VILLABER vs.

COMELEC Case Digest

VILLABER vs. COMELEC 369 SCRA 126 Facts: Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Cagas filed with the COMELEC, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latters certificate of candidacy, alleging that Villaber was convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. COMELEC issued the resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, which would disqualify Villaber as a candidate for and from holding any public office. Held: COMELEC believed it is, applying Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code that any person who has been sentenced by final judgment for any offense for which he has been sentenced for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. There was no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.

LABO vs. COMELEC Case Digest

LABO vs. COMELEC 176 SCRA 1 Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held: The petitioners contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other

allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship.

Lonzanida vs COMELEC [311 SCRA 602] Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011 (Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit rule) Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an election protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him from running on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. The private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections. Issue: WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials. Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. ABUNDO VS COMELEC SC Clarifies "Three-Term Limit" Rule, Proclaims Abundo Winner of 2010 Mayoral Elections in Viga, Catanduanes Posted: February 7, 2013; By Bianca M. Padilla The Supreme Court En Banc has partly granted the petition for certiorari under rule 65 of Abelardo Abundo, Sr., Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, setting aside the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division Resolution dated February 8, 2012, COMELECs En Banc resolution in EAC (EA) No. A-25-2010 dated May 10, 2012, and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes Branch 43s Decision in Election Case No. 55 dated August 9, 2010, which declared Abundo ineligible to run in the 2010 Mayoral elections of Viga, Catanduanes under the three-term limit rule. Abundo ran for the position of Municipal Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes in the years 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010. He was proclaimed winner of the 2001 and 2007 elections. In the 2004 election, however, Jose Torres was proclaimed the winner of the electoral race and Mayor of Viga, performing the functions of the office. Abundo protested Torres election and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. He assumed office from May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007. As a result of such reversal, the Court declared Abundo eligible for another term as Mayor to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and immediately reinstated him to such position. Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes were also ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively and to revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and first Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of this Decision, which is immediately executory. The Court likewise lifted the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) it issued on July 3, 2012 to restrain the COMELEC from enforcing the abovementioned resolutions. As provided for in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of the Local Government Code, the three-term limit rule constitutes a disqualification to run for an elective local office when an official has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and has fully served those three consecutive terms. In the Courts 35-page decision, written by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., it unanimously held that Abundo did not serve three consecutive terms as Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes due to an actual involuntary interruption during the 2004-2007 term. This was because he assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served a little over one year and one month only. Thus, the two -year period which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundos case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule, ruled the Court. The Court further ruled that the COMELEC erred in applying Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, which held that service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an 3

election protest is considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule as the doctrine refers to a situation where the elected official is under preventive suspension and is only temporarily unable to discharge his functions yet is still entitled to the office as compared to the situation of Abundo where he did not have title to the office. The Court emphasized that pending the favorable resolution of Abundos election protest, he was relegated to being an ordinary constituent and private citizen since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. While awaiting the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the constituents of Viga and cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner. It stressed that Abundos case differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constitutents. In his separate opinion, Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote to briefly expound on the Courts ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections which the COMELEC erroneously relied upon in affirming the grant of the quo warranto petition against Abundo, and to express my own views on how our present Decision should be read in light of other three-term limit cases that have been decided under a protest case scenario. He stressed that the Court cannot avoid considering the attendant factual and legal realities, based on the requirements that Borja established, and has no choice but to adjust its appreciation of these realities, as may be necessary. Justice Brion agreed that the Aldovino ruling relied upon by COMELEC cannot be used as a basis for the conclusion that there had been no interruption in the case of Abundo - the eventual winner who is so recognized only after winning his protest case. Notably in Aldovino, while preventive suspension is an involuntary imposition, what it affects is merely the authority to discharge the functions of an office that the suspended local official continues to hold the local elective official continues to possess title to his office while under preventive suspension, so that no interruption of his term ensues. After discussing the prevailing jurisprudence cited by the majority (Ong v. Alegre, Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, and Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections), Justice Brion pointed out that the differing factual situations of the cited cases and Abundo that necessarily gave rise to different perspectives in appreciating the same legal question, immediately suggest that the Courts ruling in the cited cases cannot simply be combined nor wholly be bodily lifted and applied to Abundo. At the simplest, both Lonzanida and Ong were protestees who faced the same legal reality of losing the election, although Ong fully served the elected term; for Abundo, the legal reality is his recognized and declared election victory, In terms of factual reality, Lonzanida and Abundo may be the same since they only partially served their term, but this similarity is fully negated by their differing legal realities with respect to the element of election. Ong and Abundo, on the other hand, have differing legal and factual realities; aside from their differing election results, Ong served the full term, while Abundo only enjoyed abbreviated term. Based on this analysis, Justice Brion concluded his separate opinion by stressing that Abundo should not be considered to have been elected for the full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule, despite the legal reality that he won the election; as in Ong, the factual reality should prevail, and that reality is that he served for less than this full term. Thus, where less than a full term is served by a winning protestant, no continous and uninterrupted term should be recognized. This is the view that best serves the purpose of the three-term limit rule. Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro joined Justice Brions separate opinion. The Court also summarized the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and involuntary interruption. Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections provides that when a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position through succession, his service for the unexpired portion of the term cannot be treated as one full term. 4

Montebon v. Commission on Elections supplemented this by saying that if the official runs again for the same position he held rior to his assumption of the higher office, his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption. On the issue of recall elections, Adormeo v. Commission on Elections and Socrates v. Commission on Elections held that an elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth trm, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the officials servicefor he had become in the interim a private citizen. Latasa v. Commission on Elections ruled that the abolition of an elective office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent officials continuity of service. As mentioned above, Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections states that preventive suspension is not a term interrupting event as the elective officers continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of the office during this period. Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections and Dizon v. Commission on Elections continued on to rule that when a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he losess in an election protest and is ousted from office. An interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary is sufficient to break the continuity of service. Lastly, Ong v. Alegre and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections declared when an official is defeated in an election protest and decision becomes final only after the official had served the full term for the office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term. (GR No. 201716, Abundo v. Commission on Elections, January 8, 2013) x x x."

Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April 18, 1995)

Posted on October 3, 2012

GR No. 112889 243 SCRA 538 April 18, 1995 FACTS: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State

of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that country. Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible postelection quo warranto proceeding against private respondent. Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for cancellation of respondents CoC on account of the candidates disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC. ISSUE: Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office. HELD: Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in criminal cases here and abroad are disqualified from running for any elective local position. It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Art icle 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who has been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC outrightly
6

dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

Chavez vs. COMELEC , GR 162777, Aug 31, 2004 Petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520. He claims that said section in the nature of an ex post facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. ISSUE: Is Sec. 32 of COMELEC Res. No. 6520 in the nature of an ex post facto law? HELD: NO. Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of "propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office." Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.

SWS vs Comelec

Facts: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?

Ruling: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.