Terrorism and U Page 1 of 23

Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy

Paul Pillar

Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

1: Introduction

-Clinton 1998 to UNGA: "terrorism is at the top of the of the American agenda—and should be at the
top of the world agenda." 1

-successes:

• frequency of attacks worldwide halved from mid-1980s to 1990s [but the attacks were deadlier];

• speed of solving big attacks such as Oklahoma City, WTC 1993, 1998 embassies;

• cooperation bw. law enforcement and intell;

• disrupted terrorist operations, such as FBI 1993 success in stopping Sudanese terrorists' plot to
blow up NYC landmarks

-1995-98: U.S. intell focus on UBL helps make 1998 case

-narrow focus on body count ignores other costs of terrorism

-mistake to focus on CBRN attacks; sensationalism

-Clinton read a novel about terror attack on NYC w. bioengineered virus and asked U.S. experts to
evaluate the real risk p. 4

-"If counterterrorism is conceived as a war, it is a small step to conclude that in this war there is no
substitute for victory and thus no room for compromise." p. 5

-but still need finesse, accomodation, creativity; avoid absolutism

-caricature of conventional school: "confrontational, fight-don't-finesse stream of American thinking

about terrorism" p. 8

-esp. on state sponsors, engagement may be shrewder over long haul, however easy to slam as soft

-June 2000 National Commission on Terrorism:

• rising danger to U.S., so step up efforts, esp. in intell and law enf.

• "firmly target" state sponsors

• direct "full force and sweep" of law to terror financing

• prepare for WMD attacks

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but ignored foreign complications of counterterror policy

-official U.S. counterterror policy shows continuity:

• no deals, no concessions

• bring terrorists "to justice"

• isolate and pressure state sponsors

• help counterterrorist capabilities of U.S. partners

-but how do you apply these?

-"... what may seem to be the strongest (that is, the most determined, more hard-hitting, or most
inclusive) counterterrorist policies are not always the best ones." p. 10

".. .the aspect of counterterrorism that has had the greatest analytic shortfalls—and where additional
analysis could most help to make what has been a largely successful counterterrorist policy even
better—is the fitting of counterterrorism into the larger context of U.S. foreign policy. Terrorism is
primarily a foreign policy issue, as well as a national security issue." p. 9

-except domestic defense, all counterterror steps have foreign elements

2: The Dimensions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism

J& -tend to conceive terrorism too broadly and see counterterrorism too narrowly p. 12

-in 1970s, U.N. and other forums tried to dilute def n of terrorism and excuse attacks in name of national
liberation

-or define it by ways that set the policy response: call it a crime if you want to use law enforcement, war
if you want to use military

-U.S. statutory definition: "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against

noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience." p. 13

• premeditation—so excludes rage, accident

• political motivation—so excludes crime, greed, or personal revenge; terrorists focus on grand
concerns and claim to serve greater good

• civilian targets—so excludes military targets (unless off duty, as in Marine barracks in Beirut or
Khobar Towers) [dodgy, that last bit]

• subnational perpetrators or clandestine agents—so excludes normal warfare, although should

probably be broadened to include lone individuals, rather than just groups

-statute echoes consensus, however anguished, of academic specialists

-but U.S. force will inevitably get called terrorism (as in U.S.S. Vincennes' 1998 accidental strike on
* Iranian airliners, as sharply contrasted to 1998 Libyan deliberate downing of Pan Am 103)

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-true, U.S. sometimes uses clandestine agents and subnational groups, but it doesn't target civilians
deliberately

-terrorism is a choice on a menu, past guerrilla strife, diplomacy, etc.

-remember: terrorism is a tactic, not a foe in itself

-in 1980s and 1990s, 666 Americans died from foreign terror p. 18

-during same period, 190 more died from domestic terror p. 19

-far smaller than losses from older-style warfare: 291,557 combat deaths in WWII, 33,651 in Korea,
47,378 in Vietnam

-but U.S. lost only 514 soldiers from Iran hostage crisis to Haiti p. 20

-biggest single loss of military life since Vietnam was 1983 Marine barracks in Beirut, where 241 died
p. 20

-in 1980s and 1990s, 7,152 people died of intl terrorism worldwide p. 19

-plus, 31,000 wounded

-plus thousands more in terrorism inside countries, such as 100,000 or so in Algeria since 1992

-new emphasis on mass casualties: deaths from intl terror "more than doubled" over the 1990s, but
number of attacks dropped 19 percent p. 20

-more stress on WMD, rise of small groups of fanatics like al-Qaeda

-threat of WMD terrorism may be overblown:

• technical difficulty of acquiring, weaponizing, and delivering the stuff (instead of killing
thousands, Aum killed 12 in 1995 subway attack)

• terrorists generally tactically conservative, prefer tested tactics

• conventional stand-bys like truck bombs are less risky

• may prefer theater of big explosion to raw fear of germ attacks

• actual WMD attacks likely not to kill many [eg. anthrax letters]

• most terror U.S. faces will probably be conventional

-keep perspective on high-impact, low-probability events

-take wide view of terrorism's costs: simple fear among citizenry, social disruption, cancelled trips,
economic ripples, discrimination, diplomatic constraints, undermined peace processes, inflamed regional
conflicts, destabilized friendly governments (Egypt, Peru)

-FY2000 Clinton counterterror budget was about $ 10 billion p. 25

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-but Admiral William Crowe's panel on 1998 embassy attacks estimated $14 billion over a decade to
boost security at U.S. missions abroad

Elements of counterterrorist policy:

• Root causes

• terrorism doesn't arise randomly

• touches on vast range of U.S. policymakers

• need a grudge

• also need conditions of privation to get recruits for ugly, risky work

• most terrorists are young men, underemployed, with poor prospects and limited social support p.
31

• have had some successes getting terrorists to change by giving aid to get a job, a
incentives to settle down with family; have also had some luck with peace, reform, economic
development

but it's tricky: al-Qaeda came from wealthy Saudi Arabia, not from poor Muslim societies like

• there will always be incorrigibles [like Zawahiri] who we fear most

• no point tackling UBL's "root causes"; his root is hatred of America

• Groups' capabilities

• degrading capacities can be dramatic, as in Peru's 1997 raid on Tupac Amaru goons holding
Japanese embassy, which crippled the group

• but, per McVeigh, one jerk with limited means can be devastating

• big groups like Hizballah can't be crippled as easily as Tupac Amaru

• Groups'intentions

• Hizballah hasn't targeted U.S. since 1996; Hamas and Tamil Tigers never have, although they
clearly could do serious damage

• try to get terrorists not to use what they have in the can

• punishment, prosecution, and strikes can deter some groups

• to avoid giving terrorists motive to attack U.S., Washington doesn't make concessionsTwkh
terrorists—although it surely did during Iran-contra, and Israelis have cut dealsjspeatedty

U.S. has held nicely firm in hostage-takings and prisoner swaps, although those are more rare
today than just immediate murder

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• but sometimes, giving terrorists what they want is sensible policy [pullout from Lebanon, or
indeed from Saudi Arabia today]

• worse, al-Qaeda doesn't have concessions in mind; attack is end in itself

• Domestic defenses

• only way to deter UBL is short-term, tactical defenses

• if physical barriers and guards hadn't kept al-Qaeda's trucks off embassy grounds in East Africa,
1998 toll would've been far worse

• even at Khobar Towers, could've lost more than 19 if not for defenses

• but 1998 bombings showed failure to meet "Inman standards" (from his advisory panel after 1983
Beirut bombings) for embassy security

• simpy expensive; military antiterror budget aprx $3.5 billion in 2001

• moreover, bad guys can be inventive and get through (al-Qaeda, IRA)

3: Terrorism, the United States, and the World Order

-in 1980s, 5,431 int'l terror incidents, killing 4,684 people

-in 1990s, 3,824 such incidents, killing 2,468

-VP Bush chaired taskforce on terrorism, which drove CIA in 1986 to set up Counterterrorist Center p.
42 -get Bush report, use language

-with collapse of USSR, sharp decline in leftist terrorism (Red Army, &c.)

-but nationalism roared back in FSU, and failed states became havens

-new concern w. religious terrorism (Hamas, Kach, Aum, al-Qaeda, etc.)

-1979 Iranian revolution boosts Islamist terrorism, esp. Hizballah

-Afghanistan war also stimulated Islamist terror:

• gave terror-related skills to many non-Afghan militants, esp. Arabs

• helped forge "the ultimate extremist networking opportunity" p. 46

• learned from drubbing USSR that Islamist violence can beat anyone

-new easier movement across borders lets groups set up far-flung cells (eg. Hizballah in Argentina)

-new rise of ad hoc groups like 1993 WTC cell

-Ramzi Yousef shows transnational reach: Pain heritage, raised in Kuwait, trained in Afghanistan,
educated in Britain, plotted in U.S. and Philippines, caught in Pakistan p. 49

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-today's terrorism doesn't boost a rival, like 1970s attacks boosted Soviets

-closest thing to a big power backing terrorism is India over Kashmir

-but is Islamist terrorism a unitary entity that could challenge U.S.? _

-Bernard Lewis coined phrase "clash of civilizations" popularized by Huntington, who argues that
true problem "is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of th£
and are obsessed with theiinferipjity-of theif-pow^r/' p. 53_ ^

-but Islam is hardly unified: split bw. Sunni/Shiite, ethnicity, states

-and Islamism is hardly Islam

-still, UBL surely sees himself as engaged in a clash of civilizationsvs. West

-UBL plays unique role in bringing together disparate Islamist extremists

• but has little following among Shiites, despite large Sunni following

• and has more sympathizers than direct control

• network runs on back-scratching, not direct orders from top

•*^_^ _ _ , __ . , _^^
• "This network is something like the Internet: it is a significant transnational phenomenon that has
grown in recent years and that some determined people have used to their advantage, but nobody
owns it or controls it." p. 55

-as sole superpower, U.S. will remain leading target of terrorists

• terrorism is tactic of weak against the strong

• exposure of far-flung U.S. interests and targets, as well as open society

• power breeds resentments

-do terrorists hate U.S. for what it is or for what it does?

-al-Qaeda really did hate Somalia intervention, hunt for Aidid

-support for repressive regimes doesn't help

-also resent U.S. cultural and economic reach

-"Being at the top of the terrorists' hit list is an unavoidable price of superpowerdom." p. 66

-Islamists often hate U.S. for what they think it does, not its real policies

-also, you can't win; U.S. was blamed for noninvolvement in Bosnia and involvement in Somalia p. 68

-effective counterterrorism often requires foreign commitments, so mistake to think hauling up

drawbridge would end terrorist threat

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t: Counterterrorist Instruments

-need to rely on a whole tool-box

Diplomacy

-any point of potential friction bw. U.S. official and others bears on counterterrorism, so everybody
needs to watch it

-most important counterterrorist diplomacy is bilateral, not big forums

-UNGA was a disaster during 1970s, though UNSC helped on UBL

-see counterterrorism as penumbra from Geneva convention norms p. 78

-some international conventions are great; other 1970s ones are weak

Criminal law

-in 1993, had 550 FBI agents on counterterror; by 1999, it was 1,400 p.80

-in 1993,4% of FBI budget went to counterterror; in 2000, it topped 10%

-since 1970s, U.S. law enforcement has operated more internationally

-criminal justice has advantages as a counterterrorist instrument...

• giving Ramzi Yousef 240 years inside clearly makes world safer

• making terrorists fugitives cramps their style and freedom

• drama of a trial may buck up resolve of U.S. partners

• prospect of trial and punishment may deter some terrorists

-...as well as drawbacks

• an uncertain deterrent, unlikely to slow the fanatical or desperate

• prosecutions could stimulate terrorist retaliation (as in Jamaat Islamiyya's threats against U.S.
during Abd al-Rahman's trial)

• terrorist prisoners in jail could spur hostage-takings for swaps

• more likely to catch the low-level operatives than the leaders (as in Pan Am 103 or 1998 embassy
bombings), and it's even worse when a state like Libya planned the attack

• even harder to prosecute leading terrorists than it is to catch them, requiring far higher level of
proof than in intelligence work

• an acquittal would be a dramatic blow to counterterrorism [really?]

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• sometimes the best subjects for prosecution are the best sources of intell

• seeking death penalty dodges statue of limitations but cuts foreign help

• extraterritoriality is tricky; not everyone accepts U.S. right to try those who kill its citizens abroad,
so must rely heavily on foreign cooperation that may be less than forthcoming (fine in 1998
embassies, bad from Saudis over Khobar) p. 86

• foreigners sometimes resent U.S. focus on own dead, as in East Africa

-U.S. didn't want terrorism under ICC's jurisdiction, fearing undermining existing efforts and the
difficulty of handling sensitive intelligence sources in an international court

-often makes sense to let other countries enforce rule of their own law, as in Scottish court that handled
Pan Am 103

Financial controls

-often oversold as way to dry up terrorists' lifeblood

-but terrorism is cheap

-hardly requires big transnational cash flows, like drug deals

-truck bomb at 1993 WTC attack cost $400 p. 94

-moreover, terror funds are excruciatingly difficult to track

-groups and individuals routinely use fake names

-terrorists usually have back-up channels for moving funds

-legitimate businesses and NGOs often involved

-and most terrorist financial transactions happen outside U.S.

-informal hawala system and off-shore banking hard to penetrate

-for many foreign govts, not worth cracking down when threat

strikes them as tenuous and likely to irk local groups

-U.S. has taken two types of action here:

1. freeze assets belonging to terrorists, groups, or state sponsors

2. bar material support to terrorists

-in 1995, U.S. first freezes terrorist assets, under executive order

-1996 omnibus antiterror act blocks assets of all designated FTOs

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^Treasury Dept orders U.S. financial inst'ns to freeze relevant accounts

-most of assets seized [pre-9/11] were from state sponsors ($1.5 billion from Iraq, about $1 billion from
Libya), but just got chump change from FTOs (eg. $104,000 from Hamas and PIJ) p. 96

-January 2000 convention requires govts to criminalize terror fundraising and to seize terror funds p. 93

-more modest benefits to financial controls:

1. blocked assets of state sponsors can be bargaining chips

2. every bit helps when limiting terrorist capabilities

3. makes it harder for group to operate if it fears interdiction of funds

4. criminalizing support of the group may deter some backers

5. symbolic: lets U.S. demonstrate its resolve

Military force

-still the least-used instrument, despite ever-smarter bombs p. 97

-haven't tried to rescue hostages since Desert One debacle

-only launched three retaliatory strikes through 2000

-the paucity of use of force rightly reflects serious difficulties

-after failed 1972 German mission to rescue Munich Olympic hostages, several West European govts
developed commando units to free hostages

-U.S. developed Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to apply force in ongoing terrorist incident
after failed 1980 Iran hostage rescue

-but such raids are very risky, despite dazzling success of Entebbe in 1976

• a 1985 Egyptian raid on hijacked EgyptAir jet in Malta left 60 of 96 passengers dead p. 98

• even Israel screws up, as in Ma'alot in 1974, when IDF commandos stormed DFLP cell, which
killed 16 teens and wounded 70 p. 99

-rely on luck; had Tupac Amaru had more warning in 1997, disaster

-all these difficulties are seriously compounded for preemptive strikes, which states have shunned in
modern times (except Israel in Lebanon) be. such strikes lack justification of response to attack

-"For those reasons, the overt preemptive use of military force against terrorists is unlikely and unwise."
p. 97

-most important counterterror use of U.S. force is retaliation

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• first used against Libya in 1986, after bombing of Berlin disco killed 2

• Reagan sent 100 combat jets to strike military targets, SAM sites

• second retaliatory strike was 1993 strike on Iraqi mukhabarat HQ with 23 Tomahawks for April
1993 attempt to kill ex-Pres. Bush in Kuwait

• third retaliatory strike was Aug. 20, 1998 strikes on UBL targets in Afghanistan and Sudan after
East Africa embassy bombings

• [presumably most massive case is post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan]

-using cruise missiles in 1993 and 1998 strikes avoided civilian casualties of 1986 strike, which killed
36 civilians p. 100

-in first and third strikes, attempting to kill leaders (Qaddafi, UBL)

-all three were unilateral (minus Brit cooperation in Libya strike)

-all three were based on ironclad proof of responsibility for attacks

-such strikes may deter future attacks, but surely satisfy public desire to "do something" after an attack
p. 101

-revenge is an unworthy motive

-still, strikes do help buck up national resolve (as in Israel)

-"A punitive strike is chiefly a message-sending exercise..." p. 101

-retaliation may help reduce terrorism:

1. may encourage other govts to follow U.S. lead on counterterror

2. may hurt the group targeted

3. implicit threat of future retaliation could deter future attacks

4. other groups may also be deterred

-retaliation helped goad European action against Libya and UNSC sanctions on Taliban in 1999 (though
Russian anger at Taliban for backing Chechens helped swing Council more) p. 102

-first three strikes have done little to erode capacity of terror groups

-these three strikes did less to deter terrorists from attacking again, esp. UBL, who survived a good hit
from U.S. military and now hides better

-nor did Qaddafi quit terrorism after 1986 (viz. Pan Am 103, 1988)

-retaliation unlikely to deter other terrorists:

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• most dangerous terrorists have least obvious targets to hit (such as rudimentary targets in Taliban
Afghanistan, or making rubble bounce at Hizballah training camps oft-hit by IDF)

• being the target of U.S. wrath may suit terrorists fine, as with Qaddafi (who had Libyan people
rally behind him) or UBL (who liked the publicity of 1998 strikes, hoped to provoke a U.S.
reaction, and used strikes to call U.S. cowards who only understand force) p. 105

• terrorists may retaliate rather than being cowed, as in endless Israeli-Palestinian cycle of action
and reaction

-other problems with retaliation:

• hard to do, since ordnance is hard to move and overflight's a headache

• global resentment of superpower throwing weight around, as in European distaste for 1986 Libya
strike, Arab sulking in 1993, or cynicism about hitting Sudan's al-Shifa plant (though intell still
holds, the strike hurt overall portrait of U.S. counterterror efforts, and U.S. shouldn't have lowered
its evidentiary standards) p. 109

• "Wag the Dog" cynicism about 1998 UBL strikes really plays abroad

-doing nothing after an outrage isn't an option, but keep up high standards of proof and high levels of
skepticism about how much retaliation does

Intelligence and covert action

-the least open of the instruments, and often the most substantial

-intell on terrorist threats is usually too vague to stop attacks

-sometimes get it right and nab bad guys or cancel the flight

-but often get hijack threat that names country, not city...

-often have good strategic intell on overall threat but lack the tactical intell to prevent the immediate
attack

-few sources can give good specific intell on pending attacks

• groups are small (Yousef cell) or compartmentalized (Hamas)

• leaders who know most about pending attacks are least likely to blab

• hard to get access to terrorists and cultivate relationships with them, esp. with Islamists

-the sources who know most tend to carry lots of baggage

-2000 Nat'l Commission on Terrorism said CIA guidelines on

recruiting terrorist informants had made agency "risk averse"

-may have to get OK from DCI, DOJ, Congress

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-still, few sources are turned away, even a few memos are needed

i ^ -technical intelligence also has limitations

• most important pre-attack communications are face-to-face

• rarely get smoking gun, like Libyan message after disco bombing

• terrorists disguise the communications

-analysis of terrorist intell confronts sheer magnitude of threats

-do you follow every cult to catch the next Aum in the bud?

-new efforts at "data mining" to monitor border crossings, financial transactions, airline ticket purchases

-but terrorists fake their identities, and agencies may not cooperate

-so have suggested creating "terrorist profile" to aim at in data mining

-biggest challenge for analyst: fragmentary or dubious info, like finding out what's going on inside a
building by picking through its trash p. 114

-tend to rely too much on tactical intell, but strategic intell's pretty good

-intell also passes on alerts to FBI and INS

-intell also helps track down fugitive terrorists after attacks, working with local intell agencies

-most of U.S. intell on int'l terrorism comes from foreign govts

-intell gives president more options to preempt, disrupt, and beat terrorists

-can go after the whole infrastructure—in best case, disrupt it cell by cell

• avoids publicity and keeps U.S. hand hidden

• lets U.S. bring to bear criminal law of foreign govts

• any disruption can divert terrorists from their plots

• success breeds success, helping roll up the next cell

-assassination was barred by Ford's executive order in 1976, renewed by Reagan in 1981—which means
another president can override stat

-Israel's open use of hits has had "mixed results at best" p. 121

-1995 Malta hit on Fathi Shiqaqi gave PIJ a far weaker successor

-but 1995 hit on the Engineer bred spree of bus bombings

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-still, targeting head of chain of command makes much sense, both as potential deterrent and way to
punish major criminals

|p -those benefits are outweighed, however, by drawbacks:

• U.S. interest in preserving intl norm against killing foreign leaders

• makes U.S. stoop in eyes of world, undermining argument that Iran's hits on opponents abroad are
terrorist attacks

• resurrect old American skepticism about CIA integrity

Coordinating the instruments

-should have NSC lead the coordination, since it sees bi^

______ • i
-bylate 1990s, center of U.S. counterterror machinery wajs Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG)
chaired by senior NSC aide

. bring together antiterror chiefs from CIA, FBI, JCS, State, DOT, DOD

• sometimes include Treasury, DOT

• created by Presidential Decision Directive 62, May 1998, but basic structure set up several years
previously

• core CSG agencies also confer regularly on more junior levels

-other interagency bodies also chip in:

• Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, including 40+ federal agencies from NSA to
U.S. Capitol Police

Technical Support-Working Group, 50+ federal offices

-DCI Counterterrorist Center is also a community effort

-informal cooperation is at least as important; historic FBl/(JI7^~straTns

-main alternative to current structure would be centralizing counterterror under one roof

-Pillar doesn't like the idea; current structure basically works; rips FBI analysts away from the field
offices at home base

-foreign missions rely on three key players: CIA station chief, FBI legal, and State regional security
officer (who safeguards embassy)

-larger problem abroad is failure to report from field to HQ

-Natl Commission urged creating own cadre of reports officers

-State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism watches to see if counterterror doesn't hurt other

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U.S. objectives and sees that counterterror perspective is injected into policymaking [not a prob now...]

-Crowe panel warned that this State office doesn't always mesh well with INR, which assesses intell,
and Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which guards embassies

-better to have more folks at the table than fewer—good to have the AG or JCS chair there even if
neither prosecution nor airstrikes are likely

5: Groups

-start by asking:

1. what is the group's objective?

• leverage, stopping a peace process, ethnic cleansing, provocation, proving they're still alive,
imposing costs, deterrence, revenge, hatred, eschatology

2. does the group represent something larger than itself?

• embodiment of a political or religious movement, such as Hamas, IRA, PKK, Tamil Tigers,
FARC, Hizballah

-groups that represent something larger tend to use terrorism in more calibrated ways [he means
nationalism, but al-Qaeda sees itself as the voice of all Islam] p. 132

-worst recent threats to U.S. from visceral, unrepresentative haters, such as 1993 WTC plot or McVeigh

-Hizballah has killed more U.S. citizens than any group [pre-9/11], but knocked it off in the 1990s once
U.S. was driven out of Lebanon

-PKK, LTTE, FARC have all launched big waves of terrorism

-but must see PKK as more than just a terrorism problem

-capturing group leader can help

• 1999 arrest of Abdallah Ocalan in Kenya devastated PKK

• Peru's 1992 capture of Abimael Guzman sped decline of Shining Path

• similar cult of personality around LTTE's Velupillai Prabhakaran

-what makes a group decide to attack America?

• groups out for acceptance may be leery of alienating U.S., which may be why groups like Hamas
or PKK haven't hit U.S.

• groups reliant on funders inside U.S. less likely to cross Washington (IRA, but also Hamas,
Hizballah, Jamaat Islamiyya)

• groups in regional conflicts may not want to lose U.S. sympathy

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Peace processes

-Hizballah won't accept U.S. as mediator, but FARC, IRA, PLO all did

-which groups could be peace partners and which are incorrigible?

-ultimately, decide whether to engage or eliminate a group

-most authentic resistance groups tend to be large and durable p. 144

-might prefer nonterrorist interlocutor, but LTTE wiped 'em all out...

-small fanatical groups should be rubbed out, not engaged, by and large

-but sometimes U.S. should gulp hard and deal, such as FARC, PLO, IRA

-but even after accord's signed, die-hards will resist, and new rejectionists can roar to life

-don't expect perfect compliance w. peace pacts, given continued hard-line feelings and imperfect
command-and-control p. 149

Lists

-1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act created list of FTOs

-30 FTOs listed in Oct. 1997

-in 1999, al-Qaeda was added, a few dropped p. 150

-use FTO list to freeze assets and deport aliens

-but tricky issues; mix in vastly different groups (al-Qaeda, Nov. 17); left off the IRA; fruit of a
cumbersome process involving State, Treasury, DOD

6: States

-most countries mentioned in counterterror policy are "both part of the problem and part of the means to
manage the problem" p. 157

Sponsors

-can destroy many terrorist groups, but can't end a state [well, Iraq] p. 157

-1979 Export Administration Act created list of state sponsors of terrorism

-used to sanction govts, end foreign aid, bar arms sales, etc.

-the bad seven: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, Syria

-plus, de facto, Afghanistan under the Taliban after 1999 exec order

-Taliban never fully made the list be. U.S. said it wasn't a real govt

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-U.S-Jias_£oncerns with these states other than terrorism

-most active state sponsor is Iran

1. kills regime's foes outside the country

2. gives money, arms, training, and aid to anti-Israel groups

3. regularly surveilsU.S. targets overseas

s-~-_—-~-—~~ ——
-Iraq is smaller beer—just backing Abu Nidal, MEK—so focus of policy is Saddam's aggression and
WMD

-Libya is seen mostly as a terrorism problem for U.S., esp. re Pan Am 103

-Sudan is also seen mostly as a terrorism issue, hosting Islamist groups

-Syria's role in terrorism is less important to U.S. than role in peace process

-with North Korea and Cuba, terrorism is hardly dominant U.S. concern

-label has gotten in the way of U.S. engagement

-why is Cuba on the list but Pakistan isn't? p. 163

-state sponsors unlikely to pass WMD to terrorists: losing control of the materiel, getting dragged into
showdown by group's hotheads, and higher likelihood of tracing WMD than other less dramatic
assistance

-sanctions don't lend themselves to cookie-cutter approach

-depends on target's reliance on trade, breadth of support, etc.

-haven't split Iran from Hizballah (though weakened by Europe)

-haven't moved Iraq be. Saddam's too determined and tyrannical

-didn't even get Taliban to surrender UBL p. 166

-best sanctions case is Libya, where multilateral ones helped prod surrender of Pan Am 103 suspects,
although key may have been general pariah status rather than just the sting of sanctions

-general limitations to use of sanctions:

1. often unclear how state meets standards for lifting

-tough to insist that not one cell remain when cells exist in Florida...

2. sanctions don't really degrade state's ability to sponsor terror

-can stop its ability to get WMD, but terrorism is cheap

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3. U.S. out of step w. most of rest of the world, incl. Europe

-unilateral sanctions almost never work

-secondary unilateral sanctions on foreign firms doing business

w. targeted states cause tensions (Helms-Burton, ILSA)

-only two states ever got off the list of state sponsors:

1. South Yemen 1990, when merged with North Yemen

2. Iraq 1982, part of U.S. tilt toward Baghdad in Iran-Iraq War

(relisted in 1990 after invasion of Kuwait)

-lists don't recognize vast changes from Syria, Cuba, North Korea, Libya

-should_he-easier-t©-set delisted, lest we lose another incentive ~~

-State Counterterrorism Coordinator Michael Sheehan on the Hill: "if you have a problem with Cut
;mman rights, get your own sanctions, don't use mine." p. 172
__^==== , = ~ =- =^===
-we're letting terrorism get in way of engaging a reforming Iran
"~-
-U.S. should try to help—~^_ _ terrorism
other state~feduce suppofTTor

1. objective isn't to pin label "terrorist" on the state; that's a means...

-point isn't to get confession of past sin, it's to reduce current danger

2. lay out clear goals and standards expected

-key failing of Europeans' dealings with Iran is vagueness

3. expect only incremental improvement, and reward the increments

-cold turkey isn't gonna happen; reward the progress

4. ask for feasible steps

-easier to keep a group on a short leash than to expel it outright

5. exploit natural linkages bw. state's demands and U.S. goals

-so go after MEK; they're bad actors, consistency is a virtue, and

it gets you mileage in Tehran, despite Congress' odd yen for MEK

Enablers

-gray area; not only fail to stop terrorism but do things to help it happen

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Greece:

1. coddles Nov. 17 out of wide admiration for leftism, anti-U.S., anti-NATO

2. quieter support for PKK as way to hurt rivals in Turkey

-Ocalan had been hosted by Greek amb. to Kenya when caught there

Pakistan:

1. backing for Muslim militants attacking Indian-controlled Kashmir

-central to Pakistani self-identity, not casual like Greek yen for PKK

2. support for Islamist militants in Pakistan and Taliban-run Afghanistan

3. backed Taliban to get friendly neighbor on eastern flank, unlike India

-even if central govt wanted to crack down, lots of sympathy for Islamists, Taliban, and Kashmiri
mujahedeen in ISI, army, police

-terrorism issue overshadowed by fear of nuclear war on subcontinent

-Greece and Pakistan rapped in 2000 Patterns of Global Terrorism, as well as 2000's National
Commission on Terrorism; the govts noticed

'tJL -could use better listing system to reflect spectrum

-Natl Comm. urged greater use of AEDPA provision for states "not cooperating fully," for enablers and
reforming state sponsors like Cuba

-alas, that category still triggers automatic sanctions

Cooperators

-even key U.S. rivals, like China and Russia, also fear Islamist terrorism

-Russia fears links bw. Chechen rebels and Afghanistan

jmlin says strike on Afghamstanjs_pos&ible-~ s

——•—• ,

• June 2000: joint U.S.-Russian statement urging Taliban to give up UBL and dismantle terror
infrastructure, before Clinton-Putin summit

-China fears violence from Muslim Uighurs of Xinjiang province

-U.S. needs help dismantling FTOs' infrastructure, intell coop'n, security for U.S. embassies and
interests, and diplomatic backing

-incentives: avoid attacks on soil, better control own turf, curry U.S. favor

-but partners often fear groups' reprisals or sympathize with their cause

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-also hate to be seen as U.S. lackey (Saudis on Khobar, Japan on Aum)

^. -plus, security services may be divided, or govts may bicker

-so key principles, especially in developing world:

1. emphasize common interest in fighting terror

2. emphasize secrecy, and avoid disastrous leaks

3. offer aid to other govt in boosting counterterror capabilities

-key is State's Antiterrorisia-TFainhig Assistance program (ATA)

n-Slate sponsors. Euro£e often backs engagement (Iran), notisolation

-some partners may go further than U.S. would (extrajudicial killings in developing world, but also
Israeli closures, Turkish creation of refugees)

• human rights violations break U.S. standards

• harsh measures often breed more terror, not less

-overreactions can come from bad judgment, domestic pressures, or other doctrines (such as Ataturk's
old anti-Kurd dogma on Turkish ethnic unity)

-U.S. should work together to persuade partner to be sensible

-can sculpt aid to limit bad behavior, such as Israeli closures

-speedy extradition of terrorists to U.S., without legal niceties, suits us fine

7: Publics

-full CT entails shaping attitudes and intentions of publics, too

Foreigners

-foreign attitudes to terrorism matter:

1. part of the roots of terrorism, for recruits, sympathy, support

2. limits foreign govt's willingness to fight terrorism

3. affects foreigners' willingness to help U.S. or their own govt fight terror

-stress commonality in public diplomacy

-viciousness of terrorists

-attacks on U.S. call kill others, as in Nairobi embassy bombing

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-fight misperceptions that U.S. is persecuting Islam

-it's just targeting a method p. 198

^^fr _—__
-public diplomacy re UBL should cut him down, not build him up p.

-public diplomacy to be "energetic, continuous, and on the offense" p. 215

• . . .
-publicity about fugitives helped catch Ramzi Yousef, others

-"Rewards for Justice" program awards now top out at $5 million, plus $2 million more if threat
involves airlines p. 199

Americans

-U.S. public support for CT generally strong; rises after attacks

-1993 WTC attack raised concern but real rise came w. Okla. City 1995

-1996 jitters: Khobar, TWA 800 accident, Atlanta Olympics pipebomb

-manage public perceptions to reinforce tough truths and avoid simplicity:

• counterterrorism is a long-haul effort

• absence of attacks doesn't mean threat is gone

• series of attacks doesn't necessarily mean old CT policy is wrong

-jitters about WMD sustain support for CT, but they've been overblown

1. skews resources to preventing worst-case scenarios, not likelier threats

2. can skew U.S. reactions, as in 1998 al-Shifa plant reprisal raid

3. overdoing it could hurt overall public support for CT

4. provokes hoaxes

5. worst of all, advance talk will amplify panic from real WMD attack—just what the terrorists want

-Congress represents two streams:

1. general public support for fighting terror

2. influence of vocal minorities keenly interested in aspects of CT

-AIPAC, fans of MEK, Pan Am 103 families, anti-Castro exiles

-after an attack, Congress asks for "more of everything" p. 205

-hence, 1996 led to AEDPA, Helms-Burton, and ILSA

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-Clinton tried to water down Helms-Burton, but then shootdown of

^ Brothers to the Rescue planes leads him to just sign it

-ILS A originally aimed at Iran, but crash of TWA 800, with seeming

overtone of Pan Am 103, gets Teddy Kennedy to add Libya

-hardline sentiments against state sponsors can hem in policymakers

-those squeaky wheels aside, broader public would probably back softer line on reforming state sponsors
like Libya, Iran, or Cuba

-victims' families can be a pressure group, as in Pan Am 103, or can sue

-Iran hasn't contested the suits, so big judgments awarded by default

-hard for White House to argue against making foreigners pay

-sometimes, they pay (Libya on Pan Am 103, PLO to Klinghoffers)

-"Private citizens should not make foreign policy, even if they

happen to be victims of terrorism." p. 211

-U.S. owes its citizens traveling abroad most complete info about threats
n • "duty to warn"

• "no double standard": no advantage for govt officials

-but not much U.S. can to do manage vulnerability of U.S. firms abroad

8: Lessons and Futures

-a problem to be managed, not solved

"If there is a Var' against terrorism, it is a war that cannot be won. " p.217

-no fixed foes, nor prospect of real clear victory

-better metaphor: public health battle against disease p. 218

-can't beat terrorism, only reduce, attenuate, and sometimes control it

"Terrorism happens. It should never be accepted, but it should always be expected." p. 218

-even Fukuyama's "End of History" forecast ongoing terrorism p. 232

/j^ -goal of counterterrorism: "save lives (and limbs and property) without unduly compromising other
national interests and objectives." p. 219

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-inevitably, CT impinges on other U.S. interests; don't mess 'em up

Lessons:

• Inject CT perspective into foreign policy-making

• Watch full range of terrorism threats, not just UBL or WMD; look for the next UBL, too

• Disrupt infrastructure worldwide, using piece-by-piece foreign help

• Use everything in the toolbox, but don't rely hard on any of them (e.g. criminal justice)

• Tailor different policies to different groups

• Give peace a chance; most groups should be eradicated, but some—IRA, PLO, perhaps FARC—
are worth engaging

• label "terrorist" shouldn't permanently disqualify an interlocutor (Begin and

Shamir also started out ugly)

• Legislate sparingly; broad brush measures hurt U.S. flexibility

• Keep terrorist lists honest

• Encourage reforming state sponsors by engagement that makes it easier for them to clean up their
acts

• Help foreign partners help us

• Work with allies, not against them; respect European approach and try to make use of it, chide
Israeli & Turk excesses while working with "em

• Use public diplomacy to explain terrorism, not glamorize terrorists

• Level with American people; build long-term, realisitic support

• More isn't necessarily better

• Sometimes need finesse and nuance, not vigor and activism

-worst-case WMD scenarios are low-probability, high-impact contingencies

-truly hard to predict patterns of terrorism

-sporadic events, so hard to glean patterns from isolated data points

-heavily dependent on individuals (UBL, McVeigh, Shoko Asahara)

-dependent, too, on both world, national, and local events

-U.S. is likely to remain preeminent target as lone superpower

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-1990s decline in state sponsorship likely to continue p. 234

-no Cold War, no Soviet support, less colonial strife

-but new coups or unrest could mean new states sponsoring terror

-international groups will continue to be ad hoc, fractionated affairs

-will probably see more entrepreneurs like Ramzi Yousef

-expect the unexpected...

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