego and the You. Then, the philosopher refers to similar teachings in Eastern philosophies as well as to those of Buber and Aurobindo Ghose. Comment: Kosans system as such is not the point of discussion here. It is presented because it illustrates the erroneous transfer of the love principle from the physical and emotional to the spiritual sphere. In the spiritual sphere, the love principle is both too demanding and insufficient; it is too demanding because no-one can love everything and everybody; it is insufficient because the logically thinking being wants to follow the higher principles of respect and responsibility. Those principles are unlimited and include everything and everyone, the loved and the unloved. They are the only qualities which contain dignity, maturity, and reward in themselves. Regarding worldwide problems, only responsible acting can answer them. Love culminates in the copulation of the couple, whereas thinking culminates in responsibility. Copulation without love is terrible. Responsibility, however, may be correct to violate love, and love without responsibility is immature and undignified. Magee 1a As human persons, we have two abilities that separate us from other animals. These are cognition, especially through the intellect, and appetition, especially through the power of the will. Comment: It is correct that cognition is considered a specific capacity of the human brain, in that animals do not develop general ideas that are applicable to the corresponding individuals. For instance, a cat does not have an idea (which subsumes all the cats included) of what a cat is; in fact, it does not recognise itself in a mirror, because it can only discern its own species by smell. However, in terms of `love and `will, there is not the least difference between humans and other mammals. Magee 1b In order to love, we must have knowledge of what is really good.

Comment: Knowledge refers to the objects existence, whereas love and goodness refer to the feelings which the objects produce. Many people love animals unconditionally. It means that they feel good about their presence. This precious capacity makes them rich. The more we are able to love, the richer we are. However, we all have our handicaps and everybodys capacity to love is limited (Chapter Ten COM 13). Moreover, in terms of responsible decision-making, love cannot be the decisive factor; one would not feed ones own body to a starving tiger, and one would take a medicine that kills bacteria. Magee 2a Being is true and being is good. `True and `good are called transcendental attributes of being. These attributes belong to being precisely because it is being, and they are convertible with being itself. If both truth and good are being, it follows that truth and good name the same reality. Each names this one reality under different aspects. Comment: First, only `knowledge is true or untrue. Scholarly teaching that being is true is a rejudice that is derived from the erroneous premise that our intellect is able to recognise the essence of its objects. The process of notion-formation ( Mackintosh 70-113) proves the premise completely wrong. Nobody knows what a cat really is; how, then, should we know whether or not it is true? Secondly, only feelings are good or bad. Beings and actions do not have such qualities. We want to respect all beings, because it is wise and dignified to do so, no matter whether their presence or qualities evoke good or bad feelings. The scholarly identification of being and good was generated by the wish to prove that our longing for infinite, eternal happiness must be met by reality, which is to say, the everlasting beatitude of the Saints. That inadequate identification was meant to serve theology. Thirdly, `good and `bad are not philosophical parameters. They are related to psychology. For instance, the sucking of our blood is `good for a fertilised female mosquito, but we kill the biting animal to prevent the sucking, for it is `bad for us. Fourthly, the term being has such a complex meaning that it cannot be qualified in any way, for it necessarily includes all qualities. The vain assertion of its goodness resembles a fish that claims water to be the most appropriate element for it to live in; even if it had tried all the other liquids, it could not know whether or not there will ever be a better one. In terms of responsibility, it does not matter whether the universe is good or bad, for we want to act responsibly in either case. Fifthly, the claim contradicts Christian theology, for, if Heaven exists, the universe cannot be perfect. Magee 2b Therefore, love and knowledge must have a fundamental unity. Comments: 1) Those are desperate attempts to prove that our strongest biological desires correspond to the comprehensive quality of our ideas. It is true that the most perfect and wide spread idea is the `Idea of God. It is also true that `love is the strongest desire. But it is not possible to unite them, since `love is an eminent biological factor, while `knowledge belongs to a universal, spiritual domain. 2) Magees identification of love and knowledge is also an attempt to reconcile Thomism and Molinism. It has already been signalled that those considerations can help to recognise the essential difference between feeling and being happy (Ex 3 COM 1-13). Lastly, the dispute between the two schools is nothing other than a fight about whether or not it is possible to make feeling and being happy identical; the Thomists hope that we will be, while the Molinists want us to feel happy in Heaven.

As long as you, patient reader, are a believing or disbelieving Molinist, you have not understood what this paper is all about. 3) And with that intimation, we have returned to our initial question as to whether the Christian love principle has to be refuted. The answer is, yes.

Chapter Twelve: The Outlook

1) At that point, the paradigm of religion changes altogether. History is no longer a part of religion, but religion a part of history, in fact a very important one. It does not need to be transcendental anymore, as though it were able to transmit messages of a domain and time outside the universe. There is no doubt that the natural origin of religion resulted from the Feare of power invisible (Hobbes I 6c), which was conceived as transcendental. However, the city religions which constitute the foundations of all the High Cultures in history apart from being committed to mastering those fears, developed from the priesthood and the temples, which originally were storage rooms for the corn that had been grown and harvested communally (Bahro A 82-84, Hosang 102). Those beautiful buildings were administered by the priests. After the temples lost that function, the priests wanted to keep their social, professional, and financial position. They were paid by the meat of the sacrifices. The priests, obviously, forbade animals they would not have liked for people to sacrifice at the temple and for themselves to eat the meats of. The idea was that people should never offer animals they were not allowed to eat. The priests wanted live pigeons, lambs, immaculate calves, bulls. They could not allow for squealing pigs around the temple, either. Consequently, they forbade dead animals and pork altogether. Putting the edible parts aside for themselves, they felt reluctant to give the donators back the bones, sinews, and hides. Thus, they burnt them, there and then, in front of the temple as a very welcome gift to their gods. The kosher laws must have had the same historical background as the prohibition of certain animals, in that the priests could not have blood around the shrine and altar. They resorted to have the animals bled alive and the blood sucked into the soil, and made this horrible method of slaughtering into a law of God, for everybody to follow. They had no other option. Had they chosen that atrocious slaughtering only at the temple, people would certainly have protested against it. Consequently, the priests declared it a general order given by the gods. Kosher slaughtering was also practised by the Greeks at sacrifices. The meaning was that the dead souls would drink the blood. 79 Historically, the religious fasting regulations must have an origin that is similar to the one about the kosher meat, sacrifices, and forbidden animals. The priests, who were in charge of the warehouses (that were later upgraded to temples) had to ask the population to reduce their food consumption towards springtime, when the supply was running short. As a consequence, they suggested that the gods wanted them to fast. Otherwise, people would have suspected that the priests chose to withhold the food in order to extort more sacrifices.

79

Odyssey XI 48-50, 153

Using their superior intellectual powers and the art of writing, the priests began to offer advice, moral guidance, and information of divine things and thus to feed the spirits, fantasy, and feelings of the masses. One can almost agree to Schopenhauer 466-467, where this process is analysed, what gives every positive religion its great strength, the point of contact through which it takes possession of the soul, is entirely its ethical side. Not, however, the ethical side directly as such, but as it appears firmly united and interwoven with the element of mythical dogma, which is present in every system of religion, and as intelligible only by means of this. So much is this the case that, although the ethical significance of action cannot be explained in accordance with the principal of sufficient reason believers regard the ethical significance of action as quite inseparable, and indeed as absolutely identical, and regard every attack upon the mythus as an attack upon right and virtue. This goes so far that among monotheistic nations atheism and godlessness has become identical with the absence of all morality. To the priests such confusions of conceptions are welcome, and only in consequence of them could that horrible monstrosity and fanaticism arise and govern, not merely with single individuals who happened to be specially perverse and bad, but with whole nations, and finally embody itself in the Western world as the Inquisition which put human beings to a painful death at the stake on theological grounds It is suggested that the term welcome is too weak. In fact, the identification of ethics and religion was wanted and sought by the priests. Following this creative phase, the psychological syndrome generated its own momentum, so that the priests became the most convinced believers themselves. These narrative metaphors (Herbert 30) were useful in corroborating the priests position and prestige by sacrifices and obedience, and they became the foundation of respective theologies. It also made sense to religiously attend to the facts of life birth, marriage, death in dignified, solemn rituals. Since the store of spiritual food is inexhaustible, the priests influence and prestige grew. They undertook to explain why things moved Apollo carried the sun, Artemis instigated men to hunt, Athena provided intelligence. The priests motives were somewhat egotistic, but not only egotistic, since the masses were eager to learn about things they had never dreamt of and found help and hope in sacrifices, rituals, and prayer. At a later stage, the paradigm changed; the priests themselves surrendered to those Scriptures, attributing them divine authenticity and absolute authority. Jung suggested that the narrative metaphors were innate archetypes, and Freud simultaneously developed the teaching that they were meant to be an artificial, and thus neurotic, remedy for troubling affections in the individual ( Fromm 16f). They both were wrong, for the myths were created by priests like Homer and Hesiod. 2) In terms of the future development of religion, it has become a fact that, no sooner does religion promote creeds, than it clashes with science. If it makes rules, it clashes with politics, and if it engages in pastoral care, it clashes with psychology. Such confrontations are useless, dangerous, and detrimental to both the intruder and the defender. Calvin (Aphorism 13) claims, God takes care of the whole human race, but especially of his Church God governs all things by his will, and regulates them by his wisdom he has most abundant power of doing good; for in his hand are heaven and earth, all creatures are subject to his sway, the godly rest on his protection, and the power of hell is restrained by his authority nothing happens by chance, though the causes may be concealed, but by the will of God; by his secret

will which we are unable to explore, but adore with reverence, and by his will which is conveyed to us in the Law and in the Gospel. This is exactly the attitude of those fundamentalist Christians who exhibit a boundless and completely irresponsible acquisition of goods and resources and exploit the planet ad libitum. 3) The gods and goddesses of the ancient polytheistic religions were not objects of faith, but the personified, immortal, invisible forces which moved things and people, either favourably or unfavourably; Zeus moved the clouds, Poseidon triggered the marine tempests, Dionysus obstructed the walk and the thoughts of drunken men, Demeter made the corn grow, and so on. Foreign gods were freely introduced into the traditional collection of divinities. Monotheism, however, started to fight foreign gods. Their sole God was still considered the cause of everything, but, in order to explain the existence of evil, needed a negative force which refused to obey and the notion of guilt and eternal punishment or recompense changed the paradigm profoundly. 4) The monotheistic God, as the idea of ideas, is a philosophical, not a religious conception, and prayer presents a psychological necessity. For instance, it makes sense to pray to the engines when entering an aircraft. The meaning of that prayer is to accept that one will be completely dependent on their function and that one is not in control of how they will work. The author prays every evening to his solar plexus, because his well-being depends on it and he cannot control it in any way. In the morning, before starting to write, he prays to his computer, because if it fails him, he is not able to repair it. The prayer does not change a thing in the computer, but it makes him aware of its miraculous abilities, which, other than that, he might take for granted. In fact, neither Christianity, nor Islam is truly monotheistic. The most popular Catholic pilgrimage place is the shrine of the Holy Virgin in Guadalupe, Mexico, and the worship of the Saints substitutes former polytheism. Muslims venerate the Koran, the Kaba, Prophet Muhammad, Hussein, the Mahdi, and other Saints. Religious feelings for a single entity cannot satisfy our multiple emotional needs. 5) Although controversial, the beginnings of the High Religions led to the most important spiritual development, in a unifying cultural process, the power of which cannot be overestimated. And this unifying power cannot be replaced by mass organisations like the United Nations or mass events like the Olympic Games, World Championships, Pop Festivals, and Military Parades. In order to unify humanity a thing absolutely urgent to the survival of the species and the planet all religions are called to unite, abandoning all their creeds, but maintaining their holy days and feast days, in a World Religion that is true, takes the lead in addressing the gigantic challenges of the future, gives our spiritual needs a home in more beautiful temples (using and embellishing the former shrines, too), religious services, and liturgy than ever, and offers the arts the necessary stimuli to develop their highest potentials, in order to create the cooperation of mankind, in an ultimate effort to celebrate EXISTENCE itself. Certainly, a World Culture will emerge, hopefully more peaceful, beautiful, and inspiring than any culture before. The economical and social impact of such a paradigm shift will also be extremely beneficial to humanity and the earth. It is understood that people will pray in those shrines. It is also understood that the three main religious festivals of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Shinto, and Sikhism will all be integrated, re-interpreted, re-

devised, and enhanced by the future World Religion, which may be named `Sinaism (Mackintosh 265-288). For instance, it is unthinkable that feasts like Christmas or Eid ul Adha (End of Ramadan) disappear, but Christmas will become the festivity in which all the newborn children will be blessed, and Eid ul Adha will celebrate the divine blessings of our planet altogether. 6) Dignity seems to ask foremost the Christian theologians since they are the best educated ones to renounce their creeds and appeal to the representatives of the other denominations to join them. And that is why the refutation of the love principle has been undertaken; if the love principle is untenable, the whole strong structure of their and all the other theologies collapses, for it is not good enough to love EXISTENCE, but we want to take responsibility for it (Ex 1 COM 6-7). In addition, if the love principle collapses, then there is no God Who loves us and it would not be good enough to love Him, either. If He, indeed, were a person, we would want to look after Him as well. Luckily, such a thing is not necessary. 7) In terms of the denial of Gods love, it is certain that the universe deserves, in all its parts, a totally respectful approach, and if it was really given by someone, He would deserve more love than all the creatures were ever able to muster. All the same, the universe is neither just nor friendly, and its Creator could not be attributed either of these qualities, for there are innumerable creatures which never have had the least chance to feel a second of happiness, let alone the spiritual satisfaction of taking responsibility, while others may have enjoyed good long lives. Schopenhauers 452-461 theory of eternal justice has to defer to the Hindu myth of rebirth, so as to explain that a murderer will be reborn as an animal and killed in the same way the victim died. The philosopher hurries to explain that the myth is an allegory of the true idea of eternal justice. However, if that kind of punishment is not going to happen in reality, the idea seems to be wrong, too, which is to say that there is not eternal justice. 8) The people of the Roman Empire were asked to abandon their magnificent and rich polytheism in favour of Christianity. Why should the Christians of today not be encouraged to adopt a religion that makes sense? Or, would they rather choose to have neither a religion nor a culture, but the permanent threat of bloody conflicts between todays extremisms? Do they think todays tremendous global challenges can be tackled by secular means exclusively, in a more and more divided world? Who are they waiting for to start in overcoming the dreadful religious segregation of humanity? Is it not evident that more and more people join small, undignified religious communities, charismatic movements, and esoteric sects, because the traditional Churches offer poor liturgy, poor incentives, and poor teaching? Bonhoeffer 144, in 1944 yet, suggested the celestial paradigm be abandoned in favour of a terrestrial Christianity. He was right and prophetic in this, but then proposed that cult and religion be abolished. Since then, `religion has become a word of abuse for many. In addition, Bonhoeffer 207 proposed that the Church teach temperance, veracity, faithfulness, persistence, patience, continence, humility, modesty, frugality. Yet another superfluous catalogue of virtues! At least, he does not mention `faith, hope, and love. And where has `responsibility, once so dear to his heart ( Bonhoeffer 1026), gone? Bonhoeffers approach, unfortunately, led to the movements that promote a fundamentalist Christianity `without religion. 80 They maintain the Bible or the love
80

principle to be absolute, while they pursue very earthly goals, exploit the devotees, make a lot of money, tend to extreme intransigence, and take success to be proof of righteousness. Their exponents mostly talk about themselves, their `positive thinking , and their achievements. The psychological mechanism of religious abuse was aleady exposed by Hobbes I 11e, Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it; because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming Kindnesse. In fact, the Jews were flattered to hear that God had chosen them, and the Christians and Moslems were attested to be favoured by God as well. The resulting fundamentalisms are most damaging, misleading, and divisive. For instance, practically all the Biblical fundamentalists take the risk of a World War III by supporting the biased view that the Jews have an absolute right to the whole Palestinian territory, because they like to read the Bible in that way. What kind of responsibility is that? We are all disabled and make mistakes. The most disappointing thing about the Catholic, Lutheran, and Anglican Churches, however, is that they have the best educated leaders at hand, but continue to maintain messages whose relevance has vanished. Those holy texts were all written by humans for specific purposes, which are not too difficult to interpret. It is also undignified to deny scientific facts on religious grounds. In terms of the fundamentalist Methodist, Baptist, and Pentecostal Churches, it is unfair not to acknowledge that Mt 16.10f clearly defines the Popes infallibility. If they were consequential, they would either join the Catholic Church or renounce their claim to the Bibles infallibility. Muslim fundamentalism is untenable as well, but, under the conditions of migration, a little more understandable, although a burden on everybody and counterproductive. 9) It is suggested that the Christian paradigm originated from the fact that the Temple of Jerusalem and the community of Qumran were destroyed, which fact demonstrated that Gods promise to the Jewish people was no longer effective, because the latter had rejected the progressive teaching of the Master of Righteousness of Qumran. In addition, sacrifices could no longer be offered. As a consequence, the sacrifice was transferred into the spiritual domain. It was represented by the Mass, which became the most important religious service. It seems that some Essene monks, who later became the four Apostles with double names, the secular one and the one given at the vows (Levy-Matthew, Simon-Peter, Saul-Paul, Nathanael-Philip), devised the new paradigm in order to provide a new religious home to the dispersed Jews. Those monks had survived the annihilation of Qumran, probably because they were members of the Essenes in Nazareth. Matthew wrote the first Gospel in Aramaic, in which he made substantial use of the Masters

teachings. The Masters crucifixion by the Romans in m2037 81 was re-interpreted as an expiatory sacrifice to pay for the sins of mankind. The story of Ananias and Sapphira (Acts 5.1-11) reveals that the communities of the early Christian Church imitated the community of Essenes in Qumran. It is obvious that the Gospels do not

reflect historical facts, since the figure of Jesus is either divine or invented. 82 However, the theory of salvation which was later presented in the Letters attributed to Paul, became the foundation of Christian theology. In terms of those letters, refer to Chapter Three 20j. In the given historical circumstances, the Qumranic change of paradigm made much more sense to the gentiles than the Jews, because it offered the opportunity to replace the untenable Roman God Emperor by a God who had no power, but overwhelming love, and who died for our sins. The idea appealed most strongly to the numerous Roman troops, for the Roman soldiers hated to sacrifice to the Emperors who ordered them to undergo all the cruel hardships of war. The Jews, however, must have felt utterly disgusted by the ritual of drinking the blood of Christ, which certainly presented a liturgical fraternisation, introduced by the Master of Righteousness in Qumran. (The respective texts, still accessible in the m50s, seem to have disappeared in the meantime.) Constantine, for his part, ingeniously used the mostly Christian soldiers against the legitimate Emperor Maxentius and changed the paradigm altogether, without converting himself, having himself venerated as divinity throughout his life. The new paradigm was able to generate the fabulous Byzantine, Romanesque,and Gothic cultures, whereas baroque culture reaches far beyond the Christian paradigm (points 12, 24, 32 below). It proved unable to develop the democratic paradigm and fight slavery, since the Master had not objected to it and Paul (Phlm 12) supported it. All these historical suggestions present reconclusions and are not provable, but make sense as soon as one accepts that Damascus in

Acts 9.2, 9.8, 9.10, 9.14, 9.19, 26.12 (not so in 2 Cor 11.32 and Gal 1.17) referred to

Qumran, but not to the Syrian capital, which was way out of Jewish jurisdiction. 83 For all their emotional, cultural, and spiritual merits, however, the creeds of the traditional religions do not present dignified and sensible approaches to the future of mankind and the planet. 10) Do we want to have a multicultural society that adheres to different creeds which all promote wrong principles? Do we want creeds to be promoted that do not accord equal rights to women and men? It will also be the future World Communitys responsibility not to tolerate religions that threaten and make promises, since they are aggressive and exploitive by definition. There is no doubt that professional and financial concerns play an important role, as though the exponents would lose their positions and jobs as soon as they gave up their creeds. This will not happen, if there is a peaceful transition to a correct, beautiful, and dignified World Religion, which inspires everybody. All kinds of fundamentalist attitudes, not questioning the truth and relevance of certain texts, are unwise and undignified. They are supported by professionals who, most of them unknowingly, want to maintain their social, professional, and financial positions. 11) It is true that this paper criticises Christianity in the first place. However, Judaism and Islam equally deserve to be rebuked. a) Judaism: Adherence to the creed of being the Chosen People, focussing on territorial prerogatives, kosher slaughtering and eating, male circumcision, the prohibition of images, the intertwining of religious and political aspirations, poor liturgy, the teaching of non-resistance to oppression in order to further the arrival of the Messiah. b) Islam: Prayer duties, male und female circumcision, Ramadan, the mandatory pilgrimage to Mecca, helal meat and slaughtering, male polygamy, the veil, memorisation of the Koran (which, in fact, is the worst in terms of Muslim extremism, being patronising and contemptuous of women, and intransigence in the most important domains of public life; as a matter of fact, the mandatory memorisation of those monstrous, repetitious, extremely poor, and boring texts is an artificial and very cruel means to keep them popular) prohibition of images, Sharia punishments, the intertwining of religious and political aspirations, poor liturgy, the doctrine of jihad, prohibition of abandoning Islam. In terms of the last point, it subverts all the laws of religious freedom and is not tolerable in a constitutional state. All those peculiarities are either undignified, irresponsible, or exploitive. The buildings and liturgies of both religions are very uninspiring. Religious services are meant to celebrate life and existence, the most holy and precious things in the universe; they derserve much better than that. In these cultures, religious art and art in general cannot develop as it should in transmitting its vital inspiration to society. It is very regrettable that philosophy does far too little to recognise the shortcomings of religious fundamentalism, and to determine the limits of religious freedom (point 29, below). 12) The creation of a relevant religion presents an urgent worldwide responsibility in which everybody is asked to participate. It is, indeed, critical to the planets survival. The idea is that the abolition of religion, sought by communists and a materialistic scientific community from the period of Enlightenment, was right in the refutation of the untenable creeds, but wrong in under nourishing our spiritual dimension, which needs sustenance, too. Since then, Western main stream philosophy has segregated

itself from European culture, which had already developed baroque art and classical music as a satisfactory expression of a new religious paradigm (point 24, below). It is suggested that the new liturgy venerates the five most precious elements which we consume and which consume us; time, air, water, bread, and sexuality. They are, indeed, the most holy things in the universe. It is suggested that the very moments of adoration be accompanied by classical Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Korean, or Indian dance groups, whose solemnity and graciousness is second to none. It is also paramount to maintain important religious holidays and feasts, offer dignified interpretations of them, and, most importantly, enrich and embellish the respective celebrations. The liturgy, although relating to elementary realities of life, is supposed to exhibit a mysterious form of a dream world ( Fromm 93-94), in which all the blessings, challenges, and sorrows of life amalgamate into a mystical universe of the sublime. Religion and cult, in their most genuine forms, can be compared with the rainbow, in which the light of spirituality develops its full splendour. Music wants to be as serene, serious, and magnificent as possible. Some further suggestions are presented in point 5 above, point 25 below, and Mackintosh 282-283. 13) What we live in today is not a culture. All our leading artists, unknowingly, send the message, I do not know what to do and what for. The arts have escaped in the

pathetic theory of `Lart pour lart (V. Cousin) 84, which is to say, art exists for its own sake and that is all. They lack the challenge of a World Religion and World Culture, to create works of art that exceed all the achievements of the past. The task is to create shrines that are as or more beautiful than the Golden Temple of Srinagar, a liturgy that is as or more beautiful than the one of the Russian Orthodox Church, liturgical music that is as perfect as that of Handel, liturgical poetry that is as dignified as the verses in the Koran or Bhmes writings, with the power and dignity of the old West

Indian prayers85 and the intensity of E. Lasker-Schlers poetry 86 and Nietzsches Zarathustra. This new culture will produce stories more fascinating than the Tales of the Arabian Nights, statues that are more impressive than those of Ignaz Gnther, frescos that match the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, rooms as magnificent as the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. Cultural philosopher, R. Schneider is right in stating that the highest form of art positions itself at the border between the tangible and the

transcendental and has there its true home 87. From a psychological point of view, it opens the gates of the unknown, inexplorable sources of the so-called `Unconscious , the realm of dreams, the mysteries of the right half of the brain. What Jung believed to be the decisive factor in psychotherapy, general Archetypes, presents the

artists conscious approach to his inspiration. It is understandable that Jung did not

dare visit Rome, the world capital of religious art. 88 Once, religion used to be the great initiator of all the High Cultures. In those times, narrative metaphors and creeds were inspiring. Today, they present the worst hindrance to true religious reform and have fallen far behind the cultures. For instance, a religious service in a splendid baroque church, filled with the sounds of a classical Mass with orchestra, will be attended by great numbers of people who cannot relate to the lectures and the sermon. Those texts lost their relevance at the times of the Renaissance. In fact, if one is prepared to take reports in the Gospel as historical facts, then it does not make sense to consider Athenas help for Ulysses (Ex 4) as mythical. Why should we care to believe the former and disbelieve the latter? There is no doubt that mankind was able to develop almost perfect religious celebrations for things that were only imagined. All the more it is expected to devise religious services of utmost dignity for things that are real and tangible. On the other hand, it seems that people would never have built temples unless they had been told by the priests that the gods and godesses wanted them. Rather than incriminate those ingenious inventors of the truth, we are better to admire and be grateful to them. The future will prove that humans will build temples because they want them, for it presents the only dignfied way to honour ourselves, life, and existence. For instance, if water and air are not accredited divine honours, we do not merit to breathe nor quench our thirst. 14) The popular wave of nostalgia that started sweeping through Western countries in the m40s is not able to substitute the lack of a World Culture. That renewal of ancient folk culture always appeals to minorities and is unable to inspire society as a whole. All the same, it demonstrates cultural desires which remain unanswered by the modern works of art. 15) The actual movie culture also fails to create a thoroughly new approach to what it means to be responsibly acting individuals that collaborate in the unifying commitment of a dignified, inspiring World Society. Films are unable to address serious issues. For instance, I Bergmans masterpiece, `The Seventh Seal (m43), remains in the domain of a horror movie. 16) At this point, it is useful to shortly address the main difference between psychology and religion. Their approach to what it means to be a person is totally different; psychology is concerned with the balance of feelings, while religion is above feelings and aims at the transformation of reality into pure beauty and perfection. Traditionally, many religions have unnecessarily occupied vast territories of psychology by their creeds ( Fromm 56-83, point 30, below). The vicious meddling of religion with psychology is drastically pictured in Fromm 46-54. An example concerning the latter point can be found in Calvin II 8.49, As, therefore, the Lord previously ordered that charity should regulate our wishes, studies, and actions, so he now orders us to regulate the thoughts of the mind in the same way, that none of them may be depraved and distorted, so as to give the mind a contrary bent. Having forbidden us to turn and incline our mind to wrath, hatred, adultery, theft, and falsehood, he now forbids us to give our thoughts the same direction. The advice is given in the context of the Tenth Commandment, `Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbours wife nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox nor his ass, nor anything that is thy neighbours.

Such intrusive advice makes the psychologists hair stand on end, because the denial and artificial suppression of negative feelings has a counterproductive effect, whereas the first thing would be to become fully aware of them and then try to find out where they come from. In fact, they always result from a complex fear that needs decoding. However, Fromm 89 is mistaken in claiming that the decisive factor of religion is the well-being of the soul. If the soul is conceived as the embodiment of the feelings, the task of looking after its well-being is definitely a task for psychology and psychotherapy. As a negative example , a priest has taken up the ritual to present a candle to the mourners at the end of the funeral services. He advises them to light it whenever they are feeling desperate about the loss of the loved one, as though to light a candle could substitute for weeping, mourning, and praying, which are the only wise and dignified ways to cope with despair. A religious funeral service wants to be a celebration of life and existence just as a wedding is. The mentioned presentation of a candle is as disturbing as if, at the end of the wedding ceremony, the couple were handed a candle to light whenever they started quarrelling; a quarrel can be as correct and important as mourning. The idiosyncratic ritual presents an undue intrusion of religion into psychotherapy. In terms of a funeral service as a celebration of life, Schopenhauer 355 may be quoted, It was precisely the same sentiment, that led the Greeks and Romans to adorn their costly sarcophagi with feasts, dances marriages, the chase, fights of wild beasts, bacchanalians etc., thus with representations of the full ardour of life, which they place before us not only in such revels and sports, but also in sensual groups, and even go so far as to represent the sexual intercourse of satyrs and goats. The Christian Churches have engaged in psychology so much that Hobbes I 12 even suggests that religion had the purpose to make those men that relyed on them, the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and civill Society. Shaftesbury 61 also suggests that 'tis certain that such a belief must prove a seasonable remedy against vice, and be in particular manner advantageous to virtue. It continues to be a popular error, even with many unbelievers in Western civilisation, that theism has been able to improve the social behaviour of the masses, only that they themselves can dispense with that mental support. However, children, raised without religious teaching, but with respect and care, often exhibit higher social competence than religiously indoctrinated ones. Shaftesburys statement also contradicts Shaftesbury 16-17 (below, 17e). Moreover, Shaftesbury 75b erroneously states, the end of religion is to render us more perfect and accomplished in all moral duties and performances The theme of morality was occupied by the priests in order to substitute for the loss of their original assignment to distribute the harvested goods at the temple (point 1, above). In addition, Schopenhauer 459 presents yet another explanation of religion, the myth enables the method of knowledge to comprehend by figurative representation the ethical significance of conduct, which itself is ever foreign to it. This is the aim of all systems of religion, for they are the mythical clothing of the truth, which is unattainable to the uncultured human intellect. Such is no longer the commitment of religion, but of psychology; it is true that myths and allegorical narratives are the safest way to communicate psychological concepts. On the other hand, it is also true that religious myths can be detrimental to the correct interpretation of psychological problems, for instance the Christian myth of original sin and the Hindu myth of the transmigration of souls.

The original purpose of pre-Jewish myths was to channel peoples sinister fears of natural threats, transforming them into the worship of the gods that caused both blessings and disasters. 17) In terms of faith, the paradigm changes completely. Once, it meant to believe in messages that cannot be experienced and have no scientific evidence. Such a kind of faith is as insufficient as the love principle. `Faith wants to be put in opposition to `science. The logical square that results looks as follows;

Faith

Science

Ego

Reality

a) `Science is about things that are certain, while `Faith is about things that are uncertain. The most uncertain thing is the `Ego. Consequently, we want to believe in ourselves, which means to believe that we want, are allowed, and are able to change the world despite all our shortcomings. We want it in order to be happy, we are allowed to on account of our autonomy, and we are able to in our virtuous hope. Then, faith becomes the highest and most demanding challenge, which responsibility, in its heroic approach, wants to tackle. In fact, faith is not a virtue, but the art of arts, more difficult than any other of them. For example, none of Schuberts nine symphonies was ever performed in his lifetime. All the same, at the end of his short life, he confessed that he was happy because he knew that he had done the right

thing.89 In addition, the ego is not an object of science, and faith is not concerned with reality. b) The traditional objects of faith, which is to say, the narrative metaphores, favoured the desire to make others believe in ones creeds as well. However, if the proper object of faith is the Ego, the impulse to try and make others believe in ourselves as well, becomes neurotic. Responsibility wants others to believe in themselves. The neurotic error is grave, because the acknowledgement of others will usually seduce us in adjusting our message, so as to maintain the support of our devotees, or to stick to the acknowledged teaching, preventing us from changing it when we become aware of errors. Rather many philosophers have made great efforts to establish schools in order to have students who trust and believe them. What a damaging, unwise, and undignified enterprise! Locke 23, very correctly, states, I shall say no more here of this, but that it is undoubtedly a wrong use of my understanding to make it the rule and measure of another man's, a use which it is neither fit for nor capable of. Later, Locke 26-27, brilliantly pictures the dread of being a devotee. c) In terms of faith, the approach by Aquinas II 108.1 needs both transcription and correction. It reads, the New Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth by faith that worketh through love. The transscription looks as follows, `To live as a logically thinking being, which can be considered a divine privilege, asks for faith in ourselves, which wants to work through responsibility. The Five Examples prove that love was not the decisive factor in the heroes actions. The question is whether or not such complex definitions are helpful. It is suggested that they are not. Experience teaches that such stilted arguments try to prove something that is not true. In terms of the corrections, this is not a New Law, but has been the case ever since humans can think. As a matter of fact, the Holy Ghost failed to give Bonhoeffer (Ex 2), who certainly was a believer, most urgently needed advice. The object of faith cannot be external, and it does not necessarily work through love; it can be presumed that Ulysses (Ex 4) hated the suitors, and Samson (Ex 5) the Philistines. d) Calvin II 4.4 is wrong when he claims that the principal part of rectitude is wanting, when there is no zeal for the glory of God, and there is no such zeal in those whom he has not regenerated by his Spirit. Nor is it without good cause said in Isaiah, that on Christ should rest `the spirit of knowledge, and of the fear of the Lord, ( Is 11-2); for by this we are taught that all who are strangers to Christ are destitute of that fear of God which is the beginning of wisdom ( Ps 111.10). Calvins `fear of the Lord is insufficient by all means, because the wise want to respect everything (Chapter Ten COM 6) and it is not necessary to be a Christian. As a matter of fact, the whole Bible fails to teach that everything deserves to be respected. That general and comprehensive respect, however, is the essential attitude of a logically thinking being. In that context, Calvin II 3.3 refers to people who lived before Christ and acknowledges that, In every age there have been some who, under the guidance of nature, were all their lives devoted to virtue. Then, he gives the abstruse explanation that they were restrained only by shame, others by a fear of the laws, from breaking out into many kinds of wickedness. Some aspire to an honest life, as deeming it most conducive to their interest, while others are raised above the vulgar lot, that, by the dignity of their station, they may keep inferiors to their duty. The statement ridicules

those peoples responsible ways. In II 3.4, he adds another untenable reason why some gentiles were good, which is to say, that those are not common endowments of nature, but special gifts of God, which he distributes in divers forms, and, in a definite measure, to men otherwise profane. There is no reason why God, in His absolute Righteousness, should choose to prefer some people over others. e) Calvins biased view of peoples morality is brilliantly refuted in Shaftesbury 16-17, We have known people who, having the appearance of great zeal in religion, have yet wanted even the common affections of humanity, and shown themselves extremely degenerate and corrupt. Others again, who have paid little regard to religion, and been considered as mere atheists, have yet been observed to practise the rules of morality, and act in many cases with such good meaning and affection towards mankind as might seem to force an acknowledgment of their being virtuous. And in general, we find mere moral principles of such weight, that in our dealings with men we are seldom satisfied by the fullest assurance given us of their zeal in religion, till we hear something further of their character. If we are told a man is religious, we still ask, `What are his morals? But if we hear at first, that he has honest moral princi- ples, and is a man of natural justice and good temper, we seldom think of the other question, `Whether he be religious or devout? f) One can accept Calvins statement in II 8.1, which reads, In regard to the knowledge of ourselves, we showed that it principally consists in renouncing all idea of our own strength, and divesting ourselves of all confidence in our own righteousness . The recognition of our many shortcomings, however, makes the thus defined faith all the more convenient, in that we want to take responsibility despite our very limited capacities. It is understood that the wise welcomes all kinds of help and support by others in those crucial matters. All the same, one does not refrain from taking utmost responsibility on account of the lack of support. Do free and open what you have intended, but always know the limits of your ways

and that yourself, not others, should be mended. 90 g) Schopenhauer 396 strongly advises against such a form of faith. If we have once for all distinctly recognised not only our good qualities and our strength, but also our defects and weakness, established our aim accordingly, and rest satisfied concerning what cannot be attained, we thus escape in the surest way, as far as our individuality permits, the bitterest of all sorrows, discontentment with ourselves, which is the inevitable result of ignorance of our own individuality, of false conceit and the audacity that proceeds from it. Faith in the sense of Kellers approach has no place whatsoever in that attitude. It, indeed, does not favour `the contentment with, but questions ourselves. If the philosopher is right, the author himself is better to abandon his project, whose dimension seems to exceed everybodys understanding. Faith, by definition, cannot be proved necessary. Its aim is to challenge, rather than `satisfy us. There is a danger in an overly distrustful approach to our abilities, in that we are inclined to qualify them according to the chances of immediate success. Such would not be a qualified parameter (Ex 3 COM 16b). h) Wohmann 183 states, To believe in Gods promise to save us is the very essence of faith. As a modern writer, the author is advised to realise that no-one will come to save us. i) Bonhoeffer 191, God wants us to know that we are supposed to live without his help. The Lord who is with us is the one who deserts us. Comment: The statement includes a denial of the love principle and the Christian paradigm altogether, while it is comparable to a correct doctrine of responsibility. It defines that God as love or our mother (Chapter Eleven COM 3) has born us in love and takes care of us for some time, while God as life and existence or our father wants us to take responsibility and gives us the dignity and true autonomy to decide according to our wisdom, although it is limited and relies on our belief in ourselves. 18) In this context, Calvin III 17.1 wants to be refuted, when he states that we say, that men are not justified, and do not merit salvation by works; . Calvin follows Luther and defines that only faith in Christ can justify man. The truth is that happiness (if `salvation means the same) is achievable by the works of taking responsibility. 19) This approach could erroneously be ridiculed as a kind of `secular fundamentalism. Although it is a fundamentalism, indeed, a philosophical one which considers religion an essential part of history, this refutation of the love principle is not an attack on religion at all, but on its creeds (not to talk about the religiously promoted principles of celibacy, male polygamy, and innumerable superstitions). The approach can also be defined as a `historical fundamentalism, which realises the tremendous relevance of religion in both the past and the future. The creation of the High Religions wants to be considered a more important and decisive factor than science in terms of the cultural and spiritual development of humanity. However, todays creeds and theologies have become the most divisive factors at a point where humans want to unite and open themselves to a universal spiritual paradigm with all its challenges and possibilities. The anti-religious secular stance of the Enlightenment, Materialism, and Communism failed to recognise the relevance of religion. That failure, however, was provoked by the backward Christian teaching. Consequently, a new approach to the question is necessary, one which is able to

dismantle the true origin of the city religions and abandon the myths which are based on revelations. In terms of appropriate parenting, it is of utmost relevance and unfair that public schools promote any creeds and, vice versa, it is not appropriate for schools that promote creeds to be supported by public funds. Although it is true that traditions should not be abandoned easily, `historical fundamentalism adheres to the oldest of all traditions, possibly some twelve thousand years old; it teaches that High Cultures can only develop on religious foundations. 20) The First Vatican Council (m130-129), unfortunately, further fossilised the Catholic Church and, due to the premature demise of the charismatic, ingenious Pope John XXIII (m37), the Second Vatican Council (m40-35) was taken over by the traditionalists and failed to open a new religious paradigm (HERDER XII-XIV). That kind of fundamentalism nourishes the danger of accepting unilateral partisan answers to ambiguous questions, so intimating that everything in politics would come right if only all the politicians were believers.

21) Catholic Kngs basically correct approach to reconcile religions 91 seems to move in the wrong direction. One cannot unite people by going downwards, but upwards. The effort to save religion by a multicultural agreement on few social principles does not take into account the eminent cultural relevance of religion and the undeniable spiritual needs of humans, whose distinguishing quality is to think in the form of ideas, as opposed to other mammals. Although the abandonement of the traditional metaphors is correct and necessary and the love principle is insufficient, the importance of cult and prayer has not diminished on account of that, since we still want both help in our fragility, which persists, and the utmost celebration of life and existence. These holy days and liturgies appeal to our deepest desires of beauty and perfection. Otherwise, religion and priesthood will be rejected altogether, to the detriment of everybody. There is a puzzling difference between Kngs stern, didactical approach and Bhmes inspired and inspiring approach to what religion is all about. There is more spirituality and inspiration in the latters De Tribus Principiis than in the last three

hundred years of Catholic and Protestant theology, including the effusive theo-drama

of H. U. v. Balthasar.92 Bhme A 13.4, Therefore let none make himself stark blind, for the time of restitution of whatsoever man hath lost is now near at hand: the day dawneth, or

the morning-redness breaketh forth; it is high time to awake from sleep .93 The divine comprises both good and evil and nothing is imaginable but by the two opposite principles (Bhme A I 3). Bhme F 55 suggests that God did not rest on the Seventh Day, but generated His Son, Who became man. Gods recreation would then mean that He exuded His Whole Divinity and Completeness into this universe and thus found His rest. Bhmes teaching presents a new religious paradigm, which is clothed in the Christian myth. It becomes obvious that he was both a theologian and a philosopher. His approach, hopefully, will be used by modern, open-minded Christian priests, preachers, and teachers to find a soft transition from the traditional Christian paradigm to the one of the future World Religion. It was a mistake, mainly promoted by the Reform Church, to make religion a question of the religious software creeds, faith, and morals rather than the religious hardware temples, art and liturgy. In terms of continued Christian backwardness, when Bruno was burnt in m400, Bhmes tomb was desecrated in m375, and Galileis findings were refuted (m367), Christian theology missed the point, in which the change of paradigm would have been imminent. The Catholic Church completely detached itself from science, literature, and dignity by the establishment of the `Index of Prohibited Books in m341. The three hundred years of backward Christian teaching supported the obsolete feudal system, failed to appreciate the social misery of the industrial masses, and provoked Marxist antagonism and Nietzsches helpless Superman approach with all their materialistic and political implications, to say nothing of the abominable Christian history of anti-semitism, without which Hitlers genocide could not have happened. To make things worse, the undue adherence to the narrative metaphors has stopped religion from remaining a credible let alone inspiring partner of mainstream philosophy, culture, and history altogether. The extreme enthusiasm for classic Greek culture held by the exponents of the period of enlightenment illustrates the relief felt at the deliverance from the obsolete Christian paradigm. Unfortunately, most of those people abandoned religion altogether, rather than further developing the ingenious theological innovation of Bhme, whose writings compare with liturgical texts. Consequently, Hegel, Schopenhauer 416, Spengler, and the Frankfurt School ignored the absolute priority of religion in the evolution of the advanced civilizations. The history of all the High Cultures is the history of their respective priesthoods in the first place. The Romans understood that the religious centres of communities excelled in relevance to all other aspects of political, social, and cultural integration The neglect of this fact by the Western scholars led to a vicious syndrome, in that the religious leaders themselves forgot about their historical responsibility. They deserted society (while accusing society to have deserted them) and withdrew in an elitist ivory tower of redemption or rebirth. In terms of Hegels untenable approach, refer to point 29, below. Schopenhauer 416 mistakes religion for an idle entertainment of bored minds. Then he explains, This is most markedly the case with nations for which life is made easy by the congenial nature of the climate and the soil, most of all with the Hindus, then with the Greeks, the Romans, and later with the Italians, the Spaniards, &c. Demons, gods, and saints man creates in his own image, and to them he must then

inceasingly bring offerings, prayers, temple decorations, vows and their fulfilment, pilgrimages, salutations, ornaments for their images, &c. The philosopher, who was so fond of the arts, neglects the essential cultural stimuli which result from those supreme efforts; he almost considers them as abuse of the arts. In terms of Bhmes completely new approach, Schopenhauer 284 approvingly, but ignoring his religious approach, quotes his Signatura Rerum (The Meaning of the Things), There is nothing in nature that does not manifest its internal form externally Everything has its language by which to reveal itself And this is the language of nature when everything speaks out of its own property, and continually manifests and declares itself, for each thing reveals its mother that thus gives the essence and the will to the form. Bayreuth presented Wagners powerful attempt to convert the opera house into a temple and music into religion. To conclude this point, either religion is superfluous as Marxists and the Frankfurt School suppose, or it is much more important than Kng supposes. In other words, humanity can only be united by a new and valid World Religion, and if philosophy does not engage itself in that critical quest, it fails its most important political and cultural task. In addition, unless religion is able to unite society by its spiritual foundations, it fails its most elemental task and cannot be considered a helpful and dignified approach to what it means to be a community of logically thinking beings on this most blessed planet. As a matter of fact, the Romans practised an ingenious system of religious integration. They did not suppress or eliminate the religion of the conquered regions, but transferred their principal objects of devotion to Rome, where their reception was

enthusiastic.94 Communism, however, completely failed, because it fought religion instead of applying religious foundations in the development of the new paradigm. At this stage, Chinese. Korean, and Vietnamese communism is likely to fail as well. In fact, it has only be sustainable by repression. 22) All the same, Kngs approach of promoting the idea of a World Ethos has the potential to unite the Jewish, Christian, and Moslem religions, in that one would define the Ten Commandments of Sinai, interpreted and extended according to Mackintosh 274-276, as the only revelation, and abandon all the other teachings. This would offer the possibility of keeping the Sabbath and reducing moral teaching to the basic maxims of social behaviour, although they can be dispensed with being taught (Aristotle II.9C). The Sabbath, on its part, would facilitate the consolidation of future communities, called `Sinas, as proposed in Mackintosh 264-288. Such is not a retreat, but the beginning of the establishment of a new culture ( Bahro R 145). Similar communities have also been suggested by M. Bookchin ( Bahro R 306). In terms of Kngs approach, it is expected that the fusion of the three Biblical religions and the abandonment of all the narrative metaphors would invite the other denominations to amalgamate in a dignified and inspiring World Religion. Such suggestions envisage a time frame of some two hundred years. All those transformations want to be achieved peacefully. That is the very place where Habermas `communicative rationality (Chapter Ten COM 8-9) is very much desired. Kng, however, does not envisage a unifying World Religion, but a peaceful multireligious society. That society will never deserve to be called `multi- cultural, for no culture whatsoever will arise from it, as is blatantly manifested by modern churches, synagogues, and mosques. Those religions have long ceased to inspire a live culture. On account of the lack of religious foundation, 20 th century arts were the most miserable of all times, despite the artists creativity. The longing for small, manageable, and trusted communities was already noticed by Bonhoeffer 155, Are we heading for monstrous unities and immense collective entities, which deny the longing of the masses for small, manageable, supportive communities? Such a transformation of society is also necessary to overcome the prerogatives of money and power. Habermas, who suggests that the socially-integrative power of solidarity (Hosang 90) can defeat them, cannot be agreed to, as long as it is not clear where and how this formidable solidarity manifests itself. 23) With regard to the two-hundred-year time-frame, mentioned above, the German poet, G Keller (m181-110) already wrote a piece of poetry on `Dream and Reality, where he talks about the ideal of a general peace between the nations. The final verse reads, If you have lost that sacred goal and never wanted thus to strive, you dont deserve to have your soul, for you lie in your grave alive. (Gedichte 385) Indeed, it is our responsibility never to desert that cause, although it seems impossible to ever be accomplished. In that respect, Kngs efforts are very appropriate, and heroic as well. 24) Baroque art was in itself a huge step beyond the Christian paradigm of faith. It is, in fact, disturbing to listen to a Bible reading in a Baroque cathedral, because the

message of Baroque art is that we are able to create and enjoy heavenly beauty here on earth, while the message of the Gospel promises Heaven in another world. One would wish to listen to passages taken from Bhme As `Aurora (point 21, above) or

an adapted text of the Sikh Guru Granth Sahib. 95 High Masses with orchestra by the classic composers, featuring celestial beauty, thoroughly fit the spirit of those rooms, whereas a Gospel reading seems to present an element alien to both music and architecture (point 13, above). The barbaric Zwinglian and Calvinian moves to remove images, statues, and altars from the Reform churches (some decades prior to Bhme) had been a desperate attempt to save the obsolete Christian paradigm by a merely rhetorical and literary approach. Although they were right in refuting the images which figured Christian scenes for the thousandth time, they should have replaced them by pictures which featured, for instance, the beauties of the native forests. Unfortunately, they destroyed the pictures, the precious religious hardware, and kept the creeds, the obsolete Christian software. In terms of the economy, Brechts provocative maxim,

Grub first, then ethics96, presents a short-sighted approach to general social welfare, for the classic periods in history were the ones in which poverty was less frequent than in the times of cultural decline. The economical benefits of religious and cultural efforts are obvious. For instance, music is not essential to our survival; however, if it were totally eliminated today, it would cause substantial damage to our economies. 25) In terms of architecture, Saint Ivo in Rome by Borromini (m401-333) prefigures a perfect example of what a new religious paradigm would offer. The architect was given the task of designing a church in honour of Pope Urban VIII, whose coat of arms featured three bees. The artist designed a building whose ground plan, as well

as its elevation, resembled the figure of a bee. 97 This marvellous result, however, does not honour the Pope nor Saint Ivo, but the bee, and ought to be re-baptised The Shrine of the Holy Bee. With the help of zoologists and experienced beekeepers, it should be possible to create a dignified liturgy and a great annual festival in honour of the extraordinary creature, whose existence is a thousand times more beneficial and relevant to humanity than that of both Saint Ivo and Pope Urban. What a challenge would it mean to design a Temple of the Horse, the Lion, the Dolphin, the Sequoia, and develop adequate rituals, texts, and music? This is not a renewal of ancient animistic beliefs, but the adequate spiritual reaction of a logically thinking being to the innumerable and incomparable wonders of this planet and the universe. The emotional resistance against this kind of religious approach, mainly by religious fundamentalists, originates from a lack of self-respect. That lack necessarily results in a disrespectful attitude towards disbelievers and earthly goods altogether, which are considered inferior to the heavenly goods, as though there could be substances that are more worthy and perfect than that of a bee, or angels that are superior to humans. 26) A few more suggestions of how a non-transcendental religion can be formed may be presented. When entering a Gothic cathedral, one has to run the gauntlet of the holy figures at the porch; those are the watchmen, telling us that we hardly merit to enter the House of God. Even the devilish gargoyles pour water from the roof onto believers to give them a further cleansing, before they are granted access to the holy shrine. Inside the cathedral, one is reduced to a helpless nothing which better fall on its knees at the sight of the highest rooms ever constructed. This is the Christian paradigm; the believer is worthless in comparison to the Almightys grandeur. Baroque architecture, however, already fits the new paradigm; the Baroque church talks and responds to its visitor through its painted walls and domes. The introduction of baroque art into religion was effected by the Catholic Jesuits in Rome. The idea was to integrate Renaissance art into the shrines to make them more attractive. So, one intended to fight stern and plain Protestantism, but failed to adjust the paradigm. The most beautiful rooms ever created, whose perfection seems unsurpassable, resulted from that effort (Rome; St Peter, Sant Andrea al Quirinale / Germany; Frauenkirche Dresden, Birnau). Classical music, as well, is the satisfactory expression of what an infinite terrestrial beauty and perfection wants to offer. Handels Messaiah does not present a glorification of the moralist, consoler, and sufferer Jesus, but the celebration of existence and life and its challenges, while Bach desperately tried to save the Gothic Christian paradigm in a music his contemporaries and the majority of Europeans were and are no more able to relate to. Moreover, the festive Kyries of Mozart do not fit in with the imploring sense of the words Lord, have mercy on us. The `German Requiem by Brahms would be suitable music to a funeral; its most beautiful choral, `How lovely are Your dwellings, presents a moving glorification of life and existence on this planet. In terms of liturgy, appropriate rituals and ceremonies are prefigured in the Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Shinto liturgies. Each temple would be unique in many respects. The themes of their rituals and ornaments are obvious, which is to say, the blessings of life, the celebration of the planet, and the infinite greatness of the universe. For example, it would have been a dignified task for Picasso to create a Temple of the Pyrene, assisted by geologists and mountaineers; or Chagall should have been commissioned to devise and supervise the construction of the Temple to Poetry, or D Liebeskind ought to have been invited to build the Shrine of the Milky Way. Such tasks would have been and

would be the ultimate challenge for those artists, binding their efforts and the efforts of their numerous assistants for decades. In contrast, the Crystal Cathedral in Garden Grove, California presents a symbol of a void Christian paradigm; there are no walls, but sheer glass everywhere the very place of spiritual emptiness, unanswered questions, and emotional homelessness. However, the building features a spectacular outside, whereas La Sagrada Familia in Barcelona is a veritable eyesore and nobody is able to imagine for what reason the Holy Family should choose to live there. 27) Russel 27f misjudged the relevance of religion in terms of its cultural and unifying power. He hoped that religion would become as critical to its creeds as science is to all creeds. Religion, however, is not a science, but the great celebration of the human spirit, that wants to deploy utmost effort in terms of beauty and perfection whereas it can dispense with all creeds (points 1-2, above). 28) In order to salvage the Christian paradigm, Bonhoeffer 207 takes a desperate approach in asking for a fully altruistic Church. The Church is only Church, if it is there for the others. First of all, it has to donate all its properties to the needy. Ministers have to live exclusively on the voluntary donations of the communities and even have a worldly job besides. Similar things were already attempted by the Mendicant Orders in the Middleages. Bonhoeffer ignores the spiritual and historical relevance of religion. In order to celebrate existence and provide the best stimuli to a future World Culture, the Shrines need the most beautiful and expensive construction and decoration, a breathtaking liturgy, the most professional music, and professional Ministers of both sexes. Services want to be administered by both a professional priestess, who is a gifted and educated mezzo-soprano singer, and a priest, who is a baritone singer. They are joined by numerous other assistants to enhance the magnificence of the liturgic spectacle. Their chants will be accompanied by the organ. Excellent choirs and orchestras will give the services their ultimate solemnity. The parameter of appropriate solemnity is pre-figured in the Catholic Pontifical High Mass, as well as in the impressive Shintoist liturgies. The vividness of Hindu services merits to be imitated, not so the unpleasant woodwind music. Hopefully, a new, inspiring, and unifying culture will emerge. The communities will compete in their efforts and give all their input into the sublime cause, which alone presents a dignified approach to what it means to be a human society. All this is urgent. The gigantic amounts of money which nowadays are invested in the totally ridiculous star cult would be better employed in the establishment of that new culture, which will also prompt tremendous economical stimuli, creating dignified work for hundreds of thousands of artists and hundreds of millions of people a process and progress whose blessings are innumerable. Moreover, it is not fathomable how World War III could be avoided without them. 29) At present (Y12), the idea of a `multicultural society has the support of a majority of democratic politicians in the West, because they need the votes of all the denominations. Likewise, a substantial number of religious leaders in the West is in favour of that idea; they hope that Christianity has a better chance of surviving in such an environment than in a secular society. Indeed, if religion continues to be granted the right to both threaten people and offer them promises of transcendental favours as they please, the representatives are unlikely to lose their pool of devotees. However, responsibility wants to create a religion that is plausible enough to be

supported by everybody. Who does not want to celebrate existence? World religion is meant to become the foundation of the future World Culture, the final and last one, whose paradigms, challenges, and blessings will never cease. This is the very thing for everybody to strive. Hegel (Phenomenology of the Spirit) fathomed that cultural development was a natural process that developed with dialectical necessity. Modern arts, obviously, have proved him very wrong (points 12 and 22, above). Without a religious foundation, no High Culture will ever arise. Hegel was also wrong in his definition of the Absolute Spirit; he suggests that art and religion will be unified in philosophy, whereas, in fact, art and philosophy culminate in religion, for there cannot be a higher form of approach to the magnificence of life and existence. In fact, unless truth and beauty culminate in a celebration, they lack an adequate expression of their glory. Despite all that, a complete change of paradigm in both the social structure of society and parenting, as suggested in Mackintosh, Chapter Six and Ten, accounts for equal urgency and relevance in terms of the future of mankind, and those goals are unattainable in a multicultural, which is to say multi-religious, let alone, fundamentalist society.

30) Drewermanns98 ingenious efforts to re-inspire the Gospels narrative metaphors by a therapeutic approach falsify their original purposes (point 7, above), and, in order to justify religion, he transforms it into therapy, as though religion was all about feelings. Religion, however, is about nurturing of the spirit and a concentric cultural effort of society. In fact, his approach presents the ultimate consequence of an erroneous psychological and ethical hagiography, initiated by the Jewish priests in Babylon (Chapter One 7a), in so far as religion replaces psychology altogether or, vice versa, psychotherapy becomes religion. In terms of Practical Philosophy, Drewermann seems to ignore the main function of the city religions, which consist of the unified celebration of spendour and magnificence by a complete communal cultural effort. He still adheres to the loveprinciple and wants to transform the Roman Catholic Church into a psychiatric ward. Fact, however, is that religion never and rightly so abandons a paradigm before a new and better one has been created and allows the maintenance of what Drewermann erroneously considers an expression of the `ecclesiastical establishment. The Pope, at liturgy, still wears the clothes of the Roman godemperors and rightly so; for such presents the most splendid manifestation of a grand religious trans-historical and trans-cultural permanence, rather than an incarnation of the Super-Ego. 31) It is to show that all those criticisms are rather unfair, in that the persons who decided such definitely wanted to take responsibility, too. Their essential concern was to salvage the paradigm. It is as though one undertook to criticise the surgeons who once worked without anaesthetics. All the same, one would not understand that a surgeon deliberately would do so today. Likewise, religions which still promote creeds are out of touch. Marx and Russel 27f, however, were wrong when they sought to abolish religion in a Masonic way; religion is neither a drug nor a science, but presents vital spiritual nourishment. On the other hand, Aquinas II 108.4 is wrong as well when claiming that he that cleaves wholly to the things of this world, so as to make them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he does, falls away altogether from spiritual goods. The essential point in spirituality is the unifying approach to the celebration and veneration of life and existence, rather than the search for a superior kind of reality, as though this life were not good enough for humans. 32) Recapturing the issue of a `multicultural society (points 9, 15, 18 above), further discussion is needed. A multicultural society cannot be a true community and will not be cultural, either, since a high culture needs the support of the whole body of a society which, in our day and time, can only mean a World Society. Other than that, the split between religion and civic society will widen and religions will become as irrelevant as leisure clubs, with the dire difference that they constantly compete with one another and want to proselytise. The disintegration of society will intensify and the most beneficial unifying power of religion will turn into its opposite. All sorts of extremisms, esoteric idiosyncrasies, and exploitive guruisms will develop and the number of denominations will grow by the day. Such has been illustrated by the thousands of sects among the Reform Churches, while the Roman Catholic Church still forms a more or less compact body of adherents. This is the reason why the latter has the greatest potential in terms of an effective and peaceful change of paradigm despite its dreadful backwardness. Through baroque art, the hardware of that new paradigm thanks to the efforts of Renaissance and the Counter-

Reformation was developed some 500 years ago, so that it is about time to adjust the software (point 21, above). In addition, the disorientation of people will lead to abstinence from religion altogether within the stratum of the most considerate people; to most of them, religion has long ceased to be a topic worth discussing. The religions then like to blame society for its lack of interest (Herbert 213), claiming that society has deserted the Churches, whereas the sheer opposite has been the case. 33) Moreover, unless we create a valid World Religion without dogmatic creeds, the segregation of the world community will forbid a combined effort to save our planet. Philosophical morals can never arrive at the point to make us save water, avoid pollution, rectify parenting, fight dictators and poverty, and engage in the salvation of humanity, life, and the planet. It is about time for those theologians, preachers, and priests to wake up, leave behind their inappropriate beliefs, and embrace their unique responsibility in taking the lead in the peaceful and inspired unification of humanity, since philosophy and sociology will never be able to initiate that final transformation of world society, of which a greater one has never been seen in history. With that society, the rupture between civic society and religion disappears; s ocial life will be attended by the sinas (point 22, above), the political affairs will be ruled by democracy, and the spiritual domain will be cared for by religion. So, the most exciting potential will be opened to the elemental human trinity of body, mind, and spirit. This seems to be a fantastic, but nonetheless more realistic outlook than Fukayamas `End of History, which pictures a dull capitalist political-economic model (Herbert 215) in a bleak and poor future. H.-P. Hempel, in Bahro R 188-189, suggests that meditation will bring along a change into our imprisoned minds, for us to take a new approach to our existence. This would mean a return to the ancient oriental passivity, while the present needs a totally new paradigm and a unifying programme for humankind as a whole. Those new challenges need active support. 34) Nietzsches 370-371 gross parody in the Prayer of the Charlatan has a bitter aftertaste, considered that the teaching of Superman presents a thorough religious approach and both Nietzsches language and his missionary fervour move on a very liturgical level. In addition, by putting his philosophical argument into the mouth of an ancient, mythical prophet, he accords it a metaphysical quality. The moving prayer reads, `No! Come back, with all your tortures! To the last of the abandoned! Oh, come back! All my tears take to Thee their course! And my hearts last flame For T h e e it burns! Oh, come back! My unknown God! My smart! My last bliss! No longer, now, could Zarathustra refrain his wrath, seized his rod, and thrashed the lamenting charlatan with all the strength he could muster, `Stop that at once, he shouted and roared with laughter, `shut up, comedian of yours, forger of yours, charlatan of yours! I recognise you! The philosophers rage can only be explained by his neurotic loathing of the love principle. However, he chose to use thoroughly liturgical language, which indicates

that he felt that only a religious approach would be able to instigate a total change of paradigm. 35) Locke 10 appropriately refers to our shortcomings in terms of addressing unpleasant issues, Everyone declares against blindness, and yet who almost is not fond of that which dims his sight and keeps the clear light out of his mind, which should lead him into truth and knowledge? 36) Christianity (Mt 6.25-34), as well as the Eastern European Hassidism, teach a sort of childish naiviety with regard to taking care of our future. Rabbi Sussja used to say,

I learnt the three best things from a child; always be cheerful, always be busy, and

cry when you are sad.99 The advice resembles three maxims given to someone who is learning to drive, `Always drive on the left-hand side, always obey the police, and stop when you are feeling tired. These rules are normally quite correct and useful, but it is laughable to think that they cover the most prominent points, let alone the only ones, a responsible driver wants to respect. In fact, both Christian and Jewish teaching include a double bind which reads, `If you take your concerns seriously, you are not a child of God.

37)

University Curricula
Faculty II Sinaism Liturgical Studies Artistic Studies Simple Lifestyle Sabbath Activities Parenting and Education Allotment of the Sinas Reconciliation Councils Inter-Sinaism Travel Animals Normality

Faculty I Transformation of Society Abandonment of Research and Technology World Religion Priesthood International Relations Foundation of Normal Party Challenges of Coprophobia Planet Green Gerontology Criminality Finance Sound-Spell. Spell-Sound Sustainable Peace

Epilogue
Less Than Nothing Once, a thrush asked the pigeon, How much does a snowflake weigh? The pigeon answered, Less than nothing. The thrush was taken aback and said, Then, please, explain to me how the following thing came to pass. I was once sitting on a branch, when a heavy snowfall set in. Since I had nothing else to do, I started counting the snowflakes that fell on the branch I was sitting on. I counted three million seven hundred thirty-five thousand eight hundred and twenty flakes. However, no sooner had the three millionth sevenhundred thirty-five thousand eight hundred and twenty-first flake fallen on the branch, than it broke and I almost fell down on the ground.

The pigeon said nothing and the thrush flew away. Then, the pigeon, which re-presents a symbol of peace, grew pensive. She thought, If a single flake can break a branch, there is possibly just one person lacking, in order that there will be peace on earth at long last.

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