1. CARLET V CA IIGO F. CARLET, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Pablo Sevillo and Antonia Palisoc, petitioner, vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS, VIRGINIA C. ZARATE, JACOBO C. ZARATE, VICTORIA C. ZARATE, HON. CONRADO DIZON, Acting Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, and DEPUTY SHERIFF ROGELIO S. MOLINA of Bian, Laguna, respondents. ROMERO, J.: The Rules of Court provide litigants with options on what course of action to take in obtaining judicial relief. Once such option is taken and a case is filed in court, the parties are compelled to ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. Such is the situation in the case at bar: whether or not there is res judicata or bar by prior judgment. The present controversy is surrounded by the following facts: Lot 981 of the Bian Estate in Laguna, with an area of 864 square meters, was purchased by Jose Sevillo in 1910 on installment. In 1917, Transfer Certificate No. 1599 was issued in his name after payment of the full purchase price. Jose Sevillos marriage to Severa Bayran produced four sons, Teodoro, Mariano, Vicente and Pablo. Pablo married Antonia Palisoc in 1920 and they begot four children, Consolacion, Alejandra (Andrea), Samero (Casimiro) and Marin (Martin or Maltin) Sevillo. In 1949, Pablo Sevillo declared Lot No. 981 for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration Nos. 6125 and 2586 even if the property was still in Jose Sevillos name. In 1955, Pablo, by then a widower, married Candida Baylo. The union produced no offspring. Candidas daughter, Cirila Baylo Carolasan, was sired by another man. In 1965, Pablo Sevillo, with Candida Baylo, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance for reconstitution of title. Reconstitution was allowed and TCT No. RT-926 was issued in the name of Pablo Sevillo, married to Candida Baylo. Pablo Sevillo and his wife died in 1967 and in 1974, respectively. In 1980, the heirs of Cirila Baylo Carolasan,[1] all surnamed Zarate and herein private respondents, filed a case for annulment of deed of sale over Lot 981 and for partition of property among the surviving heirs of Pablo Sevillo. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1656 before the Court of First Instance of Bian, Laguna. The Deed of Sale sought to be annulled was allegedly executed by Candida Baylo, grandmother to the Zarates, in favor of Gregorio, Samero, Martin and Andrea, surnamed Sevillo and Isidro Zamora. After trial on the merits, the court rendered its Decision on June 15, 1982 with the following dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of sale entitled Bilihang Patuluyan ng Bahagi ng Isang Lupang Panahanan purportedly executed by Candida Baylo on August 25, 1971, acknowledged before Notary Public Apolinario S. Escueta and entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 124, Page No. 16, Book No. IV, Series of 1971, as null and void and of no force and effect, and the representative of the estate of the plaintiff Cirila Baylo Carolasan and the defendants Gregorio Sevillo, Samero Sevillo, Maltin Sevillo, Andrea Sevillo and Isidro Zamora, as the surviving spouse of Consolacion Sevillo, are hereby ordered to partition Lot No. 981 of the Bian Estate, situated in Tubigan, Bian, Laguna if they are able to agree among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, within 30 days from the finality of this decision, which shall be confirmed by this Court, otherwise, commissioners will be appointed to make the partition. The defendants Gregorio Sevillo and Samero Sevillo are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay plaintiffs substituted heirs of the late Cirila Baylo Carolasan, namely, Virginia C. Zarate, of Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna, Jacobo C. Zarate, Victoria C. Zarate, Nemesio C. Zarate, Dominador C. Zarate and Elvira C. Zarate, all of Brgy. Tubigan, Bian, Laguna, the sum of P3,000.00 for attorneys fees and the sum of P2,000.00 for litigation expenses aside from costs of suit. The decision having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued on November 10, 1982. Lot 981 was surveyed and subdivided into six lots, one lot having an area of 452.04 square meters, four lots with 86.49 square meters each and one lot with 66 square meters as footpath or concession to a right of way.[2] By virtue of this adjudication, private respondents Zarate procured TCT Nos. T-163388 and T-163393 over their share in the property. The losing parties in that case, the Sevillos, filed a case to annul the aforesaid decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. B-1656 before the then Intermediate Appellate Court (CA-G.R. SP No. 07657) alleging lack of jurisdiction based on service of summons on unauthorized counsel. On March 31, 1986, the appellate court granted the Zarates motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review filed by the Sevillos for lack of merit on September 8, 1986 in G.R. No. 74505.[3] On May 6, 1983, private respondents, the Zarates, filed Civil Case No. 2375, an ejectment suit against the Sevillos before the Municipal Trial Court of Bian.[4] The municipal court ruled in favor of plaintiffs and ordered defendants below, to immediately vacate the subject property and remove their houses thereon and to pay rental in arrears, damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.[5] Writs of execution and demolition were issued by the court. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but before said motion could be heard, they filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna (Civil Case No. B-3106). The Sevillos alleged that the inferior court did not have jurisdiction over

the case which was filed more than a year after the alleged unlawful entry. The Regional Trial Court held that the municipal court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Courts decision on July 11, 1990 in CA-G.R. SP No. 18806. Affirming the appellate courts decision, the Supreme Court denied the Sevillos petition for review in G.R. No. 94382 on April 10, 1991.[6] On July 10, 1991, petitioner Iigo F. Carlet, as special administrator of the estate of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, filed the case at bar, an action for reconveyance of property, docketed as Civil Case No. B-3582, against the heirs of Cirila namely, Virginia, Jacobo, Victoria and Elvira, all surnamed Zarate. Plaintiff therein prayed for a declaration of ownership over the entire 864-square-meter lot in the name of the estate of Jose Sevillo and/ or the estate of Teodoro, Mariano, Vicente and Pablo Sevillo; that TCT Nos. T-163393 and T-163388 be annulled and a new one be issued in favor of said estate; and that defendants be ordered to pay P20,000.00, attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and expenses of litigation.[7] Defendants Zarate moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata, claiming that the facts alleged in the complaint had already been pleaded and passed upon by the lower court in Civil Case No. B-1656, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07657 and by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 74505. They also opposed the motion for preliminary injunction saying it was meant to delay and that the grounds relied upon had previously been passed upon by the lower court in Civil Case Nos. B-1656 and 2375, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 18806 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 94382. On October 8, 1991, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. B-3582, stating that the issue of ownership had been threshed out in the cases cited and that, as held by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07657, plaintiff below merely tried to obtain the same relief by way of a different action. The dispositive portion of said Order reads: WHEREFORE, finding merit in the motion to dismiss, the same is hereby granted and the above case is hereby ordered dismissed. As a consequence, the motion for preliminary injunction is hereby denied. Pursuant to well-settled pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the plaintiff and her counsel are hereby ordered to explain within five (5) days from receipt hereof why they should not be cited in contempt of court for forum-shopping. Let a copy of this order be furnished the local IBP Chapter where Atty. Modesto Jimenez belongs so that he may be administratively dealt with in accordance with law. SO ORDERED. Carlets appeal to respondent court (CA-G.R. CV No. 36129) was dismissed on January 11, 1994, with the Court of Appeals affirming the questioned Order of the trial court in toto and ordering appellants and counsel to pay treble costs.[8] Hence, the instant petition for review where the issue to be resolved is whether or not the adjudication in Civil Case No. B-1656 (including CA-G.R. SP No. 07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505) constitutes res judicata to the case at bar (Civil Case No. B-3582). Petitioner in the main contends that respondent court erred, because there is no identity of cause of action between the case at bar (Civil Case No. B-3582) and the cases cited, particularly Civil Case No. B-1656. The former is an entirely different case which seeks the annulment of TCT No. 1599 and the derivative titles issued in the name of private respondents Zarate. There is likewise no identity of parties. According to petitioner, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3582 is the Special Administrator representing the estate of Jose Sevillo and Severa Bayran, who does not represent any of the private respondents herein.[9] We affirm the contested decision of the Court of Appeals. When material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action and were admitted or judicially determined there are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter. This is the essence of res judicata or bar by prior judgment.[10] There are four requisites to successfully invoke res judicata: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.[11] A judgment on the merits rendered in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action when the three identities are present.[12] The attendance of the first three elements for the application of res judicata is not disputed by petitioner. What needs to be determined is the existence of identity in parties, subject matter and cause of action between Civil Case Nos. B1656 and B-3582. Respondent court correctly concluded that there is identity of parties between the case at bar (Civil Case No. B-3582), an action for reconveyance of Lot No. 981, and Civil Case No. B-1656 for annulment of deed of sale and partition involving

the same Lot 981. Although Civil Case No. B-3582 was initiated by petitioner as administrator of the estate of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, the fact remains that he represents the same heirs of Pablo Sevillo, namely Martin, Alejandra, Casimiro (or Samero) and Consolacion Sevillo who were defendants in Civil Case No. B-1656, as the latter or their heirs would eventually benefit should petitioner succeed in this case. Petitioners allegation that he represents the heirs of Jose Sevillo and Severa Bayran Sevillo and, therefore, including Pablo Sevillos three brothers, is belied by the very title of the instant petition that he is the special administrator of the estate of Pablo Sevillo and Antonia Palisoc, having been appointed as such on July 10, 1991.[13] It should further be stressed that absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res judicata to be applicable.[14] A shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle.[15] While it is true that the heirs of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo will still be judicially determined at the intestate proceedings in which petitioner was named estate special administrator, it is equally true that the defendants in Civil Case No. B-1656, namely Consolacion, Alejandra, Samero and Martin Sevillo, are the children and heirs of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo. There is no dispute as regards the identity of subject matter since the center of controversy in the instant case and in Civil Case No. B-1656 is Lot No. 981 of the Bian Estate. As regards identity of causes of action, the test often used in determining whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two actions be different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not.[16] The instant case (Civil Case No. B-3582), which is an action for the reconveyance of Lot No. 981, is premised on the claim that TCT Nos. T-163388 and T-163393, belonging to private respondents as heirs of Candida Baylo and Cirila Baylo Carolasan, are null and void.[17] To succeed entails presenting evidence that the title acquired by the Zarates, upon which they founded their complaint for partition in Civil Case No. B-1656, is in fact null and void. In Civil Case No. B-1656, the Zarates prayer for partition of Lot No. 981 was anchored on the authenticity of their title thereto. Consequently, the case provided the defendants, heirs of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, the opportunity to prove otherwise, i.e. that the Zarates title was null and void. However, they failed to contest the matter before the trial court, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.[18] Inasmuch as the same evidence was needed in prosecuting Civil Case No. B-1656 and the case at bar, there is identity of causes of action. The additional fact alleged by petitioner - that Candida Baylo was not in fact married to Pablo Sevillo and the reconstituted title in their name reflects a misrepresentation is, under the circumstances, immaterial. Said allegation could have been presented and heard in Civil Case No. B-1656.[19] The parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case.[20] Neither does the fact that Civil Case No. B-1656 was an action for annulment of deed of sale and partition while Civil Case No. B-3582 is for reconveyance of property alter the fact that both cases have an identical cause of action. A change in the form of the action or in the relief sought does not remove a proper case from the application of res judicata.[21] Moreover, as early as March 31, 1986 in the original action for annulment of judgment case, the then Intermediate Appellate Court immediately recognized that: Clearly, the relief sought in this action for annulment of judgment beyond nullity of the decision in Civil Case No. B1656, is an adjudication that herein defendants are not entitled to Lot 981 of the Bian Estate or any part thereof, on the stated grounds that said property in the name of Pablo Sevillo and Candida Baylo under T.C.T. No. RT-926 was in fact owned by Pablo Sevillo and Antonia Palisoc, and that in any event, Candida Baylo had ceded her interest therein to plaintiffs and/or their predecessors in interest on March 31, 1969. The self-same issue of ownership of Lot 981 was squarely raised in Civil Case No. B-1656, herein defendants interest in said property having therein been traversed by invoking instead an alleged sale of Lot 981 to Gregorio Sevillo on August 25, 1971. This amounts to employment of different forms of action to obtain identical relief, in violation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not twice be litigated (Yusingco v. Ong Hian, 42 SCRA 589).[22] It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated - republicae ut sit finis litium. And an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause - nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. As this Court has had occasion to rule: The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.[23]

With respect to the issue of forum-shopping for which the trial court ordered counsel for petitioners, Atty. Modesto Jimenez, to explain why he should not be cited in contempt,[24] this applies only when the two (or more) cases are still pending.[25] Clearly, despite knowledge of final judgments in Civil Case No. B-1656, CA-G.R. CV No. 07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505, as well as in G.R. No. 94382 (the ejectment case), counsel persisted in filing the case at bar for reconveyance. Since this case is barred by the judgment in Civil Case No. B-1656, there was no other pending case to speak of when it was filed in July 1991. Thus, the non-forum-shopping rule is not violated. What counsel for petitioners did, however, in filing this present action to relitigate the title to and partition over Lot No. 981, violates Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers which states that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 of the same Canon states that (a) lawyer shall not do any falsehood x x x nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Counsels act of filing a new case involving essentially the same cause of action is likewise abusive of the courts processes and may be viewed as improper conduct tending to directly impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice.[26] WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. Treble costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Regalado, (Chairman), and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave.

ROMERO, J.: The Rules of Court provide litigants with options on what course of action to take in obtaining judicial relief. Once such option is taken and a case is filed in court, the parties are compelled to ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. Such is the situation in the case at bar: whether or not there is res judicata or bar by prior judgment. The present controversy is surrounded by the following facts: Lot 981 of the Bian Estate in Laguna, with an area of 864 square meters, was purchased by Jose Sevillo in 1910 on installment. In 1917, Transfer Certificate No. 1599 was issued in his name after payment of the full purchase price. Jose Sevillos marriage to Severa Bayran produced four sons, Teodoro, Mariano, Vicente and Pablo. Pablo married Antonia Palisoc in 1920 and they begot four children, Consolacion, Alejandra (Andrea), Samero (Casimiro) and Marin (Martin or Maltin) Sevillo. In 1949, Pablo Sevillo declared Lot No. 981 for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration Nos. 6125 and 2586 even if the property was still in Jose Sevillos name. In 1955, Pablo, by then a widower, married Candida Baylo. The union produced no offspring. Candidas daughter, Cirila Baylo Carolasan, was sired by another man. In 1965, Pablo Sevillo, with Candida Baylo, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance for reconstitution of title. Reconstitution was allowed and TCT No. RT-926 was issued in the name of Pablo Sevillo, married to Candida Baylo. Pablo Sevillo and his wife died in 1967 and in 1974, respectively. In 1980, the heirs of Cirila Baylo Carolasan,i[1] all surnamed Zarate and herein private respondents, filed a case for annulment of deed of sale over Lot 981 and for partition of property among the surviving heirs of Pablo Sevillo. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1656 before the Court of First Instance of Bian, Laguna. The Deed of Sale sought to be annulled was allegedly executed by Candida Baylo, grandmother to the Zarates, in favor of Gregorio, Samero, Martin and Andrea, surnamed Sevillo and Isidro Zamora. After trial on the merits, the court rendered its Decision on June 15, 1982 with the following dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of sale entitled Bilihang Patuluyan ng Bahagi ng Isang Lupang Panahanan purportedly executed by Candida Baylo on August 25, 1971, acknowledged before Notary Public Apolinario S. Escueta and entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 124, Page No. 16, Book No. IV, Series of 1971, as null and void and of no force and effect, and the representative of the estate of the plaintiff Cirila Baylo Carolasan and the defendants Gregorio Sevillo, Samero Sevillo, Maltin Sevillo, Andrea Sevillo and Isidro Zamora, as the surviving spouse of Consolacion Sevillo, are hereby ordered to partition Lot No. 981 of the Bian Estate, situated in Tubigan, Bian, Laguna if they are able to agree among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, within 30 days from the finality of this decision, which shall be confirmed by this Court, otherwise, commissioners will be appointed to make the partition. The defendants Gregorio Sevillo and Samero Sevillo are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay plaintiffs substituted heirs of the late Cirila Baylo Carolasan, namely, Virginia C. Zarate, of Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna, Jacobo C. Zarate, Victoria C. Zarate, Nemesio C. Zarate, Dominador C. Zarate and Elvira C. Zarate, all of Brgy. Tubigan, Bian, Laguna, the sum of P3,000.00 for attorneys fees and the sum of P2,000.00 for litigation expenses aside from costs of suit. The decision having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued on November 10, 1982. Lot 981 was surveyed and subdivided into six lots, one lot having an area of 452.04 square meters, four lots with 86.49 square meters each and one lot with 66 square meters as footpath or concession to a right of way. ii[2] By virtue of this adjudication, private respondents Zarate procured TCT Nos. T-163388 and T-163393 over their share in the property. The losing parties in that case, the Sevillos, filed a case to annul the aforesaid decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. B-1656 before the then Intermediate Appellate Court (CA-G.R. SP No. 07657) alleging lack of jurisdiction based on service of summons on unauthorized counsel. On March 31, 1986, the appellate court granted the Zarates motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review filed by the Sevillos for lack of merit on September 8, 1986 in G.R. No. 74505. iii[3] On May 6, 1983, private respondents, the Zarates, filed Civil Case No. 2375, an ejectment suit against the Sevillos before the Municipal Trial Court of Bian.iv[4] The municipal court ruled in favor of plaintiffs and ordered defendants below, to immediately vacate the subject property and remove their houses thereon and to pay rental in arrears, damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.v[5] Writs of execution and demolition were issued by the court. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but before said motion could be heard, they filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna (Civil Case No. B-3106). The Sevillos alleged that the inferior court did not have jurisdiction over the case which was filed more than a year after the alleged unlawful entry. The Regional Trial Court held that the municipal court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Courts decision on July 11, 1990 in CA-G.R. SP No. 18806. Affirming the appellate courts decision, the Supreme Court denied the Sevillos petition for review in G.R. No. 94382 on April 10, 1991.vi[6] On July 10, 1991, petitioner Iigo F. Carlet, as special administrator of the estate of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, filed the case at bar, an action for reconveyance of property, docketed as Civil Case No. B-3582, against the

heirs of Cirila namely, Virginia, Jacobo, Victoria and Elvira, all surnamed Zarate. Plaintiff therein prayed for a declaration of ownership over the entire 864-square-meter lot in the name of the estate of Jose Sevillo and/ or the estate of Teodoro, Mariano, Vicente and Pablo Sevillo; that TCT Nos. T-163393 and T-163388 be annulled and a new one be issued in favor of said estate; and that defendants be ordered to pay P20,000.00, attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and expenses of litigation.vii[7] Defendants Zarate moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata, claiming that the facts alleged in the complaint had already been pleaded and passed upon by the lower court in Civil Case No. B-1656, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07657 and by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 74505. They also opposed the motion for preliminary injunction saying it was meant to delay and that the grounds relied upon had previously been passed upon by the lower court in Civil Case Nos. B-1656 and 2375, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 18806 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 94382. On October 8, 1991, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. B-3582, stating that the issue of ownership had been threshed out in the cases cited and that, as held by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07657, plaintiff below merely tried to obtain the same relief by way of a different action. The dispositive portion of said Order reads: WHEREFORE, finding merit in the motion to dismiss, the same is hereby granted and the above case is hereby ordered dismissed. As a consequence, the motion for preliminary injunction is hereby denied. Pursuant to well-settled pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the plaintiff and her counsel are hereby ordered to explain within five (5) days from receipt hereof why they should not be cited in contempt of court for forum-shopping. Let a copy of this order be furnished the local IBP Chapter where Atty. Modesto Jimenez belongs so that he may be administratively dealt with in accordance with law. SO ORDERED. Carlets appeal to respondent court (CA-G.R. CV No. 36129) was dismissed on January 11, 1994, with the Court of Appeals affirming the questioned Order of the trial court in toto and ordering appellants and counsel to pay treble costs.viii[8] Hence, the instant petition for review where the issue to be resolved is whether or not the adjudication in Civil Case No. B-1656 (including CA-G.R. SP No. 07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505) constitutes res judicata to the case at bar (Civil Case No. B-3582). Petitioner in the main contends that respondent court erred, because there is no identity of cause of action between the case at bar (Civil Case No. B-3582) and the cases cited, particularly Civil Case No. B-1656. The former is an entirely different case which seeks the annulment of TCT No. 1599 and the derivative titles issued in the name of private respondents Zarate. There is likewise no identity of parties. According to petitioner, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3582 is the Special Administrator representing the estate of Jose Sevillo and Severa Bayran, who does not represent any of the private respondents herein. ix[9] We affirm the contested decision of the Court of Appeals. When material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action and were admitted or judicially determined there are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter. This is the essence of res judicata or bar by prior judgment.x[10] There are four requisites to successfully invoke res judicata: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.xi[11] A judgment on the merits rendered in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action when the three identities are present.xii[12] The attendance of the first three elements for the application of res judicata is not disputed by petitioner. What needs to be determined is the existence of identity in parties, subject matter and cause of action between Civil Case Nos. B-1656 and B-3582. Respondent court correctly concluded that there is identity of parties between the case at bar (Civil Case No. B-3582), an action for reconveyance of Lot No. 981, and Civil Case No. B-1656 for annulment of deed of sale and partition involving the same Lot 981. Although Civil Case No. B-3582 was initiated by petitioner as administrator of the estate of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, the fact remains that he represents the same heirs of Pablo Sevillo, namely Martin, Alejandra, Casimiro (or Samero) and Consolacion Sevillo who were defendants in Civil Case No. B-1656, as the latter or their heirs would eventually benefit should petitioner succeed in this case. Petitioners allegation that he represents the heirs of Jose Sevillo and Severa Bayran Sevillo and, therefore, including Pablo Sevillos three brothers, is belied by the very title of the instant petition that he is the special administrator of the estate of Pablo Sevillo and Antonia Palisoc, having been appointed as such on July 10, 1991.xiii[13] It should further be stressed that absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res judicata to be applicable.xiv[14] A shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle.xv[15] While it is true that the heirs of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo will still be judicially determined at the intestate proceedings in which petitioner was named estate special administrator, it is equally true that the defendants in Civil Case No. B-1656, namely Consolacion, Alejandra, Samero and Martin Sevillo, are the children and heirs of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo.

There is no dispute as regards the identity of subject matter since the center of controversy in the instant case and in Civil Case No. B-1656 is Lot No. 981 of the Bian Estate. As regards identity of causes of action, the test often used in determining whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two actions be different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not. xvi[16] The instant case (Civil Case No. B-3582), which is an action for the reconveyance of Lot No. 981, is premised on the claim that TCT Nos. T-163388 and T-163393, belonging to private respondents as heirs of Candida Baylo and Cirila Baylo Carolasan, are null and void.xvii[17] To succeed entails presenting evidence that the title acquired by the Zarates, upon which they founded their complaint for partition in Civil Case No. B-1656, is in fact null and void. In Civil Case No. B-1656, the Zarates prayer for partition of Lot No. 981 was anchored on the authenticity of their title thereto. Consequently, the case provided the defendants, heirs of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, the opportunity to prove otherwise, i.e. that the Zarates title was null and void. However, they failed to contest the matter before the trial court, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.xviii[18] Inasmuch as the same evidence was needed in prosecuting Civil Case No. B-1656 and the case at bar, there is identity of causes of action. The additional fact alleged by petitioner - that Candida Baylo was not in fact married to Pablo Sevillo and the reconstituted title in their name reflects a misrepresentation is, under the circumstances, immaterial. Said allegation could have been presented and heard in Civil Case No. B-1656.xix[19] The parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case.xx[20] Neither does the fact that Civil Case No. B-1656 was an action for annulment of deed of sale and partition while Civil Case No. B-3582 is for reconveyance of property alter the fact that both cases have an identical cause of action. A change in the form of the action or in the relief sought does not remove a proper case from the application of res judicata.xxi[21] Moreover, as early as March 31, 1986 in the original action for annulment of judgment case, the then Intermediate Appellate Court immediately recognized that: Clearly, the relief sought in this action for annulment of judgment beyond nullity of the decision in Civil Case No. B-1656, is an adjudication that herein defendants are not entitled to Lot 981 of the Bian Estate or any part thereof, on the stated grounds that said property in the name of Pablo Sevillo and Candida Baylo under T.C.T. No. RT-926 was in fact owned by Pablo Sevillo and Antonia Palisoc, and that in any event, Candida Baylo had ceded her interest therein to plaintiffs and/or their predecessors in interest on March 31, 1969. The self-same issue of ownership of Lot 981 was squarely raised in Civil Case No. B-1656, herein defendants interest in said property having therein been traversed by invoking instead an alleged sale of Lot 981 to Gregorio Sevillo on August 25, 1971. This amounts to employment of different forms of action to obtain identical relief, in violation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not twice be litigated (Yusingco v. Ong Hian, 42 SCRA 589). xxii[22] It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated - republicae ut sit finis litium. And an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause - nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. As this Court has had occasion to rule: The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.xxiii[23] With respect to the issue of forum-shopping for which the trial court ordered counsel for petitioners, Atty. Modesto Jimenez, to explain why he should not be cited in contempt,xxiv[24] this applies only when the two (or more) cases are still pending.xxv[25] Clearly, despite knowledge of final judgments in Civil Case No. B-1656, CA-G.R. CV No. 07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505, as well as in G.R. No. 94382 (the ejectment case), counsel persisted in filing the case at bar for reconveyance. Since this case is barred by the judgment in Civil Case No. B-1656, there was no other pending case to speak of when it was filed in July 1991. Thus, the non -forum-shopping rule is not violated. What counsel for petitioners did, however, in filing this present action to relitigate the title to and partition over Lot No. 981, violates Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers which states that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 of the same Canon states that (a) lawyer shall not do any falsehood x x x nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Counsels act of filing a new case involving essentially the same cause of action is likewise abusive of the courts processes and may be viewed as improper conduct tending to directly impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice.xxvi[26] WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. Treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED. Regalado, (Chairman), and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave.

2. BAUTISTA V. GONZALES

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990 ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent. RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM: In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts: 1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation. 2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490; 3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still pending; 4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City; 5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936; 6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client; 7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City; 8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings; 9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either." Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18, 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.

In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda. On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice. On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the following acts of misconduct: a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case where the properties were involved; b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement; and c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404]. Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings. I. Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that: This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been substantially completed. The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation. Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139B provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353]. Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.

Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a witness against him. II. The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista. After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power. The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)]. However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility. This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him. Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented, because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that: ... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied]. It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement was implemented.

Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971. Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the complainant in an antigraft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part. The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517]. Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement. Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that: We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees. Alfaro T. Fortunado [signed] Editha T. Fortunado [signed] Nestor T. Fortunado [signed] CONFORME Ramon A. Gonzales [signed] [Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4]. is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public

policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions. The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him. The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution. The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to harass complainant. Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds. The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, JJ., took no part.

3. The Insular Life Assurance Co. Employees Association v Insular Life Assurance Co IIGO F. CARLET, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Pablo Sevillo and Antonia Palisoc, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, VIRGINIA C. ZARATE, JACOBO C. ZARATE, VICTORIA C. ZARATE, HON. CONRADO DIZON, Acting Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, and DEPUTY SHERIFF ROGELIO S. MOLINA of Bian, Laguna, respondents.

Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners. Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations. Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.

CASTRO, J.: Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP. The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies). Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretarytreasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail. Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions. In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957. Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for union security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point by point, en toto. But the respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-proposals. In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security demand, otherwise the Companies "would no longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands. From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded from the Companies final counterproposals on their economic demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which would justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices. Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.

On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga. On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows: We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing. However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may: 1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so. 2. Take your meals within the office. 3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots have been prepared. 4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies. 5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours. 6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families. The decision to make is yours whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the fairness of the Management. The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958. From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers. Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions, issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' building. On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety: The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958. Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision. We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you. If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement. Before, the decisions was yours to make. So it is now. Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two others.

At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958. However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all nonstrikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees AssociationNATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them. On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike. On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of the complaint, stating special defenses therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint. After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the said decision, and their supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on October 20, 1965. Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred: 1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out individually to the strikers the letters marked Exhibits A and B; 2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmission of employees after the strike; 3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side in regard to activities undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and 4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment. I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a legitimate exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree. The said letters were directed to the striking employees individually by registered special delivery mail at that without being coursed through the Unions which were representing the employees in the collective bargaining. The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. (31 Am. Jur. 563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045) Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).

Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus, the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the employer's molestation.1 Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422). Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or unionbusting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work would be. Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.2 Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which states that "the officers and members of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return to work on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main cause why the strikers returned to work and not the letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. The circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were calculated, or which tended, to interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is not, and should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice. The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that antiunion conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. (Francisco, Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A., 1948, 170 F2d 735). Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but should be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine," ... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established collateral plan of coercion or interference. (Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.) It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After the notice to strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And during the negotiations in the

Department of Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to strike, the strikers were individually sent copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers.lwph1.t Then the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that the injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent again individually and by registered special delivery mail to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not report for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the respondents thru a screening committee of which Ramon Garcia was a member refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges." However, when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not, however, disputed that all-nonstrikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts.. Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them. To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in order to protect and continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a "deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some union men who did not actually know the very reason for the strike. It should be noted that exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia: TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR MANILA Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions intends to go on strike against THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. Plaza Moraga, Manila THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP Plaza Moraga, Manila INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION Plaza Moraga, Manila . for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING... However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from January 27, 1958. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958, the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of Strike," which so far as material, reads: 3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958, citing `deadlock in collective bargaining' which could have been for no other issue than the union shop." (exhibit 8, letter dated April 15, 1958.) The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And the actual and main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal clear the management double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed by the management such as the sudden resignation of some unionists and [who] became supervisors without increase in salary or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958,

p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they could not go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7, respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for union shop, the respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well reasoned, workable formula which takes into account the financial position of the group companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.) II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the employee must be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; (2) there must be no criminal charges against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the employees reported back to work at the respondents' head office on June 2, 1953, they must be considered as having complied with the first and third conditions. Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the second condition. It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances 34 officials and union members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents whence the criminal charges against the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec. 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act. The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for one union official who deserted his union on the second day of the strike and who later participated in crashing through the picket lines, not a single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement. So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by them." (Carlos and Fernando, Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citing Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.) It is noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work the respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that these two employees having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike were hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring. Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in another mill, which was imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473, citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43 NLRB 545; emphasis supplied.) Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening committee admitted the discrimination committed against the strikers, they tossed back and around to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in exercising for the management the authority to screen the returning employees, the committee admitted the non-strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp. 1519, 23-29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's screening committee, while admitting the discrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the management, speaking through the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an employee was left in the hands of that committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of the strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.) Of course, the respondents through Ramon Garcia tried to explain the basis for such discrimination by testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct during the picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose participation was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction between acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was the basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory examination of the evidence on record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the alleged commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct."

III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later received letters from the respondents in the following stereotyped tenor: This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958. The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of misconduct while picketing during the last strike. Because this may not constitute sufficient cause under the law to terminate your employment without pay, we are giving you the amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every year of your service in the Group Company. Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) JOSE M. OLBES President, Insurance Life Acting President, FGU. The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed strikers were the same acts with which the said strikers were charged before the fiscal's office and the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or dismissed. Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate sufficient basis for dismissal. Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not report for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many others, Tabasondra particularly identified the management men to whom he and his group presented themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one who received them and later directed them when Olbes refused them an audience to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. He likewise categorically stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If Tabasondra were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the respondents to produce De Asis and Enage who testified anyway as witnesses for the respondents on several occasions to rebut his testimony. The respondents did nothing of the kind. Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention to his non-admission and asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness required that before being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court." At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the union and in the strike, reported for work at various times during the next three days, but were told that there were no openings. Said the Court: ... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking back six union men, the respondent's officials discriminated against the latter on account of their union activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until after the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the discrimination against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725, 728) The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused readmission on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement when an employee reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee relieved from the duty of returning further. Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the Companies spent more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do not find this allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the officials referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an outgoing traveller on a combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket money; hence, this was the only amount that would appear on the books of the Companies. It was only on January 21, 1962, per

its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls. Tongos could not therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above sum. And his competence in figures could not be doubted considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified public accountants. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip which the respondents never denied or tried to disprove his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give "publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or by any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose the truth before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a union man and one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on whether or not the respondent Companies were justified in refusing to accede to union demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of management. And his statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech protected by the Constitution. Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is free ... to turn its publicity on any labor oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working conditions. The employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn publicity on the records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his men ... (Concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 591.) The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos committed not only a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and ethics of accountancy. But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this stated. Moreover, the relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a client. And with regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo, both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court should not have given them much weight. The firm of these witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a "general agency" of the Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more inclined to favor the respondents rather than Tongos. Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Dao, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez, opined the lower court, were constructively dismissed by non-readmission allegedly because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the Companies, from entering the Companies' premises on May 21, 1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest and forehead acts considered inimical to the interest of the respondents. The Unions, upon the other hand, insist that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who elbowed his way through the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in which both suffered injuries. But despite these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958, there are grounds to believe that the picketers are not responsible for what happened.lwph1.t The picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter report, exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted). Moreover, although the Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta, Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the personnel records section, reported for work at the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the court of first instance. Besides, under the circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not resort to violence. The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the following commentary: . We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act would indeed be illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the possibility of reinstatement. (Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d 472, cited in Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 378) Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has been held that:

Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p. 855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.) Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law, they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement. In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford Motor Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.) Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking employees before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those strikers who had pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the strikers is thus in order. [W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to the inference that union activities rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer] objection, the Board has usually required reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third Annual Report of NLRB [1938], p. 211.) Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as president of the FGU Workers and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they could use force and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and customers from entering the Companies' buildings. Even if this were true, the record discloses that the picket line had been generally peaceful, and that incidents happened only when management men made incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management dispute. It may be marked by colorful namecalling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board of directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex C, Decision, p. 27) another matter which emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the circumstances, there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of the union members. This act of the respondents is considered unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor practice. It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join unions as to constitute unfair labor practice. ... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization than such activity even where no discharges result. The information obtained by means of espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be used in a variety of cases to break a union." The unfair labor practice is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the employer, or by fellow employees acting at the request or direction of the employer, or an ex-employee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.) . IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental milieu of this case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices committed by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported back for work upon the invitation of the respondents they were discriminatorily dismissed. The members and officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back pay. [W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are entitled to reinstatement with back pay. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 418.) [A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication that the discharge was illegal." (Id., citing Waterman S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R. B. v. Richter's Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F. 2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. American Mfg. Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.) And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of these union members have already been filled by replacements.

[W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice," the employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out employees position has been filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved employee can be found, the employer must discharge the replacement employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out worker to his old or comparable position ... If the employer's improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement employees wherever necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases cited.) A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the backpay payable to the unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to work under the same conditions just before the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the employer is liable for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13 SCRA 258; see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We have likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra). The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, 1958, which the latter did. A great number of them, however, were refused readmission because they had criminal charges against them pending before the fiscal's office, although non-strikers who were also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted. These strikers who were refused readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed employees and are entitled to backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil, Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially so because their unlawful acts arose during incidents which were provoked by the respondents' men. However, since the employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of the Companies (for more than ten years) during which they may have found other employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever they may have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat the liability of the company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v. Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]). The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the dismissed employees of separation pay. This Court has ruled that while employers may be authorized under Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving the required notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the required compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to justify a dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union activities. ... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate the employment of its employee by serving notice on him one month in advance, or, in the absence thereof, by paying him one month compensation from the date of the termination of his employment, such Act does not give to the employer a blanket authority to terminate the employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind such termination. Certainly, it cannot be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or a scheme to trample upon the right of an employee who has been the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena Micaller, et al., 99 Phil. 904 [1956].) Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations are supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court is not therefore precluded from digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of Philippine Education Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]). V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: . ... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions: In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether or not the acts of the employees concerned justified the adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the employees may be able to put up a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or neutralize the employer's right to impose discipline on said employees. For it is settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charged was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest... The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.) (emphasis supplied)

The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored portions of the above citation read however as follows: Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer as proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it really contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by the Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-filing of the case against the employer. In rejecting the employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article as "a report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions" and, therefore, does away with the presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not have been viewed or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal Code. We are not here to determine whether the employees' act could stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so, the exempting character thereof under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may warrant employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest. In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion," which actually amounts to a public accusation, that his employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate activities on the employees, which charge, in the least, would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but an act inimical to the said employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made in the union newspaper does not alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union activity, because such end can be achieved without resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours) It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph. This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest." Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct. Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no substantial change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is entered, ordering the respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Zaldivar, J., took no part.

Footnotes 1 Cf. Chicago Apparatus Company, 12 NLRB 1002; Fruehauf Trailer Co., 1 NLRB 68; Remington Rand, Inc., 2 NLRB 626; Metropolitan Engineering Co., 4 NLRB 542; Ritzwoller Company, 11 NLRB 79; American Mfg. Co., 5 NLRB 443; Ralph A. Fruendich, Inc., 2 NLRB 802). 2 See Robert Bros., Inc., 8 NLRB 925; Hercules Campbell Body, Inc., 7 NLRB 431; Aronson Printing Co., 13 NLRB 799; E.A. Laboratories, Inc., 88 NLRB 673; Star Beef Company, 92 NLRB 1018; Jackson Press, Inc., 96 NLRB 132. * As reproduced on pp. 123-127 of the mimeographed and paperbound Supreme Court decisions for December 1964. ** Id., p. 126. (The entire decision may now be found in printed form in 12 SCRA 699-700.)

4. Adez Realty, Inc. v. CA

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 79, Morong Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and AGUEDO EUGENIO, respondents. RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.: On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law. 1 On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the President for appointment as regional trial judge. 2 But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution. 3 On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor promised that if given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City. 4 However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the motion. 5

On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among others that he had been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and community work, especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of extending legal assistance because of his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost humility his commission of an unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart." 6 His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while she did not condone what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court took a second look into its decision disbarring her husband as her entire family had been traumatized by his disbarment. 7 On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994. Thus I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full responsibility for it. I realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my secretary who was merely following my instructions. The intercalation was my own act and I am justly punished for it. Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have a wife and children to support but my only means of livelihood has been withdrawn from me. I am destitute and desperate and can only turn to you for relief . ... Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the law profession, to which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by admitting me back to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly according to its canons . ...8 On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay. On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been struggling to make both ends meet to provide for my wife and three children. Please give me the chance to prove that I am a reformed offender who will henceforth do nothing whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession. 9 On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter. 10 On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was justly punished at the time with the extreme sanction of disbarment. I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is my wife and children who have suffered more for my transgression. Although innocent, they bear with me the stigma and burden of my punishment. 11 The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that [T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . . 12 WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is effective immediately. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave.

5. Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp v. CA and Seelin ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN, respondents. DECISION MARTINEZ, A.M., J.: This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation has come to this Court assailing the execution of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-9297. Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner, considering that the issues raised in this second petition for review are but mere reiterations of previously settled issues which have already attained finality. We now write finis to this controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as we ruled in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City:[1] x x x litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium. The facts: The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of said corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment,[2] the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and void. Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to costs." The aforesaid decision was affirmed[3] by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on March 5, 1992.[4] The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents moved for execution which was granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision was issued. Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely unaware of the suit between private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner of the lot having bought the same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith. On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents motion. Another Order was issued on August 18, 1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which read: We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling reason to disturb the same. Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge. Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee[5]

The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993.[6] On further appeal to this Court, petitioners petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G. R. No. 109076, was denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993.[7] Upon finality of said resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated October 21, 1993.[8] Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a second writ of execution before the trial court which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994. Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioners motion was initially granted[9] on August 29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private respondents, the said order was reconsidered on December 19, 1994[10] by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued. Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for certiorari[11] with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be executed against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the private respondents; that certain facts and circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render the execution highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers freedom of religion and worship; and that private respondents title is being questioned in another case. On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment[12] dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. It ruled, thus: "This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent Court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. The respondent court's writs of execution and possession could have been implemented a long time ago if not for the series of legal maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. x x x x Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop the execution of a final judgment by raising issues which actually have been ruled upon by this Court in its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs, although prevailing party, will not benefit at all from a final judgment in their favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting the assessment of double costs of this suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court). Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, the instant petition has already become moot and academic as the property in question was already turned over by the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs of execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully, putting the legal battle of this case to rest." (Emphasis ours.) The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30, 1996.[13] Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating in essence the same line of arguments espoused in their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals. The petition must fail. It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy litigated come to an end. Petitioners argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to surrender and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the ground that they were never parties to the case between private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been resolved by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled: Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge. Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee.[14] The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 109076 and attained finality on October 21, 1993. There is, therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here. Further, petitioners contention that a determination of the issue of possession should first be resolved before the issuance of a writ of possession is untenable.

Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject realty. Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297 which will render the execution of the said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by the Republic of the Philippines against private respondents for nullification of 22 titles which include the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that the pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification why execution of the aforesaid judgment and delivery of possession of the subject property should be permanently stayed or at least held in abeyance until after the final resolution of the case. We do not agree. The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioners title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private respondents title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment. Finally, petitioners fear that the grave lots will be disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once the execution of the judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the Orders of the trial court with regard to the execution of the judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners have been taken into account by the trial court when it took steps and made suggestions as to how their rights could be amply protected. In its Order dated February 13, 1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated: "The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not completely without recourse or remedy because they can still go after the original party-defendant or transferor of the property in question which is Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And should it be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiff-respondents to be placed in possession of the subject property, due to defendant-petitioners' arguments that the same have already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be incumbent for the defendant-petitioners to negotiate with the plaintiffrespondents for payment in cash of the property subject of their complaint to avoid demolition or desecration since they benefited from the sale of the burial lots."[15] In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was given, to wit: "The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the plaintiffs and as proposed by the plaintiffs, they are given authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so that they can have access to the property. But as to the demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could be made by the defendant with the former owner so that cash payment or cash settlement be made."[16] Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following limitation on the writ of execution, as follows: "Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within the Eternal Gardens have been sold to so many persons who now have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the interest of justice and equity, that the enforcement of the writ of possession and break open order should be applied only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question where the factory of the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of the resting souls over the graves spread over the parcels of land within the said memorial park."[17] From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue as to the status of the burial lot owners has been properly addressed. Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the Sheriffs Return,[18] dated March 31, 1995, with the attached Turn Over Premises[19] indicating therein that private respondents took possession of the subject property. A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice.

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.[20] In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al.,[21] we ruled: "As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts." WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. Regalado (Chairman), Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.