Boehmer - Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace

Trustees of Princeton University
Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace? Author(s): Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke and Timothy Nordstrom Reviewed work(s): Source: World Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Oct., 2004), pp. 1-38 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054282 . Accessed: 05/12/2012 19:03
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to World Politics.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.222 on Wed, 5 Dec 2012 19:03:02 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DO
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS PROMOTE PEACE?

By CHARLES BOEHMER, ERIKGARTZKE, and TIMOTHY NORDSTROM*
I. Introduction TRADITIONAL paradigms inworld politics offer starkly contrast
of the role of intergovernmental ing interpretations organizations IGOs foster nonviolent institutional (iGOs). Liberal theory argues that conflict resolution and constrain the advent of disputes. Functionalists state of IGOs as capable of transforming and pro preferences relations. Students of the democratic peace have moting pacific global now added IGOs to the liberal cocktail.1 the three prescriptive Together, conceive cross-border trade, and in pillars of the "Kantian tripod"?democracy, to diminish ternational the likelihood of milita organizations?appear in some large-sample rized contests studies. Realists, by quantitative have long argued that IGOs reflect, rather than effect, world contrast, IGOs and peace also support for a link between politics. Quantitative with attenuated, appears when violations of certain IGOs the probability of conflict increasing are addressed.2 statistical assumptions war and accounts Conventional of the role of IGOs in influencing in their praise and overly categorical peace seem to us to be incomplete as well as in their criticism. We develop a more nuanced alternative to
We thank David Bearce, Quan Li, John Oneal, Matt Ruppert, Bruce Russett, Holger Schmidt, and Erik Voeten for helpful comments. Erik Gartzke thanks Ned Lebow and the Mershon Center, the Ohio State University, where he was a postdoctoral An earlier draft of the fellow in 2000-2001. paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Tucson, Ariz., November 1-3, 2002. Data for the project are available from the authors. 1 See, for example, Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal, and David Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kant Organization for Peace: International Organizations andMilitarized International 1950-1985," Disputes, Peace: Democracy, In 52, no. 3 (1998); Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating and International Organizations 2001). (New York: W. W. Norton, terdependence, 2 See John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, World Politics 52 (October and International Organizations, 1885-1992," 1999); Interdependence, ianTripod Interdependence
Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer, "Investing in the Peace: Economic and International Conflict," International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001).
WorldPolitics 57 (October2004), 1-38
WORLD
POLITICS arguments. Bargaining theory and informational conditions. explains States
war
visions of classical the contrasting as the result of both material
is omnipresent, but conflict among nations re disagree and power more contests. sults often in diplomatic than in violent bargains Diplo ensues when states differ in their fails and warfare macy occasionally beliefs about power and interest. Third such as IGOs, can most parties, or foster peace by credibly effectively informing by inter competitors often vening in ways strategic our explanation a variable rather pirical conditions new from converting that carefully prevent participants into different, more extractive demands. As such, a "middle IGO effectiveness constitutes is path" inwhich than a parameter. The theory some of which are in research offers a number of em as it explored here?even are IGOs not all design. First, in their institutional and structure, mandate, it follows that they can also vary in their impact
implications?only two suggests improvements created equal. If IGOs vary
member then cohesion, on interstate IGO attributes that are likely to make disputes. We identify some of them more effective at among states. Sec agreements fostering sometimes statistical re ond, states are not all equal, either. The positive lationship accounted
can be IGO and militarized conflict between membership are also for if the countries that are most active internationally to to in those most We organizations. likely belong intergovernmental ac inworld that troduce a control variable for state engagement politics for an observed article The of IGOs to be associated with tendency as follows. We briefly review relevant disputes. studies of
counts
proceeds for why then outline an argument intergovernmental organizations. We can states IGOs and how influence interna fight, why they join IGOs, introduce variables tional conflict. Next, we explain our research design, to measure of IGOs, and re the institutionalization and contentiousness are a necessary our tests The first step in ana port presented findings. to maintain limitations the need the Because of and space theory. lyzing with previous studies, some of the most intriguing impli comparability await further study.While individual results can cations of our argument our as realist or liberal arguments, be interpreted collectively favoring are not IGOs in effective classical accounts. broadly challenge findings or the way they should be if international alter preferences organizations are IGOs commitments. Neither form aweb of constraining universally as critics. The ineffective, suggests bargaining approach by suggested We are to promote that only those IGOs with certain attributes peace. likely IGOs reduce the risk of militarized dis show that institutionalized on conflict. We IGOs also direct influence have little but that other putes IGO IGO members increases effectiveness. show that cohesion among IGOs with a security mandate are more effective at promoting peace
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS& PEACE

than are economic the international We conclude with organizations. system helps a discussion to Finally, controlling
explain previous of the implications
in for engagement anomalous findings. of the study.
II. Literature:
Research speaking summarized on interstate or on
Linkages
conflict and
between
igos and Peace

institutions
IGOs matter. ficacy
broadly can be in intergovernmental organizations particular as follows. a matter it is how of debate and when First, IGO is examination there limited of ef Second, systematic evidence evidence to be Third, contradictory. a IGOs nonuni that have suggest may both increase and decrease con appears that could correlate with the
international
even while
on state behavior; they states select into IGOs inways flict. Fourth, IGOs on impact of disputes. Most there treat
controversy form effect
existing and anecdotal
Realists, liberals, and others have long debated the utility of IGOs.3
in some form or in certain contexts, but agree that IGOs matter as to the extent of IGO influence is no consensus and how best to
as an IGOs that aspect of world analytically politics. By holding IGOs matter, in the debate usually mean that they should participants con state behavior. On one side in the debate, be capable of altering IGOs that and liberal contend institutionalists structivists, functionalists, are (or can be) a central of world order. On the other side, component in world realists argue that IGOs are only marginally influential many and that IGOs typically reflect status quo power relations. politics functionalists, Constructivists, is politics organized increasingly foster cooperation by providing norms and ture, promoting transaction costs.4 Realpolitik and institutionalists around regimes struc information and organizational common belief and systems, reducing less important with should become the argue that global and institutions that
3 International "The False Promise of International Institutions," John Mearsheimer, Security 19, no. 3 (1995); Randall L. Schweller and David Preiss, "ATale of Two Realisms: the Institu Expanding tions Debate," Mershon International Studies Review 41, no. 1 (1997). And for reviews of and perspec tives on the literature, see Lisa L. Martin Studies of and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical International Organization International Organizations," 52, no. 4 (1998). 4 Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organiza See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the tion (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power ward and Interdependence (New York: Harper Collins, 1989); Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: To aNew of In Theory of Institutions," World Politics 39 (October 1986); idem, "The Effectiveness in James M. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto ternational Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables," eds., Governance without Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); John Czempiel, aNeorealist Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in theWorld Polity: Toward Synthesis," World Politics 35 (January 1983); idem, "The False Promise of Realism," International Security 20, no. a 1 (1995); James M. Rosenau, in and Czempiel, in Changing Global Order," Rosenau "Citizenship Governance without Government, and Alexander Wendt, International Politics," Inter "Constructing national Security 20, no. 1 (1995).
WORLD POLITICS
and the growing salience of rise of multiple channels of interaction a nonstate in militarized violence. actors, leading to decline Neoliberal institutionalists much of the functionalist/Kantian accept for international but they also accept the realist prescription politics, nence of systemic of power, and the preemi anarchy, the importance are nev of states' interests.5 Collective security and cooperation or states ertheless feasible where share common complementary states value absolute over relative IGOs interests and where gains.6 help in reciprocity by encouraging through regularizing cooperation as the be teractions.7 institutionalist construed Indeed, may perspective once one the strongest advocate for IGOs, given the lack of alternatives as endemic to international affairs. accepts anarchy While tenets
foster
work by functionalists, liberals, and realists is ex conceptual on institutions is decidedly the literature tensive, sparse. It is empirical as are as IGOs unclear whether effective claim. (or ineffective) partisans the limited scope of empirical research may have retarded the Indeed, oretical stands to advance most quickly when Theory development. confronted literature that IGO with evidence. The suggests contrasting status and factors such as regime type and major power heterogeneity IGO to current fails influence ad Nonetheless, functionality. analysis assess dress these claims several studies call for fully, and although ments to be done.8 of institutional remains much efficacy,
5 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University The Evolution (New York: Basic Press, 1984); Robert Axelrod, of Cooperation under Anarchy: and Robert O. Keohane, Books, 1984); Robert Axelrod "Achieving Cooperation Strategies and Institutions," World Politics 38 (October 1985); Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (1991); Duncan Gains American Political Science Re Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," view 85, no. 3 (1991); Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (1995); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of no. 1 (1995); Duncan Snidal and Kenneth Abbott, Collective Security," International Security 20, Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations," and Simmons (fn. 3). (1998); Martin 6 Snidal (fn. 5) points out that contrasting predictions of absolute and relative gains depend on the number of actors involved. For an informative debate, see comments by Joseph M. Grieco, Robert American Problem for International Cooperation," Powell, and Duncan Snidal, "The Relative-Gains "Relative Gains Concerns When Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993). See also James S. Mosher, no. 5 of States in the International System Increases," Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, in Interna for Choice: The Salience of Relative Gains "Motivations (2003); and David L. Rousseau, tional Relations," Journal of 'Conflict Resolution 46, no. 3 (2002). 7 See research suggests that the shadow of the future can actually inhibit cooperation. Subsequent under Anarchy: The Effects of Symmet Curtis S. Signorino, "Simulating International Cooperation ric and Asymmetric Noise," Journal of 'Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996); James D. Fearon, "Bargain International and International 52, no. 2 (1998); J. Cooperation," Organization ing, Enforcement, Inter in International Cooperation," and Multilateral Enforcement Samuel Barkin, "Time Horizons national Studies Quarterly 48, no. 2 (2004). of and the Preservation 8J.David Singer and Michael Wallace, Organization "Intergovernmental International 1816-1964: Some Bivariate Relationships," 24, no. 3 (1970); Peace, Organization the Number
ORGANIZATIONS& PEACE INTERGOVERNMENTAL

case studies.9 research involves qualitative existing empirical inter have become democratic however, peace researchers Recently, extant evi ested in the role of IGOs and have provided the strongest Most dence to date that IGOs alter state behavior.10 that Oneal and Russett
memberships to the sensitive less likely to experience result appears disputes. This IGOs either increase con choice of sample and econometric technique. non flict or have no effect when all dyads or when assessing adding Other studies find little or no linear controls for temporal dependence. indication Domke ther Oneal At First, that IGOs bring peace. Jacobson, Reisinger, IGOs and interstate offer regression analysis of results for and Mathers conflict, and but nei
in a series of articles
that dyads
share more
IGO
argue are
reports significant intergovernmental organizations.11 results sug and Russett and Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer produce IGOs that increase interstate conflict among members.12 gesting least three factors IGOs are appear responsible institutionally heterogeneous. for these disparate findings. In the three decades since
Wallace first highlighted the issue, no study has investigated Singer and heterogeneity in a systematic fashion.13 NATO and the EU exemplify in
stitutionalized izations with IGOs with more an moderate to alter state behavior. Other ability or limited institutional structures, organ such as
or the Economic the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) hold promise. IGOssuch West African States (ECOWAS), Community of or as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL)
little ability to influence member tions with different institutional distorts ability behavior. structure Attempts and scope to treat organiza homogeneously a of IGOs with genuine
the apparent impact of the minority to influence state foreign policies.
Michael
in the Global and J. David System, Singer, "Intergovernmental Organization International A Quantitative 24, no. 2 (1970); William Description," Organization Press, 1988); Young (fn. 4, Domke, War and the Changing Global System (New Haven: Yale University and Simmons 1992); Martin (fn. 3). 9 Martin and Simmons (fn. 3) provide a review of the extensive case study literature. L. Berbaum, "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interde 10John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett, and Michael Studies Quarterly 47, no. 3 (2003); Oneal and International Organizations," International pendence, Wallace 1815-1964: (fn. 1). (fn. 8) provide typologies of IGOs; Jacobson, Networks of Interde and the Global Political System (New York: Knopf, 1984). How pendence: International Organizations use an inappropriate M. Reisinger, and Todd Mathers ever, Harold Jacobson, William dependent for each year; see Jacobson, Domke relies on disaggregated variable, whereas probit estimates American Politi in Governmental and Mathers, "National Entanglements Organizations," Reisinger, cal Science Review 80, no. 1 (1986). 12 Oneal and Russett (fn. 2); and Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (fn. 2). 13 (fn. 8). Singer andWallace and Russett 11 Harold (fn. 2); Russett, Oneal, Jacobson and Domke and Davis
6 Second, internationally states with Even
WORLD POLITICS
extensive interests abroad are more likely of international to act
or to be members likely are successful IGOs in tensions that between ganizations. reducing rivals may appear unsuccessful if at least part of the impetus for mem in IGOs follows from need. States that share in many bership diplomatic are more to memberships likely interact?cooperatively, are other states. and tively, occasionally violendy?than IGO function as liberals would expect. According ofthat independent competi
and are more
Realists will not be surprised by findings suggesting that IGOsfail to

toMearsheimer, IGOs have of states.14 impact powerful Major or enhance the global powers use IGOs to mold system and maintain a their own power. "For realists, the causes of war and peace are mainly function of the balance of power, and institutions mirror the dis largely no international concerns over relative in the system."15 Moreover, even block substantial while institu gains and cheating cooperation tions fail to alter system structure. Not all realists dismiss international tribution of power institutions, alists have behavior.16 mechanisms bind other however. Schweller and Preiss IGOs can contend that traditional re that always understood structural realists Modified a role in state play altering act as argue that institutions
states exert control, impose rules, through which powerful to and collude the status quo. In short, IGOs states, preserve act as variables between power and world politics. intervening
A third challenge to traditional explanations involves the lack of an

explicit must theory of contests. For IGOs to influence on the causal processes impinge uation of the utility of IGOs as a means calculus of states in conflict. Fearon they dispute behavior, that lead states to fight. An eval for promoting peace necessarily
involves linking the capabilities and actions of IGOs with the decision
such as the argues that variables to distribution of power, threat, or interests?while key determining us rel the content of negotiated who (that is, gets what)?tell bargains states resort to overt force.17 The atively little about why occasionally in the of a inherent behavior that "causes" symmetry requires dispute to end. If, for states contest must be remedied for the contest example, an imbalance of power, then war must lead to a balance fight because of of power in order for peace to be restored. Uncertainty about the bal
14Mearsheimer (fn. 3). 15 Ibid., 13. 16 Schweller and Preiss (fn. 3). forWar," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995). 17James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations of and Resolve: A Limited Information Model See also James D. Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, Crisis Bargaining," American Journal of Political Science 33, no. 2 (1989).

anee of power, rather than the balance the need itself, can accommodate war. a for for of mater States fight not because symmetric explanation ial or motivational have factors per se but because private knowl they status of these factors. Since any claims about how of the actual edge
IGOs influence dispute behavior must be embedded in some theory of

why disputes occur, we adopt the bargaining approach here.
III. A Theory of IGOInfluence on Peace and International Conflict

The are IGOs and interstate conflict behavior processes linking on and indirect. The effect of intergovernmental organizations complex on the structure of IGOs, the origins of in genesis and disputes depends terstate contests, of the two. Traditional and the interaction approaches causal offer
em of IGOs, in part because very different they interpretations a in this causal process. We elements phasize different complex develop on the middle between based contrasting theory, bargaining path, claims of realists and liberals. Our approach uses simple formal models
to illustrate the likely effectiveness of different methods of third-party

intervention. depends tionalized After (See Appendix 1.) IGOs can promote peace, but success on attributes most in cohesive and institu present only the we look within the
organizations. the bargaining argument, summarizing for ways that can best diminish basic framework three-actor Rather than develop models complex ditional are most to aspects of strategic to influence behavior, we believe between conflict
the risk of contests.18 that that ad incorporate it is most appro goal is not whether related result
priate at this point to identify which actions a third party can take that
likely identify how competition IGOs can best influence two states. Our behavior, number
(andwhen)
We they will seek to do so.19
will have the argue that IGOs

of ways The structure.
on in a limited greatest impact dispute behavior to mandate, member and institutional cohesion, ing theory produces a number of empirical
implications,
some of which
18 For reviews of the rationalist literature on bargaining and war, see Dan Reiter, "Exploring the of War," Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 (2003); and Robert Powell, "Bargaining The Bargaining Model ory and International Conflict," Annual Review of Political Science 5 (2002). For a critique, see Jonathan forWar?" Security Studies 10, no. 1 (2000). Kirshner, "Rationalist Explanations 19 The notion that IGOs are selective in their mediation efforts is contrasted by normative and in stitutional incentives to intervene. Unlike peacekeeping, say, where the investment is high, organizing sanctions are all rela talks, pressuring delegates, brokering deals, informing parties, and promoting and tively low-cost actions. These activities are often explicitly encouraged by IGO charters, members, to im interested publics. Indeed, the proliferation of security IGOs, the bulk of which are unequipped pose peace, would appear peculiar if they were not meant to conduct such activities.
8 cannot while be evaluated
WORLD
POLITICS the theory analysis of
challenging the theory in subsequent
our tests support here. Nevertheless, to extend We alternatives.20 existing hope research.
The Bargaining
Theories choice of war of method
Approach
to War
for conflict with the conflate the motives commonly contests for conflict resolution. Costly involve at least for excludable cannot simulta a choice
two elements. goods.21
First, there exists a zero-sum competition States differ over issues or territory that each Second, sum. states choose a method
neously that is non-zero creases better
control.
and in Fighting deprives on are states the that burdens collectively vanquished, implying costs of bar off selecting methods that minimize the transaction
of settlement, victors of benefits
end in some Since war is costly and since almost all contests gaining. are states to is if arrive at the unable rational settlement, only fighting to hostilities. contests A terminate that eventually settlements prior war is thus an account of to achieve states sometimes of fail why theory ex ante post. contests: that can precipitate costly issue indivisibilities, commitment information and asymme problems, tries.22 States can experience failures and war if the stakes in bargaining three conditions the bargains Fearon identifies that obtain ex
are un are not readily divisible bargains dispute (mutually acceptable or be either because the stakes is impossible available, apportioning one of the states has made cause action compromise costly). by prior as a because side payments Fearon discounts indivisibilities precipitant are generally available resolved negotiators For example, U.S. and appear to be practiced. a deadlock in talks the ending Spanish-American
War by offering Spain $20 million
in reparations.23 We
follow Fearon
20 Formal models serve, among other things, to tie tests of implications of an argument to untested elements of a theory. See Rebecca B. Morton, Methods andModels: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 21 States can have no incentive to dispute benefits that cannot be denied to the loser or third par ties. If players value relative gains, however, war can result from nonrivalrous goods. value 22Fearon's list is not exhaustive. Risk acceptance can motivate contests, as can a consumption for war. There is also a broader set of commitment problems that is assumed away by Fearon's model R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, "Conflict without See, for example, Michelle ing framework. or Information: How the Future Matters," Journal of 'Conflict Resolution 44, Misperception Incomplete no. 6 (2000); Branislav Slantchev, "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed of war is co States," American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003). Still, Fearon's characterization herent, widely addressed in the literature, and tractable. 23 "The likeli David F.Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (New York: Macmillan, 1981), 445-66. hood of an agreement was greatly assisted by a proposal emanating from Senator Frye that the United in exchange for the Philippines"; Joseph Smith, The Spanish States should offer financial compensation American War: Conflict in the Caribbean (London: Longman, 1994), 199-200.
in arguing that indivisibility is a relatively infrequent cause of interstate

war.24
Commitment in war honor costs, existing
problems or in interests
occur when
state can its agreements. fight because is in in future better because the than the and present strategic position a con to honor cannot its opponent commit under anarchy credibly tract. As with contests that result from commitment indivisibilities, must in order to reconcile resolve the commitment problems problem so the motives for fighting: otherwise there is resort to involve military lutions. This
provide A declining
in the balance of power, changes disincentives for a rising state to
in lead to particularly problems implies that commitment or contests in which neither tractable party knife-edged bargains to in its the future.25 States expects opponent gain significant advantage but of commitments, may be able to use IGOs to improve the credibility IGO influence is again limited by capabilities and member cohesion. in arguing follows that uncertainty about relative Blainey war or common most interests the costs, power, represents explanation to in for war.26 States possess private information about variables likely an actor so on). While fluence a contest and resolve, might (capabilities, Fearon makes revelation information, problematic. competition or ca or similar actions can states resolved Only by fighting distinguish some states are will from those seeking to bluff. That pable opponents reveal private
ing and able to fight does not explain the need for contests unless it is
impossible or resolved. these states from others that are less capable distinguish of eventual bargains, If states can agree about the content to should mutually the then opponents bargain fight prefer anticipated nature In the eventual of about the short, disagreements ing. bargains contests. explain the need for to
24 States often have
indivisibilities. Commitment increases bargain incentives to seek to generate it harder to compromise. Third parties could allow states to extract themselves ing power by making an IGO for to renege on a promise may free a leader from domes from commitments. having Blaming for gener tic audience costs, for example. It is also possible, however, that IGOs increase opportunities IGOs allow leaders to formalize that are later binding (or at least agreements ating indivisibilities. on domestic not explore these issues here. politics. We do impinging) 25 more in intrastate conflict, where Commitment problems and indivisibilities may be prevalent settlements often include a loss of autonomy for one of the competing parties or where any settlement the is part of the stakes in the contest. See Barbara F.Walter, "Explaining implies recognition, which no. 4 (2003); Monica Duffy Toft, Intractability of Territorial Conflict," International Studies Review 5, The Geography ofEthnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton: Prince ton University Press, 2003); James D. Fearon and David Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996); idem, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," Amer ican Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003). 26 For a succinct and highly intuitive account of the bargaining argument, see also James D. Mor row, "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?" Journal ofPeace Research 36, no. 4 (1999).
10 Fearons mational precipitate contests also
WORLD POLITICS
to war leads us to focus on the infor bargaining approach can IGOs. to compete and incentives impact of Uncertainty IGOs can alleviate interstate the motives warfare.27 for costly information domain by about of particular sanctioning Below strategic variables states. IGOs can or intervention, ways in fea
by credibly communicating that otherwise remain the private seek to reduce dispute
behavior
though the bargaining approach suggests a different causal logic than

that offered contests. We by traditional then tailor
which third parties can reduce the likelihood or duration of international

these generic tures of intergovernmental insights First, organizations. to the characteristic however, we review ways
explanations.
we
examine
that third parties are likely to be ineffective in limiting disputes. Why Third Parties Often Dispute Behavior
Students
Fail to Influence
of international often argue that third parties organization as in or ability to pursue conflict interest states' (such IGOs) influence costs or benefits at associated with contests. Deterrence by altering the tempts more of costly contests by making such contests the of odds seeks victory. Appeasement expensive by reducing to alter the of contests by increasing the net benefit of set probability are to the in lieu of tlements made Such arguments fighting. plausible the chances or one believes demands. as that states are restricted normally latitude to fixed Yet we states wide think and exogenously of anarchy and sover of agree either the to reduce
extent
determined eignty ments.
strategic change or the states make in lieu of fighting. probability bargains that cost/benefit fac parameters theory emphasizes Bargaining altering to reduce the risk of war will fail often ing competitors significantly.28 of a contest
allowing to alter Efforts
in the formulation can
conditions
27 Erik Gartzke, "War Is in the Error Term," International 53, no. 3 (1999). The Organization information argument is not theoretically sufficient to explain war. A sufficient account of asymmetric states. the causes of war requires that researchers access the private information of competing 28 Fearon (fn. 17) provides a formal proof. We use Fearon as the basis for our theory. Robert Pow ell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton Univer Information" sity Press, 1999); idem, "The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete and Skaperdas (fn. 22); and Slantchev (fn. American Political Science Review 98, no. 2 (2004). Garfinkel are a more in which commitment frameworks 22) offer alternative bargaining problems important cause of war and contests can occur under full information. Which of bargaining is characterization most general empirically remains a subject of debate. Note, however, that alternative conceptions hinge on about the sequence of offers in bargaining. Since states often negotiate about how they assumptions will negotiate and since a satisfactory theory of this aspect of bargaining has (structure is endogenous), yet to be introduced to international relations, we adopt the simplest model of bargaining as a place of we to better explain observed behavior than conventional departure. The theory supply is shown here liberal or realist alternatives.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS &CPEACE

The strategic or benefits nature of contests means
11
that any effort that changes costs for one actor in competition does so in a roughly reci or the war becomes more if fashion for competitors: expensive procal net benefits of fighting diminish for one state, then war is relatively or more can convert If competitors for opponents.29 cheaper appealing advantage into better bargains, then simply altering the costs or bene
fits of fighting for one actor should have relatively little effect on the probability of a dispute. If IGOs intervene, changing the balance of
to power or interests, but allow competitors bargain, see little or no reduction in conflict behavior. Proposition
competitors,
we
should
often
1.Actions
common
by IGOs that alter the bargaining power between two

knowledge, encourage revised demands rather than
when
just prompting a change in decisions to fight. are informed about in strategic variables and are If competitors changes in free to act, then the effects of changes should often be subsumed to a con of is the whether bargaining, regardless change endogenous test or in imposed compelling actors. Even where by outside (as in "corner solutions," peace costs succeeds imposing one where party prefers
any available offer to fighting), the approach is relatively inefficient, since much of the third party's effort is diverted by competitors into ob
taining appear to deter or appease all bargain. Attempting parties might as in a chicken game, to be a However, just increasing the remedy. of a contest demand.30 in the balance if conflict is prohibitively costly regardless of what be uninformed about a better
cost of fighting (or the benefits of peace) for all competitors only alters
the odds opponents States may occasionally of power, threat, or interests,
or un changes they may be incentives able to bargain effectively. However, have clearly competitors to be aware of and to act on new or better information. We argue that third parties influencing can often and most peace most promote the informational conditions surrounding economically contests. by
How Third
IGOs can
Parties
Can Best Promote
Peace
of ways. First, the degree that
in a variety affect dispute behavior potentially can act as mediators and information brokers.31 To they
29 The
zero-sum nature of dynamics in the balance of power. security dilemma makes clear the realists have failed to extend the insight to diplomatic bargaining. Factors that alter the likely However, outcomes of contests should alter the demands of diplomats in roughly the same fashion. 30 the payoffs in the chicken game alters play only if changes are ordinal. The effect is Changing set stronger in a bargaining game, where competitors through their offers. payoffs endogenously can be found in 31A review of the traditional literature on the effects of third-party mediation in Walter Lilach Gilady and Conflict and Bruce Russett, Resolution," Carlesnaes, "Peace-Making Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002).
12 contests revelation result from
WORLD POLITICS
private information information reduces the about capability to incentives and resolve, Second,
fight. can third parties intervene in contests but constrain directly partici into more extractive demands where pants from converting advantages the value of strategic variables may or may necessary. While changing not diminish third parties can promote peace by re dispute behavior, on new conditions or from straining competitors acting by concealing information about new conditions from states that stand to benefit. Fi can reduce nally, third parties that have the effect of credibly of force more uncertainty by creating minor resolve among communicating contests relevant
of this
parties (signaling). Talk is cheap in international relations.32 If threats

leaders' words face costly consequences then (sanctions, censure), diplomatic can be more to observers draw informative, allowing accurate inferences.
ARBITRAGE INFORMATIONAL
Third war parties can act as information private information the risk of arbitrageurs, reducing about strategic variables. The bar
by revealing
that war often results from uncertainty and suggests gaining approach to bluff. If a third party informs one state of the status of an incentives opponent's concessions military capabilities, when necessary. for example, then the state can make
Proposition
competitor
2. IGOs promote peace by revealing private information about
states.
Nevertheless,
of third-party promotion as an a information peace through arbitrage. To function arbitrageur, third party must have information that is not available to at least one of states. In the competing terms, the best way to achieve this is practical to have access to administrative and intelligence-gathering sophisticated major (particularly powers) even peace. Further, promoting by acting only as information some third parties stand to disadvantage arbitrageurs, so will be seen as and strategic participants.33 parties at capabilities. tures or This support be more effective implies that from member IGOs with countries extensive institutional struc
there
are barriers
to effective
will
32 see Anne Sartori, "The of the Pen: A Reputational For a discussion of credible diplomacy, Might of Communication in International Disputes," International Organization 55, no. 3 (2002). Theory 33 a IGOsmust also convince states of the veracity of information. Paradoxically, intent third-party on over the outcome of a contest may be less effective than a biased actor with averting only preferences that information from biased political sources can be informa bargaining. Randall Calvert demonstrates of Political Advice," Journal tive; Calvert, "The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model no. 2 (1985). Andrew of Kydd extends this logic to the context of third-party mediation of Politics 47,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS& PEACE INTERVENTION WITH SECRECY OR CONSTRAINT

A second method by which third parties can promote peace is by alter
13
ing the payoffs for one side in a conflict while keeping the new payoffs
new or from using the opponents constraining competitors to in A third party, themselves advantage bargaining. such as an IGO, can assist one side in a conflict or, alternatively, punish one or both as noted above, when a third party in Unfortunately, parties. secret from other conditions tervenes, the beneficiary seek to extract additional beneficiary eficiary ponent, does then is restrained to has an incentive strategic conditions If instead, the concessions from its opponent. or if the ben not know of the new strategic conditions from greater concessions demanding is likely to have a greater effect
peace by intervening IGO intervention. from secretly or
of new
from
its op
intervention
3.
on peace.
by constrain
Proposition states that ing
stand
IGOs promote to benefit
Keeping resources
secret is in terms of arguably the least taxing method changes to promote for third parties. All that is necessary peace is that of new conditions. the beneficiary be uninformed However, secrecy
may
new for IGOs. Once also be the least effective method, especially are revealed, failure ensues.34 Members of IGOs may strategic conditions interests incentives have with have divergent States partisan objectives. to IGO secrets to fellow partisans in a conflict. a consensus among members develop IGOs in promoting while peace, housing method. this often face problems using
4. Preference of efforts to homogeneity promote peace among through
divulge or possess successful will more
Thus, are more
IGOs that
to be likely interests divergent
Proposition effectiveness
IGO members intervention and
increases secrecy.
the
Third
parties
If an IGO pun constraining changing a the state with ishes a state for fighting or provides subsidy for agree to a its regular offer, is forced to make its opponent ing bargain, while their demands.
and Mediation,"American interstate conflicts; Kydd, "Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, Jour nal of Political Science 47, no. 4 (2003). In a subsequent paper, Kydd points out that reputation can be used to make unbiased mediators more credible, though the balance between costs and credibility is and Mistrust" critical. See Andrew Kydd, "The Honest Broker: Mediation (Manuscript, Harvard Uni that media relaxes the assumption July 2004). Similarly, Robert W. Rauchhaus versity, Cambridge, tors prefer peace; Rauchhaus, and Conflict Management" Information, Mediation "Asymmetric of California, Santa Barbara, 2003). (Manuscript, University 34 often viewed as critical to successful deterrence. See Robert Secret threats lack the consequences Press, Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Searchfor Credibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University about third-party actions could increase the onset of disputes. 1990). Uncertainty
can also change from opponents
incentives
for one
side in a contest while
14
WORLD POLITICS
then competitors will more often avoid disputes. The approach may be more difficult or to than informational implement arbitrage signaling, since it requires third parties to take two simultaneous actions (inter vene to appease or deter one state, the counterpart. The institutional strength of the as well as the cohesion of and will members, organization, capabilities be critical in implementing intervention and constraint.35 it must and constrain). also restrain If the IGO intervenes
COSTLYSIGNALING
The third option available to third parties in promoting peace is to con an states front warfare with additional contemplating layer of interme diate challenges. The that states fight bargaining implies approach one of the means because force represents available for only practical
re costs and thus for differential between generating distinguishing solved competitors and those seeking to bluff.36 One way of reducing the frequency of disputes, of demon then, is to create other methods can resolve. Third strating parties embargo products, impose sanctions, or take other actions that make to com it more costly for competitors pete. Again, the frequency response producing surrounds it is not the deterrent effect of these efforts that reduces in of disputes.37 States can simply change their demands or constraints. to new the peace Instead, opportunities is to remove some of the uncertainty effect of sanctions that or other third that sanctions States endure competition. competitors. costly signaling among
or other nonmilitarized
party punishment inform opponents by distinguishing themselves from

other, less-resolved Proposition
states through punishments.
5. IGOs promote peace by facilitating

the imposition of sanctions, embargoes,
Costly signaling can be implemented even when the ability of the IGO
to constrain some behavior is partial or incomplete. As long as at least competitors in differences find sanctions burdensome, resulting competitors allow observers to learn something new about relative resolve
35 Neutral third parties, while arguably less effective at information arbitrage, are likely to be more effective at intervention and constraint. Biased IGOsmay fail to constrain their favored faction, leading war. to more extractive demands and a higher risk of 36 reveal resolve through costly actions, but "burning money" also weak Actors can autonomously ens leads to pay should see such actions only when the reduction in uncertainty bargaining power. We and Jeffrey S. offs exceeding the cost in resources and the loss of leverage. See David Austen-Smith Evanston, 111., and Banks, "Cheap Talk and Burning Money" University, (Manuscript, Northwestern the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Calif., 1998). 37Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (fn. 2).

or
15
of IGO sanc that interact in the presence capabilities. Competitors or more tions will other punishments often arrive at bargains prior to the onset of violence. The to act in ways that allow states to potential signal
implies that IGOsneed not have sufficient capabilities to impose theirwill

on states in order to be effective. in security and that are willing must in the pursuit of peace stand to be most effective. Third parties a acts. to IGOs states also possess with eco mandate for political punish or unable to states nomic or social mandates may be disinclined punish interested Still, IGOs that are primarily to sacrifice economic and social interests
for purely political behavior. Thus, promoting peace through signaling

is probably most
6.
effectively
IGOs with
achieved
a mandate as
through
security
security-oriented
organizations are more
IGOs.
effec
Proposition and
tive at promoting peace through cosdy signaling than are those with nonsecurity
objectives interests.
are confronted with if competitors to escalation to militarized acts. in Holding punishments reserve may be on the since it invites misperception of part problematic, states and the third party. Concern in both competing about appearing effective may be misplaced. Even if punishments fail to deter, the result in uncertainty about relative resolve among ing reduction competitors Bargaining "tests" prior failures allows only for ex ante settlements. Punishments to if they are so large that the target finds fight seems most contexts states in It that ing. unlikely contemplating costly IGOs. violent force will be cowed by the punishments available to most Even more troubling, delay in implementation can create added uncer inhibit directly offer any preferable contests
can be reduced
tainty, increasing the likelihood of a contest. The ability of the third

and with sufficient power to influence party to act decisively sanctioning once on events and inform institu mandate, depends again competitors of tional structure, member and the cohesion, presence major powers. Evaluating igos
Testing bargaining theories is challenging because of the difficulty in

observing implications adopt information. that are We thus need to take an indirect of the uniquely indicative route, seeking need to theory. The our efforts. Our findings considerable face valid each classical mixture view. of IGO
research designs also constrains existing the that suggest, nonetheless, theory possesses
While ity.
conventional We believe
individual results can be interpreted as supporting competing

other findings perspectives, that our theory best explains and weakness that we observe. contradict the particular
strengths
16
WORLD POLITICS present four hypotheses designed to differentiate between our

and the conventional alternatives. about in the literature by variability First, we have argued the effect of IGOs on war States that and
We
argument
disparate findings peace can be explained of involvement
tive abroad share both more IGO memberships

in militarized disputes.
in state activity.
that are ac
and a higher likelihood
Hypothesis 1.After controlling for the level of international activity, dyads with more IGO memberships should appear about as likely to experience milita rized disputes as other dyads. of IGOs at promoting the effectiveness Second, peace should vary with at least some of IGOs possess structure. institutional Institutionalized resources the needed for informational intervention and con arbitrage, with IGOs (or secrecy), or signaling. Realists imply that the notion of an institutions is Liberals and functionalists oxymoron. strong IGOs may be sufficient to promote argue that merely constructing in their impact on conflict. peace. All treat IGOs as more or less uniform straint Hypothesis
IGOs with disputes.
2. Dyads
inwhich
states sharemembership
are less likely to
in a large number of
experience militarized
greater
institutional
structure
Third, IGOs
IGOs vary in the level of contentiousness among their members. consensus to be effective. Dissatisfied members may seek require or obstruct or to secrets to pro reveal interventions, delay they may more are IGOs intervention Even that undecided about serious, t?g?s. increase uncertainty, potentially leading competitors otherwise have been avoided. Traditional might the of internal political see IGOs as struggles ensuring to fight when a fail approaches for IGO effec that differences
contest to
emphasize impact tiveness. functionalists Indeed, "wither among states gradually
away."
with tighter Hypothesis 3. Dyads inwhich states sharemembership in IGOs member cohesion are less likely to be associated with militarized disputes. IGOs differ in their organizational Finally, are more to influence rity mandate likely the realist assertion that IGOs are hollow functionalist relations. more IGOs with a security Hypothesis 4. Dyads inwhich states participate in mandate have a lower probability of experiencing amilitarized dispute. and liberal claims that IGOs mandate. disputes. shells, but broadly IGOs with This contrasts it also differs transform a secu with from
interstate
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS& PEACE IV. Research

This uses study pooled of nondirected analysis time-series
17
Design
cross-national data with a unit of
dyad-years. We results using politically sample, though same.38We base our analysis on Oneal the temporal and Russett's findings the attributes for temporal uses a limit domain and then
focus primarily relevant dyads and Russett, to 1950-91.39 introduce both
on the all-dyads are the generally
attributes Oneal
on IGO though data We first replicate additional variables the BTSCS technique
measuring to correct
of IGOs. We
employ
detailed by Beck, Katz, andTucker and General Estimating Equations

former method because the in the dependent variable.40 The to account variable and cubic "peace year" splines to limited in militarized Due space and disputes. are we report only the logit/BTSCS comparable, dependence to code the IGO data, details of which are pro
for autocorrelation results
analyses. use a new We At
schema
vided inAppendix 2. IGOsvary in their degree of institutionalization.

one end of the institutionalization are continuum that organizations a nominal structure. The heads of states or only organizational or meet various ministers under the auspices of the annually biannually to But seldom the organization agreements organization. require contain implement coordination agreements continuum are states themselves for policy. The member responsible from and cooperation, which often leads to defections in the absence of further institutional support. The goals of organizations control regarding are with formal structures
these IGOs thus often go unfulfilled. Somewhere in the middle of the

guided by procedures of the agenda and voting. The members of some IGOs go further, are on all mem decisions that making binding bers. Many of these organizations also possess bureaucracies that aid and that produce other tangible benefits for members. implementation and rules institutionalized Last, the most highly possess organs or organizations or of mediation, mechanisms aimed at conflict arbitration, adjudication or of organizational resolution and the enforcement decisions; they may other benefits such as economic aid that can be withheld possess states to influence decision making. These IGOs are also capable from of un
38 All results mentioned but not published in the study are available from the authors. 39 collected data on institutionalization for 297 IGOs, coding 198 as Oneal and Russett (fn. 2).We for defunct IGOs are often unavail "minimal," 52 as "structured," and 47 as "interventionist." Details able. ^Nathaniel Cross-Section Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series with a Binary Dependent 42, no. Variable,"American Journalof'PoliticalScience
4 (1998).
Analysis
18 covering private
WORLD
POLITICS
states in cases where information, strategic especially resolve. benefits under sanctions, thus signaling forgo organizational IGOs should be most Institutionalized of international capable affecting IGOs are coded on a conflict. scale of institutionalization. three-point
1.Minimal bly and a secretariat information 2. Structured emonial), and rules. 3. Interventionist and ing adjudication, loans or aid), contain mechanisms for mediation, organizations to coerce state decisions other means and/or (such as well as means to enforce organizational decisions arbitration as withhold and norms. and/or contain organizations an extensive without gathering. organizations bureaucracy contain to structures executive of assembly, (noncer as well as formal policy, procedures plenary meetings, committees, beyond research, and possi
bureaucracy
planning,
implement
Dependent
data set
Variable Interstate Dispute
The dependent variable comes from theMilitarized
MID occurs ofWar by the Correlates produced Project.41 A or a state threatens, uses when force against another military displays, use Maoz's state. We version which also corrects for (DYMIDl.O), dyadic some errors in the basic MID data.42 MID Onset one for the only equals distinct conceptually in different very ways. Using processes might of the nonindependence of Onset also addresses the generic problem even ten the Of here, years. greater importance subsequent dispute to be IGO autocorrelated for conflict and serially dency membership a between the variables. could produce correlation misleading positive year to which IGOs contribute onset of a MID.43 Onset and duration are
Independent
We
Variables
IGO variables. The first measure analyze four different membership counts the number in which of intergovernmental both organizations a a are states of in members given year. We begin by replicating dyad IGO variable.44 The vari Oneal and Russett's aggregate joint replication
41 Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Daniel Jones, Stuart Bremer, and J. David Singer, "Militarized and Peace Science 15, no. 2 Patterns," Conflict Management Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical 1816-1976: and Zeev Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, Procedure, (1996); Charles S. Gochman Patterns, and Insights," Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 4 (1984). 42 Zeev Maoz, Interstate Disputes (DYMID 1.1) Dataset, Version 1.1" (Code "Dyadic Militarized of Political Science, Tel Aviv University, 1999). book, Department 43 and of the debate over onset and ongoing MIDs, see D. Scott Bennett For a useful discussion Allan and Estimator Stam, "Research Design cisions Matter," Journal of 'Conflict Resolution 44 Oneal and Russett (fn. 2). Replication De in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads: When Choices 44, no. 5 (2000). in data and coding. is approximate given idiosyncrasies

able ranges in value from 1 to a maximum of 93. Data sources. Data from multiple from 1950 to 1963 were Correlates 1964 ofWar come to 1992 Intergovernmental Organizations from the Yearbook International of data were taken collected from
19
the for
set.45 Data
Organizations,46
the Political Handbook of theWorld*7 and from information provided by

next subdivide IGO We accord organizations. memberships to the three institutionalization to levels outlined above, ing provide one for each in our three different variables, category typology. IGO Mandate reflects the type of role framers of the IGO anticipated was founded, as formalized when the organization in the doc founding uments or of the organization other). In the analy (security, economic, individual to sis section, we use IGO Mandate identify the sample of security IGOs. or undermine Other attributes the ability of IGOs to fos strengthen ter interstate is presumably af cooperation. Organizational efficacy fected of cohesion of among members, by the degree irrespective or institutionalization. mandate the level of agreement We measure on the of state voting pat using data similarity Nations.48 The of state preferences is similarity IGO and ranked measured for all members in of a given of quartiles are then across all contentiousness. Values and averaged aggregated a so that the can IGOs within be used in given dyad, resulting variables IGO members among terns in the United our among dyad con share membership. We that IGOs that suffer expect are less able to act to prevent or extin tentious memberships decisively measures interstate violence. Power Contention guish Similarly, Major the average divergence of preferences among major IGOs in which the states in a dyad share membership. bine the two variables above into a third variable, of power members we com Finally, in Floor Difference analysis. tentiousness Floor Member members Contention measures the states of IGOs in which average of a given from more con
45 Wallace and Singer (fn. 8). COW data are reported in five-year intervals. We interpolate missing values, as do Oneal and Russett (fn. 2). 46 Yearbook of International Organizations Union of International Associations, (Munich: K.G. Saur, various years). 47 Arthur Banks and Thomas C. M?ller, Political Handbook N.Y.: CSA of the World (Binghamton, various years). Publications, 48 in the General As Affinity provides annual measures of the similarity of dyadic voting positions is discussed elsewhere. See Erik Gartzke, "KantWe All Just Get sembly (1946-96). Data construction and the Origins of the Democratic F'eace,"American Journal of ~Political Along? Motive, Opportunity, Science 42, no. 1 (1998); idem, "Preferences and the Democratic Peace," International Studies Quarterly use the United States as the reference country to convert dyadic values to 44, no. 2 (2000). We state ideal points used in monadic values. We also examined a variable based on nominate coding of Erik Voeten, "Clashes in the Assembly," International Organization of 54, no. 2 (2000). Designation about state utilities that are not immune to controversy ideal points involves additional assumptions results in our analysis. and that yield nonintuitive
20
WORLD POLITICS
Power Contention, which reflects the degree of contentiousness Major to the the average position of all states in the IGO relative between mean the of members of IGO.49 major power position Our next teractions tionship contests. number variable explanatory with the international controls for the magnitude is likely system. There in IGOs and involvement IGOs to defend. potentially States that in conflict. of state in to be a rela in military a interact greater exten a
between States
participating in numerous active interests opportunities
have
of international
more sively also have and are more based value on Oneal for the
to engage
States with
large number of diplomatic relations are differentially likely to join IGOs

to Missions Low is conflict. Diplomatic likely experience s "weak link" and equals the and Russett assumption state in a maintains that the fewest foreign given dyad
that the higher missions. We the value of Diplo anticipate diplomatic a more MID matic Missions will occur. the Low, likely it is that Diplo matic Missions Low controls for international engagement.50
Oneal
and Russett
Control
Variables
other The variables studies, the remaining two additional of the Kant "legs"
To maintain
with comparability are all from Oneal and Russett.51
ian tripod for peace (alongwith IGOs)are joint democracy and trade in
Low use the Both Democracy Low and Trade Dependence terdependence. each "weak link" assumption. We measure regime type by subtracting as score from its state s autocracy in coded score, Polity III,52 democracy to +10 (most democratic). for an index from -10 (most autocratic) Democracy while Trade Low then equals Low the lower of the two state regime scores, the lower of the sum of a states ex
ports plus importswith its dyadic partner divided by its IGO. Again, the higher the lower value in a dyad, the less likely is aMID.
Oneal conflict. member portunity Capability
49 We
Dependence
equals
and Russett Allies equals
identify one when
realist variables
the states of a dyad
that potentially are allied,
predict and zero
otherwise. Similarly,Major Power Dyad equals one if at least one dyad

is a major power. Major to engage in MIDs. Of Ratio equals have greater op powers by definition as well. deterrence course, may work the ratio of the stronger dyadic states capability
sum contentiousness also created an alternative measure of IGOmember by inverting and IGO institutionalization variables. quartiles. The resulting variables correlate highly with the 50 In future research we plan to explore selection effects in IGOs using a different unit of analysis. 51 Oneal and Russett (fn. 2). 52 Keith Jaggers and Ted R. Gurr, "Transitions to Democracy: Tracking Democracy's Third Wave' with the Polity III Data," Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 4 (1995). ming

to the weaker power arguably distance state. We take the natural returns has diminishing has proven
21
since of the variable logarithm to scale. The greater the rela of conflict. States are
tive difference
Lastly, variables
in power in a dyad, the less likely states are to fight.

a reliable predictor
much less likely to fight with geographically distant counterparts. Two

are included variable to control equal is a dummy is the natural members. for geographic space. First, Contiguity are to one when members dyad contiguous between capitals or major ports of dyad
by land or bywater within 150 miles (zero otherwise). Second, Distance

log distance
Temporal
One
Dependence
of the primary functions of IGOs is to offer structures that encour a interstate interaction. time amicable becomes Thus, age ongoing, coex IGOs factor in the analysis of and peace. States that have major to remain at peace. IGOs isted amicably for many years are more likely to interactions between states, or they may simply may help regularize a status reflect and Davis fail to con quo. Russett, Oneal, cooperative trol for temporal Oneal dependence.53 find that, after controlling and Boehmer the Beck, Katz, and Tucker procedure, and Gartzke, Li, for temporal dependence with IGOs appear to increase the dis and Russett
pute propensity of member

other indicators of interstate
Militarized states.54
violence appear
disputes (MIDs) and

tempo
to be associated
The probability of a dispute at time /may be statistically related to rally.

the duration coincide duce to cooperate of peace since the last conflict. Past decisions a lack of motives for disputes and so IGOs appear to re in fact they simply coincide with prior peace. disputes when with
V. Results
To of states, we first propensity 1 we use logistic re In Table and Russett.55 replicate analysis by Oneal to estimate MID Involvement, the Oneal and Russett gression depen for serial with and Tucker controls dent variable, the Beck, Katz, assess the effects of IGOs on the conflict
53 Russett, Oneal, and Davis (fn. 1). 54 (fn. 2). Ibid; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 55 to establish a Oneal and Russett (fn. 2). We use Oneal and Russett s data and statistical model are re baseline for comparison. The changes in data and variable construction mentioned previously ported in subsequent tables.We also replicated all regressions using the ReLogit procedure, but found no substantive differences in in results. See Gary King and Langche Zeng, "Explaining Rare Events in International Organization International 55, no. 3 (2001); idem, "Logistic Regression Relations," Rare Events Data," Political Analysis 98 (2001).
22 autocorrelation.56
WORLD POLITICS
a more constitutes regression Logistic demanding test than GEE, as the latter to our results friendlier theory and produces
to that of Oneal and Russett. As reported by Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer

and Russett, im the BTSCS temporal controls introducing on IGOs is positive and significant.57 plies that the effect of disputes two 1 includes Table each for relevant regressions politically dyads and for the larger all-dyads 1-1 models 1-3 repli and sample. Regression and Oneal cate Oneal trol for and Russett, international 1. Our while models 1-2 and 1-4 introduce the con by and Missions, activity, Diplomatic suggested contention that the association between conflict
can be is largely by states' international activity explained In model substantiated. the IGO makes 1-2, adding Diplomatic Missions In model variable all 1-4, using dyads, the ef statistically insignificant. to fect is similar, though not as strong. Joint IGO continues Membership
hypothesis IGO status
be positively associated with disputes, though only at the marginal 10

more to control to be it is useful level. While needs percent activity, assess the on war and peace. IGOs done to adequately of impact can now to relax the We that all IGOs are created assumption begin re in Tables 2 and 4 are again obtained equal. Estimates using logistic
but with Onset as the dependent variable. The first column of gression, an aggregate variable 2 and 4 reports estimates Tables of a model using
including all joint IGO memberships

columns offer models with IGO
in a dyad. The
variables
three remaining
disaggregated to interventionist 3 and 5 detail by
membership column
level of institutional structure, beginning with minimally

ized organizations organizations substantive Model in the second in the right-hand-most effects for the estimated 2-1 shows that there on war and peace. and moving column. Tables
institutional
coefficients. effect of statistically significant Once we use a more appropriate
is no
IGOs in aggregate
dependent variable {Onset) and, as suggested by hypothesis 3, add vari

IGO members to the Oneal contentiousness ables measuring among and Russett model, realist skepticism would appear to be justified. We are not yet finished the and Russett model, however. Oneal modifying 2 asserts that the level of IGO institutionalization is a criti Hypothesis one common IGO data esti cal factor. Aggregating coefficient produces mate contains for all types of IGOs, while the "true" model arguably IGO several coefficients for different categories.
Breaking down the joint IGOvariable by level of institutionalization

reveals a different, more nuanced picture. The average IGO may be ir
56 Beck, Katz, and Tucker (fn. 40). 57 Oneal and Russett (fn. 2); Gartzke,
Li, and Boehmer
(fn. 2).
iGOs, Time Dependence,
International
Model 1-1
Table Interactions
1 and Militarized
1-2
Model
Membership in All IGOs

Politically Variable Relevant Dyads
Membership in All IGOs Politically Relevant Dyads S.E. Coefficient 0.005 0.009
-0.040 -33.610 -0.110 -0.232
Coefficient 0.008
Low -0.055 Low -18.253 -0.245 -0.301 0.757 -0.125 0.589 -0.106 0.164 -0.074 -0.033 -1.462 n = 33337 Missions, Low
S.E.
0.003*
Coef
Joint IGO Membership

Diplomatic Democracy,
006
002*** 012***
0.009*** 8.852* 0.040*** 0.154* 0.134*** 0.051** 0.155*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.053 0.408*** = -4267.
-0.0
Interdependence,
Capability Ratio Allies Geographic Contiguity

Distance between Capitals
848 057* 182

217**
-31.0
-0.1
-0.36
0.588
-0.052 -0.017 -0.175
Major Power Dyad

Peace Years
072 239
015*** 028*** 030***
-0.36
-0.10
Spline 1 Spline 2 Spline 3

Constant
0.282
-0.133
0.
-0.05
0.005
-1.516 n = 20708
057
641** = -2234.2
-0.13
-1.61 n
Log Likelihood *p< .10,**p< .05,***p< .01
3 Log Likelihood
Lo
igo institutionalization,
contentiousness,
Model 2-1
2 Table and the onset

Model2-2
of militariz
Membership in All IGOS

Variable0
Membership in
Minimal IGOs
Me
Joint IGO Membership JointMembership, Minimal

Joint Membership, Structured Interventionist Joint Membership, Floor Member Contention Major Dif Floor?MP Diplomatic Democracy, Power Contention Contention Missions, Low Low Low
Coefficient - .0078
S.E. 0.0069
Coefficient
-0.0045
S.E. 0.0117
Coeffi
-0.085
0.0536 0.2051 0.0857 0.0086

-0.0325 -10.3706 -0.0418 -0.065
0661 0861** ,0879

0023***
0.0615 0.2128 0.0596 0.0083 -0.0353 -12.6852 -0.0393 -0.094 1.9279 -0.2922
0.
.0652 ,0875
0. ,0877** 0.
0. ,0023*** 0. 0115*** 14. 0. 0.
0.0 0.20 0.08 0.00
Interdependence,

0117 1792 0480 1917

1885*** 0714*** 1892*** 0347*** 0003***
-0.0253
7170 0479 1920
-5.472
-O.037
-0.040
1.9381
-0.2965
0. 1869*** 0. 0711***
1.9
-0.3175
Major Power Dyad

Peace Years
0.9416
-0.3580 -0.0012
0.9417
-0.3577 -0.0012 0.0003 0.0001 -2.3941 n = 109965 0 Log likelihood
0. 1882***
0. 0347*** 0. 0003*** 0.
0.92
-0.357

Constant
-0.001
0.0003 0.0001
-2.2606 n =109965 Log likelihood based on the Affinity data.
0002 0000**
7551*** = -2327.
0002 0. 0000**
0. 7447*** = -2327.6
0.00 0.00
-2.1044 n = Log
*p<.10,**p<.05,***p<.01 Contention variables

Table IGO Institutionalization, Based on Model 2-3 Baseline JointMembership, Structured Floor Member Contention Major Power Contention Dif Floor?MP Contention Diplomatic Missions, Low Democracy, Low Interdependence, Low Capability Ratio Allies Geographic Contiguity Distance between Capitals Major Power Dyad
a prob after 1 standard deviation at their means or mins.
25
3 and mid Onset % Change from Baseline -12.12 4.08 14.89 8.02 22.97 -15.41 -2.61 -5.45 -3.92 587.82 -24.83 152.71
if binary, in given x variable holding others
Contention, Probability" 0.0018 ? 0.0015 0.0018 0.002 0.0019 0.0022 0.0015 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0121 0.0013 0.0044
increase, or max value
relevant the least contrast,
to peace,
but
some
IGOs
significantly
inhibit
conflict.
The
co
efficient for membership

institutionalized joint membership
inminimal
IGOs is negative but insignificant;
do not discourage organizations disputes. By as in structured in organizations, reported
model 2-3, significantly reduces the probability of a dispute (a 12 per

as cent decrease, in Table 3). The overall number of organiza reported a tions shared by states in for interstate peace dyad is less important some our for than the organization We thus find argu type. support ment structure to in order to contribute that IGOs require institutional no on onset interventionist have effect the peace. Finally, organizations of MIDs. While models unobserved institutions interventionist estimated in is negative and statistically significant we contains that the still category suspect using GEE, In particular, while both financial lending heterogeneity. as and collective security organizations figure prominently this variable
ercive measures
we briefly review the other findings from Tables 2 and 3.

Results in which for the IGO contentiousness variables
are to take active, co institutions, likely only the latter to affect the states. 4 of behavior security Hypothesis be that we should again disaggregate the data, differentiating suggests tween IGOs on the basis of their mandate. Before proceeding, however, are consistent across
the fourmodels inTable 2. As suggested by hypothesis 3, organizations

members down to get bogged common share a substantially agenda in intramural and more argument are less likely to act. likely
institutionalization,
contentiousness,
Model 4-1
4 Table of security igos and the onset

Model 4-2
of
in Membership All IGOs Variable' Coefficient S.E.
in Membership IGOs Minimal
M S
Coefficient 0.1388
S.E.
Coeffic
Joint Security IGO Membership Joint SecurityMem, Minimal

Joint Security Mem, Mem, Contention Contention Low Structured Interventionist Joint Security Floor Member Major Dif Floor?MP Diplomatic Democracy, Power
-0.13557
0.0635* 0.0881
-0.10 0.0272 0.2016 0.1122 0.0085

-0.0327 -8.6261 -0.0379 0.
Contention
0690 0870
0. 0868** 0.
Missions, Low Low
0. 0023*** 0. 0118*** 13. 0. 0
0.0727 0.2152 0.0325 0.0084

-0.0375 -14.9055 -0.0364 -0.1598
0645
0879**
0866
0023*** 0115*** ,7941
0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
-0.034
Interdependence,

0.0483 1.9383
-0.2998
8807 0477 1904
-12.513
,0472 1863
,1850*** ,0670*** ,1849*** ,0346*** ,0003***
-0.037
-0.046
0. 1894*** 0. 0747*** 0. 1870*** 0, 0343*** 0. 0003*** 0,
1.9087
-0.2932
1.9
-0.298
Major Power Dyad

Peace Years
0.9343
-0.3552 -0.0012
0.9459
-0.3576 -0.0012
0.9
-0.357

Constant
-0.001
0.0003 0.0001
0002
0. 0000**
0.0003 0.0001
-2.4007 n =109965 Log likelihood
,0002
,0000** ,7208*** -2326.6
0.0 0.0
0, 7789*** -2.2372 n =109965 = -2325.3 Log likelihood
-2.333 n =
Log
*p<.10,~p<.05,~*p<.01 variables Contention
based on the Affinity
data.

Security Based on
Baseline Joint Security Mem,
27
TABLE 5 igo Institutionalization, Contention, Model

0.0017 Interventionist
and mid Onset % Change from Baseline
3-4 Probabilitya
? 0.0013 -22.0
Floor Member Contention Major Power Contention Dif Floor?MP Contention Diplomatic Missions, Low
Democracy, Low Low Interdependence,
1.2 0.0017 0.0019 9.9 0.0020 17.8 0.0021 22.5

0.0014 -20.1 -2.6 0.0017

0.0016 -5.2 0.0017 0.5 0.0115 574.4

0.0013 -23.3
Major Power Dyad

a prob after 1 standard deviation at the means or mins.
173.6 0.0047
increase, or max value if binary, in given x variable, holding others
While
contention
among
organizational between major
members
is
ciated with a higher probability of conflict, the effect is not significant.

By contrast, disagreement power members significantly
consistently
asso
increases the likelihood of militarized disputes. As reported in all four models of Table 2, dyads that share IGO memberships with a high de
are at gree of contentiousness among major power members higher risk a 15 in a dispute for involvement increase, as reported percent (roughly in Table for contention effect is much weaker between major 3). The our of IGOs. Thus, offer some sup powers and floor members findings on IGO effi for that bears the port argument major power cooperation an results also show, however, that IGOs have cacy The impact IGOs are more of major powers; than hollow pass independent simply for major power influence. throughs the control variables, Concerning extensive and states that maintain likely power to become involved The in a MID, impact appear minimal. note also that while diplomatic the effects of relative major powers are more ties globally of alliances and relative appears insignifi
power
cant (literally), as suggested by proposition 1.As predicted by advocates

peace, democracy appears to reduce MID onset by about ismin 15 percent, the substantive effect of trade dependence although a imal. As we would also expect, the risk of MID appears to increase dra at least states and in among matically contiguous dyads that include of the Kantian
one major power. Diplomatic Missions
is significant and positive in all
28 models, regardless and which
WORLD of which
POLITICS
variable, in the volved These order
estimation which technique, dependent are examined. set of in States that are more dyads international tend to be more conflict prone. system the or states most to likely join large numbers interests. Failing their global confounds structured efforts of IGOs in to iden the to control
are also to advance
for variability tify the effect While tionist
engagement of IGOs on peace. the results in Table 2 show that conflict,
safeguard in international
IGOs reduce that suggests proportion
they a similar role. 4 organizations play Hypothesis a of action. The interventionist contains category large IGOs and other nancial that contain no organizations mission. For this reason, we test our models again, this tional
risk of interstate
also fail to demonstrate
interven a course of fi
security explicit time further dis
aggregating IGOs to identify those with mandates addressing interna

for security IGOs, while security. Table 4 reports logit estimates 5 illustrates Table the substantive from impact of relevant variables in general Table 4. It appears that security organizations reduce milita as re in model rized disputes, 4-1, but subsequent regressions reported matters In fact, veal that the level of institutionalization greatly.
minimally
institutionalized security organizations (model 4-2) margin

to interstate that the mere conflict conflict. As with our other findings, there sta is of organizations encourages presence Even for structured escalation. security
ally contribute no indication bility or
discourages
IGOs (model 4-3) that possess codified rules and procedures facilitating
interaction, ordinary terventionist security a MID at conflict in resolution may fail. Only attempts IGOs reduce interstate conflict. Table significantly
5 reports that membership
in this type of IGO lowers the probability of
or motives institu foundational by 22 percent. Without explicit IGOs lack the ability to intervene in crises in a man tional mechanisms, ner a to foster IGOs with resolution. security Conversely, likely dispute mandate and sufficient nature institutional but structure with contingent tional interpretations here. The ing common bonds of IGO effectiveness is consistent can promote peace. This to in tradi be lacking appears the argument presented on not so much forg as it does on anarchy interstate bargaining.
contribution conditions
of IGOs to peace depends or on international converting that encourage effective
creating
VI. Conclusions
The mental objective of this study has been to determine whether intergovern to interstate peace. Previous research contribute organizations
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS & PEACE
29
produced disparate findings, including the troubling possibility that IGOsmight be associated with increased conflict. With several im
provements not without in theory and research design, we find reason for cautious
optimism. Although
both liberal and realist expectations for IGOs are
basis, our results do not seem to be fully consistent with ei nature of IGO effectiveness ther classical view. Rather, the contingent IGOs can var best supports our alternative theoretical perspective?that
on the or exacerbate conflict or have no effect, depending iously reduce member and organizational level of institutionalization, cohesiveness, or inform if IGOs can constrain in mandate. they possess sophisticated or of interven structures of stitutional information managing capable a manner of power or interests without that shifts the balance ing in a mandate to shift as well. to en IGOs that possess demands allowing are also more effective. The role of IGOs as a gage in security diplomacy venue for deliberation does not in itself appear to be a direct contribu tor to interstate peace. IGOs can create conflict when they add Finally, to international uncertainty. This article demonstrates that not all IGOs contribute institutional institutionalized to interstate structure pose IGOs lack IGOs that lack extensive peace. In particular, no barrier to interstate conflict. Minimally
not information avail the ability to collect and disseminate commonly in security-oriented able to belligerents. The effect ismost pronounced IGOs where for peace increase only for those organiza the prospects structure. We tions that contain extensive also show that institutional levels of contentiousness, particularly high con are at interstate less effective among major powers, ameliorating about the effect of IGOs on peace flict. Disparate claims and findings can in to treat all IGOs as to the tendency equiv large part be attributed now to relax of IGO unifor alent. Having rigid assumptions only begun mity, we find Returning IGOs matter results.58 encouraging to the traditional debate, on what our that whether study suggests to accom IGOs are intended IGOs confronted with
depends have tended to of IGO effectiveness intuitive, discussions plish. While some IGOs make a difference, whereas others that the ignore possibility does relatively little do not. The presence of IGOs in and of themselves norms to influence IGOs may extend common conflict. international
it is that
and enhance global prosperity, but these objectives differ from a direct
contribution structivist to peace. IGOs are treated as a panacea in liberal accounts. We that we have demonstrated believe and con that the
58 at the level of the dyad is far from ideal.We use the dyad as the unit memberships Aggregating studies of IGOs. of analysis to facilitate comparison of our results with other quantitative
30 mere presence
WORLD POLITICS
of IGOs in the absence of extensive institutional structure
and amandate has little significance forwhether states fight. The abil ity of IGOsto impinge on warfare is limited by the causes of war and by
the resources of the IGO. a useful counter realist criticism of IGOs, while Conversely, offering out that and flawed. Realists point, is equally categorical correctly point the countries that are most active in IGOs are also most active interna tionally. We between have shown that the positive correlation found in previous
studies between IGOsand conflict can be explained by the relationship

in claiming however, account taking into alliance capabilities, ized have and IGO membership. Realists err, engagement that IGOs are simply a proxy for power. Even after the contribution of major powers, the balance of institutional ties, and international involvement, to IGOs reveal themselves interventionist and security-oriented an on the advent of so As often independent impact disputes. international claims arguments organizations of all or none must to more nuanced and con give way in the light of evidence. Do intergovern empirical promote peace? It depends.
happens, tingent mental
Appendix
1: Formal Theoretical of the Propositions
Analysis
This
formal arguments the six proposi appendix provides supporting are au in the text. Many interaction of patterns possible between a model a tonomous actors. of bargaining would incorporate Ideally, in which is de the structure of interaction framework among players over how in the termined States real world endogenously. negotiate tions
such a framework for they will negotiate. Unfortunately, mimicking is somewhat Further, mally extremely arbitrary assumptions complex. are still to model about structure negotiations, required preliminary in turn determine which patterns. A second best bargaining subsequent em we observe be to mirror the patterns of bargaining over what remains debate best There considerable assumptions pirically. interstate negotiations. Several authors argue that iterated characterize see iterated static games.59 We games are more realistic than single-shot option would games as duration, solve for subsequent advantageous such as the primarily insight that bargaining.60 when states issues of timing or addressing can re to signal fight initially or terminate that preempt Factors
59 Powell (fn. 28, 2004); idem, "Bargaining and Learning while Fighting," American Journal of Po litical Science 48, no. 2 (2004); Slantchev (fn. 22). 60 R. Harrison Wagner, 44, no. 3 (2000). "Bargaining andWar,"American Journalof'PoliticalScience

contests often can be illustrated devise using static models. structures similar to
31
bargaining time is precious when particularly can states in in practice While wings. theory bargain indefinitely, they to seek confine and The negotiations frequently temporally spatially. for example, occurred over a specified three-week Accords, pe Dayton riod in November 1995. At least one key participant credits success at to a finite game structure; last-minute that resulted Dayton bargaining some terminus to in an agreement required that there be bargaining.61 s demands At some point, failure to accept an opponent implies that games, a a must will not continue. The target of bargaining challenge provide to accept a com final answer, and the challenger must decide whether or back down. Static models moment this of cri represent promise, fight, sis in dynamic games and in real-world negotiations. are The chief virtue of is practical. They games, however, non-sequential to solve than are games and they avoid dynamic In the present application, temporal discounting. considerably easier about
states themselves Indeed, type single shot ultimatum or when war waits in the
thorny questions where we seek to ad
extensions dress multiple of the basic model, is an important simplicity use an virtue. We it is simple and similar to Fearon because approach more elaborate creates a foundation it for and logical explanations.
The Basic Model

To
issue or good (k, where 1 > k > 0). States keep any division of the stakes
but forfeit the game contest simple, costs
begin with,
imagine
that
two
states
(A and B)
compete
over
some
where k > d > 0) to B. If B accepts the offer, then it receives d, while A

(k-d). If instead B rejects the offer, then a contest ensues. Sup zero the loser obtains pose that the victor gets k (minus costs) while minus A Assume also is wins the that costs). (again probability that/) receives
c. > 0 and where / G [A,B]). To (c., where keep a take-it-or-leave-it A that makes offer (dy imagine
and (1-p) is the probability that B wins (where 1 >p > 0). Thus, fight * = + ing has an expected value of [p k (1-p) 0-rJ [p k-cA] forA and = + 0 for B. list below utility func We [( 1-p) k-cB] [p (1-p) k-cB] tions for each player,where/is fis dichotomous fight decision.62 = UA (1-/) = UB (1-f) (k-d) +/ -d+f-[p-0 + [/> -k (1-/-) 0-cJ (1) + (1-p) k-cB] (2)
61 To End a War (New York: Random House, Richard Holbrooke, 1998). 62 treat the status quo as a Game-theoretic models often include the status quo as an outcome. We case of the inwhich the bargain in the game equals the bargain ex ante. special equilibrium
32
WORLD POLITICS
and B fight depends on d. If d < [(1-p) 'k-cB]y Obviously, whether^ then B prefers to rejectA's offer. If d> [(1-p) k-cB]y then B accepts
Ays offer peace, jargon * of bargaining theory, [(1-p) k-cB] isB's reservation price. Similarly,^ iswilling tomake an offer ?/such that (k-d) > [p k-cA] => d< [(1-p) k + price, willingly Cj]. ' * offer d > [(1-p) k + c ].The region between [(1-p) k + cj and [(1-p) ' + = ?-cB] k-cB] is the bargaining space of size [(1-p) k cA]-[(l-p) r, + or risk-averse space is a positive actors with costs for positive interval. There always exists This isA's reservation since A cannot make an and or at least an absence of war, obtains. In the
cB. For risk-neutral the bargaining fighting,
some bargain that ismutually preferred to fighting. What does A's offer look like? Payoffs forA are strictly decreasing in d, [(^LQ/(dd)] < 0, up to the point where B prefers to fight rather than = accept d. Thus, A optimizes by just meeting 5s reservation price (d*
' [(1-p) k-cB]). Since B must be indifferent over equivalent outcomes,
B is said to weakly prefer A's offer to fighting.63 This basic bargaining

game never information Suppose costs contest. The in the full sole equilibrium leads to a military to to A B is d* for offer and for game accept. remains that we assume that the cost of fighting instead where cB equals information for arbitrarily high boundary r5). use of the Perfect Bayesian requires rather than Nash concept subgame perfec best offer is about what B prefers, thenîs to A's beliefs about Bys subject are characterized by the proba we assume simple, keep things over the interval (cB~ C/[0, cB]). some
public information forA (c?)but that B is privately informed about its

(cB >cB>0y Introducing Equilibrium tion above. one private (pbe) solution If A is uncertain A's
that maximizes
type at each information over bility distribution that B's costs
utility function, set. A's beliefs
types of B. To are distributed uniformly
A must estimate the probability that B will fight as the portion of types where cB= (1 thatwill reject a given offer dyProb(/= 1) = [(c*B-0)/(cj?-0)], or -p) k-d is the value of cB the "type"player B that is just indifferent
between fighting and accepting a given offer d. Substituting^ s estimate
of/into equation (1) and solving for [(dU?)/(dd)], gives [(2 ??-d-k- (1-p)) + to 0 and solving for ?/as an op cA-cB)/(cB)]. Setting [(dU?)/(dd)] equal timal offer yields the following (where k>d*>0): + d*=\[2k-{\-p)
63 Having to A sweeten
cA-cB] (3)
fighting. However,
its offer by making an arbitrarily small concession ? leads B to stricdy prefer d this clutters the model while yielding no new substantive conclusions.
ORGANIZATIONS& PEACE INTERGOVERNMENTAL = < then B rejectsA\ get cB [l/2](cB-cA). lfcB cBy
Setting fis reservation price equal to equation 3 and solving for
33
we cB,
now have an B A 's bargain. We if cB > Otherwise, equilib c'B, accepts rium solution for a game that involves both war or peace. The next sec to derive the ten tion uses this basic model in the offered propositions body of the text.
offer andî and B fight.
Sketching
Proofs
of the Propositions
by IGOs that alter the bargaining power between two
knowledge, encourage revised demands rather than
Proposition
competitors,
1.Actions
common
when
just a change in decisions to fight. Suppose that some third party /raises fis war costs or lowers fis prob
We can ability of victory (1-p). We examine each possibility in turn. treat this added cost (h,where h > 0) as a dead weight loss for fighting. Where the distribution of types B was originally bounded [?^,0], it is + now bounded fis reservation price becomes [(1-p) [cB h,ti\. Similarly, A If offers k-d-h]. again equation 3 to the distribution of types B, = < =? 1 Ih > 0) < 1 Ih then ?lh [l/2](c5Prob(/= cA-2h) ?B Prob(/= =
of third-party intervention, 0). In this conception in J's B accepts A's demand is strictly increasing costs of the h. through impact the probability that on fis war influence
A is strategic, it no longer prefers its original demand.We can Yet if recalculate a solution to the modified game based on adding h. Vrob(fh = = = 1) [(C?-h)/(cB + h-h)]y where chB (1-p) k-d-h. Substituting into themodified equation (1) and solving for [(dUA)/(dd)] yields [(2-(-d-h + to 0 and solving for d, we -k (1-p)) cj-cB)/(cB)]. Setting this equal = + for U?f=1} = t/5(/=0) re d*h [l/2][2? get (1-p) cA-cB-2h\ Solving
veals that cB = cB = [l/2](
boundary conditions limit the offer), the effect of h tends to be felt in terms of the bargains without reducing the likelihood of a contest. The
as types of B reject d*h reject d*. Fs the chances for peace.64 same intervention does not increase
cB-cA).
Unless
the change
is very
large
(where
one side or Suppose instead that /alters the probability of victory for a the other. Equation 3 is function of relative capabilities (the size of^>), but the probability of fighting depends only on the relationship be
tween
bility of victory have little impact on whether bargaining fails. Since A's
64 Actors may be limited in their ability to optimize by the bounded nature of parameter values or are restrained from altering demands). by constraints imposed by third parties (assuming opponents
cB and cB. By construction,
interventions
that change
the proba
34 probability of victory,^),
WORLD POLITICS
is a parameter, we can substitute some other
value pf such that p' >p or p' <p without

substantive victory means
changing the results in any
(1-p)
provides
>
to influence that /attempts the probability of way. Imagine for both parties. Trivially, of relative power the zero-sumness > means is futile. that such an attempt that p Increasing^) topf
(1-p') and that/-/
(1-p)-
(1-/).
Finally,
m > 0) to accept A's offer. IfA makes its original offer, the probability that B rejects d will of course go down, but A again has incentives to alter its demand. It is easy to show that inducements (m) not to fight and punishments (h) for fighting are equivalent in expected utility
terms. We omit the proof
2. states. IGOs
to appease B. that an effort is made that I suppose Imagine B with an inducement in the form of a side payment (mywhere
here
to save space.
peace by revealing private information about
Proposition competitor
promote
that both B and /learn the value of c?y but not A. If/can reveal Imagine this information, then A can make an offer that B will accept, leading to that /is fully peace. The argument holds even ifwe relax the assumption informed. 5s costs, Suppose say along some that / can only provide A with interval where [cBl(ywycBhig^y = an of approximation < < < (0 cB/ow cmh cB).
?% offer to B is then d* of fighting, Prob(/=
Prob(/= [([l/2](^r^-r,J/(g]. -[(^?-^)/fe-0)] = > c [([l/2](r5 0)/(cB 0)] cJ)/(cB)] and since, by definition, cB < follows that Prob(/= 1 I Prob(/= 1). [W^])
[l/2][2? (1-p) + cA-cm J, and the probability = 1 I cBlJ/(cBhigh-cBlJ] [cBlowycBhigh]) [(cB =
Since
1) [(c'B
yit
Proposition 3. IGOspromote peace by intervening secretly or by constrain ing states that stand to benefit from IGO intervention. We can return to the setup for 1. Suppose that /imposes h proposition which this fromî. Stated offers ?ffrom equation 3,
on 2?, but conceals
is now accepted by more types of stateBy [cB+ hyh\=> c'Bh< ?B =?Prob(/ = 1 Ih > = 0) < Prob(/= 1 Ih 0), as in proposition 1.
Alternatively, w = \l if h cannot be concealed > 0 scales fromî, /can potentially
force
A to retain the default offer (d*). Suppose that /imposes (d*-d*b)y onAy where |X the magnitude
a punishment,
of the punish
ment for an offer less than d*. Solving for^f s optimal offer produces d*^ = [1/2] [2k (1-p) -2h + c4-cB (1- |ll)]. If 1wants to exactly cancel the
effect
of punishment
of B onA's
offer,
then
it should
[2h/(cB)\ Given that [(dUB)/(df)]
impose
sanction
|l
[1/2]^
(l-|l)-^-2^],
the prob

ability of a contest or is strictly decreasing in \i. /may choose any value
35
of
\i to reduce the probability of fighting, depending again on /s

tionalization
Proposition effectiveness
institu
help
from major
powers.65
among through IGO members intervention and increases secrecy. the
4. Preference of efforts to
homogeneity promote peace
Suppose equation
that 4:
n members
of an IGO have
preferences
as
specified
by
a = (i-/)[z;. +o
Let / G [1,?]
(k-d)] +/
[/ (? *) + (i-/)
of/. The
o] (4)
lowercase v., (v > 0)
reflects Vs payoff for achieving peace and G, (0 > a > [(v.)/(cA)])y is Vs

terms are as defined. For simplic degree of bias.66 All other previously = assume n-1 that the first members of/are neutral (a 0), while ity, = n favors A (o con / member Neutral members of 1). strictly prefer a can cealing h from A, but single partisan member prefer revealing h if > + h. In fact, v. < to re o such member that any cA [(v.)/(cA+ h)] prefers from B, at the risk of a veal h and allow A to obtain greater concessions
represent
each member
higher probability of a dispute.

Proposition
states through punishments.
5. IGOs promote peace by facilitating

the imposition of sanctions, embargoes,
costly signaling among

or other nonmilitarized
Imposing a punishment on B for fighting shifts the distribution of ben

efits toward^ without necessarily reducing the probability of a contest.
An alternative is for / to impose h prior to bargaining.Without

mitting early First, cost to substantive details, suppose particular ex ante sanction on B in the game. This requires some low war costs, will types of By those with h prior to bargaining that B can
com
incur h
two conditions. suffer h anyway. informative to
Second, precisely because the first condition is not true for high war
types By embracing set with low war can prove high war
A. In preparing its offer,A can identify two different groups of players

By one costs and one set with costs. A can tai
lor its offers to each group, reducing the range of types that reject both offers. Equations 5 and 6 below detail players' utility functions.
65 In an iterated game, B could use This result depends on the inability of B to make a counteroffer. 1. the vulnerability of A to extract additional concessions, much asA does to B in proposition 66 as the upper bound would both allow that the third party ismore eager for a contest than Using 1 A (not likely) and eliminate the possibility that /values the stakes more than A.
36 WORLD POLITICS UA-S'[(l-fJ(k-dJ,f^(p'k-cA)}
+(i-*)[(i-?o) (*-O
+(1-J)[(1-/J ' <=0 +/'
+/,o (/> *-0] (S)

" ((!"/>) *-^-*)] (6)
= as the type of player B such that Define cBCRrr C//1 ?7/?. Let ?=? and be the type of player B indifferent between fighting and not fight c^=1
in each ing 0 subgame
= ously forA s optimal offer in each subgame yields d*^ [1/3] [3^ (1-p) = + + + and The probability [l/3][3? (1-p) ?/*0 2cA-cB h] c4-2cB-h]. = + + 2?)]. Prob(? s 1 subgame is [(2?^- c5 of a contest in the h)/(c-2cB = = 1) [(2c- cA-2h)/(3cB)]y so that the probability of a contest given = = = = Prob(j 1) Prob(? 1) [(c signaling, Prob(/= 1 Is 1), equals = < 2cA-h)/(3cB)] Prob(/= 1) [(cB cA)/(2cB)l
Proposition and 6. IGOs with a mandate as security organizations are more effec
= since types B that will fight subgame. c'Bs=0 cBCRITy s = 1 at least weakly subgame. Solving prefer the
in the s = previ
as
tive at promoting peace through costly signaling than those with non-security
objectives interests.
Up to this point we have assumed that it is costless for / to impose sanctions. Imagine that the price for /of imposing h on B is p h where y < < 0 p 1. Equation 7 below is /s utility function:
Vi' v K1-/..1 *i+X=i o)]+d-?)[(i-/J(i+

/suffers an opportunity cost for sanctioning
P *) +X=o o]
(v is / s dichotomous
(7)
sanc
tion decision). Substituting the probability of fighting, Prob(/= 1), from proposition 1, and the probability of fighting with signaling, s= Prob(/= 1 I 1), from proposition 5 for /'s estimates of the probabil the partial with respect to the sanction decision, we get [(dty/Cdv)] = = 0 and [(* (ci+ cB+ 2h)-3ph (cA+ cB))/(6 cB)l Setting [(dU^dv)] = + + + [(i (cA cB 2h))/(3h (cA c^))] such solving, we are able to define p' that ?7/^?= I//-1. Values of p > p' => t//"0 > U^1 and vice versa. The
a contest ity of in the v = 0 and v = 1 subgames, respectively, and taking
is thus a function of the relative size oft and likelihood that /sanctions * > sanction, pursuing (/ p h) more willingly p h. Security organizations cost at But for the of organ non-security peace example. prosperity, as izations may have mixed (i < p h)y considering prosperity objectives or more as conflict. than much political part of their mandate
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS& PEACE APPENDIX 2: IGOINSTITUTIONAL CODING CRITERIA

We IGO score the institutionalization variable is created the second of IGOs in three for each categories. as well category,
37
membership dicator that combines
A joint as an in
and third categories.
Minimal
This is composed of two IGO types. First, some organizations category on exist almost exclusively of any appara is little evidence paper. There
tus or organization. The English Commonwealth

Group themselves otherwise. Union of Ten fall meet into and on a this a name For category. then the heads These
(prior to 1965) or the

often give states or
organizations of state of member
other ministers seems
example, to hold states. These meetings organiza only of heads of or tions lack any bureaucratic, that executive, any organs possess judicial formalized power. Second, committees some IGOs contain or councils states meet as structure, often organizational or ministers of where other representatives issues. There may be a few rules on and discuss that are nonbinding to enforce or do not states compel and the implementa agreements states. The most for member centralized is often a secretariat or similar executive few autonomous or functions minimal
or regular basis, whether annually, biannually, the Central African Customs and Economic
member
such procedures, to take action. The tion of decisions feature organ yond There in these the
voting,
ability is optional
organizations
that generally
be powers possesses communication. of and logistics meetings organizational are many of this type of organization, among them, the examples
Arctic Council and the Central American Common Market. Structured

Almost ative every organization and administrative several deliber appears on paper to possess often the linkages between organs, but most
bodies are unguided by codified procedures and littlework is done be

At the intermediate institutionalization level, how yond committees. states amounts to of their sovereignty ever, member relinquish minimal are made decisions and missions. support IGO projects Organizational in formal and/or other member codified voting, by guide procedures teractions. positions) ists to carry Organizational are also well operations specified. out decisions?some to and elections (appointments a often ex Additionally, bureaucracy on member are of which binding
38 states?and where sume without there
WORLD manage programs exists no extensive administrative relying
POLITICS concrete other benefits. In cases as
that produce bureaucracy, over powers
bodies
or organs
concrete directly
on state decisions. have to
of the Central European Initiative makes some binding decisions. Of

states course, all member most IGOs never attempt manner. Intermediate-level the ability to ignore IGO dictates, but state behavior influence in this directly IGOs are scored as a two. structural
programs organizational For example, the secretariat
Interventionist
These behavior. or IGOs possess state clear mechanisms for coercing influencing in several ways. First, these IGOs include This can be realized with missions overt or conflict-resolution statements in security that allow them to inject themselves into inter
organizations their official state conflicts
structures and mechanisms of medi through established These and adjudication. also ation, arbitration, organizations typically of the institutional extensive characteristics possess many regarding codification of rules and procedures between and within the executive, legislative, one (more such and judicial example. structures. Any organization that possesses a ju
diciary structure is included in this category. The European Union

Another known commonly
is
is the League of Arab States example as the Arab some of these Second, League).
IGOshave the ability to influence state behavior by directly manipulat

costs associated with IGOs may interstate conflict. ing the opportunity states in the form of grants, sanction economic benefits by withholding Bank and IMF are loans, credits, or access to other resources. The World high-profile examples. All IGOs in this category are scored a three.

Boehmer - Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Descrição original:

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Boehmer - Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Trustees of Princeton University

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS PROMOTE PEACE?

I. Introduction TRADITIONAL paradigms inworld politics offer starkly contrast

WorldPolitics 57 (October2004), 1-38

POLITICS arguments. Bargaining theory and informational conditions. explains States

visions of classical the contrasting as the result of both material

implications?only two suggests improvements created equal. If IGOs vary

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS& PEACE

explain previous of the implications

in for engagement anomalous findings. of the study.

igos and Peace

IGOs matter. ficacy

controversy form effect

existing and anecdotal

ORGANIZATIONS& PEACE INTERGOVERNMENTAL

the apparent impact of the minority to influence state foreign policies.

6 Second, internationally states with Even

and are more

Realists will not be surprised by findings suggesting that IGOsfail to

A third challenge to traditional explanations involves the lack of an

ORGANIZATIONS& PEACE INTERGOVERNMENTAL

IGOs influence dispute behavior must be embedded in some theory of

III. A Theory of IGOInfluence on Peace and International Conflict

to illustrate the likely effectiveness of different methods of third-party

We they will seek to do so.19

will have the argue that IGOs

8 cannot while be evaluated

POLITICS the theory analysis of

challenging the theory in subsequent

two elements. goods.21

neously that is non-zero creases better

of settlement, victors of benefits

War by offering Spain $20 million

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS& PEACE

in arguing that indivisibility is a relatively infrequent cause of interstate

Commitment in war honor costs, existing

in the balance of power, changes disincentives for a rising state to

10 Fearons mational precipitate contests also

though the bargaining approach suggests a different causal logic than

which third parties can reduce the likelihood or duration of international

determined eignty ments.

allowing to alter Efforts

in the formulation can

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS &CPEACE

by IGOs that alter the bargaining power between two

Can Best Promote

12 contests revelation result from

parties (signaling). Talk is cheap in international relations.32 If threats

2. IGOs promote peace by revealing private information about

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS& PEACE INTERVENTION WITH SECRECY OR CONSTRAINT

Proposition states that ing

IGOs promote to benefit

divulge or possess successful will more

Thus, are more

to be likely interests divergent

IGO members intervention and

can also change from opponents

side in a contest while

party punishment inform opponents by distinguishing themselves from

5. IGOs promote peace by facilitating

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS& PEACE

implies that IGOsneed not have sufficient capabilities to impose theirwill

for purely political behavior. Thus, promoting peace through signaling

Log Likelihood p< .10,p< .05,p< .01

0. ,0023* 0. 0115* 14. 0. 0.

p<.10,p<.05,p<.01 Contention variables