Columbia Roosevelt Review

Spring 2009

The Roosevelt Institution

at
Columbia University
 Columbia Policy Review
A project of the Roosevelt Institution at Columbia University
Copyright 2009
All rights reserved

Justin Floyd - Editor-In-Chief

Sonali Pillay - Assistant Editor

The Editorial Board

Nick Turner - Administrative Director

Dario Abramskiehn - Research Director
Katherine O’Gorman - Secretary
Nancy Huemer - Membership Director
Andrew Colvin - Treasurer
Sarah Scheinman - Equal Justice Director
Clare Kelley, Raul Mendoza - Education Co-Directors
Isaac Lara - Foreign Policy Director
Barak Wouk - Energy and Environment Director
Aaron Welt - Labor Director
Adrian Haimovich - President Emeritus
Eric Rosenberg - Executive Board Member
Maddy Joseph - Education Center Member
Columbia Roosevelt Review
A project of

The Roosevelt Institution

at
Columbia University

Spring 2009
 Preface

We welcome you to the Columbia University Roosevelt Institution Journal. This is the first annual
progressive policy journal produced by students at Columbia University and Barnard College.
In the following pages, we present innovative and pragmatic solutions to problems facing the
United States at the local, state, national, and international levels.

The Roosevelt Institution is the first non-partisan, non-profit, student-run think tank in the United
States, with chapters at over 75 different university campuses across the country and abroad.
Here at Columbia, we strive to affect our community by advocating for progressive ideas and
policies. As our membership continues to grow and mature, our voice grows louder at Columbia
and around the nation.

Our chapter emphasizes two components of participation. The first part is a weekly body meet-
ing, where our membership has spirited discussions and debates on progressive issues. Often,
these meetings include distinguish guest lecturers from Columbia’s faculty and elsewhere dis-
cussing their areas of expertise. The second part is through our policy centers. Individual mem-
bers join with other members in groups that discuss and formulate policy in six fields: Economic
Development and Labor, Equal Justice, Energy and the Environment, Healthcare, Education, and
Foreign Policy. These centers meet outside of body meetings to devise and provide the strategic
means for implementing policies.

This Journal is the product of a diverse and committed group of undergraduate writers at Co-
lumbia and Barnard. The Journal’s pieces are organized by Center. They cover topics ranging
from incentivizing energy conservation on Columbia’s campus to improving America’s role in
promoting and securing nuclear stability. Our members, executive board, and editorial board
put forth an extraordinary effort to produce a high-caliber Journal with informed and creative
policy solutions. But, as all our members acknowledge, writing progressive policy is only the first
step toward enacting change. In creating this Journal, we hope our ideas inspire policy leaders
of today and tomorrow with the content of our ideas and demonstrate the promise of our gen-
eration.
 Table of Contents

Economic Development and Labor

7 Saving the MTA
Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein
8 Measuring Poverty: The Moment to Change
Nicolas Rio
8 Freedom of Speech on the Job
Aaron Welt

Equal Justice
11 Protecting America’s Immigrant Workforce
Emily Tamkin
12 Redistricting and Representation: Reforms for a Broken System
Billy Organek
16 Tax-Exemption and Political Involvement: Institutional Regulation
Eliot Oh
17 Representing the People: A Standard for Filling Senate Vacancies
Nancy Heumer and Sarah Scheinman
19 Hope for Minor Parties: Electoral Fusion
Katherine O’Gorman

Energy and the Environment

23 Waste Disposal and Energy Generation through Plasma Gasification
by Parinitha Sastry, Angela Wong, Barak Wouk
24 A New Approach to the Electricity Bill in Higher Education:
Submetering College Dorm Rooms to Incentivize Sustainable Consumption
by Dario Abramskiehn and Brenden Cline

Education
28 Green Jobs through Vocational Education
Maddy Joseph and Clare Kelley
29 Secular Education Against the Proliferation of Unregulated Madrassas
Kyu-In Lee and Raul Mendoza

Foreign Policy
32 Towards a Stronger Nuclear Policy
Sam Klug
33 Culture without Bias, Diplomacy without Propaganda
Justin Floyd and Philip Verma
36 After Guantánamo
Eric Schorr
38 Swat Valley and Beyond: Re-examining American Efforts in Pakistan
Christine Choi
44 From Poppies to Red Gold: An Alternative Approach to Eradication
Sonali Pillay
48 The Clout of Creativity: Shaping American Policy on Foreign Arts
Justin Floyd and Isaac Lara
 Economic Development and Labor

Democracy is a system that spreads into every aspect of life, including the politi-
cal, cultural, economic and social realms. Crucial to any successful self-governing
system are the economic rights and opportunities that ensure fairness to workers
and consumers in their everyday lives. The current world financial crisis reveals the
dearth of American democratic norms and the weakness of liberal principles within
our social structure. The following are policy proposals that would ensure greater
fairness and equity in the U.S. economy as well as bolster American democracy.

Saving the MTA
Michael-Spitzer-Rubenstein
By mid-July, New Yorkers will be subject to a world of hurt every
time they leave home. If their bus or subway line still exists (35
bus routes and 2 subway lines will be cut) a ride will cost $2.50,
assuming the ride is in New York City, under the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority’s recent rate hikes. In Long Island, the
new bus fare will be $3.50. It will cost $5.26 to cross the East
River Bridge using E-ZPass, and $6.50 using cash, up from $4.15
and $5, respectively, as the New York Times reported. Commut-
ers taking the train will suffer the most, paying as much as $350
a month. Those living in Manhattan or New Jersey and driving
to work will barely be touched by these new tolls and fares. In-
stead, the brunt of the burden falls on poor, working class, and
even middle class workers who need to get to Manhattan to
earn a living. Moreover, there is no suggestion that a dramati-
cally increased commuter tax will reduce either transit pollution
or gridlock. It’s a horrible situation, and from the cries of city and
state elected officials, one would think there is no alternative.
But there is.
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg recognized that
there were other options in January 2008, when he proposed
a congestion pricing system by which cars entering Manhattan’s
Central Business District (Manhattan south of 60th St) between
6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. would be charged $8. This would have
decreased traffic by six percent in this District and generated
significant extra revenue that could strengthen NYC’s aging
transit system. It was a novel idea for New York, though it drew
heavily on similar plans in Europe, especially London, Milan, and
Stockholm, that had been very effective at reducing traffic. How-
ever, with opposition from many in Brooklyn, Queens, and Long
Island, all of whom would pay dramatically more under Mayor
Bloomberg’s plan than drivers from New Jersey and Manhattan,1
the plan did not win approval.
After Bloomberg’s proposal failed to gain support, the Nur-
ture New York’s Nature Foundation studied congestion in the
city and discovered that each additional car that enters the Cen-
tral Business District adds $30 worth of delay and gridlock and
an additional $10 worth of pollution. As a whole, it totals more
than $13 billion of costs to the metropolitan area and 52,000 jobs
lost annually, according to the Partnership for New York City’s
report Growth or Gridlock? The Economic Case for Traffic Relief
and Transit Improvement for a Greater New York. If all drivers
were expected to pay for the externalities they caused, tolls to
go into Manhattan would be $40 instead of $5, dramatically sur-
passing even the $8 tolls Mayor Bloomberg proposed. However,
because straphangers taking the bus or subway downtown sub-
tract from both traffic and pollution, they should pay nothing.
Even reducing bus and subway charges to $20 or less, depend-
ing on the time of day, would fundamentally reshape New York
City’s transit system, take cars off the streets, and make New
York’s air much healthier to breathe. Of course, it would also be
so controversial and revolutionary that it would not likely pass.
As a result, the Nurture New York’s Nature Foundation put out
a much less radical plan, the Kheel-Komanoff Plan, which was
named after its authors, noted transit experts Ted Kheel and
Charles Komanoff.
Under the Kheel-Komanoff Plan, a sliding scale of tolls is im-
posed on cars driving into Manhattan’s Central Business District,
from $2 at night and for most of the weekend to a maximum of
$10 during morning rush hour (from 6:00-9:00 a.m.), when the
most cars are going into the city, according to traffic statistics
included in the Balanced Transportation Analyzer provided by
Nurture New York. The average congestion price would be $6,
low enough that Westchester and Long Island residents could
afford to come into the City for an occasional cultural outing.
Nevertheless, such policies would offset many of the negative
externalities of traffic, as car speeds would increase by as much
as 28 percent, saving drivers more than $1.1 billion in time as
people began using mass transit or curtailing unnecessary trips.
This would also create almost $1.4 billion of new revenue for
NYC.2 This revenue would cover the current operating deficit of
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, allowing the system
to run itself and build up long-term capacity, without depending
on a state or federal bailout to continue service without increas-
ing fares.
These proposals should then be combined with Senate Major-
ity Leader Malcolm Smith’s plan to create an income tax of one
quarter on every $100 (0.25 percent) on New Yorkers. This would
create a very low, fair tax to balance out the benefits everyone
would gain from NYC having less traffic and less auto pollution.
Non-drivers, too, would see benefits as shipping costs decline
since trucks face less traffic bringing goods from one place to
another. Police would respond to incidents more quickly if they
do not have to slog through traffic to reach the scene of the
crime. Buses could get through traffic more quickly if there were
fewer cars on the street, just as other cars would. There would
be less potential for accidents between motorists and pedestri-
ans. The only people who would not see a direct benefit would
be subway riders during their commutes, and even then, they
would reap other benefits once they step aboveground. As
such, it is only fair that New York taxpayers help support those
improvements with an almost negligible tax that would generate
$1.16 billion.
Between the two revenue streams, roughly $1.3 billion would
be available to the MTA to make mass transit a more viable al-
ternative to driving. For one, the MTA would have no need to
cut services, so that transit fares would still pay for the same trip
they do now. Alternatively, they could also be used to gradually
reduce fares, making it more affordable to take the subway or
bus. That would in turn stimulate the economy as consumers
could travel to more stores to buy goods and open up more
potential jobs for commuters. In addition, by staggering the fare
reduction, the MTA could also pay off its debt, gradually freeing
it from the $1.5 billion burden of servicing already-issued bonds
and opening up more opportunities to reduce fares. Within a
year of this plan being implemented, however, the base fare for
the subway and bus could be halved from its current $2 a trip to
just $1, making it inestimably more affordable for the millions of
New Yorkers who take the MTA. Another, similarly priced alter-
native, which the Kheel-Kormanoff Plan actually endorses, would
make buses entirely free and put subway fares on a sliding scale
so that only at rush hour would fares be $2. Either way, the sav-
ings for commuters and travelers would be immense.
If this plan proves anything, it is that there are options. The
MTA fare hikes are not the only alternative open to New York
in order to save the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. In-
7
stead, by combining a miniscule income tax with congestion pric-
ing, the MTA’s operating deficit would be alleviated and the MTA
would make significant progress on paying down its multi-billion
dollar debt burden. With the excess money, NYC could then
plot a new future that would make mass transit more affordable
and accessible for New Yorkers. It would spur economic growth,
as car-free New Yorkers would have access to a wider market in
which to work and shop in. Car drivers would spend less time
stuck in traffic and more time being productive at work or enjoy-
ing time with family. Everyone would benefit, which is a far bet-
ter situation than the current fare hikes that leave no one better
off. Political will is all that is required for New York’s leaders in
Albany and at City Hall to stand up for sensible transportation
policy that does not merely delay an inevitable reckoning.
Measuring Poverty: The Moment to Change
Nicolas Rio
The middle-class was the main focus of the 2008 Presidential
campaign. This is understandable; the middle-class represents
the majority of the U.S. population. However, the focus on this
demographic has contributed to disregard for another group,
growing in number as a result of the economic crisis. I am, of
course, talking about the poor. In designing successful policy,
one first needs to know whom it is targeting and how many peo-
ple are being targeted. This is also true in regards to poverty.
The U.S. measurement for poverty becomes increasingly archaic.
Improving its accuracy is now more necessary than ever.
Poverty measure needs to switch from absolute to relative.
Currently, poverty is measured in relation to a fixed level of
income, dependent on family size: $14,000 a year for a couple
and $3,600 per child. These figures were derived in the 1960s
by tripling basic food costs. Since then, it has been adjusted in
accordance with changing rates of inflation. Today, however, the
proportion of food in one’s average total budget is no longer
one-third, but one-seventh. This can mainly be attributed to rela-
tive cost increases in health care and transportation. The thresh-
old of absolute poverty is therefore more than two times lower
than what it should be.
This is already becoming a huge problem. However, there is
still a bigger one: this method does not correlate with the defini-
tion of poverty in a developed country. In countries like the Unit-
ed States, levels of poverty do not focus on having enough to
avoid starvation. Rather, poverty is about social exclusion: having
enough economic resources to remain integrated in American
society. The appropriate measure is not a fixed amount of money,
but should depend on the income of the rest of the population.
Having enough to buy basic food is not a satisfactory measure in
countries where more is needed to be socially integrated, such
as a car, a home, and clothes.
That is the reason why most developed countries and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) define poverty as personal income below 50 percent
of the average. There is no reason why it should not be the
same for developed countries, including the United States. This
method is easy to measure and includes no risk of becoming
outdated. Since it is based on average income, inflation does not
play a factor.
This might seem obvious. Why, then, has the measure for pov-
erty not already been changed? The new measure will increase
the total number of the poor and as such has lead to the failure to
implement this policy. No politician wants to have negative pov-
erty data undermining his mandate. Today is the best moment
to change this. No one would blame Obama for an increase in
poverty at such an early stage in his presidency. On the contrary,
the Obama Administration would be praised if it were table to
reduce the poverty rate calculated under this new system.
During an economic crisis that will make poverty a more divi-
sive issue, the United States can no longer afford to ignore those
who really are the poor. To fight poverty boldly and swiftly, rel-
evant tools and honest data are needed.
Freedom of Speech on the Job
Aaron Welt
The stagnant and declining standard of living of American
workers is the result of the absence of individual sovereignty
in the workplace. This loss of sovereignty is the result of con-
temporary labor laws that strip workers of the basic rights taken
for granted in the political sphere. The most egregious denial of
rights is the refusal of the right of free speech during union elec-
tions in the American work force. American workers ought to
have the right to speak freely at their worksites and express their
values and beliefs no matter the biases and agendas of manage-
ment. Ultimately, allowing workers free speech rights transforms
employees from commodities to citizens and thus enhances the
control they have over their material and emotional livelihoods.
According to political scientist Gordon Lafer, “Under federal
labor law, management is permitted not only unlimited reign to
voice anti-union arguments to employees, but also nearly unlim-
ited reign to stifle employees’ own political speech.” Every year,
10,000 employees are punished in some form during union elec-
tions for pro-union speech at their worksite. Official labor law
bars pro-union discussion at a worksites, except during break
time and in a break room. This prohibition includes distribut-
ing pro-union literature, one of the most effective means of per-
suading fellow workers of the benefits of unionization. Addition-
ally, union organizers are not allowed to even enter a worksite.
While workers can claim only token rights, employers gain what
is essentially a monopoly of media in union elections. They can
compel workers to have one-on-one meetings with the manage-
ment to emphasize the drawbacks of a union unto their subor-
dinates. These meetings serve as both an intimidation tactic to
their employees and as a de facto elimination of the secret ballot
in union elections as employers can gauge which way an em-
ployee will vote based on their one-on-one meetings. Manage-
ment can and generally does organize mass anti-union speeches
(so-called “captive audience speeches”) turning a worksite into
hostile ground for pro-union sentiments. Evidence suggests that
in the 1990s, 92 percent of union campaigns witnessed such cap-
tive audience propagandizing. The statutes of labor law in Amer-
ica essentially eliminate fair enforcement of worker freedom of
speech and conscience during union drives.
Simple policy alterations would eliminate this dearth of liberal
rights in the workplace. First, prohibitions to freedom of discus-
sion and campaigning must be eliminated, without creating an
openly hostile working environment. Labor law should have pro-
tections for freedom of discussion amongst workers outside of
the break room and distribution and display of pro-union litera-
ture and propaganda. Additionally, labor law should create for-
mal designation of where campaign literature can be displayed
and when pro- or anti- union speech can be made. This could
be enforced by a representative of the National Labor Relations
Board during a union election. Violations of the agreed places
and times of speech would be reported to this representative,
with a subsequent investigation and fines for any infringement
proven to have taken place. The goal of these reforms should
be equality and freedom of speech between employees and em-
ployers of a workplace.
In line with principles of fairness and liberty, labor law should
mandate that a debate between representatives of a union and
its opposition take place on a worksite 24 to 48 hours prior to a
union election. This would give both sides of a campaign equal
time and access to refute claims of the opposing side as well
as to present their own arguments, free of contextual bias or
intimidation. A federally mandated debate on a worksite would
also reverse the inherent control an employer may have over the
sentiments within the worksite as compared to the very limited
control a union outsider may have.
Overall, the goal should be to replicate the ideals and prin-
ciples Americans hold sacred in political elections within union
elections. Political elections necessitate free and open dialogue,
which is currently egregiously absent from elections of the work-
place. It could be argued that having extensive campaigning
within a worksite could politically polarize a workplace, pitting
workers against each other or against management and thus in-
hibit the productivity and even livability of a worksite. But a free
society should burden adults with such circumstances, that we
may and will disagree with one another over crucial issues such
as workplace democracy. Workers are in fact citizens, and if they
cannot be trusted to adequately deal with campaigning in their
work area then this argument must hold for democratic political
society as well. But the great lesson of American history is that
greater, not less, democratization produces beneficial outcomes
because it grants the individual autonomy over their life. If we
are to be a free people, democracy cannot be confined to the
political or social realm. Our economic lives are indeed a funda-
mental aspect of existence and to deny democracy in this sphere
is essentially a negation of freedom in the entire working life of
an individual
Free speech is thus the first step toward the direction of mak-
ing workers actual citizens. However, a true revitalization of the
working class in the United States, and working life in general,
will see this as only the first step, but a crucial one nonetheless.

9
 Equal Justice

The Equal Justice Center consists of diverse undergraduate policy makers, unit-
ed in the common quest for progressive reforms that rectify electoral and social
wrongs. Whether protecting the rights of those who crossed our borders to find
work, or to defend the democracy of our political institutions, the submissions
that follow provide solutions to the central injustices that animate modern Ameri-
can life.

Protecting America’s Immigrant Workforce
Emily Tamkin
In the 1900s and 1910s, the Immigration Bureau viewed the United
States’ southern border as “regulated by labor market demands
in [the southwestern] border states.”1 Although the 1920s – and
virtually every decade thereafter – saw border control as a less
trivial and vastly more formal issue, the intricate link between
border regulation and labor is, to this day, undeniable. However,
the faults of one do not permit the corruption of the other; the
fact that border control is a work in progress is not an invitation
to disregard fair labor standards.
In 1935, Congress established the National Labor Relations
Board. The NLRB was set up to ensure that the National Labor
Relations Act was effectively enforced. The Act exists to guaran-
tee employees the right to organize and bargain collectively.
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court upheld the integrity
of the aforementioned act through its decision in Sure-Tan, Inc.2
The case centered on the plight of employees who had left the
country to avoid deportation as the result of their employers in-
forming the INS of their status after they had tried to participate
in union elections.3 The court held that undocumented aliens
did indeed fall into the National Labor Relations Act’s definition
of an “employee,” and that these employees must be given four
years time to legitimately re-enter the country so as to be rein-
stated with a minimum of six months back pay.4 The decision so-
lidified the legitimacy of the NLRA and demanded progress on
the labor front in American government. Fourteen years later, a
kosher butcher attempted to change all of that.
A company by the name of Agriprocessors (the largest na-
tional kosher meat producer), owned by the Rubashkin family,
seems to want to exist in 1934. In May 2008, an Agriproces-
sors warehouse in Postville, Iowa was raided; 400 illegal workers
were found, though employers claimed they did not know that
any held such a dubious status. Before that, however, agriproces-
sors and its illegal immigrant employees were embattled in three
years of legal struggles. The illegally employed workers wanted
to unionize as a result of mistreatment. Three courts have ruled
that Agriprocessors must recognize the unionization, pointing to
the 1984 ruling. Agriprocessors, however, has decided to forgo
judicial precedent in favor of an appeal to the Supreme Court.5
Generally speaking, the right of employees to form unions can-
not be denied. It is also popularly considered unacceptable to
pay one’s employees $6.50 an hour without benefits.6 One might
think it wrong, then, that there is a standard rejection for anyone
who approaches an employee about unionization,7 particularly
since the National Labor Relations Act, which allows workers to,
in fact, say yes if they so choose, has been in existence for over
seventy years. Workers cannot be fired for supporting unions,
nor can workers votes be blocked, and typically it is considered
inappropriate to bully workers into supporting a puppet union.
Employers cannot ignore employee’s vote because he or she just
happened to discover that the worker is undocumented.
Agriprocessors maintains, as it did in the Iowa incident, that
it had no idea its workers were illegal. Its lawyer, Richard How-
ard, has argued that illegal immigrants’ votes should not count
because “they’re not documented workers and not allowed to
work.”8 Nathan Lewin, the company’s lead lawyer in its appeal,
has argued that the 1984 decision is no longer applicable be-
cause there are more illegal immigrants today and because of
the existence of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),
which made hiring illegal immigrants a criminal act.9
Mr. Howard’s and Mr. Lewin’s arguments are troubling on mul-
tiple counts. The only reason that the undocumented workers
were working was because Agriprocessors hired them. Addi-
tionally, as the Sure-Tan decision eloquently established, allow-
ing illegal immigrants to unionize “helps to assure that the wages
and employment conditions of lawful residents are not adversely
affected by the competition of illegal alien employees,” thereby
reducing the number of jobs open to illegal immigrants. This in
turn adversely affects the allure of unlawfully entering the coun-
try. Hence, the reality of the benefits of illegal immigrants union-
izing directly contradicts Mr. Howard’s claim that there are too
many undocumented workers for the principles of the 1984 deci-
sion to apply. Finally, it is absolutely true that IRCA made hiring
undocumented workers illegal, and it is true that, with the imple-
mentation of complex I-9 forms, employers must be cognizant
of the immigration status of their workers and not employ those
who are not appropriately documented. Thus, if an employer
improperly fills out her or his I-9 forms while either not knowing
or choosing to ignore the status of his workers, she or he must
accept the fact that the chosen workers that are criminally hired
are entitled to the same benefits as every other worker.
Unions exist for the protection of workers. The group of
workers that need this protection the most has changed over
time. At one point, it was young women, and at another, poor,
legal immigrants benefited most. The new frontier of progres-
sive labor policy is that which behooves the group that, in today’s
America, most easily finds itself under employment’s wheel: ille-
gal immigrants. Their protection is domestically prudent (as has
been said, it makes them as expensive as documented workers)
and, far more importantly, ethically sound. Twenty years is a long
time to regress, seventy longer still. If Agriprocessors did not
want undocumented workers in its union’s ranks, it should not
have hired them.
If, however, an employer breaks the law by hiring an illegal
alien, the onus should be on that employer. Immigrants – legal
and otherwise – must unionize, which means that employers
need to allow them to do so without incursion of deportation,
which even nativist Judge Learned Hand recognized as “exile, a
dreadful punishment, abandoned by the common consent of all
civilized peoples” in 1929.10 Eighty years later, regardless of the
imperfections of border control or the process of naturalization,
the veracity of that statement must not be undermined.
It is sadly evident that the laws that led to the Sure-Tan de-
cision are now insufficient to ensure the fair treatment of all
workers. Legislation should and must be passed such that the
union elections process need not require proof of citizenship. A
neutral body familiar with workers, possibly the particular state’s
labor bureau or a legal mediation firm, should be responsible for
counting the workers’ votes, thus moving away from the possibil-
ity of INS interference. Cases such as the one described above
are not a matter of immigration, citizenship, or deportation.
There is a larger issue of basic labor rights to uphold, regardless
of how or in what way a worker crossed a border.
11

Redistricting & Representation:
Reforms for a Broken System
Billy Organek
The House of Representatives consists of 435 members elected
every two years by constituents of each Representative’s district,
in order to represent the will of the people; therefore, each rep-
resentative should be the voice of a small number of constitu-
ents, and the Founding Fathers felt that re-election should not
be taken as a “matter of course.”1 Yet, out of the 435 seats in the
House, fewer than 40 are considered to be competitive today.2
Why is this? When the lines that divide districts are drawn not out
of any concern for local interests, fairness, or natural boundaries,
but instead are drawn for partisan political gain, the representa-
tion of the individual suffers, and elections become less com-
petitive. Redistricting for political advantage regardless of local
concerns, in order to ensure a politician’s or party’s re-election,
known as gerrymandering, is alleged to cause decreased voter
turnout, increased election costs, and increases in partisanship;
this essay will seek to evaluate those claims by using data from
three districts, and suggest policies which can address gerry-
mandering. After analyzing the data, we will see that the largest
problem associated with gerrymandering is not any quantifiable
variable, but the immense effect that small changes in the shapes
of districts have on the outcome of an election, and thus on the
quality of representation; and, since this power is vested in the
hands of the very legislators who stand for election in these po-
liticized districts, the only way to prevent Representatives from
using this power to their own advantage is to remove this power
from them while simultaneously making districts more represen-
tative by making them smaller.
History
Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution requires that a cen-
sus be taken every ten years, and that the reapportionment of
Representatives follow this census to ensure representative ac-
curacy. However, the Constitution is silent on the shape and size
of individual districts. Therefore, Congress is free to create its
own districts at will, so long as they conform to the proper ra-
tio of representation. This has come to be known as the “one
person, one vote” doctrine – every district within a state must
have the same population, to ensure that every resident in a
state has the same voice as every other. Due to Public Law 62-5
(1913) which froze the number of Representatives to 435, the size
of districts has increased without a corresponding increase in
representation; now, a district encompasses 650,000 people be-
cause the U.S. population has tripled, as compared to approxi-
mately 30,000 when the Constitution was written. Moreover, the
population of the United States has tripled since the passage of
Public Law 62-5, with no corresponding increase in the number
of Representatives.3 The United States has become the world’s
second-least representative democracy simply because of this
rule, without even considering the effect of gerrymandering on
representation.4
Effects of Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering is considered to be the cause of many
electoral ills, such as creating uncompetitive districts which dis-
courage voter turnout; increasing the cost of elections due to
the increased cost of presenting a viable challenger in an un-
competitive district; and finally, electing politicians with narrow,
ideological agendas, further polarizing our national politics. It is
these assumed effects of gerrymandering which will be analyzed
in this paper.
Yet, gerrymandering does have its legitimate defenders. It
has been used successfully to increase the representation of mi-
norities in many areas by uniting distinct population centers into
a single district, thus politically empowering them. Furthermore,
gerrymandering is sometimes used to respect the wishes of lo-
cal communities, such as Arizona’s 2nd district, which was drawn
to consider the wishes of Native American communities.5 While
the merits of policies which favor one group can be argued, it
seems that gerrymandering cannot easily be called unequivo-
cally good or bad, but is instead more complicated.
The following diagram can serve as an illustration of how ger-
rymandering works:6
In the above picture, the Grey Party (G) outnumbers the Black
Party (B) by 36:28, with B located mainly in the center, and G
located mainly along the outskirts. In this diagram, one can see
that districts can be redrawn to give either party a significant
advantage. The two most egregious cases of gerrymandering
are the bottom two, in which G wins all four districts or B wins
three districts, from left to right. As the proportion of G to B
does favor G, it would make sense that, in a given area, there is
more representation for G than for B; however, as this is only a
slight advantage, it makes no sense for G to win all four seats.
More obviously, however, is the outcome where B, the minority,
wins 3 of 4 districts. This is obviously gerrymandered, as one can
tell from the odd shapes of the districts, a telltale sign of gerry-
mandering. But, the most important part of the above diagram is
that all four situations follow the “one person, one vote” doctrine
– every district in the state has 16 residents. It is therefore evi-
dent that gerrymandering can have a significant impact on the
outcome of an election, regardless of the actual voting behavior
of constituents in a given area.
Since there is no correct way to draw a district’s boundaries,
there is no agreed-on quantitative assessment to determine how
gerrymandered a district is, but there are mathematical approxi-
mations.7 Using one approximation method, which compares
the compactness of a district to the compactness of the state in
which it lies, two of the most gerrymandered districts which sat-
isfied the following two criteria were selected for analysis in this
paper: first, the district must not have recently been redrawn; and
second, once the first district that satisfied the first criterion was
selected, the next district selected must be from the opposite
party, to show that gerrymandering is used by Democrats and
Republicans equally. Using this methodology, the first two dis-
tricts eligible were the Illinois 4th, represented by Democrat Luis
Gutierrez, and the Pennsylvania 18th, represented by Republican
Tim Murphy. Finally, as a control, the Colorado 7th was selected:
due to a 2002 court case in Denver, a judge redrew the district
to evenly divide it between Democrats, Republicans, and Inde-
pendents, making it the only district in the country “purposefully
drawn to be balanced between the parties and provide a genu-
ine test of the ideals and abilities of the opposing candidates.”8
Using these districts, voter turnout records, FEC records, and
Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI) scores will be compared to try
to show that gerrymandering does, in fact, decrease voter turn-
out, increase the cost of elections, and increase the partisanship
of districts, as is often alleged.
Data – Voter Turnout
In the Colorado 7th, of 614,465 residents, and a population
over the age of 18 of 460,849,9 the total registered population
was 366,078, or 79.44 percent of the voting-age population.10
Yet, on Election Day, only 182,108 voters actually voted, a total
turnout of just under 50 percent of registered voters.11 Even
though this district is referred to as Colorado’s most competi-
tive,12 the turnout in this district was below the Colorado aver-
age of slightly less than 55 percent.13 This seems like an anomaly,
as one would expect the most competitive district in the state
to easily outperform the state average, but this is not the case.
Understanding how voter turnout is affected by gerrymandering
will become easier when compared to two districts which have
been gerrymandered.
In the Illinois 4th district, data for the total registered popula-
tion is not readily available, so numbers must be extrapolated
based on the over-18 population of the district and the overall
registration rate in the state, taking into account the higher-than-
average Hispanic, young, uneducated and poor population of
the 4th when compared to national averages.14 By comparing the
demographics of the state to those of this district, and account-
ing for how these specific indicators affect voting behavior, one
can make an extrapolation based on the likelihood that a specific
demographic group votes.
According to the Census data of 2006, Hispanics are 70
percent as likely to register as non-Hispanic whites, and a high
school dropout is half as likely to register as a high school gradu-
ate; moreover, since there is a strong correlation between in-
come and registration, it is safe to assume that the registration
rate in the 4th is significantly lower than the Illinois average.15
However, it would be impossible to calculate exactly how much
lower; therefore, I will use three possible values: 10 percent, 20
percent, and 30 percent lower than the average, or 69.94 per-
cent, 62.17 percent, and 54.40 percent respectively. Thus, using
the over-18 population of 438,255 (68.1 percent of 643,547), the
assumed registered populations used are 306,516; 272,463; and
238,411, respectively. The total turnout in the election was 79,810,
which gives possible turnouts of 26.04 percent, 29.29 percent, or
33.48 percent of registered voters, far below the Illinois average
of 49 percent, and in line with what gerrymandering would pre-
dict. That is, using conservative estimates as to how depressed
voter registration would be in the Illinois 4th due to demograph-
ics, one can see that turnout is significantly lower in this gerry-
mandered district than the national or state averages. However,
is this the result of gerrymandering or of demographics? To try
to determine this, we can look at the same data for the Pennsyl-
vania 18th.16
The data of the total registered population for the Pennsylva-
nia 18th is also unavailable, so a method similar to the one used in
Illinois can also be used. With a population of 646,374, an over-18
population of 504,172 (78 percent), and an overwhelmingly white
demographic breakdown, race and age are not factors in regis-
tration.17 Education rates and median income also are similar to
the state average, and as a result will not disproportionately af-
fect registration rates in the 18th district more than the state’s av-
erage voter.18 Therefore, it is safe to assume that the registration
rate in the 18th district is similar to that of the state-wide registra-
tion rate of 87.02 percent.19 Thus, with an over-18 population of
504,172, and a registration rate of 87.02 percent, we can assume
that there are 438,730 registered voters in the 18th district; and,
with a total turnout of 248,637, we can assume that 56.67 percent
of registered voters voted on Election Day, a value well above
the state average.20
This data seems to go against the original hypothesis, that
gerrymandering depresses voter turnout. Nationwide, 48 per-
cent of the electorate voted; yet, in both the Illinois 4th and the
Colorado 7th, turnout was significantly lower than their respec-
tive states’ averages, and in the case of the Colorado 7th dis-
trict, was roughly equivalent to the national average.21 Yet, in the
Pennsylvania 18th district, turnout was well above both the state
average and the national average. This data makes it difficult to
say that gerrymandering is responsible for depressed turnout,
as it seems that there could be other factors that affect turnout,
such as education, income, race, or other demographic charac-
teristics, that have a significantly larger impact on voter turnout
than gerrymandering. However, regardless of whether or not
gerrymandering reduces voter turnout, politicians ensure their
re-election in gerrymandered districts through the arbitrary re-
drawing of districts, and it is for this reason that gerrymandering
must be reformed.
Data – Campaign Finances22
The 2006 election in the Colorado 7th was dominated by the
Democratic and Republican candidates, who together raised
$5,814,303. Only looking at the two main contenders, their total
receipts were equivalent to $15.88 per registered voter, or $9.46
per person. But, this was the costliest election in the state, cost-
ing more than 2.5 times as much as the average of the other
elections. The least expensive elections in the state were the
elections for the 1st, 2nd, and 5th, which cost $1.03, $2.49, and
$2.78 per person, respectively, while the second-most expensive
election was the 4th, which still cost over $1 less person. Of note
is that in the least expensive elections, the 1st was unopposed,
and in the 2nd and 5th the winner outraised his opponent by a
significant margin (almost 100 times in the 2nd, and the 5th by
two times as much), showing that it is potentially the ‘competi-
tiveness’ of an election, rather than the degree to which a dis-
trict is gerrymandered, which affects its cost. Instead, it seems
that, for the Colorado 7th, gerrymandering and the cost of an
election are inversely, rather than directly, related – the more ex-
pensive an election is, the less gerrymandered a district is, and
vice-versa.
The election in Illinois’ 4th paints a similar picture. The in-
cumbent vastly outspent his opponent, but the 4th was still the
state’s least expensive election, costing only $0.26 per person in
the district for the campaigns of the two main candidates, and
13
only $0.54, $0.60, or $0.69 per registered voter, depending on
which estimate is used. By comparison, the next-least expen-
sive election (the Illinois 3rd) cost almost three times as much as
the election in the 4th. Yet, the most expensive elections were
also the most competitive, and two of those were even consid-
ered upsets, further giving credence to the negative correla-
tion between cost and gerrymandering. The average cost of
$2,275,607.89 for an election in Illinois was almost 14 times the
cost of the 4th, $164,233, while the most expensive elections in
the state were the 8th, 6th, 14th, and 10th districts, at a cost of
$14.50, $12.25, $8.22, and $7.78 per person in the district, respec-
tively; of these districts, the 8th and 6th are not gerrymandered,
while the 10th is only somewhat gerrymandered. Meanwhile, the
4th and the 7th are among the most gerrymandered, and the 7th
was also less expensive, costing only $1.16 per person.23 Again, it
seems that gerrymandering and the cost of an election are in-
versely related, as the most expensive elections were not in ger-
rymandered districts, while the least expensive elections were in
gerrymandered districts.
The costs of Pennsylvania’s elections reflect this negative
correlation, though the results are not quite as decisive in Illi-
nois. The total cost of the election of the 18th was $1,704,568,
or $3.89 per registered voter, or $2.64 per person. There are 11
elections out of 19 which were less expensive than the 18th, and
even the average Pennsylvania election cost less than the 18th -
$1,668,639.69 compared to the 18th’s $1,704,568. From this data, it
would seem that gerrymandering and the cost of an election are
unrelated. Yet, there were some elections that cost much more
than the 18th, including the 6th, 7th, and 8th, which cost $11.56,
$9.34, and $8.41 per person, respectively, and Of these districts,
the 6th and 8th are both gerrymandered while the 7th was not
gerrymandered, which would seem to provide evidence disprov-
ing the supposed inverse relation between gerrymandering and
election cost. However, the 6th and 8th were re-gerrymandered
by the opposite party to make them more competitive than they
had been previously, which explains their increased cost – in fact,
the gerrymandering of the 8th was so effective that it certainly
cost the Republican the election.24, 25 This reinforces the notion
that gerrymandering is not nearly as important a factor in the
cost of an election as the competitiveness of a race, which in
turn can be affected by gerrymandering, but is not completely
determined by it.
The conclusion to be drawn here is that, far from increasing
the cost of an election, gerrymandering for partisan advantage
almost certainly decreases the cost of an election by making it
less competitive. There are outliers in the data, alluding to other
possible factors than competitiveness which influence the cost
of an election – for instance, urban districts will cost more than
an equivalent rural district due to the increased cost of adver-
tising and campaigning, to select one possible additional fac-
tor. Therefore, gerrymandering cannot be seen as strongly im-
pacting the cost of an election, which is instead affected by the
competitiveness of a district, thus disproving the claim that ger-
rymandering makes elections more expensive. In fact, in some
cases, gerrymandering makes elections so uncompetitive that
they cost far less than the average election, by guaranteeing that
one politician or party will win in an election.
Data – Partisanship
To measure partisanship, in order to see whether districts
gerrymandered to include narrow political constituencies po-
larizes national politics, the Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI)
is used, assigning a value to a district which indicates its party
leaning: a district which is heavily Democratic may have a PVI
D+20 or higher (indicating that Democratic candidates, in recent
elections, have an average result 20 percentage points higher
than the Republican candidates), while a close district may have
a PVI with a small magnitude, such as D+1 or R+2.26 Therefore, a
more heavily gerrymandered district should theoretically have a
higher PVI; however, the data will show otherwise.
The Colorado 7th has a PVI D+2, indicating an increase in the
Hispanic population of the district since the 2002 court-ordered
redistricting. This is the lowest PVI in the state, whose districts
vary between values as low as R+6 and D+8 and values as high
as R+16 and D+18. This is what we would expect for the control
district, if the above hypothesis were true.
The Illinois 4th has a PVI D+31, while the rest of the state var-
ies between as low as R+1 and D+4 and as high as D+35 and R+8.
This makes sense, but we should also look at the districts which
share borders with the 4th: the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th. Except
for the 6th, all of these districts are heavily Democratic with a
PVI of at least D+10. The 6th has a PVI R+3, and is considered
to be a Republican-favored district. Yet, the 6th was drawn to
contain specific portions of Cook and Dupage counties which
tend to vote Republican, while being drawn not to contain the
other portions of Cook County which are heavily Democratic,
helping the Republican 6th remain in Republican control.27 No
amount of gerrymandering could reduce a PVI of D+35 enough
to make it competitive for Republicans; however, for the 6th, in-
cluding some of the Democratic parts of Cook County from the
4th would likely make the district change parties. The districts
within Chicago, including the 4th, would elect a Democrat re-
gardless; however, it is possible that the 4th and 6th were drawn
so as to include the Republican-leaning populations in the 6th,
rather than the 4th, guaranteeing the Republicans a seat.28
Pennsylvania’s 18th’s PVI of R+2 indicates that it is not a very
partisan district. The rest of the state varies between as low as
R+2 and D+2 and as high as D+39 and R+15. Being one of the least
partisan districts in the state, we must look at the districts which
border the 18th. The 18th shares borders with the 4th, 12th, and
14th, all of which have portions that, if switched, could very eas-
ily influence the outcome of an election in another district. The
4th has a PVI R+3, but is now considered a Democratic-leaning
seat and is currently in Democratic control.29 If portions of the
18th and 4th switched, it could easily make either of these dis-
tricts change their leanings. It is also worthwhile to note that the
18th contains much of Allegheny County, the county which con-
tains Pittsburgh, but the 18th does not contain the city itself. On
the other hand, the wealthy Republican suburbs of Pittsburgh
are not in the 18th either, but are in the 4th instead. If either
of these arbitrary boundaries were switched or altered, then
the 18th could be made more hospitable to Democrats, or the
4th more hospitable to Republicans. The 12th has a PVI of D+5,
and is also a famously gerrymandered district, skipping “across
nine counties, eight of which are shared with other districts;” if
it took small parts from its neighbors, the 9th and 18th, it could
arbitrarily made to be much more conservative, as opposed to
its currently arbitrary status as a Democratic-leaning district.30
Finally, the 14th includes all of Pittsburgh and very little else, and
therefore has a PVI D+22. Yet, the 14th takes suburbs from three
sides of Pittsburgh, but not the Democratically-leaning suburbs
on the other side. If these were included in the 18th, then it is
likely that the 18th would be less Republican. There can be no
reasonable geographic rationale for these divisions, and the only
explanation available is a political one.
The most important thing to note about the PVI and its re-
lation to gerrymandering is not the absolute value of the PVI,
which is often impacted by the political leanings of the location
of the district; instead, one should evaluate the PVI of the speci-
fied district as compared to its neighbors, to see if there are
small changes which can be made to switch the leaning of one
or the other district. Chicagoans will elect a Democrat no mat-
ter how gerrymandered the districts within Chicago become,
and any district within Chicago will have a PVI that is highly
pro-Democratic; therefore, these are redistricted not to change
the party in control, but instead for some other political reason.
However, in Pennsylvania and in districts outside of Chicago, it
seems that small changes which are as arbitrary as the current
boundaries of the districts in question could completely change
the outcome of an election.
Contrary to the original hypotheses of this paper, gerryman-
dering does not seem to decrease voter turnout, increase the fi-
nancial cost of an election, or increase the absolute partisanship
of a district. Yet, there is still ample reason to address gerryman-
dering: it is an obvious abuse of power, one which makes arbi-
trary divisions in communities for political advantage, decreasing
the representativeness of an elected official while allowing an
elected official to stay in office for far longer than the Framers
ever intended. As can be seen from every example of gerryman-
dering cited above, small and arbitrary changes in the borders of
districts can have huge impacts on the outcome of an election.
When districts are drawn with political calculations in mind, it
can be very easy to make minor changes which seem as arbitrary
as the original borders of a district, but can drastically alter the
outcome of an election; this is not the sign of a competitive dis-
trict, but instead of a district crafted for political, rather than rep-
resentative, reasons. How can gerrymandering be addressed, so
as to increase the representativeness of elected officials, while
still allowing for districts that help represent historically under-
represented segments of the population?
Policy Recommendations
As gerrymandering is a complex problem, it requires many
solutions, none of which will be perfect. The goal of any policy
should be to create districts that represent the interests of the
constituents in a given area without capriciously dividing com-
munities for political advantage, while simultaneously seeking to
create districts that are competitive because they represent the
interests of various portions of the community equally. Clearly,
there will be many parts of the country in which this latter goal
will be difficult – urban areas will almost always tend towards
Democrats, while more rural areas will support Republicans,
and in these areas respect for local boundaries and interests is
more important than simple ‘competitiveness’. However, there
are many parts of the country which, if districted properly, could
be competitive for both parties, forcing candidates to present
coherent ideas rather than partisan rhetoric. The only body
that would be in any position to be able to say, on a state-wide
level, whether or not a district properly represents the local in-
terests contained within it, would be the state itself. Therefore,
each state should create independent commissions that will
be responsible for redistricting every ten years. Currently, five
states have independent commissions which can both take local
interests into account and create districts which are as free from
political influence as possible, and when these commissions are
nonpartisan, such as in the case of Iowa, they are very success-
ful; a similar idea should be used nationwide, and these com-
missions should follow specific institutional guidelines to remain
politically insulated.
In order to ensure the political insulation of the commissions,
half of the members should be appointed in a staggered process
similar to the one used for the Federal Reserve, which will ensure
that no Governor has the opportunity to appoint more than one
member of the board in a term, and the other half should be
elected by the general public in the election prior to the cen-
sus. This will guarantee that half of the members, while poten-
tially politically motivated by virtue of being appointed, will have
technocratic knowledge of the state and the districting process,
while the other half of the members will directly represent the
will of the people. No person should be allowed to serve more
than one term on the commission, eliminating issues of vested in-
terests. The commission should have an even number of people,
as a tie resulting in no change to a district would be preferable
to a politically-motivated split vote which comes as a result of the
appointed members (who will likely be of the same party as the
appointing Governor) colluding against the elected members.
Clearly, there should also be strict restrictions on who is eligible
to be on the commission, to ensure their impartiality: they should
not have been elected to state-wide or federal office before, and
they can receive no kind of political gifts. Contrary to current
case law, redistricting should only be allowed according to the
results of the decennial census, and it should redraw districts
with the representation of local interests and competitiveness as
its two primary concerns. Such a plan will guarantee, as much as
possible, that redistricting remains as fair as possible.
One of the most troubling aspects of gerrymandering is the
tendency of those responsible to divide areas in seemingly non-
sensical ways from a geographic perspective. Obviously, these
divisions have huge political consequences: small changes in dis-
tricts based around specific demographic groups can, and often
does, alter the outcome of elections, as happened in the Penn-
sylvania 8th.31 In addition to giving politicians a distinct political
advantage, such arbitrary drawing of district lines completely ig-
nores the realities of the local political landscape – for instance,
many districts include parts of many counties while only contain-
ing one or two full counties, or two districts will spread in opposite
directions for miles but will fight for control of individual streets
where they share borders, such as the Pennsylvania 12th and the
Illinois 4th and 7th, respectively. Therefore, these independent
districting commissions will be mandated to make districts which
are, insofar as possible, coterminous with counties and cities.
The single most important rule that these commissions must fol-
low is the “one person, one vote” doctrine – that is, all districts
within a state must contain the same population. However, this
directly conflicts with the new mandate: for instance, New York
City has approximately eight million residents, compared to the
state’s nineteen million, thereby making it impossible to include
the whole city in one district; similarly, many counties have fewer
people in them than the requisite number of people for the “one
person, one vote” doctrine, yet there may be no combination of
counties which adds up to the exact number required.
To deal with the requirement that cities and counties will
15
sometimes have to be split, they should be split in the least politi-
cal way possible: the shortest splitline algorithm.32 When a city or
a county must be split, if it is split according to this method, then
there will be only one possible districting plan that will emerge,
and it will not take into account anything about the demographic
qualities or party affiliations of the population to be contained
within the district. So, for New York City, the algorithm will be
used to create the same number of districts that currently exist
within New York City, with the same population in each, but with-
out political bias; and, for a state with many sparsely-populated
counties, one county will be selected at random to be split, while
avoiding splitting any cities within the county, so that the two
districts to be created share the same number of people. The
advantages gained from such an additional mandate should be
manifest: by following existing political boundaries agreed on at
the local level by the parties directly concerned, rather than by
a far-removed and politically-motivated legislator, people can
be sure that their districts follow the interests of their city and
county, the two political units to which they have the closest af-
filiation and share the most direct interests with. Finally, in the
event that county or city boundaries are to be changed for lo-
cal reasons, the independent commissions must review the pro-
posed changes and suggest new possibilities for redistricting
the affected areas, if necessary. With such a solution, people can
be sure that their local interests are being accounted for, and
that political concerns have been removed, as much as is pos-
sible, from the process.
Concomitant with any gerrymandering reform must be some
kind of campaign finance reform. As the above data shows, the
price paid for making districts more competitive is quite liter-
al: competitive districts tended to cost at least three times as
much as the state average, and if elections become significantly
more costly, then politicians will become further dependent on
wealthy interest groups, taking away from any gains made by
redistricting reform. There are many suggested alternatives for
campaign finance reform, and analyzing the effectiveness of such
alternatives is far beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is
critical, if one wishes to decouple money and politics, that any
increase in competitiveness of districts is combined with a seri-
ous attempt to change campaign financing laws.
Finally, the issue of representation generally could be ad-
dressed by increasing the number of Representatives in the
House of Representatives. Federalist 58 argues that there is no
arithmetical formula for arriving at the proper number of Rep-
resentatives, and that those who wish to add more Representa-
tives to increase representation “will counteract their own views
by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of
the government may become more democratic, but the soul
that animates it will be more oligarchic”, because those new rep-
resentatives will be of lower quality and therefore susceptible
to a few powerful leaders.33 Yet, if the Framers intended each
Representative to represent 30,000 people, there surely must
be something wrong if each Representative currently speaks for
close to 700,000 people. However, if we were to follow the origi-
nal prescription of the Constitution, a House of Representatives
with over 10,000 members could not possibly function. While
Federalist 58’s worries of making government more oligarchic
are warranted, I believe that a middle ground can be found be-
tween fixing the size of the legislature, which is what is currently
the case, and ensures that each individual’s voice becomes di-
luted as the population increases; and increasing the size of the
legislature too quickly, which would certainly make the vast ma-
jority of the legislature impotent in the face of the few powerful
committee members. A compromise by which the House is aug-
mented until each member represents 500,000 people, which
would be equivalent to just over 600 members of the House,
with provisions for a staggered increase of that ratio once the
population surpasses certain benchmarks, would strike a power-
ful compromise between representativeness and oligarchic ten-
dencies. What is crucial is that the number of Representatives
should never be fixed; rather, a ratio should be fixed for a given
population level, and that ratio should change over time. This will
guarantee that people have a fair say in their government, and
that their elected officials truly will speak for them.
The data presented in this paper makes the case that ger-
rymandering, contrary to common allegations, does not depress
voter turnout, increase the cost of elections, or increase the
partisanship of a given district – in fact, it has been shown that,
in certain cases, the opposite is the case; while in others, ger-
rymandering seems to have no effect. Yet, gerrymandering still
decreases the representativeness of a district because it gives
politicians the power to redraw their districts arbitrarily to their
own advantage, thus ensuring their re-election at the expense of
the people. Such abuses of power cannot be allowed in our po-
litical system, and therefore gerrymandering must be reformed,
so that the accountability of our government can be restored.
Tax-Exemption & Political Involvement:
Institutional Regulation
Eliot Oh
On November 8, 2008, California’s Proposition 8, which defined
marriage exclusively for opposite-sex couples, was passed with
52 percent of the vote.1 The Mormon Church vehemently advo-
cated for this proposition. Some have accused it of abusing its
tax-exempt status to substantially affect the outcome of the elec-
tion. Currently, even though the Internal Revenue Service pro-
hibits tax-exempt religious institutions from performing partisan
actions, the IRS has had much difficulty in enforcing regulations.
The problem is that there is no clear definition of what it means
to “not devote a substantial part of their activities to attempting
to influence legislation.”2 Therefore, a solution involving a combi-
nation of a financial and time limit is required.
Currently, there are no clear standards to judge whether a
religious institution is politically active or not. Under current IRS
regulation 501 c), religious institutions are classified as non-profit
organizations and are granted tax-exempt status.3 In exchange,
these non-profit organizations are not to “substantially” devote
their resources to endorse a political candidate or lobby for spe-
cific agendas. Yet, there has been little court or legislative prec-
edents to clarify the standards for “substantial.” Even though a
1974 court case has determined “substantially engaged in lobby-
ing activities” as comprising between 16.6 percent and 20.5 per-
cent of the institution’s annual expenditures, the court provided
no reasoning for how it derived this figure and the definition still
remains blurry.4 In addition, the IRS is prohibited from judging
a religious institution’s primary motive.5 This ruling undermines
the necessary means to enforce regulations. As a result, the IRS,
even in the most extreme case, in which a New York church paid
for a two-page ad urging voters to vote against Bill Clinton in
1992, the IRS was only able to revoke the church’s tax-exempt
status three years later. In 2000, the court affirmed the validity of
the revocation and the IRS, after eight years, was able to revoke
a religious institution of its tax-exempt status.6 Currently, even
though the Mormons have contributed as much as nearly $20
million and over 80 percent of the early door-to-door volunteers
for Yes on Prop. 8, the IRS has been able to take no action. Twen-
ty million dollars is over half of the amount raised for Yes on Prop.
8 ($39.9 million) and next to half of what No on Prop. 8 ($43.3
million) raised.7 According to these figures, the Mormon Church
has provided substantial resources to affect the outcome of the
election, yet the IRS, due to the aforementioned problems, has
been reluctant to take action.
As the solution, I propose a stringent regulation on the
amount of money and time devoted for political agendas. As
religious institutions vary in size, the limits imposed should be
set in percentages. Even though the court ruling of 16.6 to 20.5
percent has little legal backing, it is commonsensical. If a reli-
gious institution devotes 20 percent of their financial and hu-
man resources, it means that they are devoting every one out of
five resources to the cause. Considering that the United States
spends nearly 8 percent of its GDP on defense spending, the
20 percent benchmark is quite a substantial part of its activity.8
Using one out of every five resources the church has, it has more
than ample resources to express their First Amendment rights.
As the IRS already has means to enforce regulations, providing
a clear definition will enable it to more effectively administer re-
ligious institutions.
In conclusion, setting a limit on financial and resource religious
institutions can use to express their political opinions will reduce
church abuses and protect the church’s freedom of speech. It
will provide a clear standard and enable the IRS to effectively
regulate churches and impose strict discipline to churches. This
legislation will provide an equal footing for both the church’s and
the liberals to voice their political aspirations. Even though there
is no specific timeline under which this policy should be enacted,
it should be preferably enacted within the next four years. Reli-
gious institutions have been a prominent part of the American
way of life and it is time to ensure that they can continue its
proud tradition.
Representing the People:
A Standard for Filling Senate Vacancies
Sarah Scheinman and Nancy Huemer
The 2008 Presidential election was a benchmark in contempo-
rary American society, giving many progressively-inclined voters
a renewed faith in the American system of government. However,
one of the greatest controversies of the 2008 election was how
to fill the United State Senate vacancies in Illinois, Delaware, New
York, and Colorado. The most infamous among these involved
President Obama’s vacant senate seat, an appointment that was
turned into a series of illegal negotiations by then-Governor, Rod
Blagojevich. Blagojevich was attempting to secure payment for
a seat in the United States Senate, a position to which he later
appointed Senator Roland Burris. This leads to a serious pub-
lic lack of confidence in Burris, not only by his constituents, but
even among his fellow Democratic Senators. The appointment
of Ted Kaufman in Delaware was also not well received by the
people of Delaware, and there was much complaint generated
regarding the way Governor David Paterson of New York chose
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand to fill the vacancy left by Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton. Ultimately, this most recent election season
has prompted many voters across the country to question the
process of political appointments, especially to positions of such
high authority as the United States Senate.
The Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States was created to revise the process by which United
States Senators are chosen.1 The power was originally desig-
nated to the state legislature, but has evolved over time, recon-
stituted under the jurisdiction of the citizens of individual states.
When crafting the Constitution, the New Jersey Plan maintained
one vote for each state in Congress, a measure of fairness from
the Articles of Confederation, and it remained in the structure
of our government in the form of the United States Senate. The
revision under the Seventeenth Amendment expanded the pro-
cess for electing members of the House of Representatives to
the United States Senate.2 The process with regards to special
elections in the United States Senate should mirror the process
provided for the House of Representatives because the revisions
of the 17th Amendment were made in the interest of democracy,
and democracy does not merely apply in the general election.
The same rules must apply for all elections, at all times.
Also, many states were maintaining permanent vacancies as
a result of political disputes within the state that were a result
of increased partisanship. The Seventeenth Amendment sought
to remedy this situation. There is a provision within the Seven-
teenth Amendment that grants the power to appoint an interim/
full term Senator to the governor of the individual states, if there
is a vacancy.3 The decision to include this provision is a break
from the original democratic intent of the amendment.
In a representative democracy, the legislative body is chosen
by the people, in order to promote their best interests. Under
the original United States Constitution, the people and their
Senator were separated by the State legislature, but the 17th
Amendment made the process more direct, allowing the people
to directly choose their Senator based on an electoral majority,
a far more democratic process. When governors are given the
authority to appoint one of two representatives in the United
States Senate, an institution that does wield greater authority
than the U.S. House of Representatives with regards to appoint-
ments, foreign policy, and budgetary processes, it is much more
undemocratic than to provide the same standards for electing
Senators in special elections as given by the House. By giving
the executives of our states the unilateral authority to install
members of the federal government, we are circumventing the
democratic process and denying citizens their voice in choosing
their representatives.
The United States House of Representatives has often been
portrayed as the more democratic institution of our bicameral
legislature, but the United States Senate should be the same in
this manner. When vacancies occur in the United States House
of Representatives, there are rules set in place to democratically
handle the situation. Article I, Section 2, Clause 4 of the United
States Constitution mandates, “When vacancies happen in the
17
Representation for any State, the Executive thereof shall issue
Writs of Elections to fill such Vacancies.”4 This process usually
begins and concludes within 60-90 days (find a citation) of the
vacancy, therefore quickly filling the seat. If we have made the
process the same across states with regards to electing these
representatives in our legislature, it seems only fitting to allow
for the same rules and regulations with regards to filling vacan-
cies in the Senate as well.
Furthermore, one of the least democratic parts of this pro-
cess is the disparity between individual states. Originally, under
the Articles of Confederation, each state was given one vote in
Congress. Since the Senate was designed as the body of Con-
gress that was supposed to maintain a level of fairness across all
states, no matter their size, it is preposterous that different states
could and would have different procedures for filling these va-
cancies.
While states currently have varied procedures for dealing
with vacancies, many call special elections. In these states, when
a Senator dies or resigns and a vacancy occurs before the bi-
ennial general election, which precedes the end of the six-year
term, a special election occurs. When a politician wins a special
election, he or she serves the rest of the term.
However, several states have differing policies, like Texas and
Louisiana, which hold all-parties special elections separately
from general elections, in which any qualified candidate may run.
This is a shift from other states that often hold off on democrati-
cally electing the United States Senator and instead to choose
to wait until the next general election. Additionally, many states
have party based nomination procedures, which Texas and
Louisiana do not require in special elections.5 Most states have
maintained policies in which the governor of the state can ap-
point an individual as an interim Senator, until a special election
is certified. The problem with this process is that often times the
Governor will appoint someone that may have had interest in
running for the United States Senate and this will certainly give
them an unfair advantage, not based on the rules of politics, but
rather a relatively arcane practice that provides the governors of
individual states with undue influence over federal, rather than
state policy.
Creating this great discrepancy with regards to the special
election system, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Wisconsin do not
allow their governors to appoint interim Senators, but instead,
require special elections, and Oklahoma allows interim appoint-
ments under limited circumstances, but otherwise requires spe-
cial election.6 In these states, this often creates a problem, as
they are not represented by two Senators until the entire special
election process has been completed. Ultimately, there must be
special elections that reflect the democratic system these repre-
sentatives seek to stand for.
While it is clear that this is a problem deserving a remedy,
there are certain flaws in creating a purely democratic system of
electing representatives when vacancies exist. Unlike the House
of Representatives with its 435 members, there are only 100
members of the United States Senate with each of their pres-
ences crucial for many votes. Many votes are extremely close,
and neither side wants to create a standard where there will be
vacancies when they have a chance to swing votes their way.
Unlike the House of Representatives, vacancies in the Senate do
leave a greater and potentially more problematic vacuum when
votes are being cast. Since each state is only represented by two
senators, having an opening in one of those seats is losing fifty
percent of your representation and voice in the Senate. How-
ever, this vacuum in the Senate is not as great as the one that
is left if we do not allow voters the right to voice their opinions
about who should be running their government and represent-
ing them in the Senate.
Also, it is true that some states do call for special elections and
they do maintain relatively more democratic procedures in filling
vacancies. However, when discussing the rules and regulations
of the federal government, it is important that state executives
do not have the authority to decide how the federal government
is run. There must be a standard process that is available in all
states with regards to confronting senate vacancies in a demo-
cratic and streamlined fashion, the same standard for all states
and all senate vacancies.
What we offer is a new plan. We believe that although it may
be difficult to allow vacancies to exist in the Senate, we must
allow democracy to triumph if we intend for our government to
be a true representative democracy. In order to do so, we must
make a constitutional amendment that standardizes the process
for filling senate vacancies. To begin, after a vacancy occurs in
the United State Senate, a Writ of Elections must be issued, and
an election must commence between forty-five to sixty days of
the declared vacancy. On the forty-fifth day of the vacancy, a bal-
lot will be sent to all the state’s citizens that are currently eligible
to vote. The voters will have fifteen days to return the ballot, and
the votes will be tallied between the sixtieth and seventieth days
since the Senate position became vacant. On the seventieth day
a winner will be announced. States will maintain their individual
procedures regarding runoff elections, in the case of a non-ma-
jority winner. While we would not require states to implement a
vote by mail system, investing in these kinds of systems would be
the right step to securing more fair, representative elections for
their citizens. We chose to have ballots (pre-stamped) adminis-
tered by mail because it is impractical to think that voter turnout
for a special election would be truly representative of the con-
stituency. While turnout is never 100 percent, with mail-in ballots,
a higher rate could be expected.
A candidate in a United States Senate or House of Represen-
tatives campaign can only get on the ballot officially if they have
filled out their FEC Forms 1 and 2 for the office they are seek-
ing.7 We believe this is the most fair and democratic process for
dealing with Senate vacancies and special elections to fill those
vacancies.
Ultimately, the electoral system will never be perfect, but we
can always seek to make it fairer. By adopting a procedure that
calls for special elections in the case of vacancies in the United
States Senate, we put the choice back in the hands of the peo-
ple, a key tenet on which our country was founded.

Hope for Minor Parties:
Electoral Fusion
Katherine O’Gorman
The United States, throughout its history, has been dominated
by an extensive two-party system that limits the ability of minor
parties to gain a voice in American political discourse. There has
been little opportunity for minor parties to impact elections; mi-
nor parties have, in fact, only altered the presidential election
in three instances since 1950.1 The domination of the two-party
system is a direct effect of the institutional structure of Ameri-
can elections, most critically the single-member district elections
that are most prominent in American politics.2 In a single-mem-
ber district election system, candidates are required to gain a
plurality of the votes on Election Day, motivating the major par-
ties to target fifty-one percent of the popular vote. In order to
gain electoral success, then, political parties must create broad-
based coalitions that reflect a wide number of issues and po-
litical stances. Many issues are forced out of these coalitions for
political reasons, leaving these issues out of mainstream political
debate.
While neglected from the two major parties, minor parties
often support these marginalized issues. Minor parties play this
crucial role by raising issues and political stances that are largely
ignored by the major parties.3 Minor parties ask the American
electorate to consider new policy ideas and political ideologies
that may provide solutions that will become prominent in time.4
Similarly, minor parties can impact the political discourse of the
major parties by forcing them to respond to criticism or positions
outlined by the minor parties. Furthermore, minor parties can
provide a crucial outlet to the expression of political discontent.5
Minor parties offer different ideologies for Americans upset with
the tone and issues represented by the major parties, and thus a
vote for these parties can often reflect not only support for the
issues that the minor party represents, but also discontent with
the major parties.6
Despite their crucial role in American politics, minor parties
are largely pushed to the fringes of American political discourse,
often considered illegitimate political contenders. Discounted
for their lack of success, the issues and constituencies of minor
parties are ignored because they lack a platform from which to
advocate for these stances. Voting for a third party is most often
viewed as a “wasted vote” as it will fail to impact the election
in and substantial way. At worst, however, votes for minor par-
ties are “spoiler votes” which take away votes from the political
candidate most closely aligned with the minor party and inad-
vertently aid the candidate with the most opposing views.7 Fur-
thermore, the extensive history of the two-party system results in
the socialization of the American electorate along the two-party
system. Instead of considering all the available political parties
and ideologies, questions of political affiliation tend to simply
consider whether an individual is a Democrat or Republican.8 As
a result, minor parties are not only barred from electoral success
due to institutional barriers, but also from gaining support in the
population because of political socialization.
Current election law limits the ability of minor parties to im-
pact American elections. However, the utility and importance of
third parties and the issues they support demonstrate a clear
need to provide policy solutions that allow these minor par-
ties to insert their voices into American political discourse. The
strongest democracy is that which allows the free flow of ideas,
which considers all possible policy solutions, and actively seeks
to provide organizations that represent all of the views of its
electorate. Without aiding third parties, American democracy is
missing the opportunity to add new views.
Electoral Fusion, the practice of allowing multiple parties to
endorse a single candidate for the same office, presents one
policy solution to provide a platform for minor political parties
to assert more influence in the American political system. Cur-
rently, two forms of electoral fusion are practiced in the United
States across seven states: South Carolina, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Idaho, Mississippi, Vermont, and most notably New York.9
In the first form, multiple parties are listed next to a candidate’s
name, indicating their endorsement of the candidate. For exam-
ple, Candidate X may be listed as the nominee for the Democrat-
ic, Liberal, and Working Families Parties on a single ballot line.
While this form of fusion presents a step towards more minor
party participation in American elections, it is not as effective as
fusion’s alternate form. This alternate form is distinguished from
the first in that it allows a candidate to be listed multiple times on
a single ballot under different parties. In this form, Candidate X
is listed once as Candidate X – Democratic Party, a second time
as Candidate X – Liberal Party, and a third time as Candidate
X – Working Families Party. A voter then chooses not only which
candidate to support, but which political party’s ballot line to
cast their vote on as well. All votes for Candidate X, regardless
of ballot line, are tallied together, representing the total number
of votes cast for this candidate.10 However, because the votes
are originally cast on separate ballot lines, this form of electoral
fusion is able to distinguish how many votes were cast on each
ballot line. Due to this ability, this second form of fusion is more
beneficial than the former because minor parties are then able
to directly determine the number of votes they added to a major
party ticket. As it is more effective, this paper will focus on the
form of electoral fusion that allows a candidate to be listed on
multiple lines on a single ballot.
The state with the most prominent use of fusion is New York.11
Three prominent minor parties, the Working Families Party, the
Conservative Party, and the Independent Party, consistently ei-
ther utilized fusion to cross-endorse a major party candidate or
offer their own political candidate. No other state in the United
States demonstrates such prominence of minor parties, and
many scholars argue that the prominence of major parties in
New York is due to the extensive history of fusion in New York.
Because New York represents the most prominent example of
fusion elections this paper will examine congressional elections
in New York to determine the possible effects of electoral fu-
sion.
Primarily, minor parties can increase their influence through
electoral fusion, by both raising their electoral and monetary
support and increasing their influence on the major parties.12 In
fact, minor parties actively pursue the adoption of electoral fu-
sion because they believe it will increase their support. Through
both of these mechanisms, minor parties raise their relevance in
American dialogue and gain the tools to create lasting political
parties that can consistently affect electoral politics. First, elec-
toral fusion allows minor parties to increase their base of elec-
toral support by reducing the costs of voting for a minor party.13
19
In an electoral system without fusion, minor party supporters are
asked to vote either for a candidate that has a legitimate chance
to win the election, or a candidate that represents the party to
which they subscribe. Many minor party supporters choose to
vote for the major party candidate that most closely supports
their views, so that the politicians that both has a likely chance
of electoral success and is closest to their views will win. As a re-
sult, the potential electoral success for minor parties is reduced
because of the perceived irrationality of voting for a minor party.
Minor party supporters, through fusion, are able to both cast a
vote for a political party that best represents their beliefs, and
a candidate the enjoys a likelihood of electoral success. As a re-
sult, the minority party voters are able to express their support
for minor parties without the costs of losing their vote and there-
fore minor party electoral success increases. 14
In fact, when comparing the electoral success of minor par-
ties in New York State to the national average, fusion’s effects are
clear. The table below demonstrates the percentages of the vote
that each of New York’s large minor parties gained throughout
the last five elections in comparison to the national level of minor
party support. Nationally, all minor parties combined totalled ap-
proximately three percent of the congressional vote in 2008 and
2.49 percent of the vote in 2006. Minor parties in New York, on
the other hand, were able to garner a much higher percentage
of electoral success. The Working Families party and the Con-
servative parties attained a higher percentage of the vote indi-
vidually than all minor parties across the United States. Clearly,
fusion has aided minor parties in New York to establish a more
significant base of support.
Percentage of the Total Congressional Votes
Cast for New York Minor Parties15
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 course. If there is a major party that reflects their views closely
Independence 1.5 1.42 2.8 2.54 2.46
Conservative 5.4 2.74 4.4 2.58 2.61
Working Families 0.88 1.74 1.92 2.92
National Percentage16 4.17 3.58 2.75 2.49
Increasing the number of votes for minor parties has a magni-
fied effect because it aids the ability of minor parties to secure
public finance for future elections. Currently, public money is
awarded to political parties after they have established a requi-
site percentage of the vote in an election. Minor parties bear the
initial costs, but their expenses are paid after they establish the
number of votes required.17 As fusion increases the number of
votes for minor parties by reducing the costs of voting for these
parties, they also increase the ability of minor parties to qualify
for public money. Thus, minor parties are able to gain important
resources that can aid in sustaining their effect on the political
dialogue.
Electoral fusion further establishes the influence of minor
parties because it provides a mechanism through which minor
parties can greatly impact the major parties. Fusion provides evi-
dence for minor parties to rely upon when attempting to alter
the agenda of the major political parties. In the form of fusion
that lists candidates on multiple ballot lines, minor parties are
armed with evidence of how many votes their supporters add-
ed to the major party ticket. In close elections, these votes may
provide the difference in the election. As a result, minor parties
can put pressure on the major parties to include their issues and
views in their major party agenda.18 Minor parties can threaten
to endorse the other candidate, or withhold their endorsement
and run their own candidate.19 In fusion states, major party can-
didates do, in fact, become concerned with the endorsement of
minor parties, and will actively seek to gain the support of minor
parties because they want to gain the votes of that party’s sup-
porters.20 For example, the Working Families Party makes influ-
ence on the major political parties a primary piece of why they
advocate for fusion: “it [fusion] lets third parties like the WFP
demonstrate support for the issues we’re fighting for. When vote
on the WFP’s ballot line help a candidate we’ve endorse win, we
can hold that politician accountable to working people. Big busi-
ness has plenty of money and power. Fusion helps us even the
score.”21 Clearly, minor parties are able to insert themselves into
the electoral equation through their endorsement of the major
parties. After the election, they can continue to push for rep-
resentation by the major party due to their involvement in the
electoral coalition that elected the official. They can lobby for
patronage jobs, which would insert minor party officials into the
government structure, thereby increasing minor party support-
ers in office. As a result of fusion, therefore, the political views
that are traditionally marginalized are brought into the political
debate through minor parties’ influence on the major political
parties.22
In addition to aiding the rise of minor political parties, electoral
fusion has a positive influence on the nature of American democ-
racy by creating a system that allows voters to send a message
with their vote and increasing participation. Fusion voting allows
more information to be conveyed to public officials through the
nomination and electoral process. For minor political parties, an
endorsement, or lack of endorsement, can demonstrate how the
minor party views the current status of American political dis-
enough, minor parties will endorse a major party, indicating that
they believe their views are reflected enough in the existing ma-
jor parties. However, if a minor party withholds their endorse-
ment of a major party, then the minor party either believes that
they have a more exciting candidate, or they believe that neither
of the major parties represents their constituencies enough.
Furthermore, fusion allows individual voters to indicate what
issues induced them to vote for a particular candidate. Minor
parties often reflect a more specific group of issues that are cen-
tral to their party’s creation. As a result, fusion, by allowing voters
to choose which candidate and party that they support, gives
voters the ability to not only vote for a candidate but indicate
which issues were the central issues in their electoral decision.
Voting for Candidate X on the Green Party line gives public of-
ficials different information than voting for Candidate X on the
Democratic Party line. Thus, fusion allows voters to not only say
that they support a candidate, but they can also give insight as
to why they support that candidate. 23
While fusion allows voters to send a message to public of-
ficials, fusion plays a dual role in also offering more information
to voters on Election Day. Through endorsements of minor par-
ties that often reflect a smaller range of issues than do major
parties, voters making a decision on Election Day can glean ad-
ditional information about the candidates by understanding the
endorsements of the minor political parties.24 This is particularly
illuminating in smaller elections that do not enjoy the same level
of publicity that major elections have. These indicators allow for
voters to make more informed decisions, thus representing an-
other benefit of electoral fusion.
Furthermore, fusion has more positive effects on American
democracy by increasing voter turnout in elections. By increas-
ing the perceived representation of minor party views, fusion
encourages minor party voters to come to the polls. More minor
party voters are pleased with their electoral choices because
they are able to express support for a candidate that is elector-
ally viable, while not neglecting the minor party that they sup-
port. In consider this point, the voter turnout in six congressional
districts in New York. In New York congressional districts four,
twenty-one and twenty-six, fusion is heavily practiced with three
minor political parties impacting the elections. Each of the Con-
servative, Independence, and Working Families Parties endorsed
one of the major party candidates in these three districts in the
2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 elections in all but one election
where the Working Families party decided to not endorse any
candidate. Alternatively, districts six, seven, and ten demonstrate
low amounts of fusion. District 10 shows the least amount of fu-
sion, as the Working Families Party decided to cross-endorse
only in the 2006 election. Otherwise, the Conservative party
chose to run their own candidate in 2000-2006 and the Work-
ing Families Party chose to run their own candidate in 2002. The
Independence Party did not participate in Congressional elec-
tions in district ten at all. Districts six and seven both show some
occasions in which minor parties ran their own candidates and
other times where they chose not to participate at all. There are
some cases of fusion in these districts, but none as prevalent as
in districts four, twenty-one, and twenty-six.
Voter Turnout in Six New York Districts25
2000 2002 2004 2006
District 4 65% 43% 67% 40%
District 6 55% 34% 54% 31%
District 7 55% 32% 54% 31%
District 10 48% 32% 51% 27%
District 21 66% 53% 69% 52%
District 26 65% 49% 69% 50%
Comparison of the turnout across these districts demon-
strates that fusion does in fact increase voter turnout in these
districts. Districts with a high level of fusion (highlighted in gray)
demonstrate turnout ten percent higher than the districts with
low levels of fusion (in white). This effect is more pronounced
when considering the difference between district ten, the dis-
trict with the lowest frequency of fusion, in comparison to dis-
tricts six and seven, which have low but more fusion in their
elections. District ten demonstrates turnout rates of 2-4 percent
lower than those of districts that have any fusion at all. Clearly,
fusion impacts voter turnout by sending more voters to the polls.
However, the increase in voter turnout is not directly the result
of increasing voter turnout amongst minor party voters because
the percentage of minor party voters does not widely vary across
the districts. Thus, more voters turned out regardless of political
affiliation indicating that fusion may have had a greater impact
across political parties. More districts need to be incorporated
into this study in order to ascertain with any certainty the impact
of fusion on voter turnout. Yet these preliminary results demon-
strate the potential of fusion’s effects.
Despite these advantages of fusion voting, many scholars and
politicians oppose fusion voting. Many argue that electoral fu-
sion will increase voter confusion, resulting in a large increase in
the number of over-votes because voters will cast their vote on
each line that a candidate appears on..26 To remedy this potential
effect, all that is needed is to build into fusion policy a require-
ment that multiple votes for the same candidate represent a
single vote for that candidate. Furthermore, opponents to fusion
highly object to excessive factionalism, which would occur with
more minor parties gaining power. The United States has shown
marked rejection of excessive factionalism, or even factionalism
at all, since the Revolutionary War period.27 Opponents of fusion
use this argument to claim that fusion would produce negative
effects on the efficiency of elections and on the legitimacy of
elections. First, if minor parties were successful in achieving po-
litical office, whether by patronage jobs due to fusion or by direct
election, the minor party officials in government would create in-
efficiency because they would strain existing governmental coali-
tions. Each vote would become more complicated and it would
result in a stalling of the legislature. Second, opponents argue
that if minor parties were to become more numerous through
the device of fusion, plurality victories would increase, thereby
delegitimizing the election. While these arguments consider le-
gitimate concerns, these objections appear more directed to the
rise of minor parties themselves rather than against the practice
of fusion. The effects of minor parties on the United States are
largely unknown because there have ever been more than two
major political parties in the United States. Currently, however,
third parties’ benefits appear to drastically outweigh the conse-
quences.
Regardless of these concerns, however, fusion provides a
mechanism through which American democracy can be strength-
ened. It increases the number of voices in American political
discourse, increases voter turnout, and allows voters a tool to
send a message with their vote. While fusion, even in the states
in which it is practiced, has not lead to a significant number of
minor party office holders, its wide adoption may have more
extensive results. By increasing the level of support for minor
parties across the United States, minor parties may be able to
gain enough political support to begin to run for office in greater
numbers. Furthermore, because of the institutionalization of the
two-party system, additional reforms are needed to promote the
rise of minor parties in American political discourse. The main
point, however, is that fusion represents a step in the right di-
rect – a step towards making the American political system more
representative of all political views of the electorate.
21
 Energy and the Environment

As the Columbia Roosevelt Institution’s Energy and Environment Center,

we are proud to tackle 21st century issues with technological and sustain-
able proposals. In order to solve our global energy and environmental crisis,
communities must focus on implementing local solutions. The Energy and
Environment Center’s contributions focus on exploring a clean, high-tech,
energy-creating garbage disposal system for New York City, and designing
an energy saving dormitory information system at Columbia University.

Waste Disposal and Energy Generation
Through Plasma Gasification
Parinitha Sastry, Angela Wong, Barak Wouk
In 1987, a garbage barge from Long Island was at sea for sev-
en weeks in search of a landfill. While the “barge to nowhere”
provoked more laughs than outrage, its inability to find a home
for its trash draws attention to problems with New York’s waste
disposal programs. New York’s twenty-seven landfills require a
large amount of monetary funding, with no financial gains or re-
turns in the long run. These landfills quickly reach full capacity
since garbage requires thousands of years to decompose. Con-
sequently, even more taxpayer money is needed to transport
surplus waste to facilities as far as Virginia. Instead of landfills,
which require lots of money and land while emitting significant
amounts of greenhouse gases, New York City should employ a
new technology that would allow cities to permanently dispose
of their waste while generating a profit. Plasma gasification tech-
nology converts trash to electricity, and it is poised to become
a prominent disposal method for cities with significant amounts
of solid waste. New York City currently generates 12,000 tons of
garbage every day, resulting in an above-average cost of dispos-
al. With its already high rates of garbage generation and popula-
tion growth, New York City must face its high costs of disposal.
This makes New York City an obvious candidate to implement
plasma gasification technology, as landfills are quickly filling up
and becoming scarcer. By embracing plasma gasification, New
York City will reap economic profit, counteract environmental
damage, and also set an example for other global metropolises
to feasibly enact sustainable policies.
While New York’s twenty-seven landfills accepted more than
eight million tons of solid waste in 2007, the city also must rely
heavily on out-of-state landfills, shipping garbage to Pennsylvania
and Ohio by railway and trucks.1 Although landfill disposal meth-
ods are an improvement from ocean-dumping and incineration
New York residents, and the environment pay an enormous price.
The disaster of Fresh Kills Landfill in Staten Island exemplifies the
costs of these methods. A landfill that could be seen from outer
space, Fresh Kills was ordered to close by Mayor Rudy Giuliani
in 2001 because it caused significant air pollution and ground-
water contamination.2 Numerous studies have shown that land-
fills contribute to global warming by emitting greenhouse gases
like methane, carbon dioxide, and other bioaerosols.3 Moreover,
landfills have also leaked leachate and other harmful chemicals
into groundwater, contaminating drinking water and damaging
the environment. Liners and other methods are designed to
minimize air and water emissions from landfills.4 However, ac-
cording to the EPA, landfills inevitably produce emissions.5 Be-
cause gasification can decompose all non-radioactive material, it
does not require a complex separating process, distinguishing
it from processes like recycling. Incineration, a process whereby
garbage is simply burned, is very inefficient as it produces and
releases high amounts of carbon dioxide, poses a risk of starting
fires, and emits toxins and odors into the air. Plasma gasification
produces no odors, releases negligible amounts of carbon diox-
ide, does not start fires, and even generates significant amounts
of surplus energy.
According to Foster A. Agblevor, a bioprocess engineering
specialist at Virginia Tech, municipal solid waste is an ideal feed-
stock for gasification.6 As a process, plasma gasification converts
waste into energy by vaporizing material into a gas, which can
then be used to produce electricity. Specifically, the garbage is
pelletized and placed into a high-heat and high-pressure cham-
ber called a gasifier. Inside the gasifier there is a lightening-like
electrical arc created by two electrodes. Gas is passed through
the electrical arc, creating an intense energy field. As a result,
temperatures within the electrical arc reach as high as 30,000
degrees Fahrenheit (17,000 degrees Celsius), over three times
as hot as the surface of the sun. The heat radiating from these
arcs decomposes waste into two main products. The first is an
inorganic glass-like substance that can be reused for roadbed,
high-strength asphalt, and heavy construction. The second is a
gas, termed syngas, which can be converted into fuels such as
hydrogen, natural gas, and ethanol. Additionally, syngas can be
fed into a cooling system to generate steam that is then used to
drive a turbine and produce electricity. After the first use of the
gasifier, the machine no longer needs an external energy source;
it produces enough electricity to power itself while creating sur-
plus electricity to export for other uses.7
In addition to being more environmentally sustainable, gas-
ification is also more cost-effective than landfills. Approximately
$400 million of taxpayer money is sacrificed each year to ship
and store New York City’s trash.8 Of this $400 million, a fraction
is directly paid to Virginia and Pennsylvania’s landfills for merely
storing the city’s trash. Because New York City is in the unusual
position of having to ship and store its garbage to other states,
New York City pays as high as $90 per ton of garbage, compared
to the national average of $35 per ton.9
While landfills pose an environmental risk and drain New York
City’s limited monetary funds, gasification generates a profit in
the long run. A plasma converter that processes up to 2,000
tons of waste a day costs approximately $250 million to build.
With three plasma converters, New York City can feasibly pro-
cess half of its daily waste of 12,000 tons. The cost of transporta-
tion and maintenance is negligible in comparison to the amount
of money that the city currently pays to support its landfills, as
the city will no longer have to pay to ship and store trash out-of-
state. After the decrease in transportation and storage costs, the
plasma converter has the potential to reduce New York City’s
cost of disposal from $90 per ton to $36 per ton.10 Additionally,
about one-third of the electricity generated by the syngas of
each gasifier can be sold to utility companies. In total, the profits
generated by selling the surplus electricity are greater than the
cost of the gasification disposal system; the city would make $15
per ton of garbage disposed! In other words, the city would be
gaining money by gasifying its garbage.
Although the fixed cost of installing three plasma gasifiers is
$750 million, this is affordable with the help of a federal loan.
By investing in gasification, New York City could repay its entire
loan within a decade. If New York City applied for a $750 mil-
lion federal loan, the city would be able to redirect funds that
are currently used to sustain the cost of waste management to
pay back its loan at a steady rate. The city’s debt would be set
at a rate similar to the amount that would have been spent on
the transportation and storage of trash before the gasifiers were
built. Since the payment system is correlated to the amount New
York City would have already spent without the gasifiers, this will
allow repayment of the city’s loan at a three percent interest rate
23
without any significant added strain to their yearly budget. This
way NYC turns a $90 per ton garbage cost into a $15 per ton
garbage profit within 5-7 years. By implementing a gasification
system, NYC’s garbage disposal will be greener, less costly, and
energy creating.
Considering the immense environmental and financial cost of
New York’s current garbage disposal system, it makes sense to
invest in a new, effective, and sustainable system such as plas-
ma gasification. Despite the large initial investment, the money
saved through plasma gasification helps make it economically
viable. Although plasma gasification is still an emerging technol-
ogy, successful implementations in Japan demonstrate its feasi-
bility.11 Plasma gasification will allow New York City to reduce its
carbon and toxic gas emissions, diminish the need to unsustain-
ably store trash and generate enough surplus electricity to en-
able this disposal to become profitable.
Submetering College Dorm Rooms
To Incentivize Sustainable Consumption
Dario Abramskiehn and Brenden Cline
Columbia University, like a significant majority of other insti-
tutions of higher education, incorporates the costs of students’
electricity consumption into their annual housing fee, effectively
causing a disconnect between students’ usage and charges. The
additional costs from residents who waste electricity and savings
from those who conserve are not passed along to them directly,
but are distributed into the average cost of housing for the en-
tire on-campus undergraduate community.
Thus, simple, but mildly inconvenient tactics for reducing en-
ergy usage—unplugging one’s refrigerator over breaks, turning
off lights, and disconnecting appliances that consume standby
electricity—go unheeded by all but the most environmentally-
committed students. The end result of all of this is that most Co-
lumbians choose not to make even the smallest effort to curb
their energy usage because the University’s policies disconnect
them from the financial and environmental costs of their con-
sumption.
In the context of sharply rising real electricity prices over the
coming decade, the threat presented by anthropogenic climate
change today, and Columbia University’s oft-cited commitment
to environmental sustainability in the future, it is abundantly
clear that this conventional method of charging students for
their electricity usage must be revised.
Solution & Benefits
The economically and environmentally pragmatic solution is
to have students pay an electricity bill for their individual con-
sumption—the same way that electric utilities charge residential
consumers for their electricity usage rather than the average per
capita consumption of their municipality. All Columbia University
residential buildings, particularly undergraduate dormitories,
should be retrofitted with an energy information system (EIS)
comprising electricity submetering of every dorm room and a
graphical feedback system for individuals’ usage data.
Even without a pricing mechanism, the introduction of a high
resolution energy information system, which provides partici-
pants with real-time feedback on their room’s individual electric-
ity use,1 has been proven to reduce energy consumption. For
example, as documented by Petersen et al., the availability of
high resolution feedback for residents of Oberlin College’s dor-
mitories, combined with peer education and the moderate in-
centive of a small party, was sufficient to cut electricity use by 55
percent during a competition.2 Significantly, these savings were
77 percent greater than those of the low resolution group, which,
like Columbia students during the “Do It In the Dark” Energy
Challenge,3 only received weekly data transcribed from build-
ings’ aggregate electricity meters. This trend demonstrates that
the immediacy of feedback is a key component of understanding
and subsequently changing one’s patterns of consumption.
It has also been demonstrated that economic incentives can
be successfully used to reward students’ energy conservation
at the college level.4 Rather than merely reward students col-
lectively for aggregate savings, however, modern technologies
of individual room metering should be harnessed to provide the
same price incentives renters and home owners receive to re-
duce consumption: an electricity bill.
Implementation
Physical installation of the EIS requires purchasing multipoint
submeters with Ethernet capability, retrofitting all existing un-
dergraduate dormitories over several years to meter each resi-
dent’s room, concurrently installing LCD monitors in dormitories’
lobbies, and incorporating submetering into the design of future
dormitories.
The first physical consideration must be the number of sub-
meters to purchase. According to Enetics, Inc., Columbia’s cur-
rent supplier of electricity meters, submetering technology will
be available within the next two years that can track as many as
42 circuit points with an expected price of $1400 per unit. These
meters, like those the university currently uses, can be used with
automatic meter reading (AMR) software to report the data as
frequently as every 15 seconds to a central digital database.
Excluding Watt, the East Campus high-rise, and the Brown-
stone residences, the average of the remaining 16 undergradu-
ate dorms has approximately 20 people per floor and about 9
floors.5 For our undergraduate housing, the East Campus high-
rise would require one small-scale (< 12 circuit) submeter in each
suite, each of the 16 Brownstones needs a single meter, Watt war-
rants no additional metering, and the remaining 16 buildings call
for one meter per floor on average. Thus, an estimated 150-175 of
these upcoming large multipoint submeters and 110 small-scale
submeters will be sufficient for monitoring all undergraduates’
residential electricity use. These meters will be installed at cir-
cuit breakers or other access points to the electrical distribution
system, and their transponders will be set up through a connec-
tion to the local IP network. Estimating the price of smaller-scale
multipoint meter to be $1000 yields a total cost for the meters
within the next five years of approximately $350,000.
When a dorm is retrofitted with the submetering technology,
it will be highly beneficial to display the building’s instantaneous
electricity usage on the ground floor entrance of each building.
It would contribute greatly to residents’ awareness of the system
if the data were publicly displayed in a readily interpretable way,
by tracking the dormitory’s aggregate electricity usage, display-
ing the average resident’s demand, comparing per capita usage
amongst dorms, and displaying resources equivalent to the level
of energy consumption (i.e. pounds of coal, pounds of CO2 emis-
sions, dollars, etc.). New LCD dedicated monitors for the 18 resi-
dence halls and 16 brownstones at $500 each will cost less than
$20,000.
Secondly, since the capital expenditure and installation time
will be an issue, these energy monitors should first be introduced
in freshman dormitories, which are more prone to change their
energy usage behavior.6 This trend, along with the inability to ret-
rofit all buildings at once and the need to develop proper imple-
mentation protocol before the project is scaled up completely,
entails that the system’s efficacy and cost-effectiveness could be
maximized by phasing in installation over a number of years and
ideally accomplishing one stage of retrofitting per year.
At a minimum, Columbia must commit to incorporating sub-
metering into the design of all future undergraduate housing
to be constructed and all significant renovation projects. This
proposal for an EIS could be extended to graduate students’
housing, but the smaller scale and varying nature of graduate
students’ buildings (including apartments that already charge
utilities) forces this to be looked at on a case-by-case basis.
Stage 1 Carman and John Jay (~50 meters)
Stage 2 Furnald, Hartley, and Wallach (~30 meters)
Stage 3 47 Claremont, McBain, Ruggles, and 600 West 113th (~30 meters)
Stage 4 Schapiro and Wien (~30 meters)
Stage 5 Brownstones, Hogan, and Woodbridge (~30 meters)
Stage 6 East Campus townhouses, high-rise floors 6-10
(~20 meters and ~40 small meters)
Stage 7 East Campus high-rise floors 12-20 (~70 small meters)
Next, technological implementation will involve acquiring
software to render the energy usage in an accessible, engag-
ing way and formulating a computer program for attributing the
costs of electricity usage and assessing the charges to students’
accounts.
The former program could be realized with little difficulty, as
the introduction of Lucid Design Group’s Building Dashboard7
software on campus is currently in the works and Google will
soon be releasing free software for this purpose called Google
PowerMeter.8 The task of making the raw metered data student-
friendly may be outsourced in this way or managed in-house by
software engineers, as Enetics’ metering software is already ca-
pable of some level of graphical representation.
Secondly, a new program needs to be developed to ascribe
electricity use to students and charge them for the variable cost
of their usage. While a perfectly equitable system for attribut-
ing shared electricity use to individuals is not possible, one must
be attempted for the sake of spurring conservation and levying
usage fees appropriately. Thus, the program should take data
from individual room meters and add to it prorated shared usage
(such as bathrooms, lounges, kitchens, and hallways with light
switches) proportionate to the number of residents who share
the space. To illustrate, this would entail that the typical resident
of Carman Hall is charged for 1/2 of his double’s electricity use
plus 1/4 of a 4-person suite’s bathroom and hallway usage.
Besides appropriately coupling energy use with the students
responsible, this software should charge the most accurate fee
possible. In some buildings, the university is charged a different
rate for peak and off-peak hours; where possible, this fee should
be passed along to students in real-time to reduce costs and
even out the peak demand load. In the next two decades, there
is a chance that New York City will have a “smart” grid in some
fashion and charge a varying rate dependant on instantaneous
demand; with a submetering system in place using even today’s
technology, this price signal can further affect student decisions
and reduce utility costs. In order to best serve residents in any
case, the software should post charges digitally on an hourly
basis, allowing students to check at any time throughout the
month to find out how much they will owe and accordingly alter
their behavior. Finally, the software must be able to report these
charges to Student Financial Services for posting on each stu-
dent’s monthly E-Bill.
The billing system is most effective when it is frequent enough
for students to be reminded of the fees, but infrequent enough
that the costs are given time to accumulate and be substantial.
Thus, a monthly billing interval is far preferable to the regular se-
mester cycle not only because it mirrors the reality of a residen-
tial monthly utility bill, but because this frequency will divorce
the charge’s relationship to tuition, next to which it is a paltry
sum. Additionally, by that time the average student (with today’s
consumption habits) will have a bill of $25, but their individual
choices can reasonably reduce this by around $10.
Lastly, personnel demands may necessitate the contracting
or hiring of additional staff to install the meters, develop needed
software, meet the new data management needs, and handle the
new item of student billing. The physical installation could eas-
ily be contracted or performed by Columbia staff during sum-
mer break. According to estimates based on a similar installation
conducted by Columbia Professor John E. Taylor for a research
project, installation costs may be as high as $1000 per unit. This
may be lower when performed on the much larger scale pro-
posed, but at an estimated $750 per large multipoint meter and
$500 per small meter, the total cost of installation may be up to
$200,000. The software could be developed rather quickly by
a team of computer programmers at a likely project cost of less
than $10,000. Finally, this amplified energy infrastructure may ne-
cessitate the hiring of a Facilities electricity infrastructure man-
ager dedicated to running the database as well as an additional
Student Services Representative to help manage the fee pay-
ments, including ensuring the automatic application of students’
financial aid to the charges and their timely posting to students’
accounts. These additional salaries can be liberally estimated to
cost $120,000 per year.
The total cost of purchasing and installing the meters and
LCD monitors, developing graphical feedback and pricing/bill-
ing software, and hiring additional staff will have a cost in the
neighborhood of $600,000 fixed expenditures plus additional
salaries of $120,000 per year. The electricity usage of Columbia’s
undergraduate dorms is on the order of 1,000,000 kWh/month
and electricity prices in New York City are approximately $.18/
kWh,9 amounting to an estimated $180,000 in monthly charges.
While submetering has been demonstrated to prompt residen-
tial electricity conservation of 18-26 percent and the mere pres-
ence of an EIS has prompted short-term savings of up to 55
percent and sustained savings of 5 percent,10 a conservative es-
timate from this pricing plan could put the estimated reduction
at 12.5 percent, or roughly $22,500/month and $270,000/year in
savings.
Next Steps
At today’s prices and market conditions, this plan is not fea-
sible. However, over the next few years as meter prices fall, elec-
tricity demand rises, and economic conditions improve to allow
needed investment in infrastructure, this proposal will be a rel-
evant and prudent course of action.
25
 Numerous variables will dictate the exact repayment period
of these savings, but these assumptions estimate that the sys-
tem will pay for itself within approximately 4 years of being fully
online. Although the university operates on a largely short-term
investment cycle and may be hesitant to embrace these upfront
costs, the EIS is not only a smart investment for its savings of
$150,000 per year, but because the system will enable Colum-
bia to optimize investments in dorms’ energy efficiency, provide
insight on electricity losses and waste, and demonstrate Colum-
bia’s commitment to sustainability and energy conservation in a
meaningful, precedent-setting way.
This system is not only environmentally and financially sound;
it also should not be particularly difficult to sell to students. Al-
though this introduces a rate charge where a fixed fee existed
before, the reduction of students’ housing fees because of this
alternate electricity charge will likely benefit the 60-70 percent
of residents who use less than the per capita average. Further, it
is a more fair allocation of costs because, on average, the highest
consuming 10 percent of residents use 20-25 percent of a build-
ing’s total electricity.11
Conclusion
We acknowledge that a comprehensive EIS will take a very
substantial amount of time for Columbia to put into place, and
may require a greater level of detail than this initial inquiry pro-
vides. We hope that this paper can provide the impetus for
some such investigation, as we believe that an electricity pric-
ing scheme in higher education residences that more closely
reflects that which conventional energy costumers experience,
can empower the most substantive and most important changes
in patterns of consumption among college students, and better
prepare them to be conscious consumers in the future. Colum-
bia, as an institution that prides itself on its leadership within
the realm of academia, must also take this as an opportunity to
set a positive example of fiscally prudent, but conscientious and
relevant environmental practices from which other colleges and
universities may take heed. As efforts to combat anthropogenic
climate change become more entrenched in American society
and an effective carbon pricing scheme takes root, electricity
prices are likely to increase substantially in the near future, while
the cost of metering technology will continue to decrease. Thus,
it is crucial that Columbia begin its investigation of EIS imple-
mentation as soon as possible, in order to take full advantage of
the changing economic conditions that will facilitate its efforts at
conservation.
 Education

Unlike many policy issues the benefits of educational reform may not be immediately appar-
ent but are indisputable. Education fosters progressivism through promoting equal opportuni-
ty and the flow of information. In a progressive society, education is at the core and promotes
active citizenship. We as a center work to further these tenets by exploring, developing, and
hopefully implementing educational reform on the local as well global level.

Roosevelt and New York’s After School Education. This semester the Education Center has
been working with the Partnership for After School Education. PASE is a New York City area
non-profit organization which works over 1,600 partner programs to develop and promote
after school education. The Education Center has worked with PASE to develop a policy
statement on their initiative to promote healthy eating in after school programs. Childhood
obesity has become epidemic in poor and minority communities in New York City. PASE and
Roosevelt hope to create a program that teaches children and parents about the importance
of healthy lifestyle choices. Through tools such as a cookbook and possible partnership be-
tween food providers and after school programs, the initiative hopes to educate and motivate
communities.

Center members have visited PASE partner programs and presented policy to the Children’s
Health Advisory Council, of which the center is a member. Visiting afterschool programs al-
lowed center members to see education policy in action, and the concrete effects that after
school programming has on children. The relationship between PASE and Roosevelt has al-
lowed Roosevelt members to create lasting ties to the New York City community. Mindful of
the need to preserve programs despite budget cuts, the education center hopes to propose
alternative solutions that both streamline existing programs and create efficient new ones.

Green Jobs through Vocational Education
Maddy Joseph and Clare Kelley
In recent decades, education reform movements in the United
States have shifted money and infrastructure steadily towards
test-based approaches to improvement, neglecting funding and
support for vocational education programs. Yet there is strong
evidence that vocational education, like apprenticeship pro-
grams, can increase social inclusion and aid responses to shifting
economic conditions.1 Apprenticeship and vocational programs
are more abundant in various forms outside the United States. In
many European countries, vocational education remains an im-
portant element of social policy, and the ability to learn a trade
is considered a right. This model, however, has flaws including
a lack of flexibility and choice. The United States should im-
prove upon the European model and build a vocational training
program that takes advantage of opportunities in the growing
green jobs sector.
Two basic models for apprenticeship programs exist in Eu-
rope: the U.K. and German models. In the United Kingdom,
vocational education exists as government-regulated appren-
ticeships, where professional organizations and government-
supported job centers help to connect potential trainees and
mentors. In 2001, the British Association of Construction Heads
recommended that apprenticeship programs be expanded, ex-
plaining that apprenticeships are desirable because they provide
on the job training, employer involvement in education, and an
opportunity for trainees to earn while they learn.2
The apprenticeship system in the United Kingdom offers a
useful model for vocational education outside of school. How-
ever, while it provides support and resources for people already
interested in apprenticeships, the program does not offer in-
school programming that can target a wider audience and allow
for students to experiment with different trades.
German schools, in contrast, offer an in-school approach to
vocational education. German children are tracked into different
types secondary schools based on teacher recommendations.
One level of secondary education is focused primarily on voca-
tional education for trades. This system provides strong institu-
tional support for young people who aspire to enter the trades
and starts training at an early age. However, the rigidity of the
system does not allow for the exploration of different options.
Young people often have shifting interests and abilities, and vo-
cational education programs are perhaps most effective and de-
sirable when they do not force people into trades in which they
are uninterested.
Though the United States has recognized the economic
and social importance of vocational education programs, it has
lagged behind other industrialized nations, such as the United
Kingdom and Germany, in their successful implementation.3 Ap-
prenticeship programs in the United States developed without
much regulation until the 1937 Fitzgerald Act created a national
regulatory framework that promoted standards and models of
apprenticeship.4 This trajectory of development ensured that,
despite the Fitzgerald Act’s creation of the Bureau of Appren-
ticeship and Training and despite state offices dedicated to ap-
prenticeship, programs in the United States lack the “supporting
infrastructure of the European models.”5
Concerns about the absence of a coherent system connect-
ing high schools and workplaces and about the economic effects
of this on the skilled workforce prompted the passage of the
School-to-Work Opportunities Act in 1994. The Act has reduced
drop-out rates and increased college enrollment where imple-
mented.6 However, despite the successes of this program and
the recognized need for vocational education, legislation and
reforms like No Child Left Behind have shifted the focus and
funding away from vocational programs to test-based reform.7
The current global economic climate provides an opportunity
to re-shift this focus. As the United States seeks to address ris-
ing unemployment, two policy elements are essential. First are
training and re-training programs that equip workers for skilled
jobs and provide more adequate employment opportunities to
the underemployed and those at risk of losing their jobs. Sec-
ond are programs that look to growing and previously untapped
industries as avenues for job creation. The establishment of an
apprenticeship program that trains young people to go into
the green jobs sector would introduce both of these program
types.
The most recent stimulus bill8 includes funding for a green
jobs training initiative that is funded through the Department of
Labor that both creates new green industries and re-trains work-
ers to enter those industries. However, the program lacks a clear
path to achieving these goals. Though there is a framework for
vocational programs, policy points are vague and lack specific
procedures of implementation.9
An effective approach to a green apprenticeship program
under the Department of Labor (DOL) initiative would be a two-
year certificate program, called Eco Corps, operated through
community colleges. The first year of the program centers on
a classroom-based curriculum focusing on environmental issues
and various opportunities in the green jobs sector. Students will
spend the second year completing an apprenticeship in the cho-
sen field.
Offering the program as a community college degree would
lessen the stigma attached to traditional vocation education
programs run through many high schools. To ensure that no po-
tential participants are excluded from the Eco Corps program
because of financial considerations, comprehensive financial aid
would be provided and apprentices would be compensated on
a staggering scale beginning at 50 percent and increasing to
full pay.
The aim of the certificate’s first year would be to educate par-
ticipants in two areas. The first is the importance of environmen-
tal stewardship and the strong connection between the health
of the economy and the health of the environment. This would
make clear the value of green sector jobs to the economy, the
environment, and to society as a whole. Second, participants
would be educated about a variety of career opportunities in
the green sector. This avoids the negative consequences of the
narrowness of the British and German systems, and as a result,
participants can make informed decisions about their future em-
ployment.
In the second year, participants will be paired with mentors
from their specific, chosen green industries. Apprenticeships
provide hands-on experience and allow workers to enter the in-
dustry with skills already in place. Companies that agree to take
on apprentices should receive a government subsidy to both in-
centivize and cover the cost of the program. Following appren-
tice’s completion of the program, it is hoped that these mentor
companies will hire these experienced apprentices.
America currently lacks a strong and structured framework
for apprenticeship; this proposal’s implementation will create a
foundation for future growth in this area of vocational education.
That the program can potentially fuel both economic growth
and the American green revolution is a broader benefit in which
the skilled workforce can take pride.
Secular Education Against
The Proliferation of Unregulated
Madrassas
Kyu-In Lee and Raul Mendoza
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States be-
gan improving its diplomatic presence in the Muslim world af-
ter decades of neglect. Among the better known American in-
terventions, the U.S. Department of State and other executive
agencies have targeted their efforts towards stamping out ex-
tremist religious education in Muslim madrassas. Events of the
past decade have aroused much antipathy against the United
States. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in Pakistan,
where the Taliban has gained a foothold in the largely tribal ar-
eas of the Northwest. Enrollment in madrassas has grown rap-
idly in this region. It would be a mistake to equate the rise of
enrollment in these institutions with a similar rise in animosity
against the United States. Madrassas serve a vital purpose; pro-
viding an education to those who simply lie beyond the reach of
government. The problem is not the role of religious education,
but the lack of governmental oversight that allows organizations
with known terrorist links to operate madrassas. Any proposed
solution must address several areas: firstly, the Pakistani govern-
ment must put forward a program of direct school financing as
an inducement for madrassas to implement a broad curriculum;
and secondly, the Pakistani Ministry of Religious Affairs must de-
velop a council of Quranic scholars to evaluate the legitimacy
of religious curricula. While the first course of action requires a
distinctly Pakistani response, the latter could be achieved with
the help of the United Nations and Red Crescent nations.
The precipitous increase in the number of madrassas has
strained the ability of the government to effectively monitor the
education progress of the Pakistani youth. During their early
proliferation from 1947-1956, the number of madrassas increased
from 137 to 244.1 This number increased dramatically during the
tenure of General Mohammed Zia Ul-Haq as Pakistani head-of-
state from 1977-88 on account of his generous patronage of re-
ligious schools.2 Because many in Ul-Haq’s loyal military corps
came out of these schools, religious education during his time
also served a political purpose. With the onset of the Soviet inva-
sion in 1979, Muslims from across the region and beyond came
to the madrassas for instruction and ultimately mobilization into
guerrilla units. Unlike madrassas elsewhere in the Muslim world,
Pakistani madrassas focused on the doctrine of jihad as a tool of
ideological mobilization for the purpose of combating the Sovi-
ets. Much of this ideological instruction remains present today.
Recently there has been an exponential increase in the num-
ber of madrassas in Pakistan. In 2005, the number has broken
the 13,000 benchmark. Several thousand of these madrassas cur-
rently remain unregistered as only 11,000 madrassas were regis-
tered according to statistics released by the Pakistani govern-
ment in 2005.3 Unregistered madrassas are highly problematic
because students may not be offered an education that meets
the standards either offered by the public education system or
mandated by religious institutions.4 In addition, unregistered
madrassas do not receive aid offered by the Pakistani govern-
ment’s Madrassa Reform Programme (MRP), which offers federal
financial support to help standardize the privatized madrassas.5
By creating a more tightly enforced, efficient licensing system
for madrassas, the Pakistani government will be able to more ef-
fectively implement the MRP to standardize education and intro-
duce secular subjects such as the sciences, math, and computer
courses in madrassas.
The education offered by the madrassas is usually limited to
religious studies; students are taught how to read and recite the
Qu’ran. As a result, the students who graduate from the madras-
sas are usually employed as imams (priests) or khatibs (lecturers)
at mosques or they are employed by their madrassa.6 Currently,
the curricula of most “reforming” madrassas address the sci-
ences, math, technology, and English. These courses, however,
disappear by the eighth grade, since clerics argue that, beyond
a certain point, these subjects lose their focus on God.7 Some
graduates establish their own madrassas. The current expan-
sion of madrassa graduates also entails a surplus of qualified
candidates for advanced Quranic study as well as the positions
mentioned above. If the madrassas were to offer more secular
and modern courses such as math, sciences, computer related
courses, and foreign languages, then variety of potential occupa-
tions for madrassa graduates would increase. This would mean
that Pakistan’s job market would likewise expand, in turn creating
larger and more diverse job markets in the future. For example,
children who would normally be limited to being employed as
an imam because of their exclusively religious education would
be able to alternatively become engineers if they are offered the
basic science courses. Graduates of the madrassas with a more
diverse education will be able to make better individual career
decisions and join larger job markets.
Yet similar proposals have met failure across Pakistan. Due
to the entrenchment of military officers trained in the madras-
sas during the past two decades, the Pakistani military has ap-
proached its task of enforcing the MRP with ambivalence. Once
cleric describes his experience with the Pakistani government,
“The negotiations (with the government) failed, but this was a
success for us.”8 Also wary of the influence of the Pakistani gov-
ernment in tribal affairs, prominent clerics have blocked the ef-
forts of the government to enforce this policy.9 Opponents of
Madrassa regulation claim that their educational approach does
not advocate violence or antipathy towards the West. Yet the
cleric of the Darul Uloom Haqqania madrassa, where prominent
Taliban leaders were educated, claims that Osama bin Laden is
“a brave and courageous man.”10 According to the leadership of
this madrassa, 1,000 of its pupils left to fight the United States in
Afghanistan and Iraq.11 This madrassa is still active today.
Some critics of Musharraf’s policy, like the International Cri-
sis Group which is a self-described “independent, non-partisan,
source of analysis” for conflict mediation based in Brussels, claim
that Musharraf did not go far enough to force clerics to submit
to state regulation.12 President Musharraf appointed Muhammad
Ijaz Ul-Haq as the Head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.13 Fre-
29
quently invoking the legacy of his father, General Zia Ul Haq, decide the legitimacy of curricula thus eliminating the problem
Ijaz Ul Haq sought to forge a compromise.14 Recognizing the of conflicting religious opinions on jihad. The Pakistani govern-
large degree of autonomy that tribal leaders possess, Ul Haq ment should be ready to furnish educational materials and ad-
positioned himself as friendly intermediary between religious ditional teachers should madrassa clerics request it, but should
leaders and the central government. His relationship with clerics not impose them by force. By enacting such measures, Pakistan
has so far failed to be fruitful. The issue of madrassas in Pakistan can finally achieve what former President Musharraf described
raises larger questions beyond education about the autonomy as “Enlightened moderation” instead of being a hotbed of ideo-
of religious leaders in Northeastern Pakistan. President Mushar- logical war.17
raf relied on the support of this constituency due to its strong Despite the failure of previous reforms and in spite of regional
military ties. His challenge to them was largely responsible for opposition, reform of the madrassas is still possible. The satia-
his recent ouster. After the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and tion of the job market with over-qualified, madrassa-educated
the attacks in New Delhi by Pakistani militants, the need for the students limits the potential of Pakistan’s human capital. The
regulation of madrassas is greater than ever. The government struggle over religious education in Pakistan also represents
has shown, however, that it cannot accomplish this alone. a proxy test of wills between the Karachi government and the
The proposal of offering state-funds to madrassas also expos- chieftains of the outlying areas. Although President Musharraf
es a number of concerns regarding the application of education- attempted to forcefully change the system of madrassa regis-
al funds. Firstly for estimated number of unregistered madrassas, tration during his time in office, his efforts failed on account of
it is possible that state financing would directly fund terrorism. the implicit limitation of their ideological influence. In order to
This is a crucible that the government cannot afford to under- combat the ideological ambiguities of jihad, credible experts in-
take. Rather, the government must offer state funds to religious vited at the behest of the Pakistani government must denounce
schools in exchange for more oversight over the curriculum. Any what they perceive to be as extremism. Since madrassas satisfy
proposed measure would have to encompass secular subjects as the demand for education in some areas, the government should
well as the religious curriculum. The government must assemble not impose itself in a forceful way, but offer incentives for an
a panel of national or international Quranic scholars to ensure ideologically balanced curriculum with more support and teach-
that the religious component of madrassa education encom- ers. Recent events have shown religious extremism manifested
passes Islam broadly and not focus exclusively on jihad. into violent actions have originated from Pakistan exclusively.
The role of jihad in the unregulated Pakistani madrassas is ex- Further reform of the Pakistani school system will ensure peace
cessive. The struggle defined in the Qu’ran as jihad takes many and progress for generations to come.
definitions, predominantly dealing with one’s personal struggles
in overcoming the vices that threaten to obstruct the path to-
wards holiness that the Prophet describes. The more familiar
definition of jihad revolves around a holy war when the faith falls
under attack. In the entire Qu’ran, only fifteen pages deal with
either definition.15 The outright prevalence of militant jihad in the
Quranic education in unregulated madrassas seems to be doing
a disservice to the rest of the religion. In the Haqqania madrassa,
for instance, one cleric denied that students left to go wage jihad
on the Americans in Afghanistan, yet a member of this cleric’s
community claimed that the cleric in question—as well as the
other religious leaders who operate Haqqania madrassa—told
followers, “Go there is a jihad.”16 The clerics that run these insti-
tutions have indicated their unwillingness to deal with the gov-
ernment. The level of commitment the government can expect
from the military is similarly limited. In addition to the problem of
regional loyalties, another pressing problem is how clerics use
their own religion.
Beyond the registration of madrassas, the government of Pak-
istan must also recognize the lessons of the failure of the MRP in
terms of exerting itself over the autonomous tribal chieftains of
the North. These leaders have challenged the apparent religious
neutrality of their own religions to urge their followers on to jihad.
The prevalence of jihad in the curriculum of unregistered ma-
drassas makes this religious extremism appear legitimate. With
the assistance of the United Nations, Pakistan should establish
a national tribunal of preeminent Muslim scholars to determine
which schools do not meet the standards for national registra-
tion on account of their extremist views. This panel should rep-
resent a wide diversity of scholars and clerics from around the
world. Working in conjunction with the Ministry of Religious Af-
fairs and the Ministry of Education, this distinguished panel will
 Foreign Policy

“If civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships - the ability of all
peoples, of all kinds, to live together, in the same world at peace.”
Franklin D. Roosevelt

The year 2009 promises to be a crucial year in American Foreign Policy. The United States must
assert itself as a world power that seeks not to impose its own values, but rather to deal even-
handedly with all nations. Its role must be to protect morality and humaneness, rather than hidden
agendas. Its policies must be lucid in dealing with ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well
as future policies with both allies and nations that harbor anti-U.S. sentiment. It is crucial that the
United States regain its status as a trusted mediator beacon of morality in order for its presence in
international politics to be legitimized once again.

The Obama Administration has inherited foreign relations crises in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result
of the exposed torturing at Abu Gharaib Prison as well as the deprivation of Guantanamo Bay’s
enemy combatants to basic legal rights, President Obama closed the Guantanamo Prison on his
first day of office. While this is a step forward for progressive American policy, it is unclear what
will come of the prison itself as well as the prisoners it housed (i.e. how they will be tried and if they
will be extradited). U.S. Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke has been sent on
a tour of the region and returned reporting that the situation is grimmer than previously reported;
he stated that in Afghanistan the $800 million spent per year on counter-narcotics operations in
Afghanistan is “wasteful and ineffective,” and that violence is spreading from the tribal areas bor-
dering Afghanistan eastward to the city of Lahore.

Rather than the Cold War’s “us versus them” approach, the United States must be willing to engage
all nations in bilateral or multilateral talks. These talks must certainly include the looming issue
of nuclear proliferation and expand its policy to include unrecognized nuclear-weapon states. In
dealing with those nations, a true appreciation and understanding of those cultures is necessary,
whether it be by understanding typical local governing systems or by ensuring the preservation of
its historical landmarks and art. True understanding is the only means to mastering F.D.R.’s “science
of human relationships,” and ultimately will allow us to regain our status as a morally conscious
world power.

Toward a Stronger Nuclear Policy
Sam Klug
The United States has not adjusted its nuclear policy to meet
the challenges of the post-Cold War world. Looking forward,
any potential nuclear threat to the United States will most likely
come from either a rogue state attempting to increase its re-
gional power or from a non-state actor that has acquired nuclear
weapons in the aftermath of state failure. Given the current in-
ternational climate, maintaining over 3,000 nuclear weapons is
unnecessary and dangerous. American policymakers must cast
our country’s nuclear policy not in terms of national strength, but
in terms of global non-proliferation. This reconsideration would
require two new priorities: bringing unrecognized nuclear-weap-
on states into international treaty agreements and significantly
reducing the size of our own arsenal. To address these new pri-
orities, the United States must commit itself to strengthening
current treaties that govern the world’s nuclear weapons.1
The United States is committed to three nuclear-weapons
treaties: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991 (START I),
the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 2002,
and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. START I calls for
verification of all U.S. and Russian nuclear sites, allowing each to
know where the other’s nuclear weapons are located, thus reduc-
ing the potential for another Cuban Missile Crisis. The Moscow
Treaty requires the United States and Russia to reduce their nu-
clear stockpiles to between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons by the end
of 2012, when the treaty expires. Finally, the NPT, the only mul-
tilateral nuclear treaty signed by the United States, established
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors
the nuclear activities of each signatory state, and expresses the
twin goals of global disarmament and non-proliferation.
The United States should attempt to turn both of its bilateral
treaties with Russia into multilateral treaties that include all other
recognized nuclear-weapon states – the U.K., France, and China
– as soon as possible. Former Secretaries of State George Shultz
and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry,
and former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee Sam Nunn argue that the United States must “extend key
provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991” as a
first step toward greater nuclear security.2 START I expires on
December 5, 2009. The Obama Administration should seek to
extend the treaty beyond this date and expand its membership
to include the U.K., France, and China.
The United States should take similar steps to strengthen the
Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. According to
the Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear Matters, the treaty’s requirement for maximum stock-
pile size by the end of 2012, a range of 1,700 to 2,200 weapons,
“is a level that will provide a credible deterrent with the lowest
possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with national
security requirements and Alliance obligations.”3 This statement
epitomizes the Cold War mindset under which American policy-
makers continue to operate. Because the most credible nuclear
threats to the United States will most likely come from rogue
states or terrorist groups, the time for a large stockpile of nucle-
ar weapons to play the role of strategic deterrent has come to
an end.
Therefore, the United States should reaffirm its commitment
to arms reduction on a larger and more multilateral scale. Work-
ing with Russia to extend the Moscow Treaty beyond 2012, the
United States should set a short-term target of reducing arsenals
to 1,000 weapons by 2016. The belief that 1,700 nuclear weapons
(as opposed to 1,000 or 500) would serve as a deterrent to an
attack by a terrorist organization is not plausible. Regarding po-
tential threats from rogue states, continued attempts to enrich
uranium in North Korea and Iran prove that the current U.S. ar-
senal does not successfully deter proliferation in countries that
believe acquiring nuclear weapons is necessary to ensuring na-
tional security or prestige.
Eventually, the United States must also seek to include the
unrecognized nuclear-weapon states – India, Pakistan, and Israel
– in START I and the Moscow Treaty. This task will be difficult,
especially considering the provision in Article XI of START I that
gives “each Party…the right to conduct inspections and continu-
ous monitoring activities” of the other parties.4 While the U.K.,
France, and China are likely to see the success the treaty has
had in reducing alert levels on nuclear weapons in the United
States and Russia as a reason to sign, Pakistan, India, and Is-
rael are unlikely to allow inspections of their nuclear arsenals.
However, agreement on this point is the only way to reduce the
chances of both a nuclear crisis in South Asia and further prolif-
eration in the Middle East. By verifying and monitoring locations
of nuclear weapons in Pakistan, the international community
could provide greater assurance that these weapons do not fall
into the hands of the terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan’s
Northwest Frontier Province. In addition, increased confidence
in Israel’s accounting for and monitoring of its nuclear weapons
would reduce the temptation for countries across the Middle
East – all of whom currently act under the assumption that Israel
possesses nuclear weapons – to seek their own nuclear arsenals
as a means to self-defense.
Presumed unwillingness on the part of these states to sign
START I should not deter the United States and Russia from ex-
tending an invitation to them; it should also not deter the United
States and Russia from pressuring them to accept an invitation.
If these states agreed to reduce the secrecy of their nuclear pro-
grams, but not to adhere to the provisions of Article XI, the Unit-
ed States should urge them to sign a limited agreement. START
I has helped the United States and Russia make significant prog-
ress in regards to nuclear safety by reducing alert levels on both
countries’ nuclear weapons; any extension of this treaty’s prin-
ciples to other nuclear-weapons states is worth pursuing.
A long-term agreement with Russia that sets a goal of re-
ducing stockpiles to no more than 500 weapons should consti-
tute the final goal of the new U.S. nuclear policy. In the recent
article, “The Logic of Zero,” Ivo Laalder and Jan Lodal identify
even 1,000 weapons as excessive, given the current threats to
the United States; at the height of the Cold War, “it was widely
agreed that 400-500 weapons on target would assuredly de-
stroy the Soviet Union’s vast economic and military potential.”5
Acknowledgment of this fact, in addition to recognition that no
threat currently facing the United States possesses the industrial
or military capacity of the former Soviet Union, would lead to
increased support for a policy of further reduction beyond the
1,000-weapon threshold.
As no country other than the United States and Russia has
more than 350 nuclear weapons, the United States should seek
to include all other nuclear-weapon states – recognized and
unrecognized – in a provision of the treaty that, outside of the
NPT, calls for countries not to expand their arsenals under any
circumstances.6 Such a provision would force China, the only
recognized nuclear-weapon state still building new weapons, as
well as India, Pakistan, and Israel, to adhere to a policy of not en-
larging their nuclear stockpiles regardless of their status inside
or outside the NPT.
Security benefits of further disarmament to the United States
lie in the strength such a policy would give to the NPT. The NPT
expresses two fundamental goals: disarmament and non-prolif-
eration. So long as the recognized nuclear-weapon states make
cursory attempts at the former goal, the world will continue to
see the treaty as weak, and thus will shirk on its commitment
to the latter goal. Article VI of the NPT calls upon the five rec-
ognized nuclear-weapon states “to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and ef-
fective international control.”7 While such language only requires
“negotiations” toward disarmament, it does put forth “general
and complete disarmament” as a goal. Regardless of the desir-
ability of complete disarmament from an American point of view,
a strong non-proliferation treaty is undoubtedly in U.S. national
interest. The treaty will never be seen as strong if one of its spon-
sors fails to pursue one of the treaty’s goals.
Negotiated reductions in nuclear weapons on the part of
all five recognized nuclear-weapon states, especially the Unit-
ed States and Russia (who own over 90 percent of the world’s
nuclear weapons), would demonstrate a renewed commitment
to following the NPT’s requirements, exposing failure by states
such as Iran to adhere to the other core principle of the NPT:
non-proliferation. Article II demands “each non-nuclear-weapon
state…not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices,” while Article III calls upon
the same states “to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agree-
ment to be negotiated and concluded with the International
Atomic Energy Agency…with a view to preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.”8 Iran represents the best current
example of a country taking advantage of the weakness of the
NPT to continue proliferation at only a moderate cost in terms
of sanctions and international criticism. Because the IAEA is not
satisfied with Iran’s cooperation regarding Article III – the agency
recently reported that “Iran needs to provide the [IAEA] with
substantive information to support its statements and provide
access to relevant documentation and individuals…to provide
credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities in Iran” – Iran’s adherence to Article II can-
not be verified.9
By renewing their commitment to Article VI of the NPT, the
five nuclear-weapon states would demonstrate the importance
of full compliance with the treaty and expose states such as Iran
that are not in full compliance. Because of the clarity of the con-
trast between those who adhere to the NPT in its entirety and
those who do not, any action taken against a rogue state after
some form of disarmament by the five recognized nuclear-weap-
on states would benefit from broader international support, and
thus could have more wide-reaching effects than the narrow
sanctions on individuals currently levied against Iran.
In a 1960 presidential debate, John F. Kennedy expressed
the fear that “ten, fifteen, or twenty nations will have a nuclear
capacity…by the end of the Presidential office in 1964.”10 Thanks
largely to the treaties enacted since that time, fewer than ten
nations possess such a capacity even in 2009. Despite its detrac-
tors, who cite the examples of India, Pakistan, and North Korea
as nations who left the treaty with impunity, the NPT remains the
strongest document protecting the world from further nuclear
proliferation. By extending the verification provisions of START I,
and by further reducing weapons stockpiles through expansion
of the Moscow Treaty, the United States would demonstrate its
belief in the continued importance of adhering to the NPT. To
ensure that the world never sees ten, fifteen, or twenty nations
with nuclear capacities, the United States must make every effort
to live up to its obligations under the NPT and lead the move-
ment toward further disarmament.
Culture without Bias,
Diplomacy without Propaganda
Justin Floyd and Philip Verma
Cultural diplomacy is an integral component of any pro-
gressive foreign policy. Current U.S. policy, however, does not
recognize the power of freely-exchanged culture in securing
diplomatic links between nations. Because of its world political
position and rhetorical commitment to progressive ideals, the
United States must craft a new cultural diplomacy regime for the
twenty-first century.
Cultural diplomacy, also known as public diplomacy, is the use
of various arts and media to advance a nation’s foreign policy. To
understand the current problems with American cultural diplo-
macy, it is necessary to look at the historical residues of the Cold
War. The Cold War, through efforts by the CIA, United States
Information Agency (USIA), and other organizations, as well as
state-run media outlets such as Voice of America and Radio Free
Europe, saw the creation of a massive web for cultural diplomacy.
These individual components served as instruments with which
the government created a propagandistic message that could
be disseminated to foreign countries, especially hotspots where
Soviet influence was most potent or feared. Many of these insti-
tutions and programs have since ceased operations. Yet, no cul-
tural diplomacy institutions have been created to replace them,
particularly in the 1990s post-Soviet world. And although the col-
lapse of the U.S.S.R. should have warranted a re-examination of
diplomatic policy and its underlying motivations, lingering Cold
War structures remained and continue to form the basis of twen-
ty-first century cultural diplomacy.
The Cold War foreign policy mentality, characterized by an
‘us versus them’ rhetoric and decision-making apparatus, cur-
rently resonates with U.S. governmental efforts to combat so-
called Islamic ‘extremism.’ In both instances, U.S. foreign policy
leaders used alarmist rhetoric to scare the citizenry and garner
support for offensive and defensive measures. For example, the
United States portrayed the Soviets as increasingly threatening
because of their nuclear capabilities and potential to detonate
nuclear weapons. Now, terrorist cells are seen in the same fear-
33
ful light because of their quests to acquire ‘loose nukes’ could
potentially be successful. In both cases, the specter of a nuclear
attack served to increase hostility and American hysteria, thus
swaying American foreign policy towards the antagonistic. Con-
doleezza Rice’s now famous dictum, ‘We don’t want the smoking
gun to be a mushroom cloud,’1 indicates that the same rhetoric of
diplomacy and defense lingers from the Soviet era.
Cultural diplomacy should be given high priority in U.S. for-
eign policy, but it must not have the characteristics of anti-Soviet
policy. During the Cold War, cultural diplomacy was the corner-
stone of a foreign policy that trafficked information, ideas, and
artists around the world. However, it was very much tainted by
the simultaneous and somewhat conjunctive propaganda war of
the time. With an eye to both the successes and failures of these
past policies and adjusting to world affairs today, the U.S. must
craft a cultural diplomatic policy fundamentally based on open
cultural exchange, not pre-packaged propaganda.
Because of the antagonistic history of U.S. cultural diplomacy,
arts packaged directly under U.S.-government auspices today is
immediately open to criticism of biases and message tampering.
Many of these criticisms hit upon central problems of U.S. cul-
tural diplomacy, prime among them the hypocrisy of America’s
foreign image. The United States crafted an international pos-
ture that presented itself as a monolithic state built upon shared
cultural, economic, and political values. Such a model served as
a tool to forge unity against an outside antagonist, first Soviet
Communism and more recently Muslim ‘extremism’ This unity of
purpose—defeating an enemy and protecting the ‘American’ way
of life—treated all forms of opposition could be portrayed as part
of the larger effort to undermine American society For the past
60 years, then, American cultural diplomacy rested upon founda-
tions of antagonism. Uniting both Cold War era and more recent
cultural propaganda efforts is the common misrepresentation
of the ‘American Dream’ as universally accessible. The view that
Americans have unlimited, unrestricted potential for greatness is
constrained by the realities of continued racism, misogyny, and
overarching socio-economic disadvantages. The 1950s saw the
legacies of segregation and racial bigotry systematically purged
in favor of a falsified self-representation of an inclusive, egalitar-
ian American society. These falsifications allowed the American
government to portray its country as an unimpeded teleologi-
cal entity, which then cultivated amongst the American people
a sense of superiority and predestination for greatness. This
model of manipulation has been altered as the twentieth century
progressed, but its root antagonistic spirits remain.
In 2004, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued
that, ‘The values of freedom and democracy—as much, if not
more, than economic power and military might—won the Cold
War. And those same values will lead us to victory in the war on
terror.’2 Historically, the verdict is still out on this issue. But Rice’s
statements are defensible and shed at least partial light on what
happened during the Cold War period. However, what is missing
from Rice’s argument is recognition that concepts of freedom
and democracy were and remain mutable. Furthermore, there
is the continued—and false—assumption that American-made art
inherently carries with it so-called American values like ‘freedom’
and ‘democracy,’ the values that constitute the core of American
exceptionalism.
The freedom with which the United States supposedly won
the Cold War was not one of unfiltered free exchange, whether it
is commercial, intellectual, nor artistic. The last of these realms—
the artistic—was the site of actions that supported freedom and
democracy in name while employing intentionally unfree means
to win the ideological battle. The U.S. government saw the Sovi-
ets as ‘conducting an intensive propaganda campaign directed
primarily against the US and...employing coordinated psycho-
logical, political and economic measures designed to undermine
non-Communist elements in all countries.’ The U.S. government
responded with efforts to reconfigure and polish American cul-
ture for worldwide distribution, creating a press mechanism that
could defeat the Communists. Alleged Soviet propaganda ef-
forts spurred both censorship and active propaganda on the part
of the U.S. government; but, these were excused, as they were
in defense of liberal ideals. The U.S. government’s propaganda
tactics of cultural diplomacy pervaded not only art intended for
foreign distribution but also art produced predominantly for
Americans. For example, after George Orwell’s death in 1950, the
CIA successfully used agents to purchase film rights over Animal
Farm. Thus, when the first silver screen adaptation of Orwell’s
classic emerged in 1955, several plot developments and charac-
ters were altered to inculcate an anti-Communist message. At
the end of the movie, only the ‘communist’ animals are shown in
a negative light, whereas the original book depicted communist
animals and capitalist humans in totalitarian collusion.
This episode illustrates that the United States’ campaign of
propaganda against the Soviets contained much more than just
cheerleading for freedom abroad. The “us-versus-them” mental-
ity pervasive in the U.S. government’s posture was foisted upon
the American public, and involved the articulation of a simple
pro-America, anti-Soviet message. Even on the screen, the com-
plex realities of world politics could never come to light. Thus,
pro-American propaganda not only demonized the Soviets; it ac-
tually cultivated cultural ignorance among the American people.
These policies deprived both the artist and the spectator of their
ability to freely engage with the creative process. By rigging the
arts towards pro-Americanism, the U.S. government confessed
that liberal American art no longer existed. In fighting Commu-
nism, propaganda and artistic manipulation were seen as better
armaments than free cultural exchange.
The American government used its national cultures, spe-
cifically jazz, during the Cold War as a response to Soviet criti-
cisms. The perpetual attack was that, although the United States
preached the ideals of freedom and equality, it was in fact a re-
markably elitist and racist society, perhaps an inevitable result of
capitalism. The United States was further criticized as culturally
inferior to the U.S.S.R. whose investments in cultural programs
sustained the internationally-renowned Bolshoi Ballet among
other groups. Jazz seemed to the American government the
perfect reply to Soviet criticisms. Jazz began in the early twenti-
eth century as black music, but it quickly became popular among
interracial audiences and musicians. Bands often became sites of
racial integration and interaction, symbols of racial harmony that
the government was only too happy to exploit. However, two ma-
jor changes had to occur in jazz’s presentation for it to become
a political tool of diplomacy and propaganda. First, instead of
being presented as solely black music, jazz needed to be framed
as inherently American in nature and universal in appeal. Sec-
ond, it had to be presented as art, not just entertainment. Both
of these changes are evinced by shifts in the period’s discourse
about jazz. Popular middle-class magazines including The New
Yorker and Esquire began to devote more attention to jazz as a
legitimate and respectable music.3 Jazz was meanwhile touted
by writers and politicians alike as America’s art form, with its sup-
posed messages of egalitarianism, coexistence, and freedom.
Once this process of Americanization began, the United
States started exporting jazz around the world as a form of cul-
tural diplomacy. This exportation took two main forms. The first
was radio; Voice of America’s Music USA program began broad-
casting jazz around the world in 1955 to international acclaim.4
The second type was Department of State-funded tours, which
sent musicians across the world as cultural ambassadors. The
famed trumpeter Dizzy Gillespie became the first of these am-
bassadors when he toured eastern Europe, the Middle East, and
Asia in 1956.
However, the government’s presentation of jazz abroad belied
certain realities of the music’s past and present. Embracing jazz
with a “color-blind universalism” obscured the seminal role black
musicians played in jazz’s creation, development, and spread.5
It also obscured the contemporary racial tension in the music
industry. White musicians consistently received better contracts
because they were viewed as less threatening and therefore
more profitable. For example, television companies at the time
did not show integrated bands lest they risk losing their South-
ern audience.6 Voice of America did not broadcast in the United
States for similar reasons. Thus, the masking of jazz disabled the
comprehension of America’s social ills and made manifest mate-
rial disadvantages for black musicians.
Music aside, the United States was still very much a racially di-
vided society, both in law and in practice. In 1956, when Gillespie
began his global tour, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
was only two years old and it would be a number of years before
enforcement of the decision took effect. The schools of Little
Rock had yet to be integrated, and the Rosa Parks-inspired
boycott of Montgomery buses began only two months earlier.
Gillespie would conclude that diplomatic trip, as well as other
trips abroad, before the boycott ended successfully. Jazz was
deliberately presented internationally as the embodiment of the
American Dream but that dream had not yet been fulfilled, re-
vealing a disconnect between the reality of segregation and the
mirage of racial harmony that would haunt the tours for decades.
By propagandizing jazz, the American government formulated
a central paradox of American racial relations: integration and
unity abroad, segregation and bigotry at home.
The second major problem with the jazz ambassadors pro-
gram was that it very often had political undertones. The State
Department almost always sent ambassadors to non-aligned or
Communist-leaning nations in the hopes that cultural diplomacy
would either engender a political alliance or dispel the Soviet
‘myths’ about American culture. Dizzy Gillespie traveled to the
Middle East, Louis Armstrong to Africa, Dave Brubeck to Europe
and Asia, and Benny Goodman to Southeast Asia and later to
the U.S.S.R. Sending cultural diplomats to strategically important
areas is a worthwhile venture in itself, but the Cold War mis-
sions were too often accompanied by covert C.I.A. operations.
Two notable examples include the invasion of Lebanon in 1958
and the assassination of Congolese president Patrice Lumumba
in 1961. These actions occurred after Gillespie’s and Armstrong’s
visits, respectively, and they demonstrate the shallowness of the
United States’ commitment to transparent cultural diplomacy.
Cultural exchange should never be politicized. Political views
will inevitably be manifest in cultural representation but the ex-
ternal injection of politics into cultural interchange is something
that must be avoided.
This is not to say that American efforts at cultural diplomacy
were fruitless or completely bungled. Many important intercul-
tural contacts and relationships were created during this period
but they occurred at personal, informal levels that bypassed the
scrutiny of the Department of State, especially during the pro-
gram’s first fifteen years. Benny Goodman’s band strayed from
the official agenda during its tour of the U.S.S.R. in 1962. His mu-
sicians frequented Moscow’s recently reinstated jazz clubs and
played with local musicians.7 This episode reveals the conflict-
ing interests of the American government and the musicians
it sent as ambassadors. Musicians were interested in fostering
intercultural exchange and spreading their music around the
globe. They wanted to play for the masses, especially youths,
as well as jam with local musicians. On the other hand, the U.S.
government was primarily interested in working with local elites
as a means of cultivating political alliances against Communism.
It was not until Richard Nixon’s presidency that the man in the
street became the intended audience of jazz embassies, perhaps
because Nixon recognized the power of popular resistance.
However, Nixon’s actions should not be taken as a model for cur-
rent cultural diplomacy. Although his efforts to bring American
music to the people of different countries might seem laudable,
his motivations were not. Political and military concerns underlay
every one of his actions and the United States continued to sup-
port coups around the world under his tenure.
A September 2005 report by the Department of State Advi-
sory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy recommended Nixonian
ambassadorial policies. The recommendation had the stated
purpose of mobilizing non-governmental individuals to foment
change abroad.8 This startling continuity in discourse indicates
the problem with government-led cultural diplomacy. Such dis-
course says that ‘diplomacy’ will always take precedent over the
‘culture,’ preventing true artistic exchange. The U.S. government
should therefore leave cultural exchange to those who under-
stand it best, the Benny Goodmans and Dizzy Gillespies of the
world. The most notable achievements of U.S. cultural diplomacy
during the Cold War were ones in which the government played
almost no role. They occurred in the interstices and voids of gov-
ernment policy, the spaces where musical ambassadors could
deemphasize the politics of otherness and reassert the primacy
of artistic achievement and exchange.
The accidental successes of the Cold War program indicate
the importance of interpersonal relationships in fostering cul-
tural understanding. In order to gain the unintended benefits
from interpersonal meetings, the United States should establish
an artistic exchange program within the State Department. This
program should receive a line-item in the federal budget so as to
ensure its funding will not be subject to competition with other
State Department agencies. In this program, a council of musi-
cians, music executives, critics, and scholars would jointly select
small groups of musicians to represent the United States abroad.
The council would also invite and sponsor other countries to
send artists to the United States. A number of provisions must
be made to prevent the politicization of the program. First, the
council should not target specific, politically-salient regions for
cultural bombardment. Instead, funding for the artist exchange
program should be allocated regionally, with funding assigned
35
per region based on the State Department’s overall budget al-
locations for each region. Second, the council should choose
American artists solely on their artistic merits, not for any po-
litical reasons. Finally, the United States should grant foreign
governments the right to choose their representatives and not
censor any group. As a point of comparison, the U.S. government
prevented the Soviet Chorus and Ensemble from performing in
the United States during the late 1950s, effectively heightening
diplomatic tensions and forestalling cultural exchange for years
to come.9 Foreign governments will see that cultural exchange
creates opportunities for increased economic and political inter-
action and will then, hopefully, be motivated to form their own
cultural diplomacy programs. The establishment of this program
by the United States should build myriad avenues of intercultural
relations.
The United States should not end all efforts at publicly fund-
ing and exporting the arts. Funding for the arts both domestical-
ly and abroad should be increased. Instead of a public diplomacy
regime that tends towards the propagandistic, the U.S. govern-
ment should fund institutions and individuals without regard to
their political utility. This can be accomplished within the federal
arts regime. Funding should take place under the National En-
dowment for the Art’s auspices, as the NEA is an independent
agency not engaged in security or military efforts. In order to
further shield cultural diplomacy from political machinations, the
NEA should reinstate its policy whereby individual artists may re-
ceive NEA sub-grants, a policy which was eliminated along with
much of the entire NEA’s budget during the 1995 budget cycle.
Funding individuals requires investment without much control
over the final product.10
At the same time that American artists should be sponsored
to go abroad, there must be increased awareness of foreign art-
ists in the United States. The free exchange of art is a circuitous
process, in which creators and their products travel back and
forth across cultural boundaries. One of the main flaws of pro-
grams like Radio Free Europe and Voice of America was the lack
of reciprocity between foreign consumers and American produc-
ers. In order to increase the volume of foreign voices in America,
radio outlets that are either publicly-owned or the results of
public-private partnerships must devote at least five percent of
their weekly programming to international artists. Furthermore,
to prevent foreign entertainment from being placed in grave-
yard timeslots, compliance with this regulation will be measured
based on ratings figures instead of merely one-to-one hour ra-
tios. Such requirements will show a commitment to the importa-
tion of international arts, and American cultural ignorance will
be reduced.
U.S. foreign policy should be augmented so that the residue
of past political antagonisms does not stain current cultural di-
plomacy efforts. If there is any message the United States should
impart, it should be a subtle one in which the process of cul-
tural exchange is more important than the culture itself. In other
words, the government should not try to treat cultural diploma-
cy as a way to sell American culture or showcase the so-called
American Dream. The United States promoting free cultural
exchange would provide a stronger message about our inten-
tions—perhaps even our culture—than an ideologically-tainted
artistic mission ever could.
After Guantánamo
Eric J. Schorr
The events of September 11, 2001 proved to be some of the most
trying and difficult the United States has seen since World War II
and the assault on Pearl Harbor. The political, military, and even
social responses to that day’s events have helped shape the poli-
cies and direction of the U.S. government for the last seven years.
President Bush initiated two military conflicts, one in Afghanistan
and the other in Iraq, partially in an effort to pursue his adminis-
tration’s goals in the newly outlined War on Terror. One factor of
any war is the inevitability of capturing prisoners or enemy com-
batants. However, unlike previous national conflicts, the global
War on Terror has resulted in persons whose prisoner status is
not clearly defined. The United States, although engaged in mili-
tary conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, is in fact not officially at war
with those countries. Therefore, traditional rules of war regard-
ing captured enemies do not apply creating a void in defining
how armies should deal with captured enemies. This absence in
policy necessitates a new and innovative plan that will combine
U.S. military detention, international prosecution, and third party
rehabilitation; all vital elements for addressing this issue.
For the purposes of the forthcoming argument, when stating
“captured enemy combatants,” “jihadists,” “captured terrorists,”
etc., the defined terms refer to individuals who are arrested or
captured under suspicion of terrorist acts against the United
States, its citizens, and its allies. This definition includes only in-
dividuals who are not charged with capital crimes, that is to say,
crimes or acts of terrorism that would warrant a punishment of
execution. By limiting the scope of this definition, it is possible to
address the main policy issues facing the United States concern-
ing captured terrorists. As dictated in the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, the formal definition used for captured, non-state
aggressors is understood to apply to anyone “engaged in hos-
tilities … against the United States … who is not a lawful enemy
combatant.”1 According to this definition, these individuals are
not covered by international law, and no official precedent exists
for properly dealing with them.
Critique: Obama’s Orders
Immediately following his inauguration, President Barack
Obama issued a series of executive orders concerning the de-
tention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. President Obama’s or-
ders describe new policies to deal with the prisoners currently at
Guantánamo, as well as to facilitate the prison’s closure. In Sec-
tion 2 of the executive order Review and Disposition of Individu-
als Detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure
of Detention Facilities, the Obama outlines specific conditions
for detainees currently held at the base. Obama declares that
“individuals currently detained at Guantánamo have the consti-
tutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus” as well as the
chance for prosecution only following a formal review process.2
The order also states that,
If any individuals covered by this order remain in
detention at Guantánamo at the time of closure of
those detention facilities, they shall be returned to
their home country, released, transferred to a third
country, or transferred to another United States de-
tention facility in a manner consistent with law and
 the national security and foreign policy interests of
the United States.
This broad description leads to the open-ended question,
“What law?” Is the President referring to domestic U.S. law, U.S.
military law, international law, or perhaps even the laws of the
prisoner’s home country? It seems it would not be the last pos-
sibility, for that would compromise U.S. jurisdiction over these in-
dividuals. But the question of what law President Obama means
remains a prevalent one, and its answer is necessary to properly
understand his policy agenda.
In Section 4 of his executive order, President Obama calls for
an official review of all Guantánamo detentions. The first part
orders a review to identify “whether it is possible to transfer or
release the individuals.”3 Should some individuals not be able
to be transferred, the review is to move onto the possibility of
prosecution. The order declares that “the cases of individuals
detained at Guantánamo not approved for release or transfer
shall be evaluated to determine whether the Federal Govern-
ment should seek to prosecute the detained individuals for any
offenses they may have committed.”4 Finally, the last section of
the order approaches the situation of individuals who do not ap-
ply for either transfer or prosecution. The order states that “the
Review shall select lawful means, consistent with the national se-
curity and foreign policy interests of the United States and the
interests of justice.”5 The order leaves the president wide lati-
tude of discretion in terms of how to implement his policy. The
problem with such leeway is that an official policy does not exist,
leaving both a political and an operational gap in addressing the
issues in handling captured terrorists. Although the President’s
executive orders attempt to sort out the many issues associated
with captured enemy combatants currently held at Guantánamo
Bay, they fail to describe or even institute formal policy that will
solve the difficulties in releasing, prosecuting, or even rehabilitat-
ing captured terrorists. Furthermore, in ordering the closure of
Guantánamo Bay “no later than 1 year from the date” of his order,
President Obama limits the time-frame necessary to formulate
policy for accurately managing the detainees held at the base.6
Critique: The Army Field Manual
The Army Field Manual, the basis for all U.S. military actions
and functions both domestic and abroad, details a number of sec-
tions associated with Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW’s). In Field
Manual 19-4, only two of the portions of the document remotely
apply to the pretext of captured enemy combatants. Nowhere
among any of the sections are guidelines given to deal with the
issues that arise when faced with EPW’s. Nowhere in the policy
are the terms for such prisoners clearly defined, nor are instruc-
tions provided to handle such individuals. Without carefully de-
fined terminology and procedural measures, army personnel are
left at a considerable disadvantage in implementing appropriate
actions. The federal government needs proper policy to ensure
that the military observes regulations and upholds the interests
of the United States.
Method of Reform: Rehabilitation
One option for handling captured jihadists, explored
by a number of countries but overlooked by the United States,
is the process of rehabilitation. In the Kingdom of Saudi Ara-
bia, efforts to deal with the increasing number of homegrown
extremists have led to a new series of initiatives at special in-
stitutions, aimed at “deprogramming” jihadists.7 Saudi Arabia is,
unfortunately, the top country in the world in producing jihad-
ists and Islamic extremists, as illustrated by the Saudi majority of
September 11th hijackers.8 Reporting on the program in a New
York Times article, Katherine Zoepf writes, “the Saudi govern-
ment tends to explain its rehabilitation program in purely Islamic
terms, as an effort to correct theological misunderstandings.”9
By addressing the core elements that breed jihadist mentality,
the Saudi program combats the problem at its root. Above all,
the Saudi program may reap its biggest reward in providing an
example for others to follow. Other Islamic nations may look to
Saudi Arabia for guidance in managing their concerns and grow-
ing problems with jihadist militancy, making success in the King-
dom all the more necessary.
The United States, on the other hand, does not have a formal
rehabilitation program. According to Cmdr. Jeffrey Gordon, a
Pentagon spokesman for Guantánamo, the main purpose of U.S.
detention facilities such as Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib
are to “keep dangerous enemy combatants off the battlefield.”10
There currently exists no formal policy dealing with the pros-
pect, let alone functioning program, for the rehabilitation and re-
integration of captured enemy combatants. However, individual
cases do exist where efforts are being made to treat captured
terrorists, such as a small initiative in Iraq under Maj. Gen. Doug-
las Stone. Using a process of separation, alienating the “truly
hardened extremists from those who had potential to abandon
violence,” Maj. Gen. Stone formed a program to deradicalize in-
dividuals who have the potential to give up their extremist ways.11
Still, the small number of private efforts aimed at rehabilitation is
not enough to fill the vacant space in need of formal policy.
Method of Reform: Release & Transfer
A second option in handling captured combatants is releasing
or transferring them to foreign countries. Under this technique,
the United States moves a captured terrorist from his detention
facility to either to his native country or to a third country, often
Saudi Arabia.12 The initial issues with such policy stem from a lack
of cooperation or willingness on the part of the individual’s na-
tive country. The most critical issue with release or transfer is the
propensity of captured jihadists to return to the business of ter-
rorism and fundamentalism. Most recently, on January 27, 2009,
Fox News reported it obtained a video of a former Guantána-
mo inmate, Abdallah Ali al-Ajmi, before he committed a suicide
bombing attack in Mosul, Iraq that killed twelve people. Al-Ajmi
had been previously released and transferred to his home coun-
try of Kuwait in 2005.
When local governments neglect the essential factors in-
volved with containing these dangerous individuals following re-
lease and transfer, they abandon their responsibility to both the
United States and the international community, and any positive
efforts made by the United States are ultimately compromised
and the policy is a failure.
Policy Proposal: Triangle Policy
In order to fill the void of no official policy position, U.S. legis-
lators may benefit from a new, more conditional policy sugges-
tion that incorporates many of the aspects previously discussed.
By considering all of the angles that are necessary for properly
dealing with captured terrorists, the United States will set a
precedent that can be followed by its allies and other countries
around the world.
Triangle Policy is a system by which three main actors, not
necessarily three distinct countries, work together to accomplish
a set of goals. This policy structure would be the foundation for
37
conditions in managing the dilemma of handling captured ter-
rorists. The first piece of the triangle centers on the capture and
detention of the individual under the supervision and jurisdiction
of the United States military. Adhering to the regulations of the
Army Field Manual, though introducing new sections with clearly
defined terms and additional conditions not previously included,
the military would have complete control over where and how
the individual is detained. To address concerns over issues such
as exploitation and abuse of power, a congressional commit-
tee should be formed to facilitate proper civilian oversight and
thereby assuage political concerns for what President Obama
calls the “the U.S. commitment to human rights, civil liberties and
the rule of law.”13 The focus of the policy puts the United States
in direct control over all detention facilities and procedures. By
doing so, individuals captured over the course of military opera-
tions will stay under the direct supervision and jurisdiction of the
United States military.
The second aspect of the policy requires the inclusion of a
judicial body able to properly prosecute and convict these in-
dividuals in accordance with the conditions of war, specifically
the untraditional War on Terror. Under these circumstances, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) is the most feasible venue in
which to address the issues of war crimes and crimes against
humanity most often associated with acts of terror. By includ-
ing the ICC in the process of dealing with captured terrorists,
the United States can properly defend its own detention policy
while adhering to the international rule of law. Captured individ-
uals are not American citizens and therefore warrant a neutral,
objective judicial body to perform appropriate, impartial, and
just prosecutions.
The last function of the Triangle system integrates a third ac-
tor to administrate the process of rehabilitation. Under the con-
ditions associated with fundamentalist Islam, or what is consid-
ered “the jihadist mentality”, convicted terrorists should be sent
to rehabilitation facilities in Saudi Arabia that are capable of ac-
curately handling the provisions of religious ideology. The Saudi
program seems the most suitable for such conditions. The Saudi
Arabian government defines its rehabilitation services in strictly
religious terms, and attempts to combat the mentality of funda-
mentalist jihad in order “to correct theological misunderstand-
ings.”14 By including the Saudis in the process of dealing with
captured jihadists, specifically in the administration of psycho-
logical and medical treatment, the United States lends further
legitimacy to its overall support for the rehabilitation program.
The jihadists are under the supervision of a Muslim government,
and their treatment is defined “in purely Islamic terms.”15
Conclusion
The War on Terror has undoubtedly led to a rise in the num-
ber of groups and individuals aiming to cause harm and destruc-
tion directly to the United States and its allies. It is clear that,
currently, no real policy exists in the United States to properly
handle and manage captured enemy combatants. In order to fill
this procedural gap, the federal government should adopt a sys-
tem of practical measures, such as those of Triangle Policy, which
creates mechanisms for adequately dealing with captured jiha-
dists. Detention, prosecution, and finally, rehabilitation, are the
cornerstones of a solid policy foundation that will guarantee the
United States can satisfy its domestic and global interests.
Swat Valley and Beyond:
Re-examining American Efforts in Pakistan
Christine Choi
In 1969 the shari’a based legal system in Pakistan’s Swat Valley
was exchanged for a federally backed judiciary. By the 1990s,
the system had grown so corrupt and inefficient that many in the
region agitated for a return to the “simple, if sometimes brutal”
shari’a law codes.1 At the time, such a movement never amounted
to a formal agreement. But in the past two years, the Taliban-
backed uprising in Swat Valley has left 1500 civilians dead and
200,000 more displaced.2 The combination of administrative
and civic upheaval resulted in an agreement between the local
government and insurgents this past February, a cease-fire in ex-
change for shari’a-based courts.3
This is certainly not the restoration of order Swat Valley resi-
dents had in mind back in the 1990s. While violence against
prominent civilians and military officers has remained steady
it is also unclear how long the 120,000 female students in the
area will stay in school, and residents have continued to flee the
area. Furthermore, the cleric responsible, Sufi Muhammad, and
his son-in-law, Mullah Fazlullah, have tightened deadlines and
refused to compromise with the government on the judges ap-
pointed to the shari’a courts.4
The unraveling of the cease-fire seemed to justify the con-
demnation of observers who decried the deal as a concession
that would embolden radicals in an already volatile area.5 How-
ever, other members of the international community, alongside
the Pakistani government and military, argued that it was a tacti-
cal move meant to restore stability and separate more moderate
militants from truly dangerous radicals.6
Either way it is viewed, the cease-fire is a messy situation that
leaves little room for maneuvering. Reneging on the deal could
mean an insurgent backlash that will result in the further desta-
bilization of Swat Valley. Allowing it to remain intact, however,
would potentially allow for the consolidation of Taliban-based
forces in the region. But this is not the only factor. The situation
in Swat Valley is a microcosm of larger troubles plaguing both
the country and American and European-backed efforts across
the region.
Focusing on Pakistan
It has become widely recognized that “winning the war” in
Afghanistan, now entering its eighth year, hinges on the coop-
eration and stability of Pakistan,7 particularly since the country
has been identified as the seat of various radical networks that
have been responsible for attacks as nearby as Karachi and as
far away as London.8
The two countries share a 1500 mile border, and numerous
extremists who were routed by the 2001 U.S. invasion fled to
the Pakistani side, so much so that Quetta, the capital of Paki-
stan’s Baluchistan province, has now become an Afghani Taliban
stronghold.9 Furthermore, the border region is poorly overseen
by both governments as it is considered a “soft” border. As such,
the region has become notorious for the ease with which drugs
(such as Afghanistan’s crop of opium), militants, and arms slip
across in either direction.10
The issues extend deeper into Pakistan, into provinces as cen-
tral as Punjab and cities as financially developed as Karachi. The
country’s volatile political and economic situation has provided
fertile breeding grounds for local and international militant and
radical groups that have created multi-layered, variously-linked
networks with a plethora of agendas that, in turn, have contrib-
uted to further destabilization.11
It doesn’t help that Pakistan’s government and military have a
long legacy of supporting militant groups to promote geopoliti-
cal agendas. Furthermore, numerous military dictatorships have
often trampled on the country’s shaky democratic foundations,
destroying public confidence in the government. This has fos-
tered civil unrest and hampered efforts by other governmental
elements to track down and prosecute radicals who are under-
cutting infrastructural and economic development, All of these
factors have helped facilitate the growth of militant and radical
groups in Pakistan.12
Additionally, any internal government reforms that do occur
will have little worth in the long term if the country does not
develop its economy and infrastructure. Unemployment and a
poor education system, particularly against the backdrop of a
youthful Pakistani population disillusioned by the government’s
internal strife, create an ideal pool of potential recruits for many
militant groups.13
American Policy
American efforts must work in tandem with those of the Paki-
stani government, but the United States cannot and should not
attempt to stabilize the region with broad strokes of policy. In-
stead, a pragmatic approach that identifies and addresses sourc-
es of weakness is necessary. As such, there are three specific
areas that any American policy must target: overdependence on
military intelligence, the legal status of the border regions, and
national economic and infrastructural development on the pro-
vincial and local scale. By no means will resolving these issues
result in the elimination of militant and radical groups, but nei-
ther can any efforts to stabilize Afghanistan occur without them.
From the September 11th attacks onward, the United States’
material support to Pakistan manifested itself in monetary aid
for the country’s military operations,14 which, while presumably
directed towards the country’s fight against militants, were also
unaccounted for by U.S. officials.15 President Obama’s recent shift
in strategy seeks to change such a pattern by developing bench-
marks for Pakistan’s counterterrorist efforts and shifting the fo-
cus from blind monetary support for the Pakistani military to
specifically delineated training of the country’s forces.16 While
such criteria have not yet been determined, the Obama adminis-
tration’s change in policy is a step in the right direction.
However, alterations in military and combat strategy alone
will not suffice: American officials must also apply pressure in the
realms of Pakistan’s political and civic life. This means insisting
on the independence of the judiciary, particularly the Supreme
Court, and respecting the electoral mandate.17 Both need to oc-
cur in order to restore popular confidence in the government,
which is currently viewed as ineffectual. Furthermore, the Unit-
ed States must pressure Pakistan to revisit the political and legal
status of the tribal provinces, one of which, the Federally Admin-
istered Tribal Area, continues to be governed under an antiquat-
ed code that has not been revised since 1901.18 The civic limbo
in which these provinces exist has been identified as a source of
hostility towards Islamabad and must be eliminated.19
There is also much the United States specifically can, and
must do, in terms of expertise and financial support. In order
to reduce Pakistan’s dependence on the military and its intel-
ligence, the United States must help to develop a plan alongside
the Pakistani government to expand non-military intelligence
agencies by redirecting current monetary aid for the military
and American expertise into such endeavors. Furthermore, the
United States must help to oversee the economic and infrastruc-
tural development of the country, another source of popular dis-
content. The Obama administration has set aside $750 million
for the development of Pakistan’s tribal belt in addition to billions
in aid for Pakistani citizens. Once again, this is a step in the right
direction, but a cohesive plan towards Pakistan’s infrastructural
and economic development, particularly on a local level, and
working directly with provincial and community-based leaders
and organizations, must emerge.
Having sketched an overview of the situation, this paper at-
tempts to further explore the varying factors that determine
Pakistan’s current situation and recommendations towards U.S.
policy in the country.
Pakistan’s Shaky Democracy
In the sixty-two years since its inception, the Republic of Paki-
stan has seen thirty-three years of rule under military presidents.
Most recently, former president General Pervez Musharraf
seized power in 1999 in a bloodless coup and only ceded control
of the government last year upon the prospect of impeachment.
This is indicative of the nature of Pakistan’s political system, one
in which, out of historical and cultural necessity, the military plays
a key role in state affairs.20
Intelligence also largely lies in military hands. Of the country’s
three national intelligence agencies, the military’s Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate (ISI) remains the most powerful and, un-
like its oft-cited U.S. counterpart, the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy,21 answers to neither the executive nor legislative branch.22
Founded in 1948 to facilitate the coordination of information
between Pakistan’s three military branches, the ISI’s role was fur-
ther developed in the 1950s under President Ayub Khan, who,
as a Commander-in-Chief of the army, seized power in a military
coup. In order to help sustain martial law during his term, he
shifted the accountability of the ISI to the president rather than
the Commander-in-Chief.23 But throughout the 1980s (which will
be discussed shortly) and since then, its role has expanded so
greatly that it is now often referred to as a “state within a state,”
held accountable neither by the President, the Prime Minister or
the Army’s director.24
While the ISI possesses the power to operate independent-
ly of the army, its ties to the military remain intact: many in its
10,000 member staff are members of the military; it draws its di-
rectors from the army’s pool of lieutenant generals; its main func-
tion continues to be the coordination of intelligence amongst
the country’s military divisions.25 Such lack of supervision means
that the ISI has been able to pursue its own agenda, regardless
of official government policy. it has acted both independently
and in conjunction with the central government, and, as such,
its role within Pakistan’s government is hazy. What is clear, how-
ever, is that due to its power, it is able to pursue an agenda that
may or may not coincide with Islamabad’s.26 As such, the ISI may
best be described as the military’s powerful and independent
intelligence branch that, while at times working with the central
government, is not held accountable in any other governmental
capacity and is thus able to pursue its own agenda. Thanks to
the close ties between the government, military and ISI (particu-
39
larly as officials from one organization have fulfilled roles in an-
other), the ISI’s goals have converged with those of the executive
branch. However, due to the recent official shift in government
policy away from the support of militant groups, the ISI has been
described as fulfilling ulterior governmental agendas that have
not been a part of Islamabad-sanctioned policy but rather the
result of Pakistan’s military-oriented history.27
As such, the ISI greatly overshadows its civilian counterparts,
the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), the National Intelligence
Bureau (NIB) and the provincially-based Criminal Investigation
Departments (CID). The three organizations are, in contrast to
the ISI, staffed by civilians and remain accountable in both an
official and practical capacity to the legislature and president,
tasked with carrying out official Islamabad-sanctioned policy.
Technically, the CID and FIA are tasked with criminal investiga-
tions, while the NIB, the civilian-based counterpart to the ISI, is
responsible for gathering intelligence.28 However, all three are
understaffed, underfunded and underdeveloped, thus limiting,
for all practical purposes, any capacity to execute such tasks.
They have been described as lacking “the resources and the
authority to meet their potential,”29 and, consequently, suffering
from deep-seated corruption. Furthermore, these civilian-based
agencies not only rely on the ISI for data but, given such de-
pendence, are unable to pursue an agenda independent of the
ISI.30
What does such an agenda entail? As mentioned, the ISI’s
relationship with both the executive branch and its agenda has
remained unclear.31 However, the long legacy of close ties be-
tween the presidency, military and ISI ensures that, for much of
its history, the ISI’s goals have aligned with or served the goals
of the central government. In this manner, one of the ISI’s chief
functions has been to develop relations with and facilitate the
use of proxies in Pakistan’s geopolitical struggles by contacting
and supporting various militant groups, including many that are
considered unsavory by the United States, as a means of assert-
ing the Pakistani government’s agenda in regional conflicts.
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the United
States urged Pakistan to facilitate insurrection along the Afghan
border that would destabilize the Soviet regime and lead to its
departure.32 Complying, the Pakistani government oversaw the
growth of the ISI in this capacity, using the organization as a chan-
nel through which to provide Afghani mujahedeen that waged
war against the Russians money and arms from the CIA.33
Following the departure of Soviet forces and the subsequent
power vacuum, southeastern Afghanistan was subsumed in
1990s by civil wars amongst various tribal leaders. As a means of
stabilizing the region, the ISI began to foster relations with the
Pashtun-based Taliban, providing intelligence and arms.34
Despite a change in policy following September 11, 2001, in
which the Pakistani government withdrew official support for
Kabul’s Taliban regime and extremist organizations within Paki-
stan,35 the links continue to this day; the Afghani Taliban hold
on Quetta is widely recognized as having been facilitated by
the ISI.36 Furthermore, according to the March 2009 New York
Times article “Afghan Strikes by Taliban Get Pakistan Help, U.S.
Aides Say,” Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt described the claims
of American officials, who stated that “the Taliban’s widening mili-
tary campaign in southern Afghanistan is made possible in part
by direct support from operatives in Pakistani’s military intelli-
gence agency, despite Pakistani government promises to sever
ties to militant groups fighting in Afghanistan.”37 While it is un-
clear to what extent such an agenda has been facilitated by the
upper echelons of the agency, U.S. officials have asserted that
even midlevel officials have provided both material and tactical
support to the Taliban in preparation for the proposed increase
of American troops in Afghanistan.38
Due to the agency’s long history with the Taliban, it is no won-
der that the United States is government doubts the extent to
which the ISI will be cutting off ties with Taliban and other mili-
tant groups despite recent Pakistani pledges.39
The diverse network of militants and radicals that exist in Paki-
stan are linked in any number of ways and motivated by a range
of agendas. Groups such as the Taliban have roots in Pashtun
law codes, while many, many others fall under the ideology of
puritanical Deobandi Sunni ideology. Still others, such as al-
Qaeda, have a more international scope. Alignments between
the groups shift, and many often draw recruits from a variety of
pools across the country. Whatever the relationship between
the organizations, it is clear that the country’s government, par-
ticularly via the military’s intelligence branch, has a long history
of facilitating their development as a means of furthering politi-
cal agendas. Only following the September 11, 2001, attacks did
Pakistan begin to undergo an official change in policy toward
such groups, but whether such ties will be cut off in reality re-
mains to be seen.
Another recent change that has yet to be tested in the long
term is Pakistan’s stabilization as a democracy. Much of Mushar-
raf’s presidency was characterized by the rise of new militant
groups and deals between Islamabad and such organizations
to rig elections and gain majority coalitions over various locali-
ties.40 While Musharraf’s resignation signaled the end of military
power and such wheeling and dealing, the transition to current
president Zardari merely shifted concern to the independence
of the Supreme Court. Zardari recently ensured in a Supreme
Court ruling that his political rival, former prime minister Nawaz
Sharif, would be kept from assuming his elected seat at the gov-
ernorship of a province. Civil unrest and numerous protests
followed until the chief Supreme Court justice Iftikhar Muham-
mad Chaudhry, viewed as independent of Zardari’s interests,
was reinstated. This led to hopes that both electoral mandate
and commitment to democracy would be respected.41 However,
again, only time will tell if such commitment will be or can be
sustained.
It is no wonder that there is such little faith in Pakistan’s de-
mocracy. Zardari may not be a military general, but the dispute
over the Supreme Court and the intense contentiousness with
Sharif is another characteristic of the Pakistani political system
in which institutions meant to serve as checks on the executive
branch are severely politicized and squabbling and unrest be-
tween political factions distract from issues such as counterter-
rorism.
Stabilizing the Government,
Reworking Intelligence
Hence there are three major factors that have superseded
any semblance of Pakistani democracy. Firstly, military power
and intelligence, rather than electoral mandate, has too often
played the key role in determining the source of governmen-
tal power. Secondly, the government’s deal making with various
militant groups has further damaged any electoral mandate and
facilitated the rise of such groups. Thirdly, competition amongst
political parties and the resulting politicization of the judiciary
have also impeded any institutions intended to serve as a check
against executive power.
There is little the United States can do beyond pressuring
Zardari to continue to respect the independence of the Pakistani
Supreme Court allow Sharif to assume his governorship, and en-
sure the continuation of fair elections. Two more policy possibili-
ties are to either condition American assistance on the basis of
perceived political stabilization or ally the United States with
Sharif on the understanding that Zardari faces such little popular
support that aligning the United States with the current presi-
dent will produce little in the way of tangible results. However,
pursuing both strategies on an official level would most probably
deepen the perception of American meddling in a populace that
has become wary of such foreign influence. Instead, what the
United States can and must do in terms of the administration is
to help in the development of civilian-based intelligence agen-
cies that are accountable to the central government, providing
both funds and training for intelligence and counterterrorist or-
ganizations.
Doing so would result in the circumventing of longstanding
Pakistani relations between government, military intelligence,
and militant groups, relations which have strengthened over the
years, even after the government’s post-9/11 change in policy. Ar-
naud de Borchgrave, the Director of Transnational Threats at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes:
In the 1980s, during the Soviet occupation of Af-
ghanistan, some 1,300 Pakistanis attended U.S. war-
staff colleges. … And over the past eight years, it was
a paltry 98. Senior Pakistani officials are reluctant
to accept U.S. counterterrorism training or to partici-
pate in combined operations. But they have accept-
ed 25 military trainers to advise selected members of
the Frontier Corps, raised from tribes in FATA, who
will then train others fighting Taliban and al Qaeda
terrorists.42
But the seeds for the successful development of the three
civilian based intelligence agencies arguably do exist. The Inter-
national Crisis Group notes that “the Bhutto and Sharif govern-
ments’ attempts at curtailing Islamist radicalism in 1995 and 1997-
1998, respectively, were more thorough than Musharraf’s exactly
because they relied on civilian law enforcement and the courts
rather than the military.”43
While the situation has drastically changed since the 1990s,
Pakistan must begin by curtailing not only the power of the ISI
and military but also lifting technical limitations on the civilian
intelligence and police forces, forces staffed by civilians without
current ties to the military and operating under the aegis of Is-
lamabad. As the FIA, NIB and CID do not have the funds, man-
power or training to obtain their own information, they often de-
pend on the ISI to supply them with the basic intelligence, such
as mobile phone records, that they rely on to track down and
prosecute militants and extremists. Furthermore, these agencies
lack the equipment, including forensics labs, to effectively gather
evidence for cases.44 Additionally, witnesses who are often cru-
cial to the prosecution of militants are not protected and thus
remain in fear of testifying. The creation of a witness protec-
tion program is thus absolutely necessary.45 As such, U.S. sup-
port must help such civilian-based agencies in developing their
own means of obtaining and storing records of intelligence and
provide the equipment necessary for their operations. By doing
so, the United States would help the FIA and NIB develop into
intelligence and criminal investigation entities strong enough to
pursue agendas and cases independent of those of the ISI.
Furthermore, the underdevelopment of such civilian agencies
means that personnel lack the proper training through which
they are able to effectively serve in intelligence and counter-
insurgency capacities. As de Borchgrave noted, there remains
resistance to U.S. sponsored counterterrorism education, Amer-
ica must provide some measure of development in this manner
through expertise and the funding of such training. If current
trends against American-facilitated training prove to be an im-
pediment, the United States must develop a program alongside
the local government to train a select group of Pakistani recruits,
particularly younger officers, who will then be able to aid in the
development of such programs within Pakistan’s intelligence and
counterinsurgent agencies. Only by facilitating the material and
tactical development of these agencies will Pakistan’s civilian in-
telligence community be able to play a more prominent role in
mitigating both the strength of militant groups and producing a
longer legacy of governmental and military ties to such organiza-
tions.
The Tribal Belt: The Durand Line
Beyond the strife occurring in Islamabad, the country’s more
remote regions play a crucial role. Swat Valley is located in Paki-
stan’s North West Frontier Province that, along with the Feder-
ally Administered Tribal Area and the province of Baluchistan,
comprises a large swath of territory bordering Afghanistan. The
provinces, particularly FATA and NWFP, are dominated by tribes
of ethnic Pashtuns, of whom some 40 million live on either side
of the 1500 mile-long Durand Line, with 25 million in Pakistan.
As such, these regions play a crucial role for militant groups, and
it is widely known FATA and NWFP host training grounds and
bases for organizations such as the Taliban.46
The key difference between the two areas is in jurisdiction;
whereas NWFP falls under the rule of Pakistan’s federal govern-
ment, FATA is semi-autonomous and governed by a set of laws
known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR).47 The FCR
were established by British mandate in 1848, back when Paki-
stan was India’s northwest frontier, and were continually revised
until 1901. They are frequently criticized as antiquated and in
violation of several human rights tenets and, as such, many of
Pakistan’s judiciary have condemned the Regulations’ provisions,
including those regarding trial procedure and arrest and deten-
tion, as dated and out of step. Last year, the Pakistani parliament
expressed a desire to repeal the FCR, one supported by popular
sentiment in the FATA, but official action has yet to arise from it.48
Endowing FATA with a separate legal status that is not only iso-
lating but roundly criticized has stirred national discontent with
Islamabad’s policies.
FATA’s political status has also been criticized as isolating:
while FATA was granted universal national enfranchisement in
1997 and is represented in the National Assembly, it does not
have any regional representation in the NWFP legislature as it
does not come under the jurisdiction of the province. Despite
the fact that residents of FATA are affiliated with various parties,
political parties are officially barred from operating in the region
as the Pakistan Political Parties Act does not extend there. As
such, Nawaz argues, “This has given a free field of operation to
the religious groups, affiliated with various political parties” and
41
“the lack of political participation has also created a sense of
deprivation of rights and alienation from Pakistan proper.”49
FATA also suffers from a dearth in physical governmental
presence. Part of this stems from Afghan policy. Pakistan’s west-
ern neighbor has thus far not recognized the Durand Line as
an official border and, as a result, does not maintain legitimate
border patrols or posts that regulate movement between the
two countries. Nawaz notes that “currently some 1,000 border
posts on Pakistan’s side attempt to monitor movements across
this difficult and porous border” while “only 84 coalition and Af-
ghan National Army border posts exist on the Afghan side. The
tribes that straddle the border do not recognize the border as
anything more than a bureaucratic hindrance…”50 Furthermore,
though Pakistan maintains a greater number of forces at the
Durand Line, it still generally considers the border provinc-
es, particularly FATA, as a buffer state against Pakistan rather
than another national entity. Combined with the lack of official
boundary recognition by Afghanistan and many of the tribes in
the area, militants, arms and the Afghan-grown opium crop have
little trouble slipping across in either direction, supporting and
funding militant groups on both sides of the Durand Line.
More important than the recognition of the border, however,
is the issue of severe underdevelopment in the region. In Wa-
ziristan, a significantly remote and rural region of FATA, maliks, or
tribal leaders, have identified three areas of urgent need: irriga-
tion via canals and tube wells and control of waterways so as to
prevent flash floods, conserve rain water, and to grow cash crops
such as olives; an education system, particularly for young fe-
males; and organized health-care.51 This is not an issue unique to
Waziristan; FATA is generally acknowledged to lack basic infra-
structure, including roads and other administrative capacities.
As such, the Pashtun-dominated border region suffers from
a variety of issues that, in some aspects, may be chalked up to
neglect on Islamabad’s part. FATA is isolated by lack of fully-real-
ized political enfranchisement and recognition. The Durand Line
is a “soft” border that allows for easy movement between Paki-
stan and Afghanistan. Many of the border provinces are severely
underdeveloped. Combined with Taliban roots in the Pashtun
tribes, the area is full of weaknesses ripe for militant exploita-
tion. Since a great number of Pashtun tribes do not feel their
rights are fully represented locally and nationally, many feel that
the Taliban and other militant groups are the best proponents of
their rights. Furthermore, lack of development provides infra-
structural weaknesses that militant groups are able to fill in order
to legitimize themselves to local populations.
Political and Civic Overhaul
Given these weaknesses, the national government must work
to further develop FATA, both politically and in terms of infra-
structure. As such, the United States must once again exert
pressure on Islamabad to go through with the repealing of the
FCR and the application of national civic presence in the region.
Additionally, the Pakistani government must be urged to allow
political parties to be officially recognized in the region and to
incorporate FATA into the NWFP so as to allow for greater re-
gional political recognition. In Afghanistan, where the United
States exercises a great deal more influence, Karzai’s government
must also be urged to recognize the Durand Line as a bound-
ary and to work with Pakistan to create greater jurisdiction over
the area. This means increasing the presence of Afghani troops
and outposts along the border and following stricter regulations
with the passage of humans and goods from one country to the
other. In conjunction with the tightening of borders, the United
States must offer assistance in the way of equipment and training
to counterinsurgency forces both in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
which will increase the counterinsurgency presence along offi-
cial border outposts. In addition, the United States must reach
out to members of tribes to recruit them to work in or alongside
such counterinsurgency forces. Otherwise, the salary offers of
militant groups provide an appealing alternative to the lack of
employment that characterizes much of the tribal regions.
Furthermore, one of the most important ways that the United
States can help Pakistan in the tribal belt is via economic and
infrastructural development. Without economic and infrastruc-
tural development, there will remain opportunities for militant
groups to legitimize themselves to local populations. The United
States must not allow this to happen. Instead, it should provide
both the aid and expertise to local governments and organiza-
tions to further develop. In places such as Waziristan, but also
throughout the underdeveloped border provinces, this would
mean aiding in technological development and the construction
of administrative structures like roadways, schools, hospitals and
governmental buildings.
Economic and Infrastructural Development
As debilitating as Pakistan’s military dominance and the fron-
tier situation may be, any efforts towards the rectification of ei-
ther situation will fall quickly without short-term and long-term
economic and infrastructural development. More specifically,
this must be manifested in two concrete developments: the es-
tablishing of schools and the creation of jobs.
Overwhelmingly Youthful
Amongst Pakistan’s 176 million citizens, the median age is strik-
ing: 20.8 years, or 20.6 for the average male. Furthermore,
dearth of employment remains a chronic problem. The average
per capita GDP is $2,600, and where the unemployment rate is
at 7.8 percent, there’s also a substantial percentage that suffers
from underemployment.52 It is clear that the country’s popula-
tion of jobless, uneducated, and disenchanted young males
provides the ideal pool from which militant and radical groups
are able to draw their members. Sunni Deobandi organizations
such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (formerly the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) have
been noted for aggressively recruiting amongst Punjabi youth.
Another group, Jamaat-i-Islami, has a student wing that “enlists
students from universities and high schools; these young men of-
ten join the party’s jihad wing, Hizbul Mujahidin, or new terrorist
cells.”53 In Swat, the Pakistani Taliban has tapped “into a large and
increasingly alienated youth pool,” enlarging the Deobandi ma-
drassa and converting some schools into seminaries.54 Halting
recruitment amongst militant groups is a crucial step towards
U.S. efforts in Pakistan.
Infrastructural and Economic Weaknesses
Pakistan’s lack of infrastructural and economic development
has proven to be a weakness that militant groups have exploited
to their advantage. The aforementioned Jamaat-ud-Dawa, cen-
tered in southern Punjab, “recast itself as a social welfare orga-
nization, setting up medical camps and providing ambulance
services in major districts… Its welfare networks and ambulance
services are expanding… The group has also established 150
‘model schools’ in various districts of…Punjab, imparting, it claims,
‘truly Islamic’ education, and provided relief to victims of natural
disasters in Baluchistan and NWFP.”55 As the International Crisis
Group has noted, “Pakistani Taliban groups have targeted the
limited administrative infrastructure in tribal areas, destroying
educational institutions…establishing parallel Shari’a courts, and
killing and intimidating tribal leaders…”
International Assistance
Recently, the Obama administration announced plans to
“dramatically increase civilian aid to Pakistan as part of its new
strategy on Afghanistan and the surrounding region,” partly in
order to gain leverage over the Pakistani military and stymie the
influence of militant groups.56 Such plans are a step in the right
direction. However, the United States must help local regions
develop comprehensive plans for economic and infrastructural
growth. Like the situation in Waziristan, this will extend beyond
throwing money at the problem. Instead, any aid must be given
in the context of a strategically developed plan. International of-
ficials must work with local leaders to target areas most in need
of development, whether in terms of agriculture or hospitals.
One of the clearest areas of development is in the establishment
of schools, which must be opened so as to help prevent the fur-
ther recruitment of youths by radically-oriented madrassas.
Furthermore, aid should also extend to individuals displaced
by militant activity in these regions, including the residents who
have fled from violence in Swat Valley. By establishing funds for
such groups, the United States may help prevent the susceptibil-
ity of refugees to aid offered by radical organizations.
Conclusion
Given the interplay of numerous organizations and elements
in Pakistan, it is no wonder the situation there is daunting in
scope and intensity. The country’s government has a long his-
tory helping to cultivate the very groups the United States is
currently combating. The Pashtun tribal elements and the messy
Afghanistan-Pakistan border situation provide fertile grounds on
which radical groups can develop. Pakistan’s lack of infrastruc-
tural and economic development makes portions of the country
susceptible to militant and radical overtures.
As such, U.S. policy towards Pakistan must take the following
course:
All U.S. pressure in regards to Islamabad must work towards
restoring the confidence of the Pakistani constituency in the
presidency and the country’s democratic process. The United
States must pressure Zardari to respect the independence of
the judiciary. Reinstating chief justice Chaudry was the right
move on the President’s part but such a move should occur inde-
pendent of political motivations. Additionally, the United States
must also pressure Zardari to respect the electoral mandate.
With respect to intelligence, all U.S. aid with Pakistani intel-
ligence agencies must be oriented towards establishing a strong
civilian-based intelligence community that is independent of the
ISI’s agenda and power. Obviously the military remains crucial
to any U.S. efforts to combat militants but given the ISI’s and mili-
tary’s long history and relationship with such groups, which may
prevent their full integration into official Islamabad policy, the
United States must help Pakistan develop alternate intelligence
and counterinsurgency organizations.
As such, the United States must support the development of
civilian-staffed intelligence agencies that are held accountable
by the presidency and legislature and are not affiliated with the
military. Assistance must include providing the FIA, NIB and CID
with the most recent counterterrorist and counterinsurgency
training, equipment (include modern forensics labs), the struc-
ture for a witness protection program and recruiting program,
support for the development intelligence gathering and filing
and access to information that is currently stored by the ISI.
Meanwhile, in the tribal regions, the United States must pres-
sure Pakistan to incorporate FATA into the NWFP and grant
it provincial enfranchisement. Furthermore, American officials
must also pressure Pakistan to repeal the antiquated CFR and
replace it with a modern-day civic code that integrates both na-
tional laws and FATA-oriented laws that recognize the unique
structure of the tribal system. The residents of FATA must feel
that Islamabad and the provincial government of the NWFP rep-
resent their interests.
The United States also needs to pressure Afghanistan to rec-
ognize the Durand Line and establish stricter patrols and regula-
tion along the border. This will mean setting up border patrols
to ensure that individuals and goods do not move illegally from
one country to the other and to monitor and record any such
movement.
Washington. must aid with the development of infrastructure,
education, agriculture and jobs in the tribal regions, but must
work on a local level with community leaders and organizations,
not larger provincial structures, to devise specific plans of devel-
opment and aid that will and must be followed through. Wash-
ington cannot afford to blindly pump monetary aid into such
plans but must help oversee such development.
The United States and Pakistan must also work to recruit
tribal members to work in counterinsurgency operations by of-
fering better salaries and stability in communities. Otherwise,
such individuals may be and are often recruited to work in such
militant organizations. The United States must also provide the
monetary aid and expertise to train counterinsurgency forces.
Finally, in terms of economic and infrastructural development,
as in FATA and elsewhere, the United States must provide aid,
particularly with the creation of and access to schools and jobs
so that youths are not driven to the particular madrassas that are
central to militant recruitment.
The situation in Pakistan will continue for decades, and will
remain crucial for efforts both in Afghanistan and the interna-
tional realm. As such, the United States must prepare itself for
long term investment. Investment, however, must not come in
the form of military prowess but in the strategic application of
economic assistance and expertise. The focus must be on the
development of civilian and democratic organizations and in-
frastructure, in order to prevent any weaknesses. A legacy of
resistance to foreign influence will make any American efforts in
the region infinitely more complex. However, by seeking alterna-
tives to the previous policy of unaccounted monetary aid to the
Pakistani government, the United States and its regional allies
will begin to see progress both for its own efforts and for local
populations.
43

From Poppies to Red Gold:
An Alternative Approach to Eradication
Sonali Pillay
In the nation of Afghanistan, the illicit trade of opium is ram-
pant. Afghanistan produces 93 percent of the world’s opiates.1
Not only does this trade exacerbate a global drug crisis, but it
also provides Taliban and insurgent groups between $100 million
and $400 million per year.2 Tackling the ongoing and growing
opium trade in Afghanistan must be a priority to American poli-
cymakers. The current U.S. strategy is to train and aid Afghan
forces to conduct a mass forcible eradication campaign, which
has proved to be ineffective. Instead, in order to tackle the vast
production of poppies, one must tackle the forces that compel
farmers to plant them – namely that poppies are a high-value,
low-risk crop with marketing and trading outlets already estab-
lished. A substitutable crop, which provides an equal or better
livelihood for farmers, such as saffron, must be introduced. This
paper proposes that U.S. assistance and aid be used to fund de-
velopment initiatives that give farmers the resources to substi-
tute saffron for poppies without forcing them to incur any costs
that make substitution unfeasible. Providing small farmers with
alternative sustainable livelihoods may be the key to the elimina-
tion of the drug trade, which will in stabilize Afghanistan and
restrict the breeding ground for extremists and terrorists.
“Opium is a source of literally billions of dollars to extremist and
criminal groups... Cutting down the opium supply is central to
establishing a secure and stable democracy, as well as winning
the global war on terrorism.”3
- Former Assistant Secretary of State Robert Charles
Afghanistan is responsible for 93 percent of the world’s opi-
ates and 90 percent of the world’s opium.4 The illicit trade has
flourished into an integral part of the Afghan economy. 70 per-
cent of poppy cultivation occurs in five provinces bordering
Pakistan and 50 percent of the entire nation’s production comes
from one province, Helmand.5 An increasingly lawless Afghani-
stan, riddled with corruption at all levels of government and po-
lice, has led the way to an explosion of poppy cultivation. The
illicit trade and production of opium and heroin has become an
increasingly embedded part of the Afghan economy, benefiting
members of every level of government and funding insurgent
and Taliban activity. Indeed, the nexus between the insurgency
and the opium trade has been clearly established; the Taliban
extracts a percentage of revenue in return for protection and the
securing of trade and distribution routes.6
The scope of this trade is enormous. In 2007 the UN calcu-
lated that Afghan farmers made $1 billion from poppy harvests,
while the total export value of these poppies was $4 billion (53
percent of Afghan GDP). In the last year (between 2007 and
2008), production has hit a record high of 8,200 tons of raw
opium, much of which was refined into heroin by traffickers be-
fore it left the country.7
Past and Current Tactics
Beginning in 2000, the Taliban simply used a policy of sum-
mary execution as punitive action against poppy farmers during
their ban of poppy cultivation as an “un-Muslim” endeavor. Since
the overthrow of the Taliban-led government, the United States
and Britain have taken an active role in training Afghans to carry
out poppy eradication themselves. One tactic for poppy eradi-
cation was to use military enforcement, drawing on Taskforce 333
(Afghan commandos), trained by Britain’s Special Boat Service8,
which shut down more than 125 heroin refineries.
In 2005 the Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) was created with
the help of United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and
the U.S. State Department. The troops consist of Police drawn
from Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior.9 The AEF’s first major ef-
fort in Uruzgan consisted of its 250 man force as well as nearly
40 contractors supplied by DynCorp, a Virginian private military
company with many U.S. contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan.10 On
occasion these eradicators have been put in the line of fire or
even ambushed by Taliban forces.11 Suicide bombers have even
targeted police assigned to ensure eradication.12
Eradication is not working; in fact, last month Richard Hol-
brooke, U.S. Envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, stated that the
$800 million the United States spends per year on counter-
narcotics is “wasteful and ineffective.”13 Clearly, the root causes
of the drug trade have not been properly addressed, such as
the necessity for low-income farmers to have a high-profit, low
risk, substitutable crop with a proper marketing strategy and as-
surance of markets for their goods. In June of 2005, the Coun-
ter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) was established through the
United Nations Development Programme to aid the Afghan
Government by providing additional resources to implement
the policies of the National Drug Control Strategy of the Afghan
government. The CNTF has, among other things, been promot-
ing a system of subsidies as a means of creating incentives for
provinces that eradicated all their poppies, making them “poppy-
free provinces.” The United States has been responsible for 75
percent of the funds pledged for so called “performance incen-
tives” for poppy-free provinces. Many farmers who endeavored
to eradicate poppy cultivation did so because they were eager
to receive a portion of those subsidies. According to a UNODC
report, 98 percent of farmers said they would be ready to stop
poppy cultivation “should access to alternative livelihoods be
provided.”14 In 2007, this system seemed promising; 13 out of a
total of 34 provinces became poppy free. It is important to note
that this has, in most instances, been achieved with the active
support of provincial governors, most of whom have strong mi-
litia followings and are capable of providing protection to farm-
ers if they in fact choose to move away from poppy cultivation,
thus depriving Taliban and insurgents of profit from the trade.
Unfortunately, in many instances, provinces that claimed poppy-
free status substituted poppies with cannabis, another illicit crop
that propagates drug trade. In fact, one survey found an increase
in cannabis cultivation, with 18 percent of villages planning to
grow it in 2008, compared with 13 percent last year, when some
172,970 acres of cannabis crops were cultivated.15 Not only have
development agencies ignored the potential for proliferation of
other drugs through unregulated eradication, but they have not
followed through on their promises to provide those subsidies
to the farmers and provinces that rightly deserve it. This incon-
sistent behavior will certainly lead to lowered confidence in the
integrity of the Afghan government and the agencies involved,
decreasing the effectiveness of poppy substitution efforts in the
future to be effective in the region. Lowered confidence will
lead to a resurgence of poppy growth if the farmers and provinc-
es are not properly rewarded for moving away from cultivating
an incredibly high profit crop, something they would certainly
not be interested in doing without proper incentives.
Continued Expansion of the Trade
National production of opium rose from 6,500 tons to 8,200
tons between 2005 and 2006.16 The number of hectares of land
used to produce poppies increased from 165,000 in 2006, to
193,000 in 2007. The export value of these poppies increased
from $2.7 billion in 2005 to $3.1 billion in 2006. Under President
Hamad Karzai’s rule, the number of provinces growing poppies
has increased from 24 to 32 provinces out of 34 in the nation.
Between 2007 and 2008 there was a 19 percent drop in cul-
tivation, though “bumper yields” (high productivity due to un-
usually high rainfall) may mean that total yields only dropped
6 percent.17 This drop in cultivation can largely be attributed to
pre-planting campaigns as well as low opium prices and high
wheat prices that made licit goods a more viable option. While
this sounds like a promising statistic, in 2008 poppy cultivation
was estimated to have only dropped by 3.5 percent by October.18
On the whole, poppy eradication has been popular in provinces
that were never the central cultivating grounds in Afghanistan. In
fact in between 2007 and 2008, poppy cultivation increased by
1 percent in Helmand,19 the largest site of cultivation in Afghani-
stan. In 2007 alone, although some provinces became poppy
free, poppy production increased in eight other provinces.20
Poppies and Insurgents: A Cozy Nexus
Insurgency forces and the Taliban currently profit greatly
from the trade of opium. Both the UN and NATO believe insur-
gents get roughly 60 percent of their annual income from drugs,
between $100 and $400 million, while the Taliban is estimated to
gain $100 million alone from the drug trade.21 According to the
UNODC, farmers cultivating poppies only receive 24 percent of
the total income from narcotics, while the remaining 76 percent
goes to traffickers and heroin refiners. It is estimated that insur-
gency or Taliban forces tax farmers 10 percent of the farm gate
value of their crops (the net value of the crop after it leaves the
farm, after marketing costs have been subtracted).22 The head of
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has
said that the Taliban made about £50 million from opium in 2007
by extorting money from smugglers and charging for guarding
convoys as well as labs where opium is processed into heroin.
In a nation so dependent upon drug trade, which constitutes
more than half of its GDP, members of all levels of government
are involved in the trade. It is estimated that 80 percent of per-
sonnel at the Ministry of Interior benefit from the drug trade
and Afghan officials even believe that 100,000 members of the
Afghan government benefit directly from drug trade (whether
it be from transportation fees, bribes or profits).23 Even highway
police are believed to be involved in facilitating and taxing smug-
gling, and at times smuggling the drugs themselves in govern-
ment law enforcement vehicles.24 Current Interior Minister Hanif
Atmar admits that drug lords were tolerated because they paid
government officials in order to carry out their illicit business. It is
estimated that Policemen make £80 a month, while a drug mule
can earn £100 a day by carrying drugs.25 In addition, the network
of drug traders itself has evolved, becoming a more organized
entity. Former Finance Minister, Ashraf Ghani claims that while
the drug trade before comprised of 400,000 individuals, it is
now a hierarchy, similar to that of Colombia, led by 35 individu-
als.26
The Attraction to Poppy
Poppies are resistant to natural diseases and require less
irrigation than most crops, and are therefore exceedingly well
suited to Afghanistan’s arid conditions. Poppies can be used
for a variety of purposes; residue provides fuel for winter, the
seeds have medicinal value, oil is used for cooking and oil cake
for winter fodder, and finally, opium resin can be made from pop-
pies. The trade of opium once again provides a series of con-
veniences such as its high value, long shelf life and its ability
to be easily transported. Profits from poppies are estimated at
around $5,200 per hectare,27 and buyers are guaranteed. All the
appropriate channels for packaging are established as well as
means for financing (though the interest rates are either usuri-
ous or subject to massive penalties imposed by local traders or
warlords).
Substitution vs. Eradication
Forcible crop eradication is not a viable option to end the
cultivation of poppies in Afghanistan. Eradication would entail
the destruction of the livelihoods of many Afghan farmers who
simply cultivate out of necessity. In fact, many farmers cultivate
poppies in order to pay off a loan-in-kind from the previous year.
It is common for moneylenders to charge usurious rates or con-
duct other forms of intimidation such as simply kidnapping family
members of defaulters (usually daughters).28 At this point in time,
farmers are reliant upon loans at staggeringly high interest rates
and have taken loans in advance for the next season’s harvest,
meaning that if they choose to abandon poppy cultivation, they
will still have to pay for the loan they took out on the next sea-
son’s harvest, without any of the profits they should have made
during that period. This makes it nearly impossible for them to
move away from poppy cultivation for fear that they will default
on the loans they have taken.
The welfare of these farmers must be the primary concern of
the international community if it intends to end the drug trade in
Afghanistan, which benefits insurgency and Taliban forces. The
most viable solution that keeps the best interest of these farmers
as a focal point is to induce crop substitution. In order for crop
substitution to occur, a high-profit crop must be introduced to
the region. This crop’s profitability must be comparable to that
of poppies ($5,200 per hectare in 2007, an increase from $4,600
per hectare in 2006)29 and at least as high as the profits accrued
through cannabis (which yields twice as much crop per hectare
as poppies and can even equal profits per hectare of poppy), in
order to make cannabis a less inviting prospect for substitution.
In order to find a crop of this nature, one must examine crops in
the region that match this description and would be suitable to
Afghanistan’s climate.
Upon finding this substitutable crop, the international com-
munity should pledge to provide the farmers with the resources
(i.e. machines and even seeds or corm at a fair or subsidized
price). In order to fund what is not provided, farmers should
have access to credit at fair market or lower rates. Agricultural
organizations must be invited to share their expertise with the
farmers through detailed training programs on how to grow
these new crops, refine them and ship them to buyers. Indeed,
it is not enough to ensure that the farmers create a product of
high profitability if there are no markets to which they have ac-
cess to sell their goods. In order for Afghans to have access to
these international markets, their national regulators must adopt
quality standards uniform to the International Organization for
45
Standardization (ISO), allowing Afghan crops to be deemed up
to international quality assurance regulations. This will ensure
the product’s profitability, making it viable in the international
market. With international quality assurances from the ISO, or an
Afghan regulator up to ISO standards, must come willing buyers
who are ensured a high-quality good at a competitive rate. This
means that buyer channels must be established for these farm-
ers before they begin crop-substitution; they will only cultivate
knowing that there are prospective buyers for their product.
Red Gold: Saffron
The ideal substitutable crop is saffron. As a result of being one
of the most expensive spices in the world, saffron has been nick-
named “red gold.” Saffron is a high-profit, low-risk crop, which is
suitable to climatic conditions especially in Western Afghanistan,
along the border with Iran. Iran has a long history of growing the
best saffron in the world. The regions of Afghanistan on the bor-
der with Iran have almost identical climatic conditions and could
easily use the same techniques as Iranian growers. In fact, trials
of saffron growing in the Herat province, bordering Iran, have
beaten the international record for most productive yield, on
average $5,000 per hectare annually and even up to $8,000,30
making Saffron a higher-value crop than cannabis and close to
par with poppies. Saffron, like poppies are relatively resistant to
disease (except fungus growth, which can simply be controlled
by proper irrigation draining), it requires less irrigation than
many crops (a maximum of two irrigations required annually, and
none required between May and September), has a higher value,
longer shelf life, and is more easily transported than crops such
as wheat as it is less perishable. As a crocus flower, saffron is
perennial, and poppy seeds cannot be planted on the same land.
This makes it a direct competitor to poppies, ensuring that once
a farmer has made a proper shift to saffron cultivation, he will not
be able to cultivate poppies simultaneously.31
Saffron is a versatile crop whose stigma can be used for spice
or coloring in food preparation, materials in pharmaceutical,
cosmetic and perfume industries, dyes for textiles and has even
been found to have anti-cancer effects. In addition, the leaves
can be used for animal feed, which could be useful to farm own-
ers who also breed animals.
While Saffron is a labor-intensive crop, family labor is often
sufficient for small farmers or sharecroppers to cultivate without
having to resort to outside labor and incur additional costs. This
makes it appropriate to the condition of small farmers, who cur-
rently have no choice but to grow poppies because it is a simi-
larly manageably labor-intensive crop that accrues high profits.
In addition, Saffron corms (bulbs) usually double in 4-5 years
and should be lifted at that time because their useful life is over.
This ability to double in so short a period makes landowners
more willing to allow tenant farmers and share croppers to culti-
vate saffron for an extended period,32 allowing larger scale farms
to operate effectively as well.
Implementation
There must be an initial investment to provide farmers with
saffron corms. Saffron corm must be planted after maturing 2-4
years.33 These corms may be provided from a saffron corm bank
or multiplication field. The head of agricultural administration
in western Afghanistan, Bashir Ahmad Ahmadi, implemented a
pilot for growing saffron in his province. Upon seeing that his
40-hectare plot yielded 320 kilograms of saffron, he received
hundreds of applications from farmers asking for saffron corms.
Access to these matured corms is essential and must be provid-
ed by the international community because increasing interest in
corm has lead to artificially inflated prices. Currently the amount
of corms necessary per hectare stands at $5,000,34 which is ex-
orbitant for most farmers.
The process of collecting saffron is highly labor intensive and
requires thorough knowledge of the crop. Farmers must be edu-
cated on the differences between ridge planting and flat bed
planting. While flat bed planting has proven to be slightly more
lucrative, it requires immaculate irrigation draining to prevent
fungus growth, which could wipe out the entire harvest. Since
applying fungicide to corms is not recommended because high
mercury contents may impede the quality of the harvest, ridge
planting irrigation, while slightly less lucrative, may be a safer
method of planting to reduce the chances of fungal growth.
Saffron does not require any artificial fertilizer and requires few
nutrients, but between 20-30 tons of well-decomposed animal
manure must be spread per hectare of land before plowing and
planting.35 This cost must at the least be subsidized, or rather
provided for the first planting season.
Picking saffron flowers is possibly the most labor intensive
and time constrained aspect of its cultivation. It takes around
450,000 stigmas and between 150,000-170,000 flowers to make
a kilogram of saffron spice. Saffron requires little irrigation be-
cause it grows primarily during the rainy season (for more infor-
mation on irrigation, see ICARDA’s Saffron Manual for Afghani-
stan). Instigated by the first irrigation at the end of September,
flowering lasts for only three weeks in October. Flowers only
live for 48 hours but should be picked early in the morning as
soon as they open, even before there is full sun. If the flow-
ers are picked after they have begun to wilt, this can make the
post-harvest process difficult or even impossible and will surely
severely lower the quality. After collection, the flowers must be
transported to a farmhouse or location where they can be kept
clean and out of the sun for no more than seven days.
In order to keep the quality of the stigma after picking, dry-
ing must be done immediately. An exact level of moisture must
be maintained after drying; too much moisture makes the saffron
subject to fungus, while if it is too dry, it may break and turn into
powder, reducing the weight and thus the value of the crop. This
process, like all parts of saffron cultivation, can be done by hand.
Simple air-drying takes a week and cannot guarantee the proper
moisture content of the saffron. Handheld electric dryers can be
used instead. These dryers take minutes rather than days and
make it much easier to control the moisture level. These dryers
have been introduced in Herat with great success. The most
accurate drying method is to use kiln dryers, though they are far
too expensive to provide to all farmers willing to cultivate saf-
fron. Both the electric dryers and kilns require steady electrical
supply, which presents a problem in Afghanistan where electri-
cal outages are common. As a result, farmers would require gen-
erators and access to fuel to ensure timely drying as to save the
harvest from possible spoil. Once dried properly, the stigmas
can be stored for up to two years.
Packaging is also incredibly important to raise the value of the
saffron produced. Without proper packaging equipment, local
farmers and exporters cannot expect maximum value for their
final product. Without this proper packaging, they do not have
the benefit and advantage of price speculation. In Iran, farmers
typically receive just a few hundred dollars for each kilogram
of high-quality unpackaged saffron, which once repackaged in
Spain or Italy is valued at $2,000 per kilogram in the West. Saf-
fron prices in Herat rose from $300 per kilogram in 2005 to $450
per kilogram in 2006, while the current potential price is equal
to Iranian saffron, which can stand at a maximum value of $2,000
when packaged properly.36 Each hectare of land should produce
ten kilograms of saffron, meaning the potential for up to $2,000
per hectare of properly packaged saffron. Industrial packaging
machines are incredibly expensive but necessary for the crop to
be sold in western markets without losing a portion of profits to
middlemen.
Access to the Global Market
As a new entrant in the global saffron market, the quality of
Afghan saffron must either be better than other international
competitors, or be on par with the best in the world but sold at
a slightly discounted rate so as to attract the attention of buy-
ers. In keeping with the current quality control norms in the
international marketplace, Afghan saffron needs to be graded
according to ISO 3632 standards. The main ISO determinant of
quality is based on crocin (color) in a properly dried sample. The
gradations of quality are measured in four categories (I-IV), of
which Category I is superior. The range of scores varies from be-
low 80 in Category IV, to above 250 in Category I. Sargol, which
is known to be the best saffron produced by Iran, is given a rat-
ing between 235 and 250.37 In order to produce saffron of this
quality, only separated stigmas should be packaged, rather than
stigmas connected to the style; connection to the style makes
the drying process less reliable and can result in both shortening
of shelf life and reduction in quality.
While some interest has arisen from investors interested in
organic saffron who are willing to pay a higher price for “fair-
trade” saffron,38 the restrictions on Afghan farmers in order to
comply with the Fair Trade Organizations Internal’s (FLO’s) stan-
dards would be unfeasible in the short term.
The FLO guidelines for organic production include:
1. Prohibition of the use of fertilizer or unapproved
pesticides for up to three years before the harvest.
2. Prohibition of the application of manure within 90
days of harvest.
3. Use of only organically produced corm.
4. Crop rotation that would require saffron to be re-
planted where saffron has not grown for at least one
year.
While pesticides are not a necessity, chemical fertilizers may
be indispensable for farmers cultivating saffron for the first time
who need to ensure the growth of their crop. A three-year win-
dow would result in three years of no income on that land and a
resulting inability to pay outstanding loans. Furthermore, organic
corms are likely to be sold at an increased price from regular
corms. Finally, crop rotation poses an insurmountable problem
for small farmers who most likely do not have spare land that can
sit idle for one year.
Organization: The Role of Cooperatives
Moral dilemmas must be expressly addressed when talking
about the ways in which United States’ Aid should be channeled
into Afghanistan. The CNTF has been riddled with accusations
of corruption and aforementioned data seems to prove that a
large component of the Afghan government is complicit in the
drug trade. In addition, the US’s policy of collaborating with war-
lords has come under scrutiny.
To circumvent the aforementioned problems, a more direct
and palatable means of providing aid to farmers may be through
the creation of cooperatives of communities of farmers. If prop-
erly managed, cooperatives should also serve to cut out mid-
dle-men and maximize farm-gate value. Unlike the cooperatives
established by the Soviets, toward which Afghans harbor incred-
ible disdain,39 these cooperatives would be a capitalist endeav-
or intended simply to provide farmers with the resources they
would otherwise be unable to afford if forced to function alone.
The services these cooperatives must provide to farmers are:
i) Inputs at favorable prices
ii) Machinery to do ISO quality testing
iii) Stockpiling facilities
iv) Packaging supplies for distribution
v) Marketing know-how and access to markets
The cooperatives should be an outlet to distribute necessary
inputs and allow farmers to purchase these inputs at favorable
prices. Because of the large volume of the cooperatives, serving
a community, the cooperative would be able to purchase these
inputs at a discounted value (i.e. through their bulk purchase).
Inputs would include corms, chemical fertilizer, packaging ma-
terials, handheld electric dryers, backup generators, etc. Initially
these inputs would need to be provided to the cooperatives by
U.S. aid. These cooperatives would then distribute these inputs
to the farmers by need.
In order to make Saffron competitive on the global market,
the cooperative should seek to ensure that all saffron produced
by its farmers is ranked with an ISO rating between 235 and 250,
which is on par with Sargol. The cooperative should house the
simple testing materials to verify quality in compliance with ISO
3632.
The cooperatives should provide stock-piling facilities so that
farmers are protected from price drops as a result of surplus
supply or diminished demand in any given year. Once properly
dried, farmers can stockpile saffron for up to two years, giving
them the flexibility to wait out one or two harvests before selling
their crops.
The cooperative should provide packaging supplies to farm-
ers. Packaging facilities have a high initial cost, which must be
provided in full by U.S. aid, but one that is necessary to ensure
the success of saffron in Afghanistan. The ability to package on
site cuts out a series of middle-men who typically profit expo-
nentially more than the saffron farmers themselves. Packaging
materials, while simple, are often a cost that individual farmers
cannot take on. The ability to package on site would increase the
farm-gate value significantly.
Finally, the cooperatives should provide marketing know-how
and provide access to markets. This can include transportation
providing simple access to markets outside rural areas. This is
the final necessity in order to reach international markets once
quality has been established as well as proper packaging stan-
dards.
Because of the crucial role that cooperatives would play, it is
essential that they be established as independent, not-for-profit
entities, managed at the community level in a fully transparent
manner. In the traditional community structure, village elders
form a council called a “shura” and are the repository of signifi-
cant communal authority. In consultation with the farmers, the
47
shuras should nominate outstanding members of the community
(a typical qualification for leadership in rural Afghanistan)40 to
serve on the board of the cooperative. Board members, in turn,
should nominate the staff of the cooperative based on skills and
experience. Cooperative staff and board members will need to
be trained by a donor agency in management skills as well as
protocol for farming saffron to ensure they are fully informed
of the technical expertise they must have to produce saffron of
international trade quality.
The Role of U.S. Assistance
U.S. assistance should be used to:
i) Provide essential equipment for drying, packaging and
marketing;
ii) Subsidize inputs required for the first season of planting
(in order to break the cycle of dependence on moneylend-
ers); and
iii) Provide training to the staff and board members of the
cooperatives in management skills as well as the essential
elements of the production chain involved in the saffron
industry.
U.S. funding should also be used to capitalize a micro-finance
scheme managed by the cooperative, along the lines of the
Grameen Bank’s group lending practices, but adapted to Islamic
banking principles. For instance, instead of charging an interest
rate on a loan, which is a notion quite foreign to many Afghans, 41
the cooperative could receive a small percentage of each farm-
er’s output. Upon receiving the assigned quantity of saffron from
each farmer, the cooperative could then sell the saffron itself for
cash to continue lending to farmers or could barter for the es-
sential inputs its farmers require, as bartering is a widespread
practice in rural Afghanistan.42 The managers of the credit facility
would need to be fully trained in the management of credit by
donor agencies.
For the United States, the value of providing aid to crop sub-
stitution of saffron for poppies in Afghanistan is threefold: it will
increase national security in both Afghanistan and the United
States by destroying a major source of Taliban income and a ma-
jor source of terrorism, it will complement our anti-narcotics traf-
ficking endeavors by eliminating up to 93 percent of the world’s
opiates that are produced in Afghanistan and finally, this can
only serve the U.S. economy in the long run as the United States
is a major importer of Saffron.
It is important to note that while the U.S. imports most of its
saffron from Spain, that the saffron is actually produced in Iran, a
nation with which we have a trade embargo. The United States
would be pursuing a more coherent foreign policy strategy by
substituting imports from Iran guised as Spanish imports with
Afghan saffron. The transition to Afghan saffron would not be
an economic loss. In fact as previously explained, Afghan saf-
fron has the potential to be as good quality as the best Iranian
saffron, Sargol. In addition, as a new industry for Afghanistan,
prices would most likely be somewhat discounted from current
prices on the international market, so that it can enter competi-
tively. Not only would this serve to end this indirect trade with
Iran, but it would also promote economic ties with Afghanistan,
a nation that needs U.S. assistance not only to maintain security,
but also to regenerate its economy.
The Clout of Creativity:
Shaping American Policy on Foreign Art
Justin Floyd and Isaac Lara
Some modern policymakers do not appreciate the power of
the arts in crafting individuals, the nation, and the world. As evi-
denced during the ‘Gingrich Revolution’ of the 1990s, slashing
the funds of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) became
a cause célèbre for many conservatives in Congress. These par-
ticular politicians tried to forge tenuous links between the NEA
and public programs to create public outrage. False equivalen-
cies were drawn, even from defenders of the NEA, as sober writ-
ers cut through the ‘hysteria’ on both sides of the debate.1 Yet,
the furor in 1995 was concentrated on one side: conservatives
wishing to destroy the American system of public arts funding
(conveniently forgetting that, per capita, American arts funding
is lower than most other industrialized nations by a magnitude).
Despite their initial efforts to subvert the arts, these policy-
makers did not realize the power for the arts to secure American
national interests through it inherently progressive messages. By
serving as a testament to history, art provides a glimpse of truth
for current and future generations to admire and learn from; with
the destruction of these testaments, windows into a particular
society and people as well as connections to their past are ir-
revocably shattered. Through the promotion and preservation
of the arts, the United States can foster increased social equality,
pacifism, and historical awareness both at home and abroad.
This essay will explore the progressive and practical benefits
of preserving art during today’s era of American international-
ism. Art objects are vital in defining the progressive state and
cultivating progressive values amongst people across cultural
and national boundaries. Art should be protected because its
destruction only serves to weaken forces of equality, justice, and
common human experience. However, current American foreign
policy does not actively incorporate art objects into its foreign
policy calculus. This imbalance can be redressed through several
interlinked measures including art protection and preservation
training for soldiers, the establishment of a State Department
Office of Artistic Preservation, and the creation of an interna-
tional body to oversee the reconstruction of destroyed objects
and the protection of endangered objects. These steps, taken
together, will improve America’s protected world image, and
they will signal that leadership has arrived to address the artistic-
historical policy changes that modern warfare necessitates. On
a short-term scale, efforts to preserve the arts in violent regions
of the world where they are currently being compromised would
best serve American national interests by acting as a political
deterrent against warfare and instability.
Art and Warfare: A Brief History
Whether it is from the Chinese Sun Tzu or the Western re-
publican Niccolo Machiavelli, the ‘Art of War’ holds a titular place
within global military and intellectual development. Progressives,
on the other hand, have instead cast their gaze towards the Art
of Peace. Throughout the millennia, they have developed and
defended complex relationships between art, power, and mili-
tary might.
Examples of works that have inspired progressive movements
include American Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, which helped
galvanize Washington to enter the war against the British. Pica-
sso’s Guernica depicted the German bombing of Spanish civil-
ians and intensified Castilian nationalism amongst republicans
against Franco’s authoritarian rule. These examples demonstrate
the forward-thinking essence art tends to inculcate.
This traditionally progressive message of art is sharply un-
dermined, however, when a state subordinates the value of art
during periods of armed conflict. In war, items of artistic value
are compromised purposefully or accidentally; either they are
destroyed intentionally or incidentally via the preliminary phases
of invasion by a state, or the weaker state may purposefully de-
stroy its own cultural artifacts in an effort to undermine the ef-
forts of opposing forces. Looting may also occur from all parties
in conflict, delivering pieces to the Black Market and removing
them the jurisdiction of public museums. The effects of such ac-
tions are incredibly detrimental to state politics.
The United States has been involved in several armed con-
flicts where art has been undermined as a priority and spared
preservation. Take for instance the Allies’ inaction as Nazi forces
looted Polish museums during WWII, or American refusals to
avoid bombing the National Museum of Iraq.2 The implications
of these transgressions on the national interest of the United
States, however, are serious because of the value art holds to
particular nations, as well as the individual property rights of art
owners. Present-day standards in American foreign policy for
preserving art during military campaigns fall short in accounting
for the tumultuous consequences destroying or losing art has on
a nation-state’s political and social development.
The wartime compromise of art, especially during the last
century’s rise of destructive weapons, has disastrous conse-
quences for the nation-state’s political stability. Oftentimes art
is housed at cultural heritage sites that when bombed, breed
intense (and often times violent) antagonism against opposing
forces since items of cultural and historical value are destroyed.
This destruction wreaks havoc on a nation-state’s self-identifica-
tion, and insurgencies often develop around the destruction of a
particular artifact to defend what they view as representative of
their nation-state.
Nations often identify particular pieces of art as symbols of
national sovereignty and fight fiercely to defend them. During
the Civil War, for instance, Union soldiers’ resolve was reinvigo-
rated after the American flag reminded them of the tenets of
federalism.3 Dolley Madison’s rescue of an original portrait of
President George Washington before the White House was set
ablaze in the War of 1812 also demonstrated a desire to preserve
the American national identity.4 Had Washington’s portrait been
lost, the resulting sense of detachment from the republic’s found-
ing father would have undermined the legitimacy of American
values just as it would for other states had their national symbols
been compromised.
When praised and beloved art is destroyed, a cultural vacuum
develops whereby visceral hatred towards the destroyers be-
comes the normal mode of artistic creation. Israel’s bombing of
cultural heritage sites in southern Lebanon during its 2006 war
fueled harsh resentment among Arabs against Israeli troops. The
Lebanese arts community retaliated by painting pieces, compos-
ing songs, and drawing graffiti that slandered Israeli forces. This
contributed to lingering discord and fostered new feelings of
resentment among the public towards occupying forces. Anti-
Semitic caricatures were even circulated by Arab newspapers
in an attempt to stir fervor over the Second Lebanese War and
the destruction it was causing to Lebanese society; they often
demonized Israel as a genocidal state bent on killing Arabs.5
Opinion leaders and weekly magazines also helped express
Arab discontent with the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. One such
Jordanian editorial published in Al-Rai Newspaper describes
how “…the Israeli soldier butchers the family after he commit-
ted rape to the body, soul, land and to the honor, sanctioned all
of the women, men, children and elders…”6 The fact that this is
the most widely distributed newspaper in Jordan helps explain
how the Arab population can be swayed by these kinds of anti-
Semitic propaganda.7
Moreover, Arab columnists such as Dr. Latifa an-Najjar pro-
ceed to rationalize their anti-Semitic attacks by recasting doubt
over Israel’s legitimacy as a state. “The Zionist theory is racist,
arrogant and colonial, which is based on the concept of rob-
bery, subjugation and hostility. In order to implement its goals,
it relies on the great colonial powers, and it does not belong
to the region in its culture, civilization and expectations...”8 It is
inflammatory commentary like his that produces a framework
for current and future Arab generations to refocus antagonism
against Israel.
This adverse reaction from the Arab arts community is impor-
tant in understanding why consolidating stability in any state is
difficult after military exercises are finished. New creative and
intellectual pieces that emerge depicting injustice, death, and
exploitation have consequential effects on the psyche of the
public, breeding more anger and violence against invading forc-
es like Israel.
The Compromise of Art
Art is compromised by a nation’s own forces in two ways. The
first involves the state’s purposeful destruction of its own pieces
to avoid them being compromised by opposing forces. This prin-
ciple of destroying a resource that could be valuable to invaders
has been repeated numerous times throughout history, most no-
tably during the Gulf War when Iraqi forces attempted to under-
mine UN troops by implementing a scorched earth policy and
burning oil wells that could be of use to the enemy.9
Ironically, the destruction of one’s own art also serves as an
effort in preserving its own national identity by preventing its en-
emies from asserting their control over a state’s identity. If invad-
ers are able to control a state’s museums, art galleries, or artistic
community, they can subsequently transform art to their own
ideological or political standards; much like how Hitler’s forces
mandated the creation of anti-Semitic art and propaganda fol-
lowing the fall of Warsaw in 1939. As a result, the infiltration and
artificial instillation of alien, Aryan messages of hate within Pol-
ish identity helped pave the way for Anti-Semitism among Pol-
ish citizenry that persisted long after the fall of World War II, as
was part of Hitler’s motives. This manipulation and corruption
of Polish identity via artistic propaganda after the war included
an instance in which the Polish Peasants Party actually passed a
resolution thanking Hitler for the annihilation of Polish Jewry.10
Hitler’s manipulation of Polish art to serve his own ends explains
why some nation-states may purposefully destroy their own ar-
tistic works to avoid any further compromise of their identity.
The second way art is compromised by domestic forces is
via partisan conflict between various interest groups within the
country. Some of these groups, in vying for power, may restrict
the consumption of art in order to maintain cultural and political
49
spheres of influence. This can have severe implications on the
nation’s political stability, as exemplified in 2001 by the Taliban’s
destruction of the giant statues of Buddha in Bamiyan and the
wave of rocket attacks launched by Buddhist militants in retali-
ation.11 The struggle for power in Bamiyan has enabled militants
to grow increasingly violent towards one another, and conse-
quently will undermine each other’s artistic creations to express
their disapproval.
Secondly, domestic forces can also threaten its own art when
ruling government resorts to censorship as a political tool in re-
moving voices of civilian dissent. The implications of such action
on regional stability, however, are unclear. When this occurs, dis-
sent does not simply fade away but is merely channeled through
other legal means of expression. Most notably when Argentine
dictator Juan Peron censored certain tango lyrics in 1943, he was
surprised by the powerful opposition tango enthusiasts and Ar-
gentine nationalists formed to challenge the government’s ac-
tions. Not surprisingly, he relaxed the restrictions on tango music
to avoid the instability that had plagued earlier regimes.12 It is
evident from this example that censoring art merely channels
the community’s energy into other forms of dissent that could
endanger the consolidation of the standing regime.
Reorienting American Foreign Policy Towards the Arts
In order to inure military invasions against artistic destruction,
the armed forces must be trained to recognize art’s value be-
fore wars start. This can be accomplished by establishing cultural
training programs that all members of the armed forces must
complete before entering the field of combat or even prepar-
ing for military missions. Soldiers will be trained in the artistic
landscape of the state in which they will stationed, including spe-
cialized training for those whose positions or missions involve
direct interaction with heritage sites or other artistically-valuable
areas.
Within the armed forces, there should be certain groups
whose task is the surveying and protection of artistic heritage
sites within an invaded country. These specialists will be respon-
sible for initial assessment of damages after a mission, and they
will provide full written reports of how art fared during military
engagement. After each artistically sensitive mission, a written
report should be produced detailing how art was impacted as
well as what could have been done better to preserve culturally
sensitive art objects. This would in turn improve the public im-
age of our armed forces, as well as their efficacy in addressing
problems on the ground related to art.
In cases of military invasion, it is important that the invaded
country experience as little trauma at the hands of U.S. military
personnel as possible. This includes not only the individuals
living in invaded areas, but just as importantly the artistic and
historical heritage objects that define who they are. Warfare in-
evitably leads to the destruction of land; there is no reason why
blameless individuals deserve their identity stripped away, too.
The inculcation of art-preservation habits in the armed forces
is only the first step towards protecting art during wartime. The
United States should also establish an Office of Artistic Pres-
ervation within the State Department to ensure the emphasis
of art in diplomatic engagements. By establishing such an of-
fice, the government will signal to both allies and enemies that
in the battle of creativity and destruction, the United States is
a force for creation. Since the inherently destructive nature of
warfare can potentially compromise art at all times, the Office
will work to cure the negative portrayal of the United States as
solely militaristic and uncaring. The Office will do this by utiliz-
ing the NEH and NEA, which have domestic and international
components, as advisors to this office since the Endowments
already have trained professionals and scholars who deal day-
to-day with questions of artistic value. Finally, the Office must be
under the State Department as its message must be communi-
cated through diplomatic channels and through the representa-
tive faces of the American government abroad.
Because this Office will be within a Cabinet Department, it
will take its shape based upon the particular organizational em-
phasis of the overseeing president. For the Obama administra-
tion, creation of an Office of Artistic Preservation will help to
spread the platform and ideas that then-Senator Obama articu-
lated during his presidential campaign. His party platform con-
tained a pledge to increase federal funding for the arts, and both
he and Vice President Biden have continued to speak favorably
for such increases. The White House has played host to many
American singers and musicians during the early months of this
administration, showing that President Obama understands the
value of keeping art alive.13
Finally, in conjunction with reorienting American foreign pol-
icy toward art’s protection, the United States must also lead the
world in assuring that the future destruction of art pieces does
not occur and that current neglects of artistic preservation are
rectified. To do so, the United States should begin assembling
a multi-national coalition, secured by treaty, whose purpose is
the monitoring of artistic objects and projects during and after
military engagements. This coalition will serve as the center of
first response whenever member states are militarily engaged
abroad. Sanctioned art experts will be commissioned to survey
damages to artistic heritage sites, thereby serving as a stamp of
approval for their efforts. After assessments are made, appropri-
ate measures must be taken to ensure that the void left by art’s
destruction is quickly filled. A key first step should be complete
funding for the reconstruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues in
Afghanistan. The then-supposed defeat of the Taliban left many
Afghans hopeful for the future, and the reconstruction of their
decimated iconographic heritages was one expected change.
Failure to secure funding for this project has only exacerbated
the artistic problems of Afghanistan, and because there is little
art onto which the Afghani people can rely to define themselves,
the population is more open to a return to Taliban oppression,
destruction, and iconoclasm. Despite the continued fragility of
the military endeavor, rebuilding the Buddhist monuments will
help bolster a positive American legacy in Afghanistan. Switzer-
land and Japan have so far formally pledged funds for the recon-
struction effort, thus a U.S.-led effort to rebuild those statues will
signal that art now has a place in American foreign diplomacy.
Conclusion
Art’s manifestation of progressive values continues to trans-
form cultural and political events in the world today. By serving
as a window into other societies, art offers us unique perceptions
of a nation’s historical identity. When art is compromised from
warfare, these windows into society are shattered, fostering an-
tagonism and hatred against its offenders, and worse, domes-
tic instability that could endanger American national interests
within that country.
For this reason, the United States has a vested stake in pre-
serving the arts on its interventionist missions and in places
where it does not even have active military presence. Any failure
in addressing these concerns can have severe implications on
the external security of American troops overseas, as well as on
the global reputation of the United States. Through three key
measures – surveying cultural heritage sites, establishing an Of-
fice for Artistic Preservation within the State Department, and
organizing a multilateral treaty to monitor the condition of ar-
tifacts during periods of hostilities – the United States will take
a leading role in preserving the national identity of other coun-
tries, thereby improving its own among the international com-
munity. America must become proactive in the preservation of
other countries’ artifacts in order to continue fostering cultural
relations with other countries. Good diplomacy is build upon
the foundation of a mutual understanding, which is destroyed
when the arts are likewise undermined. The future fashioning of
American diplomacy may rely on the extent to which the United
States appreciates the progressive nature the arts may have on
a nation-state and the world.

51

Endnotes
Saving the MTA
1. Manhattan drivers do not have to pay bridge tolls as they are already on
the island, while tolls on bridges and tunnels from New Jersey would have been
included as part of the congestion charge. Commuters going across the East
River, however, would have had to pay bridge tolls in addition to the congestion
charge.
2. These numbers are based on the Kheel-Kormanoff Plan’s internal analysis
and are included with the Balanced Transportation Analyzer.
For more information on the plans discussed in this article, please see:
Komanoff, Charles. “Free Buses, Cheaper Subways -- and a Solution to New
York’s Traffic”, Gotham Gazette, February 6, 2009: http://www.gothamgazette.
com/article//20090209/255/2821.
Neuman, William. “How Will You Cope With Higher Fares?” New York Times
City Room, March 23, 2009: http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/
how-will-you-cope-with-higher-fares/.
Partnership for New York City. Growth or Gridlock? The Economic Case for
Traffic Relief and Transit Improvement for a Greater New York, December 2006:
http://www.nycp.org/publications/Growth%20or%20Gridlock.pdf.
Smith, Malcolm. Senate MTA Proposal: http://www.nymtasolutions.org/
proposal/.
Freedom of Speech on the Job
All statistics and information on union election procedures can be found in:
Lafer, Gordon. Free and Fair: How Labor Law Fails US Democratic Election
Standards. American Rights at Work Report. June 2005. Accessed on April 2,
2009, at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/
FreeandFair%20FINAL.pdf
Protecting America’s Immigrant Workforce
1. Ngai, Mae M. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Mod-
ern America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 64
2. Prescott, Andrew P. “Illegal but protected: Federal Appeals Court holds
that undocumented aliens enjoy employee status under National Labor Rela-
tions Act.” Nixon Peabody. 10 Jan. 2008. http://www.nixonpeabody.com/publi-
cations_detail3.asp?ID=2128.
3. ibid.
4. ibid.
5. Popper, Nathaniel. “In Rubashkins’ Backyard, Another Tale of Labor
Strife.” Forward. 14 Aug. 2008. http://www.forward.com/articles/13997/.
6. ibid.
7. ibid.
8. Greenhouse, Steven. “Meatpacker in Brooklyn Challenges a Union
Vote.” New York Times. 31 Aug. 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/01/
nyregion/01union.html?_r=1.
9. ibid.
10. Ngai, Impossible Subjects. 56
Redistricting and Representations: Reforms for a Broken System
1. Federalist No. 53, accessed at http://federali.st/53.
2. Noncompetitive Elections for Congress. Ed. Lee Hamilton. The Center on
Congress at Indiana University. <http://www.centeroncongress.org/radio_com-
mentaries/noncompetitive_elections_for_congress.php>.
3. Hastings Letter. FairVote Program for Representative Government. 21
May 2001. < http://www.fairvote.org/?page=866>.
4. Ibid.
5. CQ Politics: Arizona 2nd, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/wm-
spage.cfm?docID=district-AZ-02
6. “Gerrymandering”. Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Accessed at: http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerrymandering
7. Please see The Gerrymandering Index. Cicero Geospatial Districting
Analysis, Avencia Inc. October 2006. <http://www.avencia.com/LinkClick.aspx
?fileticket=EnCCb7KObuU=&tabid=205&mid=848> for more information on the
mathematics behind this model.
8. Hulse, Carl. “Leveled Colorado District Creates an Election Lab”.
New York Times 5 August 2006. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/05/
washington/05house.html?_r=1&scp=10&sq=colorado%207th%202006&st=cse>
9. CQ Politics: Colorado 7th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/wm-
spage.cfm?docID=district-CO-07#
10. Colorado Secretary of State. Colorado 2006 Election Data, accessed at:
http://www.elections.colorado.gov/ DDefault.aspx?tid=860&vmid=777, and then
by selecting “Voter Recaps by Congress and District”.
11. CNN Election Day 2006 Data, accessed at: http://www.cnn.com/ELEC-
TION/2006/pages/results/states/CO/H/07/
12. CQ Politics: Colorado 7th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/wm-
spage.cfm?docID=district-CO-07#
13. United States Census Bureau. Voting and Registration in the Election of
2006. Accessed at: http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p20-557.pdf, p. 10.
14. Ibid., p. 4; CQ Politics: Illinois 4th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.
com/wmspage.cfm?docID=district-IL-04#; United States Census Bureau.
Median Income of Households by State: 1984-2006 Two-Year Moving Aver-
ages. Accessed at: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/h08a.
html; United States Census Bureau. Illinois – Congressional District (106th
Congress). Accessed at: http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-
context=gct&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-mt_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_GCTP11_
ST6&-CONTEXT=gct&-tree_id=403&-geo_id=04000US17&-format=ST-6&-_
lang=en; Illinois State Board of Elections. Voter Registration Data. Accessed
at: http://www.elections.il.gov/Downloads/ ElectionInformation/PDF/reg-prct.
pdf. Please note that the 77.71 percent figure was arrived at by dividing the
percentage of registered voters by dividing the registered population by
the over-18 population found here: http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFF-
Facts?_event=&geo_id=04000US17&_geoContext=01000US|04000US17&_
street=&_county=&_cityTown=&_state=04000US17&_zip=&_lang=en&_
sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=040&_
submenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=ACS_2007_3YR_SAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr_
name=null&reg=null%3Anull&_keyword=&_industry=
15. United States Census Bureau. Voting and Registration in the Election of
2006. Accessed at: http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p20-557.pdf, p. 16.
16. CNN Election Day 2006 Data, accessed at: http://www.cnn.com/ELEC-
TION/2006/pages/results/states/IL/H/04/
17. CQ Politics: Pennsylvania 18th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/
wmspage.cfm?docID=district-PA-18
18. United States Census Bureau. Pennsylvania – Congressional District
(106th Congress). Accessed at: http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCT-
Table?_bm=y&-context=gct&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-CONTEXT=gct&-
mt_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_GCTP11_ST6&-tree_id=403&-redoLog=true&-_
caller=geoselect&-geo_id=04000US42&-format=ST-6&-_lang=en; United States
Census Bureau. State Median Income. Accessed at: http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/income/statemedfaminc.html, and then by selecting “Using 2-Year
Average Medians”.
19. Pennsylvania Department of State. Voter Registration Statistics. Ac-
cessed at: http://www.dos.state.pa.us/elections/cwp/view.asp?a=1310&q=446974
&electionsNav
20. CNN Election Day 2006 Data, accessed at: http://www.cnn.com/ELEC-
TION/2006/pages/results/states/PA/H/18/
21. United States Census Bureau. Voting and Registration in the Election of
2006. Accessed at: http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p20-557.pdf, p. 2.
22. The following financial data for all three elections was collated from
the following source: United States Federal Election Commission. Summary
Reports Search, accessible at: http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/srssea.
shtml. For each district, the 2005-2006 period was selected, an individual state
was selected (Colorado, Illinois, or Pennsylvania), and only the House election
receipts were compared for the Democratic and Republican candidates.
23. Ibid.
24. CQ Politics: Pennsylvania 6th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/
wmspage.cfm?docID=district-PA-06
25. CQ Politics: Pennsylvania 8th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/
wmspage.cfm?docID=district-PA-08
26. The methodology of the PVI as well as the source of all of the PVIs
below, can be found here: Cook Political Report, PVI for the 110th Congress,
accessed at: http://www.cookpolitical.com/sites/default/files/pvichart.pdf
27. CQ Politics: Illinois 6th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/wm-
spage.cfm?docID=district-IL-06#
28. This alludes to a potential flaw in the Avencia model of compactness, as
the district that was more likely drawn for outright political advantage was not
included in its list of most gerrymandered districts.
29. CQ Politics: Pennsylvania 4th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/
wmspage.cfm?docID=district-PA-04
30. CQ Politics: Pennsylvania 12th, accessed at: http://www.cqpolitics.com/
wmspage.cfm?docID=district-PA-12
31. Cf. Notes 24,25.
32. For a mathematical explanation of this algorithm, please see Rangevot-
ing.org, accessed at: http://www.rangevoting.org/GerryExamples.html
33. Federalist No. 58, accessed at: http://federali.st/58
 Tax-Exemption and Political Involvement: Institutional Regulation
1. Statement of Vote: November 4, 2008, General Election. California Sec-
retary of State. 1 April 2009. < http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_gen-
eral/sov_complete.pdf>
2. Tax Guides for Churches and Religious Organization. Internal Revenue
Service. 1 April 2009. < http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf>
3. 501 (c) (3) exemptions apply to corporation, funds or foundations oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, testing for public
safety, education purposes. They are to devote a majority of their activities to
the listed activities. They are prohibited from conducting political campaigning
as well as lobbying for influence legislation. In exchange, they received tax-
exemption status for these activities. Churches and religious institutions do not
need to request tax-exempt status as they are automatically provided with it.
501 (c) (4) exemptions apply to civic leagues and other organizations oper-
ated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare or local associations of
employees whose membership is limited to a designated company or persons
in a particular municipality or neighborhood and the net earnings of which are
devoted exclusively to charitable, education, or recreational purposes. Even
though they receive the same tax-exempt status as 501 (c) (3) organizations,
they can participate in political campaigns and can lobby for legislations.
527 exemptions apply to groups created to influence the nomination, elec-
tion, appointment of candidates for public office. For further information, refer
to Internal Revenue Service’s tax guides.
4. Internal Revenue Manual 7.26.3. Internal Revenue Service. 1 April 2009. <
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/ch10s06.html>
5. United States v. Christian Echoes Ministry, 404 U.S. 561 191972).
Findlaw. 1 April 2009. <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.
pl?court=US&invol=561&vol=404>
6. From Branch Ministries to Selma. Duke Law School. 1 April 2009. < http://
www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?71+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+185+(spring+2008)#
H2N4>
7. “Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay Marriage.” New York Times.
14 Nov. 2008. 1 April 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/15/us/
politics/15marriage.html>
8. “Trillion Dollar Defense Budget is Already Here.” The Independent
Institute. 15 March, 2007. 1 April 2009. < http://www.independent.org/newsroom/
article.asp?id=1941>
Representing the People: A Standard for Filling Senate Vacancies
1. Constitution of the United States. Amendment Seventeen
2. ibid.
3. ibid.
4. U.S. Constitution. Article 1, Section 2, Clause 4
5. The United States of America. The Library of Congress. Congressional
Research Service. By Sula P. Richardson and Thomas H. Neale. House and
Senate Vacancies: How are they filled? Congressional Research Service. <www.
senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Vacancies.pdf>.
6. The United States of America. The Library of Congress. Congressional
Research Service. Filling U.S. Senate Vacancies: Perspectives and Contempo-
rary Developments. By Thomas H. Neale. 10 Mar. 2009. Congressional Research
Service. <www.opencrs.com/getfile.php?rid=80860>
7. The United States of America. Federal Election Commission. Information
Division of the Office of Communications. Campaign Guide for Congressional
Candidates and Committees. By Dorothy Yeager.
Hope for Minor Parties: Electoral Fusion
1. Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, Controversies in Voting
Behavior (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001), 379
2. Howard A. Scarrow, “Duverger’s Law, Fusion, and the Decline of Ameri-
can ‘Third’ Parties,” Western Political Quarterly 39, no. 4 (December 1986): 634
3. Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties
in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984), 4
4. Daniel Mazmanian, Third Parties in Presidential Elections, Studies in Presi-
dential Selection (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 67
5. Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties
in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984), 9
6. Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties
in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984), 8
7. L. Sandy Maisel and Kara Z. Buckley, Parties and Elections in America, 4th
ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005), 270
8. Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties
in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984), 3
9. Adam Morse and J.J. Gass, eds., “More Choices, More Voices: A Primer
on Fusion,” special issue, Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elec-
tions Series (October 2006): 1
10. Adam Morse and J.J. Gass, eds., “More Choices, More Voices: A Primer
on Fusion,” special issue, Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elec-
tions Series (October 2006): 2
11. Adam Morse and J.J. Gass, eds., “More Choices, More Voices: A Primer
on Fusion,” special issue, Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elec-
tions Series (October 2006): 2
12. Melissa R. Michelson and Scott J. Susin, “What’s in a Name: the Power of
Fusion Politics in a Local Election,” Polity 36 (January 2004): 2-3
13. William R. Kirschner, “Fusion and the Associational Rights of Minor Politi-
cal Parties,” Columbia Law Review 95, no. 3 (April 1995): 683-684
14. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), Justice
Stevens
15. “Election Results,” New York State Board of Elections, http://www.elec-
tions.state.ny.us/2008ElectionResults.html (accessed October 20, 2008).
16. Richard Winger, “Minor Party and Independent Candidate Vote for U.S.
House in 2008,” Ballot Access News, entry posted December 9, 2008, http://
www.ballot-access.org/2008/12/09/minor-party-and-independent-candidate-
vote-for-us-house-in-2008/#respond (accessed December 9, 2008).
17. Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties
in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984), 25-26
18. Adam Morse and J.J. Gass, eds., “More Choices, More Voices: A Primer
on Fusion,” special issue, Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elec-
tions Series (October 2006): 5
19. Melissa R. Michelson and Scott J. Susin, “What’s in a Name: the Power of
Fusion Politics in a Local Election,” Polity 36 (January 2004): 2-3
20. Alyssa Katz, “The Power of Fusion Politics,” The Nation, September 12,
2005, 1
21. “Working Families: About Us,” New York Working Families Party, http://
www.workingfamiliesparty.org/about/ (accessed December 7, 2008). Emphasis
added.
22. Daniel Mazmanian, Third Parties in Presidential Elections, Studies in
Presidential Selection (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 118
23. Ashlee Albies, “To Restore Fusion Voting” (Testimony, Senate Elections
and Ethics Committee, Oregon State Senate, March 28, 2007), National Open
Ballot Voting Project, http://www.openballotvoting.org/resources.php (accessed
December 6, 2008).
24. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), Justice
Ginsburg
25. “Election Results,” New York State Board of Elections, http://www.elec-
tions.state.ny.us/2008ElectionResults.html (accessed October 20, 2008).
26. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), Mr. Slowes’
Argument
27. Lisa Jane Disch, The Tyranny of the Two-Party System (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 2002), 35
Waste Disposal and Energy Generation through Plasma Gasification
1. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. “Municipal
Solid Waste Landfills.” 2009. <http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/23682.html>
2. Cohen, Steve. “Wasted: New York City’s Giant Garbage Problem.” The
New York Observer. 25 March 2009. <http://www.observer.com/2008/wasted-
new-york-citys-giant-garbage-problem>.
3. Energy Information Administration. “Official Energy Statistics from the
U.S. Government: Landfill Gas.” April 2008. < http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.
renewables/page/landfillgas/landfillgas.html>
4. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. “Municipal
Solid Waste Landfills.”
5. United States Environmental Protection Agency. “Landfill Gas Emission
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6. Agblevor, Foster. “Feedstocks for Gasification.” 4 April 2007. 25 March
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9. Behar, “The Prophet of Garbage.”
10. Behar, “The Prophet of Garbage.”
11. Cobbs, James T. Jr. “Production of Synthesis Gas by Biomass Gasifica-
tion.” University of Pittsburgh. <www.engr.pitt.edu/chemical/facstaff/Biomass_
Energy_Project.doc>
 A New Approach to the Electricity Bill in Higher Education:
Submetering College Dorm Rooms to Incentivize Sustainable Consumption
1. B. Swords et al., “An enterprise energy-information system,” Applied
Energy, Vol 85, Issue 1, Jan 2008: 61-69.
2. John E. Petersen et al., “Dormitory residents reduce electricity consump-
tion when exposed to real-time visual feedback and incentives,” International
Journal of Sustainability in Higher Education 2007, Vol. 8, No. 1: 16, 33.
3. http://www.environment.columbia.edu/greenlivingchallenge/
4. Gregor P. Henze, “Building energy-management as a continuous quality
control process.” Journal of Architect Enginereering, 2001: Vol. 7, No. 4: 97–106.
<http://scitation.aip.org/getpdf/servlet/GetPDFServlet?filetype=pdf&id=JAEIED
000007000004000097000001&idtype=cvips&prog=normal>.
5. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/housing/docs/residence-halls/index.html
6. Person et al., 27.
7. http://www.luciddesigngroup.com/contest.php
8. http://www.google.org/powermeter/index.html
9. “Electricity Prices – Why do New Yorkers Pay More? (Summary)” Feb 23,
2008. <http://www.nyri.info/docs/White-Paper-Electricity_Price_Differences_%20
(summary)_%202-23-08.pdf>
10. Herbert E. Hirschfeld, P.E. “Integration of Energy Management, Electri-
cal Submetering and Time Sensitive Pricing in a Large Residential Community
Utilizing Wireless Communications” <http://www.submeteronline.com/pdf/
ACEEE_SummerStudyPaper.pdf>: p.2
11. Herbert E. Hirschfeld, P.E., et al., “New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority Residential Electrical Submetering Manual,” 2001.
<http://www.submeteronline.com/pdf/subman2001.pdf>
The Single Payer Solution
1. “Can George Bush Fix American Health Care?” The Economist, June
26, 2006. 2006. http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_
id=5436968
2. Kaiser Family Foundation. “Health Care Spending in the United States
and OECD Countries.” January 3, 2007. http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/
chcm010307oth.cfm
3. “Can George Bush Fix American Health Care?” The Economist.
4. The 2008 World Fact Book. Central Intelligence Agency, 2008. https://
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html
5. Nationmaster.com. http://www.nationmaster.com/red/country/cu-cuba/
hea-health&all=1
6. K. Davis, C. Schoen, S. C. Schoenbaum, M. M. Doty, A. L. Holmgren, J. L.
Kriss, and K. K. Shea. Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: An International Update on the
Comparative Performance of American Health Care. The Commonwealth Fund,
May 2007 http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/publications_show.
htm?doc_id=482678
7. Huebner, Jeff. “Equality for All? Will Med Students in the 21st Century Be
the Difference? From the COC to Your Practice.” American Medical Student
Association, 2001. http://www.amsa.org/uhc/cocuhc.ppt
8. Ruth, Erin. “Health Care Financing and Reimbursement.” American Medi-
cal Student Association, 2005. http://www.amsa.org/uhc/2005_healthcare_fi-
nancing.pdf
9. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. “National Compen-
sation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the United States, March
2005.” http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebsm0003.pdf
10. Institute of Medicine, “Hidden Costs, Values Lost: Uninsurance in
America.” The National Academies Press, June 17, 2003.
11. Heubner, “Equality for All?”
12. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “The Number of Uninsured
Americans Is at an All-Time High.” August 29, 2006. http://www.cbpp.org/8-29-
06health.htm
13. ibid.
14. ibid.
15. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Second Inaugural Address.
16. Children’s Defense Fund. “Improving Children’s Health: Understanding
Children’s Health Disparities and Promising Approaches to Address Them.”
http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data/Chil-
drens-Health-Disparities-Report-2006.pdf
17. State Health Access Data Assistance Center and the Urban Institute.
“Going Without: America’s Uninsured Children.” Robert Wood Johnson Foun-
dation. http://www.rwjf.org/files/newsroom/ckfresearchreportfinal.pdf
18. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. “National Compen-
sation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the United States, March
2005.” http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebsm0003.pdf
19. State Health Access Data Assistance Center and the Urban Institute.
“Going Without: America’s Uninsured Children.”
20. Green, Jeff. “U.S. Has Second Worst Newborn Death Rate in Modern
World, Report Says.” CNN.com, May 10, 2006. http://www.cnn.com/2006/
HEALTH/parenting/05/08/mothers.index/index.html
21. Insititute of Medicine of the National Academies. Insuring America’s
Health: Principles and Recommendations. January 14, 2004. http://www.iom.
edu/?id=17846
22. Physicians for a National Health Program. “Study Shows National Insur-
ance Could Save $286 Billion on Health Care.” Public Citizen, January 14, 2004.
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=1623
23. ibid.
24. ibid.
25. McCormick, Lauren A. and Russel T. Burge. “Diffusion of Medicare’s
RBRVS and Related Physician Payment Policies – Resource-Based Relative
Value Scale – Medicare Payment Systems: Moving Toward the Future.” Health
Care Financing Review, 1994. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0795/
is_n2_v16/ai_16863013
26. Himmelstein, David and Steffie Woolhandler. “Why the US Needs a
Single Payer Health System.” Physicians for a National Health Program. http://
www.pnhp.org/facts/why_the_us_needs_a_single_payer_health_system.php
27. Galvin, Robert S. “Physician payment in Canada, Germany, and the
United States.” Physician Executive (May-June 1993). http://findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi_m0843/is_n3_v19/ai_14235773/pg_5?tag=artBody;col1
28. ibid.
29. Himmelstein, David and Steffie Woolhandler. “I Am Not Health Re-
form.” The New York Times, December 15, 2007, Opinion. http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/12/15/opinion/15woolhandler.html
Green Jobs through Vocational Education
1. “Toward a history of vocational education and training (VET) in Europe in
a comparative perspective” Proceedings of the first international conference,
October 2002, Florence. Volume II: “The development of VET in the context of
the construction of the EC/EU and the role of Cedefop”. Cedefop Panorama
Series; 101. Luxembourg: Office Publications of the European Communities,
2004.
2. “Modern Apprenticeships, The Way to Work: A synopsis and commen-
tary”. British Association of Construction Heads. A BACH Occasional Paper:
2001. http://www.bach.uk.com/downloads/2003/modern_apprenticeships_2002.
pdf
3. Study of School-To-Work Initiatives October 1996
4. Daniel Jacoby, “The Transformation of Industrial Apprenticeship in the
United States.” (The Journal of Economic History, Dec., 1991), 906.
5. Peter Cappelli, Daniel Shapiro, and Nicole Shumanis, “Employer Partici-
pation in School-to-Work Programs.” (The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Sep., 1998), 112
6. Katherine L. Hughes, Thomas R. Bailey and Melinda J. Mechur, “School-
to-Work: Making a Difference in Education. (Institute on Education and the
Economy, Teachers College, Columbia University, 2001).
7. School-to-work and educational reform symposium. (Economics of Educa-
tion Review, 2006).
8. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
9. “Green Jobs: A Workforce System Framework for Action.” United States
Department of Labor. http://www.doleta.gov/
Secular Education Against the Proliferation of Unregulated Madrassas
1. Khan, Shehar Bano. “Pakistan: There’s More to Madrassas Than Terror”
Women’s Feature Service. New Delhi: Aug 8, 2005
2. Lancaster, John. “Lessons in Jihad for Pakistani Youth; Religious Schools
Resist Law to Curb Extremism.” The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Jul 14,
2002. pg. A.19
3. Khan. “Pakistan: There’s More to Madrassas Than Terror.”
4. Ahmed interviews one cleric who claimed that his students could merely
memorize and recite the Qu’ran. They did not even understand the words they
were reciting, according to the cleric.
5. Looney, Robert. “Reforming Pakistans educational system: The challenge
of the Madrassas” The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies. Wash-
ington: Fall 2003. Vol. 28, Iss. 3; pg. 267
6. Khan. “Pakistan: There’s More to Madrassas Than Terror” Women’s Fea-
ture Service. New Delhi: Aug 8, 2005
7. Lancaster. “Lessons in Jihad for Pakistani Youth”
8. ibid
9. ibid.
10. Ahmed, Noreen S. “Schooled in jihad; Clerics block education reform in
Pakistan; Musharraf seen as U.S. lackey Series: SPECIAL REPORT: Struggle for
the soul of Islam.” Chicago Tribune. Chicago, Ill.: Nov 28, 2004.
11. ibid.
12. Lancaster. “Lessons in Jihad for Pakistani Youth”
 13. Ahmed. “Schooled in jihad.” held or have ever been held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
14. ibid. 13. Prieto, Daniel B. ‘Terror War now Obama’s.’ Baltimore Sun, February 15,
15. ibid. 2009.
16. ibid. 14. Zoepf. ‘Deprogramming Jihadists’
17. ibid. 15. Ibid.

Towards a Stronger Nuclear Policy Swat Valley and Beyond: Re-examining American Efforts in Pakistan
1. While ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the 1. Fareed Zakaria, “Learning to Live with Radical Islam,” Newsweek, 9 March
U.S. would strengthen non-proliferation efforts as well, this paper will focus on 2009.
the treaties the U.S. has already ratified. 2. Ibid.
2. Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. 3. Ibid.
“Toward a Nuclear-Free World.” The Wall Street Journal Online. 15 Jan 2008 4. Talat Masood, “The Sultan of Swat,” Foreign Policy, 20 March 2009.
<http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html>. 5. Christopher Hitchens, “Swat? Not!: Handing the Swat Valley to the
3. “Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Quantities and Deployment” in “U.S. Taliban was shameful and wrong,” Slate, 9 March 2009.; Masood.
Nuclear Stockpile.” Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 6. Jane Perlez, “Truce in Pakistan May Mean Leeway for Taliban,” The New
for Nuclear Matters. <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nuclearstockpile.html>. York Times, 5 March 2009.
4. U.S. Department of State, “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.” 31 July 7. Shuja Nawaz and Arnaud de Borchgrave, “FATA—A Most Dangerous
1991. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Place: Forward,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (2009): VI.
Logistics. <http://www.dod.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start1/text.htm#top>. Article XI. 8. “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” International Crisis Group
5. Laalder, Ivo, and Jan Lodal. “The Logic of Zero.” Foreign Affairs. Novem- (2009): 7.
ber/December 2008 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64608/ivo-daalder- 9. Ibid, 5-8.
and-jan-lodal/the-logic-of-zero>. 10. Nawaz, 7-10.
6. Figures on the size of other country’s nuclear stockpiles are from: “Just 11. International Crisis Group, 6-15.
How Low Can You Go?” The Economist Online. 27 Mar 2008 <http://www. 12. Ibid, 2.
economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10926586>. 13. Ibid, 8, 10, 13.
7. U.S. Department of State, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 14. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Obama’s War,” The Washing-
Weapons.” 1 July 1968. U.S. Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/www/ ton Post 15 February 2009: B2.
global/arms/treaties/npt1.html>. Article VI 15. Peter Baker and Thom Shanker, “Obama Sets New Afghan Strategy,”
8. “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Article II; Article The New York Times 26 March 2009.
III 16. Ibid.
9. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provi- 17. Jane Perlez, “Rise of Pakistani Raises Questions: U.S. Weighs Sharif Role
sions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) as Possible Partner,” The New York Times 25 March 2009: A1
and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” International Atomic Energy 18. Jayshree Bajoria, “The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border,” Council on
Agency. 15 Sep 2008 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2008/ Foreign Relations, 20 March 2009.
iran_iaea_gov-2008-59_081119.htm 19. Nawaz, 8.
10. “Third Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debate.” 13 Oct 1960. The 20. Iftikhar H. Malik, The History of Pakistan (Westport: Greenwood Press,
American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showdebate. 2008), 129-10; Robert Kaplan, “The Lawless Frontier,” Atlantic Monthly, Septem-
php?debateid=3>. ber 2000..
21. “Inter-Services Intelligence,” The New York Times, 25 March 2009.
Culture without Bias, Diplomacy without Propaganda 22. “Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence,” Globalsecurity.org, 31 March
1. Condoleezza Rice, Interview on Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, CNN. 2009.
September 7, 2003. Accessed online at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRAN- 23. Ibid.
SCRIPTS/0309/07/le.00.html 24. Ibid; “Inter-Services Intelligence.”
2. Speech at the United States Institute of Peace, September 19, 2004. 25. Globalsecurity.org
Webcast of speech available at http://www.usip.org/events/2004/0819_webrice. 26. Ibid; “Inter-Services Intelligence.”
html 27. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Afghan Strikes by Taliban Get Pakistan
3. Anderson, Iain. This is Our Music: Free Jazz, the Sixties, and American Help, U.S. Aides Say,”
Culture. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007, p 11. 28. International Crisis Group, 19.
4. Music USA’s listening audience was 30 million in its first year and up to 29. International Crisis Group, i.
100 million a decade later (Von Eschen, p 14). 30. Ibid, 19.
5. Anderson, p 75. 31. Ibid, 19.
6. Anderson, p 13. 32. “Inter-Services Intelligence,” The New York Times 25 March 2009.
7. Von Eschen, Penny. Satchmo Blows Up the World. Cambridge, MA: Har- 33. Kaplan.
vard University Press, 2004, p 110. 34. Kaplan.
8. p 2 35. International Crisis Group, 4.
9. Von Eschen, 95. 36. “Inter-Services Intelligence.”
10. NEA Budget Cuts Aimed at Controversial Art Projects.’ Philadelphia 37. Mazzetti and Schmitt.
Enquirer. 27 October 1994. Page E01. 38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
After Guantánamo 40. International Crisis Group, 4-5.
1. United States. Cong. Military Commissions Act of 2006. 109 Cong., 2nd 41. Perlez, “Rise of Pakistani Raises Questions.”
sess. Cong. Doc. Washington, D.C, 2006. 42. Nawaz and de Borchgrave, VII.
2. Exec. Order No. 13492, 3 C.F.R. 1-4 (2009). Sec. 2 (c) and (f) 43. International Crisis Group, 18.
3. Ibid. Sec. 4 (2) 44. International Crisis Group, 18-21.
4. Exec. Order No. 13492, 3 C.F.R. 1-4 (2009). Sec. 4 (3) 45. International Crisis Group, 20.
5. Ibid. Sec. 4 (4) 46. Nawaz, 1-14.
6. Exec. Order No. 13492, 3 C.F.R. 1-2 (2009). Sec. 3 47. Jayshree Bajoria, “The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border,” Council on
7. Zoepf, Katherine. ‘Deprogramming Jihadists.’ The New York Times. No- Foreign Relations 20 March 2009.
vember 9, 2008. 48. Nawaz, 1-8.
8. Ibid. 49. Nawaz, 56.
9. Ibid. 50. Nawaz, 12,
10. Rehabiliation never tried at Gitmo – By Rowan Scarborough, February 51. Nawaz, 31.
19, 2009, The Washington Times 52. “Pakistan: People”; “Pakistan: Economy,” CIA—The World Factbook, 19
11. Ibid. March 2009.
12. To the knowledge of this author, no female prisoners are currently being 53. International Crisis Group, 10.
 54. Ibid, 13. 35. ICARDA. Saffron Manual for Afghanistan.
55. Ibid, 8. 36. Synovitz, Ron. “Afghanistan: Saffron Could Help Wean Farmers Off
56. Julian E. Barnes and Paul Richter, “U.S. plans to boost civilian aid to Opium Poppies”
Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times 24 March 2009. 37. Department of Trade of Bhutan. Saffron: Issues in International Market-
ing. Published March 2005. Viewed March 19, 2009. http://www.trade.gov.bt/
From Poppies to Red Gold: An Alternative Approach to Eradication administration/mktbriefs/12.pdf
1. Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The 38. For further information see: http://www.icarda.org/RALFweb/
Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” FinalReports/G_Marketing_Afghan_Saffron_Strategy_RALF02-02.pdf
2. Brigadier General John Nicholson. News Hour with Jim Lehrer. Aired 39. Interview. Shoaib Harris. 3/18/09.
3/18/09. 40. Interview. Shoaib Harris. Interview. Shoaib Harris. 3/18/09.
3. (Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Robert Charles. Congressional 42. Interview. Shoaib Harris. 3/18/09.
Hearing, 1 April 2004)
4. Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The The Clout of Creativity: Shaping American Policy on Foreign Arts
Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” 1. Alice Goldfarb Marquis, ‘N.E.A. Hysteria, On Both Sides’, February 21, 1995
5. Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/21/opinion/nea-hysteria-on-both-sides.html
Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” 2. Bogdanos, Matthew (January 2005). “Pieces of the Cradle”. Marine Corps
6. Emery, James. Middle East Times “The Taliban Opium Connec- Gazette (Marine Corps Association) (January 2005): 60–66
tion.” Published April 1, 2008. Viewed February 1, 2009. http://74.125.95.132/ 3. The Flag in the Civil War. Smithsonian National Museum of American
search?q=cache:8Vthwzoxi4wJ:www.metimes.com/International/2008/05/14/ History. Retrieved February 23, 2009, from http://americanhistory.si.edu/star-
the_taliban_opium_connection/2650/+taliban+profit+opium+trade+distribution&cd spangledbanner/the-flag-in-the-civil-war.aspx
=7&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari 4. Mattern, D. B., & Shulman, H. C. (Eds.). (2003). The Selected Letters of
7. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in Dolley Payne Madison (p. 3). Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?” 5. Wagner, M. (2007, January 29). Anti-Semitic incidents on the rise. The
8. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in Jerusalem Post, pp. 6, 7.
Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?” 6. Al-Horani, Yosif (2006, July 6). From Gaza to Al-Mahmodia and back
9. Anderson, Jon Lee. The New Yorker: “The Taliban’s Opium War.” Pub- again. Ar-Rai. (Jordan).
lished July 9, 2007. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_ 7. http://www.360east.com/?p=230
fact_anderson 8. an-Najjar, Latifa (2006, August 2). Zionism and Arabism are opposed to
10. Anderson, Jon Lee. The New Yorker: “The Taliban’s Opium War.” Pub- each other and cannot meet. Al-Bayan. (UAE).
lished July 9, 2007. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_ 9. Bhattacharya, S. (2003, March 20). Iraq oil field fires could be devastat-
fact_anderson ing. The New Scientist. Retrieved March 2, 2009, from http://www.newscientist.
11. Anderson, Jon Lee. The New Yorker: “The Taliban’s Opium War.” Pub- com/article/dn3529-iraq-oil-field-fires-could-be-devastating.html
lished July 9, 2007. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_ 10. Margolick, D. (2006, July 23). Postwar Pogrom. The New York Times.
fact_anderson Retrieved March 2, 2009, from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/books/
12. Governor Muhammad Ghulab Mangal of Helmand. News Hours with Jim review/23margolick.html
Lehrer. Aired 3/18/09 11. Ahir, Diwan Chand. Bamiyan Buddhas. (2001). Senseless Destruction by
13. BBC News Online. “Envoy Damns US Afghan Drug Effort.” Published Taliban. New Delhi: Blumoon Books.
3/21/09. Viewed 3/24/09. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7957237.stm 12. Foster, D. W., Lockhart, M. F., & Lockhart, D. B. (1998). Culture and Cus-
14. Rubin, Barnett R., Jake Sherman, Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghani- toms of Argentina. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 124
stan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication (9). 13. Baxter, Sarah. ‘Celebs in non-stop parade for Obamas’ Sunday Times
15. Coleman, Joseph. Associated Press. “Afghanistan: Opium Growth Thriv- (London), March 8, 2009.
ing.”
16. Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The
Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.”
17. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in
Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?”
18. ibid
19. ibid
20. Coleman, Joseph. Associated Press. “Afghanistan: Opium growth thriv-
ing”
21. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising
in Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?”; Brigadier General John Nicholson.
News Hour with Jim Lehrer. Aired 3/18/09; Coleman, Joseph. Associated Press.
“Afghanistan: Opium Growth Thriving.”
22. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in
Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?”
23. Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The
Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.”
24. Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The
Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.”
25. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in
Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?”
26. Ashraf Ghani. News Hours with Jim Lehrer. Aired 3/18/09
27. T. V. Padma. “Dropping the Poppy Habit.” August 20, 2008. Viewed at:
http://www.scidev.net/en/features/afghan-agriculture-dropping-the-poppy-
habit.html
28. Interview. Shoaib Harris. 3/18/09.
29. IRIN. Afghanistan: Afghan opium production soars to record levels
30. ICARDA. Saffron Manual for Afghanistan.
31. Research in Alternative Livelihoods (RALF). Research in Production and
Marketing of Saffron as Alternative to Opium Poppy Cultivation
32. Research in Alternative Livelihoods (RALF). Research in Production and
Marketing of Saffron as Alternative to Opium Poppy Cultivation
33. ICARDA. Saffron Manual for Afghanistan.
34. ICARDA. Saffron Manual for Afghanistan.
 Congratulations to
The Columbia University Chapter
of
The Roosevelt Institution

Nominated for
Chapter of the Year
2009

In recognition of outstanding scholarship,

visionary leadership,
and contribution to the progressive movement.
 iraq ¼ wall street ¼ congress ¼ katrina ¼ ethics ¼
criminal justice ¼ community development ¼ lgbtq rights ¼

election protection ¼ race ¼ health care ¼ jobs ¼ clean

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new leadership through progressive policy

Columbia University Chapter

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contact: Nick Turner
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your ideas. your leadership. your issues.

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