MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR.

, Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC, Manukan and JOSE DALMAN, 9th Judicial Region, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, respondent. A.M. NO. MTJ-92-716 OCTOBER 25, 1995 PER CURIAM FACTS: Repondent Judge Tabiliran was married to Teresita Banzuela. Sometime in 1965, Banzuela left and abandoned their family home in Zamboanga del Norte and thereafter her whereabouts could not be known. In 1970, Tabiliran began cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan, with whom he had three children born in 1970, 1971 and 1975, respectively. Tabiliran and Baybayan got married in 1986. In the marriage contract, Tabiliran represented himself as single. Petitioner is a clerk of court assigned in the sala of respondent, charging Tabiliran for gross immorality. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Tabilirans marriage to Baybayan was valid; 2. Whether or not their children were legitimated by their subsequent marriage. RESOLUTION: (1) The Supreme Court held Tabiliran culpable for gross immorality, having scandalously and openly cohabited with Baybayan during the existence of his marriage to Bazuela. Evidently, respondent and Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondents marriage to his (first) wife was still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court and Article 390 of the Civil Code which provide that after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. From the time Banzuela left the conjugal home in 1966 until the time that respondent started to cohabit with Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no right to presume therefore that Banzuela was already dead for all purposes. As to respondents act of eventually marrying Baybayan in 1986, the Supreme Court (SC) declared to be not in the position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for proper determination. The SC considered the finding of the Investigating Judge that said marriage is authorized under Article 83 (2) of the Civil Code. (2) As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, the three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and Banzuela. The applicable provision in this case is Article 269 of the Civil
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Code, which states that: Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by an impediment to marry each other, are natural. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations. The reasons for this limitation are as follows: (1) rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; (2) it would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; (3) there will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; (4) it is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of the marriage; and (5) it will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents. GR No. 92326, January 24, 1992 REGALADO, J.: FACTS: Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC of Legaspi City granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari. Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six years old and who had been living with her family since he was four months old. The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order setting the petition for hearing. The order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The trial court rendered judgment disposing that the minor child, Jason Condat, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner. ISSUE: WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the petition. RESOLUTION: The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them. After the trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in CA, Family Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory. Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family Code will have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When Zenaida filed the petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law in force at the time and thus vested and must not be prejudiced. A petition must not be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with law not yet in force and effect at the time. Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was sufficient to make him a copetitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings.

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MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents. GR NO. 85044, JUNE 3, 1992 FELICIANO, J.: FACTS: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. ISSUE: Whether or not parental authority concerned may be given a retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents. RESOLUTION: Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code. SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical
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custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

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ALFREDO JAVIER, petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite; SALUD R. ARCA and ALFREDO JAVIER, JR., respondents. GR No. L-6706, March 29, 1953 BENGZON, J.: FACTS: Salud Arca, respondent and Alfredo Javier, defendant had their marriage solemnized at the MTC of Manila. At the time of their marriage, they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier Jr. Alfredo Javier left for US on board a ship of US Navy, for he was an enlisted man in the US Navy. Because of defendants departure, respondent chose to live with defendants parents but left due to frictions having occurred between them. She then stayed to her native place in Tanza, Cavite. With the events transpired, the relationship of the spouses become strained and with that Alfredo Javier filed an action for divorce against Salud Arca at Alabama, USA. Having received the complaint, respondent averred that defendant was not a resident of Alabama but a resident of Naic, Cavite. She also professed that the cause of their separation was not of desertion on her part but of the defendant. And that since his departure to US Navy, he had always supported his spouse and his son through allotments by US Navy Department of US Government. Through these she prayed that the complaint be dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not Alfredo Jr. is entitled for support. RESOLUTION: Alfredo Jr. indeed has reached the age of majority yet under the provision of Family Code, the support may be given beyond the age of majority in order enable him to complete his education, for some trade and profession. If financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination of the appeal, his education or the completion thereof would be unduly delayed. This is a good reason for immediate execution. The father claimed that based on the records, the son is no longer studying. However, it might have resulted to lack of means to support his studies considering that the father admits that the son is just a pre-law graduate.

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MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES, respondents. GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999 PURISIMA, J.: FACTS: Private respondent, in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against petitioner before the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that petitioner is the father of subject minor, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands. Petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor alleged and that he cannot be required to provide support for him. The mothers child sent in a manifestation stating that because of petitioners judicial declarations, it was futile and a useless exercise to claim support from him. Hence, she was withdrawing her complaint against petitioner subject to the condition that the latter should not pursue his counterclaim. By virtue of the said manifestation, the parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted by the trial court, which then dismissed the case with prejudice. Subsequently, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against petitioner, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian, herein private respondent. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. The trial court likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed wit h the CA a petition for certiorari. CA dismissed the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the minor is barred from action for support. RESOLUTION: The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With respect to Manuels contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.
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MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES, Petitioners, vs. LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006 QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of the minor, Lorenzo. They loved with Marie's parents. Due to in-law problems, Abanilla suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Salientes refused. Abanilla left the house, and was thereafter prevented from seeing his son. Abanilla, in his personal capacity and as a representative of his son, filed a petition for habeas corpus and custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The trial court ordered the Salienteses to produce and bring before the court the body of Lorenzo, and to show cause why the child should not be discharged from restraint. Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but it was dismissed. CA stated that the order of the trial court did not award custody but was simply a standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry. A subsequent MR was likewise denied. Salienteses filed the current appeal by certiorari. ISSUE: 1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari 2. Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is available to the father. RESOLUTION: 1. The CA was correct in holding that the order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial courts full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it. An interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order. 2. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although he couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline forthe proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondents petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Respondent. GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008 QUISUMBING, J.; FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar. ISSUE: Whether or not correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted. HELD: The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

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TERESITA LLANETA (known also as TERESITA LLANETA FERRER and TERESITA FERRER), petitioner, vs. The Honorable CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, as Presiding Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, respondent. G.R. No. L-32504 May 15, 1974 CASTRO, J.: FACTS: Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the court for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner be allowed to change her surname based on her alleged facts. RESOLUTION: The petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted. The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember. A sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname.

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ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor. GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962 BARRERA, J.: FACTS: Elisea Laperal filed in the CIF of Baguio a petition which reads: That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition; That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final; That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now; That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL. Petitioner prayed she be allowed to resume using her maiden name. ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband. RESOLUTION: In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

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Libi, plaintiff, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT, respondent. 214 SCRA 16 FACTS: Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong, 18 years old, and deceased Wendell Libi, between 18 to 19 years old, were sweethearts for two years prior to the incident. After the girl decided to end the relationship finding the guy sadistic and irresponsible, the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that they be together again this made the guy resort to threats. But, the girl hold steadfast to her decision. In order to avoid the guy, the girl lived with her best friend.On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from a single gunshot wound from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The respondents, parents of Julie Ann, filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Julie Anns parents. ISSUE: Whether or not the parents should be held liable for such damages. RESOLUTION: The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. However, Wendells mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mothers bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

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ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents. GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002 PARDO, J.: FACTS: Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the damages. RESOLUTION: CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.
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FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO petitioners, vs. EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. GR NO. L33722, JULY 29, 1988 GANCAYCO, J.: FACTS: Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in Pangasinan, private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. As part of work education, private respondent Aquino ordered the pupils to help Banez in the burying of the stones caused by the fittered remnants of World War II. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez to borrow some rope. Before leaving, private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone." After private respondent Aquino left, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught him, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. Ylarde sustained injuries, three days later, he died. Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. ISSUE: Whether or not both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages. RESOLUTION: As held in Amadora vs CA, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, this is the general rule. However, in case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and he did not give any instruction regarding the digging. The excavation instructed clearly exposed the students to risk and should not be placed under the category of Work Education such as school gardening, planting trees etc. Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence where instead of availing himself of adult manual laborers he instead utilized his students. Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient to cast away all serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to the excavation would present to the children. He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the petitioners.
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JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents. GR NO. L47745, APRIL 15, 1988 CRUZ, J.: FACTS: Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. ISSUE: Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

RESOLUTION: The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed incharge of particular classes. In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities.
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Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident. Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.

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REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents. GR 115640, March 15, 1995 MELO, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

RESOLUTION: In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mothers infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the mothers conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least
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with the daughter. Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

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IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner. GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009 CARPIO, J.: FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

RESOLUTION: Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

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