R U S S I A

Perm'

Kazan' Samara

afghanistan & pakistan on the brink

Yekaterinburg Ufa Chelyabinsk Omsk Novosibirsk

Krasnoyarsk

framing u.s. policy options

february 2009 authors Atyrau
Astana
Qaraghandy (Karaganda)

Barnaul Irkutsk

Frederick (Atyrau) Barton and Karin von Hippel Lake Balkhash with Mark Irvine, Thomas Patterson, and Mehlaqa Samdani

KAZAKHSTAN
Aral Sea

M
rmqi

Almaty

Caspian Sea
AZERBAIJAN

UZBEKISTAN

Bishkek KYRGYZSTAN
Kashi Dushanbe TAJIKISTAN
Indian claim

Baku
Tabriz

TURKMENISTAN Ashgabat
Mashhad

Tashkent

Tehran
Esfahan

Kabul

Al Basrah

IRAN
Kuwait
KUWAIT Shiraz

AFGHANISTAN Islamabad
Kandahar Lahore Quetta

Chinese line of control

DI

Persian BAHRAIN Gulf

PAKISTAN
OMAN

New Delhi
Jaipur Lucknow

NEPAL
Kanpur

Lhasa BHUTAN

Kathmandu

Thimphu

Manama Riyadh
QATAR

Doha Abu Dhabi

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Karachi

BANGLADESH
- Ahmadabad Nagpur Kolkata Dhaka (Calcutta)

ARABIA

Muscat

OMAN
Mumbai (Bombay)

Pune

INDIA
- Hyderabad

Sanaa

YEMEN

Bay of

DJIBOUTI Gulf of Aden

Djibouti

(YEMEN)

Socotra

Arabian Sea

Bangalore Chennai (Madras)

LAKSHADWEEP
(INDIA)

Bengal

Berbera

Contents
Executive Summary 1. U.S. Policy Challenges 2. Assumptions 3. Recommendations and Policy Options Acknowledgments Appendix A: Conference Agenda Appendix B: Conference Participants Further Reading Biographies About CSIS ii 1 10 13 19 20 22 23 26 28

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ON THE BRINK

Executive Summary
Dramatic changes are needed in order to succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Almost daily, the people of the region experience deteriorating security and a worsening economic situation. At the same time, Afghans and Pakistanis will both make tough political choices in the coming months, and the United States and major allies are in the midst of multiple policy reviews. The appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke should provide the opportunity to transform the current approach into one that has clear goals and a compelling narrative. Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink is the result of a 200 person conference, held on November 21, 2008 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and coorganized by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU). The event included participants from all parts of the U.S. government. (See agenda in Appendix A and participants in Appendix B). The report is divided into three sections: 1) Policy Challenges; 2) Assumptions; and 3) Recommendations and Policy Options. Policy Challenges Afghanistan and Pakistan pose some of the most complex challenges imaginable. All parties have struggled with: 1) formulating and implementing an integrated strategy across U.S. government agencies, and with international and local partners; 2) understanding the evolving situation on the ground in both countries, especially in the gray zones (or ungoverned spaces); and 3) managing civilian political and economic development programs in dangerous, conflict environments. This report outlines eighteen major questions, including: What U.S. and international force levels are required to achieve the stated objectives? Are sufficient forces available? (p. 3-4) Will more equipment and training address Pakistans insufficient counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capacity? (p. 7) What discussions should take place with the Taliban? (p. 8-9)

Assumptions The report highlights eighteen realistic assumptions that should inform policy. Among those discussed are: Afghanistan is no longer the safe haven or base for the al Qaeda network (though they still maintain a presence) and it is unlikely that a major attack on the United States will come from that country in the near future (p. 11). The NATO allies do not all share U.S. priorities, thus the mission in Afghanistan will continue to be opposed by the publics of some of the top ii

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contributing allies. Significant increased force deployments or rules of engagement that are more flexible are unlikely (p. 12). Pakistan will not eliminate Taliban/al Qaeda sanctuaries or develop a rapid political solution for the governance problems in the tribal regions. The Pakistani government is not likely to devise a workable political-military strategy and doctrine or build the necessary public support to deal with counterinsurgency in the near term (p. 12). Extremism could well spread into other parts of Pakistan as provincial issues are not addressed and economic pressures increase. Greater U.S. and NATO military efforts in southern Afghanistan may generate a spillover into adjacent areas of Pakistan (p. 12). It will not be enough to make incremental improvements. Small increases in troops, improved diplomacy, reduced corruption, and a flush of economic assistance will be insufficient. The publics of Afghanistan and Pakistan have been losing confidence for more than two years, and it is necessary to make more dramatic changes in order to gain their full participation and ownership of the challenges (p. 11, 13).

Recommendations and Policy Options The report offers five major recommendations for this critical period. Within the recommendations are the following ideas: Simplify and clarify the overarching goals to develop a sense of common purpose. The people of Afghanistan and Pakistan must believe that their safety and well-being will be advanced by fighting the insurgents/terrorists and stabilizing the region. Their allies must see targets achieved within reasonable periods. Shared goals, in turn, will enable all parties and partners to develop the appropriate strategy, realistic objectives, and measures of success, as well as secure the necessary resources (p. 13-14). Secure a three-year military and economic commitment from the allies and signal to the Afghans that the military commitment is not open-ended, although the financial commitment will continue. The 134,000-soldier target strength of the Afghan National Army by December 2011 is consistent with this timeframe. Ensure that the elected governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan accept leadership responsibility (p. 4, 14-16). Focus the vast majority of the effort (70-80%) in a few provinces (in both Afghanistan and Pakistan) and seek to build governance wherever it is promising, from select ministries to governors, local village, city, and civil society leaders, womens groups, and public servants, such as teachers, judges, and police (p. 15).

Success can be achieved with a clear direction and goals, the assumption of responsibility by all parties, and regular and open information flows directly to the people of the region and to allied nations.

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1. Policy Challenges
The critical challenges in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region include widespread violence, deep poverty, unsettled border tensions, nuclear weapons, drug trafficking, and poor governance. Moreover, issues of sovereignty, as well as the complex social, historical, and religious dynamics in the region, threaten to overwhelm national and international capabilities. Thus far, the external provision of financial, military, and technical governance support has been fairly significant, yet also largely ineffective and, in some instances, counterproductive. Afghanistan and Pakistan suffer from terrorist and criminal violence, with some territory in each that is not fully under national control. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are better than they have been in the past, but they are still strained; the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks have threatened the slow reduction in India-Pakistan tensions. Coalition fatalities increased for the fifth consecutive year in Afghanistan in 2008, and more than half of the country is too dangerous for civilian aid workers. 1 The U.S. government and most allies recognize the need for a new approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan, one that takes on a broader regional focus. Ambassador Holbrooke has just completed a visit to the region, initial discussions with allies have begun, and a 60-day U.S. government-wide review is being prepared for the April NATO summit, which also will include official Afghan and Pakistani participation. 2 The review will incorporate a number of recent assessments, 3 including efforts led by Lieutenant General Douglas Lute at the National Security Council, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Petraeus at Central Command (CENTCOM Assessment Team), Jim Bever at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the recent National Intelligence Estimate. 4 Also, the Obama administration already has made certain decisions, such as the announced deployment of an additional 17,000 U.S. forces to Afghanistan and the continued use of remotecontrolled missiles in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan.

UN Programme Accessibility Map, October 8, 2008, from Anthony Cordesman, Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2 The White House review is being led by Bruce Riedel and co-chaired by Richard Holbrooke and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy. Robert Gibbs, Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, The White House, February 10, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/PressGagglebyPressSecretaryRobertGibbs/. 3 Several additional strategy reviews related to Afghanistan and Pakistan were commissioned in 2007-2008. These include: Interagency review of Afghanistan, Afghanistan 2008 Strategic Review Update; National Security Council, Getting to December 08 paper; UK Regional Command South (RC South) study; UN study Towards an Integrated Strategy for Afghanistan; NATO International Staff Strategic Vision paper; NATO/ISAF Comprehensive Political-Military Strategic Plan for Afghanistan; SECDEF Gates Afghanistan Strategy Paper (3-5 year scope); Center for Army Analysis study on the size of the Afghan National Army; Intelligence Community Bulletin on the Afghan Insurgency; and ISAF Regional Command South (RC South) Comprehensive Campaign Assessment. 4 While the CENTCOM Assessment Team is reviewing strategy for CENTCOMs entire area of operations, the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a major area of focus.

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An Afghan National Army soldier scans Korengal Valley for threats on February 16, 2008, outside Korengal Outpost, Afghanistan. U.S. Army photo by Spc. Jordan Carter.

Admiral Mullen has noted that Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked in a common insurgency that crosses the border between them. 5 The fortunes of both Afghanistan and Pakistan despite being at different stages of development are indeed inter-connected and will require a carefully calibrated mix of tools, including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism as well as short-term humanitarian and long-term economic and development activities. Moreover, the wider neighborhood will also have to become part of the solution in order to prevent any of the neighboring countries from becoming spoilers. Important decisions must be made in the coming months. In Afghanistan, the United States and its allies must determine force levels, address command and control difficulties, and decide how to localize security and development efforts. In Pakistan, the deterioration of the security and economic situation, along with the limited levers of

Michael Mullen, Opening Statement at the House Armed Services Committee on Iraq and Afghanistan, Department of Defense, September 10, 2008, http://www.jcs.mil/chairman/speeches/10sep08cjcs-hascmullen.html. More recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that a re-examination of the U.S. strategy and approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan would be one of the first priorities of the [Obama] administration. See Robert Gates, Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates from the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, VA, Department of Defense, December 2, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4325

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external influence, require a new political calculus that includes mature partnerships in the region and with allied nations from around the world. The recent negotiations between the Pakistani government and a part of the Pakistani Taliban in Swat highlight the enormity of the challenges. What is actually going on there? What is meant by Shariah law in this case? Will either party honor the agreement? Will it bring peace to the valley? Why has the Pakistani military been unable to quell the violence and stop the intimidation? Is this a capitulation to violent insurgents that will now be repeated elsewhere or a model to build upon? This section outlines several of the key questions and challenges that should help define U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan in the months and years ahead. Recommendations for dealing with these challenges are addressed in Section 3. I. Afghanistan Just over seven years after American forces and coalition partners ousted the Taliban, Afghanistans stability is far from guaranteed. Security in fact has worsened, with the Taliban and other militias expanding their presence. At the same time, Afghanistan is home to some of the worst health and poverty indicators in the world. Rampant corruption, drug trafficking, and deterioration in the rule of law are causing widespread discontent among the population. What is the goal in Afghanistan? Currently there is a fundamental problem in Afghanistan: the Afghan government, the United States, NATO, the United Nations, and other key allies have not agreed on a common strategy for the country. There are a number of ambitions, which most feel should be narrowed to a common narrative. Since taking office, President Obama and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have attempted to ratchet back expectations by commenting that a key goal will be the elimination of safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. How public safety can be provided over the long term without the establishment of basic rule of law institutions still needs to be clarified. In other words, basic good governance will be required to ensure that Afghanistan and Pakistan do not again become terrorist sanctuaries or authoritarian states. What U.S. and international force levels are required to achieve the stated objectives? Are sufficient forces available? Approximately 65,000 international soldiers, including 36,000 Americans, are currently deployed in Afghanistan. 6 The United States is considering sending as many as 30,000
6

In a recent Congressional Research Service Report, Kenneth Katzman summarized overall force levels: The United States and partner countries now deploy a 51,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan. Of those, about 22,000 of the 36,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan are part of ISAF; the remainder (about 14,000) is under Operation Enduring Freedom. U.S. and partner forces also run 26 regional enclaves to secure reconstruction

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

additional troops to Afghanistan this year (with President Obama agreeing to an initial increase of 17,000 on February 17) to stem the rise of violence. Even at these higher levels, the size of the force in Afghanistan continues to be determined by the number of troops available once force needs in Iraq are met, rather than a considered estimate of actual needs in country. Will the allies contribute more troops and/or loosen operational restrictions (i.e., national caveats)? Given U.S. force constraints, significant manpower increases beyond the additional American troops must come from allied countries in the form of additional deployments or loosened operational restrictions. Many NATO countries have geographic and other restrictions on how their forces can be used, limiting the overall number of troops that will engage in direct combat versus those which are more constrained to a traditional peacekeeping role. Despite requests from the Obama administration, support in NATO countries for increasing force commitments and loosening caveats remains low. 7 How can the capabilities of Afghan national security forces be enhanced? The exit strategy for U.S. troops is linked to a well-trained national army and police. While the army training is considered fairly successful thus far, and national troops are respected by the Afghan population, the police training lags far behind. The current projection is for the total Afghan National Army (ANA) forces to reach 134,000 by December 2011 (today it is at 80,000). 8 Some argue that the problems in generating additional coalition forces could be mitigated by increasing the ANA by two to three times the planned figure. In addition, police reform needs to be an urgent priority, given the general incompetence and corruption of the forces. Police are also taking the brunt of Taliban attacks: more than 900 have been killed in the past two years. There are also plans on the table to support locally organized militias in the battle against the Taliban and other extremist groups, even though many analysts are concerned about re-arming local militias and the control over such forces. Whichever choice is made will require substantial revenue support from the international community. Can command and control reforms improve operational efficiency and effectiveness? Coalition forces continue to face command and control difficulties. Elevating General David McKiernan to commander of ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan in October 2008 substantially improved coordination on the U.S. side, but there are still many layers of
(Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are building an Afghan National Army and National Police now totaling about 150,000. See Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, January 16, 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf. 7 Jan Cienski and Isabel Gorst, Nato Allies Spurn US Troops Plea, Financial Times, February 19, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ca851e0-feaa-11dd-b19a-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1; and Craig Whitlock, Afghanistan Appeal May Temper European Allies Ardor for Obama, Washington Post, February 6, 2009, A13. 8 Michelle Tan, Dwell time may increase to 30 months by 2011, Army Times, February 5, 2009, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/02/army_dwelltime_020209w/.

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ON THE BRINK

complexity. CENTCOM, European Command (EUCOM), and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) all have responsibility for U.S. forces in the country, while ISAF is comprised of 41 contributing states, which have the numerous caveats on how forces can be used, often prohibiting any involvement in combat. This may not change, and peacekeeping forces are also needed, but NATO countries should be persuaded to loosen restrictions and transfer more authority to the NATO commander. What actions can disrupt narcotics activities and deny Taliban funding from the drug trade? Counternarcotics programs have so far failed to make a major dent in opium production, possibly just moving the production of heroin into areas where the Afghan government and coalition forces have less control. Drugs are a major source of revenue for the Taliban and other militants. Many different strategies have been attempted, none successful. Are there other options? How can the United States and international partners work directly with local communities without undermining the national government? Enhancing governance capacity across the country is difficult given the weakness and corruption of the central government in Kabul and, at the same time, the highly centralized design of the state. New approaches should also be linked to elections, which are scheduled for later this year (they have already been delayed from May to August) 9 . Security is one factor many politicians are already having trouble campaigning in the countryside and there is a concern that registration will be obstructed. At the same time, the election process could be used to build up local capacity by enhancing political party training and other activities. How can Afghans and coalition partners support infrastructure and development projects while combat operations are underway? While the coalition has made progress on major road projects, security problems now prevent those roads from being used. Other development programs also have been handicapped by over centralization in Kabul, an excessive reliance on foreign experts, a lack of trustworthy ministries and governors, and the kidnapping and killing of hundreds of civilian workers. 10 Notwithstanding some progress on health, education, the National Solidarity Program, and womens issues, Afghans are not receiving the assistance that has been allocated for them. As a result, they see little-to-no improvement in the quality of their lives, which hurts efforts by the United States and its allies to win their support. 11
A schedule for the Afghan elections is detailed in Key Dates for the 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections, Civil-Military Fusion Centre draft working paper, February 11, 2009, www.cimicweb.org. 10 Recent figures show that more than 400 people died working on USAID funded projects in Afghanistan. 11 This was a major finding in an earlier CSIS study on Afghanistan and has grown more severe in the past two years. See Frederick Barton, Karin von Hippel et al, Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2007), http://www.csis.org/breakingpoint.
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Children walk to school in Shimshall, a village in northern Pakistan. Photo by Philipp Frster.

II. Pakistan On February 18, 2008, after eight years of military rule, Pakistanis elected a democratic government. A year later, the initial euphoria associated with the new government has all but evaporated, with Pakistanis growing more critical of the governments inability to address the dire political, economic, and security challenges facing the country. U.S.Pakistani relations have suffered from Pakistans failure or unwillingness to stem crossborder violence into Afghanistan and the unpopularity of U.S. airstrikes on Pakistani territory. Internal security problems continue in Swat and other areas with seemingly weak responses by the government. 12 Given divergent U.S. and Pakistani interests, can both countries develop a common agenda? Divergent interests between the United States and Pakistan complicate efforts to shift from a quid pro quo model to a real partnership with Pakistani ownership of issues it now considers only the priority of the United States. The United States is primarily concerned with transnational terrorism and the militant threat emanating from the tribal areas of Pakistan. Pakistan has been overly focused on the perceived external threats from India,
Jane Perlez, Pakistan Makes a Taliban Truce, Creating a Haven, New York Times, February 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/world/asia/17pstan.html.
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AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ON THE BRINK

though it has recently become more concerned with its own internal insurgency due to increased extremist violence within Pakistan. The challenge for the international community is to help Pakistan develop counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capacity and assume full responsibility over domestic security. How should the United States target its limited levers of influence? The United States has significantly less influence over Pakistan than Afghanistan, the latter being host to an international force of 65,000 and largely dependent on foreign aid for its budget. Even multi-billion dollar assistance packages are only able to accomplish so much in terms of impact and influence in Pakistan, given the scale and complexity of the country. Nevertheless, Pakistan does seek assistance for its budget shortfalls and its military, and the country also wants a reliable and mature relationship with the United States. Will more equipment and training address Pakistans insufficient counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capacity? Increased militant violence in many parts of the country is a major challenge for the new civilian-led government. A number of distinct militias operate in Pakistan, including sectarian groups, Kashmiri mujahideen, Pakistani and Afghan Taliban forces, the Haqqani Network (HQN), the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddun (HiG), al Qaeda, and other criminal elements. Some of these groups have overlapping agendas and cooperate on occasion. More than 1,900 Pakistani and expatriate civilians and more than 600 security personnel were killed in terrorist-related violence in 2008. The Pakistani security services and other investigative bodies lack the necessary doctrine, training, equipment, and capacity to prevent and respond to these attacks. More importantly, there is still a lack of a dominant political will in Pakistan to address the challenge of terrorists and insurgents, with many officials preferring to label the problem as a regional one, or a Pashtun issue, or even as Americas War. How does the United States deliver assistance and help shape the situation in a region such as FATA, where even the Pakistani government has a limited presence? Coalition Support Funds and other security-assistance packages continue to bolster Pakistani military counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. The United States is in the second year of the five year, $750 million FATA initiative. Yet there are important limitations to the programs projected impact, and expectations should be modest. In 2009, Congress must decide whether to pass the Kerry-Lugar Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act that would create a framework for U.S. assistance over the next 5-10 years, while increasing the proportion of non-security, development assistance. To what extent should the United States assist Pakistan economically? Pakistan today suffers from acute financial, food, and energy crises. The country recently secured emergency assistance from the IMF after China, Saudi Arabia, and the United

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States could not meet Pakistans needs. The success of the new government and possibly its effectiveness in other areas hinges on its ability to guide the country through these problems. How can the United States strengthen Pakistans democratically elected civilian government? Pakistans long history of military intervention in politics makes civilian authority over national security matters exceedingly complex. The military maintains substantial budget and operational autonomy. There is also the issue of controlling the Directorate for InterServices Intelligence (ISI). While Pakistan has recently attempted to reform the ISI, the government remains too weak to hold the ISI, as well as the military, accountable and subordinate to civilian government policy. III. Regional Issues The region is rife with long-standing disputes and current challenges from border disputes to terrorism to the economy. With the presence of the Awami National Party in the current Pakistani government, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have improved somewhat. Increased exchanges between Afghan and Pakistani parliamentarians, meetings of Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and a peace jirga have led to greater discussion on issues of mutual interest, such as institution building and counterterrorism strategies. Other substantial issues include the dispute over the Afghan-Pakistani border (the Durand line), refugee populations, and the development of oil and gas pipelines through the region. Greater progress will be determined by the satisfactory reduction of India-Pakistan tensions and the constructive engagement of other neighbors, including Iran and China. Is there a solution to safe havens in Pakistan? Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, and other militias continue to operate in Pakistan and launch cross-border operations. These groups have extended their presence from the FATA region into settled parts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and increasingly in Balochistan. Cooperation and information sharing on both sides of the border is important, but the key issue is finding ways to contain or eliminate the threat through extending Pakistani government control and settling lingering domestic disputes, such as those in Balochistan. Talking to the Taliban? The Taliban are now a series of loosely knit organizations some more accessible for talks than others. Various ad hoc negotiations have taken place at different levels in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in some third-party countries. President Karzai has called for negotiations with the senior Taliban leadership, including Mullah Mohammed Omar. Agreements in Pakistan have yet to bear fruit. If talks are to have value, the United States and its allies need to determine what their role will be on both sides of the border

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and what type of support they will provide. The international and local stakeholders involved must make important decisions together about the costs and benefits of negotiations and agreements, which groups should be dealt with, and what incentives should be on offer. 13 What role could the United States and the international community play in reducing India-Pakistan tensions? Unresolved differences have fueled terrorism and an arms race in the region. The tragic events of November 26, 2008 in Mumbai were a stark reminder of how quickly relations between the nuclear-armed rivals can deteriorate. Prior to these attacks, however, Pakistan and India had made significant progress on a variety of fronts. Recently, the countries completed the fifth round of the composite dialogue, the strategic framework under which India and Pakistan discuss important issues such as Siachen, Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, economic and commercial cooperation and friendly exchanges, terrorism and drug trafficking, peace and security, and, critically, Jammu and Kashmir. Further progress may require both states to reduce their traditional resistance to outside assistance a difficult task when both governments are weak. Can dialogue and coordination with regional actors improve in-country conditions? What is the appropriate role for neighboring and important regional states? Effective diplomacy by the United States and its NATO allies could be helpful in encouraging states such as China, Iran, India, Russia, and Saudi Arabia to engage constructively in Afghanistan.

Karin von Hippel, Confronting Two Key Challenges in Afghanistan, October 17, 2008, http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=5093.

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2. Assumptions
Certain assumptions have driven U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan since September 11, 2001. The United States launched the original Afghanistan mission in order to root out al Qaeda from its operational base in the country. At the same time, it was assumed that a modern state could be built in a reasonable timeframe, without dedicating full U.S. attention to the task. Allies rallied to support the United States, but many of these countries had limited public support back home. The decision to go to war in Iraq also distracted the United States. The relationship with Pakistan was onedimensional, and far too focused on terrorism, former-President Pervez Musharraf, and support of the military, without engaging the Pakistani people. All assumptions need to be reconsidered in order to inform policy recommendations. The following assumptions emerged from the conference and should anticipate the reality of the coming months. These assumptions ground the recommendations in Section 3. Status of the security mission 1. There has been a growing sense of insecurity felt by ordinary Afghans and Pakistanis over the past two years, which is reflected in low levels of public confidence in the Afghan and Pakistani governments, the United States, and its allies. The Taliban and other insurgents are NOT popular, but the Afghan, Pakistani, and coalition governments have been unable to secure the populations and promote economic development. Thus, there is still a window to turn things around and increase public support. 2. In 2009, 17,000-30,000 additional U.S. troops will be deployed to Afghanistan, with half arriving in time to make a difference this year if they are deployed to the most insecure areas and focus on counterinsurgency operations. 3. The Afghan and Pakistani security forces will marginally improve their capacity to deal with the challenges, but they will not make the necessary progress in 2009. 14 4. Drone attacks will continue to target foreign fighters in Pakistans tribal areas.

The Pakistani government does not have sufficient force to defeat the Taliban and foreign fighters based in the autonomous tribal areas along the Afghan border. Pamela Constable, Islamic Law Instituted In Pakistan's Swat Valley, Washington Post, February 17, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601063.html.

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10

Bundles of supplies descend toward a drop zone in Afghanistan on April 25, 2008, after U.S. Airmen dropped them from a C-17 Globemaster III aircraft. DoD photo by Master Sgt. Andy Dunaway, U.S. Air Force.

The Stakes 1. Afghanistan is no longer the safe haven or base for the al Qaeda network (though they still maintain a presence) and it is unlikely that a major attack on the United States will come from that country in the near term. 2. Pakistan poses a greater threat in regard to transnational terrorism than does Afghanistan. The recognition of this threat by a vast majority of Pakistanis is critical to regional and global safety. 3. Pakistans difficult political transition and serious economic crisis will make it an erratic ally. Operational limitations 1. The situation is unlikely to improve by doing everything better without shifts in leadership, strategy, and resources. 2. The U.S. government remains ambivalent about both the nature and advisability of developing an interagency regional strategy and will not show operational agility in the near term. 3. More resources, including a civilian surge of about 500 people, will be made available across the U.S. government, but the basic models of operation will need to change in order to gain substantial benefit.
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4. Pakistan will not eliminate Taliban/al Qaeda sanctuaries or develop a rapid political solution for the governance problems in the tribal regions. The Pakistani government is not likely to develop a workable political-military strategy and doctrine to deal with counterinsurgency in the near term, or to build the necessary public support. 5. Extremism could well spread into other parts of Pakistan as provincial issues are not addressed and economic pressures increase. Increased U.S. and NATO military efforts in southern Afghanistan may generate a spillover into adjacent areas of Pakistan. 6. The NATO allies do not all share U.S. priorities, thus the mission in Afghanistan will continue to be opposed by the publics of some of the top contributing allies. Significant increased force deployments or rules of engagement that are more flexible are unlikely. 15 7. The Afghanistan war will become increasingly unpopular in the United States unless a more focused narrative is developed and disseminated, one that has achievable goals. 16 Greater Clarity 1. U.S. and allied policy will be driven by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, and regional players will become more engaged. 17 2. There is an opportunity to change policy and operations in the coming months. 3. Significant attention and resources will be dedicated to the upcoming Afghan elections, but the outcome is not likely to result in a decisive turning point. 4. Significant U.S. and international assistance will be necessary for the next ten years, but the total will not be as large as current expenditures since two-thirds of todays spending goes toward U.S. troops.

15

Craig Whitlock, Afghanistan Appeal May Temper European Allies Ardor for Obama, Washington Post, February 6, 2009, A13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/05/AR2009020503786.html. 16 See the recent polling data indicating there is a limited public appetite for a greater U.S. role in Afghanistan: barely more than a third, 34 percent, said the number of U.S. military forces in that country should be increased. About as many would opt for a decrease (29 percent) or no change at all (32 percent). Karen DeYoung, More Troops Headed to Afghanistan, Washington Post, February 18, 2009, A1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR2009021702411.html. 17 Paddy Ashdown, Just the man to bang heads together in Kabul, (London) Times, February 2, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article5634470.ece.

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3. Recommendations and Policy Options

The overriding need in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region is for a common purpose that is understood and agreed to by all parties, including the leadership of each country, their publics, the neighbors, and international players. Without a simple and achievable set of goals that unite the governments of the region and the alliance, it is difficult to imagine a winning strategy or even minimal success. Unity of purpose is possible in grave times. Recent polling in Afghanistan has shown that the vast majority of the population is eager for a safe and predictable future. 18 The terrorist attack on Mumbai has brought forward a new and higher degree of collaboration among the intelligence services of India, Pakistan, and the United States.19 Most of the NATO countries support the current strategic reviews, and the deteriorating international economic crisis may curtail the meddling of some neighboring countries. It will not be enough to make incremental improvements. Small increases in troops, improved diplomacy, reduced corruption, and a flush of economic assistance will be insufficient. The publics of Afghanistan and Pakistan have been losing confidence for more than two years, and it is necessary to make more dramatic changes in order to gain their full participation and ownership of the challenges. 20 The PCR Project has developed a Five Critical Step Model 21 to improve overall response to states at risk. These five can also provide the framework for the recommendations section of this report, which includes five necessary steps to achieve the desired outcome in the region.

The Way Forward Simplify and clarify the overarching goals to develop a sense of common purpose. The people of Afghanistan and Pakistan must believe that their safety and well-being will be advanced by fighting the insurgents/terrorists and stabilizing the region. Their allies must see targets achieved within reasonable periods. The following goals would help to define the mission:

Gary Langer, Frustration With War, Problems in Daily Life Send Afghans' Support for U.S. Efforts Tumbling, ABC News, February 9, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/story?id=6787686&page=1. 19 Joby Warrick and Karen DeYoung, CIA Helped India, Pakistan Share Secrets in Probe of Mumbai Siege, Washington Post, February 16, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/15/AR2009021501957.html?nav=emailpage. 20 See CSIS studies Barton, von Hippel et al, Breaking Point, http://www.csis.org/breakingpoint, a data rich review of progress in Afghanistan that showed a growing concern all over the country regarding security and the minimal benefits of assistance; and Frederick Barton, Karin von Hippel, and Mehlaqa Samdani, A New Course for Pakistan, May 2008, http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4488. 21 See Publications at the PCR Project blog, http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject/?page_id=266.

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A CH-47 Chinook helicopter flies over Kabul, Afghanistan, June 4, 2007. DoD photo by Cherie A. Thurlby.

Goals: Restore a degree of sustainable public safety in both countries that will allow for freedom of movement, assembly, and speech. Increase the sense of direct ownership and responsibility for progress among local citizens and their leaders. Secure the support of all key allies and other partners for a three-year military commitment and for longer-term economic aid. These goals can be achieved by taking the following five steps: 1. Improve Basic Knowledge of the Region. It is essential that U.S. officials and partners admit to high degrees of uncertainty about critical parts of both countries that are not fully under national government control. Garrison-like operations have left large swathes of land in Pakistan and Afghanistan poorly understood, difficult terrain has been unyielding, myths about the Pashtun and Balochi people persist, and natural connections between the region and the diaspora are not being made. This is more than simple intelligence a fundamental broadening of information gathering, using open sources, cell phones, Web 2.0, and other social networking tools, coupled with a broad public education effort about what is happening in the area is needed within the region and among the allies.
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The following actions would help national and international policymakers make a significant difference: Actions: Expand the contact pool of policymakers to include hundreds of new public sources that reach beyond capitol-based officials and intelligence professionals into local communities, and include journalists, civil society and religious leaders, students, businessmen and women, teachers, police, and activists. Invest in interactive exchanges on official and informal levels with a wide-range of broad-based civic organizations and media outlets. The goal should be to develop regular two-way exchanges between people and officials. Draw on the connections and social networks between Karachi (the largest Pashtun city in the world), NWFP, Balochistan, troubled areas of southern Punjab, the United Arab Emirates (with its significant workforce from the region), diaspora populations in the UK, and key provinces in Afghanistan/Pakistan. Convene a U.S. government-wide conference (virtual and in-person attendance) of current and former officials with experience in the region to test ideas and to expand avenues of information. Use this kind of outreach to build a broader electronic community of unclassified contacts and opinions. 2. Develop a Coherent Strategy. What is critically needed is an integrated strategy designed to be carried out in the main by national populations, with external support. Over the past few years there have been too many competing visions, internal contradictions, individual and disconnected country programs and projects, foreign versus national leadership struggles, and long lists of priorities. The way forward should be anchored in Afghan and Pakistani willingness to satisfy popular demands in troubled parts of their countries and to stand up to terrorists and insurgents. All responses to locally driven calls for help from the international community need to be grounded in a realistic assessment of political will and available resources. Key elements of the strategy should include: Strategic Elements: Ensure that the elected governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan accept leadership responsibility and design appropriate roles for neighboring and alliance countries that go beyond their current efforts. Focus the vast majority of the effort (70-80%) in a few provinces (in both Afghanistan and Pakistan) and seek to build governance wherever it is promising, from select ministries to governors, local village, city, and civil society leaders, womens groups, and public servants, such as teachers, judges, and police. Build up force levels 22 in targeted provinces so that there will be a reassuring presence of security forces at the district level in current Taliban strongholds. In Afghanistan, there should be a three-year plan to transfer the leadership in these places to the Afghan National Army and police, with the international capability
See RAND study on force levels. Since there is no chance of reaching the prescribed levels nationally (1:50 ratio suggests 300,000-600,000 forces necessary in Afghanistan), make sure that it happens in a few key provinces.
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being directed at a rapid response 23 and a possible follow-on role for the United Nations. 24 Expand public and private discussions with key insurgent groups to determine their interest in joining a peaceful political process. Elevate the rule of law, which continues to be a recurring problem in the region. Dedicate a significant effort to the regions under-25 population, which comprises more than half of the population.

3. Catalyze Operations. The emphasis of all efforts must be on the promotion of local leadership and responsibility, in every available realm. As the dependence on singular figures and institutions has grown, public confidence has dropped. The early momentum from the Grand Loya Jirga process, which brought together numerous parties from all parts of Afghanistan, has been lost and must be restored and expanded, on a regional basis when possible. Only by expanding the decision-making and benefits of programming to the universe of prospective leadership throughout the region can progress take root. This should include local tribes, the Pashtun and Balochi communities, a full range of Pakistans developing political parties, and partners at every level of the Afghan government. 25 Putting local people first can be done in the following way: Local Opportunities Encourage cross border peace jirgas of key communities. Make sure that the alliance is in a position to outspend any insurgent forces in the employment of local fighters or allies. 26 Channel assistance through popularly-elected local groups, such as the Awami National Party in Pakistans NWFP, to help empower them and build their capacity. Advance regional compacts for sharing terrorist information and other key concerns. Develop matching grants for community safety programs and expand direct cash assistance to people and local groups who demonstrate initiative or provide inkind contributions. Support the establishment of Truth Commissions and special investigations into official corruption and national tragedies (assassinations, mass murders, etc.) in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
See the recommendation describing helicopters and lift capacity Barton, von Hippel et al, Breaking Point, 69, http://www.csis.org/breakingpoint, , http://www.csis.org/breakingpoint. 24 Imran Khan, An Open LetterFrom PakistanTo President Obama, Forbes, January 29, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/29/obama-afghanistan-taliban-opinionscontributors_0129_imran_khan.html. 25 Karin von Hippel and Frederick Barton, Getting it Right in Pakistan and Afghanistan, CSIS Commentary, January 28, 2009, http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,5226/type,1/. 26 In some areasthe Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army pay recruits roughly $100 per month, while the Taliban have paid $150 or more, quoted in Seth Jones, Going the Distance, Washington Post, February 15, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/13/AR2009021301646.html.
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4. Measure Progress Independently. The overarching goal is to increase the stability of the region and the safety of the local people so that there will be fewer threats, and they can begin the difficult task of rebuilding their countries. Accordingly, the situation in the region will need to get to the point where citizens have a fighting chance of making it on their own. Key questions should be: What are the tipping points? Are we better off doing more or less? What is a certain objective worth in terms of resources and opportunity cost? To be credible, there will need to be clearly stated goals, some baseline measures, independent data collection, accountability, and transparent reporting. The following are a few fair measures to consider for the coming three years: Fair Measures In the next year, the alliance must shrink the operating space of the insurgents in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and secure more of Afghanistans South and East at the district level. The protection of local leaders must also be improved. Polling numbers that reflect public confidence in the entire enterprise should improve in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in alliance countries. 27 Assistance programs should be able to show vastly larger numbers of people who have received direct assistance. The trials, timeliness, and the activity level of the justice system should be significantly increased and improved. 5. Fully Engage the Public. The restoration of civil order depends on the belief and commitment of the vast majority of the population in each country. How can a single FM radio station in the Swat valley so dominate the psyche of an entire region? Much more must be done to engage and mobilize the people. This will require new levels of trust that have been eroded by years of violence, corruption, double-dealing, and a lack of transparency. Initial communications steps should include the following: Communications Steps: Massive national campaigns of revulsion against terrorist attacks on civilians, which would include locally-produced television ads, radio programs, Internet and cell phone text message alerts, and other promotions that feature the innocent victims and steps that can be taken by local groups. Youth-oriented programs that increase their community roles and broaden their exposure to social progress in the region. The trust deficit in the region has unfortunately been built on years of violence and intimidation, weak to non-existent rule of law, impunity, and corruption. Constitutions have been violated, political leaders assassinated, treasuries and programs ransacked, and crime tolerated. Judges have not met their obligations and police have not been paid nor protected. This must change for average people to have any hope of a peaceful future. All parties who seek a peaceful resolution to the regions many challenges must weigh
27

Frederick Barton, Measuring Progress in International State Building and Reconstruction, A Paper for the Aspen European Strategy Forum, August 20, 2008, http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject//wpcontent/uploads/2009/02/barton_mop_august2008.pdf.

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their own limitations, the risks and opportunities of the situation, and the direct and unintended consequences of action and inaction. The people and governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan need to become full partners in this new policy and approach. The ultimate goal is to empower national actors to strengthen governance and fight extremism and corruption on their own terms. Both countries are too big and too complex to allow their development and security to be offshored. Pakistanis and Afghans need to be fully in the lead, with international partners in an integrated, supporting role. Only then will joint efforts translate into peace and security.

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Acknowledgments
The conference, Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink, and this report would not have been possible without the support of our donors as well as the assistance of many individuals who generously contributed their time and expertise. The PCR Project team would like to thank its own staff as well as the moderators, speakers, working group leaders, and rapporteurs listed below. Special thanks to Joseph McMillan, our invaluable partner at the National Defense University, and Ambassador Teresita Schaffer and LtCol Robert Scott at CSIS for helping to conceive and organize the conference. The PCR Project would like to extend a special thanks to the Open Society Institute, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for their generous support. The authors are responsible for the content and judgments in this report, which should not be construed to represent opinions of CSIS or any of the persons listed here. Staff CSIS Justine Fleischner Shannon Hayden Katherine Koleski CAPT Jeffrey Maclay, USN Karina Marshall Daniel Porter Teresita Schaffer LtCol Robert Scott, USMC David Sokolow Rebecca Wexler Heather Winn NDU Andrew Burt Patrick Cronin Gerald Faber Joseph McMillan Moderators Anthony Cordesman Joseph McMillan Teresita Schaffer Karin von Hippel Speakers Jonah Blank Richard Boucher John Dister Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. David Kilcullen James Kunder Robert Lamb Stephen Lennon Polly Nayak Col. David O. Smith (ret.), U.S. Army Mark Webber Working Group Leaders R. Stephen Brent Beth Cole Glenn Cowan Audrey Cronin Evelyn Farkas Col. Jeffrey Hemler (ret.), USMC Timothy D. Hoyt Jerry Hyman Elisabeth Kvitashvili CAPT Jeffrey Maclay, USN Charles North Col. Scott Taylor, U.S. Army Alex Thier Caroline Wadhams Andrew Winner Theodore Wright Rapporteurs Katherine Campbell Colin Cookman Stephanie Gilbert Nicholas Hamisevicz Lt. Isaac Harris, USN Andrew Jaynes David Kasten Sahar Khan Michael Kofman Adam Mausner Thomas Patterson Azita Ranjbar Mehlaqa Samdani Adam Seitz Daniel Simons Sarah Soroui Jeremy White

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Appendix A: Conference Agenda

Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink November 21, 2008 8:00-8:30am 8:30-8:35am Breakfast and Registration Opening Remarks: Dr. Karin von Hippel, senior fellow and codirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, CSIS Keynote #1: Mr. James Kunder, Acting Deputy Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development Chair: Dr. Karin von Hippel, senior fellow and codirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, CSIS Session #1: Breaking the Cycle: Establishing Long-term Partnerships and Constructing a Regional Approach Panel Discussion Ms. Polly Nayak, Independent Consultant, former South Asia Issue Manager for the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community Colonel David O. Smith (ret.), U.S. Army; Senior Defense Intelligence Officer for Pakistan, Defense Intelligence Agency; formerly Country Director for Pakistan in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Jonah Blank, Chief Policy Advisor for South Asia, Central Asia and Archipelagic Southeast Asia, Majority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Moderator: Dr. Karin von Hippel, senior fellow and codirector, PCR Project, CSIS Working Group Discussion Session #2: Eliminating Safe Havens: Crafting a Successful Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Strategy Panel Discussion Dr. David Kilcullen, special adviser for counterinsurgency to the United States Secretary of State Mr. Robert Lamb, University of Maryland, co-manager and author of the final report for the Ungoverned Areas Project

8:35-9:20am

9:20-10:45am

9:20-10:20am

10:20-10:45am 10:45am-12:00pm

10:45-11:45am

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under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Mr. Stephen Lennon, Asia/Middle East Team Leader, Office of Transition Initiatives, U.S. Agency for International Development Moderator: Dr. Anthony Cordesman, holder of the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS

11:45am-12:00pm 12:00-1:15pm 12:30-1:15pm

Working Group Discussion Lunch Keynote #2: Ambassador Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Department of State Chair: Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, Director, South Asia Program, CSIS

1:15-2:55pm Session #3: Reversing the Trends: Next Steps 1:15-2:30pm Panel Discussion Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director-International Counterterrorism & Afghanistan/Pakistan-Related Issues, International Affairs and Trade Team, Government Accountability Office Mr. John Dister, Deputy National Intelligence Officer for South Asia Mr. Mark Webber, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for National Security Affairs for South and Central Asia, National Security Council Moderator: Mr. Joe McMillan, Acting Director of Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

2:30-2:55pm 2:55-3:00pm

Working Group Discussion Closing Remarks: Mr. Joe McMillan, Acting Director of Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Reception

3:00-3:30pm

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Appendix B: Conference Participants

U.S. Government Participation at Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink November 21, 2008 Executive Branch Agencies Department of Defense Department of State Department of Treasury U.S. Agency for International Development Office of the Director of National Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Defense Intelligence Agency Executive Office of the President National Security Council Office of the Vice President Office of Management and Budget Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Congress U.S. House of Representatives U.S. Senate Congressional Budget Office Congressional Research Service Government Accountability Office Attendance 160 U.S. government 44 Think tanks, universities, contractors, consultants, and former government officials 204 Total

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Further Reading
Richard L. Armitage and Lee H. Hamilton, senior reviewers, The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan, Pakistan Policy Working Group, September 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/09_pakistan_cohen/09_p akistan_cohen.pdf. Frederick Barton, Derek Chollet, Mark Irvine, Bradley Larson, and Karin von Hippel, A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4123/. Frederick Barton, Karin von Hippel, Seema Patel, and Steven Ross, Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), http://www.csis.org/breakingpoint. Frederick Barton and Morgan Courtney, In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=2580. Frederick Barton, Mehlaqa Samdani, and Karin von Hippel, A New Course for Pakistan: PCR Project Research Visit, PCR Project Special Briefing, May 14, 2008, http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4488. Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), http://www.amazon.com/Punishment-Virtue-InsideAfghanistan-Taliban/dp/0143112066/ref=ed_oe_p Craig Cohen, A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4147. Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), http://www.amazon.com/Idea-Pakistan-Stephen-PCohen/dp/081571503X/ref=ed_oe_p Anthony Cordesman, Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces, Working Draft, January 6, 2009, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090106_ansf.pdf. Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed, Report to Congressional Committees, July 2008, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08689.pdf. Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain

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Capable Afghan National Security Forces, Report to Congressional Committees, June 2008, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf. Government Accountability Office, Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Report to Congressional Requesters, April 2008, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622 Government Accountability Office, Increased Oversight and Accountability Over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds Needed, Report to Congressional Requesters, June 2008, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08806.pdf Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque And Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), http://www.amazon.com/PakistanBetween-Military-Husain-Haqqani/dp/0870032143. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier. International Security 32 4 (Spring 2008): 41-77, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3204_pp041077_Johnson_Mason.pdf. James L. Jones and Thomas R. Pickering, co-chairs, Afghanistan Study Group Report: Revitalizing Our Efforts, Rethinking Our Strategies, Center for the Study of the Presidency, January 30, 2008, http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdf. Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, January 16, 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf. K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, CRS Report for Congress, November 10, 2008, http://opencrs.com/document/RL33498. K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, Islamist Militancy in the PakistanAfghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, November 21, 2008, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/113202.pdf. Robert D. Lamb, "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens, Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project, prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, January 2008, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/display.php?id=306 James R. Locher III et al, Forging a New Shield, Project on National Security Reform, November 2008, http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging%20a%20new%20shield.pdf. Daniel Markey, Securing Pakistans Tribal Belt (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/publication/16763/securing_pakistans_tribal_belt.html.

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Michael F. Martin and K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistans Capital Crisis: Implications for U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, November 21, 2008, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/113214.pdf. Joseph McMillan, Energy Security in South Asia: Can Interdependence Breed Stability? Strategic Forum, September 2008, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF232/SF232.pdf. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (New York: Oxford University Press USA, 2008), http://www.amazon.com/Crossed-SwordsPakistan-Army-Within/dp/0195476603. Polly Nayak, The Impact of Pakistan's and Bangladesh's National Strategies on U.S. Interests, in Strategic Asia 200809: Challenges and Choices, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo, and Andrew Marble (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008), http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject/?p=733. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008) http://www.amazon.com/Descent-into-Chaos-BuildingAfghanistan/dp/0670019704. Robert R. Scott, A Battalions Employment of The Elements of National Power, Small Wars Journal, February 5, 2008, http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/02/a-battalions-employment-of-the.php. United States Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24, December 2006, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf United States Army, Stability Operations, Field Manual 3-07, October 2008, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf Karin von Hippel, Confronting Two Key Challenges: A PCR Project Research Visit, PCR Project Special Briefing, October 17, 2008, http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,5093/. Caroline Wadhams, Brian Katulis, Lawrence Korb, and Colin Cookman, Partnership for Progress: Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region, Center for American Progress, November 2008, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/11/pdf/pakistan.pdf. Joshua T. White, Pakistans Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistans North-West Frontier (Arlington, VA: Center on Faith & International Affairs, 2008), http://pakistanstudiesaips.org/English/PDF/Islamist%20Frontier%20(summary).pdf.

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Biographies
Frederick Barton is a senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program and codirector of its Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project. He is currently on the World Economic Forums Global Agenda Council on Humanitarian Assistance, was a member of the Presidential Transition Agency Review Team on Development Assistance, and was the chair of the Obama for President Subgroup on Post-Conflict Reconstruction. He was also a member of the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, cochair of a the Working Group on Stabilization and Reconstruction at the U.S. Institute of Peace, cochair of the Working Group on Reconstruction and Development at the Princeton Project on National Security, and an expert adviser to the Iraq Study Group and the Task Force on the United Nations. An active contributor to public discussions through the press, panels, and speeches, and at congressional and international hearings, Barton was also a visiting lecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University for five years, where he was the Frederick H. Schultz Professor of Economic Policy and lecturer on public and international affairs. His work is informed by 12 years of experience in nearly 30 global hot spots, including serving as UN deputy high commissioner for refugees in Geneva (19992001) and as the first director of the Office of Transition Initiatives at the U.S. Agency for International Development (19941999). A graduate of Harvard College (1971), Barton earned his M.B.A. from Boston University (1982), with an emphasis on public management, and received an honorary doctorate of humane letters from Wheaton College of Massachusetts (2001). Karin von Hippel is a senior fellow in the CSIS International Security Program and codirector of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project. She is currently on the World Economic Forums Global Agenda Council on Fragile States and has direct experience in over two dozen conflict zones. Previously, she was a senior research fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College London, and spent several years working for the United Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo. In 2004 and 2005, she participated in two major studies for the UNone on UN peacekeeping and the second on the UN humanitarian system. Also in 2004, she was part of a small team funded by USAID to investigate the development potential of Somali remittances. In 2002, she advised the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on the role of development cooperation in discovering the root causes of terrorism. She directed a project on European counterterrorist reforms funded by the MacArthur Foundation and edited the volume Europe Confronts Terrorism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). She was a member of Project Unicorn, a counterterrorism police advisory panel in London. Additional publications include Democracy by Force (Cambridge, 2000), which was short-listed for the Westminster Medal in Military History. She received her Ph.D. in international relations from the London School of Economics, her M.St. from Oxford University, and her B.A. from Yale University.

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Mark Irvine is a research assistant with the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, where he works on a range of U.S. foreign policy issues. He is currently involved in projects examining U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, government capabilities for addressing fragile states, and counterterrorism strategy. He coauthored the study, A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States (CSIS Press, 2008), identifying legislative and executive branch obstacles to improved stabilization and reconstruction operations. Mr. Irvine received a B.A. from Boston College in international studies with a focus on security studies and economic relations. Thomas Patterson is an intern with The Washington Quarterly at CSIS, where he does research on global strategic changes and their public-policy implications. He also has worked as a reporter and editor for newspapers in New Hampshire and Virginia. He received an M.A. from The University of Texas at Austin in Asian Studies, with a focus on Islamic Studies and the modern history and politics of Pakistan, and a B.A. from Washington and Lee University in history. Mehlaqa Samdani is a consultant and advisor to the PCR Project on Pakistan. She previously managed political development projects in Pakistan where she trained women in rural Punjab to contest local council elections. She has also been actively involved with track-two peace initiatives between India and Pakistan. Prior to her work with CSIS, she was a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations with the U.S. Foreign Policy and Women program. She also has extensive experience with development and humanitarian work in various conflict settings. Samdani is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and has an undergraduate degree from the University of Denver.

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About CSIS
At a time of new global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and policy solutions to decisionmakers in government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society. A bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, DC, CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded in 1962 by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the worlds preeminent international policy institutions, with more than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since April 2000.

About the PCR Project

The Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project at CSIS develops innovative strategies to speed, enhance, and strengthen international conflict response. Established in 2001, the PCR Project is seen as a leading global source for authoritative analysis, evaluation, and recommendations for fragile states and post-conflict reconstruction. The Project focuses on the full spectrum of conflict-related concerns, from early warning and conflict prevention to rebuilding shattered societies. It incorporates the four essential pillars of reconstruction: security and public safety, justice and reconciliation, governance and participation, and economic and social progress. PCR Project staff collaborates closely with U.S. congressional and executive branch decisionmakersas well as local communities and international partners. The PCR Project has conducted path-breaking studies on Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and special challenges - such as youth in conflict. The PCR Project blog (www.pcrproject.com) is a source of regular commentary and analysis. The project is codirected by Frederick Barton and Karin von Hippel. Contact Mark Irvine (mirvine@csis.org; 202-741-3941) for more information.

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