LEGAL SEPARATION ONE ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner vs.

LUCITA ONG, respondent DATE: October 2006 PONENTE: J. Austria-Martinez FACTS: William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975. Union was blessed with 3 children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Art 55 (1) of FC on grounds of physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted prayer for legal separation. CA upheld RTCs decision when herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The climax of the couples drama was on December 14, 1995 when the respondent asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back from Bacolod which turned into a violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting the respondent on the head, left cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately pointing a gun at respondents head asking her to leave the conjugal house. ISSUES: Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTCs decision granting legal separation to Lucita when she herself has given ground for legal separation when abandoned her family. HELD: No. RATIO: It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted when both parties have given ground for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment referred to in the Familu Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Also, it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct which does not constitute the abandonment contemplated in the said provision. DISPOSITION: Petition denied for lack of merit.

Ancheta vs. Ancheta CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004 Annulment of Marriage, Civil Law, Marriage FACTS: Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed before

the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Pias, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio. Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial courts order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid? HELD: NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion, says the Court. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default. The Supreme Court reiterates: The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. Petition is GRANTED.

PROPERTY RELATIONS Saguid vs CA Facts: Private respondent Gina Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband , herein petitioner. As a result of such separation, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her. Petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondents meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said house. In the court, the judge declared the petitioner in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. The private respondent was allowed to submit her evidence ex-parte and the TC rendered a decision in her favor. The petitioner filed with the CA an appeal but the decision of the TC was affirmed. The CA ruled that the propriety of the order which declared the petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new rules now require the filing of a pre-trial brief and the defendants noncompliance therewith entitles the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte. Hence, this petition. The petitioner contends his failure to file pre-trial brief was due to the fact that he did not have a counsel. Hence, the court was incorrect to deny his motion for reconsideration. He further contends that the rule on failure to file a pre-trial brief is a new rule that was unjustly applied retrospectively in this case. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private respondent to present evidence ex parte due to his failure to file a pre-trial brief? Held: NO, the TC was correct in finding the petitioner in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief. Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration, showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable

neglect. The motion need not really stress the fact that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his defenses is already on record. In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he was not represented by counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by counsel. In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. . The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular, [f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to appear at the pre-trial, that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default.

Arturo Abalos vs Dr. Galicano Macatangay Jr

on December 4, 2011

30 September 2004, 439 scra 649 Law on Sales Option Earnest Money Facts: Arturo and Esther Abalos are husband and wife. They own a parcel of land in Makati. On June 2, 1988, Arturo, armed with a purported Special Power of Attorney, executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Galicano in which Arturo acknowledged he received a P5k check from Galicano as earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price and that Arturo binds himself to sell the land to Galicano within 30 days from receipt of the P5k. The purchase price agreed upon was P1.3 M. The P5k check was dishonored due to insufficiency.

Apparently, Esther and Arturo have a rocky relationship. Esther executed a SPA in favor of her sister and that she is selling her share in the conjugal property to Galicano. It was alleged that that the RMOA is not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed thereto. And that Esther never executed a SPA in favor of Arturo. Galicano informed the couple that he has prepared a check to cover the remainder of the amount that needs to be paid for the land. He demanded that the land be delivered to him. But the spouses failed to deliver the land. Galicano sued the spouses. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contract of sale between Arturo and Galicano. Whether or not the subsequent agreement between Galicano and Esther is binding and that it cured the defect of the earlier contract between Arturo and Galicano. HELD: No. No matter how the RMOA is looked upon, the same cannot be valid. At best, the agreement between Arturo and Galicano is a mere grant of privilege to purchase to Galicano. The promise to sell is not binding to Arturo for there was actually no consideration distinct from the price. Be it noted that the parties considered the P5k as an earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price. Taking arguendo that it was a bilateral promise to buy and sell, the same is still not binding for Galicano failed to render a payment of legal tender. A check is not a legal tender. Taking arguendo that the P5k was an earnest money which supposedly perfected a contract of sale, the RMOA is still not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed. The property is conjugal and under the Family Code, the spouses consents are required. Further, the earnest money here is not actually the earnest money contemplated under Article 1482 under the Civil Code. The subsequent agreement between Esther and Galicano did not ratify the earlier transaction between Arturo and Galicano. A void contract can never be ratified.