T3 B15 Counter Terrorism Policy FDR - 3 Draft Team 3 Workplans 987

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Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2003 12:47:42 -Q4QO\: Daniel|
Byman \ \: pzelikow@9-11lcommission.gov9, ck.ojm@9-1 Tcommission.gov*
Cc: team3@9-11 commission.gov9, \'Bass. Warren" \. 1^' ^onnie _

| \>9\ 5allan(g>a-i 1commission.gov*
Subject: Workplan
Philip and Chris,
Attached is the workplan for the policy team (team 3). In meetings
yesterday and this morning, we tried to identify the most important
issues and develop a strategy for tackling them.
I've suggested to team members that they initially concentrate on doing

background reading based on the list we suggest for commissioners. When
their clearances are active (only mine and Scott's are at this point),
I've given suggestions as to which Joint Inquiry documents they should
look at. In the meantime, if there are any open source materials that
you would suggest we familiarize ourselves with, please send me or the
team an e-mail.
However, after you've had time to look at the work plan, I suggest we
all meet to discuss the steps staff members should take during the next
few weeks as well as the broader vision for this team.
Best, __ "\n
— ***""* "*""! , > \] 2 W
Proposed Work Plan for the Counterterrorism Policy Team
Alexis Albion
^
Scott Allan
/Warren Bass
Daniel Byman
Bonnie Jenkins
Charles Hill
Draft: April 25, 2003
Contents
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Mail:: INBOX: Workplan Page 2 of 10
Project Overview
•*v
Key Questions
Proposed Division of Labor
Initial Document Review List
Appendix One: Summary of Joint Inquiry Staff Work on Policy
Appendix Two: Suggested Readings
Appendix Three: Notional Interview List
Appendix Four: Proposed Briefings for the Commissioners
Project Overview: Counterterrorism Policy
The policy team seeks to understand and assess the development of U.S. counterterrorism policy before the September
11 attacks, the changes in the immediate aftermath, and the nature of the policy today. These tasks will require
reviewing overall priorities, identifying and evaluating the different instruments used to fight terrorism (prosecutions,
military strikes, extraditions/renditions, and so on), and determining how well senior policy makers understood the threat
from al-Qa'ida. Another integral part of the policy team's effort is examining U.S. relationships with key foreign partners
and adversaries with regard to counterterrorism. When appropriate, the team will distinguish between U.S.
counterterrorism policy in general and U.S. efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in particular.
The nature of terrorism during the Cold War shaped U.S. counterterrorism policy when al-Qa'ida began to emerge. These
earlier terrorists, in the words of RAND's Brian Jenkins, wanted "a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and
not a lot of people dead." Their goals were usually tied to Marxist or ethno-nationalist agendas. The most lethal terrorists
during this era were those backed by states, not those operating independently. In general, terrorism during this period
was viewed as an important but not overriding policy concern.
As al-Qa'ida and affiliated Islamist groups emerged and grew in the 1 990s, the focus slowly shifted. The 1 993 attack on
the World Trade Center marked a turning point. For the first time, Islamist radicals sought mass casualties on U.S. soil. In
contrast to the terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who had balked at destroying entire buildings, the new radicals
wanted a lot of people watching anda lot of people dead.
Several government counterterrorism officials recognized the danger al-Qa'ida posed, but U.S. policy changed unevenly at
best. The 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania elevated the importance of terrorism in general
and al-Qa'ida in particular, but policy still lagged behind the immensity of the threat. It took the September 11 attacks to
dramatically change U.S. counterterrorism policy. Even today, counterterrorism policy is evolving, with important policy
decisions being made almost daily.
"V
The policy team expects to follow a normal investigative regimen of document requests and review, briefings by key
individuals both inside and outside government, and extensive interviews with those in a position to discuss the
formulation and implementation of U.S. government policy in the counterterrorism arena. In addition, the team will draw
on the work of the Congressional September 11 Joint Inquiry as appropriate.
Key Questions
At the Commission hearings held on March 31 in New York, witnesses described their views of the September 11
^attackers, the intelligence capabilities of the government, and the quality of the USG's counterterrorism policy before
September 11. They also suggested improvements in these areas in order to prevent another tragedy. Based upon their
statements and our research so far, we have compiled a list of key questions and issues that we think need to be
addressed by the Commission.
The list is divided into three parts, corresponding to the overall statutory structure of the Commission's inquiry. Most of
the questions focus on Part I (the pre-September 11 era), as this is essential for understanding Parts II and III, which
cover the period after the attacks.
Part One: Counterterrorism Policy before September 11, 2001
Background
1. What shaped counterterrorism policy before the 1 993 World Trade Center attack?
• What was the "old paradigm" regarding the threat posed by terrorist groups?
• What instruments (law enforcement, diplomacy, military strikes, financial controls, and so on) were used for
fighting terrorism?
• How important was terrorism considered, in general?
Strategy and Priorities

™^.
2. Did the USG possess a unified counterterrorism policy prior to September 11, or did policy vary between agencies?
• Did our strategy employ all instruments of U.S. national power?
\ *^ j- 1 *\ What wer
• Was there leadership and coordination? ~ ffQ S 'f*'
^^* m £b* f*r
* • Did any political concerns affect counterterrorism policy? \^* »**^
counterterrorism factored into the design of key foreign policy measures, including policy toward Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, the Middle East peace process, Pakistan, and Egypt?
4. Where was counterterrorism on the overall USG priority list?
• What were the other priorities?
• Did money follow the priority list? Did high-level time and attention follow the list? If not, why not?
• Was there a system for managing priorities?
• Was there an integration of domestic policy and foreign policy on counterterrorism?
""* • With the knowledge available at the time, should counterterrorism have been a higher priority?
• Was the particular threat of al-Qa'ida recognized?
5. Were any "balls dropped" during the transition from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration? Were
transition mechanisms effective?
Understanding the Threat
6. Did policy makers feel well-informed by the intelligence community on the nature of the threat, both at home and
abroad? At what stage was al-Qa'ida considered a threat? At what point was al-Qa'ida considered a grave threat?
7. Did the White House and Congress exercise effective oversight of the intelligence community and other bureaucracies
fighting terrorism?
• Was U.S. policy realistic given the limitations of the key agencies?
• In formulating counterterrorism policy, was sufficient attention given to the organization of the intelligence
community and its ability to combat terrorism?
• In formulating counterterrorism policy, did the USG focus sufficient attention on the FBI's organizational
ability to counter foreign terrorists in the United States?
Terrorism and Foreign Relations
_§/To what extent did the United States emphasize and integrate counterterrorism into its foreign relations? What were
the tradeoffs?
Did the USG fail to confront terrorist sanctuaries in the Sudan and Afghanistan?
\fi. Di
n 0. Did the United States properly address the issue of state sponsors of terrorism? Was too much attention given to
,_ state-sponsored terrorist groups?
\Jrt- How supportive were key countries in fighting al-Qa'ida? *v t -i
• How supportive were Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries where popular support for Islamists was high and
where the governments reportedly had links to al-Qa'ida?
• How supportive were key European countries, such as Germany?
• Who were our vital friends in the effort against al-Qa'ida?
Counterterrorism Instruments
12. What were the primary instruments used in fighting terrorism?
• What were their limitations?
• Were these instruments effective? Were they used well?
• Were certain options off the table? Should they have been?
/ Part Two: The Immediate Aftermath of September 11 (through September 20)
^rr1 A/hat changes were made in the aftermath of September 11, and why?
4ACould these changes have been made before September 11 ? Why or why not?
15. What was the doctrine laid out by the President's September 20 speech and other key pronouncements made during
isJjivotal period? How did these emerge?
'T^
Part Three: Counterterrorism Policy Today
fl6. Could the United States be better positioned to fight al-Qa'ida and other terrorists today?
* 17. Are the problems that hindered effective efforts against al-Qa'ida and terrorism before September 11 fixed?
^
18. What policy steps should be taken today? What bureaucratic and coordination changes are necessary?
"~7
19/ls counterterrorism properly integrated into U.S. foreign policy today? Does our current handling of such issues as
-twinning hearts and minds" abroad, using preemptive or retaliatory force, handling failed states, and formulating Middle
East policy make sense from the perspective of the war against al-Qa'ida?
Proposed Division of Labor (this will change as our team decides who has the best skills for which issue)
Person Agency Issues

Background (lead), oversight,
Alexis Albion CIA, DoD transition, understanding the threat
(lead)
Post-9/1 1 changes, counterterrorism
Scott Allan State, DoJ, CIA instruments (lead), foreign
governments and sanctuaries
Strategies/priorities (lead), foreign
governments, transitions (lead),
Warren Bass White House/NSC, State
understanding the threat, post-9/1 1
changes
Foreign governments (lead),
Daniel Byman White House/NSC
strategies/priorities
Post-9/1 1 changes (lead), oversight
Bonnie Jenkins DoD, State (lead), counterterrorism instruments
(but not law enforcement)
Charles Hill* State Background, foreign governments
Dana Leseman or other person who Counterterrorism instruments
DOJ
could do DOJ issues (particularly law enforcement)
Kevin Scheid or other person with
OMB Counterterrorism budgets
budget experience
• Senior advisor. It may be best to use him to review the research plan and work as it progresses rather than assign a
particular task. Byman may be used in a similar manner.
All team members will work Part III - or at least we will split it up later.
Proposed Briefings for the Commission
We believe the Commissioners would benefit from briefings about general U.S. counterterrorism policy, U.S. policy toward
al-Qa'ida before September 11, and the status of U.S. policy today.
• Richard Clarke, the former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would be the ideal briefer, given his pivotal
role in counterterrorism in both administrations.
v
• General John Gordon, who now holds Clarke's old job, should brief on the current counterterrorism policy.
• Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would also be well-suited for
helping Commissioners understand counterterrorism policy in context before September 11.
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• Dr. Bruce Hoffman of the RAND Corporation, perhaps the leading non-government authority on terrorism, could
provide an excellent analysis of how the threat of terrorism has changed over the years.
-N.
• Dr. Paul Pillar, currently the National Intelligence Office for the Near East and South Asia, is perhaps the
government's leading analyst of terrorism and could provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of
different counterterrorism instruments.
If necessary, staff member Daniel Byman could brief on the nature of al-Qa'ida and several aspects of the Joint Inquiry
investigation (e.g. covert action, foreign liaison, the use of military force, and the overall counterterrorism strategy as it
related to intelligence). However, in his view, these briefers would be preferred given their stature and experience.
Mr. Clarke, Ambassador Sheehan, Dr. Pillar, and Dan Byman would probably prefer to brief in a classified or, at least,
private venue in order to provide the maximum detail. Dr. Hoffman could brief in public.
Generalized Document Review List
It will be difficult to accurately predict what documents the team will want to review, although there are some obvious
ones. Much, if not all, of the material we will be asking for will be classified. Since we will be requesting policy documents,
the focus will be the Executive/NSC/OMB and probably the Departments of State and Justice as well. This list will grow
and become more specific as the investigation proceeds.
The documents we will be requesting include:
• Presidential Decision Directives related to counterterrorism policy;

~N
• NSC Memoranda related to counterterrorism policy;
• State Department records, from both Foggy Bottom and the field, related to counterterrorism policy;
• Records of discussion of counterterrorism policy;
• Deliberative information and factors considered before issuing policy;
• Tasking directed to the intelligence community related to counterterrorism;
• Tasking directed to the military related to counterterrorism; and
• Budget documents reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism.
Many of the most interesting documents for the purposes of our effort will be predecisional. Such documents will provide
insights into which options were chosen, which were rejected, and which were off the table. Because of the sensitivity of
-vthese documents, it may prove difficult to acquire them, which may necessitate high-level interventions.
Appendix One: Congressional Joint Inquiry Activity in the Policy Area
The Inquiry did some work on policy issues, but most of that focused on the intelligence-policy nexus rather than on the

soundness of the overall policy. The Inquiry discussed intelligence priorities, the dissemination of information, and the
quality of analysis with policy makers in some depth, but it did not venture far beyond this. The focus of its work was on
^the late Clinton-early Bush administrations, with the Inquiry having more success learning about the Clinton period.
Policies toward foreign partners received at best incomplete attention. For example, the Inquiry looked at how the policy
makers' desire for a strong bilateral relationship with Country X affected intelligence gathering on Country X or on
neighboring countries. However, this was only done with a few countries, and even there it was not done systematically.
Moreover, the Inquiry deliberately did not try to judge whether other equities in a bilateral relationship were more or less
important than counterterrorism.
The Inquiry did more extensive work on the use of military force and on covert action. On the former, however, it was
hampered by a lack of interviews and access to many key individuals and documents outside the strict purview of
intelligence.
The Inquiry did not try to judge overall counterterrorism policy in any comprehensive way. Parts of the Inquiry's work
looked at issues such as warning the public, working with state and local officials, and emphasizing law enforcement over
disruption of terrorist groups. Many of these issues, however, involved the work of non-Intelligence Community agencies
(e.g. the Department of Justice, the INS), which received less attention than they deserved. In addition, the Inquiry did
not do basic policy analysis such as trying to evaluate the available instruments, the limits on those instruments, and
political support in Congress.
Suggested Readings for the Commissioners on Terrorism and U.S. Policy
Readings on U.S. Policy
1. Jonathan Fredman, "Covert Action, Loss of Life, and the Prohibition on Assassination," Studies in Intelligence
(1997), pp. 15-25.
—^
2. Adam Roberts, "Counter-terrorism, Armed Force, and the Laws of War," Survival, Vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp.
7-32.
3. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2001), pp. 73-1 29.
i/4. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 219-392.
General Readings on Terrorism
1. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L.
Sawyer (McGraw Hill, 2002), pp. 55-66.
2. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 13-44.
Readings on al-Qa'ida and Jihadist Groups
t/f. Anonymous, Through Oi/r£/7em/es'£yes(Brassey's, 2002), entire.
•jL. Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, no. 25
(2002), pp. 303-316. /
» 2>. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 101 -114. \
4. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?" New . I I
Republic, June 24, 2002. l\A'
y 5. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 3-37. rA/1-
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Notional List of People to Interview
~xAs a first cut, the team would divide people to be interviewed into several categories: those with responsibilities for U.S.
foreign policy who can place counterterrorism in context; those with counterterrorism responsibilities; those with valuable
related responsibilities; foreign officials; and outside experts. The first list in particular includes the most prominent names
in U.S. government. That may seem ambitious, but priorities and focus do begin at the top — and often end there. Once
you go one or two levels down the food chain, the individuals have "accounts" and thus do not have a sense of where
their responsibilities fit into the overall picture. So if we are to be comprehensive, we need to talk to these people. In
several cases (e.g., at OMB), it may be more appropriate to talk to a deputy or someone who focused more on
counterterrorism.
Given the prominence of several of the people on this list, we favor interviewing the working-level individuals, particularly
those involved in counterterrorism, and outside experts first whenever possible. Only when we know as much of the story
as possible will we interview the most senior individuals.
People Responsible for Overall Policy
• President George W. Bush
• President William J. Clinton
• Vice President Richard Cheney
• Vice President Al Gore
• Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor

—-,
• Samuel Berger, former National Security Advisor
• Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor

-» VQ0f}
I
I <2^"
f**
• Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor 0") w ?**>""T
• Colin Powell, Secretary of State
• Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State
• Attorney General John Ashcroft
• Former Attorney General Janet Reno
• Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
• Secretary of Defense William Cohen
• Former Office of Management and Budget Director Jacob Lew
• Office of Management and Budget Director Mitch Daniels
• Former FBI Director Louis Freeh
• Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet
• Former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch
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Mall:: INBOX: Workplan Page 9 of 10
• Former U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson
^ • Any other participants in the "Small Group"
• Deputies of various departments as appropriate
Counterterrorism Specialists
• Richard Clarke
• Past and present participants in the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG)
• Ambassador Michael Sheehan (former S/CT at State)
• Sheehan's predecessors at S/CT
• General (ret.) Wayne Downing, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism
/v ' • General John Gordon, Coordinator for Counterterrorism
A • Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), for both the
Bush and Clinton administrations
• SOLIC and CENTCOM officials with CT responsibilities
• Other former NSC staff working with Clarke (Roger Cressey, Dan Benjamin, Steve Simon, and so
on)
i • NSC staff working on intelligence

»
-v • Cofer Black, both in his CTC and in his S/CT responsibilities
• Dale Watson, former senior FBI official
\
• Ambassador Robert Oakley, former S/CT
Those with Related Responsibilities
• Ambassador Karl Inderfurth (former Asst. Secretary, South Asia)
• Ambassador Mark Parris (former Asst. Secretary, Near East)
• Ambassador William Burns (Asst. Secretary, Near East)
• Ambassador Martin Indyk (Asst. Secretary, Near East)
• Bruce Reidel, former Senior NSC Director for the Middle East
• Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Germany, Britain, Israel, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, and other
-v countries before September 11
Foreign Government Officials
• HRH Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi ambassador to the United States
Mail :: INBOX: Workplan Page 10 of 10
• Jean-Paul Brugiere, investigating magistrate, France
• Selected other foreign officials
Outside Experts
• Bruce Hoffman, the RAND Corporation
• Brian Jenkins, the RAND Corporation
• Martha Crenshaw, Wesleyan University
• Jessica Stern, Harvard University
• Juliette Kayyem, Harvard University
• Richard Betts, Columbia University
11
Draft — Unclassified
Draft - Unclassified
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Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 17:26:03 -0400
From: Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>^
To: pzelikow@9-11 commission.gov^P
Cc: Stephanie Kaplan <skaplan@9-11commission.gov>4|, Lisa Sullivan <lsullivan@9-11commission.gov><P, teamS
<team3@9-11 commission.gov><S'
Subject: Revised Team 3 Workplan
Philip,
Attached is the revised version of the Team 3 Workplan. As you

suggested when we met last week, we've tried to err on the side of
brevity whenever possible. In particular, we severely cut the
"questions" section in order to make it more manageable. We also tried
to focus the interviewee and document lists a bit more. In all cases,
we hoped that what we proposed was inclusive -- much of our plan will be
adjusted as we begin our research, and we don't want to rule out any
major issues at this point.
We'd welcome your comments on the new version and would be happy to meet
when your schedule permits.
Best,
Dan
|D 2 Work Plan Draft 051103.doc application/msword 148.00 KB Hi
Alexis Albion
Scott Allan
Warren Bass
Daniel Byman
Bonnie Jenkins
Charles Hill
Draft: May 12, 2003
Contents
Project Overview
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Key Questions
Project Overview: Counter-terrorism Policy
The policy team seeks to understand and assess the development of U.S. counter-terrorism policy before the September 11
attacks, the changes in the immediate aftermath, and the nature of the policy today. These tasks will require reviewing
overall priorities, identifying and evaluating the different instruments used to fight terrorism, and determining how well senior
policy makers understood the threat from al-Qa'ida. Another integral part of the policy team's effort is examining U.S.
relationships with key foreign partners and adversaries with regard to counter-terrorism. When appropriate, the team will
distinguish between U.S. counter-terrorism policy in general and U.S. efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in particular.
The nature of terrorism during the Cold War shaped U.S. counter-terrorism policy when al-Qa'ida began to emerge. These
earlier terrorists, in the words of RAND's Brian Jenkins, wanted "a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not
a lot of people dead." Their goals were usually tied to Marxist or ethno-nationalist agendas. The most lethal terrorists during
this era were those backed by states, not those operating independently. In general, terrorism during this period was viewed
as an important but not overriding policy concern.
As al-Qa'ida and affiliated Islamist groups emerged and grew in the 1990s, the focus slowly shifted. The 1993 attack on the
World Trade Center marked a turning point. For the first time, Islamist radicals sought mass casualties on U.S. soil. In
contrast to the terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who had balked at destroying entire buildings, the new radicals wanted a
lot of people watching and a lot of people dead.
Several government counter-terrorism officials recognized the danger al-Qa'ida posed, but U.S. policy changed unevenly at
best. The 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania elevated the importance of terrorism in general and
al-Qa'ida in particular, but policy still lagged behind the immensity of the threat. It took the September 11 attacks to
dramatically change U.S. counter-terrorism policy. Even today, counter-terrorism policy is evolving, with important policy
The policy team expects to follow a normal investigative regimen of document requests and review, briefings by key
individuals both inside and outside government, and extensive interviews with those in a position to discuss the formulation
and implementation of U.S. government policy in the counter-terrorism arena. In addition, the team will draw on the work of
the Congressional September 11 Joint Inquiry as appropriate.
Key Questions
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The policy team will determine why the United States did not successfully stop al-Qa'ida before September 11 and assess
the effectiveness of counterterrorism policy today. In the process, the team will tell the story of how counterterrorism policy
evolved as the al-Qa'ida threat grew during both the Clinton and Bush administrations, examining such key events as the
1993 World Trade Center attack, the 1998 Embassy bombings, and the 2000 attack on USS Cole.
In particular, the team plans to answer the following questions:
• Strategy. What was U.S. counterterrorism policy and how did it evolve, particularly after 1998? Were there gaps in
the strategy and, if so, how did policy makers address them? What factors hindered policy makers?
• Instruments. What counterterrorism instruments did policy makers consider, use, or neglect and why? How effective
were instruments such as diplomacy, criminal prosecutions, renditions, fundraising restraints, disruptions, military
operations, covert action, and public diplomacy? What were the limits of various instruments? How supportive were
key countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan?
• Safe Havens. Did the United States confront terrorist sanctuaries, such as Sudan and Afghanistan, properly? Were
"permissive environments" in Europe and elsewhere addressed?
• Immediate Aftermath. How did counterterrorism policy change in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks? Why
were several hard-hitting steps only taken after the attacks occurred?
• Current and Future Policy. Does the United States have the right policies to fight al-Qa'ida and other terrorist
groups today? What additional changes should be made, and who should make them?
Note: The policy team will work closely with other teams in its research. For example, it will support the terrorist financing
team when assessing efforts to disrupt radicals' fundraising and assist the intelligence team in determining whether policy
makers received sufficient information on al-Qa'ida's unusual nature to properly structure U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
Person || Agency ||lssue Lead

Alexis Albion ||CIA, DoD [[instruments
Scott Allan ||state, DoJ, CIA ||Safe Havens
Warren Bass ||White House/NSC, State ||strategy
Acting team leader; will work with all
Daniel Byman White House/NSC
team members on their specific tasks.
Bonnie Jenkins IJDoD, State ||lmmediate aftermath
Charles Hill* ||State
Kevin Scheid or other person with Assist with counterterrorism budget
OMB
budget experience issues
* Senior advisor. It may be best to use him to review the research plan and work as it progresses rather than assign a
particular task. Byman may be used in a similar manner after a new team leader is chosen.
All team members will work on assessing current and future policy. All team members will work on at least one issue in
addition to the one for which they are responsible.
Proposed Briefings for the Commissioners
We believe the Commissioners would benefit from briefings about general U.S. counterterrorism policy, U.S. policy toward
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al-Qa'ida before September 11, and the status of U.S. policy today.
• Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would also be well-suited for
helping Commissioners understand counterterrorism policy in context before September 11.
• General John Gordon, the National Director for Counterterrorism and the Deputy National Security Advisor should
brief on the current counterterrorism policy.
• Dr. Paul Pillar, currently the National Intelligence Office for the Near East and South Asia, is perhaps the
government's leading analyst of terrorism and could provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of
different counterterrorism instruments.
• Dr. Daniel Byman, who headed the "lookback" team on the 9-11 Inquiry, could offer a staff briefing on several
aspects of the Congressional Joint Inquiry investigation, particularly covert action, foreign liaison, the use of military
force, and the overall counterterrorism strategy as it related to intelligence. These briefings would follow the Joint
Inquiry's more narrow focus and would not reflect many of the broader issues the Commission will examine.
All four suggested briefers would probably prefer to brief in a classified or, at least, private venue in order to provide the
maximum detail.
Notional Document Review List
Much, if not all, of the material we will be asking for will be classified. Since we will be requesting policy documents, the
focus will be the Executive/NSC/OMB and probably the Departments of State and Justice as well. This list will grow and
become more specific as the investigation proceeds.
• Presidential Decision Directives related to counterterrorism policy;
• Records of discussions of counterterrorism policy, particularly among "Small Group" and "Counterterrorism Security
Group" members;
• NSC Memoranda related to counterterrorism policy;
• State Department records, from both Foggy Bottom and the field, related to counterterrorism policy;
• Tasking directed to the intelligence community related to counterterrorism, including tasking related to renditions and
other covert action as well as collection and analysis;
• Tasking directed to the military related to counterterrorism, both with regard to instructions to prepare military options
and instructions to use military force;
• Military and intelligence agency briefings and memoranda related to military strikes and covert action against al-
Qa'ida;
• Budget documents reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism.
Many of the most interesting documents for the purposes of our effort will be predecisional. Such documents will provide
insights into which options were chosen, which were rejected, and which were off the table. Because of the sensitivity of
these documents, it may prove difficult to acquire them, which may in turn necessitate high-level interventions.
http://kinesis. swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php ?index= 139 5/13/03

To gain a deeper understanding of counter-terrorism, we also intend to focus on the activities of several U.S. missions, such
as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Germany, to determine how they handled counterterrorism in practice. In addition to
examining directives from Washington, we also plan to look at cables and instructions to and from key counterterrorism
officials at these posts. We will also interview key country team members as appropriate.
The Congressional 9-11 Inquiry's work on policy issues focused on the intelligence-policy nexus rather than on the
soundness of the overall policy. The Inquiry discussed intelligence priorities, the dissemination of information, and the quality
of analysis with policy makers in some depth. The focus of its work was on the late Clinton-early Bush administrations, with
the Inquiry having more success learning about the Clinton period.
Policies toward foreign partners received at best incomplete attention. For example, the Inquiry looked at how the policy
makers' desire for a strong bilateral relationship with Country X affected intelligence gathering on Country X or on
neighboring countries. However, this was only done with a few countries, and even there it was not done systematically.
Moreover, the Inquiry deliberately did not try to judge whether other equities in a bilateral relationship were more or less
important than counterterrorism.
The Inquiry did more extensive work on the use of military force and on covert action. On the former, however, it was
hampered by a lack of interviews and access to many key individuals and documents outside the strict purview of
intelligence.
The Inquiry did not try to judge overall counterterrorism policy in any comprehensive way. Parts of the Inquiry's work looked
at issues such as warning the public, working with state and local officials, and emphasizing law enforcement over disruption
of terrorist groups. Many of these issues, however, involved the work of non-Intelligence Community agencies (e.g. the
Department of Justice, the INS), which received less attention than they deserved. In addition, the Inquiry did not do basic
policy analysis such as trying to evaluate the available instruments, the limits on those instruments, and political support in
Congress.
1. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2001), pp. 73-129. These pages in Dr. Pillar's book provide
an excellent overview of the instruments used to fight terrorism.
2. Michael Elliott, "Could 9/11 Have Been Prevented?" Time, August 4, 2002. This article provides a fairly detailed
history of various efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in the Clinton and Bush administrations. Many of the quotes suggest that
former Clinton administration officials were sources for the article.
3. Daniel Byman, "A Scorecard for the War on Terrorism," The National Interest, Summer 2003. This piece examines
how well the war on terrorism has gone since September 11.
Note: we also highly recommend as background Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random
House, 2002), pp. 219-349. These pages review (and defend) the Clinton administration's counterterrorism policy and
examine (and attack) the Bush administration's policy before September 11. This is the most detailed look at U.S.
counterterrorism policy to emerge so far, though it remains incomplete.
As a first cut, the team would divide people to be interviewed into several categories: those with responsibilities for U.S.
foreign policy who can place counterterrorism in context; those with counterterrorism responsibilities; those with valuable
related responsibilities; personnel at key posts; and outside experts. NSC staff will prove particularly important, as they often
directed and coordinated the overall "war on terrorism" in both the Clinton and Bush administrations.
http://kinesis. swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php ?index= 139 5/13/03

The first list in particular includes the most prominent names in U.S. government. That may seem ambitious, but priorities
and focus do begin at the top - and often end there. In several cases (e.g., at OMB), it may be more appropriate to talk to a
deputy or someone who focused more on counterterrorism.
Given the prominence of several of the people on this list, we favor interviewing the working-level individuals, particularly
those involved in counterterrorism, and outside experts first whenever possible. Only when we know as much of the story as
possible will we interview the most senior individuals.
1. President George W. Bush
2. President William J. Clinton
3. Vice President Richard Cheney
4. Vice President Al Gore
5. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor
6. Samuel Berger, former National Security Advisor
7. Colin Powell, Secretary of State
8. Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State
9. Attorney General John Ashcroft
10. Former Attorney General Janet Reno
11. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
12. Secretary of Defense William Cohen
13. Former FBI Director Louis Freeh
14. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet
15. Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State
16. Strobe Talbott, former Deputy Sectary of State
17. Sean O'Keefe, former Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget
18. Josh Gotbaum, former Executive Director, Office of Management and Budget
19. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense
20. Douglas Jay Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
21. Steven Cambone, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php ?index=139 5/13/03

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 3
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107
WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/21/2008
BOX: 00005 FOLDER: 0008 TAB: 6 DOC ID: 31207086
COPIES: 1 PAGES:
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
FOLDER TITLE: Counterterrorism Policy Working Papers
DOCUMENT DATE: DOCUMENT TYPE: List
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Counterterroism Specialists and Other Senior Working Level Officials.
Pages 7 and 8 of a nine page documents
This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Closed by Statute
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
16. Gregory Passic, Director
17. Nicholas Rasmussen, Director
Outside Experts
1. Bruce Hoffman, the RAND Corporation
2. Brian Jenkins, the RAND Corporation
3. Juliette Kayyem, Harvard University
4. Richard Betts, Columbia University
Draft -- Unclassified
Draft -- Unclassified
Delete I Reply I Reply to All I Forward I Redirect I Blacklist I Message Source I Resume I Save as I Print Back to INBOX
Move I Copy [This message to
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Initial Work Plan of the Counterterrorism Policy Team Page 1 of 9
Alexis Albion
Scott Allan
Warren Bass
Daniel Byman
Bonnie Jenkins
Charles Hill
Draft: May 15, 2003
Contents
Project Overview
Key Questions
Project Overview: Counterterrorism Policy
The policy team seeks to understand and assess the development of U.S. Counterterrorism policy before
September 11, 2001, the policy changes in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, and the nature of the
policy today. These tasks will require reviewing overall policy priorities, identifying and evaluating the
different instruments used to fight terrorism, and determining how well senior policy makers understood
the threat from al-Qa'ida. Another integral part of the policy team's effort is examining U.S.
relationships with key foreign partners and adversaries with regard to Counterterrorism. When
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmaiyimp/view.php?thisrnailbox=INBOX&index=170&id=2... 5/16/03
appropriate, the team will distinguish between U.S. counterterrorism policy in general and U.S. efforts
to fight al-Qa'ida in particular.
The nature of terrorism during the Cold War shaped U.S. counterterrorism policy when al-Qa'ida began
to emerge. These earlier terrorists, in the words of RAND's Brian Jenkins, wanted "a lot of people
watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead." Their goals were usually tied to
Marxist or ethno-nationalist agendas. The most lethal terrorists during this era were those backed by
states, not those operating independently. In general, terrorism during this earlier period was viewed as
an important but not overriding policy concern.
As al-Qa'ida and affiliated Islamist groups emerged and grew in the 1990s, the focus slowly shifted. The
1993 attack on the World Trade Center marked a turning point. For the first time, Islamist radicals
sought mass casualties on U.S. soil. In contrast to the terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who had balked
at destroying entire buildings, the new radicals wanted a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead.
Several government counterterrorism officials recognized the danger that al-Qa'ida posed, but U.S.
policy changed unevenly at best. The 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
elevated the importance of terrorism in general and al-Qa'ida in particular, but policy still lagged behind
the immensity of the threat. It took the September 11 attacks to dramatically change U.S.
counterterrorism policy. Even today, counterterrorism policy is evolving, with important policy
The policy team expects to follow a normal investigative regimen of document requests and review,
briefings by key individuals both inside and outside government, and extensive interviews with those in
a position to discuss the formulation and implementation of U.S. government policy in the
counterterrorism arena. In addition, the team will draw on the work of the Congressional September 11
Joint Inquiry as appropriate.
Key Questions
The policy team will seek to determine why the United States did not successfully stop al-Qa'ida before
September 11 and assess the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policy today. In the process, the
team will tell the story of how counterterrorism policy evolved as the al-Qa'ida threat grew during both
the Clinton and Bush administrations, examining such key events as the 1993 World Trade Center
attack, the 1998 Embassy bombings, and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole.
In particular, the team plans to answer the following questions:
• Strategy. What was U.S. counterterrorism policy, and how did it evolve, particularly after 1998?
Were there gaps in the strategy, and if so, how did policy makers address them? What factors
hindered policy makers?
• Instruments. What counterterrorism instruments did policy makers consider, use, or neglect—
and why? How effective were instruments such as diplomacy, criminal prosecutions, renditions,
fundraising restraints, disruptions, military operations, covert action, and public diplomacy? What
were the limits of various instruments? How supportive were key countries such as Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan?
• Safe Havens. Did the United States properly confront terrorist sanctuaries, such as Sudan and
Afghanistan? Were "permissive environments" in Europe and elsewhere addressed?
• Immediate Aftermath. How did counterterrorism policy change in the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks? Why were several hard-hitting steps only taken after the attacks occurred?
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/view.php?thismailbox=INBOX&index=170&id=2... 5/16/03
• Current and Future Policy. Does the United States have the right policies to fight al-Qa'ida and
other terrorist groups today? What additional changes should be made, and who should make
them?
Note: The policy team will work closely with other teams in its research. For example, it will support
the terrorist-financing team when assessing efforts to disrupt radicals' fundraising and assist the
intelligence team in determining whether policy makers received sufficient information on al-Qa'ida's
unusual nature to properly structure U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
Issue Lead (all team members

Person Agency** will play a role in at least two
issues)
[Alexis Albion CIA Instruments
[Scott Allan State, DoJ Safe Havens
Warren Bass White House/NSC, OMB Strategy
Bonnie Jenkins DoD Instruments
Acting team leader; will work
Daniel Byman (^r") with all team members on their
specific tasks.
[Charles Hill*
Kevin Scheid or other person Assist with counterterrorism
with budget experience + budget issues
*Senior advisor. It may be best to use him to review the research plan and work as it progresses
rather than assign a particular task. Byman may be used in a similar manner after a new team leader
is chosen.
**The agency designee is largely administrative. He or she will act as the primary interlocutor for
document and interview requests and liaise with other teams working on that agency. All team
members may interview at or work with documents from key agencies.
All team members will work on the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the assessment of
current policy, and the recommendations for the future.
All team members will work on at least one issue in addition to the one for which they are responsible.
Proposed Expert Briefings for the Commissioners
We believe the Commissioners would benefit from briefings about general U.S. counterterrorism policy,
U.S. policy toward al-Qa'ida before September 11, and the status of U.S. policy today.
• Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would help
Commissioners understand counterterrorism policy in context before September 11.
• Dr. Paul Pillar, currently the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, is
perhaps the government's leading analyst of terrorism and could provide an overview of the
strengths and weaknesses of different counterterrorism instruments.
• Dr. Daniel Byman, who headed the "lookback" team on the 9-11 Inquiry, could offer a staff
briefing on several aspects of the Congressional Joint Inquiry investigation, particularly covert
action, foreign liaison, the use of military force, and overall U.S. counterterrorism strategy as it
related to intelligence. These briefings would follow the Joint Inquiry's more narrow focus and
would not reflect many of the broader issues the Commission will examine.
All three suggested briefers would probably prefer to brief in a classified or, at least, private venue in
order to provide the maximum detail.
Notional Document Review List
Much, if not all, of the material we will be asking for will be classified. Since we will be requesting
policy documents, the focus will be the Executive/NSC/OMB, and probably the Departments of State
and Justice as well. This list will grow and become more specific as the investigation proceeds. For
almost all categories of documents, we will focus our requests on the period after January 1998.
• Presidential Decision Directives and National Security Presidential Directives related to

counterterrorism policy;
• Records of discussions of counterterrorism policy, particularly among "Small Group" and

"Counterterrorism Security Group" members;
• NSC taskings and requests to agencies related to counterterrorism policy;
• Records of the Transnational Threats Directorate at the National Security Council. This would
include briefing memos, meeting notes, and perhaps selected e-mails related to key events;
• State Department records, from both Foggy Bottom and the field, related to counterterrorism
policy. The initial focus will be on documents from the Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism's
Office, the deliberations of senior State Department officials, and selected documents related to
policy toward key states in the war on terrorism;
• Tasking directed to the intelligence community related to counterterrorism, including tasking

related to renditions and other covert action, as well as intelligence collection and analysis;
• The Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and key commands' (CENTCOM, SOCOM)
documents related to counterterrorism, particularly with regard to instructions to prepare military
options and instructions to use force;
• Military and intelligence agency briefings and memoranda related to military strikes and covert
action against al-Qa'ida; and
• Selected budget documents reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism.
Many of the most interesting documents for the purposes of our effort will be predecisional. Such
documents will provide insights into which options were chosen, which were rejected, and which were
off the table. Because of the sensitivity of these documents, it may prove difficult to acquire them, which
may in turn necessitate high-level interventions.
To gain a deeper understanding of counterterrorism, we also intend to focus on the activities of several
U.S. missions, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Germany, to determine how they handled
counterterrorism in practice. In addition to examining directives from Washington, we also plan to look
at cables and instructions to and from key counterterrorism officials at these posts. We will also
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmaiyimp/view.php?thismailbox=INBOX&index=170&id=2... 5/16/03
interview key country team members as appropriate.
The Congressional 9-11 Inquiry's work on policy issues focused on the intelligence-policy nexus, rather
than on the soundness of the overall counterterrorism policy. The Inquiry discussed intelligence
priorities, the dissemination of information, and the quality of analysis with policy makers in some
depth. The focus of its work was on the late Clinton-early Bush administrations, with the Inquiry having
more success learning about the Clinton period.
Policies toward foreign partners received, at best, incomplete attention. For example, the Inquiry looked
at how the policy makers' desire for a strong bilateral relationship with Country X affected intelligence
gathering on Country X or on neighboring countries. However, this was only done with a few countries,
and even there it was not done systematically. Moreover, the Inquiry deliberately did not try to judge
whether other equities in a bilateral relationship were more or less important than counterterrorism.
The Inquiry did more extensive work on the use of military force and covert action. On the former,
however, it was hampered by a lack of interviews and access to many key individuals and documents
outside the strict purview of intelligence.
The Inquiry did not try to judge overall counterterrorism policy in any comprehensive way. Parts of the
Inquiry's work looked at issues such as warning the public, working with state and local officials, and
emphasizing law enforcement over the disruption of terrorist groups. Many of these issues, however,
involved the work of non-Intelligence Community agencies (e.g. the Department of Justice, the INS),
which received less attention than they deserved. In addition, the Inquiry did not do basic policy analysis
such as trying to evaluate the available instruments, the limits on those instruments, and political support
in Congress.
1. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2001), pp. 73-129. These pages
provide an excellent overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the instruments that the United
States has used to fight terrorism.
2. Michael Elliott, "Could 9/11 Have Been Prevented?" Time, August 4, 2002. This article provides
a fairly detailed history of efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in the Clinton and Bush administrations. Many
of the quotes suggest that former Clinton administration officials were sources for the article.
3. Daniel Byman, "Scoring the War on Terrorism," The National Interest, Summer 2003. This piece
examines how well the war on terrorism has gone since September 11.
4. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 219-
349. These pages review (and defend) the Clinton administration's counterterrorism policy and
examine (and attack) the Bush administration's policy before September 11. This is the most
detailed look at U.S. counterterrorism policy to emerge so far, though it remains incomplete.
As a first cut, the team would divide people to be interviewed into several categories: those with
responsibilities for U.S. foreign policy who can place counterterrorism in context; those with
counterterrorism responsibilities; those with valuable related responsibilities; personnel at key posts; and
outside experts. NSC staff will prove particularly important, as they often directed and coordinated
overall U.S. efforts against terrorism in both the Clinton and Bush administrations.
The first list, in particular, includes the most prominent names in the U.S. government. That may seem
ambitious, but priorities and focus do begin at the top—and often end there. In several cases (e.g., at
OMB), it may be more appropriate to talk to a deputy or someone who focused more on
counterterrorism.
Given the prominence of several of the people on this list, we favor interviewing the working-level
individuals (particularly those involved in counterterrorism) and outside experts first whenever
possible. Only when we know as much of the story as possible will we interview the most senior
individuals.
1. President George W. Bush
2. Former President William J. Clinton
3. Vice President Richard Cheney
4. Former Vice President Al Gore
5. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor
6. Samuel Berger, former National Security Advisor
7. Colin Powell, Secretary of State
8. Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State
9. Attorney General John Ashcroft
10. Former Attorney General Janet Reno
11. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
12. Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen
13. FBI Director Robert Mueller III
14. Former FBI Director Louis Freeh
15. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet
16. Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State
17. Strobe Talbott, former Deputy Secretary of State
18. Sean O'Keefe, former Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget
19. Josh Gotbaum, former Executive Director, Office of Management and Budget
20. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Initial Work Plan of the Counter-terrorism Policy Team Page 7 of 9
21. Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
22. Steven Cambone, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
23. Steve Hadley, Deputy National Security Advisor
24. James Steinberg, former Deputy National Security Advisor
25. Lt. General Donald Kerrick, former Deputy National Security Advisor
Counterterrorism Specialists and Other Senior Working Level Officials with Duties Related to
Counterterrorism
1. Richard Clarke, former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism
2. Ambassador Cofer Black, Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) and former CTC
Director
3. Ambassador Francis Taylor, former S/CT
4. Ambassador Michael Sheehan, former S/CT
5. Evelyn Lieberman, former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy & Public Affairs
6. Ambassador Tom Pickering, senior State Department official in several administrations
7. Ambassador Chris Ross
8. General (ret.) Wayne Downing, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism
9. General John Gordon, Coordinator for Counterterrorism
10. Robert C. Doheny, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict
(mission: overall supervision of SOLIC)
11. Brian Sheridan, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC (around 1999)
12. H. Allen Holmes, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC
13. General Tommy Franks, CINCCENT since June 2000
14. General (ret.) Anthony Zinni, former CINCCENT
15. Mary Jo White, former U.S. Attorney for Southern District of New York
16. Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, former Asst. Secretary of State, South Asia
17. Ambassador Mark Parris, former Asst. Secretary of State, Near East
18. Ambassador William Burns, Asst. Secretary of State, Near East
19. Ambassador Martin Indyk, Asst. Secretary of State, Near East
20. Bruce Riedel, former Senior NSC Director for the Middle East
21. Stephen Jennings, former Asst Section Chief, Intl Terrorism Unit at FBI
22. Thomas Knowles, former member of Intl Relations Branch at FBI
23. Michael Rolince, former Section Chief at International Terrorism Unit at FBI
24. Barry Savin, Counterterrorism Section Chief in DoJ's Criminal Division
25. James Reynolds, former Chief of Terrorism and Violent Crimes section at DoJ
Key Country Team Members from Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan
(1998-2001)
1. Ambassador
2. 9/11 Closed by Statute
3. Deputy Chief of Mission
4. Legal Attache (FBI)
5. Other U.S. officials as appropriate
6. Foreign Ambassador to the United States
Select Additional NSC Staff
1. Susan Rice, former Director
2. Randy Beers, former Director
3. Lee Wolosky, former Director (CFR international affairs fellow)
4. William Wechsler, former Director
5. Fred Rosa, former Director (from Coast Guard)
6. Mary McCarthy, former Director
7. Daniel Benjamin, former Director
8. Steven Simon, former Senior Director
9. Roger Cressey, former Director
10. Michael Fenzel, former Director
11. Gayle Smith, former Senior Director (Africa)
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmaiyimp/view.php?thismailbox=INBOX&index=170&id=2... 5/16/03
12. Jeffrey Jones, Senior Director
13. William McRaven, Director
14. Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, Director (from DOE)
15. Joseph (Jody) Myers, Director
16. Gregory Passic, Director
17. Nicholas Rasmussen, Director
Draft - Unclassified
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0.83MB / 476.84MB (0.17%)

Cc: team3@9-11 commission.gov9, \'Bass. Warren" \. 1^' ^onnie _

I've suggested to team members that they initially concentrate on doing

— ***""* "*""! , > \] 2 W

Proposed Work Plan for the Counterterrorism Policy Team

Draft: April 25, 2003

Proposed Division of Labor

Initial Document Review List

Appendix One: Summary of Joint Inquiry Staff Work on Policy

Appendix Two: Suggested Readings

Appendix Three: Notional Interview List

Appendix Four: Proposed Briefings for the Commissioners

Project Overview: Counterterrorism Policy

Part One: Counterterrorism Policy before September 11, 2001

• How important was terrorism considered, in general?

Strategy and Priorities

• Did our strategy employ all instruments of U.S. national power?

* • Did any political concerns affect counterterrorism policy? \^* »**^

4. Where was counterterrorism on the overall USG priority list?

• What were the other priorities?

• Was there a system for managing priorities?

• Was there an integration of domestic policy and foreign policy on counterterrorism?

• Was the particular threat of al-Qa'ida recognized?

transition mechanisms effective?

Understanding the Threat

Terrorism and Foreign Relations

\Jrt- How supportive were key countries in fighting al-Qa'ida? *v t -i

• How supportive were key European countries, such as Germany?

• Who were our vital friends in the effort against al-Qa'ida?

12. What were the primary instruments used in fighting terrorism?

• What were their limitations?

• Were these instruments effective? Were they used well?

/ Part Two: The Immediate Aftermath of September 11 (through September 20)

Part Three: Counterterrorism Policy Today

Person Agency Issues

Proposed Briefings for the Commission

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=l 01 &index=52&start=3 04/25/2003

Generalized Document Review List

The documents we will be requesting include:

• Presidential Decision Directives related to counterterrorism policy;

• NSC Memoranda related to counterterrorism policy;

• Records of discussion of counterterrorism policy;

• Deliberative information and factors considered before issuing policy;

• Tasking directed to the intelligence community related to counterterrorism;

• Tasking directed to the military related to counterterrorism; and

• Budget documents reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism.

Appendix One: Congressional Joint Inquiry Activity in the Policy Area

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Suggested Readings for the Commissioners on Terrorism and U.S. Policy

Readings on U.S. Policy

General Readings on Terrorism

Readings on al-Qa'ida and Jihadist Groups

t/f. Anonymous, Through Oi/r£/7em/es'£yes(Brassey's, 2002), entire.

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Notional List of People to Interview

People Responsible for Overall Policy

• President George W. Bush

• President William J. Clinton

• Vice President Richard Cheney

• Vice President Al Gore

• Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor