Message Page 1 of 1

Yoel Tobin

From: Yoel Tobin

Sent: Monday, July 19, 2004 11:58 AM
To: Chris Kojm
Cc: Tom Dowling; Nicole Grandrimo; Doug MacEachin; Melissa Coffey; Sarah Linden
Subject: 7-16 press guidance

Chris: Attached is suggested press guidance from Team 1. This replaces what we sent you on Friday. Thanks.

7/19/2004
 ACCESS
Q. Vice President Cheney said he had access to materials regarding the al Qaeda-Iraq
relationship which the Commission had not seen. Have you now seen everything the White
House has seen? How confident are you of that?

A. We have reviewed our materials and are confident that we have seen everything the White
House has seen.

IRAQ
Q. What is the true nature of the relationship between al Qaeda and Iraq?

A. We believe that al Qaeda—Bin Ladin—and Iraq had a number of contacts spanning several
years. There is evidence that the two sides discussed possible cooperation, including a
reported Iraqi offer of safehaven to Bin Ladin in the late 1990's. However, it appears that
little, if anything concrete emerged from these contacts. Furthermore, we have seen no
evidence that Iraq cooperated with Al Qaeda in carrying out any attack on the United States
or that either Iraq or al Qaeda ever provided support for violence against the United States
being conducted unilaterally by the other.

Q. Did Iraq have a hand in 9/11?

A. We found no evidence that Iraq was involved in the 9-11 attack.

Q. Why do the Commission's findings on Iraq differ so sharply from so much press and other
public commentary?

A. We cannot speak for the press and various commentators. We can tell you that one of the
main sources regarding Iraqi support to al Qaeda has recanted his claims. The Commission
thoroughly investigated the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship. We had access to classified government
documents, including material acquired after the invasion of Iraq. We believe that we have
developed and presented as accurate and thorough an understanding of Iraq's pre-9/11
relationship to al Qaeda as is possible with the evidence currently available.

Q. Many commentators have cited Zarqawi as an intermediary between Al Qaeda and Iraq.
What did the Commission conclude?

A. Whatever his subsequent role, he does not appear to figure in events prior to the 9-11 attack.
 IRAN

Q. You say that Hezbollah had a hand in arranging transportation for several of the 9/11
hijackers through Iran. Is it possible that either Hezbollah or Iran was actually responsible
for the 9/11 attacks?

A. We did not say that Hezbollah had a hand in arranging transportation for several of the
hijackers through Iran. We did say that some of the hijackers transited Iran on their way in
and out of Afghanistan, and that Hezbollah's precise role in that travel, if any, warrants
further investigation by the U.S. government. Regardless, two facts stand out. First, Iran and
Hezbollah did provide assistance of various types to Al Qaeda in the years before 9/11.
Second, we have seen nothing to indicate that Iran or Hezbollah had any knowledge of the
9/11 planning, or that anyone other than al Qaeda planned and executed these terrible attacks.

Q. Are you saying that while the Commission found no compelling evidence of Iraqi support
for Al Qaeda, it did find evidence of Hezbollah and Iranian support?

A. Yes, we found that Iran and Hezbollah provided explosives training to al Qaeda operatives in
the early 1990's. We also found that, after Bin Ladin's return to Afghanistan, Iran allowed al
Qaeda operatives to freely transit its territory on their way to and from terrorist training
camps in Afghanistan. This transit was very helpful to al Qaeda.

Q. Doesn't this mean that Iran, not Iraq, was Al Qaeda's main foreign patron?

A. Al Qaeda's main foreign patrons were Sudan and then the Taliban. Iran's role was
considerably more limited but it was still significant.

Q. What is happening today? Are Iran and al Qaeda still cooperating? Is Iran harboring al
Qaeda officials?

A. These are very important questions, but they take us beyond the Commission's mandate,
which was to investigate the facts and circumstances leading up to 9/11.

OTHER COUNTRIES

Q. What other countries had relationships with al Qaeda?

A. Certainly the then governments of Sudan and Afghanistan both had strong relationships with
al Qaeda. Both clearly provided bin Ladin with a place to live, train, and run his operations.
Al Qaeda also had a strong relationship with individual Pakistani officials and organizations,
although it is unclear how much of this relationship was the product of formal government
decisions. In any case, al Qaeda benefited enormously from Pakistani support of the Taliban.
Q. What about Saudi Arabia? What responsibility does it bear?

A. Over the decade or more preceding 9-11, individuals and organizations within Saudi Arabia
provided some funding to al Qaeda. Some of these sources appear to have been unaware that
their contributions were going to subsidize al Qaeda violence. We have found no evidence
that the government or royal family of Saudi Arabia knew of or supported the 9-11 attack or
its perpetrators. However, the ideological and financial support that some Saudi institutions
provided to Islamic extremism deserves serious attention.

Regional Attitudes
Q. Many Middle Easterners and others argue that anger over specific U.S. policies and
actions fuel support for Bin Ladin and other radicals. Your report appears to avoid addressing
this issue. In your view, how much do American actions contribute to our problems?

A. A variety of polls taken over a number of years make it plain that there is substantial regional
criticism of some American policies and actions seen as unbalanced or unfavorable to Muslims.
At the same time, there seems to be a tendency to discount or dismiss American actions, such as
our efforts on behalf of the Bosnians, which directly benefit Muslims. Both our actual policies
and the perceptions of those policies plainly have contributed to the attitudes upon which bin
Ladin and his ilk thrive.

Q. A number of Western commentators argue that the primary cause of Islamist violence is
an inherently flawed or failing Arab or Muslim civilization. How would you characterize the
Commission's views on this question?

A. Our report identified factors that we believe contribute to the rise of violent Islamist
movements. We recognize that bin Ladin and other extremists, who plainly aspire to identify
themselves as embodiments of Islamic society, no more represent Islamic civilization than Hitler
represented western culture.

Q. Doesn't your report's criticism of Arab political and economic conditions essentially endorse
the radical critique of Arab governments? Isn't the Commission effectively saying that the
Islamists are right about the problem but wrong about the solution?

A. Openly available data demonstrates that the countries discussed have serious political and
economic problems. Our report simply recognizes that reality. TWe certainly do not suggest that Deleted: We do not presume to suggest
how those countries and their leaders
should resolve those issues.
the radical critique is correct or that its proposed solutions are either correct or in the best
interests of the people of the region.

Al Qaeda
Q. What can you tell us about Al Qaeda's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction?

A. Al Qaeda is actively trying to develop such weapons and will likely use them against us if
they can acquire them. One of our most vital national security goals must be to keep weapons of
mass destruction away from Al Qaeda and all other terrorist groups.

Q. How much of a threat does Al Qaeda pose today?

A. Al Qaeda and like-minded groups are still determined to hit us as hard as they can. They
pose a serious threat to the United States. Our report addresses ways to neutralize that threat.
But no one should be fooled by the absence of attacks on U.S. soil since 9/11. We are still at
war.