GONZALES VS. COMELEC Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.

The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions: 1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member; 2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) electivedelegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November,1971;" and 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution. Held: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of hisoffice, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned. "The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof." Article XV of the Constitution provides: . . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention. MARY CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS COMMISSION APPOINTMENTS & MALLILLIN On 27 Aug 1987, Cory designated Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of CHR. In December of the same year, Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. The CoA, ignoring the decision in the Mison case, averred that Bautista cannot take her seat w/o their confirmation. Cory,

through the Exec Sec, filed with the CoA communications about Bautistasappointment on 14 Jan 1989. Bautista refused to be placed under the CoAs review hence she filed a petition before the SC. On the other hand, Mallillin invoked EO 163-A stating that since CoA refused Bautistas appointment, Bautista should be removed. EO 163-A provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President. ISSUE: Whether or not Bautistas appointment is subject to CoAs confirmation. HELD: Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the CoA it follows that theappointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CoA. To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the CSC, the CoE and the COA, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the CoA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint. And Sec 2(c), EO 163 authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the CHR. Because of the fact that the president submitted to the CoA on 14 Jan 1989 the appointment of Bautista, the CoA argued that the president though she has the sole prerogative to make CHR appointments may from time to time ask confirmation with the CoA. This is untenable according to the SC. The Constitution has blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with the participation of the Commission on Appointments, so also has the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in the Commission on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution. The exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained. Further, EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTSAN APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS NO VACANCYTO WHICH AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989. There can be no ad interim appointments in the CHR for the appointment thereto is not subject to CoAs confirmation. Appointments to the CHr is always permanent in nature. The provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office. SANIDAD VS COMELEC Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for anational referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among otherthings, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, theperiod of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree,Pres ident ial Decree1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to thenational referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed interalia, Section 4, ofPresidentialDecree 991. On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating thequestions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recitesin its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim NationalAssembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in thereferendum-plebiscite of October 16.The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father andson, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission onElections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without forceand effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution,as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise,

control,hold, and conduct the Referendum- Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend thatunder the1935and1973 Constitutions there is nogrant to the incumbentPresident to exercise the constituent powerto propose amendments to the new Constitution.As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L- 44684, wasinstituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the powerto propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferredon the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition forProhibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., andAlfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative tothe forthcoming Referendum- Plebiscite of October 16.Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to,or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of allits Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of allits Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendmentto, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscitewhich shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In thepresent period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferredwith that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly,upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, proposeamendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with ArticleSixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e.,period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated bythe proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of threefourths of all its members; or (2) by aConstitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election votedupon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendmentsmay be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call bythe interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbentPresident is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interimNational Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailingconditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted onthe Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President wasgiven the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision todefer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In theplebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, thepeople voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, theCitizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether theinterim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of theinterim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the peoplehad already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes theproposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is notlegislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon itby the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interimNational Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation byvirtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In politicalscience a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a

legislativecharacter. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of thePresident of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve ordisapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with propositionor adoption of amendments totheConstitution. IMBONG V COMELEC RELATED LAWS: Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970. RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2 Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of 320delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates. RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4. Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy Sec 2: apportionment of delegates Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from assuming any appointive office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon. Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a delegate to the convention. FACTS: This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8 ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional. HOLDING: The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional. RATIO: - Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution -Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132: Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4 - Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population. - Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention. - Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations. PAMATONG VS. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court

claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office? RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this

Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.