UNCLASSIFIED

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with
Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C.
Type of event: Interview
Date: Monday, September 22, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire
Participants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238
7045]
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Please refer to the recorded interview for a complete account.

Zilowski has been with the FAA since 1982. He has been with ZBW for his entire career,
but spent a short period of time with Area E.

On 9/11 Zilowski took a position at Hampton 31 at about seven o'clock, he then went
over to R46 Boston High Sector (24k ft. and above). AA11 was handed off to him, and he
climbed the flight first to FL 280, then to FL 290 for normal spacing procedures. He
turned AA11 twenty degrees right to expedite the climb, and AA11 responded. Fairly
soon thereafter he climbed them to FL 350, but AA11 did not respond. He tried calling
AA11 again, since he wanted to turn AA11 back on course. AA11 started to move into
the arrival route for Logan, and Zilowski became concerned. Zilowski changed his
transmitters and receivers to check his own equipment, and when everything checked out
he attempted to reach AA11 on the 121.5 guard code. He checked previous sector
frequency, and tried to contact the flight's company to establish communication.
Zilowski became even more concerned as AA11 started to approach another sector's
airspace.

As these factors persisted and Zilowski still did not hear from the pilot of AA11, he noted
that the situation was highly unusual. When the transponder had first shut off, Zilowski
had told his supervisor, John Shippani, quietly. He then explained to Shippani what he
had done to attempt to communicate with AA11. At this point hijacking had not occurred
to Zilowski. He kept track of AA11 's primary, and still had no reading on its altitude. As
AA11 starts to turn Zilowski heard a strange voice over the frequency. He noted that
since he had experience at air route with heavy international traffic, an Arabic pilot's

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
COMMISSION SENSITIVE

voice wasn't unusual to him. But in this sector, Zilowski noted that most pilots are
American, so he thought the Arabic voice was out of place. Zilowski could not
distinguish the message in the first transmission. It was the second transmission that he
heard clearly. He "screamed" to his supervisor, and told him of the hijack. He put AA11
on the loudspeaker for the section. He had no RA to assist, and asked for an immediate
"D" side. He concentrated on listening for communication from AA11 and, once Greg
Tichini became his RA, gave Tichini all the planes in his sector. Zilowski firmly believes
that the communication from the hijacker was meant for the passengers to hear, and is
adamant that it did not come from the American Airlines pilot keying the microphone,
Zilowski also stated that UAL175 heard the transmission from AA11 since they were on
the same frequency. After the second communication Zilowski thought AA11 was
headed back to Logan Airport, and was worried that it would turn back into the
departures. He wanted to get another supervisor since he did not think Shippani was
taking the situation seriously, and stated that he requested Bob Jones pull tapes to check
the transmission.

When AA11 continued on a southbound heading Zilowski thought it was headed to

Kennedy. He gave the handoff to Athens Area B put Athens hadn't cleared the airspace
yet, Athens picked up Zilowski's point out, but Zilowski kept monitoring the frequency
in case of a further transmission.

Zilowski handed control of his airspace over to Tichini once Athens took over tracking
the flight. Zilowski then left the building for a break. Zilowski was informed of the first
WTC hit from his parents, and stated he immediately knew it was AA11. Tichini told
Zilowski of the second WTC hit of UAL175.

9/11 Personal Privacy

Zilowski explained to Commission staff that "Nordo" indicates no radio, whereas

"Norac" indicates no radio communication. So AA11 was officially Norac. Zilowski also
explained that when a transponder goes off the computer will automatically attribute a
data tag with a call sign to the primary.

Post 9/11 Zilowski believes the air travel is safer, and believes supervisors and the FAA
take security much more seriously. He noted that pilots should be more involved in
staying aware of the need for continued vigilance, and is worried the "system" may
become complacent as time distances memory from the attacks. He noted that the rapport
between pilots and ATCs is going away, and believes there should be more interaction
between the two groups to better secure air traffic.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
 Commission Sensitive
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with
Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C.
Type of event: Recorded Interview
Date: Monday, September 22, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire
Participants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238
7045]
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Background
Zalewski has been with the FAA since 1982. He has been with Boston Center
Area C (Boston Sector) for his entire career, but spent a short period of time with Area E.
Because of shift swaps he had worked until 11pm the night before and then came back on
duty on 9-11 as the Radar Controller, Boston High Sector (24,000 feet and above), R46.
Morning of 9-11
Zalewski started at the Hampton, R31, sector at about seven o'clock and then
went over to R46. AAl 1 was handed off to him routinely from Bosox Sector (lower
altitude), and he climbed the flight first to FL 280, then to FL 290 for normal spacing
procedures. He turned AAl 1 twenty degrees right to expedite the climb, and AAl 1
responded. Fairly soon thereafter he directed them to FL 350, but AAl 1 did not respond.
He tried calling AAl 1 again, since he wanted to turn AAl 1 back on course. AAl 1 started
to move into the arrival route for Logan, and Zalewski became concerned. Zalewski
changed his transmitters and receivers to check his own equipment, and when everything
checked out he attempted to reach AAl 1 on the 121.5 guard code. He checked previous
sector frequency, and tried to contact the flight's company to establish communication.
Zalewski became even more concerned as AAl 1 started to approach another sector's
airspace.
These factors persisted and Zalewski still did not hear from the pilot of AAl 1.
He told Staff that the situation was highly unusual. When the transponder shut off
Zalewski quietly told his supervisor, Jon Schippani, about that additional development
and explained to him what he had done to attempt to communicate with AA11.
At that point the possibility of a hijacking had not occurred to Zalewski. He kept
track of AA11 's primary, but had no reading on its altitude. As AA11 started to turn
Zalewski heard a strange voice over the frequency. Since he had experience on an air
route with heavy international traffic (Area E), an Arabic voice wasn't unusual to him.
But in Boston sector, he told Staff that most pilots are American, so he thought the
Arabic voice was out of place.
Zalewski could not distinguish the message in the first strange transmission. It
was the second transmission that he heard clearly. He "screamed" to his supervisor, and
told him of the hijack. He put the AA11 frequency on the loudspeaker for the section. He
had no RA to assist, and asked for an immediate "D" side. [A "D" side at Boston Center
is a Radar Associate who assists the Controller] He concentrated on listening for
communication from AA11 and, once Greg Taccini became his RA, gave Taccini all the
planes in his sector to handle.
Zalewski firmly believes that the communication from the hijacker was meant for
the passengers to hear, and is adamant that it did not come from the American Airlines
pilot keying the microphone. Zalewski also stated that UAL175 must have heard the
transmission from AA11 since they were on the same frequency. After the second
communication Zalewski thought AA11 was headed back to Logan Airport, and was
worried that it would turn back into the departures. He wanted to get another supervisor
since he did not think Schippani was taking the situation seriously, and stated that he
requested that Bob Jones [Quality Assurance] pull tapes to check the transmission.
When AA11 continued on a southbound heading Zalewski thought it was headed
to Kennedy. He gave a handoff on AA11 to Athens Sector, Area B, but Athens hadn't
cleared the airspace yet. Athens picked up Zalewski's point out, but Zalewski kept
monitoring the frequency in case of a further transmission. [Note: even though Zalewski
handed off AA11 the airplane remained on the R46 frequency and had to be monitored
from that positon.]
Zalewski handed control of his airspace over to Taccini once Athens took over
tracking the flight. Zalewski then left the building for a break. Zalewski was informed of
the first WTC hit from his parents, and stated he immediately knew it was AA11. Taccini
told Zalewski of the second WTC hit of UAL175.

9/11 Personal Privacy

Additional Points
Zalewski explained that "Nordo" indicates no radio, whereas "Norac" indicates
no radio communication. So AA11 was officially Norac. Zalewski also explained that
when a transponder goes off the computer will automatically attribute a data tag with a
call sign to the primary.
Post 9/11 Zalewski believes air travel is safer, and believes supervisors and the
FAA take security much more seriously. He noted that pilots should be more involved in
staying aware of the need for continued vigilance, and is worried the "system" may
become complacent as time distances memory from the attacks. He noted that the rapport
between pilots and ATCs is going away, and believes there should be more interaction
between the two groups to better secure air traffic.
[Staff Note: Zalewski broke down at this point and he was given the opportunity to
collect his thoughts. When the interview reconvened Staff made the offer to continue
with the recorder off. Zalewski gratefully accepted the offer and the following
information is based on notes only.]
His Personal Experience
Zalewski reiterated that the second unusual communication was "not good," it
"scared the hell out of me." He screamed for the supervisor, "Jon, get over here right
now." He had no Radar Associate and tried to get the AA11 frequency on speaker and
"tried to do 95 things at once." He did not "hear" the phrase "we have some planes" at
the time it was spoken. Subsequently, the "FBI didn't talk to him."
Zalewski feels wronged and that undue heroic credit has gone to the pilot of
AA11, John Olangowski. "The keying part is a myth," Zalewski said. People do not
know what happened. Someone in the building had talked to the media about events and
Zalewski went to the front office and said, "I want to know who did this, find him and
fire his ass."
Zalewski is proud of his career. In 22 years he "never had an operational error,
unusual in this building." "People" claimed that controllers talked to the media and a
transcript was out in the public domain. He recalled that a controller offsite was held on
Thursday (Sep 13) and he recalls saying in that forum, "that's not right," "that's not what
I remember." His point was (and is) that his story has never been told and that the story
in the public domain is not accurate. He only talked to Tom Brokaw—he was asked to
do so and he said he would.
At that point Zalewski returned to the main story. He said to Schiappani, "What
are they saying?" "What are they saying?" (the cockpit communications) He recalled
that "Jon goes away." [Note: Schiappani saw his role as the go between to the watch
desk and he focused his efforts on keeping his supervisors informed.] UA175 was on his
frequency and AA11 had not gone off the frequency. He asked for a "D" side
immediately. Jon "had sauntered off.. .no sense of emergency." "I wanted a supervisor
immediately." He recalled that other controllers looked at him as if he was crazy.
[Staff Note: At this juncture Zalewski voluntarily made the statement "Here's a gay air
traffic controller" shouting and screaming. Staff made no comment and did not pursue
the issue.]
He wanted the speaker on "loud" so that everyone could hear what he was
experiencing. He went to Greg (Taccini) his RA and he was helpful but was "freaking
out himself." At that point management combined sectors and took all the planes and
gave them to Greg so that AA11 was singly on that one frequency.
As above, his first thought was that AA11 was "returning to the airport," and
thought "Boston." But then he asked himself the question, why aren't they shutting
traffic off. He then got a supervisor [other than Schiappani], I "finally got one." He
wanted "someone with me, someone behind me... .1 could make the decisions." Quality
Assurance had been notified and Bob Jones came to the Sector. Zalewski said, "I freaked
out on him" and said, "some one has to pull these fucking tapes," "right now."
He did not understand the first transmission, "they [hijackers] weren't even
talking to us." He volunteered that, minus the cockpit communications, he would not
have considered it to be a hijacking until much later.
Returning to the arrival of Jones, Zalewski said, "he got it." "He felt what I felt."
After Jones called back with the results of the re-listen [we have some planes] we began
shutting off traffic. He said, "You see Mineta on TV saying we shut off traffic. That's
not what happened."
Zalewski thought "he [AA11] was going to JFK, that's exactly what I thought."
Another supervisor came over [other than Jones], he "didn't get it." Then came the third
transmission [approximately 0933] and Mark O'Neil said, "that's really scary." After
that the "place got quiet." Even though he had handed off AA11 to Sector R38 he kept
watching.
After the first impact Zalewski was taken off position and he went to his car and
called his parents. He was alone in the parking lot and "he knew it was AA11," but did
not equate AA11 to terrorism. He had to hang up on his parents. At that point Greg
Taccini came out to the parking lot and said he had seen a second aircraft impact and
knew it was UA175. Zalewski's response was "who is 175," "you worked him." I never
climbed him," he was stuck at FL 230.
Zalewski said the union realized they had to do something. I though I "was going
to have a nervous breakdown." They brought us into the union office and I "could hardly
write a statement." He asked, "get these people away from me." [Note: Zalewski's
statement is dated November 2, 2001
Zalewski's Observations (In response to a question about recommendations he might
have)
Zalewski stated that "security has gone overboard."
He asked rhetorically why pilots aren't given letters. We [controllers] are always
monitored. Where is the check and balance with the pilots? Earlier, Zalewski had
characterized "NORDO" as a common occurrence because of pilot inattention—drinking
their coffee and doing other things.
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