The Deadly Sins in Public Administration Author(s): Peter F. Drucker Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 40, No.

2 (Mar. - Apr., 1980), pp. 103-106 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/975619 . Accessed: 07/05/2013 18:23
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103

Professional Fromthe Streamp

CURRENTS and SOUNDINGS

THE DEADLY SINS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Peter F. Drucker,Claremont Graduate School I one can guarantee the performanceof a public service program,but we know how to ensure non-performancewith absolute certainty.Commit any two of common sins of public administration, the following and will inevitablyfollow. Indeed, to comnon-performance mit all six, as many public serviceagencies do, is quite and an exercisein overkill. unnecessary (1) The firstthingto do to make sure thata program will not have resultsis to have a loftyobjective-"health care," for instance,or "to aid the disadvantaged."Such sentiments belong in the preamble.They explain why a specific programor agency is being initiatedratherthan what the program or agencyis meantto accomplish.' To use such statements as "objectives" thus makes sure that no effective work will be done. For work is always specific, always mundane, always focused. Yet without work thereis non-performance. To have a chance at performance, a programneeds clear targets, the attainmentof which can be measured, appraised, or at least judged. "Health care" is not even a pious intention. Indeed it is, at best, a vague slogan. Even "the best medical care for the sick," the objective of many hospitalsin the British National Health Service, is not operational. Rather,it is meaningful to say: "It is our aim to make sure that no patient coming into emergencywill go for more than three minuteswithout beingseen by a qualified triagenurse." It is a propergoal to say: "Withinthree years,our maternity ward is going to be run on a "zero defects" basis, which means that there will be no "surprises" in the deliveryroom and therewill not be one case of post-partum puerperalfever on maternity."Similarly,"Promotingthe welfareof the American farmer" is electioneering,while "Installing electricityin at least 25 per cent of America's farms within the next threeyears"-the firstgoal of the New Deal's Rural Electrification Administration, which was, perhaps,the most successfulpublic serviceagency in all our administrative history-was an objective that was specific,measurable,attainable-and attained.It immediately was converted into work, and veryshortlythereinto performance. after, (2) The second strategy guaranteed to produce non-performance is to tryto do severalthings at once. It is to refuse to establishpriorities and to stick to them. of effortsguaranteesnon-results. Splintering Yet without concentration on a priority,effortswill be splintered, and the more massivethe program, the more the splinteringeffects will produce non-performance. By contrast, even poorly conceived programsmight have resultsif priorities are set and efforts concentrated. It is popular nowadays to blame the failure of so many of the programsof Lyndon Johnson's "War on Poverty" on shaky theoretical foundations. Whether poorly conceived or not, quite a few of the Headstart schools had significantresults; every one of them, without exception, was a school that decided on one overridingpriority-havingthe children learn to read lettersand numbers-despiteheavy criticism fromWashingtonand fromall kindsof dogmatists.

No

Whether poorly conceivedor not,quite a fewof the Headstartschools had significant results; every one of them, withoutexception, was a school thatdecided on one overriding priorityhaving the childrenlearn to read lettersand numbers....
An even more impressiveexample is the Tennessee Valley Authority(TVA) in the thirties. Despite tremendous opposition, the bill establishingthe TVA only passed Congress because its backers promised a dozen different and mutually antagonistic constituencies: cheap power, cheap fertilizer, flood control,irrigation, navigation, community development and whatnot. TVA's first administrator,Arthur Morgan, a great engineer,then attempted to live up to these promises and to satisfyeveryone of his constituencies.The only result was an uncontrollablygrowingbureaucracy,unPeterF. Drucker is ClarkeProfessor of Social Scienceand Management at Claremont Graduate School.Hissixteenth book, in Turbulent Managing Times, willbe published by Harper & RowinApril 1980.

MARCH/APRIL 1980

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104

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

controllably growingexpenditures,and a total lack of any performance.Indeed, the TVA in its early years resembled nothing as much as one of those "messes" which we now attack in Washington.Then President Roosevelt removed Morgan and put in a totally unknown young Wisconsin utilitieslawyer, David Lilienthal, who immediately-againstall advice from all the "pros"-announced his priority: power production. Withina year, the TVA produced results.Lilienthal,by the way, met no opposition, but was universallyacclaimed as a saviour. is (3) The thirddeadly sin of the public administrator to believe that "fat is beautiful," despite the obvious fact that mass does not do work;brainsand musclesdo. inhibitswork, and gross overweight In fact, overweight totallyimmobilizes. One hears a great deal today about the fallacy of "throwing money at problems," but this is not really what we have been doing. We have been throwing manpower at problems, with Vietnam, perhaps, being than the worst example, and it is even worse to overstaff whethercivilianor to overfund.Today's administrators, military,tend to believe that the best way to tackle a problem is to deploy more and more people against it. The one certain result of havingmore bodies is greater and in in logistics,in personnelmanagement, difficulties communications.Mass increases weight,but not necessarilycompetence. Competence requiresdirection,deciratherthan manpower. sion, and strategy is not only much harderto correctthan Overstaffing cerpractically it makes non-performance understaffing, always focuses energies on the tain. For overstaffing inside, on "administration"ratherthan on "results,"on ratherthan its purpose. It always leads to the machinery meetingsand memorandabecoming ends in themselves. It immobilizes behind a facade of furious busyness. Harold Ickes, FDR's Secretaryof the Interiorand one of althe New Deal's most accomplished administrators, ways asked: "What is the fewestnumber of people we need to accomplish this purpose?" It is a long timesince has (or in the state governments) anyone in Washington asked thatquestion. be dogmatic" is the next-and (4) "Don't experiment, deadly the next most common-of the administrator's you do, do it on a grandscale at the first sins. "Whatever God forbid,you mightlearnhow to do it try.Otherwise, differently."In technical or product innovation, we sometimes skip the pilot-plant stage, usually to our sorrow. But at least we build a model and put it through we start wind tunnel tests. In public service,increasingly out with a "position"-that is, with a totally untested theory-and go from it immediatelyto national, if not international,application. The most blatant example may have been the ultra-scholasticdogmatism with in the "War on which we rushed into national programs Poverty" that were based on totallyspeculative,totally untried social science theories,and backed by not one shredof empiricalevidence. However, even if the theorieson which a programis based are themselvessound, successfulapplication still

balancing.It trying, fitting, demandsadaptation,cutting, always demands testing against reality before there is no Above all, any new program, finaltotal commitment. matter how well conceived, will run into the unexpected, whetherunexpected "problems" or unexpected "successes." At that point, people are needed who have been througha similarprogramon a smallerscale, who know whether the unexpected problem is relevantor not, or whether the unexpected success is a fluke or genuineachievement. Surely one of the main reasons for the success of so was thattherehad been many of the New Deal programs in states and cities earlier-in "small scale" experiments Wisconsin,for instance, in New York State or in New in York City, or in one of the reformadministrations Chicago. The outstanding administratorsof the New Deal programs-FrancesPerkinsat Labor, Harold Ickes at Interior,or ArthurAltmeyerat Social Security-were all alumnae of such earlier small-scale experiments. the New Deal programs, the trulyunsuccessful Similarly, WPA for instance, were, without exception, programs that had not firstbeen developed in small-scaleexperimentation in state or local governmentsbut were national panaceas. initiatedas comprehensive, (5) "Make sure that you cannot learn from experiin for non-performance ence" is the next prescription in advance "Do not thinkthrough public administration. resultsto what you expect; do not then feed back from expectationsso as to findout not only what you can do well, but also to find out what your weaknesses,your and yourblind spots are." limitations, does certain like everyindividual, Every organization, that "come easy to one's thingswell. They are the things like everyindieveryorganization, hand." Nevertheless, vidual, is also prone to typical mistakes, has typical limitations, and has its own blind spots. Unless the organizationshapes its own expectations to reflectthe accuracy of results,it will not findout what it does well Moreover,it and, thus, not learn to apply its strengths. will not findout whatit does poorlyand will,thus,have no opportunityto improve or to compensate for its weaknesses or its blind spots. Typically, for instance, certain institutionsexpect results much too fast and throwin the towel much too soon. A good manyof the "War on Poverty" agencies did just that. Also, thereare many organizationswhich wait much too long before they face up to the fact that a programor a policy is unsuccessful-our Vietnam policies, both civilian and military,probably belong here. One can only learn by feedback, and we know that feedback from results capacity and effectiveness. always improvesperformance the Withoutit, however,the weaknesses,the limitations, from dominate.Without learning blind spots increasingly results through feedback, any organization, like any individual,must inevitablydeterioratein its capacity to perform.Yet, in most public service institutionssuch feedback functions are either non-existentor viewed with casual skepticism.If the resultsdo not conformto expectations, they are all too frequentlydismissed as as indicationsof the obtusenessof clients,as irrelevant, 1980 MARCH/APRIL

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FROMTHE PROFESSIONALSTREAM the reactionaryobscurantismof the public, or, worstof all, as evidence of the need to "make anotherstudy." Most public service institutions,governmental ones as well as non-governmental ones, are budget-focused, but the budgets measure effortsrather than results. For performance, the budget needs to be paralleled with a statement of expected results-and with systematic feedback from results-on expendituresand on efforts. Otherwise,the agency will, almostimmediately, channel more and more of its efforts towardnon-results and will become the prisoner of its own limitations,its weaknesses, and its blind spots ratherthan the beneficiary of its own strengths. (6) The last of the administrator's deadly sins is the most damning and the most common: the inabilityto abandon. It alone guarantees non-performance, and withina fairly shorttime. Traditional political theory, the theory inherited from Aristotle,holds that the tasks of government are grounded in the nature of civil society and, thus, are immutable: defense, justice, law and order. However, very few of the tasks of modern public administration, whether governmental or non-governmental public service institutions, such as the hospital,the Red Cross, the university, or the Boy Scouts, are of thatnature.Almost all of them are manmade ratherthan grounded in the basic essentialsof society, and most of themare of very recent origin to boot. They all, therefore,share a common fate: they must become pointless at some juncture in time. They may become pointless because the need to which they address themselvesno longer exists or is no longerurgent.They may become pointless because the old need appears in such a new guise as to make obsolete present design, shape, concerns and policies. The greatenvironmental problem of 1910, for instance-and it was a very real danger-was the horrendous pollution by the horse, with its stench and its liquid and solid wastes, which threatenedto bury the cities of that time. If we had been as environmentally conscious then as we are now, we would have saddled ourselveswith agencies which only ten yearslaterwould have become totally pointlessand yet, predictably, ten yearslatertheywould have redoubled theirefforts, since they would have totally lost sight of their objectives. Moreover,a programmay become pointlesswhenit fails to produce results despite all efforts, as do our present American welfare programs.Finally-and most dangerous of all-a program becomes pointlesswhenit achieves its objectives.That we have a "welfaremess" today is, in large measure, a result of our having maintained the welfare programs of the New Deal after they had achieved their objectives around 1940 or 1941. These programswere designed to tackle the problemscaused by the temporaryunemploymentof experienced (and almost entirelywhite) male heads of families-no wonder that they then malperformed when applied to the totallydifferent problemscaused in largemeasureby the mass movementof black femalesinto the cities 10 or 15 yearslater. The basic assumption of public service institutions, MARCH/APRIL 1980

105 governmental or non-governmental ones alike, is immortality.It is a foolish assumption.It dooms the organization and its programsto non-performance and non-results. The only rationalassumptionis that everypublic service program will sooner or later-and usually sooner-outlive its usefulness, at least insofar as its present form, its present objectives, and its present policies are concerned. A public service programthat does not conduct itself in contemplation of its own mortalitywill very soon become incapable of performance. In its originalguiseit cannot produce results any longer; the objectives have eitherceased to matter, have provenunobtainable,or have been attained.Indeed, the more successful a public service agency is, the sooner will it work itself out of the job; then it can only become an impediment to performance,if not an embarrassment.

A public serviceprogram thatdoes not conduct itselfin contemplation of its own mortality will soon become incapableof performance. very
The public service administrator who wants results and performance will, thus, have to build into his own organizationan organizedprocess for abandonment.He will have to learn to ask everyfewyears: "If we did not do this already,would we now, knowingwhat we know now, go into this?" And if the answeris "no, he better not say "let's make another study" or "let's ask for a biggerbudget." He betterask: "How can we get out of this?" or at least: "How can we stop pouring more effort, moreresources,more people into this?" II Avoidance of these six "deadly sins" does not, perhaps,guaranteeperformance and resultsin the public serviceorganization,but avoidingthesesix deadly sins is the prerequisite for performance and results.To be sure, there is nothingvery recondite about these "do's and don'ts." They are simple, elementary, indeed, obvious. Yet, as everyone in public administration knows, most administrators commit most of these "sins" all the time and, indeed, all of themmost of the time. One reason is plain cowardice. It is "risky" to spell out attainable, concrete, measurable goals-or so the popular wisdom goes. It is also mundane,pedestrian and likelyto "turn off" backersor donors. "The world'sbest medical care" is so much more "sexy" than "every emergency patient will be seen by a qualified triage nurse withinthree minutes." Furthermore, to set priorities seems even more dangerous-one risksthe wrathof the people who do not really care for electricpower or fertilizer, but want to protect the little snail darteror the spotted lousewort. Finally, of course, you do not "rank" in the bureaucracy unless you spend a billion dollars and employ an armyof clerks-"fat is beautiful." Perhaps so, but experience does not bear out the common wisdom. The public serviceadministrators who

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106 to ordered priorities,and to face up to goal-setting, theirresources(the public serviceadminiconcentrating stratorswho are willingto ask: "What is the smallest number of people we need to attain our objectives?") may not always be popular, but they are respected,and theyrarelyhave any trouble at all. They may not get as far in their political careers as the ones who put but, in the end, theyare popularityabove performance, the ones we remember.

PUBLICADMINISTRATION REVIEW

We needed work on all phases of what we now call "management": personnel,budgeting,organization, and so on. But these are inside concerns.Now we need hard, systematicwork on making public service institutions perform. As I noted, for a century,from the Civil War until 1960 or so, performanceof public service institutions was taken for granted. For the last 20 years,however, malperformance is increasingly being taken for granted. Great programsare still being proposed, are still being III debated, and, in some instances, are even still being enacted, but few people expect themto produce results. But perhaps even more importantthan cowardice as All we really expect now, whetherfroma new Departan explanation for the tendency of so much of public ment of Education in Washington or froma reorganizaadministrationtoday to commit itself to policies that tion of the state government by a new governorwho can only result in non-performanceis the lack of preachesthat"small is beautiful,"is more expenditure, a concern with performance in public administration bigger budget,and a more ineffectual bureaucracy. theory. The malperformanceof public service institutions For a centuryfromthe Civil War to 1960 or so, the may well be a symptom only. The cause may be far and programs more basic: a crisis in the very foundations and of public serviceinstitutions performance was taken for grantedin the United States. It could be assumptionson which rests that proudest achievement some- of the Modern Age, national administrativegoverntaken for grantedbecause earlier administrators how knew not to commit the "deadly sins" I have 2 ment. outlined here. As a result, the discipline of public of the public service But surely the malperformance administration-apeculiarlyAmerican discipline,by the institution is in itself a contributingfactor to the way-saw no reason to concern itselfwith performance. sickness of government, and a prettybig one. Avoiding It was not a problem. It focused instead on the political the "deadly sins" of public administration may only give Gets process, on how programscome into being. W1ho symptomatic relief for whatever ails modem governHow?, the title of Harold Lasswell's 1936 What, W4hen, ment,but at least we know how to do it. classic on politics,neatly sums up one specific focus of with its challenge to American public administration, Notes traditionalpolitical theory. The other focus was procedural: "The orderlyconduct of the business of governA Results ShouldYou Expect? "What seemyarticle, 1. On this, ment" an earliergenerationcalled it. It was a necessary Vol. Review, User'sGuide to MPO,"PublicAdministration concern in an America that had little or no administra36,pp. 12-19. and experienceand was suddenlyprojected 2. I hopeeventually tivetradition tentatively subject, a bookon this to finish I havebeen on which Be Saved?," into very large public service programs,firstin World "Can Government entitled in WorldWarII. for ten yearsor more. working War I, thenin the New Deal, and finally

1980 MARCH/APRIL

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