55. Rep.

vs Nestor Galang FACTS: Respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money, and often asked money from their friends and relatives on the pretext that their son was confined in a hospital. According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from "mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards him and their] child." He posited that Juvys incapacity was "extremely serious" and "appears to be incurable." The respondents testimony showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up fal se stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling. Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders. These disorders are manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and stealing money. She doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loy alty and these disorders appear to be incorrigible. RTC: It nullified the parties marriage. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the respondent. The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. CA: Affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution. Petitioners contention: The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was insufficient to establish Juvys psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations. The petitioner additionally argues that the respondent failed to show the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvys c ondition. ISSUE: WON there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations. The Courts Ruling HELD: There is no sufficient basis to annul the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The totality of the respondents evidence the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latters psychological report and evaluation insufficient to prove Juvys psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. These acts, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires. We stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in

the performance of some marital obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v. Norma Cuison33 Melgar, et al., we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby 34 complying with the obligations essential to marriage had to be shown. A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity. The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature to encash a check, of stealing the respondents ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her, while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows that these were mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvys penchant for playing m ahjong and kuwaho for money, nor her act of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her child was sick, warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental malady at the time of the celebration of marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy engaged in these behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers to as "swindling") only two (2) years after their marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The evidence also shows that Juvy even tried to augment the familys income during the early stages of their marriage by putting up a sari -sari store and by working as a manicurist. b. The Psychologists Report The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time required by Article 36 of the Family Code. To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively from the information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents description of Juvy would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description alone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient. We are of course 36 aware of our pronouncement in Marcos that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated need not be examined by the psychologist as a condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologists examination and report. In this case, however, no such independent evidence has ever been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent sources who intimately knew Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference and could have added weight to the psychologists report. Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply stressed Juvys negative traits which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological in capacity (e.g., laziness, immaturity and irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of initiative to change), and declared that "psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders x x x she doesnt 37 manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be incorrigible." In the end, the psychologist opined without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion

that "there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated 38 to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son." We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she administered on the respondent and the root cause of Juvys psychological condition. We als o stress that the acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the marriage; there was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties. Significantly, the report did not even categorically state the particular type of personality disorder found. Finally, the report failed to establish the incurability of Juvys condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy "lacks the 39 initiative to change" and that her mental incapacity "appears incorrigible" are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake. Psychologists Testimony The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity or incurability of Juvys alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report i.e., that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole money from the respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her child without linking these to an underlying psychological cause. Again, these allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvys early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability. 1wphi1 In these respects, she merely stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love and affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this premise, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard to cure. These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 56. Danilo Aurelio vs Ma. Corazon Aurelio FACTS: Respondent filed with RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of performing and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his familys needs. He exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in the presence of their children. Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day
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experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The psychological make-up of private respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a 5 marriage. On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismis. Petitioner principally argued that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC: Denied petitioners motion. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In denying petitioners motion, the RTC ruled that respondents petition for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit: A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of the root cause of the psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and the respondent contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of juridical antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. CA: rendered a Decision dismissing the petition. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondents complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action. Hence, herein petition. Petitioners contention: the allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition. ISSUE: WON the allegations contained in the petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage are sufficient for the court to declare the nullity of the marriage between Vida and Danilo.

HELD: YES In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit: (1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision . (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his 15 reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition . This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that 16 evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of p sychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes. Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.lawph!1 The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents
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allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings 18 of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties. 57. Kalaw vs Fernandez FATCS: Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay). Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of 12 nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyns following acts: 1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; 2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and 3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985 Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a 17 narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her 18 wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others. Malyns NPD is manifest in her 19 utter neglect of her duties as a mother. Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder "may have been evident even prior to her marriage" because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing, which the psychologist 20 gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role model.

Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties. Malyns version Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated. While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three 28 times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only. And in those instances, she always 29 had Tyrones permission and would often bring the children and their respective yayas with her. She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother and wife. Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at that time. As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, 35 and physical violence. Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness. Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn exhibited significant, 39 but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and compulsiveness. On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with 40 Tyrone, she appeared to have a good relationship with her kids. As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties as a husband. He is 41 unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty. Childrens version The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned. RTC: It concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. CA: Reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The parties faults tend only to pictur e their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration Petitioners arguments Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the best position to appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:
59 27

but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.

60

a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondents egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-obsession and self-centeredness were manifestations of 61 respondents NPD; b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave and incurable and prevents her 62 from performing her essential martial obligations; and c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it is 63 rooted in her upbringing, family background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage. Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioners part. Respondents arguments Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged 65 psychological incapacity. She argues that the testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive mother are sufficient to 66 rebut Tyrones allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity HELD: NO, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD. But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner. For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners alle gations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong -playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong -playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven. Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof

whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyns actions. What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.