[Classification]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with
Joeseph Cooper, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator.
Type of event: Interview
Date: Monday, September 22, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire
Participants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238
7045]
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Joe Cooper has been with the FAA since 1991 at Area B, and has been with the TMU
since 1999. At TMU Cooper generally manages traffic flows and considers TMU to be
the "hub" of traffic for Boston Center. The ZBW TMU communicates with ZBW sectors
and coordinates what is ongoing in ZBW airspace with the TMUs of other national air
centers. Cooper identified TMU positions as departure spacing, en route spacing, arrival
flow, military coordinator, and severe weather management. The en route spacing
coordinator is responsible for the "metering" of air craft - at about 38 crossing into a new
air space per hour. The military coordinator is responsible for clearing airspace for
military training purposes. Al Trav is the term used when the military makes an "altitude
reservation" - they receive these reservations when they plan on using an air "track" for
mid-flight refueling. Reservations for this space can be done through Herndon Command
Center. Herndon also handles any national severe weather coordination. Cooper never
deals with the ROC or the WOC.

On 9/11, Cooper first heard from Pete Pesquili in Area B that AA11 had lost
communication capabilities and radar. The next step was for one of the TMU personnel
to contact company. Cooper remembers thinking it odd that an air carrier would loose
both at once. TMU pulled the call sign for AA11 to monitor the flight. Controllers were
alerted to move air craft away from the possible route of AA11 since the altitude was
unknown, and the last registered altitude was FL 290. At that point Area C told TMU that
AA11 was a possible hijack. Terry Biggio told Bob Jones to "pull the tapes" (the record
of communication between the pilots and the ATC). AA11 veered to the right. The
primary target had been tagged, so the data block of the last known information stayed
with the primary. At first, with only three factors, NORDO, no transponder and serious
course deviation Cooper thought AA11 had experienced serious electrical damage. But
after the hard left turn and the confirmation of a hijack through the cockpit
communication, there was no doubt in Cooper's mind.

Dan Bueno asked Cooper to call for military assistance. Cooper began speaking with
Huntress at approximately 123754UTC. He asked Huntress to send F16s out of Otis Air
Force Base. Cooper did not know the physical location of Huntress (Rome, New York).
Cooper asked Bradley to stop departures headed towards New York when AA11 was
roughly five miles south of Albany. When speaking with the military, Cooper believes he
spoke with Sergeant Powell. Cooper was unaware of any specific military exercises that
were taking place on 9/11. Cooper believes there was a lack of understanding on the
military's part on the FAA definition of "primary target", but he was eventually able to
give the military a rough latitude and longitude coordinate. Cooper thought they might
vector an aircraft from the Falcon Axe area that is composed of airspace 7,000 ft to
49,000 ft. Cooper believes that Collin Scoggins asked the military about height finding
capability to be used on AA11.

Cooper stated that Terry Biggio was on a conference call that included New York Tracon
and ZNY. He does not believe those calls were recorded, but the hotline on the New York
side may have been recorded. They were still attempting to locate AA11 when Terry
Biggio told the TMU they lost radar contact with AA11, and shortly after that one of the
facilities personnel told the TMU a plane hit the WTC. Cooper went to the TV at the
facilities and Cooper immediately knew it was AA11.

Cooper was caught in "disbelief, but he then immediately thought of the strain on his
controllers who were attempting to slow down traffic. ZNY then called and informed
ZBW of a possible second hijacking and that ZNY airspace was being shut down.
Cooper stopped all departures flight planned through ZNY. He then heard of the second
hit on the WTC. He immediately realized that control in order to keep the planes still in
the sky was all he could do. He told Dan Bueno that maybe they should call ATC Zero.
Bueno said to do it, and they sent out the GI message for a ZBW ATC Zero. They
reviewed more of the audiotape and Biggio relayed the "we have some planes" through
the conference call. The Pentagon then got hit and Herndon called for a National Ground
Zero.

Cooper discovered that UAL 175 was also a Boeing 767 headed to LAX. The TMU
decided to check for planes in the air that were also flight planned from Logan to LAX.
They found Delta Flight 1989 and immediately informed Cleveland Center.

NEADS was called and the TMU asked what to do with military aircraft airbound and
not responding to the attacks. NEADS announced that all military aircraft not on mission
would return to base.

The facility manager then ordered everyone evacuate ZBW except for one supervisor per
area, one controller per area, and two TMU personnel.

Cooper is clear that any suspicion of another airborne threat the DEN line is the absolute
first place to report to. It is open at all times. Cooper is not aware of how he would get the
military involved except to use the DEN line.

NOTE: Cooper provided Commission staff with a personnel account of the events of 9/11
through his perspective.
 Commission Sensitive
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with
William Dean, Traffic Management Unit Specialist
Type of event: Recorded Interview
Date: Monday, September 22, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire
Participants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238
7045]
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Background
Dean joined FAA in 1985 at Albuquerque Center. He has been a Traffic
Management Unit (TMU) specialist for the past four years, has worked at Boston
Approach Traffic Control and at Logan Tower. He also has experience as an Air Traffic
Controller (ATC) in Area E at Boston Center. As a TMU specialist Dean is responsible
for smoothing the flow of traffic to busy airports. He gets heavily involved in cooperating
with other centers on the flow of air traffic.
Morning of 9/11
On 9/11 Dean started in TMU, but then went to Area E, Kingston Sector, RA20,
to perform his 8 hours per month of mandatory controller duty. He was operating as John
Hartling's Radar Associate. This was at about 0800 EDT and Kingston Sector is
relatively busy at that time of day. Athens Sector RA38 [Shirley Kula] called with a
report of an unusual situation involving a flight with no transponder and not
communicating (NORDO). Dean stated that NORDO wasn't unusual prior to 9-11, but
that no transponder signal was. Kula informed Dean that the last known altitude for
AA11 was FL 290 (29,000 ft). Dean does not recall if the flight was off course at that
point, but assumes that was the case.
After the situation with AA11 began to escalate, Dean unplugged from the RA
position and reported to the TMU. At the TMU watch desk Dean remembers making
several calls. TMU, Colin Scoggins, called the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to
find assistance, and thought there might have been air defense fighters in Rome, New
York where NEADS was located. Dean stated that the information conduit to the military
was "muddled", and that he would have expected a better procedure for the FAA to
receive quick military assistance. He had never been involved in a situation in his
experience in which the FAA called for military fighters, but had been involved in
situations in which the military requested FAA controllers to assist in locating targets.
Dean said that there "was not a lot we can do." Other than contact the military
they would have to get Herndon [Air Traffic Control System Command Center] to let
other Centers know there was a problem. No one likes to work fast moving primary
targets. The Controllers responsibility is to notify the supervisor who will, in turn, notify
the watch desk. Concerning AA11, they had a data block, some primary returns and were
trying to verify its altitude. They thought he was heading to Miami or Havana. They
worked with New York Center, learned of the suspicious communications and turned
UAL 175 out of the way. UAL175 was acting completely normal, but didn't say
anything about the suspicious transmissions it heard until it reached New York air space.
They called New York Center, Sector 56, but did not talk to New York
TRACON. According to Dean, Boston Center left the aircraft at altitude [29,000 ft] in
the handoff but had noted that he seemed to be moving faster. Boston Center then went
back to what else was going on.
NORDO, Transponder and Course Deviation anomalies
Pre 9-11 the standard procedure to handle a NORDO aircraft was common sense:
check the frequency of the plane's previous sector; attempt to contact the plane through
company [American Airlines]; or attempt contact through Airlnc [a commercial means
of sending text messages to cockpits from the ground. Dean stated that approximately
80% of airspace users subscribe to Airlnc.
Lost transponders, though rare, are mainly associated with older military aircraft.
He believes he has seen it happen with commercial airlines five or six times in the course
of his career. He has never seen an aircraft with no transponder, NORDO and with a
serious deviation from course. Regarding transponder loss, Dean noted the ATC will
request the crew recycle the transponder.
Dean stated that a primary target is difficult to track, and that for a primary target
to enter another center's airspace it must have permission. When AA11 went into New
York Center airspace, New York wanted to know who had given it permission. When
tagging a primary, Dean explained that the ATC must manually select the primary target,
and associate a data block with that target.
Hijack procedures
Pre-9-11 Dean noted that the ATC is trained to respond to signals from the
cockpit - either direct verbal confirmation, the confirmation of squawking the 7500
transponder code, or the use of code words - and then relay that information to the
supervisor.
There was a military number for NEADS, and there were hard lines. Dean
estimated that Boston could contact NEADS in less than 15 seconds, but noted that
getting in touch with NEADS and communicating the urgency of the situation, then
getting an actual response are two very different timetables. Since 9-11 procedural details
on receiving military aid are extensive, but may also be confusing in a real-time
emergency.
The policy for a "traditional" hijacking, according to Dean, is detailed in the FAA
Manual 7610.4 section on Special Operations and Procedures. This section also covers
the procedure for military aircraft shadowing planes, but Dean had no knowledge of a
local document on how to handle hijacks. He noted that there is proficiency training on a
yearly basis for ATCs, but that even though the exercises covered a variety of situations,
the real time encountering of such situations can be difficult for a controller to handle.
Dean views the current approach to air traffic security as "a bit of an overkill", but
believes it is positive that the FAA is taking security serious. He noted that one of the
procedures now is that a superviser can advise an ATC to tell a pilot to do a 360 degree
turn to verify that everything on board is fine. He noted that this can be difficult when
there is a good amount of traffic, and that functional control by the ATC of airspace is
critical to performing these verifications.
Staff learned from Dean that after 9/11 Patricia Garabonne (sp) at the
Northeastern ROC conducted an informal review of the events of that day. Staff pursued
that lead and received the record that after action review as part of the FAA response to
the subpoena action.
 Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with
Joseph Cooper, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator.
Type of event: Interview
Date: Monday, September 22, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire
Participants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238
7045]
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Background

Joe Cooper has been with the FAA since 1991, primarily working in Area B. He
has been with the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) since 1999. At TMU Cooper
generally manages traffic flows and considers TMU to be the "hub" of traffic for Boston
Center. The Boston TMU communicates with Boston sectors and coordinates what is
ongoing in Boston airspace with the TMUs of other national centers. Cooper identified
TMU positions as departure spacing, en route spacing, arrival flow, military coordinator,
and severe weather management. The en route spacing coordinator is responsible for the
"metering" of air craft - at a rate of about 38 aircraft entering into a new air space per
hour.
The military coordinator is responsible for clearing airspace for military training
purposes. "Al Trav" is the term used when the military makes an "altitude reservation" -
they receive these reservations when they plan on using an air "track" for mid-flight
refueling. Reservations for this space can be done through Herndon Command Center.
Herndon also handles any national severe weather coordination. Cooper never deals with
the Region Operations Center or the Washington Operations Center.
Morning of 9-11
On 9-11, Cooper first heard from Pete Pasquali in Area B that AA11 had lost
communication capabilities and radar. The next step was for one of the TMU personnel
to contact company (American Airlines). Cooper remembers thinking it odd that an air
carrier would loose both radio and transponder at once.
TMU pulled the call sign for AA11 to monitor the flight. Controllers were alerted
to move air craft away from the possible route of AA11 since the altitude was unknown;
the last registered altitude was FL 290. At that point Area C told TMU that AA11 was a
possible hijack. Terry Biggio told Bob Jones [Quality Assurance] to "pull the tapes" (the
record of communication between the pilots and the ATC).
AA11 veered to the right. The primary target had been tagged, so the data block
of the last known information stayed with the primary. At first, with only three factors, no
radio, no transponder, and serious course deviation Cooper thought AA11 had
experienced serious electrical damage. But after the hard left turn and the confirmation of
a hijack through the cockpit communication, there was no doubt in Cooper's mind.
After Bob Jones confirmed the cockpit communications, Dan Bueno asked
Cooper to call for military assistance. He asked Huntress to send F16s out of Otis Air
Force Base. Cooper did not know the physical location of Huntress [Rome, New York].
Cooper asked Bradley {Hartford CN International Airport] to stop departures headed
towards New York when AA11 was roughly five miles south of Albany.
When speaking with the military, Cooper believes he spoke with Sergeant Powell.
Cooper was unaware of any specific military exercises that were taking place on 9/11.
Cooper believes there was a lack of understanding on the military's part of the FAA
definition of "primary target", but he was eventually able to give the military a rough
latitude and longitude location. Cooper thought they might vector an aircraft from the
Falcon Axe area [over Griffiss AFB, Rome NY] that is composed of airspace 7,000 ft to
49,000 ft.
Concerning the attempt to gain an altitude on AA11, Cooper believes that Colin
Scoggins asked the military to use its height finding capability on AA11. [Staff note: the
Joint Surveillance System radars feed both FAA and NORAD sites. The NORAD
portion of that feed can determine altitude on a primary-only target, the FAA feed
cannot.]
Cooper stated that Terry Biggio, the Boston Operations Manager in Charge, was
on a conference call that included New York Tracon and New York Center. He does not
believe those calls were recorded, but the hotline on the New York side may have been
recorded. They were still attempting to locate AA11 when Terry Biggio told the TMU
they lost radar contact with AA11, and shortly after that one of the facilities personnel
told the TMU a plane hit the WTC. Cooper went to the TV at the facilities and Cooper
immediately knew it was AA11.
Cooper was caught in "disbelief, but he then immediately thought of the strain
on his controllers who were attempting to slow down traffic. New York Center then
called and informed Boston Center of a possible second hijacking and that New York
airspace was being shut down. Cooper stopped all departures planned through New York
air space. He then heard of the second hit on the WTC.
He immediately realized that control in order to keep the planes still in the sky
was all he could do. He told Dan Bueno that maybe they should call ATC Zero. Bueno
said to do it, and they sent out the message for a Boston ATC Zero.
 They reviewed more of the audiotape and Biggio relayed the "we have some
planes" through the conference call. The Pentagon then got hit and Herndon called for a
National Ground Stop.

Cooper discovered that UAL175 was also a Boeing 767 headed to Los Angeles.
The TMU decided to check for planes in the air that were also flight planned from Logan
to Los Angeles. They found that Delta Flight 1989 was a similar flight and immediately
informed Cleveland Center.

NEADS was called and the TMU asked what to do with military aircraft in the air
but not part of the response to the attacks. NEADS announced that all military aircraft not
on mission would return to base.

The facility manager then ordered everyone evacuate Boston Center except for
one supervisor per area, one controller per area, and two TMU personnel.

Cooper is clear that any suspicion, today, of another airborne threat the DEN
(Defense Event Network) line is the absolute first place to report to. It is open at all
times. Cooper is not aware of how he would get the military involved except to use the
DEN line.

NOTE: Cooper provided Commission staff with a personnel account of the events of 9-
11 he made a few days after the event.
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