Ahmed Hikmat Shakir,

Another Iraqi Who Flees To Bagdad

Shakir, unknown, murky figure is believed to

have provided logistical assistance to one,
maybe two, of the 9/11 hijackers.

Received A Phone Call From 1993 WTC

Bombing Safe House of Musab Yasin
Prior to the 1993 WTC bombing Shakir had
received a phone call from the Jersey City, New
Jersey, safehouse of the plotters who would
soon, in February 1 993, bomb the WTC . The
safehouse was the apartment of Musab Yasin, brother of Abdul Rahman Yasin 1.
When Shakir was arrested shortly after the 9/11 attacks, his “pocket litter,” in the
parlance of the investigators, included contact information for Musab Yasin and
another 1993 plotter, Ibrahim Suleiman 2.

Malaysia 1999
In 1999, August, the Shakir story begins , which sounds mo re like a fictional spy -
movie than true life. Shakir, a 37-year-old Iraqi, accepted a position as a
"facilitator" at the airport in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. A "facilitator" works for an
airline and assists VIP travelers with paperwork req uired for entry and other logistical
issues. Shakir got the job because someone in the Iraqi embassy in Malaysia wanted
him to have it. He started that fall. Although Shakir officially worked for Malaysian
Airlines, his contact in the Iraqi embassy control led his schedule 3.

2000 Escorts Khalid al Mihdhar, One of 9/11 Hijackers

January 5th, 2000: Shakir apparently received an assignment from his embassy
contact. He was to escort a recent arrival through immigration at the airport. Khalid
al Mihdhar, a well-connected Al Qaeda member who would later help hijack American
Airlines Flight 77 and had come to Malaysia for an important Al Qaeda meeting that
would last at least three days. It is also believed he may have met and also assisted
Nawaf al Hazmi, anothe r hijacker, thought to h ave arrived on January 4 th, 2000.4

Photographed Shakir Greeting Al Mihdhar ,

Malaysian intelligence photographed Shakir greeting al Mihdhar at the airport and
walking him to a waiting car. But rather than see the new arrival off, h e hopped in
the car with al Mihdhar and accompanied him to the meeting. Malaysian intelligence
has provided its photographs to the CIA. While U.S. officials can place Shakir at the
meeting with the hijackers and several high -ranking Al Qaeda operatives, th ey do
not know whether Shakir participated actively. (Also present at the meeting were
Hambali, Al Qaeda's top man in South Asia, and Khallad, later identified as the
mastermind of the attack on the USS Cole 5.

10-69
 Disappears After Al Qaeda 9/11 Malaysian Meeting

January 11th, 2000: Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, disappears. The Al Qaeda meeting
concluded on January 8 th, 2000. Shakir reported to work at the airport on January
9th and January 10th, and then never again. Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaz al Hazmi
also disappeared briefly, then flew from Bangkok, Thailand, to Los Angeles on
January 15th, 2000. 6
Catch and Release –Catch and Release
1993 WTC Connection
Project Bojinka Material
September 17th, 2001: Shakir was arrested six days after the 9/ 11 attacks by
authorities in Doha, Qatar. According to an October 7 th, 2002 article by Newsweek's
Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, "A search of Shakir's apartment in Doha, the
country's capital, yielded a treasure trove, including telephone records linking him to
suspects in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and Project Bojinka, a 1994
Manila plot to blow up civilian airliners over the Pacific Ocean .7

Terrorists Network Contacts

Shakir had contact information for a lot of bad people. As noted, one was a Kuwaiti,
Ibrahim Suleiman, whose fingerprints were found on the bomb making manuals U.S.
authorities allege were used in preparation for the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing. Suleiman was convicted of perjury and deported to Jordan. Another was
Musab Yasin, the brother of 1 993 Trade Center bomber Abdul Rahman Yasin. 8

Yet another was Zahid Sheikh Mohammed, brother of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the
mastermind of the September 11 th attacks, now in U.S. custody. Shakir also had an
old number for Taba Investments, an Al Qaeda front group. It was the number long
used by Mahmdouh Mahmud Salim 9.

Despite all of this, the Qatari authorities released Shakir shortly after they arrested
him.

A Sudan Connection? Mahmdouh Mahmud Salim

Again here is a murky connection of Shakir, to Salim ; if we think of Saddam’s
connections to Sudan and Abu Nidal terrorist camp, it makes sense why he would
have this number. But it is not conclusive. Salim is currently serving time in a US
prison.
Mahmdouh Mahmud Salim Highlights
 Managed guesthouses and tr aining camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
 On several occasions, he advised other members of Al Qaeda that it was islamically
proper to attack nonbelievers, even if others might be killed. The innocents would go
to paradise; those who were not innocent dese rved to die, he said.
 Advocated for Al Qaeda's move to Sudan in 1991 to a group of Al Qaeda members.
 He made $1,500 a month working for Al Qaeda in Sudan, prompting complaints by
Jamal al-Fadl, who was paid less.
 In Sudan, he discussed fatwa’s regarding th e United States' presence in Saudi Arabia.
 Held bank account at Bank Shmal, Khartoum, Sudan.
 Assisted in Al Qaeda's attempt to buy uranium in 1993 -94.
SOURCE: MAMDOUH MAHMUD SALIM, AL -QAEDA FINANCIER
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG/SECURITY/PROFILES/MAMDOUH_MAHMUD_SAL IM.HTM

10-70
October 21st, 2001: Shakir flies to Amman, Jordan, where he tries to board a plane
to Baghdad. But Jordanian authorities arrest him. Shortly after Shakir was detained,
Saddam's government begins to pressure Jordanian intelligence --with a mixture of
diplomatic overtures and threats --to release Shakir, but it does not work. Then ,
Shakir is held in a Jordanian prison for three months without being charged.
Amnesty International pressures Jordan to release him9. Between Saddam and
Amnesty International, Shakir is released.10

January 28th, 2002: Shakir is released by Jordan’s authorities ; he quickly returns

to Iraq and never surfaces again. 11

In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a name was found on a roster

belonging to Iraqi Intelligence Se rvice. The issue was hotly debated ; later, it was
concluded that this was not Shakir. 12The Senate Intelligence Committee's September
8th, 2006 report concluded that "Shakir was not affiliated with Al Qaeda, and had no
connections to the IIS (Iraqi Intell igence Service). 13 Just one question leaves the
reader confounded, bewildered : if Shakir had no connections with Al Qaeda, why did
he have all those connections to terrorists? In the least , he had to belong to some
kind of terrorist organization. To dismis s Shakir just as a nobody, not even worth
noting, leaves us in purgatory.

Two footnotes are the sum total of what the 9/11 Commission had to say about
Ahmed Hikmat Shakir. Here is the more substantive, footnote 49 to Chapter 6, on
page 502 of the 567 -page report: "Mihdhar was met at the Kuala Lumpur airport by
Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national. CIA Reports that he was a lieutenant colonel
in the Iraqi Fedayeen turned out to be incorrect. They were based on a confusion of
Shakir's identity with that of an Iraqi Fedayeen colonel with a similar name, who was
later (in September 2001) in Iraq at the same time Shakir was in police custody in
Qatar." The report is sourced to a briefing from the CIA's counterterrorism center
and a story in the Washington Post . And that's it.

Readers of the 9/11 Commission report who bothered to study the footnotes might
wonder who Shakir was, what he was doing with a 9/11 hijacker in Malaysia, and
why he was ever "in police custody in Qatar." They might also wonder why the
report, while not addressing those questions, went out of its way to provide
information about who he was not. Such readers are still wondering.

 Ahmed Hikmat Shakir was arrested in Doha, Qatar, just six days after the 9/11
attacks. How was he apprehended so quickly? Was the CIA monitoring his activities?
 How long was the phone call between Ahmed Hikmat Shakir and the safehouse shortly
before the 1993 World Trade Center attack?
 Does the U.S. government have other indications that Ahmed Hikmat Shakir and the
1993 World Trade Center bombers were in contact, either before or after that attack?
 Vice President Dick Cheney has spoken publicly about documents that indicate Abdul
Rahman Yasin was provided safe haven and financing upon his return to Iraq in 1993.
The FBI is blocking declassification of those documents, despite the fact that Yasin is
on the FBI Most Wanted Terrorist list. Why?
 Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Abdul Rahman Yasin, Musab Yasin, and Ahmed
Hikmat Shakir were all believed to be in Iraq. Whe re are they today?

SOURCE: SINS OF COMMISSION, BY STEPHEN F. HAYES THE WEEKLY STANDARD , AUGUST 31, 2005.
FRONTPAGEMAG.COM/ARTICLES/READARTICLE.ASP?ID=19327

10-71
FOOTNOTES / REMARKS
1] SINS OF COMMISSION, BY STEPHEN F. HAYES , THE WEEKLY STANDARD, AUGUST 31, 2005.
FRONTPAGEMAG.COM/ARTICLES/READARTICLE.ASP?ID=19327
[2] DICK CHENEY WAS RIGHT FROM THE OCTOBER 20, 2003 ISSUE: "WE DON'T KNOW" ABOUT SADDAM AND
9/11. BY STEPHEN F. HAYES 10/20/2003, VOLUME 009, ISSUE 06
WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM/CONTENT/PUBLIC/ARTICLES/000/ 000/003/238DKPEE.ASP?PG=1
[3] SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PHILANTHROPY OF TERROR (SADDAM'S 9/11 CONNECTION DOCUMENTED)
MEDIA FELLOW HOOVER INSTITUTION AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY ^ | DEROY MURDOCK
HTTP://FREEREPUBLIC.COM/FOCUS/NEWS/1254304/POSTS?PAGE=1
[4] SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL, FROM THE SEPTEMBER 5 / SEPTEMBER 12, 2005 ISSUE: WHAT THE 9/11
COMMISSION NARRATIVE LEFT OUT: IRAQIS. BY STEPHEN F. HAYES
09/05/2005, VOLUME 010, ISSUE 47
WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM/CONTENT/PUBLIC/ARTICLES/000/000/005/996SSJSB.ASP
[5] IBID 4
[6] IBID 4
[7] IBID 1
[8] IBID 4
[9] JORDAN SECURITY MEASURES VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS
JORDAN: IN COMMUNICADO DETENTION / LEGAL CONCERN / FEAR OF TORTURE...
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL IS CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY OF IRAQI CITIZEN AHMAD HIKMAT SHAKIR, WHO
IS BEING HELD BY THE JORDANIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT ...
WEB.AMNESTY.ORG/LIBRARY/INDEX
[10] IBID 1
[11] IBID 4
[12] AL QAEDA LINK TO IRAQ MAY BE CONFUSION OVER NAMES BY WALTER PINCUS AND DAN EGGEN
WASHINGTON POST STAFF WRITERS TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 2004; PAGE A13 .
[13] REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE REPORT ON THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S POSTWAR FINDINGS ABOUT IRAQ’S WMD PROGRAMS AND LINKS TO
TERRORISM AND HOW THEY COMPARE WITH PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ SEPTEMBER
8, 2006, PAGE 60.

Project Bojinka
Another stranger than fiction aspect of this Iraqi Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, being
dismissed as almost a not entity of terrorism, is that he had in possession ,
information concerning Project Bojinka. This should have started an a valanche of US
and International Intelligence agencies after him.

Project Bojinka, also known as Opplan Bojinka, was a massive, complex plot hatched
by Ramzi Yousef following the truck bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993.
Based in Manila, Yousef and his associates began work on a series of bombs and
timing devices for use aboar d airplanes. 1

According to captured terrorist Abdul Hakim Murad, who ’s apprehension foiled the
plot, Yousef chose Manila as his base of operations because of the low standa rd of
living there 2.

Yousef's primary target was up a dozen transpacific airliners. Plotters would sneak
bomb parts and liquid explosives onto planes and assemble the bombs while on
board. They would get off at an intermediate stop and leave the bombs to explode
via timers while en route to their final destination in the United States. This appears
to be the most mature part of Bojinka: Specific flights were targeted, and Yousef
himself performed a "test run" on a Philippines Airlines flight to Tokyo that left one
man dead. This aspect of the plot is similar to the transatlantic airliners plot
disrupted by British authorities in 2006 , and is that just a coincidence ?3

10-72
 Designed To Kill 5,000 People
Using airline timetables, Mohammed and Yousef devised a s cheme whereby five men
could, in a single day, board 12 flights — two each for three of the men, three each
for the other two — assemble and deposit their bombs and exit the planes, leaving
timers to ignite the bombs up to several days afterward. By the ti me the bombs
exploded, the men would be far away and far from reasonable suspicion. The math
was simple: 12 flights with at least 400 people per flight. Somewhere in the
neighborhood of 5,000 deaths. 4
FOOTNOTES / REMARKS
[1] JIHAD INCORPORATED: A GUIDE TO MILITANT ISLAM IN THE US, STEVEN EMERSON PROMETHEUS BOOK
2006, PAGES 31-32.
[2] IBID 1
[3] TRIPLE CROSS, PETER LANCE HARPER , COLLINS PUBLISHERS , 2006, PAGES 150-152.
[4] OPLAN BOJINKA
HTTP://WWW.ANSWERS.COM/TOPIC/OPLAN -BOJINKA

In 1990 when Saddam inva ded Kuwait, many

Islamic radicals voiced opposition to Saddam
Hussein after he invaded Kuwait. Sudan's Hasan
al-Turabi was not one of them. Turabi's
willingness to back Hussein gave the Iraqi
dictator the Islamist credibility he would exploit
and build on for years to come. 1 Little
remembered is Yasser Arafat throwing his full weight of support behi nd Saddam’s
invasion of Kuwait. 2

How much a bridge for bin Laden and Saddam was Turabi, considering he was one of
Saddam's staunchest allies? Turabi is considered to be one of the most influential
Islamists of the past two decades. I have discussed his hosting of international
terrorist training camps, and their summits in chapter 8. He is one of the principal
architects of Sudan's Islamist revolution in 1989 , designed after Iran’s. Let’s not
forget that Turabi was also the longtime mentor, friend, and host of Osama bin
Laden during his stay in Sudan. 3

Had not Saddam done battle with the Great Satan, “America”, and warring upon the
lesser Satan, Israel? Was not S addam providing safe harbor for terrorists, Dr.
Haddad, Abdul Rahman Yasin , Abu Nidal and more? Had not Iraqi Intelligence
provided extensive military tactics and bomb making craft to one of bin Laden’s top
operative Ahmed Hikmat Shakir? Had not Saddam Hu ssein even attempted to
assassinate a President of the Great Satan, Bush? And did not this American
president put foreign troops on the most holy ground of Islam, Saudi Arab, in 1990
where Mecca is, where Moslems turn to all over the world five times a d ay and pray
to ? As we look more closely to just a few facts, things start adding up as why bin
Laden forgave Saddam Hussein and eventually wanted to work with him.

In August of 1996, Bin Laden signed and issued a Declar ation of Jihad outlining th e
Al Qaeda goals: Drive US Forces from the Arabian Peninsula, overthrow the
government of Saudi Arabia, liberate Muslim holy sites, and support Islamic
revolutionary groups around the world. He declares that Saudis have the right to
strike at US troops in the Persian Gulf 4.

10-73
Let us consider, with the Al Qaeda, would not Saddam evidently have a means to
attack, destabilize, and change certain Mid –East countries which supported America,
and build a united fron t against the US? Would not Al Qaeda become a H ezbollah
paramilitary type unit through which Saddam could strike the US, much like Iran
does with the Hezbollah, against Israel, while maintaining plausible deniability?

Immediately after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, bin Laden approached the Saudi regime
and offered to lead Muslim forces in driving Saddam out of Kuwait . In fact, he said
he could get some 5,000 jihad warriors to come to Saudi Arabia. Many who
downplay the relationship between the former Iraqi regime and Al Qaeda point to
this as an example of the hostility between Hussein and bin Laden. 5

 But Osama's spurned offer is only part of the story. While bin Laden's first instinct may
have been to oppose the secular tyrant, his soon -to-be host in Sudan did not share
these sentiments. According to a n interview at the time with Turabi's cousin, Mudawi
Turabi, the Sudanese leader met twice with Saddam Hussein before the Gulf war and
"had appeared to be designing his own Islamic empire even then."

In October 1990, Turabi led a delegation of Islamists t o Jordan to meet with Iraqi
government officials. Bin Laden sent emissaries to this meeting as well. While it is not
clear what bin Laden's emissaries or bin Laden himself thought of the meeting, it is
clear that Turabi threw his full support behind Saddam . In a press conference after the
meeting, Turabi warned "there is going to be all forms of jihad all over the world
because it is an issue of foreign troops on sacred soil." 6

From the first pronouncement issued Feb ruary 23rd, 1998, by the "World Islamic
Front" --Osama bin Laden, Saudi; Ayman al -Zawahiri, head of the "Jihad Group,"
Egypt; Abu Yasir Taha, head of the "Islamic Group," Egypt; Mir Hamzah, head of the
Clerical Group of Pakistan; and Fazlul Rahman, Head of the "Jihad Movement,"
Bangladesh.

The Statement Began By Stating "Three Facts Known To Everyone:"

 First, for over seven years the United States ha ve been occupying the lands of Islam in
the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its
rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the
Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples. The
best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people
using the Peninsula as a staging post.

 Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader -
Zionist alliance, and despite the large number of those killed, which has exceeded 1
million, despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific
massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after
the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation. So here they come to
annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors.

 Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is
also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of
Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagern ess to
destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state.7

Sudan shared a common border with Iraq ,8 which made it easy to allow a flow of
people, information and commutations. Moreover, Saddam’s like time ally Abu Nidal,
had been in Sudan for sometime, b eginning in 1969 as a representative of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization. 9But also Sudan was a place where Osama bin

10-74
Laden, met with the infamous terrorist Imad Mugniyah and through him his ties with
Hezbollah and Iran blossomed to evil. 10
FOOTNOTES / REMARKS
[1] THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST STATE OF SUDAN? GERRIE SWART AND HUSSEIN SOLOMON
[2] AFTER THE WAR: THE P.L.O.; Arafat Sees No Damage to P.L.O. in War Stand
By JUDITH MILLER, SPECIAL TO , March 15, 1991.
[3] TURABI ESTABLISHED A REGIONAL UMBRELLA FOR POLITICAL ISLAMIST MILITAN TS, THE POPULAR ARAB
ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (PAIC), HEADQUARTERED IN KHARTOUM.
In 1990-91, Turabi also established a regional umbrella for political Islamist militants, the Popular Arab Islamic conference
(PAIC), headquartered in Khartoum. It was formed with t he immediate aim of opposing American involvement in the Gulf
War. Turabi became its secretary general. Under his guidance, the Sudan government created an open -door policy for
Arabs, including Turabi's Islamist associate Osama bin Laden, who made his base in Sudan in 1990-1996. The efforts of
the NIF to refashion Sudan into an Islamic state bore mixed results because of the opposition it inspired and the civil war.
The Government of Sudan ceased hosting PAIC in 2000.
BIOGRAPHY OF HASSAN AL TURABI, HUMAN R IGHTS NEWS .HRW.ORG/PRESS/2002/03/TURABI -BIO.HTM
[4] MESSAGES TO THE WORLD, THE STATEMENTS OF OSAMA BIN LADEN , BRUSE LAWRENCE VERSO UK 2005
PAGE 23.
[5] INSIDE AL QADEA, GUNARATNA, BERKLEY BOOKS NY, 2002, PAGE 34.
[6] THE MOTHER OF ALL CONNECTIONS, BY STEP HEN F. HAYES AND THOMAS JOSCELYN
WEEKLY STANDARD | JULY 12, 2005.
[7] JIHAD AGAINST JEWS AND CRUSADERS WORLD ISLAMIC FRONT STATEMENT , 23 FEBRUARY,1998.
Sheikh Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Laden , Ayman al-Zawahiri, emir of the Jihad Group in Egypt ,Abu -Yasir Rifa'i
Ahmad Taha, Egyptian Islamic Group Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat -ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan Fazlur Rahman,
amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh
FAS.ORG/IRP/WORLD/PARA/DOCS/980223 -FATWA.HTM
[8] BACKGROUND SUDAN 2006 GEOGRAPHY
HTTP://WWW.STATE.GOV/R/PA/EI/BGN/5424.HTM
[9] ABU NIDAL, 1969: BANNA IS CHOSEN AL FATAH'S REPRESENTATIVE IN SUDAN.
HTTP://LEXICORIENT.COM/E.O/ABU_NIDAL.HTM
[10] TRIPLE CROSS, HOW BIN LADEN’S MASTER SPY PENETRATED THE CIA, THE FBI , BY PETER LANCE, 2006
HARPER COLLINS PUBLISHER 2006, PAGES 140 -141.

I think it is clear, that things were forgiven between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein .
How far did the relationship go? We may never know, but what as it peels back
another layer of Saddam’s dark work, we shall come to understan d the threat which
was evolving, slowing, insidiously by this evil genius of Saddam. To this we need to
understand his war with Israel ; like Iran and Syria, Saddam Hussein arming was
training, financing Palestinian terrorists, suicide bombers and more.

But how much of a threat could Israe l’s few million, threaten the fourth largest
military in the world, at that time Iraq? How could this country of Israel no bigger
than a bread box pose such a grave danger to Saddam Hussein, with his deadly
arsenals of WMD, and billions of dollars in oil reserves?

 During the late 1970s and the mid -1980s, the Iraqi armed forces underwent many
changes in size, structure, arms supplies, hierarchy, deployment, and political
character. Between 1980 and the summer of 1990 Sadd am boosted the number of
troops in the Iraqi military from 180,000 to 900,000, creating the fourth -largest army
in the world. With mobilization, Iraq could have raised this to 2 million men under
arms--fully 75% of all Iraqi men between ages 18 and 34. The number of tanks in the
Iraqi military rose from 2,700 to 5,700 and artillery pieces went from 2,300 to 3,700.

 Headquartered in Baghdad, the army -- of an estimated 1.7 million or more Iraqis,

including reserves and paramilitary -- in 1987 had seven corps , five armored divisions
(each with one armored brigade and one mechanized brigade), and three mechanized
divisions (each with one armored brigade and two or more mechanized brigades). An
expanded Presidential Guard Force was composed of three armored brig ades, one
infantry brigade, and one commando brigade. There were also thirty infantry divisions,
composed of the People's Army (Al Jaysh ash Shaabi --also cited as the Popular Army
or People's Militia) brigades and the reserve brigades, as well as six Speci al Forces
brigades.
SOURCE: THE IRAQI ARMY GLOBALSECURITY.ORG/MILITARY/WORLD/IRAQ/ARMY.HTM

10-75
Above:
The Check: The President Saddam Hussein’s “Grant” to the families of suicide terrorists in the
framework of the Iraqi “terror industry” in the PA areas: a $25,000 check, which was
transferred on June 23rd, 2002 to Khaldiya Isma’il Abd Al -Aziz Al-Hurani, mother of the Hamas
terrorist Fuad Isma’il Ahmad Al -Hurani, who carried out a suicide attack on March 9th, 2002, in
the Moment cafe in Jerusalem. 11 Israelis were killed and 16 wounded in the attack.

SOURCE: INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM INFORMATION CENTER AT THE CENTER FOR SPECIAL STUDIES (C.S.S)
IRAQI SUPPORT OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISM (PART 1) OCTOBER 2004 .
.INTELLIGENCE.ORG.IL/ENG/SIB/5_05/SADDAM_1.HTM

Saddam harbored a particular hatred for the tiny Nation of Israel. Saddam’s hate
was for the most part, based on his fear for Israel’s eyes and ears. Saddam also
believed the only power capable of defeating him, was the Israeli forces, which had
defeated the combined might of the Arab world on several occasions. When Israel
destroyed the armies of Syria, Jordan and Egypt and humiliated the entire Arab
world in the 1967 war, a number of Arab nations, including Iraq, broke diplomatic
relations with the United St ates and turned toward the Soviet Union for military and
diplomatic support. Iraq was the last major Arab nation to restore ties, with the US,
and that was for support for the Iraq/Iran war 1. But is also important to note : In
1973, six years after the seco nd Arab war against the Jews, the Arab armies again
attacked Israel. The attack was led by Syria and Egypt, abetted by Iraq, Libya, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait and five other countries who gave military support to the aggressors,
including an Iraqi division of 18 ,000 men. Israel again defeated the Arab forces.
Afterwards, Egypt – and Egypt alone -- agreed to make a formal peace. 2

It is not destiny that has drawn Iraq to America, but desperation. Were it not for its
slow- moving, four-and-a-half- year-old war with Iran, a conflict that has inflicted
hundreds of thousands of casualties, Iraq might have kept the United States at arm's
length. 3

After Saddam’s defeat in the first Gulf War, and under the eyes and ears of UN
Inspectors far too much was being discovered, by the UN, this Saddam attributed to
a combined US- Israel intelligence operations. (more on this later in this chapter)
Again I will only high light these issues with facts on the matter. We have already
seen that Saddam had worked -harbored Palestinian terrorists for sometime. Here is
another example:

One of the infamous case s was Abu Abbas, former secretary general of the Palestine
Liberation Front. He masterminded the October 7 -9, 1985 hijacking of an Italian
cruise ship whose name, sadly, is now sy nonymous with terrorism. The Achille Lauro

10-76
was on a voyage across the Mediterranean when four Palestinian terrorists seized it
on the high seas. They held some 400 passengers hostage for 44 hours. At one
point, they segregated the Jewish passengers on boar d. One of them was a 69 -year-
old New York retiree named Leon Klinghoffer. He happened to be confined to a
wheelchair. Without mercy, Abu Abbas’ men shot Klinghoffer, then rolled him,
wheelchair and all, into the Mediterranean. To make a long story short Abu Abbas
was able to escape, because Saddam Hussein had provided him with the ultimate
get-out-of-jail card: An Iraqi diplomatic passport. Abu Abbas finally ended up in
Baghdad in 1994, where he lived comfortably as one of Saddam Hussein’s guests.
U.S. soldiers caught Abbas in Iraq in April 2003 .4

In the early 1980s’, Saddam was so afraid of Israel’s few, he threaten ed to use
nuclear weapons on them 5.He made perfectly clear his intentions to the Israeli
government, and boasted he was building a nuclear powe r plant for that reason 6. So
in 1981, Israel promptly bombed the atomic Iraqi Osirak reactor.7

During the first Gulf War, in 1990-1991, Saddam Hussein tried to fragment the
American formed Coalition F orces, intervening against his invasion of Kuwait.
Saddam attempted to do this by throwing his weight behind the Israeli -Palestinian
conflict. He appealed to other Arab Nations to join him in the effort to liberate the
Palestinian people from Israel .8 Saddam then turned his missile forces on Israel ,
firing some 39 Al-Hussein (modified SCUD missiles) into her. But Saddam’s ruse did
not work, he lost the war, and the Coalition held. 9

Then in late 1997, Saddam Hussein returned in depth to the issue, and resurrected
the threat of intervening in the Israeli -Palestinian dispute. How much of it was due to
UNSCOM findings of Saddam’s hidden WMD, VX etc. in Iraq. If it was aimed towards
removing UN Inspectors it did succeed : UNSCOM was kicked, and a modified and
new UN inspection team was formed, as I have already pointed out in this chapter
pages 8-10.

This was also just a few months before the first pronouncement issued on February
23rd, 1998, by the "World Islamic Front" --Osama bin Laden, summary : “the
Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to
serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and
murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq,
the strongest neighboring Arab state great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people
by the crusader-Zionist alliance, for over seven years the United States has been
occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula ,” covered
in depth on page 74 of this chapter.

Pushing the Mid-East To War

During the ongoing Israeli –Palestinian Peace talks, of the late 1990’s conflict
resolutions, Iran on one side inflaming Palestinians and related terrorist groups,
Saddam began in earnest his war on the other side , bin Laden throwing in his
measure too, with the "World Islamic Front" , continuing to issue statements related
to Israel and America. 10
FOOTNOTES / REMARKS
[1 ] THE BIG BROTHER: IRAQ UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN
BY ELAINE SCIOLINO; ELAINE SCIOLINO IS THE UNITED NATIONS CORRESPONDENT FOR THE TIMES.
PUBLISHED: FEBRUARY 3, 1985
[2] THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS MFA.GOV.IL/MFA/HISTORY/MODERN+HISTORY
[3] THE BIG BROTHER: IRAQ UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN BY ELAINE SCIOLINO; ELAINE SCIOLINO IS THE UNITED
NATIONS CORRESPONDENT FOR THE TIMES.PUBLISHED: FEBRUARY 3, 1985

10-77
[4] SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PHILANTHROPY OF TERROR BY DEROY MURDOCK MEDIA FELLOW, HOOVER
INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY ADAPTED FROM A SEPTEMBER
22, 2004 PRESENTATION AT HOOVER. .HUSSEINANDTERROR.COM/
[5]RAID ON THE SUN: INSIDE ISRAEL’S SECRET CAMPAIGN THAT DENIED SADDAM THE BOMB , BY RODGER W.
CLAIRE NEW YORK: BROADWAY BOOKS, 2004.
[6] IBID 5
[7]RAID ON THE IRAQI REACTOR (JUNE 7, 1981)
JEWISHVIRTUALLIBRARY.ORG/JSOURCE/HISTORY/OSIRAK.HTML
[8] IRAQ FIRE 39 SCUDS AT IS RAEL IN 18 SEPARATE A TTACKS.
MICHAEL SHERIDAN, "IRAQ MAY STILL HAVE SCUDS," THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), 11 JULY 1991, P. 13, IN
LEXIS-NEXIS ACADEMIC UNIVERSE, <HTTP://WEB.LEXIS -NEXIS.COM
[9]DOD: INFORMATION PAPER - IRAQ'S SCUD BALLISTIC MISSILES
IRAQ FIRED MAINLY THE AL HUSSEIN MODEL AT THE KUWAIT THEATER OF OPERATIONS AND IS RAEL.
IRAQWATCH.ORG/GOVERNMENT/US/PENTAGON/DODSCUD.HTM - 30
[10] MESSAGES TO THE WORLD, THE STATEMENTS OF OSAMA BIN LADEN BRUSE LAWRENCE VERSO UK 2005
PAGES 58 65103160 173

July 2000: President Clinton step ped in to try to give a new life to the peace
process, which still had the support of the majority of Israelis. Clinton brought
Israel’s Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat together for a final round of
negotiations at Camp David in 2000, but the at tempt failed. On July 11 th, the Camp
David 2000 Summit convened. The summit ended on July 25 th, without an
agreement being reached. At its conclusion, a Trilateral Statement was issued
defining the agreed principles to guide future negotiations . The second Intifada broke
out soon thereafter 1.

September 2000: The second Palestinian intifada or uprising broke out at the end of
September 2000 and is named after the Jerusalem mosque complex where the
violence began 2.

The second Intifada turned more violent. Rioting gave way to guerrilla attacks and
then to the apparently endless series of suicide bombings. Escalation on the Israeli
side made use of tanks, helicopter gu nships, and jet fighters. 3

 By late September 2001, more than 600 Palestinians and 170 Israe lis had been killed.
Two weeks earlier, on September 11 th, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four commercial
planes leaving New York City and Boston and crashed them into the World Trade
Center, the Pentagon Building in Washington, D.C., and a field in Pennsylva nia, killing
about 3,000 people from dozens of countries. As the United States and its allies
prepared for a war on terrorism, management of the Israeli -Palestinian conflict no
longer seems to be a priority, even as the ground situation in the Middle East steadily
deteriorated to the point where it became necessary in the spring of 2002 to dispatch
Secretary of State Colin Powell to a region shattered by almost daily Palestinian
bombings and Israeli military reprisals, in a forlorn effort to paste together a new
peace.4
Planned Second Intifada?
Some have claimed that Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA) had pre -
planned the Intifada. They often quote a speech made in December 2000 , by Imad
Falouji, the PA Communications Minister at the time, where he explains that the
violence had been planned since Arafat's return from the Camp David Summit in
July, far in advance of Sharon's visit . He stated that the intifada "was carefully
planned since the return of (Palestinian President) Yasser Arafat from Ca mp David
negotiations rejecting the U.S. conditions. David Samuels quotes Mamduh Nofal,
former military commander of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
who supplies more evidence of pre -September 28th military preparations. Nofal
recounts that Arafat told us: “Now we are going to the fight, so we must be ready .” 5

10-78
 Iran’s Hand

The Strongest Evidence That Yasser Arafat Had Planned Ahead For The
Second Intifada Is The Karin A A ffair

Since October 2000, Adel Mughrabi, a major buyer in the Palestinian weapons
purchasing system (with the assistance of the Palestinian Naval Police Commander
Juma'a Ghali and his executive Fathi Ghazem), ha d been in contact with the Iranians
and Hizbullah regarding a vast weapons smuggling operation for the use of the
Palestinian Authority. This operation included the testing and purchase of ships,
forming a sailing crew and appointing a commander for the team, as well as making
arrangements as to how the weapons would be stored, loaded onto the vessels, and
its journey until delivery to the Palestinian Authority. The Karin A, was a ship which
was purchased by the Palestinian Authority, loaded with weapons by the Iranians
and the Hizbullah, manned by Palestinian Authority personnel, with the aim of
transferring the weapons it carried to the Palestinian Nava l Police near the Gaza
beaches. 6

 The Karin A was a 4,000 ton freighter intercepted by the Israel Defense Forces on
January 3rd, 2002 while it carried a wide variety of weapons. While the ship itself was
worth an estimated $400,000 and the civilian cargo used to conceal the weapons
approximately $3,000,000, the weapons were purchased for approximately
$15,000,000. The ship was owned by the Palestinian Authority, and the arms were
bound for their use. The equipmen t included Katyusha rockets, mortars, sniper rifles,
bullets, anti-tank mines, anti-tank missiles, as well as over two and a half tons of pure
explosives. According to Maj. Gen. Yedidya Yaari, the commander of the Israeli Navy,
they were packed in 83 crate s in waterproof plastic and attached to buoys, to permit
their drop-off and retrieval at sea. 7

Washington Institute for Near East Policy Saturday,

January 5th, 2002, Karine-A

Revelations of Iranian -Palestinian collusion to smuggle fifty tons of weapons into

the hands of Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Authority (PA) through the offices of
Hezbollah have profound strategic implications for the Middle East. For the Bush
administration, responding appropriately to the Karine -A episode may have
unpleasant repercu ssions for relations with key Arab states. However, failing to deal
forthrightly with the shift in the region's tectonic plates represented by the
smuggling affair is a self -defeating exercise in delusion .

SOURCE: POLICYWATCH #593 KARINE -A: THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF IRANIAN -PALESTINIAN
COLLUSION BY ROBERT SATLOFF JANUARY 15, 2002
WASHINGTONINSTITUTE.ORG/TEMPLATEC05.PHP?CID=1471

But This Activity Had Been Going For Sometime,

Iran and Syria as Strategic Support for Palestinian Terrorism
September 30 th, 2002
 January IDF forces interdicted the ship Santorini, which was meant to smuggle
weapons from Lebanon to the Palestinian Authority through Hizbullah and the PFLP.
Three earlier attempts to perpetrate the smuggling failed, and on the fourth attempt
the ship was captured near Tyre in Lebanon. Large amounts of weapons were found
on the ship, including rockets, mortars, rifles and ammunition. The Santorini arms
boat crew recounted in the interrogation that until their arrest four smuggling
attempts were made by the Santorini and by another boat named Calypso -2. Three of
these attempts succeeded (some of the arms reached Gaza and Sinai shores), and the

10-79
 fourth one was prevented by the Israeli Navy. The four attempts are: the first
smuggling by the PFLP -GC from Tripoli (November 2000), the second one by Hizbullah
from Jiyah beach south of Beirut (April 2001), the third one by the Hizbullah from
Jiyah beach (April 2001) and the fourth one by the PFLP -GC from Tripoli on the
Santorini (May 2001). In its last trip the Santorini left Tripoli (Lebanon) and was to
unload the cargo opposite Northern Sinai shores. It was captured on May 6th, 2001 by
the Israeli Navy, about 150 miles west of Tyre. Various quality weapons were found
aboard the boat, including dozens of b arrels filled with Katyusha rockets, antiaircraft
(Strela) and antitank missiles, mortars, small arms and ammunition.

 The Iranians and the Syrians are constantly attempting to prevent any calming of the
situation and to increase the terrorist attacks. Fo r this purpose they use the
Palestinian organizations operating under their patronage, with emphasis on the PIJ,
the Hamas and the PFLP -GC. This includes coordination and briefings for the carrying
out of terrorist attacks (by phone, internet and by callin g activists to Damascus). It
also includes the preparation of mass murder attacks (such as blowing up the Azrieli
Towers in Tel Aviv). Along with instructions to escalate and increase suicide attacks,
instructions are also given to temporarily halt terrori st activity when it suits Syrian and
Iranian interests (for example, after the September 11th attacks in the US).

 Employing the financial lever : The financial lever is a very important tool for the
establishment of terrorist infrastructures and for initi ating terrorist activity. Findings
from the interrogations of "Defensive Shield" detainees point at the existence of an
institutionalized and systematic money transfer system. Large sums of money are
transferred by Iran via the organizations operating unde r its patronage, which use the
Syrian and the Palestinian banking system (the Arab Bank stands out as the main
money channel for terrorist organizations). The detainees' interrogation reveals large
scope money transfers for the PIJ, the Hamas and indirectl y also for the Fatah/Al -Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades (in addition to the money that the Fatah receives from the PA). This
money encouraged murderous terrorist attacks. The carrying out of these attacks was
a condition for transferring the financial aid for the Pa lestinian terrorist activists in the
field.

 Instruction and training. Syria enables the terrorist organizations, under Iranian
patronage, to maintain a training infrastructure in Syria and in Lebanon. From the
interrogations of Hamas, PIJ and PFLP -GC terror activists, it was learned that in Syria
there is a wide ranging training disposition for terrorist activists in PFLP -GC and Syrian
Army bases. 8
FOOTNOTES / REMARKS
[1] AL AQSA INTIFADA TIMELINE NEWS.BBC.CO.UK/2/HI/MIDDLE_EAST/3677206.STM
[2] IBID 1
[3] IBID 1
[4] HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI -PALESTINIAN CONFLICT, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE
AFSC.ORG/ISRAEL-PALESTINE/LEARN/CONFLICT -HISTORY.HTM
[5] AL AQSA INTIFADA REFERENCE.COM/BROWSE/WIKI/AL -AQSA_INTIFADA
[6] SEIZING OF THE PALESTINIAN WEAPONS SHIP K ARINE A - JAN 4- 2002
MFA.GOV.IL/MFA/GOVERNMENT/COMMUNIQUES/2002/SEIZING%20OF%20THE%20PALESTINIAN%20WEAPONS
%20SHIP%20KARINE%20A%20 -
[7] IBID 6
[8] IRAN AND SYRIA AS STRATEGIC SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN TERRORISM , SEP.30, 2002.
MFA.GOV.IL/MFA/MFAARCHIVE/2000

10-80
 Saddam Hussein’s Hand

October 9th, 2000: Iraq announced that it was establishing training bases for Arab volunteers
to fight in the coming war with Israel. Later that day, Saddam Hussein gave a speech
following an Iraqi Revolutionary Command Coun cil and Ba'ath party conference, in which he
said:

At this conference, Saddam made a number of resolutions to support the heroic Intifada and
to provide the necessities of the Palestinian jihad warriors, so that they are able to continue
their heroic jihad to liberate Palestine from the river to the sea...[additionally] in response to
the call of the masses, it was decided to open camps for volunteers for the jihad to liberate
Palestine, to complete their military training, and the Ministry of Defense was instructed to
give priority to those who entered weapons -training course "Iraq calls for rescuing the honor
of the Arabs and liberating their holy shrines, which are shackled by the Zionist entity's
occupation. To this end, Iraq calls for a holy crowd to liberate... the territory, honor, and the
holy shrines.... In turn, Iraq... is fully ready to contribute to this effort, out of its spirit, which
the sons of our glorified Arab nation know and which the land of Palestine and nearby
battlefields have experienced.

On October 2nd, Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa'id Al -Sahhaf sent the
following letter to Arab League Secretary General Dr. Abd Al -Majid:

"We listened to your call for an international investigation into the massacres
committed by the Zionist ga ng against our Arab Mujahid [Jihad warrior] people in
occupied Palestine. Although we realize your good intention in this call, we would
like to express our objection because it includes an implied recognition of the Zionist
entity as a reality. Iraq belie ves that it is a midget entity, an usurper, and a claw of
colonialism, that was made by imperialism to the detriment of the security, territory
and the holy shrines of the Arabs and the believers..." 1

"Iraq calls for rescuing the honor of the Arabs and li berating their holy shrines,
which are shackled by the Zionist entity's occupation. To this end, Iraq calls for a
holy crowd to liberate... the territory, honor, and the holy shrines.... In turn, Iraq...
is fully ready to contribute to this effort, out of its spirit, which the sons of our
glorified Arab nation know and which the land of Palestine and nearby battlefields
have experienced. 2…"

"Long live Palestine, free from the sea to the [Jordan] river. Cursed be the lowly. May evil
befall the Jewish usurper s of our holy Palestinian territory 3."

The next day, Saddam Hussein raised the specter of an Iraqi intervention and noted
that other Arabs ha d failed the Arab nation because they lack ed the fortitude to
challenge Israel. Saddam Hussein even suggested that they should be overthrown,
saying: "Five [million] worthless people are oppressing our people in Palestine,
slaughtering our children and humiliating our women.... An end must be put to
Zionism. If [the other nations of the Arab League] cannot, then Iraq a lone is able to
do so. Give us a small adjacent piece of land and let them support us from afar only.
They will see how we put an end to Zionism in a short time. We say this and we can
do it today and now. We will not wait until the day comes when the bloc kade is lifted
to put an end to them. No, from this day we can put an end to them, and we will
want nothing from [other Arabs] 4.

SOURCE: [1-4] WILL SADDAM HUSSEIN ATTACK ISRAEL? DISPATCH SERIES - NO. 136, OCTOBER 13, 2000.
NO.136 HTTP://WWW.MEMRI.ORG/BIN /ARTICLES.CGI?AREA=IRAQ&ID=SP13600

10-81
 How Saddam Hussein’s Régime Transferred Funds from Iraq to the West
Bank and Gaza Strip to Encourage Palestinian Terrorism

Intelligence & Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S)

Between the moment Saddam Hussein boosted his bonus payments to the families of
Palestinian terrorists and the March 20 th, 2003 launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
28 homicide bombers injured 1,209 people and killed 223 more, including at least
eight Americans. These bonus checks were handed out at ceremonies where banners
proclaimed the friendship of the PLO’s Yasser Arafat and Saddam Hussein.

 An archive consisting of documents, video cassettes and computer disks was captured
by the IDF in the “Arab Liberation Fr ont” (an organization under Iraqi patronage) and
the Iraqi Ba’ath organization HQ in Ramallah. Other documents and videocassettes
were captured during Operation Defensive Shield. The captured materials shed light on
the Iraqi aid to the Palestinian confron tation in the PA, with emphasis on the
encouragement of terrorist attacks. This aid, which it provides in coordination with the
Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian terrorist organizations, is an expression of
Iraqi policy – the interest to escalate t he Israeli-Palestinian conflict, inter alia, in order
to strengthen Iraq’s status among the Palestinians and in the Arab world, to divert
international attention from Iraq and to delay the US attack plans against Iraq.
According to the captured documents, this Iraqi interest gained momentum after
Operation Defensive Shield

According to the captured documents, the central figure in the Iraqi

leadership, who directs the Iraqi aid to the Palestinian terror in the PA, is
Taha Yassin Ramadan, President Saddam Hussein’s deputy, a member of
the “Revolutionary Leadership Council” (the supreme governing body in
Iraq) and Saddam Hussein’s confidant. Taha Yassin Ramadan is
described in a captured document as responsible for the Palestine Office
in the all-Arab leadership of the Ba’ath party in Iraq. In a secret
handwritten letter, signed by him, Taha Yassin Ramadan transfers
instructions for building the Ba’ath party infrastructure in the PA areas,
exploiting the Intifada events for achieving “the complete liberation of
Palestine from the river to the sea” .

Suicide Bombers Get Top Dollar From Saddam

 In the framework of the systematic Iraqi financial aid to the families of Palestinians
killed in the violent confrontation (including the families of Israeli Arabs killed in the
October 2000 events), the families of suicide terrorists receive enlarged grants from
Saddam Hussein ( $25,000 for such a family, in contrast with $10,000 for the family of
an “ordinary” killed Palestinian terrorist). The captured documents demonstr ate that
the intentional “gap” in favor of the suicide terrorists’ families continued growing as
the Intifada went on. The fact that such large sums of money, in Palestinian terms, are
distributed to the families of suicide terrorists (about nine years of work, from all the
aid bodies) encourages the suicide phenomenon. It is an important (but not the only)
consideration in the suicide terrorist’s decision .

The Iraqi Policy of Encouragement of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism,

and its Implementation

 The documents captured in Ramallah point at an Iraqi policy striving to encourage the
violence and the terror in the PA areas by intensively using financial aid, which is
viewed by the Iraqis as the main tool for promoting their interests there. This policy i s
determined by the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, who has repeatedly praised the

10-82
 Palestinian suicide attacks and encouraged the continuation of the Intifada in his
declarations. He has also declared his intention to erect a monument in memory of
Wafaa’ Idris, the first Palestinian female suicide terrorist, who carried out a murderous
attack in the heart of Jerusalem (and whose family, according to the captured
documents, received financial aid from the Iraqis).

 Since the beginning of the Intifada , the Iraqis have transferred significant sums of
money to the PA areas: According to an ALF document captured during Operation
Defensive Shield, from the beginning of the Intifada and until mid -February 2002 close
to $10 million were transfe rred from Iraq. According to an activist in the “Arab
Liberation Front” leadership in Gaza, Ibrahim Al -Za’anin, until March 2002 , Iraq
transferred about $12 million to families of Palestinians killed in the conflict (Al-Quds,
March 6th, 2002).

 According to a report in Sky News, which recently covered a ceremony of check

granting to families of killed and suicide terrorists in Gaza, Saddam Hussein granted
more than 20 million dollars to the Palestinians since the beginning of the Intifada.
The emphasis in granting this money i s on the families of the dead, the wounded and
those whose houses have been destroyed and especially on the families of the suicide
and other terrorists, and to the lesser extent on other casualties in the conflict. This is
clearly done in order to improve the capabilities and the steadfastness of Palestinian
society and to encourage it to continue the violent confrontation. This Iraqi aid was
increased after Operation Defensive Shield.
 Employment of Iraqi -supported organizations in the PA .

Cultivation of Saddam Hussein’s

personality cult in the PA areas: A photo
taken at the ceremony for distributing
grants to families of Intifada fatalities and
casualties that took place in Beit Furiq
(near Nablus). In the stage background,
posters and pictures of Sadd am Hussein,
of suicide terrorists and Sa ddam and
Arafat saluting, were s ung (source: video
recording captured in Operation Defensive
Shield)
LINK: INTELLIGENCE.ORG.IL/ENG/ENG_N/SADDAM.HTM

Iraqi president Saddam Hussein is encouraging suicide bombings by paying the

bombers' families $25,000 each , substantially more than the $10,000 paid to the
families of Palestinians who die in other attacks or who are killed by Israeli troops.
The Iraqi technique of paying families of suicide bombers has helped "build an
infrastructure that will support, fund and encourage terror," said a senior Israeli
military official. There were handwritten rosters of the deceased, with lists of who
received payments and copies of receipts from family members who accepted the
payments. One list contained the names of 1,049 people who were killed or wounded
during the uprising through the end of March.
SOURCE: PAYMENTS TO PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS OCT 02 ISRAEL TIES IRAQ TO PALESTINIAN PAYMENTS
BY MOLLY MOORE WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN SERV ICE FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2002; PAGE A34

10-83
 Almost One Billion Dollars Given?
February 10th, 2001: In the four and half months since the second Palestinian
Intifada, or uprising, started on Sept. 28 th, 2000, Saddam funneled almost a billion
dollars to the Palestinians in Gaza and on the West Bank. East intelligence sources
have told Western reporters, including UPI that the total value of the aid already
amounts to $980 million in just over one -third of a year. The aid has been openly
proclaimed to be in t he form of food and relief support and in generous
compensation payments to the families of the approximately 350 Palestinians .1

Saddam Awarded "Sword of the Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine"

For War With Israel

May 2001: Chairman of the Iraqi Parli ament, Dr. Sa'dun Hamada, awarded him the
"Sword of the Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine".
Saddam Hussein proclaimed,

"The immigrant Jews in occupied Palestine must leave Palestine and return to the
places from which they came in European and Ara b countries.”

Martyrdom Operations, Suicide Bombers

“The martyrdom of those who are fighting for Palestine, does not mean giving up
on life, but rather, protecting its meaning. It is martyrdom in order to [guarantee]
life for the coming generations. 2”

2002: Declaration of Saddam on his determination to support the Intifada in a

meeting in Baghdad (March 2002) with PLO Political Bureau Chief Farouq Al -
Qaddoumi, Fatah Central Committee member 'Abbas Zaki, and the head of the Arab
Department of the PLO Po litical Bureau Omar Al -Shak'a. Saddam Hussein elaborated
on his determination to support the Intifada : "The Intifada demands steadfastness.
We have asked the [Arab] politicians not to pretend they know better than the
Palestinian people what they want and what the fighters want, but to cooperate with
them... It is their duty to be [the Palestinians'] partners in blood, money, and
weapons, as [if they share] a common fate." "They have the right to consult with
Palestine and its people, but not to take their place... [Only] when we bear arms,
shed blood, and rebuild what has been destroyed will we have the right to a status
nearly equal to that of the representative of the Palestinian people in discussing their
problem..." "...The Palestinian people do es not need more plans. We are not
interested in [more] plans. Our basic plan is to support the Palestinian people in [its]
armed fighting. If we are incapable of offering aid to the armies, our support should
be by [giving] money or buying them arms, or by giving Muslims and Arabs the
option of volunteering [to help the Palestinian people]." "...As far as Iraq is
concerned, we are like any Palestinian district. Nothing prevents us from giving
[Palestine] everything we can .3
FOOTNOTES / REMARKS
[1] BILLION DOLLAR SADDAM BACKS ARAFAT
BY MARTIN SIEFF (UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL , FEBRUARY 9, 2001)
[2]MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE
DEBATING THE RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL AND MORAL LEGITIMACY OF SUICIDE BOMBINGS PART 2: THE DEBATE
OVER POLITICAL AND MORAL LEGITIMACY
INQUIRY AND ANALYSIS SERIES - NO. 54 MAY 3, 2001 NO.5
MEMRI.ORG/BIN/ARTICLES.CGI?PAGE=SUBJECTS&AREA=JIHAD&ID=IA5401
[3]IRAQ JIHAD AND TERRORISM STUDIES , AUGUST 28, 2002.
MEMRI.ORG/BIN/OPENER_LATEST.CGI?ID=SD41502

10-84
On this issue of terrorism wars with Israe l, I have hardly presented the mountain of
evidence. But it is a summary, an overview how the tiny nation of Israel was being
attacked by the States of Islamic Fascism . Saddam Hussein as well as the Mullah’s of
Iran greatly fear this tiny nation of Israel, and with good reason. But to these
entities, it is the eyes and ears of Israel which they fear the most, Israel’s legendary
intelligence gathering capabilities. For Israel to preserve its people, its nation, has
become a watch dog, reporting to America an d the world, of the Islamic Extremists,
their operations, their endeavors to plug the world into darkness, not just the Mid -
East. Of course Israel self -preservation is at stake ; this tiny nation not much bigger
than a bread box, with a handful of people, has to endure war upon war, and wars
without end. The Islamic Fascist has know n for sometime, that in order to truly
destroy the great Satan, you must blind him, make him deaf, by destroying the one
they call the lesser Satan.. Israel.

Here I feel it is important to note a few events, which magnify the issue of Islamic
Fascism fear of Israel, by looking at Saddam Hussein.

Spying On Saddam
One of the key components to missiles and cruise missiles is a guidance system; a
missile is useless unless you can t ell it where to go and how to get there. One of
Saddam’s prized covert operations purchases was this item.

1995
Acting on an intelligence tip, on November 10 th, 1995 the Jordanian government
intercepted a shipment of 240 Russian missile -guidance gyroscopes and
accelerometers bound for Iraq. The next month, between December 16 th and 30th,
a team of scuba divers were directed by UNSCOM to dredge the Tigris River near
Baghdad. They pulled out more than 200 additional missile instruments and
components. These parts, many bearing clearly identifiable serial numbers in Russian

10-85
Cyrillic script, included gas pressure regulators, accelerometers, GIMBAL position
indicators, and gyroscopes.

These Were Not Just Run of the Mill Thrown Away Junk, But 1st Class
Designed To Deliver Nuclear Warheads.. 4,000 Miles

These items, like those recovered earlier in Jordan, had come from dismantled
Russian submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SS -N-18s) designed to deliver
nuclear warheads to targets more than 4,000 miles away.

The Russian government initially denied that the gyroscopes were Russian,
notwithstanding their serial numbers. But to make a long story short, Russian finally
did admit they were sold to Saddam as scrape metal, some 300 million dollars worth.
SOURCE: THE MYSTERY OF THE SUNKEN GYROS BY VLADIMIR ORLOV & WILLIAM C. POTTER BULLETIN OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998 VOL. 54, NO. 6

Twice In Two Years

Twice in recent years, U. N. weapons inspectors have seized shipments of Russian
missile guidance components for long-range, intercontinental missiles (ICBM's) in or
en route to Iraq. The equipment was reportedly shipped on flights originating in
Moscow; the gyroscopes came from the submarine-launched SS-N-18 ICBM, which
has a maximum range of nearly 4,000 miles and can carry up to seven nuclear
warheads.
SOURCE: THE PROLIFERATION PRIMER INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL
SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE, UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
A MAJORITY REPORT - JANUARY 1998, RUSSIA TRANSFER OF MISSILE COMPONENTS TO IRAQ

1999 Former Iraqi News

"Acts of spying and sabotage by some of those who wear the blue hat have reached
a level which cannot be imagined," declared Babel, a paper owned by Saddam
Hussein's eldest son, Uday. Iraq had previously accused several employees of the
Special Commission, including Richard Butler, its former chairman, of spying. While
Butler denied that he spied against Iraq, Washington did not deny allegations that it
had used the Special Commission as cover for some intelligence gathering efforts.
SOURCE: IRAQ NEWS, JULY 9, 1999 , FAS.ORG/NEWS/IRAQ/1999/07/990709 -IN.HTM

Information To Note
Back in 1999, major papers ran front -page investigative stories revealing that the
CIA had covertly used U.N. w eapons inspectors to spy on Iraq for the U.S.'s own
intelligence purposes. "United States officials said today that American spies had
worked undercover on teams of United Nations arms inspectors," the New York
Times reported (1/7/99). According to the Washington Post (3/2/99), the U.S.
"infiltrated agents and espionage equipment for three years into United Nations arms
control teams in Iraq to eavesdrop on the Iraqi military without the knowledge of the
U.N. agency." Undercover U.S. agents "carried out a n ambitious spying operation
designed to penetrate Iraq's intelligence apparatus and track the movement of Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussein, according to U.S. and U.N. sources," wrote the Boston
Globe (1/6/99).
And If The Truth Be Known
But UNSCOM, which never had an intelligence section of its own, found out how
much it still didn't know in 1995, when Saddam's brother -in-law, Lieut. General
Hussein Kamel, defected to Jordan and provided the details of Saddam's elaborate
concealment system. It was operated, Kam el told the CIA, by the Special Republican
Guard and the Special Security Organization, the same outfits that serve as
Saddam's personal and palace guards. UNSCOM inspectors decided they needed

10-86
scanners and recorders that would let them listen in on the se curity forces as they
shuttled weaponry, components, technical manuals and chemical and biological
materials around Iraq. Scott Ritter, the former U.S. Marine major who was then a
leading UNSCOM inspector, traveled to Israel and persuaded that country's
intelligence agency, the Mossad, to provide scanners to tap into the radio and cell -
phone frequencies used by the Iraqi security units.

This evidently allowed UN inspectors to make major break throughs by taping into
Saddam’s Security apparatus communications, but the onset of recorded information
obtained from these security apparatus collected amounted to thousands of hours ;
when translated, 99 percent was useless.
SOURCE: BUGGING SADDAM MONDAY, JAN. 18, 1999 BY BRUCE W. NELAN
TIME.COM/TIME/MAGAZINE/ARTIC LE/0,9171,990017,00.HTML

But to Note : Again the door Kamel opened at first was only a dead end ; it did
nothing to help the UN Inspectors. It only flooded them with overwhelming mounting
work. Again I believe this is evidence that substantiates that Lieut. General Hussein
Kamel defection was a hoax, a covert operation, where he was sent to mislead and
misdirect UN Inspectors.

1998 Saddam Hussein Kicks UN Out of Iraq

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on August 5th, 1998 ended all cooperation with UN
weapons inspectors. An Iraqi government statement said that "there would be no
further cooperation with the UN's Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) or the
International Atomic Energy A gency (IAEA) until a list of demands were met, one of
them, “get all their sp ies out of Iraq”.
SOURCE: SADDAM SHUTS DOWN UN INSPECTORS, WASHINGTON TIMES, AUGUST 6th,1998, WASHTIMES.COM

Again these are but a few examples, but as already noted there was an explosion by
Un Inspectors findings in Iraq after 1995, then all through up t o 1997 when they
found Saddam’s deadly VX never agent capabilities.

But there is one more layer, of Saddam Hussein we need to look at. It consists in a
few pieces of currently disregarded information, considered no more than a curios ity
of Saddam Hussein . However, looked at in a different light, it breaks down the walls,
hiding the darkness of Saddam, his desires, goals, and deadly intentions.

First we shall start with what seems to be a trivial subject matter, the difference
between Sunni, and Shiites .

Sunnism and Shiism: the Two main Moslem sects

Shiism is one of the two main Moslem sects. (Sunnism is the other.) The schism
between the two sects occurred in the seventh century, when Ali Ibn Abu Talib’s
faction contested the Umayyad Dynasty’s righ t to the caliphate. (The caliph is
considered to be the Prophet’s substitute.) They claimed that only a descendant of
Ali and Fatima, the Prophet’s son -in-law and daughter, was authorized to lead the
believers (the “ummam”).

10-87
Important To Note:
Shiites Consider The Bloodline As Criteria of Leadership Over Them

In addition, the Shiites refused to accept the Sunna, the oral beliefs, as binding. Eventually,
they developed their own traditions and doctrines; the latter included veneration of the imam,
who was accorded supernatural powers. According to Shiite tenets, the last imam
disappeared and was transformed into the so -called “hidden imam”, who will not reappear
until the end of time.

Shiites disagree as to which imam is the last and hidden one. M ost believe that it is
the twelfth imam, and his supporters are called “atna -asaryah” (“men of the
twelfth”); the term “Shiites” generally refers to this group.

Approximately 16 percent of Moslems are Shiites. (At the turn of the 21st century,
there were around 185 million Shiites worldwide.) The majority of Iranians are
Shiites. (Shiism is Iran’s state religion.) A considerable number of Shiites are found
in Iraq too, 80 percent of the Iraqi population , and Bahrain, and Shiites comprise 35 -
40 percent of Lebanon’s population. (In Lebanon, Shiites are also known as
Metoualis.) Finally, there are large groups of Shiites in other Moslem countries,
including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
India.
SOURCE: ALONGSIDE SUNNISM, SHIISM IS ONE OF THE TWO MAIN MOSLEM SECTS,
YNETNEWS.COM/ARTICLES/0,7340,L -3285426,00.HTML

Holy Prophet Saddam Hussein ?

After the first Gulf War in 1991, Saddam
Hussein started referring himself as having a
holy Islamic pure lineage. But what he did in
reality was to force various official Iraqis and
genealogists to declare and create him into a
Sayed, (a direct descendant of the prophet
Mohammad). Those who would not, or objected
to rewriting Saddam's family tree line were
killed outright. 1

Saddam, a Sunni Moslem, simply created a

new family tree, making himself a Sayed, or a
direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammad.
This act placed him in leadership position by divine right of blood line from
Mohamed. Saddam recreated himself a s the unquestionable ruler of the Iraqi Shiites,
who comprise 80 percent of Iraq’s population.

More specifically, he had ordered Iraq's genealogists to create a family line that
linked him to Fatima, the daughter of the prophet Mohammed, making Saddam a
direct blood descendant. It is as if President Bush had traced his l ineage back to the
Virgin Mary. 2 Saddam often stated he had been chosen to “remove the Jewish state
(Israel) from the face of this earth ”. Saddam sees his self -created link to Fatima as a
precursor. Thus, being a “Descendant of the Prophet", he must be the chosen one, to
unify the Arab peoples and lead th em to an unprecedented victory. 3

10-88
 Saddam Launches an “Islamic Faith Campaign”
One of the first things he does is changing the Iraqi flag; all old flags are to be
removed; the new one has, “God Is Great” across the Iraq flag. Senior Ba'athists
were required to learn the Koran by heart, across Iraq ; religious instruction stepped
up in schools and many U lemas, Islamic scholars, receive official fun ding.

Saddam Builds A Mosque For War, Mother of All Battles Mosque’s

The Umm al-Ma'arik Mosque
The most visible part of the campaign is the
mosque-building boom in Baghdad. The Mother
of All Battles mosque was completed on
Saddam’s 64th birthday, in 2001. Among the
items on display is a large plaque, at least 10ft
long, bearing his signature. A stone tablet
carries his address to the Iraqi nation about the
war with Iran that ended in 1988, after eight
years of fighting 1.

"Oh, brave Iraqis, sons of our i mmortal Arab

nation, oh, you brave men in the armed forces, this day is the day of days ! The
conflict was a costly stalemate that claimed one million lives and gained Iraq
nothing 2”.

Clearly this statement appears to be an admission of failure, of wrong d oing, and

meant to mend the long held indifferences
between Iraq and Iran.

For the Mother of All Battles mosque , Saddam

spared no expense. The reflecting pool rings
the dome in the shape of the Arab world. In the
middle there is a monument of Saddam's
thumbprint with his initials s et in gold. The
mosque has 8 minarets, 4 are designed to
resemble the barrels of AK-47 assault rifles and
4 are in the shape of Scud missiles 3.

Four minarets are blue and white, 4 are each 43 meters tall , and meant to represent
the 43 days of conflict with the US that occurred during Desert Storm War. Another
minaret at the site is 37 meters tall to symbolize 1937 or Saddam's birth -year. The
Umm al-Ma'arik mosque also comes complete with an Arab world-shaped pool laden
with a 24 feet-wide mosaic of Saddam's thumbprint .4

At one time, a Koran was laid out in the Mother Of

All Battles mosque. In the center, an hexagonal
marble building in which this Koran was once on
display, was crowned with its own minaret - of the
Scud variety. Decorated with intricate designs, the

10-89
delicate Arabic script of the Koran seemed to have been written in red ink. In fact, a
skilled artist copied the 605 pages of the holy book using Saddam Hussein's blood.
The Iraqi dictator donated three pints over two y ears and this, mixed with chemicals,
was used for every verse 5.

There are two other unfinished Mosques,

one would have been the second largest in
the world: the al- Rahman, (picture top
left). The central dome is still open to the
sky and around it are ei ght lesser domes,
each built on eight smaller domes, each with
eight windows. Saddam had decreed that a
grand mosque bearing his name be built in
each of Iraq's 18 provinces 6.

But this was an incredible about face by Saddam

Hussein, whom had styled hims elf and Iraq after the
ancient kingdom of Babylon that once flourished in
Iraq. There are about a thousand wall murals alone ,
depicting Saddam and Babylon Kings. Saddam had
many palaces which recreated the ancient glory of
Babylon 7. Many times Saddam Husse in declared he
was a descendant of Babylon royalty. 8 He even
named certain units of his elite military Republican Guard divisions after Babylon’s
kings, like the Nebuchadnezzar Republican Guard division.

Take For Example Saddam's Palace

Adjacent to Nebuch adnezzar's ancient palace and overlooking the Euphrates R iver,
Saddam Hussein built a palace for himself. Shaped like a ziggurat (stepped pyramid),
Saddam's Babylonian palace is a monstrous hill -top fortress surrounded by miniature
palm trees and rose gard ens. The four-storey palace extends across an area as large
as five football fields. The palace Saddam built was not merely large, it was also
ostentatious. Containing several hundred thousand square feet of marble, it became
a showy confection of angular towers, arched gates, vaulting ceilings, and majestic
stairways. Critics charged that Saddam Hussein's lavish new palace expressed
exuberant excess in a land where many died in poverty. On the ceilings and walls of
Saddam's palace, 360 -degree murals depict ed scenes from ancient Babylon, Ur, and
the Tower of Babel. In the cathedral -like entryway, an enormous chandelier hung
from a wooden canopy carved to resemble a palm tree. In the bathrooms, the
plumbing fixtures appeared to be gold -plated. Throughout Sadd am Hussein's palace,
pediments were engraved wi th the ruler's initials, “SdH” 9.

Saddam portrayed himself as the successor to Nebuchadnezzar. In 1979, he was

quoted by his semi -official biographer as saying: “Nebuchadnezzar stirs in me
everything relating to pre-Islamic ancient history. And what is most important to me
about Nebuchadnezzar is the link between the Arabs’ abilities and the liberation of
Palestine. Nebuchadnezzar was, after all, an Arab from Iraq, albeit ancient Iraq. …
That is why whenever I remember Nebuchadnezzar I like to remind the Arabs, Iraqis
in particular, of their historical responsibilities. It is a burden that should… spur them
into action because of their history 10.”

10-90
But was this a ploy to give him the religious cloak that is ess ential to win the hearts
of Islam's extremists, Iran and others?

FOOTNOTES AND REMARKS

[1] TRACING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S ROOTS , DECEMBER 24, 2003, MARK WILLACY
ABC.NET.AU/AM/CONTENT/2003/S1015634.HTM
[2] INSIDE THE MIND OF SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS TERRIFYING L IFE STYLE | FREE REPUBLIC.COM.NEWS
09/09/2002
[3] IBID 2
[4] BAGHDAD MOSQUES
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG/MILITARY/WORLD/IRAQ/BAGHDAD -MOSQUES.HTM
[5] SADDAM HAS KORAN WRITTEN IN HIS BLOOD BY DAVID BLAIR , IN BAGHDAD, 13/12/2002
TELEGRAPH.CO.UK/NEWS/MAIN.JHTML?XM L=/NEWS/2002/12/14/WIRQ114.XML
[6] IBID 4
[7] IBID 2
[8] IBID 2
[9]SADDAM’S BABYLONIAN PALACE
ARCHITECTURE.ABOUT.COM/CS/COUNTRIESCULTURES/A/SADDAMSPALACE.HTM
[10]EDITORIAL GULFWAR NEWS , SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HISTORY 101 MARCH 4, 2003 ,
BY ERIC H. CLINE
GWU.EDU/~BYGEORGE/030403/CLINEEDIT.HTML

After Saddam Hussein spent a few billion dollars creating Iraq and himself as the
resurrected Babylon Empire, 1 after losing his gamble for Kuwait’s oil field riches,
Saddam does an about face as to who he is . After he reshaped, and was recreating
Iraq into an empire of Mosques, 2 building what would have been the second largest
in the world, the al- Rahman, after he decreed that a grand mosque bearing his
name be built in each of Iraq's 18 provinces, we must ask ourselve s, why?
FOOTNOTES / REMARKS
[1] SADDAM HUSSEIN'S RECORD OF INFAMY ENDS BY WILLIAM BRANIGIN, WASHINGTON POST DECEMBER
29, 2006.
[2]HUSSEIN'S OBSESSION: AN EMPIRE OF MOSQUES
BY JOHN F. BURNS DECEMBER 15, 2002 NEW YORKTIMES

Why was Saddam Hussein distancin g himself from his personification of Babylon, a
Pagan Empire?

Do we see, Saddam joining the tide of Islamic Extremism, moving towards mending
differences with Iran, Bin Laden, and others? The answer is obvious, so obvious it
has been totally unrecogniz ed. On the forgotten sands of Iraq, lies Saddam Hussein
last grand designs for world power, pla ns for creating his long sought -after world
empire: Saddam’s plans for 18 other grand Mosques across Iraq, and a hollow shell
which would have been the grandest Mosque in the world, the al - Rahman, which
would have been only second to the one in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, the most holy site
of Islam, the place where Moslems all over the world must turn to and pray to five
time a day.

My first book came out of my exper iences from Desert Storm, Gulf War, rooted from
my military training during the cold war, but my book on Saddam Hussein began
from my limited threat training classes, with 3 rd Armored Calvary, at Fort Bliss
Texas, before deploying to the Gulf. However , as fate would have it, I ended up with
2/2 of 9 th Infantry Division, as they needed scouts. But I kept my notes on desert
warfare and Saddam Hussein , which later became my book. My time in Mid -East
never left me. I returned to volunteer with the IDF Forces in 2004 through a program
called SAR-EL and spent the summer there. I returned in 2006, more volunteer work
with SAR- EL. I have been in Israel about a year now ; through this last Israel War in
Lebanon, this book was born.

10-91
My time with the IDF, attending th e Israel’s Institute for Counter Terrorism, Sixth
Annual International Conference on Global Terrorism “Terrorism’s Global Impact”,
September 11 th-14th, 2006. ICT’s annual international conferences are considered
one of the world’s leading events in the f ield of counter-terrorism, which brings
together counter-terrorism experts, security professionals, and leading academic
scholars from around the world. (see appendix, for SAR-EL and ICT)

I asked questions, talked to many professionals, and non professionals. Israelis have
the habit of saying little and meaning much ; many times their blank stares are
quietly shouting, “They just don’t get it”; it really impacted me.

Saddam Hussein, was considered to have very limited intelligence capabilities, or

even the real ability to conduct terrorism on US soil. But in tru th, Saddam had an
extensive network he could have used, or eventually used if he had chosen to. In the
least, it was his eyes and ears for gathering critical information on American’s
infrastructure. Let’s stop here and back track on some of the material covered :

“Of all the Islamic groups , Hamas has developed within America, the most
sophisticated network infrastructure. The story of how one man named Nasser Issa
Jalal Hidmi, was recruited and tra ined by Hamas illustrates just how central is the
American role in the Hamas’ network .”
----- Steven Emerson, American Jihad, page 80.
Chapter 3, page 25.

Sami Al-Arian and the Palestinian Islamic Ji had

 On February 20th, 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Sami Al -Arian and
seven co-conspirators for their role in directing the activities of the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad from the United States. The indictment provides a rare and detailed loo k into the
inner working of an international terrorist organization operating from the safety and
sanctuary of Tampa, Florida. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”) is a U.S.
government-designated foreign terrorist organization, committed to suicide bombin gs
and violent jihad activities. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad is responsible for the murder
of over 100 innocent people in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, including at least two
young Americans, Alisa Flatow, age 20, and Shoshana Ben -Yishai, age 16. Chapt er 3,
page 31.

 FBI agent Robert Wright, was assigned to the FBI’s counterterrorism task force in
Chicago, after being a FBI veteran for three years. [ Washington Times, 7/18/2004; He
immediately begins to uncover a wide network of suspected Hamas and Al Qaeda
financiers inside the US. Apparently, he got a key head start from the confession of
Mohammad Salah in Israel in early 1993. Salah named 23 organizations in the US
which he said were secretly funding Hamas, and Israel shared this information with US
officials. Some of his confession, including the mention of the Holy Land Foundation as
a key Hamas founder, is even publicly revealed in a February 1993 New York Times
article. [New York Times, 2/17/1993; Federal News Service , 6/2/2003]
----- Steven Emerson, American Jihad
chapter 3, page 38.

My point being, Saddam ’s decades of support and in -depth relationships with these
Palestinian terrorist organizations, (Just Arafat , alone in the 2nd intfada), Since
Palestinian terrorist organizations had indeed already established themselves o n US
soil for sometime, Would they not be a deadly striking tool for terrorist operations ,
within American for Saddam ?

10-92
But how much of a threat really was Saddam Hussein? Once I was told, if you have a
pile of bullets, no matter how large, there is really not much you can do with them,
without a rifle. The key to understanding Saddam’s military capability and his deadly
arsenal of WMD was to realize it was useless without delivery systems; as plain and
simple as it sounds, think about it !

Again, what was Saddam trying to rebuild with 300 million dollars worth of
intercontinental ballistic missile guidance systems?
(see also pages 98-101 findings on Saddam’s delivery systems )

Postwar findings of the ISG confirm the intelligence community assessment that Iraq
was developing missiles, in excess of UN mandate : Cruise missiles. ISG found
numerous instances where Iraq disregarded Un prohibitions’ and so ught to improve
its missile capabilities.1

From a report in 2004 by the inspector, Charles A. Duelf er, we know that Hussein
was able to buy weapons -- working directly with governments in Syria, Belarus,
Yemen, North Korea, the former Yugoslavia and possi bly Russia, as well as with
private companies in Europe , Asia and the Middle East –this report is documented in
extraordinary detail, including repeated visits by government officials and arms
merchants to Iraq and complicated schemes to disguise illegal s hipments to Iraq.
''Prohibited goods and weapons were being shipped into Iraq with virtually no
problem,'' the report says. ''Indeed, Iraq was designing missile systems with the
assumption that sanctioned material would be readily available 2.

Saddam Hussein had already given North Korea a 10 million dollar payment, to help
establish a missile production line in Iraq, but North Korea had not beg un sending
the material, which was to arrive by way of Syria, as they were told that Iraq things
were too hot, and they did not want to get caught. The information came from
captured computer in operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. 3

However, I must end here with this issue as there is more pressing material that I
need to bring to the readers ’ attention. As I am pointing out in this book, Washington
Officials, along with most of the International community do not consider Iran’s
billions spent on missile delivery systems for nuclear, or other WMD as an issue
worth debating or being concerned with. Of course in Israel, they do see things a bit
differently, hard not to, when gun is pointed directly at your head and the man
holding it says he is going to wipe you and your family off the face of the earth.

But let us look at the brutal blood trail of Saddam long forgotten :

650 People Still Missing From Kuwait Saddam’s War In 1991,

650 people never returned taken as POWS in 1990 by Saddam. Of these, 570 were
Kuwaitis and 35 were Indian, Bahrani, Omani, Lebanese, Syrian, Egyptian and Saudi
residents of Kuwait.

As you walk into the Kuwait POW Committee Office here, you are surrounded by
memories, memories stolen by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War and not
returned since. In 2000 , then Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and Kuwaiti
Defense Minister Salim al -Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah visited the office on April 9 th to
highlight the plight of Kuwaitis still waiting to learn the fate of their loved ones.
Even after Operation Iraqi Freedom, none have been found 4.

10-93
 Still US Missing Airman From 1991 Gulf War Capt. Michael "Scott" Sp eicher
A Navy pilot shot down over Iraq in January 1991
was captured by Iraqi forces . A Navy board of inquiry
concluded that there is no credible evidence that
Capt. Michael "Scott" Speicher is dead, and it
reaffirmed his official status as "missing/captu red,"
according to the board's final report. A Pentagon
team assigned to search for evidence of Speicher
after the fall of Baghdad completed its efforts in May
2004. In congressional testimony shortly afterward,
Marine Brig. Gen. Joseph J. McMenamin, who l ed the
search team, said all in -country leads regarding the
pilot's fate had been exhausted. McMenamin also said, however, that some leads
could not be fully pursued because of the security threat from the Iraq insurgency.
Evidence has turned up in Iraq as his initials have been found carved into the walls
on an Iraqi POW cell.5, 6

Speicher, Michael Scott

Name: Michael Scott Speicher
Rank at Loss/Branch: Lt.Cdr./US Navy
Rank in 2002: Commander
Unit: USS SARATOGA
Age at Loss: 33
Born: March 1958
Age in 2002: 44
Home City of Record: Jacksonville FL
Date of Loss: 17 January 1991

Of course during UN Inspections, Saddam Hussein did offer a death bounty payment
of 14,000 dollars to anyone of his soldiers who could shoot down a US Aircraft
patrolling and enforcin g the mandated no fly zones in Iraq. US Air Pilots were getting
shot at everyday by missiles and anti -air craft batteries. But what is not taken into
account, (there were only injuries, no deaths), is this forgotten shooting war of
Saddam’s and his effort to kill American pilots which lasted about 11 years. 7

"They shoot at us every day," Captain Patrick Driscoll said, after his F-15 dodged
ground fire from Iraqi forces while flying over northern Iraq. "You can't let your
guard down for a minute." (In a 2002 interview.)8

WMD, The Last RD

Let us not forget how Saddam Hussein was able to take an underdeveloped nation of
Iraq, and in the span of a few decades created the largest chemical and biological
warfare arsenal in the Mid -East; he had extensive delivery sy stems for it from
simple artillery, to drones, cruise and Scud missiles 8a, and he knew how to use it.

He also created the 4 th largest standing military in world . How long do you think it
would have taken Saddam to reestablish his arsenals once UN Inspect ions were gone
for good? Here are some of Saddam’s progenies from his educational institutions like
the infamous Dr. Germ, and Mrs Anthrax :9

10-94
Dr. Germ," the woman many consider the mother of all Iraqi biological weapons. She
is Rihab Taha, an unassuming Bri tish-trained scientist who has been identified by
United Nations arms inspectors as the driving force behind Iraq's development of a
weapons stockpile that, at least in the past, contained gallons of some of the most
lethal germ agents known to mankind. "S he has a unique knowledge of all (Iraqi
president Saddam Hussein's bio -weapons) secrets," Jane's Intelligence Digest wrote
recently.

During her bio-weapon career, the plain -looking and normally mild -mannered Taha
has overseen the production of at least 130 ,000 gallons of anthrax and botulinum
toxin - germs Taha rose to run a 150 -person bio-weapon operation at the infamous
Salman Pak facility, which inspectors once dubbed germ -warfare central. There , at
the super-secret al-Hakam weapons complex , scientists concocted not only oceans of
anthrax and botulism, but also experimented with the extremely deadly toxin ricin,
gas gangrene that causes skin to melt, aflatoxins that cause liver cancer,
hemorrhagic conjunctivitis, camel pox and various antibiotic -resistant agents.10

Mrs. Anthrax, Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, is a mysterious figure who has been
described as one of the pillars of Iraq’s bio -weapons programs. Because U.S.
intelligence placed her at the heart of Iraq's efforts to dev elop biological weapons,
she had been dubbed "Mrs. Anthrax." Considered a scientific powerhouse responsible
for rebuilding Iraq's biological weapons capabilities in the mid -1990s, in 1996, she
became the head of Iraq’s microbiology society, an alleged front for research into
such potential biological weapons as anthrax and smallpox .10a

There are many more examples, but again, this book is not only about Saddam
Hussein. Early on in my research, I wrote a paper which Iraq Watch.org posted in its
Perspectives Section , which is still posted there, as well as in my book. I found in
Saddam’s bio-warfare agents, that he had weaponized rotavirus, considered a non -
lethal weapon, as it makes adults very sick, “immobilizes”. However it will kill infants
and young children, a perfect genocidal weapon for Saddam; I believed he used it on
the Iraqi Kurds. 11

Georges Hormis Sada , A former high ranking Iraqi Military Official

Sada is different from other former Iraqi military personnel, and his comments are
worth noting on Saddam WMD .

Georges Hormis Sad a graduated from Iraq’s Air Academy in

1959 and was trained by elite forces in Great Britain, Russia and
the U.S.. Georges Sada was born into an Assyrian Christian
family in northern Iraq and became a born -again believer in
1986. Georges had great favor wi th the former Iraqi dictator, as
he is one of the few Iraqi men to ever publicly confront Saddam
Hussein and live to tell about it. Georges believes a key reason
why he served as one of Saddam’s most trusted advisors was to
persuade him against attacking t he nation of Israel with
chemical weapons, something Saddam attempted to do on two
separate occasions.

Now retired, Georges is director of the Iraqi Institute for Peace and also serves as
spokesman for the newly elected prime minister of Iraq. He is also the president of
the National Presbyterian Church in Baghdad and chairman of the Assembly of Iraqi

10-95
Evangelical Presbyterian Churches. In recent years, Georges held the position of
principal advisor to the former Iraqi Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi. Additiona lly, he
acted as the lead consultant for the reconstruction of all three branches of the Iraqi
defense system. In June of 2003, Georges received the prestigious International
Prize for Peace and Reconciliation presented by the Bishop of Coventry, England. 12

Georges Sada is the author of the book , 2006 Saddam’s Secrets, an exposé on Iraq’s
weapons programs and the murderous reign of Saddam Hussein.

According to him, in an interview and documented in his book, Saddam Hussein

moved his WMD arsenal to Syria, in 2002.

From an interview, SADA said: “Well, up to the year 2002, in summer, they were in
Iraq. And after that, when Saddam realized that the inspectors were coming on the
first of November and the Americans were coming, he took the advantage of a
natural disaster that happened in Syria, a dam was broken. So he — he announced
to the world that he was going to make an air bridge. They were moved by air and
by ground, 56 sorties by jumbo 747, and 27 were moved ; after they were converted
to cargo aircraft, they were moved to Syria. The flights - , Sada said - attracted little
notice because they were thought to be civilian flights providing relief from Iraq to
Syria, which had suffered a flood after a dam collapse in June of 2002. ”13
FOOTNOTES/ REMARKS
[1] REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE , UNITED STATES SENATE REPORT ON THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S POSTWAR FINDINGS ABOUT IRAQ’S WMD PROGRAMS AND LINKS TO
TERRORISM AND HOW THEY COMPARE WITH PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ , SEPTEMBER
8th, 2006, PAGE 58.
[2] THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ: THE SANCTIONS; U.S. REPORT SAYS HUSSEIN BOUGHT ARMS WITH EASE
BY ERIC LIPTON AND SCOTT SHANE , NEW YORK TIMES, OCTOBER 8, 2004
[3]A REGION INFLAMED: WEAPONS; FOR THE IRAQIS, A MISSILE DEAL THAT WENT SOUR; FILES TE LL OF
TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA DECEMBER 1, 2003 , BY DAVID E. SANGER AND THOM SHANKER , NEW YORK
TIMES,
[4] KUWAIT FAMILIES STILL AWAIT WORD OF GULF WAR POWS' FATE
BY JIM GARAMONE, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE , KUWAIT CITY, KUWAIT, APRIL 10, 2000
[5] NAVY BOARD SUGGESTS NEW SPEICHER SEARCH , ASSOCIATED PRESS , JULY 8, 2005
[6] NAVY: IRAQIS KNOW MISSING PILOT'S WHEREABOUTS , COPYRIGHT 2005 THE ASSOCIATED PRESS .
[7] THE FORGOTTEN WAR BY MARK THOMPSON , WASHINGTON, MONDAY, SEP. 16, 2002
HTTP://WWW.TIME.COM/TIME
[8] IBID 7
[8a] THE IRAQI THREAT AND SADDAM HUSSEIN’S WMD , TRAFFORD PUBLISHING 2002, PAGES 145-202.
[9] SADDAM'S DR GERM AND MRS ANTHRAX TO BE RELEASED , BY OLIVER POOLE,
20/12/2005
HTTP://WWW.TELEGRAPH.CO.UK/NEWS/MAIN.JHTML?XML=/NEWS/2005/12/20/WIRQ220.XML
[10] THE WORLD’S DEADLIEST WOMAN? - WORLD NEWS - MSNBC.COM
NICKNAMED "DR. GERM" BY U.N. INSPECTORS, WWW.MSNBC.MSN.COM/ID/3340765
[10a] IRAQ'S 'MRS. ANTHRAX' IS KEY FIGURE IN WEAPONS PROGRAM , BY STEVENSON SWANSON ,TRIBUNE
NATIONAL, CORRESPONDENT APRIL 11, 2003.
CHICAGOTRIBUNE.COM/NEWS/NATIONWORLD
[11] THE IRAQI THREAT AND SADDAM HUSSEIN’S WMD, TRAFFORD PUBLISHING 2002 , PAGES 203 – 212.
[12] GENERAL GEORGES SADA
HTTP://WWW.AMBASSADORAGENCY.COM/CLIENT_PROFILE.CFM/CID/1225
[13] EXCLUSIVE! FORMER TOP MILITARY A IDE TO SADDAM REVEALS DICTATOR'S SECRET PLANS
THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 2006 , FOXNEWS
HTTP://WWW.FOXNEWS.COM/STORY/0,2933,182932,00.HTML

10-96
 Dr. David A. Kay is best known for heading the Iraq Survey
Group and acting as a weapons inspector in Iraq aft er the 2003
Invasion of Iraq. Kay worked as the UN Chief Weapons Inspector
from 1991 to 1992. Following that, he was Vice President of
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) from 1993
to 2002. While at SAIC, he worked alongside Steven Hatfil l until
March 2002. Then, he was appointed as a Special Advisor for
Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs. He received
the International Atomic Energy Agency's distinguished Service Award and the U.S.
Secretary of State's Comm endation. (SAIC was contracted by the U.S. to build
prototype Mobile Weapons Laboratories in fall of 2001) . After the 1991 Gulf War, Kay
led teams of inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iraq to search
out and destroy banned chemical, b iological, and nuclear weapons. 1

Assassinations of Key Iraqi Scientists , 2004 Report

The killings began last year (200 3). Dr. Kay said in October, two Iraqi scientists then
cooperating with his team were slain. "We think it was because, in fact, they were
engaged in discussions with u s." "Pure logic leads you to conclude that these leading
scientists being killed ,who spoke to us, were not mugged, and are being selectively
assassinated so they cannot tell, which is further evidence of hiding Iraq 's
weapons."2

One of the Iraq’s most prominent nuclear scientists, Majid Hussein Ali, was found
slain, shot twice in the back. He had been questioned by the Iraqi Survey Group, as
had the other eight assassinated scientists. 3
From the 2004 statements of Congressma n Buyer , U.S. arms inspectors need to
make the public better aware that Iraqi insurgents are assassinating scientists who
could hold the key to Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.

"I want the world to be informed that these individuals are b eing assassinated, and
it's not because they have a new cooking recipe," said Rep. Steve Buyer, Indiana
Republican and chairman of the House Veterans' Affairs oversight and investigations
subcommittee.

Congressman Buyer said he learned of the assassin ations during a closed -door
briefing by Mr. Kay and wondered then why the inspector and other officials are not
doing more to publicly expose the killings as significant events. Nine top Iraqi
scientists have been killed since Saddam was ousted April 9 th, 2003.4

2004: In one case, a propionate former Iraqi Chemical Warfare Scientist who was
cooperating with search for Saddam’s WMD, was assassinated while in protective
custody in Iraq. 5

10-97
 Lawmakers Voice Concern On Failure To Control Iraqi Weapons S cientists
Members of Congress ask Rice about the absence of a plan to control
scientists who could export their knowledge to other nations
Thursday, December 11 th, 2003

WASHINGTON, D.C. - Members of Congress have voiced serious concern over the
failure of the Bush Administration to secure Iraqi scientists who might have expertise
in weapons of mass destruction, as news reports indicate that some weapons
scientists have left Iraq for Iran and Syria.

In a letter to National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice , the lawmakers noted that
there does not appear to have been a long -term plan in place to secure the
scientists, and the knowledge they represent, immediately after U.S. forces occupied
Iraq. More than six months after the declared end of "major combat op erations," a
plan for the monitoring and redirecting the activities of the scientists has only just
recently been proposed but not yet agreed to or implemented. And yet, the
lawmakers said, controlling the export of WMD technology was one of the
Administration’s stated reasons for launching Operation Iraqi Freedom. 6

FOOTNOTES / REMARKS
[1] DR DAVID KAY USINFO.STATE.GOV/REGIONAL/NEA/IRAQ/TEXT/1209KAY.HTM
[2 – 4] SILENCE ON DEATHS OF IRAQI SCIENTISTS TROUBLES LAWMAKER BY ROWAN SCARBOROUGH
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, APR/04/2004
[5] IRAQI ARMS SCIENTISTS KILLED BEFORE THEY TALK, BY ROWAN SCARBOROUGH
THE WASHINGTON TIMES , 2004.
[6] LAWMAKERS VOICE CONCERN ON FAILURE TO CONTROL IRAQI WEAPONS SCIENTISTS
HTTP://SCHIFF.HOUSE.GOV/HOR/CA29/NEWSROOM/PRESS+RELEASES/2003/ LAWMAKERS+VOICE+CONCERN+
ON+FAILURE+TO+CONTROL+IRAQI+WEAPONS+SCIENTISTS.HTM

Report Of Select Committee On Intelligence United States Senate Report On

The U.S. Intelligence Community's P ostwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD
Programs And Links To Terrorism And Ho w They Compare With Prewar
Intelligence Assessments On Iraq , September 8 th, 2006, Pages 123 -124.

The ISG found that Saddam Hussein did not consider the United
States to be a Natural adversary and according to Ta riq Aziz,
Saddam hoped to improve relati ons with the United Sates.
Between 1994 and 1998 , Iraqi Leaders did indicate to UNSCOM
personnel that Iraq wanted dialogue with US . Saddam told ISG
that he wanted better relations with the US, but said the US
refused to listen to anything Iraq had to say.

Tariq Aziz, was the Iraqi Foreign Minister (1979 –1991) and
Deputy Prime Minister (1979 –2003) of Iraq, and a close advisor of
President Saddam Hussein ...

Of course, it is kind of hard to listen to someone who has a death bounty of

14,000dollars on US airmen patrolling and enforcing the mandated no fly zones in
Iraq, and trying to shoot them down ; someone who attempted to assassinate a
president of the United States, harbor ed a terrorist from the 1993 WTC bombing etc.
etc… but the ISG ….. may have missed just a few things or quite a few things…. How
could anyone believe that with such heinous activities being conducted by the late
Saddam Hussein, think he really desired a better relationship with America, it
boggles the imagination, yet that is what has h appened.

10-98
Darkness has fallen over America . Since the WMD arsenal was not found in Iraq, a
quick victory over Saddam forces led to a prolonged sectarian violence of epic
proportions with no end in sight. Washington Officials are ready to pack up and le ave
Iraq. Now, the avalanche of bitter criticism, fault finding, and echoes that Saddam
Hussein was no threat , has become the breath of American life. A ghost of Vietnam’s
prolonged bloody war of 10 years is truly overshadowing the United States, clouding
the image of Saddam Hussein , and who he really was.

Saddam Hussein, this malevolent genius, who fashioned, then opened up a

Pandora’s Box of Weapons of Mass Destruction. From this, started an arms race
among Mid-East Countries, for arsenals and counter arsenals of WMD. Terrorists saw
what death, and devastation that could be done with these heinous weapons,
became hungry for these deadly arsenals. Saddam’s Iraqi educational systems,
created dark twisted human beings, geniuses capable of forming, creat ing
biological warfare agents, chemical warfare agents, many now roam the world freely,
free to go where they choose, and do what they choose, Pandora’s Box opened,
think not ?

Dr Germ and Mrs. Anthrax were freed by the Iraqi government, along with
many others, Freeing the demons, the human element of Saddam Hussein’s
Pandora’s Box.

SOURCE: US FREE’S IRAQ'S DR. GERM, MRS. ANTHRAX , BY VOA NEWS, DECEMBER 19th, 2005.
Rihab Taha and Huda Saleh Mahdi Amash were among 24 people freed.
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG /WMD/LIBRARY/NEWS/IRAQ/2005/12/IRAQ -051219

The Gulf War Syndrome : Illness from the 1991 war with Iraq has claimed several
thousand American lives after the war. Thousands more like myself are disabled with
chronic debilitating life -long medical conditions , and off and on hospitalization. This
and more has been eclipsed by 9/11, the war with Islamic extremists, like Agent
Orange deaths, and illness from the Vietnam War . The Gulf War Vets, are little more
than a page in history.

“It wasn't bullets that too k them down, but a casualty -producer the experts didn't
count on called Gulf War Illness ”. So far, according to an April 2002 Veterans Affairs
report,

“An additional 7,758 Desert Storm ’ Vets have died,” while 198,716 vets have
filed claims for medical and compensation benefits. Of the claims filed,
156,031 have been granted as service -connected, with more vets being
designated casualties as each day passes. The 198,716 figure represents a
staggering 28 percent of the vets – 696,579 – who fought in the Gulf War
conflict!”

SOURCE: OOPS, MORE UNEXPECTED CASUALTIES COL. DAVID HACKWORTH SEPTEMBER 17 th, 2002.
WORLDNETDAILY.COM/NEWS/ARTICLE.ASP?ARTICLE_ID=28958

January 2006: In a 2006 study led by Melvin Blanchard and published by the
Journal of Epidemiology , part of the "National Health Survey of Gulf War -Era
Veterans and Their Families", stated that veterans deployed in the Persian Gulf War
had nearly twice the prevalence of chronic multisymptom illness (CMI), a cluster of
symptoms similar to a set of condition s often called Gulf War Syndrome .
SOURCE : STUDY FINDS MULTISYMPTOM CONDITION IS MORE PREVALENT AMONG PERSIAN GULF VETS
RECORD.WUSTL.EDU/NEWS/PAGE/NORMAL/6377.HTML

10-99
I was asked if I celebrated the execution of the late Saddam Hussein . I told my
friends I did not, but I told them what I did celebrate, what I did thank God for, that
not another single American Trooper would ever have to face Saddam Hussein and
his deadly arsenal, of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

So after taking this journey through Saddam’s World,

Was He A Threat That Never Was?

The Saddam Hussein and Imad Mugniyah Connection?

From our journey through Saddam’s world,

what have we found, what has been
established? Saddam had decades’ long
brotherhood ties with Palestinian terrorists,
and the late Yassir Arafat. But one
individual who thunderous rise through the
Palestinian ranks to become one of Arafat’s
elite warrior and body guard, in his Force
17, was Imad Mugniyah. This infamous
terrorist –warrior, honed and bloody in the
1980’s with Israel offensive protective
operations, in Lebanon. As we have seen,
Imad soon became a major soldier for the
Hezbollah, and often called, “Iran’s
Merchant of Death,” and more. Yet a
Saddam and Imad Connection? We must
come to a realization, ponder, thi s is not
just an educated guess, but a terrible
unexplored issue of a connection between
Saddam Hussein, Palestinian terrorism and
the elusive Imad Mugniyah. Clearly there
had to be a meeting between Saddam and
Imad. But we may never know; such
answers lie in a cold grave buried with the
late Saddam Hussein.

10-100
 Final Footnotes For Chapter 10

Statement By David Kay On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities

Of The Iraq Survey Group (Isg) Before The House Permanent Select
Committee On Intelligence, The House Committee On Appropriations,
Subcommittee On Defense, And The Senate Select Committee On
Intelligence October 2 nd, 2003

With regard to delivery systems, the ISG team has discovered sufficient evidence to date to conclude that the Ira qi
regime was committed to delivery system improvements that would have, if OIF had not occurred, dramatically breached
UN restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.

Detainees and co-operative sources indicate that beginning in 2000 Saddam order ed the development of ballistic missiles
with ranges of at least 400km and up to 1000km and that measures to conceal these projects from UNMOVIC were
initiated in late-2002, ahead of the arrival of inspectors. Work was also underway for a clustered engine liquid propellant
missile, and it appears the work had progressed to a point to support initial prototype production of some parts and
assemblies. According to a cooperating senior detainee, Saddam concluded that the proposals from both the liquid -
propellant and solid-propellant missile design centers would take too long. For instance, the liquid -propellant missile
project team forecast first delivery in six years. Saddam countered in 2000 that he wanted the missile designed and built
inside of six months. On the other hand several sources contend that Saddam's range requirements for the missiles grew
from 400-500km in 2000 to 600-1000km in 2002.

ISG has gathered testimony from missile designers at Al Kindi State Company that Iraq has reinitiated work on con verting
SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles into ballistic missiles with a range goal of about 250km. Engineering work was reportedly
underway in early 2003, despite the presence of UNMOVIC. This program was not declared to the UN. ISG is presently
seeking additional confirmation and details on this project. A second cooperative source has stated that the program
actually began in 2001, but that it received added impetus in the run -up to OIF, and that missiles from this project were
transferred to a facility north of Baghdad. This source also provided documentary evidence of instructions to convert SA -
2s into surface-to-surface missiles.

ISG has obtained testimony from both detainees and cooperative sources that indicate that proscribed -range solid-
propellant missile design studies were initiated, or already underway, at the time when work on the clustered liquid -
propellant missile designs began. The motor diameter was to be 800 to 1000mm, i.e. much greater than the 500 -mm
Ababil-100. The range goals cited for this system vary from over 400km up to 1000km, depending on the source and the
payload mass.

A cooperative source, involved in the 2001 -2002 deliberations on the long -range solid propellant project, provided ISG
with a set of concept designs for a launcher de signed to accommodate a 1m diameter by 9m length missile. The limited
details in the drawings suggest there was some way to go before launcher fabrication. The source believes that these
drawings would not have been requested until the missile progress was relatively advanced, normally beyond the design
state. The drawing are in CAD format, with files dated 09/01/02.

While we have obtained enough information to make us confident that this design effort was underway, we are not yet
confident which accounts of the timeline and project progress are accurate and are now seeking to better understand this
program and its actual progress at the time of OIF.

One cooperative source has said that he suspected that the new large -diameter solid-propellant missile was intended to
have a CW-filled warhead, but no detainee has admitted any actual knowledge of plans for unconventional warheads for
any current or planned ballistic missile. The suspicion expressed by the one source about a CW warhead was based on
his assessment of the unavailability of nuclear warheads and potential survivability problems of biological warfare agent in
ballistic missile warheads. This is an area of great interest and we are seeking additional information on warhead designs.

While I have spoken so far of planned missile systems, one high -level detainee has recently claimed that Iraq retained a
small quantity of Scud-variant missiles until at least 2001, although he subsequently recanted these claims, work
continues to determine the truth. Two other sources contend that Iraq continued to produce until 2001 liquid fuel and
oxidizer specific to Scud-type systems. The cooperating source claims that the al Tariq Factory was used to manufacture
Scud oxidizer (IRFNA) from 1996 to 2001, and that nitrogen tetroxide, a chief ingredient of IRFNA was collected from a
bleed port on the production equipment, was reserved, and then mixed with highly concentrated nitric acid plus an
inhibitor to produce Scud oxidizer. Iraq never declared its pre-Gulf War capability to manufacture Scud IRFNA out of fear,
multiple sources have stated, that the al Tariq Factory would be destroyed, leaving Baghdad without the ability to produce
highly concentrated nitric acid, explosives and munitions. To date , we have not discovered documentary or material
evidence to corroborate these claims, but continued efforts are underway to clarify and confirm this information with

10-101
additional Iraqi sources and to locate corroborating physical evidence. If we can confirm that the fuel was produ ced as late
as 2001, and given that Scud fuel can only be used in Scud -variant missiles, we will have strong evidence that the
missiles must have been retained until that date. This would, of course, be yet another example of a failure to declare
prohibited activities to the UN.

Iraq was continuing to develop a variety of UAV platforms and maintained two UAV programs that were working in
parallel, one at Ibn Fernas and one at al -Rashid Air Force Base. Ibn Fernas worked on the development of smaller, more
traditional types of UAVs in addition to the conversion of manned aircraft into UAVs. This program was not declared to the
UN until the 2002 CAFCD in which Iraq declared the RPV -20, RPV-30 and Pigeon RPV systems to the UN. All these
systems had declared ranges of less than 150km. Several Iraqi officials stated that the RPV -20 flew over 500km on
autopilot in 2002, contradicting Iraq's declaration on the system's range. The al -Rashid group was developing a competing
line of UAVs. This program was never fully de clared to the UN and is the subject of on -going work by ISG. Additional work
is also focusing on the payloads and intended use for these UAVs. Surveillance and use s as decoys are mentioned by
some of those interviewed. Given Iraq's interest before the Gulf War in attempting to convert a MIG -21 into an unmanned
aerial vehicle to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents, attention is being paid to whether
any of the newer generation of UAVs were intended to have a similar purpose. This remains an open question.

ISG has discovered evidence of two primary cruise missile programs. The first appears to have been successfully
implemented, whereas the second had not yet reached maturity at the time of OIF.

The first involved upgrades to the HY-2 coastal-defense cruise missile. ISG has developed multiple sources of testimony,
which is corroborated in part by a captured document that Iraq undertook a program aimed at increasing the HY -2's range
and permitting its use as a land -attack missile. These efforts extended the HY -2's range from its original 100km to 150 -
180km. Ten modified missiles were delivered to the military prior to OIF and two of these were fired from Umm Qasr
during OIF - one was shot down and one hit Kuwait.

The second program, called the Jenin, was a much more ambitious effort to convert the HY -2 into a 1000km range land-
attack cruise missile. The Jenin concept was presented to Saddam on November 23rd, 2001 and received what
cooperative sources called an "unusually quick re sponse" in little more than a week. The essence of the concept was to
take an HY-2, strip it of its liquid rocket engine, and put in its place a turbine engine from a Russian helicopter - the TV-2-
117 or TV3-117 from a Mi-8 or Mi-17helicopter. To prevent discovery by the UN, Iraq halted engine development and
testing and disassembled the test stand in late 2002 before the design criteria had been met.

In addition to the activities detailed here on Iraq's attempts to develop delivery systems beyond the permi tted UN 150km,
ISG has also developed information on Iraqi attempts to purchase proscribed missiles and missile technology. Documents
found by ISG describe a high level dialogue between Iraq and North Korea that began in December 1999 and included an
October 2000 meeting in Baghdad. These documents indicate Iraqi interest in the transfer of technology for surface -to-
surface missiles with a range of 1300km (probably No Dong) and land -to-sea missiles with a range of 300km. The
document quotes the North Korean s as understanding the limitations imposed by the UN, but being prepared "to
cooperate with Iraq on the items it specified". At the time of OIF, these discussions had not led to any missiles being
transferred to Iraq. A high level cooperating source has re ported that in late 2002, at Saddam's behest, a delegation of
Iraqi officials was sent to meet with foreign export companies, including one that dealt with missiles. Iraq was interested in
buying an advanced ballistic missile with 270km and 500km ranges.

 Line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one
of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible limit.

 Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a
capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they
were told to conceal from the UN.

 Plans and advanced design work for new long -range missiles with ranges up to at least 1000 km - well beyond
the 150 km range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range would have allowed Iraq to threaten
targets through out the Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.

10-102
From examination of these few military / security elements, one can see the iron fist
Saddam had created to rule Iraq. In addition , each organization had its own
compartmentization for obscuring its activities, and clandestine operations. Here is a
summary of some of S addam’s security apparatuses, and is by no means complete.

The Presidential Secretariat

The Presidential Secretariat has around 100 staff, who are drawn from the security
agencies. The Secretariat is responsible for Saddam's personal security, as well as defense,
security and intelligence issues.

Al-Majlis Al-Amn Al-Qawni/ The National Security Council.

Was headed by Saddam Hussein but was usually chaired by his son Qusay Hussein . It
oversees the work of all other security agencies .
Special Security Committee

Qusay Hussein was the deputy chairman of the Special Security Committee of the Iraqi
National Security Council, created in 1996 as part of the President's office.

The Committee Membership Includes:

 Tahir Jalil Habbush Al -Tikriti, The Director Of The Public Security Directorate .
 Dahham Al-Tikriti, Director Of The Iraqi Intelligence Service –Al Mukhabarat.

 Abid Hamid Mahmud, The President’s Personal Secretary.

 Faris ’Abd-Al-Hamid Al-’Ani, The Director General Of The President ial Office.

This special body had included representatives of the Republican Guard. The Committee was
supported by over 2,000 staff members. The personnel was drawn from the Iraqi elite forces,
the Republican Guard, the Special Guard, and the intelligenc e services.

Their main task was preventing the UN Inspectors from uncovering information, documents,
and equipment connected with WMD. They were recruited for this specific mission
and chosen from the most efficient and loyal units. The work is divided between two
sections, each of which has a staff of about 1,000.
Section One:
Focused on the daily work of the UN monitoring commission , including sites to be
visited and inspected, escorting UN inspectors, preventing them from carrying out their
mission effectively.

Section Two
This section concealed documents, equipment, and materials and moved them about
from one location to another. Several facilities had been especially built for collecti ng and
hiding such selected material. This section was responsible for materials that were
imported through "special channels" as part of the program of rebuilding the strategic
military arsenal, including chemical and biological we apons as well as missiles and
associated technology.

Al-Mukhabarat / The Directorate of General Intelligence

This element contained about 4,000 people and had been created out of the Ba’ath party. Al -
Mukhabarat was roughly divided into departmen ts which were responsible for internal
operations, co-coordinated through provincial offices, and another responsible for
international operations, conducted from various Iraqi embassies.

It has long been known that Al -Mukhabarat used it s intelligence to target Iraqis. It forced
Iraqis living abroad to work for Saddam by threatening dire consequences for relatives still
inside Iraq. It was reported that an Iraqi c ould not work for a foreign firm inside Iraq without
also working for Al -Mukhabarat directly or as an informant. This includes those allowed to
work with foreign media organizations.

10-103
 Al-Amn al-Aam / The Directorate of General Security :
Contained around, 8,000 people, and it was one of the oldest security agency in the country.
It had supported the domestic counter -intelligence work of other agencies. As a policy,
Saddam staffed key positions in Al -Amn Al-Aam with his relatives or other close members of
his regime. Al-Amn al-Aam was given more political intelligence responsibilit ies during
the Iran-Iraq War. In 1991, Saddam Hussein provided it with a paramilitary wing, Quwat
al-Tawari, to reinforce law and order, although these units are ultimately under Al Amn al -
Khas control.

Al Amn al-Khas / The Special Security Organiz ation:

Had some 2,000 people, was the most powerful and most feared agency, headed by Qusay
Hussein. Its main responsibilities were for the security of the President and of presidential
facilities; supervising and checking the loyalty of other security ser vices; monitoring
government ministries; supervising operations against Iraqi Kurds and Shias ; and securing
Iraq’s most important military industries, including WMD. The Al -Amn al-Khas was nebulous
and highly secretive, operated on a functional, rather than a geographical basis.

The Security Bureau

The Security Bureau was divided into a Special Office, which monitored the Special
Security agency itself to assure loyalty among its members . The Office of Presidential
Facilities, another unit of the Security Bureau, guarded these places through Jihaz al -
Hamaya al-Khas (The Special Protection Apparatus). It was charged with protecting the
Presidential Offices, Council of Ministers, National Council, and t he Regional and
National Command of the Ba’th Party, and is the only unit responsible for providing
bodyguards to leaders.

The Political Bureau: The Political Bureau collected and analyzed intelligence and prepared
operations against “enemies of the stat e”. It played an active role in crushing the March 1991
Shi’a rebellion in the south of Iraq. Along with General Intelligence, Special Security agents
infiltrated the Kurdish enclave in the north of Iraq in August 1996, to hunt down operatives of
the Iraqi opposition. During the 1991 Gulf War, it was put in charge of concealing SCUD
missiles and afterwards in moving and hiding documents from UNSCOM inspections, relating
to Iraq’s weapons program.

Al-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya / The Directorate of Military Intelligence:

Fielded about 6,000 people ; its main functions were ensuring the loyalty of the army’s
officer corps and gathering military intelligence from abroad. But it was also involved in
foreign operations, including assassinations.

Al-Istikhbarat Al-Askariyya / Military Intelligence

This Organization Consisted Of Six Branches :

 Administration Branch :
Handles All Administration For The MI.
 Political Branch:
Responsible For Intelligence Collection Abroad.
 Military Brigade:
They Mainly Protect The Baghdad Region.
 Special Branch:
Responsible For Clandestine Operations.
 Security Unit:
Internal Security Organization for Countering Dissent in the Armed Forces.
 Unit 999:
Responsible For Domestic And International Clandestine Operatio ns, Sabotage And
Countering Opposition Groups. There Are Six Battalions To Counter Opposition Groups.
Each Battalion Is Responsible For A Specific Area.

10-104
 1st Battalion Iran
2nd Battalion Saudi Arabia
3rd Battalion Israel
4th Battalion Turkey
5th Battalion Sea-borne operations
6th Battalion Kurdish and Shias opposition

Unit 999 was an ultra -secret Iraqi special forces "deep penetration" unit that was tasked with
both domestic and foreign operations. It was part of the Al -Istikhbarat al-Askariyya (Special
Branch of Iraqi Military Intelligence).The main headquarters of Unit 999 was located in the
base at Salman Pak, southeast of Baghdad. This unit was tasked with several clandestine
missions that included infiltration of Kurdish rebels in the Northern Ir aq, sabotage of several
Iranian oil facilities in the 1990s , and the attempted kidnapping of General Schwarzkopf
during the Operation Desert Storm. It had a total of 1,800 troops divided into six
battalions.

Al-Amn al-Askari / Military Security Service :

Had about 6,000 people. The Amn maintained a presence in every town and village, with
personnel stationed in civilian police stations across Iraq -- normally the "ordinary"
police were on the ground floor and the Secret Police on the second fl oor.

Al-Haris al-Jamhuri al-Khas / The Special Republican Guard :

Had some 15,000 personnel, and was headed by Qusay Hussein . It served as a
praetorian guard, protecting Presidential sites and escorting Saddam Hussein on travels
within Iraq. The Al-Haris al-Jamhuri al-Khas were the only troops normally stationed in
Baghdad. It consisted of four brigades, three infantry and one armored. Al -Haris al-Jamhuri al-
Khas also has its own artillery battalions, air defense and aviation assets. Uni ts consisted
mainly of individuals from tribes loyal to Saddam Hussein.
Al Hadi Project / Project 858
Al Hadi was estimated to have a staff of about 800. The Al Hadi Project is the organization
responsible for collecting, processing, exploiting a nd disseminating signals, communications
and electronic intelligence.

Fedayeen Saddam / Saddam’s Martyrs :

Had between 30,000 to 40,000 young people . The unit reported directly to the Presidential
Palace, rather than through the army command, and was respo nsible for patrol of borders and
controlling or facilitating smuggling. The paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam (Saddam’s `Men of
Sacrifice’) was formed in 1995.

The Fedayeen Saddam include a special unit known as the death squadron, whose
masked members perform certain executions, including in victims’ homes. The Fedayeen
operate completely outside the law, above and outside political and legal structures.

Maktab al-Shuyukh / The Tribal Chief’s Bureau

This was created after the Gulf war as a vehicle for paying tribal leaders to control their
people, spy on possible dissidents and provide arms to loyal tribesmen to suppress opposition.
(1-5)
FOOTNOTES / REMARKS
[1] ORGANIZATIONS / IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
HTTP://WWW.IRAQINEWS.COM/ORG_IRAQ I_INTELLIGENCE_SERVICES.SHTML
[2] AGENCY PROFILE: IRAQI INTELLIGENCE
CVNI.NET/RADIO/NSNL/NSNL009/NSNL9IRAQ.HTML
[3] THE STRUCTURE OF THE MUKHABARAT OR IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG/WMD/LIBRARY/NEWS/IRAQ/1998/IISSTRUCTURE.HTM
[4] SADDAM'S SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE NETWORK, BY IBRAHIM AL -MARASHI
CNS.MIIS.EDU/RESEARCH/IRAQ/IRAQINT.HTM#FNB1
[5] IRAQ'S SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE NETWORK: A GUIDE AND ANALYSIS

10-105
BY IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI
The ground assault on Iraqi forces, designated Desert Storm i s illustrated in the map at the top of the
page. The most detailed accounts available are the online book "The Whirlwind War", and the book
"Certain Victory", the official U.S. Army history of the battle. Time ran out for the Air Force's Instant
Thunder campaign. Once a large Army force had been placed in Saudi Arabia, maintaining it in place was
very expensive. It had to be used, or removed, and the latter option was not an option. The assault was
launched almost as soon as the last VII Corps units made it to the theater.

The plan was relatively straight forward, strategy wise, though exceptionally difficult logistics wise,
because of the compressed time scale. The XVIII Corps was deployed to the far left flank, tasked with
isolating the battlefield and p rotecting the flank and rear of VII corps. The French 6th Light Armored
Division and the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division extended along the far left to keep any Iraqi units from
entering the area. The 101st Airborne Division and the 24th Mechanized Infantry Di vision would move
forward to the highway along the Euphrates River and prevent any Iraqi units (particularly the Republican
Guard) from getting out of the area. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (USA) acted in a scouting role,
and also was assigned to patro l the boundary between XVIIIth Corps and VIIth Corps.

The units of VII Corps were in the center, tasked with directly assaulting the Iraqi armored forces, and the
Republican Guard, with the object of destroying them. The U.S. 1st and 3rd Armored Division s and 1st
Mechanized Infantry Division, along with the U.S. 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (as scouting force) and
the British 1st Armored Division were given this task, all under VII Corps control and Lt. Gen. Fred Franks.

The Marine and Arab units were o n the right flank, tasked with frontally assaulting the Iraqi fortifications
along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. There two -fold object was to (a) entice the Republican Guard forces
forward and into the path of VII Corps, and (b) to penetrate the fortifications and move on Kuwait City
(but the Marines were not to enter the city, until Kuwaiti units had preceded them). The Marines were
supported by the 1st ("Tiger") Brigade, 2nd Armored Division, from the U.S. Army, because the Marine
Corps Sherman tanks could no t take on the Iraqi T -72 tanks evenly, whereas the Army M1 -A1 Abrams
tanks could.

10-106
Finally, the Marine expeditionary forces afloat would act as a probable decoy, pinning down large Iraqi
forces on the Kuwaiti coast, in anticipation of an amphibious assaul t. In fact, there was never any real
consideration of an amphibious assault on the heavily defended urban coastline, which would expose the
Marines to heavy casualties without good reason. However, the option of an amphibious assault on Basra,
up the Shat al-Arab, was kept open until well into the ground assault. Such an assault would have put a
major force deep in the Iraqi rear area, but was in the end unnecessary.

The actual pace of events was rather different than planned. The XVIII Corps carried out its task much as
planned. However, the Marine Corps' lesson from Khafji didn't quite sink into the Army's thinking. The
plan called for the Marine and Arab forces to be hung up in the Iraqi fortifications for 18 to 24 hours and
maybe longer. Long enough, i n any case, to entice the Republican Guard to come down in support, giving
VII Corps a straight shot at them. But the reality was that the Marines blew through the Iraqi fortifications
and accomplished in a few hours, what was expected to take days. Instea d of being enticed into the path
of VII Corps, Iraqi units were reeling backwards.

The surprising success of the Marine assault motivated CENTCOM to launch the VII Corps attack
somewhat early. According to some of the post war pundits, this was a sign of panic on Schwarzkopf's
part, reflecting his belief that the Iraqis were in full retreat. General Franks (CG, VII Corps) disagrees, and
points out that if this were really the case, CENTCOM would not have insisted that he hold his attack until
the Egyptian corps was ready to go. He says that VII Corps was ready, willing, and anxious to go even
earlier (to preserve limited daylight). The fact that they were held back for a coordinated assault leads
Franks to conclude that the motivation for an early assault was simply to ensure the safety of the Marine
Corps west flank. However, there is also no doubt but that Schwarzkopf did soon come to the conclusion
that the Iraqis were in full retreat, and that VII Corps should have moved faster in pursuit. Franks tells the
story in his own words in the book "Into the Storm" (Tom Clancy & Fred Franks), which contradicts some
arguments made by Schwarzkopf in his own autobiography "It Doesn't Take a Hero".

One interesting aspect of the operations is that map symbols can b e misleading. For instance, the 1st
Mechanized Infantry Division deployed with only two of its own brigades, with 3rd Brigade, 2nd Armored
Division as its round -out brigade. As a result, the division deployed with 6 armored battalions, and 3
mechanized infantry battalions. A normal mechanized infantry division would deploy with 6 battalions of
mechanized infantry, and 4 armored battalions. So, in fact, the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division deployed
as an armored division that was short one maneuver battalion of mechanized infantry. Likewise, the 24th
Mechanized Infantry Division also deployed with only 2 of its own brigades, the round -out brigade was the
197th Mechanized Infantry Brigade from Ft. Benning. That gave the 24 th, 5 armored and 5 infantry
battalions, a hybrid division.

The Air Force planners had high hopes that the Instant Thunder campaign would be enough to compel the
Iraqis to withdraw. They were disappointed when this did not happen. Nevertheless, a month or so of
incessant bombing has a delete rious effect on immobile soldiers, to say the least. When the Army and
Marine Corps, and other coalition forces struck the Iraqi front line positions, most of the Iraqis were more
interested in surrendering than fighting, and breeching operations that were expected to take from 18 to
24 hours were finished in as little as 2 hours.

The entire Desert Storm operation was finished in a politically satisfying 100 hours of extremely one -sided
combat (the 1st battalion, 37th Armor, 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Divis ion USA, encountered the 29th
Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Tawakalna Division of the Iraqi Republican Guard on February 26 th,
1991; they destroyed 76 T -72 MBTs, 84 BMP IFVs, 3 Air Defence Artillery pieces, 8 howitzers, 6 command
vehicles, 2 engineer vehicles and "a myriad of trucks", at a cost of 4 USA M1 -A1 MBT's knocked out of
action and zero KIA - a single U.S. Army battalion destroyed an entire Iraqi brigade, while itself remaining
intact and essentially undamaged, and this is not the only example ). (1-35)
SOURCE:
[1]TIM-THOMPSON.COM/DESERT -STORM.HTML
[2] JAMES BAKER AND THE DESERT STORM LEGACY, BY AUSTIN BAY, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15 th, 2006.
Iraqis haven't forgotten the aftermath of Desert Storm. With Saddam's troops forced to retreat from Kuwait, Shia
Arabs throughout southern Iraq rose up against Saddam's tyranny. Kurds in the north also rebelled. Many Sunnis
in Baghdad anticipated the end of Saddam's "Tikiriti" despotism. Numerous Iraqis tell me post-Desert Storm they
anticipated liberation. Ins tead, they got a dose of so -called Realpolitik -- mass murder and a return to
dictatorship. In 1991, Saddam did not fall. His Republican Guards attacked the Shia towns and massacred their
inhabitants. At least 50,000 Iraqis were murdered by Saddam's defeat ed army.
TOWNHALL.COM/COLUMNISTS/AUSTINBAY/2006/11/15/JAMES_BAKER_AND_THE_DESERT_STORM_LEGACY
[3] ARMY WAR COLLEGE (U.S.) STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. LIBERATION, OCCUPATION, AND RESCUE: WAR
TERMINATION AND DESERT STORM, BY JOHN T. FISHEL. CARLISLE BARRAC KS, PA, AUG 1992. P.95.
DOC. CALL NO.: M-U 39080-469

10-107
[4] BLAZEK, PATRICK W. (LTCOL). BAGHDAD, OR BUST ? NEWPORT, RI, JUN 1993. P.31. (NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (U.S.)
STUDENT THESIS) DOC. CALL NO.: M-U 41662 B645B
[5] BROWN, JOHN S. (LTCOL). THE HUNDRED HOUR END POINT: AN OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT. NEWPORT, RI, JUN
1992. P.34. (NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (U.S.) STUDENT THESIS)
DOC. CALL NO.: M-U (LTCOL).
[6] STERLING, ROBERT R., JR. (LCDR). DESERT STORM: THE WAR THE COALITION ALMOST LOST. NEWPORT, RI, FEB
1993. P. 24(NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (U.S.) STUDENT THESIS)
DOC. CALL NO.: M-U 41662 S838D
[7] TROTTI, PAUL W. (LTCOL). THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: A "STORM" TOO SHORT ? NEWPORT, RI, MAY 1993.
P.26(NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (U.S.) STUDENT THESIS)
DOC. CALL NO.: M-U 41662 T858P
[8] WOJDAKOWSKI, WALTER (LTCOL). CONFLICT TERMINATION: INTEGRATING THE ELEMENTS OF POWER IN TODAY'S
CHANGING WORLD. CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA, APR 1993. P. 31 (ARMY WAR COLLEGE (U.S.) STUDY PROJECT)
DOC. CALL NO.: M-U 39080-83 W8471C
[9] ZAZWORSKY, DANIEL S. THE 100 -HOUR WAR WITH IRAQ: COULD IT HAVE BEEN LONGER? A CLAUSEWITZIAN
ANALYSIS OF THE CULMINATING POINT OF VICTORY. NEWPORT, RI, NOV 1993. P. 31 (NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (U.S.)
STUDENT THESIS)
DOC. CALL NO.: M-U 41662 Z39O
[10] AFTER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE GULF WAR. LANHAM , MD, MADISON BOOKS, 1992. P. 415
APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY COVERS AUG '88 - AUG 28, 1991.
BOOK CALL NO.: 956.70442 A258
[11] BEYOND THE STORM: A GULF CRISIS READER, EDITED BY PHYLLIS BENNIS AND MICHEL MOUSHABECK.
BROOKLYN, NY, OLIVE BRANCH PRESS, 1991. P. 412.
SEE PP 356-374 (COVERS 1869-AUG 15, 1991). BOOK CALL NO.: 956.7043 B573
[12] BLAIR, ARTHUR H. AT WAR IN THE GULF: A CHRONOLOGY. COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY PRESS,
1992. 124 P. BOOK CALL NO.: 956.7043 B635A
[13] COYNE, JAMES P. AIRPOWER IN THE GULF. ARLINGTON, VA, AEROSPACE EDUCATION FOUNDATION, 1992. P. 223
SEE PP 181-190. BOOK CALL NO.: 956.70442 C881A
[14] EHTESHAMI, ANOUSHIRAVAN AND OTHERS. WAR AND PEACE IN THE GULF: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND REGIONAL
RELATIONS INTO THE 1990S. READING, BERKS, UK , ITHACA PRESS, 1991. P. 287
[15] CHRONOLOGY OF GULF EVENTS, 1980 -1991, PP 225-243. BOOK CALL NO.: 327.09536 E33W
[16] GREAT BRITAIN. PARLIAMENT. HOUSE OF COMMONS. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. GULF CRISIS: MINUTES OF
[17] EVIDENCE, WEDNESDAY 24 OCTOBER 1990. LONDON, HMSO, 1990. 1 VOL (PP 15 -50).
[18] CHRONOLOGY 1 AUG - 17 OCT 1990, PP 17-25. BOOK CALL NO.: 956.70442 G786G
[19] GULF CRISIS CHRONOLOGY, COMPILED BY BBC WORLD SERVICE. DETROIT, MI, GALE RESEARCH, INC., 1991. P.
454 INCLUDES NAMES AND SUBJECTS I NDICES. BOOK CALL NO.: 956.704 G971
[20] HIRO, DILIP. DESERT SHIELD TO DESERT STORM: THE SECOND GULF WAR. NEW YORK, ROUTLEDGE, 1992. P. 591
APPENDIX I: CHRONOLOGY, 1987 - OCTOBER 1991, PP 500 -524. BOOK CALL NO.: 956.70442 H688D
[21] IRAQ, EDITED BY WILLIAM DUDLEY AND STACEY L. TIPP. SAN DIEGO, CA, GREENHAVEN PRESS, 1991. P. 256
CHRONOLOGY 1914 - JULY 15, 1991, PP 244-247.BOOK CALL NO.: 956.70442 I65
[23] ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE GULF CRISIS, EDITED BY JAMES PISCATORI. CHICAGO, IL,
[24]FUNDAMENTALISM PROJECT, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, 1991. 267 P. BOOK CALL NO.: 320.55
[25] JUPA, RICHARD AND DINGEMAN, JAMES. GULF WARS. CAMBRIA, CA, 3W INC., 1991. 96 P. EVENTS OF THE
SITZKRIEG, PP 16-19. BOOK CALL NO.: 956.7043 J95G
[26] NAIR, V. K. WAR IN THE GULF: LESSONS FOR THE THIRD WORLD. NEW DELHI, LANCER INTERNATIONAL, 1991.
P.231
[27] CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, PP . 60-88. BOOK CALL NO.: 956.70442 N158W
[28] U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990 -1991: ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, COMPILED BY
CHARLES D. MELSON AND OTHERS. WASHINGTON, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION, HQ, U.S. MARINE CORPS,
1992. P. 258
[29] PERSIAN GULF WAR CHRONOLOGY, AUG '90 - JUN '91, PP. 231-238. BOOK CALL NO.: 956.70442 U582
[30] WINDMILLER, MARSHALL. PRELUDE TO WAR WITH IRAQ, 1 990-1991: A CHRONOLOGY OF CRISIS
MISMANAGEMENT. SAN FRANCISCO, CA, DEPT. OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SAN FRANCISCO STATE
UNIVERSITY, 1991. P. 134. BOOK CALL NO.: 956.7043 W765P
DOCUMENTS
[31] ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE (U.S.). PERSIAN GULF WAR CHRONOLOGY A ND INDEX, BY GAIL NICULA AND
OTHERS. NORFOLK, VA, JAN 1992. 1 VOL.
[32] DOC. CALL NO.: M-U 36185-33
ARMY WAR COLLEGE (U.S.) STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM: A CHRONOLOGY
AND TROOP LIST FOR THE 1990 -1991 PERSIAN GULF CRISIS, BY JOSEPH P. ENGLEHARDT (LTCOL). [CARLISLE
BARRACKS, PA?], MAR 1991. P. 82 (SSI SPECIAL REPORT)
[33] DOC. CALL NO.: M-U 39080-416
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. IRAQ -KUWAIT CRISIS: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
JULY 17, 1990 - MAY 6, 1991, BY CLYDE R. MARK AND RENEE L. STASIO. WASHINGTON, MAY 1991. P. 77 (REPORT 91-14
F (REV))
[34] DOC. CALL NO.: M-U 42953-1 NO.91-14 F (REV)
U.S. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN "DESERT SHIELD" "DESERT
STORM.” WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 1991. 1 VOL.
[35] DOC. CALL NO.: M-U 41097-75

10-108