3178065) Longino, Helen E. Keller, Evelyn Fox Fausto-Sterling, Anne Ha - Science, Objectivity, and Feminist Values

Science, Objectivity, and Feminist Values Reflections on Gender and Science by Evelyn Fox Keller; Myths of Gender: Biological
Theories about Women and Men by Anne Fausto-Sterling; The Science Question in Feminism by Sandra Harding Review by: Helen E. Longino Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 561-574 Published by: Feminist Studies, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3178065 . Accessed: 23/11/2012 14:54
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REVIEW ESSAY
SCIENCE, OBJECTIVITY, AND FEMINIST VALUES
HELENE. LONGINO on Genderand Science. By Evelyn Fox Keller. New Reflections Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1985. about Womenand Men. By Myths of Gender: BiologicalTheories Anne Fausto-Sterling. New York:Basic Books, 1986. TheScienceQuestion in Feminism. By Sandra Harding.Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress, 1986. The feminist demonstrationof masculine partialityand bias in well-establishedfields of inquiry has shaken our faith in conventional knowledge. How deeply must our skepticismreach?Is itself only an instrumentof male domination? Is objecrationality what tivity a masculineillusion?If we answer here affirmatively, is left as groundfor our own feminist claims?These questionsattain their most threateningdimensions when we bring feminist analytictools to bear on the naturalsciences. The physical,chemical,and life sciences pose a complexsubject for feminist inquiry. They are, as professions,bastions of male privilege.Throughvariousscience-based technologies,they are inin involved the transformation of productive and creasingly Most Westernersfind reproductiveprocesses. twentieth-century in these sciences a source for understanding natureand ourselves as partof and in relationto nature.They have become models for any kind of knowledge and most kinds of inquiry.And a certain vision of these sciences lies at the cool heart of modem Western culture'sself-image.In each of these aspects, the sciences have
Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (Fall 1988). ? 1988 by Helen E. Longino 561
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been constructedin hostilityto women and to what is named as female. Paradoxically,however, they have been a source of resistance to benighted prejudice even while helping to invent new modes and bases of inferiority. They have been a locus of intellectualfulfillment,emancipation,and joy, for men and for the few women admitted. And their applications can save and ameliorateas well as destroylives. Each of the books reviewed here is addressedprimarilyto one aspect of the complex face of science. Inevitably,of course, the authors'concerns spill over to the others. Evelyn Fox Keller,a biologist,has for many years been physicistturnedmathematical fascinatedby the effects of gender and of psychodynamicprocesses on the sciences. Reflectionson Genderand Science is the in-
tegratedand expanded presentationof reflectionsthat have appeared in scientific and feminist journals since the mid-1970s. is well known for DevelopmentalbiologistAnne Fausto-Sterling of of forms scientific sexism. She, devastatingcritiques specific too, has thought about the issues of good science, bad science, feminist science, and objectivity in the struggleto replace the which provide the title for her book. Sandra "mythsof gender," Hardingis one of the best known of the feministphilosophersadand has writtenilluminating dressing"thescience question" essays on theoreticalissues in the social sciences. Her concern in The
Science Questionin Feminismis as much with how feminists have
talked about science as it is with the task of envisioninga new science. Eachbook raisesand answersdifferentlyquestionsabout the natureof knowledgeand of objectivityand aboutthe relation of the sciences to their supporting culture.My essay will focus on these common concerns.
In Reflectionson Genderand Science, Keller is most concerned to
ideas in the subvertthe hegemony of certainprincipalorganizing modern natural sciences. The identificationof knowledge and dominationhas facilitatedthe developmentand establishmentof scientific theories informed by one among several possible philosophiesof nature.Kellerarguesthat alternativescientificvisions have neverthelessbeen a constant,if minority,presence,and she aims to undo the equationof knowledgeand power that keeps those visions subordinated. Becausethat equationis, accordingto
Keller, forged in masculine developmental processes, undoing it simultaneously reveals the basis of the exclusion of women from
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the sciences. Keller'sargumentproceeds through studies of the metaphoricstructureof the formativedebatesaboutearlymodem science, throughpsychodynamicinvestigationsof the emotional contentof key cognitiveconcepts,and, finally,throughthree case studies in contemporary science. As other scholars, like Brian Easlea and Carolyn Merchant' have shown, sexual and genderimagerywas (at least in England) centralto the ideologicalformationof earlymodem science. Keller notes that FrancisBacon,who first made explicitthe connections between knowledgeand power and who describedexperimentation in languageappropriate to rapeand seduction,also articulated the need for a receptiveattitudetowardnature,one that involves listeningto and respectingnatureratherthan (perhapsas well as) imposingone'swill on it. These attitudeshave not been integrated in Westernscience but have resultedin at least two traditionsof inquiryin the sciences-one dominantand anotherseemingly in need of constantreinvention.A centralgoal of Keller's is to understand why the traditionassociatedwith control,with mechanistic and reductive explanations,has thrived, but explanationsemphasizinginteraction,holism, and the integrityof organismsare continuallycast aside. To this end, she draws on the work of oborientedfeminists, ject relationstheoristsand psychoanalytically that a characteristic of scientific knowlarguing objectivity, key has been misunderstood. Keller traces that misunderedge, of scientificknowledgedescribedin standingto the sexualization the first part of the book: "'The task of explainingthe associations
between masculine and scientific thus becomes ... the task of
understandingthe emotional substructure that links our experience of gender with our cognitive experience" (p. 80). Takingthe capacityfor objectivityas the capacityfor delineating self from non-self, Kellerargues that the psychologicaldevelopment of boys accentuatesthe processesof self-other differentiation and distortsthe achievement of the true autonomy requiredfor objectivity.Both the dynamic processes of developmentthat require separation from the mother and cultural definitions of masculinityas independencereinforcean associationof the male with separateness,pushing him to rigid and exaggerated separation. Maintenanceof this form of individuationis achieved by dominationof the other. Althoughothertheoristshave used these ideas in explanationof male dominationof women, Kellersees
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here the forgingof the link between masculinity,objectivity,and the domination of nature. Once the making of this link is understood,it becomes possibleto unmakeit, and Kellerdevotes the rest of the second sectionto developingaccountsof autonomy and of objectivitythatfree these conceptsfromtheirculturallyimposed connectionswith domination. In the third section, we see how these reflectionsmight have a bearingon actualscience and not just on our ideas of science. An essay on theoreticalphysics traces long-standing problemsin the of mechanics to an interpretation quantum inabilityto let go of the of nature and of the knowledgeof natureunderlying conceptions classicalphysics. An essay on models of slime mold aggregation shows the ideological power of "mastermolecule"theories of biological processes, as against models of environmentally An essay on the work of Barbara Mcstimulatedself-organization. Clintockdemonstrateshow adherenceto a nonstandardconception of natureleads to the formulationof differentquestionsand the discovery of different answers. McClintock'sinsistence on thinking about genetic processes in the context of the entire decadesbefore genes") ("jumping organismled her to transposition -with their insistenceon the immutabilityof molecularbiologists informationcoded in DNA-could conceive of it. these essays, Kelleris concernedwith showing the Throughout effects of an ideologyof dominationon the practiceand contentof an alternative science and with articulating philosophyof naturein which nature'sorderis perceived one in which eros reappears, as inherent and self-generatedrather than construable as law governed. She endorsesa vision of natureand of society that rejects the sexual polarities permeating modern conceptions of science and natureand that would make nature's study as inviting to women as it is to men. After encounteringKeller'soriginaland provocativeideas, no one can think in the same way aboutthe sciences again.Whether one agreesor disagreeswith detailsor with the majorclaimsof her study, Keller has introduced questions that will preoccupy scholars(and,one hopes, scientists)for some time to come. Letme One set has to do try to outlinesome of my questions/reservations. in attitudes with history. How do we explainthe transformation
toward nature that took place during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? The sexualized language of the debates between
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mechanicists and hermeticists does not explain what historical at that time. conditionsmake dominationnecessary(orappealing) of the environmental destruction of Merchant's analysis Carolyn not crucial to this but The is sexual sufficient.2 explanation Europe imageryused to describe and legitimatedominationmust surely have a basis in the actualsexualpoliticsof the period,but feminist of (or any other)historianshave yet to give us an understanding this. viA second area of quandaryhas to do with Keller's pluralistic Given the sion of both science's past and its possible future. multiplicityof styles and approachesin actualsciences, why does the ideologicalprescriptioncontained in the rhetoricof domination continueto exercisea controllinginfluencein the selectionof the scientificcommunity?Keller's answer must lie in an appealto the self-perpetuating characterof gender relationsas analyzedby feminist object relationstheory. But this answer must confront exhibit severalproblems.First,humans, even modernEuropeans, greater variety in gender-relatedmatters than object relations theory seems to allow for. Feminist object relationstheory conflates what SandraHardingusefully distinguishes- symbolicand institutionalgender with individualgender. It treatsthe question of how individualsbecome gendered as equivalentto questions about the sexual division of labor (socialor institutionalgender) and about bivalent symbolicsystems associatedwith genderconor symbolicgender).Societiescan, however, maincepts (cultural tain both social and culturalgendersystems even thoughmany of their individualmembers do not conform to gender stereotypes. And if objectrelationstheoryis used to explainthe predominance of one tradition,to what can the actual variety in explanatory Is there an explanation traditionsKeller observes be attributed? available within object relations theory or must we postulate superveningfactors?Second,the scope of the theory is problematic. Does it aspireto accountfor genderdifferencegenerallyor onsocieties?Hardingnotes that ly for genderin Westernmiddle-class in some (African)societies the attributesand values associated with females in Euro-American are claimed by and for males. Other scholars have made similar claims about other nonEuropean cultures. What childrearing practices prevailing in those cultures provide the context in which the individual person develops, and do they vary in the way consistency would require?
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Third,can a phenomenonas diffuse as the patternof explanation in modem sciencesbe explainedby appealto individualpersonality, or how do features of personalitybecome ideologicallyentrenched?I suspect that there are economic and politicalreasons for the convergenceas well as psychologicalones and that a complex interactionof extrapsychicand intrapsychicprocesses is at work.3 My last concernshave to do with the discussionof objectivity. The positive account of objectivityin the chapter on "Dynamic to suggests that dynamic objectivity-which "grants Objectivity" the worldaroundus its independentintegrity,but does so in a way of (p.117)-will provide more adequate,reliable,representations naturethan are availablethroughstaticobjectivity.Becausein her epilogueKellerseems to be arguingfor diversityratherthan what she takes to be a more accurateway of conceivingnature,I'mnot sure I understandher properly. Nevertheless, the first claim I cited invites- indeed, demands-the question;How do we know? Traditionally,objectivity in science has been attributedto the justificatoryprocessesof scientificinquiry,the tests to which we subject ideas before acceptingthem. Keller'ssorts of objectivity seem to be attitudeswhich generatethe ideas that get subjectedto tests. Whatwe need is a way to connect these two conceptionsof objectivity. Anne Fausto-Sterling also addressesthe connectionbetween the sex compositionof the scientific work force and the content of Theories about science. Her concernin Mythsof Gender: Biological Womenand Men is not with a mode of knowledge that defines itself as excluding women but with the specific content of biologicalideas about women, gender, and men. As its title suggests, the aim of the book is to overturnbiologicaldeterminist of behavioraland cognitive sex differences that understandings differential treatmentof women and men. support on Five chapterstake on allegedsex differencesin performance the of various intellectual standardized tests abilities, development of gender identity and gender role behavior, premenstrualsynand the roles of dromeand menopause,allegedmale aggressivity, females and males in human evolution.In each of these, Faustopresents,in concise but sufficientdetail,the basic biology Sterling underlyingand involved in the more controversialclaims about
that remains cognizant of ... our connectivity with that world"
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sex differencesand sex-linkedcharacteristics. This better enables the readerto understandthe scientific aspects of these debates. Fausto-Sterling's teachingexperienceis in evidencehere. Although her book is clearlypitchedto a "lay" are audience,her explanations accessible without a trace of condescension. Most of the work discusses is recent. It is a measure of the lability Fausto-Sterling and inventive capacityof the fields that there is yet newer work which she does not cover. This includeswork urginga connection between fetal testosteronelevels, greaterbrainhemisphereasymmetry, and a variety of behavioralexpressionsrangingfrom lefthandedness to allergy proneness to high mathematicalability. These notions, propounded by the late neurologist Norman Geschwindand cognitiveabilitiesresearcher CamillaBenbow,are ripe for a feminist treatment. is not content merely to indicate the scientific Fausto-Sterling flaws in the work she discusses. Like other feminist scientists thinkingabout these issues, she wants to push researchin a dif- away frommodelsthat stresscontroland toward ferentdirection those that stress complexityand interaction.She also arguesthat, for the fields of researchwith which she is concerned,this is an inherently political move. It is not, in certain cases, possible "to distinguishunequivocablybetween science well done and science that is feminist"(p. 212). Fausto-Sterling supports this claim by the work of another Randi Koeske. Koeske, discussing biologist, who is developing new theoretical models for menopause research,criticizescurrentbiomedicaland behavioralmodels for their failureto take accountof both key aspectsof and the variety in women'sexperience.In addition,these models ignorethe complex interactionsbetween physiologicaland psychologicalstates. Koeske urges a much more subtle and diverse program of research, one which begins by taking as primarydata women's own accounts of their experiencesand which acknowledgesand attempts to connect the many levels at which the events associated with menopause occur. Fausto-Sterling is not suggesting that feminism offers a unique window on nature, nor is she urgingthat interactionism and respectfor complexityreplace all unicausalresearchprograms.She does seem to be sayingthat there are certainareas of biologicalresearch-those having to do with women, female biologicalprocesses, and gender-in which politics necessarily affects science. Patriarchalculture has in-
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will not prevail .... Quality research alone is not enough. Good science . . . can prevail only when the social and political at-
evitablyproducedsciences that dehumanizeand/ormisrepresent has requiredmodern women; a moreadequatescientificapproach feminism for its emergence and will continue to depend on a we don'trecognizethe apfeministcontextfor its development."If scientists Koeskeas one aspect of such as proachesdevelopedby then a real science" broadpoliticalchange, dangerexiststhat "good mosphereoffers it space to grow and develop"(p. 213). As I interpret Fausto-Sterling, she is saying, first, that flawless researchcan be pursuedwithin an inmethodologically adequatemodel. The explanatoryframeworksof a researchprogram requirescrutinyover and above the scrutinywe devote to the use of appropriate controlsin experimentsand the qualityof the statisticalanalysis of our results. Secondly, even beautiful frameworkis in researchpursuedwithin an adequateexplanatory at of no all on the overall pictureof women danger making impact the and gender presented by biological sciences. If individual researchprogramsremainisolatedfrom each other, and from the movement for social change that could supportthem, they can without a trace. I appreciated Fausto-Sterling's insistence on narrowing the of the relationsbetween science and politics,objectividiscussion ty and values, to specificresearchquestions,her sense of the complexity of these relations,and her groundingof that discussionin particularinstances of work. Of course, far from settling the issues, these virtuesraisefurtherquestions.Forinstance,by what criteriado "feministinsights concerningthe subjective/objective separation,the validation of a woman's individual health experiences, the highlightingof the fear and dislike of women frequently found in the medical literature,and the complexityand social contextsof women'slives"(p. 213) constitutegood science? Once we acknowledge the relevance of value-basedconsiderations in the developmentof scientifictheory,how do we weigh the role of empiricalconsiderations? Koeske'smodel may indeed be worth emulating, but the methodologicalissues need further developmentif her work is to serve as more than inspiration. Just this sort of methodologicaldiscussion is promisedearly in
The Science Question in Feminism when Sandra Harding writes sink into the seas of Biological Abstracts or Chemical Abstracts4
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that "thisbook examines important trends in the feminist critiques of science with the aim of identifying tensions and conflicts between them, inadequate concepts informing their analyses, unrecognized obstacles to and gaps in their research programs,and extensions that might transformthem into even more powerful tools ..." (p. 10). ambitiousvolume documents the transitionin femiHarding's nists'discussionsof science from"thewoman question"-for examdebates-to the science question-can the ple, the nature-nurture sciences accommodate women's experiences and aspirations? How must they be transformedif they are adequatelyto include and subjects?Perhapsbecause of its amwomen as participants book is more uneven than the first two bitious scope, Harding's discussed.Her discussionsof feministsocialtheory are insightful, on the social strucas is, for the most part,her review of literature ture of science. The grasp displayed in this book of both the naturalsciences and the philosophy of science is more tenuous. Hardingidentifies five projectsrelated to the sciences currently pursued in contemporaryfeminist scholarship:(1) studies of the social structureof the sciences, (2) studies of the uses and abuses and masculinebias of the sciences, (3) criticismof androcentrism in particular researchprograms,(4)textualcriticism(forexample, explorationof the metaphoricstructureof scientifictheories and manifestos),and (5) epistemologicalexplorations.Although conof taining excursionsinto Africanphilosophyand historiography and Seventeenth-century Sixteenthscience, the book is primarily a discussion of these projects.While finding much to praise in them, Hardingclaims that they have all, ultimately,been limited by inadequateconceptions of gender and by inadequateunderstandingsof science. I agree with this assessmentand found Harding's discussionof Hertreatment the tripleaspectsof the gendersystem illuminating. of science is less successful. She assertsthat the two majorerrors of twentieth-century approachesto science are treatingscience as a set of sentences and thinkingabout science as a unique methodology. Instead,we should think about science as "afully social Hardingdoes not, however, develop the implicationsof activity." of scientific knowledge but this approachfor our understanding concentrates on showing how failure to appreciate the social characterof science derailsvarious feminist projects.
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touches on a rich Although The ScienceQuestionin Feminism varietyof topics, the main threadof discussionpursuesthe last of the identified feminist projects, "epistemological inquiry." Epistemologyis the study of philosophicalproblemsin our concepts of knowledgeand truth, among them the question of what constitutesadequatejustificationfor assertionsthat a given claim is true. Hardingdistinguishesthree feminist epistemological programs-feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory, and She states,at the close of her book, that feminist"postmodernism." the projectsidentifiedwith all three of these programsmust continue, but she is concernedwith describingthe tensions within and among them, which have impeded their progress.Harding's to the questionsI have raisedfor Kellerand Faustocontributions to are be expectedin these sections,so I shall concentrate Sterling my discussionon them. Feministempiricismis describedas the view that "sexismand are social biases correctableby stricteradherence androcentrism norms of inquiry" to the existingmethodological (p. 24). Feminist not empiricismbut allegianceto philosophical empiricismis, thus, science. Hardingarguesthat femione or anothercontemporary nist empiricismunderminesitself by makingthe additionalclaim that "women(orfeminists,whethermen or women) as a groupare more likely to produce unbiased and objective results than are feminist men (or nonfeminists)as a group" (p. 25). But Harding's of "To as follows. could say any group,X, thatit is reply empiricist likely to produce unbiased results is to make a statisticalclaim about the correlationof two properties-membershipin groupX and producingunbiasedresults.It is an empiricalassertionthat is To produce itself subjectto test by the appropriate methodologies." the inconsistencyHardingseems to detect, the claim would have to be presentedas a conceptualtruthaboutthe natureof womanhood- thatit is of the essence of womanhood(orfeminism)to produce more objectiveor unbiasedresults.Whatfeministempiricist has made this claim?As Noretta Koertgeobserves, a consistent empiricismwould welcome the new hypotheses that can be expected to be put forwardfor testingthroughthe emergenceof the Whatthe gay, women's,and ThirdWorldliberationmovements.5 doesn'tgive up is case, the Popperian) empiricist(or, in Koertge's the rightto subjectsaid hypothesesto rigoroustests. in the chapters cited earlier, comes closest to Fausto-Sterling,
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to feministempiricism,but even she makingthe claimsattributed doesn'tclaim that women or feministsare more likely to produce unbiased results, nor is she content with existingmethodologies. She does say that new ideas abouta specificsubjecthave emerged in the context of a political and cultural movement that takes women'slives seriously.Once those ideas have been transformed into specifichypotheses,Fausto-Sterling, would, I'msure, demand that they be rigorouslytested. The continuingfeminist context is necessaryto keep the ideas alive, to connectisolatedresearchprograms with one another so that they can coalesce in a broader unified vision. What both the idealizingempiricistand Harding overlookis our actualworld in which so much researchis done, so (especiallyif done by women or members of other marginalized groups)can die of neglect. Harding'sfeminist empiricist is a straw woman-designed to give way to feministstandpoint theory,the view that inquiryfrom a feminist (or women's)perspectivewill provide more adequate of nature and social life. Here, there are real inunderstandings dividuals-Jane Flax, Hilary Rose, Dorothy Smith, Nancy Hartsock (I would add Alison Jaggarto Harding's list)-who identify themselves as standpointtheorists. The chapter"FromFeminist is one of the Empiricismto Feminist StandpointEpistemologies" best in the book. Harding's to address fails discussion, however, two central issues. If standpoint theories are to constitute epistemologies(i.e., theories of justificationor of the groundsfor or "obmakingtruth claims),then such notions as "lessdistorted" demand analysis. Second, standpointtheory jectivity increasing" was developedby social scientiststo addressspecific problemsin the various social sciences. Although Hardingdid argue in an earlierchapterthat we ought not take physics as the paradigmof inquiry, there is no argument (althoughone is promised) that social sciences are or should be the paradigmof inquiry.Such an argumentwould be necessaryto take the discussionof standpoint methodologicalissues in physical, chemical, and life sciences. Standpointtheories themselves are supplantedin The Science Questionin Feminism Hardingwill by "feminist postmodernism."
later say that we need both approaches but seems to be convinced by the observation, made by a number of feminists, that neither theory in The Science Question in Feminism as relevant to the much is published, that perfectly good-even brilliant-work
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women nor feminists constitute a homogeneous group from which a singleworld view or perspectivecan be constructed.The postmodernismshe endorses seems, however, incomplete. As for example,the postmodernism she finds in Donna epistemology, "A for Manifesto Cyborgs,"6 "justifies Haraway'scomplex essay, knowledge claims only insofar as they arise from enthusiastic violationof the foundingtaboos of Westernhumanism" (p. 193). Any violation?Does it matterif violationsresult in incompatible knowledgeclaims?Hardingfaultsthis approachfor failingto give us knowledge that is adequateas a basis for politicalaction, but similarquestionsarise for the thesis expressedin her conclusion that "ithas been and should be moral and political beliefs that direct the developmentof both the intellectualand social structures of science"(p. 250). This does not assist us, for example,in and Nancy Descentof Woman choosingbetween ElaineMorgan's Both of these books develop acHuman.7 Tanner'sOn Becoming counts of human origins that are shaped by feminist commitments, but Morgan's gynecentricstory flies in the face of contemporary paleontologicaland biological theory and methodology, thesis also does not adand Tanner's book exploitsthem. Harding's dress the difficulttask of evaluatingmoral and politicaldivisions among those committedto the struggleagainstmasculinismand corporatedomination. a new and coherentaccountof the If the book fails to articulate of literature.Its value as a it amount review a fair does sciences, review is, however, diminishedby some careless scholarship(or judgments.Some errorsare trivial, poor editing)and idiosyncratic incidenceof hermaphroditism such as the overestimated (p. 127), the description of the professional scientific work force as laboratorytechnicians and equipment makers (p. 72), the misleadingsuggestionthat evolutionarybiology is primarilydevoted to studying human evolution (p. 46), and occasionalmisattribuvirtual tions and miscitations.A more serious lapse is Harding's work as "abriefaccountof the imdismissalof EvelynFox Keller's plications of object relations theory for science."Keller'slongstandingengagementwith these issues has had such a stronginfluence on feministsthinkingaboutthe sciences that this description is quite perplexing. criticismsof the philosophy of science (preFinally, Harding's sented for the most part as the product of an anonymous and
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are directedat outdatedviews and overhomogeneousfraternity) for look currentthinkingin this field. Hardingchidesphilosophers or of of a set science as sentences. unique methodology thinking Even in positivism's heyday, it was scientific theories-not science-that were treatedas sets of sentences.Most philosophers of science think of scientific reasoningas on a continuum with practical, everyday reasoning and not as the expression of a unique methodology.The only establishedphilosopherof science Harding does take on individually is Mary Hesse, the British historian and philosopher of science. Harding'streatment of Hesse'srecent work seems oddly incomplete,for much of it, contrary to what Hardingsuggests,is a philosophicalexplorationof the interactionsbetween science, metaphysics,and social life.8 Because so much of the argumentof The ScienceQuestionin Feminism is structuredas a discussionof the problemsand inadein the existing literature, it is disappointingthat the quacies literatureis so unreliablyreported.The main problem with this book, however, is the attempt to subsume the naturalsciences under the social sciences without sufficiently attending to the goals, content,and methodologiesof naturalscience inquiry.Harding consequentlyrepresentsboth feminists and philosophersas havingthoughtin only the shallowesttermsaboutthe questionsof objectivity,values, realism, and truth that are raised by the critiques of science. This reductionisttreatmentof her sources prevents her from goingbeyond the obvious claimthat the "problematics"of science are androcentricand from developing sophisticated and powerful answers to the questionsshe raises. Reflectingon all three books leads me to realizethat we, feminist scholarswritingin and aboutthe sciences,have not sufficiently distinguished a critique of the sciences from a critique of positivistphilosophyof science. A discussionof alternativeways of doing science or of thinking about nature is not enough to dislodgeentrenchedphilosophicalviews aboutknowledge.And a critiqueof those views will not show us how science can be done differentlyor why it should be. In orderto answer the questions about rationality and objectivitythat troubleus as we remakethe world, we must distinguishthe sciences from their philosophies. This is not to say that the two are not related. Feminist philosophershave much to learnaboutthe natureof science from studying the practice of feminist scientists as well as from trying to
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and sociologicalquesunderstandthe more abstractphilosophical tions. And feministscientistsare eagerfor the new ideas and conceptual space that philosophers can make available. Scientific knowledge-although not the product of some uniquely truthproducingmethod- is neverthelessa specificform of knowledge. It is pursued for particularreasons, to achieve particularends. the aims of individualsengagedin scientificinquiry Furthermore, are not, or not necessarily,identicalwith those of the society that supportssuch inquiry.We must attendto what these aims are or could be to morefully understand both the limitsand the possibilities of science.
NOTES
I wish to thank Ruth Doell and ElisabethLloydfor their helpful comments on earlier draftsof this essay. N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980); and CarolynMerchant,The Death of Nature: Women,
1. Brian Easlea, Witch-Hunting, Magic, and The New Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands,
2. Merchant,42-68. 3. RogerGottliebmakes some similarpoints about feminist object relationstheorists' explanations of male domination in "Motheringand the Reproductionof Power," SocialistReview,no. 77 (September-October 1984):93-119. 4. Biological Abstractslists about 15,000 articles in biology per month, and Chemical indicatesa similar,if not even higher, publicationrate in chemistry. Abstracts 5. Noretta Koertge, "Methodology, Ideology, and Feminist Critiques of Science,"in PSA, 1980, vol. 2, ed. Peter D. Asquith and Ronald Giere (East Lansing, Mich.: Philosophyof Science Association, 1981), 346-59. SocialistReview,no. 80 (March-April 6. Donna Haraway,"AManifestofor Cyborgs," 1985):65-107. Hardingalso cites conversationswith Jane Flaxas havingcontributedto her acceptanceof a postmoderniststance. 7. Elaine Morgan,TheDescentof Woman (New York:Stein & Day, 1972);and Nancy Human(Cambridge: Tanner,On Becoming CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981). IndianaUniversity Press, 1980). Science(Bloomington:
8. See the essays in Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of
Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980).

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Science, Objectivity, and Feminist Values Reflections on Gender and Science by Evelyn Fox Keller; Myths of Gender: Biological

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