Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke Author(s): Steven Forde Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol.

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Natural Law, Theology, andMorality inLocke

StevenForde
ofNorth University Texas

Liberaltheorists have always been confronted with the criticism that liberalism lacks a moralfoundation adequate to the needs of society.I undertakea readingof Locke that agrees with those scholars who have foundgreatermoralresources in his philosophythan has sometimes been allowed. Drawingprimarily on the Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding,the Two Treatisesof Government, Some ThoughtsConcerning Education,and The Reasonableness I finda Lockean basis of Christianity, formorality thattranscends narrow or mundane self-interest. This morality howeverdepends on a controversial and unfinished naturaltheology. This, I argue, led Locke to elaborate a practicalteaching thatwas as indeThe pendent as possible of theology. resultis a bifurcated legacy: Locke bequeathes us a philosophywith moraldepth, but a politicalteaching vulnerableto the criticism of moral deficiency.

iberalism has always had to contend withthecriticism thatitlacksa sufficient moral foundation.Its notion of a social contractmotivatedby self-preservation and comfort seemsto denythe need for any moral concernforothers, whichits individualist psychology poorly in anycase.Yetcritics supports questionwhether society can dispensewith suchmoralconcernaltogether. Evenbefore Rousseaulaunchedhis famous Lockeand theotherpioneersofliberalism off attacks assault, werefending from often religiously motivated critics of theirnew politicsand morality. Locke himself deniesthathis philosophy reliesonlyon narrow, mundane self-interest, and indeedclaimsother-wordly supportforit.In accordance with this, some interpreters today find a Locke who is morallymore Locke whose substantialthan his criticshave alleged, a "perfectionist" In view of theory providesmoral resourcesoverlookedby those critics.1 and themoralfailings modernsociety's relianceon theliberalphilosophy, sometimes tracedto thisreliance, we would do wellto exploreLocke'sunhisclaimto haveincludedother-rederstanding ofthesematters, especially virtuesin his liberalism. It matters to us whatthe moralfoundagarding tionsof our liberalism are,whether theyare thecause or thepossiblecure of society's ills. In a peculiarsense,they might be both.The following reading ofLocke willsuggest fora socialmorality morerothatphilosophically, he provided thanHobbes'sforexample, bustthanhiscritics haveperceived, morerobust to some degreeunsupbut thathis practical leavesthatmorality teaching whilenot abandoningthe distinctively ported.Locke'smoralphilosophy, in self-interest, thatevenliberalmorality liberalgrounding acknowledges in thislife.This will occasionally self-interest encroachon theindividual's of otherworldly required Locketo haverecourse to a theology rewards and He neverprovideda fullaccountof thistheology punishments. however, in anycase. and doubtedtheeffectiveness of anynoveltheological teaching I suggest, worksto providea This problem, led Lockein his morepractical as much as possible in mundane self-interest, teachingthatrooteditself
StevenFordeis AssociateProfessor of PoliticalScience,University of NorthTexas, TX 76203-5340 Denton, (forde@unt.edu). I wouldliketo thank Professors ThomasPangle and ThomasWest for comments on an version. Workon thisessay was supported Endowment forthe earlier bytheNational Humanities. 'A good recent review of thesecontroversies maybe foundin Myers 1998,chapter 1. Liberalism maybe considered "perfectionist" ifitrests upon distinctive virtues, viewed as humanperfections. Myers finds a "perfectionist" Lockeand placessuchauthors as in theattendant William Galston, Joseph Raz,and Stephen Salkever campofliberalism. In the"neutralist" camp he placesJohn Rawls, Robert Nozick,BruceAckerman, and Tarcov's ofthe"non-Lockean Locke"(Tarcov, others. See also Nathan account 1983). American Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol.45,No. 2,April 2001,Pp. 396-409 ?2001 bytheMidwest Political Science Association

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neverfilled thesegaps in hiswriting (Ashcraft 1969,219; Grant,1987,26n; Dunn 1984,65; Horwitz1990,22-28; Locke 1976,4:767-768,786-787). are ambivalenton the Moreover,Locke's writings question whetherdemonstrative moralityis easy and He mainwidelyaccessibleor plaguedwithdifficulties. law is easilydiscerned, as tainsin placesthatthenatural doubtlessit mustbe if all are to be held to it. Near the oftheSecondTreatise he states thatevenin the beginning reason"teaches all Mankind, who willbut stateofnature, of the naturallaw consultit"the fundamental precepts he suggests theseprecepts (??5, 6; cf.?12). Tantalizingly, derivefromthe simple principleof equality,without howeversayingexactlyhow. Later,we learn that the failsto observenatural law in "greater part"of mankind to lackof adequate"study" thestateof nature, due partly in thisregard lim(?? 123,124). Nor is humanimbecility Locke emited to the pre-civil state.In othercontexts, of human beingsto phasizes the near-universal failure moralcode,evenin thebosom ofsodiscover thecorrect ciety. Many are the nationswho have livedin complete ofthetruenatural law (Questions, ignorance 111;cf.147, who de217; Essay1.3.9).Eventheancientphilosophers to Locke to votedtheirlivesto thetaskfailedaccording discover thisrulein itsentirety (RC, 143, 149). He once thenatural law as "hiddenand goes so faras to describe Difficulties oftheNatural Law unperceived" (Questions,111; cf. 147,217; Essay1.3.17; 11.28.11). Much of thedifficulty can be tracedto therelationWe first need to confront some basic questionsconcernLocke aling the foundationof Locke's moral philosophy, quesship betweenthe law of natureand theology. and entionsraisedby apparentgaps in Locke'spresentation of thatanylaw requireda legislating waysinsisted is will to be a law,to be binding(Questions,101, that philosophy.Morality,Locke says repeatedly, forcing law."This law is thelaw of reason, 103, 159, 193; Essay1.3.12,11.28.5-6;cf.SecondTreatise groundedin "natural or is reason itself(FirstTreatise, ?101; Second Treatise, ??7-8, 136). In the case of naturallaw,thiscan onlybe in theform of"right God: Locke'snatural law is a speciesofdivinelaw (cf.Eseither ??6, 11, 181). It is notinnate, somehowstamped say 11.28.7-8).When Locke saysthatnations and phireason"or a set of moral principles on our nature.2 Instead,it is a deductionfromcertain losophers failedto discoverthe "true foundations"of thata "demonstrative mohe meanstheir failure to findthecorrect morality, first Locke insists theoprinciples. is possible on the model of mathematics (Essay, 1.3.6;cf.RC, 139-140,144). rality" (Essay logicalunderpinnings It might be thatsomepartsofthetruemoraldemonstrahe neverpro111.11.16, IV.3.18,IV.4.7). Unfortunately, He never evenproduceda sys- tionareeasy, buttheelaboration of theseunderpinnings ducedthisdemonstration. In any event,fornaturallaw to be natural is difficult. tematiclistof the provisionsof naturallaw,as Hobbes thanrevealed, unassisted forexamplehad done, thoughmanyindividualprinci- rather reasonwould haveto be law (Strauss able to establish theseunderpinnings, theexistence ofthe ples are said byhimto belongto thenatural God itpostulates. providential 1953, 202; Yolton 1958,487-488; 1970, 172, 176-177). Despitenumerous apparand critics ent claimsthatsuch a proofis possible and even easy,3 Despite the proddingof friends alike,Locke to correct delvingintotheology onlyso faras necessary In a sense ofhiscontemporaries. themostharmful errors therefore, Lockebequeathed to us twolinked butdistinct in moralteachings. The full teaching is foundmostclearly whilethe the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, more practicalone is most associated withthe Second Treatise ofGovernment. Sincethepractical works, and the in particular, SecondTreatise accountformostof Locke's influence today, itis a truncated Locketo someextent who stands behindourliberalism. In orderto geta morecomplete view of Locke,and to see how he might therelatively thinmosupplement rality he is usuallyassociated with, it is necessary to conof his writings sulta widerarray thanis often done. We mustbegin witha reviewof the theoretical underpinningsofLocke'smorality, including hisreliance on theolas foundprimarily in theEssay. ogy, We willthenlook at some ofhisprincipal theSecondTreatise, practical works, Some Thoughts and The ReasonConcerning Education, ableness Wewillcompare ofChristianity. themoralteachingsoftheseworks to Locke'sfullor philosophical moral and evaluate in thelight teaching thediscrepancies ofhis or rhetorical practical purposein theseworks.
theLaw ofNature, QuestionsI, IV; Essay 2Questions Concerning 1.3.11.4.22; cf.IV.20.6.HenceConcerning HumanUnderstanding willbe citedas Questions and Essay, respectively. forth these works will be cited as RC, Some The Reasonableness of Christianity as Thoughts, and Conduct ofthe Thoughts Concerning Education Understanding as Conduct. 3See, e.g., Essay 1.4.17, IV.3.21, IV.10, 11.17.17; Questions, questions in mostifnotall ofthesepassages II, V. It is ambiguous whether theeasyandnatural proof Lockespeaks ofestablishes theexistence and enforcing of theprovidential God required bymorality (cf. Dunn 1984, wouldbe moredifficult 84). Thisofcourse than provingthemere existence ofa deity.

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398 Locke neverproduced one, and may in factnot have thought it fully Yetthiswould seem to lead to possible.4 is no law of natureaccording the conclusionthat"there to Locke"(Rabieh 1991,951; cf.Strauss1953,204,220). This stateof affairs is doublypuzzlingsince Locke could have avoided it in severalways.Most simply, he could havesubscribed to anyof several possible"proofs" of a legislating, God. Locke alludes to such enforcing proofsin his publishedand unpublishedwritings, but endorses none ofthem.5 We mustassumehe foundthem defective. He might thenhavestipulated thatnatural law does not require a legislating will,or a divineenforcer, to be law. This was the view taken by Hugo Grotius,a on naturallaw in Locke's whollyrespectable authority day.The factthatLocke followsPufendorf rather than in thismatter, Grotius despite thedifficulties itcausedhis is a compelling theory, signthatthiswas his sincere persuasion.6Finally, Locke could have abandoned natural in favor law altogether ofsome other foundation formorality. Perceptive and forceful arguments havebeen made that Locke did preciselythis,professing allegiance to natural law whilecovertly replacing itwithnatural right, in the mannerof Hobbes (Strauss1953,212-214, 227229; 1959,201-206; Zuckert1994,237-240,274; Rabieh 1991). It is undeniablethatLocke proceedsby thiskind of misdirectionin other matters,especially matters

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thepostouching on religion.7 Buthe seemsto foreclose rather sibility of grounding morality in thistypeof right as he does repeatedly, thannaturallaw whenhe insists, "virtue," indeed thatnot only"naturallaw,"but "duty," and "morality" tout court dependupon divinelegislation to take enforcement.8 As we shallsee,Lockeis compelled thispositionbythepremises ofhis moralphilosophy.

ofMorality Theology andtheFoundations

whichconThe EssayConcerning Human Understanding, tainsLocke'smostthorough treatment of moraltheory, also contains statements that some of his mostemphatic moralityper se depends upon divine legislationand withenforcement: "whatdutyis,cannotbe understood out a law; nor a law be known,or supposed,withouta (1.3.12;cf. lawmaker, orwithout reward and punishment" himself specifically Questions, 101, 103). Distinguishing philosophers, he says from Hobbes and from theclassical can onlybe "thewill that"thetruegroundof morality" and law of a God, who sees men in the dark,has in his and powerenoughto call handrewards and punishments, to accounttheproudest offender" (1.3.6;cf.RC, 139-140, moreovermust 144). These rewardsand punishments consistof "some good and evil thatis not the natural 4Strauss 1953,207; 1959,202-203,206; Dunn 1984,30, 84-85; productand consequenceof the actionitself"(11.28.6). Grant1987,25-26; Pangle1988,201; Horwitz1990,26. See also and providential The enforcer mustbe an active agent. RC,139. Rewardand punishThese are not idle statements. theology based on God's a providential natural 5Lockeoutlines to morality byLocke'sview mentaremade indispensable in 1678(passage transcribed for15July roleas father inhisjournal his of theinof human or rational nature and awareness von Leyden1956,35). See also RC 133,149 (but,cf.139); Essay and individualinterbetweenmorality lengthy evitableconflict Lockewouldhavebeenawareof Cicero's IV.3.18, IV.13.3. in De NaturaDeorum, as wellas theology discourse on natural est.The sole motivenot onlyof a human being,but of de theology ofRaimond on thenatural Montaigne's commentary he asserts,is its own happiness any rationalcreature, Essais11.12).It is worth de Raimond Sebond, Sebonde (Apologie 26; cf.RC 149). Thishappi(11.21.43, 52,62; 11.27.17-18, to adoptone of Lockecouldhaveprofessed mentioning as wellthat thatthe truebasis of his moral theseproofs, whileindicating nessis reducible to pleasure, whichmenpursuein differtheory layelsewhere. ent ways (11.21.41,54-56, 62). Good and evil are but For Locke'sadmissionthathe neverprovidedan adequate names forwhatbrings pleasureand pain,whichhas led of January 19, Molyneux see his letter to William proof himself, in accordance withtheir to be mento shapemorality, variably, 1694(Locke1976-,vol.4, 784-787;cf.767-768).He tended whenaskedwhy he did notcomplete this partofhisnatuevasive viewsof happiness(11.20.2; 1.3.6).Truemoralgood and thearguments for God's Lockeoffers Others whofind raltheology. and evilon theother handrequire bothdivinelegislation includeLenz 1956, or providence existence lessthansatisfactory
1969,203-206,214; Dunn 1969,194;Pangle1988, 118;Ashcraft in notes3 and 4. Dunn (1984, cited See also thepassages 198-201. of an thedevelopment thought 84) arguesthatLockeoriginally thanitproved. Thismaybe natural to be easier theology adequate the Law ofNaitis in hisearly Concerning Questions true, though and unperas "hidden Lockedescribes thelawofnature ture that ceived" (1990,26-27). (111). See also Horwitz 6Grotius 13; Pufendorf [1673] 1991 [1625] 1925 Prolegomena in A statement Cf.Olivecrona 1974,211.Locke's 1.2.2, 6, 7; 1.3.10. ofGod,thobut "Thetaking Toleration that away Concerning Letter of dissolvesall,"seemsto be a directrebuttal evenin thought, statement to thecontrary 51). Grotius' (Locke,[1689a]1983, thanhe is on 7Lockemakeshimself appearto be moreorthodox (Dunn 1969,23, matters liketheFall and thebasisforsalvation 193; Myers1998, 187-188). He also concealshis kinshipwith Someofthese caseswill Hobbeson matters likethestate ofnature. be discussed below. IV.10.7;Thoughts, ? 61. itself), 101;Essay 1.3.6,12, 18; 11.28.5-6; law on itshead by This is not to denythatLocketurnsnatural contrasting views, see rooting it in a form of right. Forpartially Strauss 1953, 228,and Zuckert 1994, 272-275.
8 See Questions, ofthefirst question 95 (including theformulation

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to align happiness with a proper law enforcement, (11.28.5-6, 8). Sincehedonismis inseparable from rationality, themorallaw will have to takeaccountof it,inin vainto supposea deed buildon it:"itwouldbe utterly rulesetto thefree actionsofman,without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determinehis will" (11.28.6).Morality, likeobedienceto anyotherlaw or rule,cannot reasonably be expectedof men,unless each gainindividually they byit. It is sometimesalleged that by tyingmoralityso closelyto enforcement, Locke confusesobligationand a consequence ofhishedomotivation, butthisis simply nistic moralpsychology.9 Not every actthatman is motivatedto is moral,obviously, but morality cannotjustly be demanded of him unless an appropriatemotiveis is necessary: supplied.This is whydivineprovidence the can easily theadgainsfrom violating morality outweigh of obeying vantages it,in thisworld.Onlya providential enforcement whose rewardsand punishments specifican bringthe cally outweighthe gains of immorality individual's pleasureand pain fully intoline withmoral action (1.3.13; 11.21.70;11.28.8;cf. Tarcov 1984, 101; itappearsthatthemoreraPangle1988,191). Curiously, becomesnecessary tionala man is,themoreprovidence to supporthis morality. Most human beings,Locke remindsus, followcustomand habitmorethanreasonin and actions (1.3.24-25; 11.28.12; theirthoughts IV.16.4; cf.Questions, aremoral, it 127,135; Conduct, 381). Ifthey is likely forthisreason.But thosewho thinkforthemwho understand thetrueprinciples of rational acselves, a for need instead reason Provition, behavingmorally. to such individualsby dence is the onlyreason offered Locke'sphilosophy. To be sure,themorality Lockeproposes, liberalmois less than itspredecessors, rality, demanding and,as we shall see, this factis pivotal to his practicalteaching. Lockean morality derivesfromthe fundamental prinand happiness of mankind, uncipleof thepreservation in thehedonistic has derstood Locke outlined way (1.3.6; cf.11.21.47-52; First Treatise ??56, 59, 86; SecondTreatise di??6, 7, 135,182; Thoughts ?116; RC, 147). A morality rectedto thisend will impingeon the interests of individualsmuchless thanother, moreaustere moralcodes. But Lockedoes not imaginethatitsdemandscan always withpersonalhappinessor self-interest in be reconciled thislife(cf. RC pp. 148-149; Tarcov 1984, 149; Pangle can onlytakeplace 1988, 191,211). That reconciliation in another.
9In the Essay,Locke writes"the inclination and tendency of [men's] nature is an obligation and motive to them" (11.21.52, emphasisadded). See Dunn 1969, 190;Yolton1958,491; Zuckert 1994, 286;Myers 1998,137.

Thus does Lockeanticipate theargument thatevena liberal order cannot be viable without a religiously grounded morality. Butitis necessary to markclosely the typeofreligion thisorderrequires and themethodLocke uses to discover it.To beginwith, God mustunderstand thatmoral behaviorcannot be reasonablyexpectedof humanbeings(or anyrational beings)unlesshe makesit worth theirwhile in termsof pleasure or happiness in theology (1.3.13, 11.21.62). Locke'sgeneral procedure is to reasonin thiswayfrom his own considered viewsof morality to conclusionsconcerning divinewill. Nor is ofmoralreasoning. thisan abusiveform Locke'ssyllogistic or demonstrative would takeprecisely morality this approach, beginning from ideas groundedin perception (v. Grant1987,38; Myers1998,49). Thus,sincepunishing othersforAdam's sin is incompatiblewithjustice, Locke knows that God does not do so (First Treatise ??46-47; RC,pp. 6-8; cf.Dunn 1969,22, 192). Similarly, thecurseput upon Eve is something she and herdaughtersareperfectly to evade,ifthey free can,in thename of happiness (FirstTreatise ?47). Locke sides withreason man's naturalright to use againstscripture concerning theanimalsforfood,a right derived from logically preservation FirstTreatise (SecondTreatise ?25; contrast ?86 with?39 and withGenesis in 1:29 and 9:3). As he writes the Essay,"Reason is naturalrevelation," and must be used to "regulate"our assent to alleged supernatural of relirevelations(IV.19.4, 14). Speakingspecifically giousmatters, he says"Reasonmustbe ourlastjudgeand guidein every thing" (IV.17.24;cf.FirstTreatise ?86). In "naturalreligion"is to be preferred to revelation fine, (111.9.23). Lockeuses his fundamental of natural principle law, and happiness ofmankind areto be thatthepreservation servedas much as possible,to siftrevelation, accepting and rejecting someofitsprecepts others. He interprets the Biblicalinjunction and multiply" as a simple "be fruitful ofthisprinciple. or notitwas actually statement Whether is conveyed Locke asserts that it to men uttered by God, via thenatural Treatise impulseofself-preservation (First him ?86). Thus did God speakto man-"that is,directed byhis sensesand reason"-commandinghimto provide forhimself (id.). This commandprovesto mandatenot of property, but"theimprovement onlyLocke'sdoctrine and Sciences, and theconveniences ofLife," too oftheArts as a ban on absolutemonarchy withsuchthings together Treatise (First ?33; cf.SecondTreatise ?4 1). God couldnot or cruelas to giveus irresistible be so capricious impulses and thelike,and to preservation, comfort, propagation, thenpunishus for them. suchimpulses, following Rather, our natural desire for happiness and the together with characteristics oftheworldin which we havebeenplaced,

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ofthedivine areour surest indications plan (First Treatise Locke silently dismisses the possibility that these ?86). impulsesmight be thecorrupt appurtenances of a fallen nature, or thatour naturalcondition might be partly the ofAdam'ssin.10 consequence Withouteven havingestablished the existence of a providential God, we alreadyknow a greatdeal about whathiswillor intention mustbe. WhatGod willsis human prosperity and happiness; the moral law thathe givesus is directed to thatand thatalone. God willspriand therespect vateproperty of thatproperty byothers. He willsrationaland industrious accumulation and has grantedthe earth(solely) to thosewho practiceit (Second Treatise?34). This, ratherthan any quietism or is God's plan formankind purely spiritual perfection, (cf. Dunn 1969,chapter 18;Ashcraft 1969). The perfection of in themostreflecour nature is thepursuit of happiness tiveor rational manner possible(Essay11.21.47, 51). The lawwe aregiven, is but"thedirection ofa free Lockesays, and intelligent Agentto his proper Interest, and prescribesno farther thanis forthegeneralGood of those underthatLaw" (SecondTreatise ?57). law is Butthisbrings us backto our problem: natural whichwill directed to the"generalGood" of mankind, often but not alwayscoincidewiththe"properInterest" of the individual.The rationalindividualis concerned withhis own interest above all (Essay11.27.17, 18), but is theperspective of the forLocke,themoralperspective It is not possibleto bringthesetwofully into generality. harmonywithoutprovidence,which is why Locke is unwillingto relinquishthe theological aspects of his moraltheory. The questionthathas vexedinterpreters fromLocke's day to thisis, Whydid he not providean God his theoryreadequate proofof the providential sketch a fairly robustnaturaltheolquires?His writings is thiscornerstone. We know ogy;all it lacks,pointedly, ifonlybecause of thatLockewas awareof thisproblem, but we mayneverbe able to say thepleas of his friends, forcertain it unremedied."1 whyhe left Perhapsa partial is to be foundin his argument thatsome things remedy adcan be knownonlyprobably, whichare nonetheless our conduct(I. 1.4-5;IV.14; cf.IV.3.6). equatefor guiding Locke is carefulto stipulateat a numberof points,in Pascalian fashion,thatthe prospectof divine rewards

and punishments is enough to determineour actions in themereprobability even ifconsidered (11.21.44, 70; IV.14.2). Indeed,upon examination, manyof his statements aboutour knowledge ofGod, and hencethestatus of "demonstrative morality," turnout to be couched in probabilistic terms (e.g.,IV.3.6,17-18; IV.14.2;IV.17.23). Whether thisis fully compatible withhis stronger statements aboutthesolidity ofnatural theology and demonis an open question. strative morality his In anycase,it is clearthatLocke nevermodified on morality on accountofthisdifficulty explicit teaching and thatthatteaching is dependent upon natural theology. Whatis striking as we movefrom theEssayConcerning Human Understanding to Locke's more practical works,where moral conduct is discussed in concrete recedes into the terms,is how this whole controversy background. Theseworksmakesome use of natural thebut typically ology, verylittle. Theyrelymuch more on to produce moral action. In lightof othermotivations of naturaltheology, the difficulties this should not be a surprising. Lockeseeksin hispractical works to provide foundation formoral actionas independent as possible of the uncertainties surroundhis thatwill necessarily Atthesametime, Lockeis awarethatanynatutheology. ral theology, behoweversolid,could not immediately come thebasis forthe sweepingreform of politicsand moral culturethathe seeks.To tie his practicalproject too closely to a noveltheology, evena fully perfected one, would onlybe to jeopardizeitssuccess.

Natural LawandPolitics

mentionof the Deity, Despite occasionallyprominent theSecondTreatise ofGovernment developsan argument of theology and the thatis almostwhollyindependent natural law.It relies noton dicontroversies surrounding and enforcement, buton mundaneintervinelegislation and at estsand materialincentives. It showseloquently how thesocial good is mosteffectively advanced length by self-interested action,in the acquisitionof property, and thelike.In making thedefense of individual rights, thisargument, the SecondTreatise takestheperspective ofsociety thantheindividual almostexclurather citizen This but we is natural its sively. enough, given focus, is notto saythat 10This following anyand every appetite amounts tomorality (Essay 1.3.13). On thecontrary, theessence ofmorality shouldnot failto noticethatthisperspective also allows is rational discipline oftheappetites (Essay 11.21.57, 62; Thoughts it to elide almost completelythe difference between in finding ?33). Butmorality doesconsist and pursuing truepleainand Good" the individual's society's "general "proper surein thisworldfirst. Thiswe can do rationally, divine without for grace being necessaryto correcta "fallennature"(cf. Essay the need disguising other-regarding morality terest," 11.21.47). in citizens. To showthatselfish actionon thewhole advances the social good, as in economics,is not to show 1'Seethecitations and discussion atnote5.

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thatself-interest has no harmfulconsequences.Locke counts,it would run counterto the divine plan, or to law. does sayat theoutsetof theSecondTreatise thatthepur- natural In politicsas well,the SecondTreatise replacesaltrusuit of individualself-interest mustbe bounded by the ismor beneficence as muchas possiblewithself-interest. law of nature,which commands that each strive, "as muchas he can, topreserve Limitedgovernment maybe the onlygovernment therest ofMankind" (?6). But that servesthepreservation of mankindand therehe interprets thisdutypurely negatively, as a prohibition properly of harm: "no one ought to harm anotherin his Life, withthenatural law (??42, 229; FirstTreatise, ??33, 41), Health,Liberty, or Possessions" (?6). And it is remarka- butLockepresumes a "godlike whowillbe neither prince" wise or generous enoughto maintain ble how farthe Second Treatise such a system (Seadvances the common interest without relying on eventhisminimal duty.12 condTreatise ?42), nor a citizenry who willdemandit in is the paradigmaticcase. In the original thenameofthegood ofmankind. Property Freegovernment is seon accumula- curedrather state ofnature, natural lawimposeda limit by individuals actingin theirown interest (??208, 230; 17,23, 111). Individuals willnotevenriseto tion,thatof waste:it was a violationof thelaw to allow of oppressedfellow-citizens, unlessthey beanything to spoil in one's possession(??31, 38, 46, 48). thedefense lieve thatoppressionaugursill forthemselves This restriction was rootedin thegeneralgood of man(??208, and mostnotoriously, in thestate 230). Finally kind,inasmuch as wasterobsothers of their share(??3 1, individuals of nature willnot by and largeenforce thatit was theinterest of thelaw of nature 37, 46). But Locke emphasizes individuals, not theircharitableness, thatmade thisrule on others'behalf,althoughtheyhave thatpower (??7, to gathergoods that 126).Thispoweris rooted explicitly in the"right" eachineffective: no one has an incentive willrotin their has to preserve mankind; said possession(??46, 48, 51). Withtheinven- dividual buttheonly "duty" tionof money, eventhislimitis lifted, and accumulation to arisefrom itis a duty notto harm(??1 1, 13,16). and themoral without regard to others' shares becomes legitimate Evena negative dutyis a dutythough, minimalism oftheSecondTreatise shouldnotblindus to ar(??36, 50; cf.Fagiani1983,169). Locke'swell-known the factthatitsnaturallaw does impose limitson indigumentis that this limitlessaccumulation servesthe commongood byunleashing theproductive viduals. This is most visible in the well-knowndifferpoweroflabor and increasing ences betweenLocke and Hobbes. Hobbes had derived wealthexponentially (??37, 40-41, morality entirely from mundaneself-interest. His natural 43). The concern with others' shares is obviated by law bid men to be socially accommodating,to be greater social prosperity, as acquisitivenessservesthe to one another, own good natural law'smandateto "preserve mankind" better than "compleasant" solelyfortheir in the in thislife,which is servedby peace.14Locke requires itself. charity ThoughLockehad spokenof charity moralrestraint from FirstTreatise,13 it is notoriously absent fromhis treat- greater individuals, partly because in the Second Treatise Lockean individuals mentof property moralprivileges. (Pangle 1988, theyhave greater evenin thestateofnature could chapter14; Strauss1953,248). Traditional enjoyexclusive property rights charity or comfort and hence do not have rightsto one another'slifeor interfere withthepreservation paradoxically of mankind,since too greatan emphasison charity There can be "force is limb,exceptperhaps in extremis. in the stateof nature,a possibility of theacquisitive imwithoutright" that likely to turnintoa condemnation in Hobbes."5 unlike exists Locke'srights, thoseof serves thegood of mankind. Traditional scarcely pulse thattruly also failsto distinguish Hobbes,entaildutieson thepartof others(Tarcov1984, charity adequatelybetweenthe to whomGod gavetheearth "Industrious and Rational" like and the"Quarrelsom '4Hobbes,Leviathan, chapters 14, 15. Hobbes does assert, and Contentious," to whomhe apLocke, thatthelaw of nature is lawonlydue to divine legislation did not (?34; cf.Fagiani 1983, 168). On both parently
12For muchmoredetailed accounts ofthis, see Pangle1988, chapters16,17,20,and Zuckert 1994, chapters 8,9. 13?42,where charity is apparently limited to casesofstarvation on theone sideand theexistence ofa "surplusage" on theother. We shouldalso notethecontext: Lockeis arguing thatone man can never use theneediness ofanother to force himintosubjectionthatAdam,evenifhe had had exclusive dominion oftheworld, could nothaveused it to gaindominion overothers, butwould havebeenboundto givethemofhissurplus (??41-43). See also theargument forcharity as a dutyin extremis in theshort essay labeled"Venditio," dated 1695 (reprinted in Dunn 1968,pp. 8487).

(Leviathan, chapters 15,21,26,31). Thishowever doesnotappear thislaw to alterthepurely mundanenatureof theself-interest defines its serves. In theLeviathan, Hobbesintroduces natural law, inthis basis(preservation ofa man's that world), is,existence "life," mentionandlists andanalyzes thenineteen lawsofnature, before 14-15). ingdivine legislation almost as an afterthought (chapters inopposition by He alsosays, toLocke, that these lawsareenforced 31; thepurely natural consequences their violation brings (chapter contrast Locke, Essay 11.28.6).
'5Second Treatise existin ??19, 232. "Forcewithout right" might without Hobbes's state ofnature ifone individual attacked another Hobbes takes beingmotivated byconcernforhis preservation. hisatlittle cognizance ofthispossibility, except perhaps through tackon vainglory (Leviathan,chapters 13-15).

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132; Grant1987,91; Zuckert1994,275). Though these are purely negative, dutiesto do no harm,theydo entail restrictions on thepursuitof self-interest (Tarcov 1984, 149; Pangle 1988,211). The factthatmanyflaunt these restraints withimpunity does not render themnugatory as moralrulesor prevent Lockefrom establishing a funmoraldividebetween the"Industrious and Radamental in the tional" and the"Quarrelsomand Contentious," stateof nature itself.16 Those who violateproperty rights mightwell advance theirpersonalinterest thereby; the rulethey violateis thatwhichseeksthegeneralgood of mankind. For LockeunlikeHobbes,there is sucha thing and itssourceis theexas injustice in thestateofnature, of self-interest. cessive pursuit This is why neitherthe theoreticaldifficulties of in thestateof natural law noritspractical ineffectiveness natureand in most societiesinduce Locke to replaceit withnatural right, at leastas he understands thatterm.17 To be sure, therights ofindividuals, based on their deepare the basis of his moral sysest needs and interests, But it is tem-this is whatmakeshis a liberalmorality. Locke'sview thatrights cannotforma naturalbasis for morality without a pre-civil dutyon thepartof others to respectthem.This is naturallaw. Its moral focusis the of mankind, thesame generalgood, or thepreservation Locketakesin advancing his philosophy. Yet perspective of thisleavesunsettled thequestion individualmotivain those cases wherethe tion,and hence obligation,18 generaland individual good do not coincide. Again: of myproperty Whileitis truethatthesecurity depends I may on an environment in whichrights are respected, of others' still from forbearance benefit taking advantage in suchan environment. It maybe a logicalcontradiction withoutconforan individualto claimproperty rights theliketo others of natural ceding (as Locke'sderivation in theSecondTreatise lawfrom bareequality suggests: ?6; cf.Strauss1953,229; Zuckert1994,277-278), but this in any motivation or obligation willnotaffect individual wayrecognized byLocke'sphilosophy. In the end,the SecondTreatise does ofGovernment be exnot fully explainhow individualscan rationally

law.Virtueis left to some depectedto obeythenatural is minimized gree"unendowed" (RC, 150). The problem public bylaying out thebroad commongroundbetween and privateinterest, which Locke's liberalismmakes broader bydefining thecommongood as an aggregation naturalmoraldutyto of private interests, and confining is adequate so longas we are abstention from harm.This on the wayin concentrating paintingin broad strokes, But whicha regimeof naturallaw servesthegenerality. of limitations oftheapproacharevisiblein theargument mar theSecondTreatise itself. Lockedoes not his presentationforexamplebybringing up thenettlesome subject inof military an area wherepublic and private service, terest clashmosturgently. Thiswas an issueaboutwhich (Leviathan,chapter21). Hobbes was most forthright primarily Similarly, liberty appearsin theSecondTreatise as a safeguard ofmaterial a "Fence"to preservainterests, tion(??17-18, 23). Thisis a surprisingly crabbeddefense documents of modof freedom forone of thefounding ern freegovernment. In otherworks, Locke places freedom in a decidedly it"a perfecdesignating noblerlight, tion of our nature"(Essay2.21.47; cf.2.21.67; Thoughts ??33, 38, 45, 122; Grant1987,90-93, 198; Myers1998, becausetruefreedom is ratio163,168). It is a perfection nal freedom, of our natureto its the rationaldirection truehappiness.Rationalfreedom presupposesa reflecof the between trueand appartiveawareness distinction ent happiness and a weighingof the respectivealterof this understanding natives.In the Second Treatise, fornatural freedom is barely visiblein Locke'sargument the law as self-restraint: freedom is freedom onlywithin their forfeit limits of reason.Those who defy theselimits and sinkto the level of beasts (??8, 10, 11, 163, rights is the but equallystriking 172). The languageis striking, to factthatLocke scarcely uses it in the SecondTreatise of freeactionor of freegovernment. arguethe nobility He does not explain,as he does in otherworks, whyrais thatwhichmakesmen human.In the Second tionality is only abstentionfrom rationalself-restraint Treatise, harmin return (?6). Rationality harm, to avoidreceiving and safe a faculty is simply thatmakesmen productive, to thelimited focusof to one another. This corresponds ofnature to argue that in practice Locke's state 16?34.It is possible theworkas a whole. beresolves so thoroughly intoa state ofwarthat hislawofnature is more a It has been said thatthe Second Treatise in thatstate, comesessentially a dead letter as withHobbes (v. wouldenZuckert 1994, 235-240).It seems tomethough that this civil than a philosophicalwork (Strauss 1953, 220; cf. right as tailthedemise of Locke'sexclusive, prepolitical property ithas been a stunDunn 1969,88, 120); in thatcapacity, wellas his distinction between therational and thecontentious, customaryways of philoso- ning success. It has transformed which wouldhavethedirest consequences for hispolitical acfor example, thinking, phy as a whole. His argument for limited government, evenwhereit does not providea complete atleastas a moralargument, wouldbe in extreme jeopardy. count of the basis of its own philosophicalunderpinstatements on law as theonly nings(Dunn 1969,88; Myers1998,38). It has been suc17Questions, 101.Again, see Locke's 12. possible basisofmorality, Essay 1.3.6, cessfulpartly basing itselfon because, while explicitly naturallaw,it minimizesthe dutiesdemanded by that above. '8Seenote9,andtext,

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pearsin Locke'sdiscussionof cruelty and how it can be in children. prevented As theantithesis ofconcern forthe preservation ofmankind, cruelty couldbe considered the or viceforLocke,as formanymodern archetypical crime thinkers. Buthowdoes Lockeunderstand thisviceand its countervailing virtue? To beginwith, Lockerefuses to believethatthere is anynatural impulse to cruelty, hypothesizinginsteadthatit mustcome from custom, and from on theperpetrators history, whichtypically confers glory of cruelty.19 To prevent from in their cruelty developing children, thereare two things Locke tellsparentsto do. Theyshouldnotallowtheir children to torment animals, a practice thatpavesthewayto crueltreatment ofhuman mustteachthemciviland combeings(?116). And they passionatebehaviortowardtheir social inferiors (?117). The secondof these, and perhapsthefirst as well,essenconstitute lessonsin theprinciple ofequality. tially Equalfrom ityis theprinciple whichnatural law or thedutyto mankind in theSecondTreatise was derived preserve (?6); Locke'sprocedure heresuggests ifsinthatthatprinciple, embraced fosters humanitarcerely bythechild,of itself inEducation Virtue ian fellow-feeling. shouldnotbe suffered "Children tolose of human naturein the shufflings the consideration of Locke mightbe dismayedwerehe to learn thatthe Seoutward conditions" (?117). Social rankis an obstacleto of humanesentiment; condTreatise has become so definitive of thedevelopment it is all too likely ofGovernment his thoughtforso manyreadersin our age. Its moral to giveriseto a haughty and pridethatnurtures cruelty is limited to therulesof social convenience and teaching oppression(id.). Locke wishesto forestall pride-based in children in itssteada humanitarian viewof whyeventhatmorality cruelty and foster does not givea complete forindividuals. A more complete forothers is choiceworthy view concern rootedin equality. of thesematters is foundin Some Thoughts Locke's education to justicereflects a similar orientaConcerning Locke's curriculum fora moral upbringing tiontoward others. It is especially useful to comparethis Education, and anotherkeyexampleof his practicalteaching. This withthe teachingof the Second partof his curriculum Locke beginshis inworkcontains Locke'smostcomplete accountof thevirTreatise. As withthe othervirtues, forthe a moreroundedviewthanthe Second struction in justicebyplaying on thechild'sdesire tuesand provides Treatisealone of the cultural transformation that esteemand approvalof his parents-by appealingto a kindofpride. "The first to anyinjustice Lockeanliberalism has in view.It makesno reference to positive tendency witha ofmankind thatappears," natural to writes law,butdoes takethepreservation Locke,"mustbe suppressed in of and and is show of wonder abhorrence the be the defining This parents goverprinciple morality. principle and the as thebasis of morality, nors"(?110; cf.?84). Gradually, parents mayteachchilpresented unequivocally if the of drencertain "rulesand casesofjustice," thebeginnings originof naturalduties,as well as rights: "truly, of all mankind, as muchas in himlies,were a rationalview of thesubject.Children who remaininpreservation as indeeditis everyone's and Locke says,should have some possession of everyone's persuasion, tractable, duty, our religion, takenaway, to makethemunderstand thestingof thetrueprincipleto regulate theirs politics,and and to"makethemsensible whatlittle theworldwouldbe muchquieter and better injustice, advantage morality by, of natured thanitis" (?116). areliketo makebypossessing themselves they unjustly are in the world We notethatthisformulation of theprinciple what is whilst there another's, stronger highin it,thedifference theconcernforothers between and morementhanthey" lights (?110). Hereis a rational arguofmankind and thenarrow Hobbesianone. It is thepreservation self-interest mentforjustice-and a remarkably of theindividual. This is thethemethatthe SecondTreaclearwhat it is notimmediately tise finessed. largely Still, 19?1 16 (butcf.? 102).Hobbesalso denied that cruelty is natural to or exactly how or why we dutiesthisprinciple prescribes, it as a men (Leviathan, chapter 6, 126),and Montaigne regarded 11). areto be concerned forothers. The statement quotedapcardinal vice("De la cruaute'," Essais, 11.

law and focuses much more memorablyon natural rights.Freedom-loving human beings respond much moreenthusiastically to thisapproach (cf.Tarcov1984, 114). As to theology, thenatural law is said in theSecond Treatise to be authorized by God, but no strong or thematicstatements are made on thesubject, and theargumentproceeds almostwholly without relying on divinity. In almostevery instance whereGod is mentioned, a parallelargument relying on reasonor"nature" is ofsimply fered as well.The prohibition of suicidemaybe theonly exception (thoughcf.Glenn 1984,86-87; Zuckert1994, 245-246). In thework, thereappearsto be onlyone explicitmentionof God as legislator (?135) and none as in thesectionon theenforcement enforcer-even of the naturallaw (??7-13)! This parsimony allows Locke to develop his argument withminimumcontroversy and maximumappeal,but it leavestheargument withsome important gaps.

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based on thechild'svulnerability and appeals onlyto his self-interest. But Lockeis careful to inform us thatthisis not how he wisheschildren-or adults-to think about justice. Rather, they shouldbe imbuedwith "an ingenuous of thisshameful whichis explicitly detestation previce," sentedas a different, and a better, fenceagainstinjustice than"any considerations drawnfrominterest" (?110). The "Hobbesian"logicis marshalled onlyas a lastresort. Itsargument is a trueone,and mosteffective forchildren whoseselfishness has proven intractable, but forLockeit represents neither the completeargument nor the true motive for justice. Locke'spreferred educationto justicegroundsit insteadin liberality. The first children shouldlearnrething garding material Locke contends, is how to possessions, and freely" partwiththem, foster "easily (?110). Parents childrenforanylosses,ensuring thisby compensating that their childrenalways profitby being liberal. Of course,a profitable liberality hardly deserves thename, but Locke's purpose is to develop habitsthatwill later makechildren truly liberal, deriving independent pleasure from generosity to others. Evenin theearly stagesof this Lockesaysthatthechild'sgainfrom education, liberality willbe twofold: greater plenty (guaranteed bytheparents) and "a return of kindness" fromthosetheybenefit and their anywho observe liberality (?110). Bythetimechildrenlearnthatliberality is often a material sacrifice, they will findit rewarding on its own terms,owing to the oftheir beneficiaries and theesteem ofsociety at goodwill The result is to be an "ingenuous ofinlarge. detestation" inclination to liberality. justiceand a positive Locke's proceduremaybe surprising to readersof the Second Treatise. The apostle of natural,exclusive property rights teacheschildren beforepropliberality and as an educational at least, matter erty, laysthe"foundations"ofjusticein thisother-regarding virtue(? 110). The virulencewithwhichLocke condemnsilliberality and the mighteven takeus by surprise: "Covetousness, in our possession desireofhaving and underour dominion morethanwe haveneed of,beingtherootof all evil, should be earlyand carefully weeded out" (? 110). This is hardly whatwe would haveexrhetoric quasi-Biblical Wherethat theLockeof theSecondTreatise. pectedfrom workportrayed "thedesireof havingin our possession and underour dominionmorethanwe haveneed of" as of thegreatest social good,it is hereproducproductive tiveof thegreatest social evil,due to itsassociation with "covetousness." The two assessments of property are not contradicnordo they stemfrom viewsofthesubject. tory, differing Whattheyreflect is the divergent purposes of the two works. The SecondTreatise outlinesa politicalmorality

based on individual withminimal natural-law durights, tiesto others. Itshowshowself-interested actionbased on thoserights is themosteffective guarantor of thesocial good,without fully accounting forindividual motivation and action.SomeThoughts on the Concerning Education, otherhand, is primarily concernedwiththese.Locke's goal hereis theformation of an individual who is to find personalhappinessas a usefulmemberof society. This leads Lockebeyondthemoralminimalism of theSecond Treatise, evenas individual pleasureremains themotivaof the tion.In orderto counteract thenaturaltendency loveofproperty tobecomepredatory or"covetous," Locke weavesliberality into theveryfoundation of the child's concernwithproperty. This proceduresuggests thatat leastpsychologically, justiceand beneficence are closely infortherights ofothers bound,thatrespect necessarily volvesa certain elementof liberality, rather thansimple selfish calculation.Hobbesian calculationmaybe a restraint on the injustice of especially refractory children, it. butitis notjusticeas Lockewishesto cultivate The same mustbe said of the moral ideal of Some as a whole.The workis Thoughts Concerning Education suffused withthe beliefthatbeneficence is vitalto the individual's The good will it earns happinessin society. from and just as importantly, thesatisfaction one others, can learnto takein beneficence are lasting rewards itself, to relish. thattheproperly raisedchildlearnsespecially Theserewards arenottobe dismissed lightly. Theyconstitutethereallinkbetween virtue and individual happiness in thework,thebridgethatliberaltheory typically has mostdifficulty Likeall liberals, Lockemust constructing. finda wayto make fundamentally separateand indivihumanbeingssociableenoughto sustainsocial dualistic In SomeThoughts he finds order. a Concerning Education, solutionin civility and "good breeding," traitsthatbecometheultimate Thesespecifically goalofhiseducation. and pleasure ofthelife socialvirtues enhancethewarmth ofvirtue in society and good breed(??94, 134). Civility morethantheother turn Lockeanindividuals ing, virtues, intosocialcreatures, ofa distinctive sort. though or fellow Civilityis an extensionof the humanity a sense thatLockewantschildren to developfrom feeling of the equalityof men. Both qualitiesare cultivated by preventing haughtybehavior toward social inferiors invoked thesenseofhumanity to pre(? 117). Lockefirst in children;now,under his husbandry, ventcruelty it blossoms into a "respectand good will to all people" thatgood willis not to be mere (?67). Lockeemphasizes outward show, but a sincere warmthtoward others whereit is thiswarmth (??67, 143). Affectation, feigning condemned is particularly lacking, byLocke (?66; Tarcov 1984,109). It is essential thatchildren developa real,not

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a counterfeit, concern forothers, foronlya sincere civilitywillfulfill thefunctions Lockedesigns forit. We cannot butbe pleasedwitha humane, friendly, civiltemper wherever we meetwithit.A mindfree and master of itself and all itsactions, notlow and narrow, not haughty and insolent, not blemished withany greatdefect, is what everyone is taken with.. .This seemsto me to be thatbeautywhich shines through somemen's .when bya conactions... stant practice, they havefashioned their and carriage, madeallthose little expressions ofcivility andrespect in conversawhich nature or custom hasestablished tion, so easyto themselves that they seemnotartificialor studied, butnaturally to follow from a sweetnessofmindanda well-turned disposition. (?66) Thissolicitude forothers is not entirely natural-it must be practiced-butit can and shouldbecomeentirely sincere (Tarcov 1984, 138). This sincerity is "sweetness of mind"(?66), "goodnature and kindness" (?67), or simply "goodnature" (?110), and itis theculmination ofLockean social virtue. of Completecivility-the"internal civility themind," withtheexternal forms to convey ittogether the"first is whatLockecallsgoodbreeding, and mosttakindiingof thesocial virtues" (?143; cf.?67). Well-bred in the from vidualsgainpleasure pleasing others, basking esteemof societyand of themselves. For thispurpose, Locke confides, than good breedingis more important virtue orvirtues. "The happiness all menso that anyother in pleasure, itis easyto see why steadily pursueconsisting thecivilaremoreacceptable thantheuseful....Powerand are valued onlyas conducingto riches, nayvirtueitself, accordourhappiness" ofvirtue (?143). Sincetheessence and self-denial ingto Locke is restraint (??33, 38, 45; cf. and good breeding Essay1.3.13),civility providetherewardforthissacrifice in our relations withothers. Good of comesto takepleasurein theverydiscipline breeding inliberality socialvirtue, and socialbeneficence. ItaccomplisheswhatLocke'ssocial philosophy must,combining forthewellbeing individual hedonism withtheconcern of his morality. of mankind thatis thedefining principle Thesetwoqualities makethelife ofvirtue notonlya most life. buta mostpleasant respectable, This pleasure,obviously,is whollyof this world, whichaccordswellwithLocke'sdesireto avoid reliance on theologywherepossible. But religionis not absent from he saysindeedthatobedienceto Locke'seducation; God is the truestandardof morality (?61), and thata of virtuein the "truenotionof God" is the foundation child(??136, 139; cf.Essay I.3.18).Still, thechild'screed is limitedto a fewsimple ideas. He is to know God as

"SupremeBeing,Authorand Makerof all things, from Whom we receive all our good,Who lovesus, and gives us all things"(?136). In due course,God is revealedas one who sees and hears all, governsall, and "does all mannerof good to thosethatlove and obeyHim" (id.). While hardly a fulltheology, thiscreedis evidently adequate to thesupportof virtue, and not onlychildren's virtue(id.). We note thatit presents God as a lawgiver as one who shouldbe onlyimplicitly (God as governor, is evenmorelatent(omniobeyed);his role as enforcer ofgood to thosewho obey).Lockesaysnothscient giver ingof theafterlife or of punishments forthosewho disarenotinvoked evenin thecase obey.Divineretributions of themostrefractory children (the Hobbesianbogeyis The God discovered enlisted instead). byLocke'spupilsis both more benign,and more remote, than the God of As fortheBible,Locke indimanyof theircompatriots. catesthatithas muchthatis wrongheaded alongwiththe good (??158-159). He recommends some readingfrom the Bible foryoung children, but only selectively, and on moraltales(??158-159). In olderpupils,the centered ofBibleis takenup again-in fact, it is theonlyreading in morals-but Lockenotesthatat thispointin the fered pupil's education, readingis less importantthan the trainingin morals that he has already experienced (?185).20 In accordancewithwhat we have noticed in othercontexts, Locke's use of the Bible displaysmore concernthatchildren not receivefalsenotionsfromit, thanthatthebook shouldbe neglected. The purely social of civility and good breeding much compensations carry in Locke'seducationto virtue. moreweight

The Reasonableness ofChristianity andTheological Reform

In SomeThoughts as in theSecond Concerning Education, Lockewishesto construct a moTreatise ofGovernment, on theology. He does thisin withminimalreliance rality stateof his own theology, partbecause of theunfinished in partto avoid unnecessary withChrisconfrontations he cannotavoid But evenin his practical tianity. works, The TwoTreatises and theology altogether. ofGovernment uncover Some Thoughts Education Concerning inevitably in his dayat leastas interpreted flawsin Christianity, in itsinsisunjustin itsbeliefin the Fall,wrongheaded tenceon charity, of happinessin falsein itsdenigration
in "morals," Cicerois as20Though theBibleis theonlyreading in "ethics," and perhaps Grotius signedas reading and Pufendorf in politics, natural right, and law(??185-186).

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thislife. Locke'sprocedure in theseinstances is to substituteproperprinciples surreptitiously, quotingtheBible wherepossible, remainingsilentwherenot, above all neveradmitting a disagreement withChristianity. But Christian stilllooms as an unconqueredfororthodoxy tress-a practicalobstaclenow,morethana theoretical on thefortress, in thenameofnatural one.An assault thewould clearly be counterproductive. ology, Whatstrategy wouldthenbe effective? Sound principles of natural theologymayeventually replaceChristian error, but Locke's moraland political teachings willhaveto maketheir way, in a worlddominated initially at least, byorthodoxy. TheReasonableness ofChristianity represents Locke's In some respects, response to thisimmediate it problem. reachofhisstrategy represents thefurthest withthepracticalworks.It showshow farLocke believedorthodoxy could be pushedin thedirection of his teachings, in his immediate historical and howfar context, itwouldhaveto be accommodated. This appearsto be thereasonforthe mostpuzzlingaspectof the TheReasonableness ofChrisits apparentacceptanceof theveracity of scriptianity, turalrevelation, and theremarkable accommodations it makesto portionsof the Biblicalteaching at odds with These have been interpreted liberalmorality. as philosophical capitulation(Ashcraft 1969,218; Dunn 1969, 187),butwe shouldsee theminstead as partsofa tempoThe EssayConcerning rizing strategy. Human UnderstandwithTheReaingwas composedroughly simultaneously sonableness ofChristianity (Dunn 1969, 198; cf .Yolton workleavesno doubtaboutthediffi1970,179),and that ifnotimpossibility ofconfirming and the revelation culty ofrelying on itimplicitly danger (IV.16,18,19). The Essay revelation to thescrutiny ofreason, under strictly subjects thedictum, "Reasonmustbe our lastjudge and guidein every thing" (IV.19.14;cf.IV.16,18, 19; Conduct, p. 342). as Deliveredin the The Reasonableness of Christianity title a strategy of Scriptures, bycontrast, signals byitsvery at facevalue,interpreting it without accepting scripture investigating its provenance.Giventheircontemporaneity, the differences betweenthe two worksmust be to differences ofstrategy alone. traceable theneed fora work Indeed,theEssayitself suggests likeReasonableness. it is thedutyof each of us Although of religion, the Essay to followreason even in matters tellsus,theunfortunate factis that"a great partof mankind are,by the naturaland unalterable stateof things in thisworld," doomed to an "invincible ignorance"of the basis of theirown opinions (IV.20.2-3; cf. 1.4.22; con11.21.47-53, 67). TheReasonableness ofChristianity curs:"thegreatest part [of mankind]cannotknow,and therefore one of theymustbelieve"(146). Paradoxically, the things Locke finds most "reasonable" about Christianity is itssubstitution of authoritative revelation

forreason(142-144, 147, 157). Up to thetimeof Jesus, philosophy had failedto establish a truemorality, upon the foundation of a propernaturaltheology(pp. 139140,144). Even if it had, Locke notes, the true philosophywould have had to competewiththe falseand could neverhavebeen as effective a prop to morality as an authoritative dogma (141-143). Moreover, the times werecorrupt, burdenedwithpernicious"mannersand principles" (144). All thismade it reasonable forJesus to rather teachbyfiat thanlogic (143). The timesin whichLockewrites are corrupt enough in theirown way,and revelation remainsa much more tool thanphilosophy, ifitsworst powerful abuses can be corrected.21Though Locke indicatesclearly enoughthe ofJesus' claimto revelation,22 unverifiability he makesno in TheReasonableissueof it.To repeat, his undertaking nessofChristianity is to interpret the Bible as it stands, and theBible'steaching is emphatically not naturaltheology(5). WhattheBible teachesinsteadis the Fall (4), salvation byfaith (17-20, 50-51), and a highly stringent moral code (1 15). Locke beginsby accepting theseprethemto account,so faras they mises,gradually turning maybe turned to account. Thus TheReasonableness endorses ofChristianity the of salvation principle byfaith, indeedelevates it intothe sole tenetof Christianity. The result is to makeit an enis theMesgineof toleration. Anywho believethatJesus and are eligibleforsalvationon the siah are Christians basis of divineforgiveness (17-20, 50-51). The myriad other whichhavesetChrispointsof Christian theology, tiansat each others' forso long,are relegated to throats ifnotinsignificant Ifthisinterpretation status. secondary of theBiblewereto prevail, all bases forsectarivirtually and toleration would be unianismwould be removed, versalamong Christians. But Locke goes further. Faith, he says,is not the onlyavenueto salvationin theBible. Non-Christians lifeifthey eternal maymerit obey"every of thelaw and so do not standin need of forgivetittle" and ness (12; cf. 10). This appears to be verydifficult, Locke is ambivalent on itspossibility forhumanbeings is closed, (11, 110, 112,114). But ifthispathto salvation
21Cf. Dunn 1984,66. Forgood accounts ofhowLockesoftens or modifies Christian doctrine in Reasonableness, see Zuckert 1986; Pangle1988,151-158;Rabieh1991.See alsoKraynak 1980, 60,62, 66.
22Locke saysJesus' commission wasproven byhismiracles, which wereso certain thatno one has everdareddenythem, not even Julian (138). Yettheexistence ofnon-Christians, atheists, and yes, theApostate, showthereverse so patently that Locke's stateJulian ment can only be understood ironically (Strauss 1959, 210;Rabieh 1991,149-150).He notesthat theJews might evenhaveadmitted themiracles, without conceding Jesus' commission (80). Locke's Discourse to ofMiracles subjects miracles subtly butunmistakably rational judgment (Locke1997a, 261-262, 264).

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or extremely difficult, the age-old questionarises,How can thosejustly be condemned who never heardofJesus? To this, the"obviousand natural"answer, saysLocke,is thatall thosewillbe forgiven by God "who rely on him, forwhatever, either by thelightof nature, or particular promises, he has revealed to themof his tender mercies, and taught themto expectfrom his bounty"(130). The "lightof nature"mightrevealto manya merciful and forgiving God; beliefin thisdeityputs themon a level with Christians.Faith in Jesus,the definingtenet of can be replaced Christianity, bya purely rational belief in and forgiving of God (cf.133). thetender nature Thus Locke endorsestheBiblicalprinciple of salvationbyfaith, uses it to sow toleration amongChristians, thenopens it to non-Christians, on thebasis of whatwe can onlycall naturaltheology. Still,the need forsalvation by faith is not questioned, nor is the principle that createsthatneed, the Fall.23These are intrinsic to the Bible.Locke'saccommodation to scripture is evenmore of moralityor natural law. strikingin his treatment on Jesus'statements in the Bible, Drawing exclusively "not onlymurder, Locke concludesthatthislaw forbids and so muchas wordsof contempt"; but causelessanger, of charity," "irregular desires," "ostentation "covetousness" and "wordly care,"as well as "lasciviousness" and "evilthoughts"-all,"upon pain of hell-fire" (115-116). Locke goes out of his way to identify these principles or naturallaw,repeating with"theeternal law of right," to the point of monotony(10, assertionsto thiseffect 11-13, 112,115,122,142-143,144, 157). It is notpossibleto squarethisteaching withthelibLockehimself under eralmorality championselsewhere therubric of natural law.It suffices to think of theidentification of happinesswithpleasurein the Essay, or the "industrious and rational" virtues of acquisition on whichGod smilesin the TwoTreatises. The ReasonablenessofChristianity acceptstheBiblicalteaching instead, even though its moral stringency contributesto the need forcontinualforgiveness, salvationby faith, and othertheological What sensecan be made peculiarities. his self-imposed of this? Asidefrom rulein thisworkto seemsto be to takescripture at itsword,Locke'sstrategy withrational or natural identify Jesus' teaching morality to suggestanlaw-by hook or by crook-then gently of such a morality otherunderstanding (142-143). In a vindicates miscrucialset of passages,Locke first Jesus' to thefailure of pre-Christian sion bypointing philosophyto establishtrue naturallaw. But in the course of thatdiscussion, he revealsthatat leastsome trueknowIn politics,true was abroad in antiquity. ledge of right
of Locke's interpretation "See pages6, 105.Thisis notto saythat theFallis orthodox.

rulesof right werediscovered by statesmen who simply soughtsocial convenienceand generalprosperity. For "The law of natureis the law of convenience too" (142; cf. 139, 144, Essay1.3.6). Similarly, part of naturallaw was knownto the"heathenphilosophers," thoughthey failedto teachit effectively (p. 138-139,142). The oppositionof priests, the competition withfalsephilosophy, and the failureof the philosophersthemselves to find the truefoundation of naturallaw,all doomed themto impotence(135, 139, 140-144). Their failure justified recourse Jesus' to revelation. Locke's own situationis not unlikethatof the ancientphilosophers, and his reliance in The on revelation Reasonableness ofChristianity is one result. But thatreliance severely limitswhathe can say in the workabout naturallaw. Locke does not say thatthe law of convenience is all of the law of nature (cf. 140, 142; Essay 1.3.10), butwe knowthathisreform ofmoralphilosophy is designedto bringit much closerto the sum of those rulesthantheBiblewillstrictly allow.TheReasonableness notesthatone oftheproblems withvirtue ofChristianity was its"unendowed" before character Jesus (150). It was unendowedbecause it requiredunnecessary sacrifices remand lackedotherworldly enforcement. Christianity edies the second defect, but only aggravatesthe first. "Virtueand prosperity do not often accompany one another," saysLocke at one point,takingthe BiblicalperLiberal spective (148). Butthisis nothisownperspective. of the"industrious thevirtue and rational," coinvirtue, cideswithprosperity thegreat of thetime.This majority virtueand itsreward are scarcely visiblein TheReasonableness Locke is careful to give ofChristianity, although The Biblemaybe nudgedin the themsome recognition. of liberal,acquisitive and in the direcdirection virtue, tion of Locke's naturaltheology, but it cannotwithout falsification be brought intotheliberalfold. Thisis whyTheReasonableness should ofChristianity one thatLockehoped perbe seenas a provisional work, A case could be made haps would outliveitsusefulness. thatLocke'sultimate is thereplacement goalas a reformer ofChristianity witha natural ofthetype he outtheology like linesin other works. he hopedforsomething Perhaps the situation thatprevailedone hundredyearsafter his ofsupplanting whenDeism seemedon theverge writing, no smallpartdue to Locke'sinfluence. Christianity-in "I trust Thiswas theeraofJefferson's bold prediction, that thereis not a young mannow livingin theUnitedStates Butnotlongthereafter, who willnot die an Unitarian."24
24This statement was pennedin 1822 (Jefferson 1984,1459;cf. 1464).On theinfluence ofLocke's theology, including itsinfluence in colonial America, see Pangle1988,151-158;Pangle and Pangle 1993,28,76-78.

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vidualgood.Thisleavesitopen to theobjections ofthose who findliberalism morally inadequate.Some Thoughts Concerning Education by contrast showshow Locke believesan individualmightbe motivated to perform his dutyto tendto thegeneral good,who indeedwillbe glad to practiceliberality and otherformsof social beneficence. Esteem and reputationare this individual'sreward,but Locke emphasizesthe virtuesof civility and Conclusion: Locke's Complex Bequest "goodbreeding" as thepivotalgratifications ofsocialvirtue.These,whenproperly find cultivated, pleasurein the The Reasonableness act of serving ofChristianity revealsmost starkly very others. To theextent the complexnatureof Locke'sbequest to his posterity, thatLocke discussestheology in these thesometimes it is moreto counteract extreme accommodations he was willing works, falseand balefulnotions to make to different audiences and occasions. The Seheldbyhis contemporaries thanto advancea full-blown cond Treatise of Government and Some Thoughts of his own. Those fewnotionsaside,he largely Contheology leavesthefield to Christianity, at leastfortheimmediate Educationshow different sortsof accommodacerning tion,but accommodations theyremain. Philosophically, future.This rendersall the more salient the need to Locke developed a liberal politics and moralitythat make Christianity itself at leastas reamorereasonable, of (natural)theology, drawson themoralresources but sonable as it can become, givenits dependenceon the in these practicalworkshe presentshis liberalismin textof theBible.This limited, but nonetheprovisional, in TheReasonableness forms mostly shornof itstheological taskis undertaken supports. My argu- less important menthas been thatLocke did thisintentionally, ofChristianity. owing to theproblems elements ofhis The complexity of Locke'sstrategy, whichis devised posed bythetheological fulltheory. to maximizethesocial and cultural Those problemsare both theoretical-the influence of his philack of a complete or fullysatisfactory in an oeuvre naturaltheolresulted losophy, whoseindividual worksdo not alwaysseem to agree. One of the most significant ogy-and practical-the resistancehis political and moral philosophywould meet if tied too closely to a severedto a consequencesof thisis a practicalteaching noveltheology. significant degreefromthe theologicalunderpinnings thatit had in Locke'sown mind.It is no doubt truethat The resultof thisstrategy is thatLocke'sbequest is divided into two main strands.In its fullyarticulated the immenseinfluence of Lockean liberalismis due in his liberalismenlistsdivine supportin orderto form, part to this separation,but it also lays him open to rational and hedonistic individuals to theservice ofan impoverished, of charges morally bring inadequatephilosothe"preservation ofMankind." Lockecould not dispense phy. This no doubtis nottheoutcomeLockewouldhave withthiselement ofhisthought but I have suggested becausetheneed forinthatit is almostinvited desired, by to virtue of his thewayhe presents The result is thatLocke centives is builtintothevery foundations his teaching. forsome of philosophy. Withoutthese,no other-regarding actions could paradoxically be said to be responsible can be expectedof Lockean individuals, and indeed no themoralshortcomings withwhichliberalism is charged such obligations whileat thesame timeoffering can be laid on them.Locke agreeswith today, guidanceon how thosewho have argued,fromHobbes's day to this,that thosevery be made good. shortcomings might needs morethannarrowor munevenliberalmorality dane self-interest March4, 2000. to be viable.But thismessagehas been Manuscript submitted of fashioning a practical muddledbyhis strategy teach- Final manuscript received September 5, 2000. ofthattheology. inglargely independent Locke'spractical worksshowboth how desiroushe his bequest fromtheologicalconwas of disentangling and how farLockeanliberalism can getwithout troversy References The Second Treatise theology. appeals to verylittlebea vision of yondimmediateself-interest, yetconstructs in Locke'sphiAshcraft, Richard.1969."Faithand knowledge and individual rightsthathuman beings government In John Locke:Problems and Perspectives, ed. John losophy." have foundcompelling.It is able to do thisin partbeYolton.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. cause itsfocuson thegeneralsocial good allowsit to fi- Cicero. 1933. De Natura Deorum,trans.H. Rackham. New nesse some of the conflicts betweenthatand the indiYork:G. P. Putnam's Sons. Loeb ClassicalLibrary.

natural theology was on thewane,and Christianity resurin theWesthas had to confront gent.Liberalism moreor less permanently a Biblicalunderstanding withwhichit can neverbe entirely in accord.This is the situation for whichTheReasonableness ofChristianity was designed.

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