ART VIII.

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Courtesy: King Norberte Powers of the Supreme Court: Art. 8 section 5 Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

Justices of Supreme Court

Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice) Antonio T Carpio

Presbitero J. Velasco Jr.

(Senior Associate Justice) Arturo D. Brion Roberto A. Abad Jose C. Mendoza Marvic M.V.F. Leonen Diosdado M. Peralta Martin Villarama Jr Bienvenido L. Reyes

Teresita De Castro Lucas P. Bersamin Jose P. Perez Estela Perlas- Bernabe

Courtesy: Don Ortega The Judicial Department (Sections 5-7) Powers of the Supreme Court Sec. 5(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting:

Ambassadors Other Public Ministers and Consuls

Under International Law, diplomats and even consuls are not subject to jurisdiction of the court of the receiving state, except in certain cases when immunity is waived either expressly or impliedly. In such cases, the Supreme Court can and should take cognizance of the litigation in view of possible international repercussions. And over petitions for:

Certiorari Prohibition Mandamus Quo Warranto Habeas Corpus

Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto are special civil actions while questions rose in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. In Quo Warranto, the title of the respondent while Habeas corpus is a special proceeding. Sec. 5(2) The Supreme Court has the power to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments or orders of lower courts in; a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of a treaty, international or Executive Agreement, Law, Presidential Decree, Proclamation, Order, Instruction, Ordinance, or Regulation in question. It should be noted that the appeals allowed in this section are from final judgments and decrees only of lower courts or judicial tribunals. Administrative decisions are not included.

In Sec. 5(2)(a), it provides that Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation in question. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is irreducible and may not be withdrawn from it by Congress. b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower courts is in issue.

d. All criminal cases which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

Sec. 5(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned. The Rationale of the Provision: The present rule bolsters the independence of the judiciary in so far as it vests the power to temporarily assign judges of inferior courts directly in the Supreme Court and no longer in the executive authorities and conditions the validity of any such assignment in excess of six months upon the consent of the transferred judge. This will minimize or altogether eliminate the pernicious practice of rigodon de jeuces, or the transfer of judges at will to suit the motivations of the chief executive. The Purpose of Transfer: Temporary assignments may be justified to arrange for judges with clogged dockets to be assisted by their less busy colleagues, or to provide for the replacement of the regular judge who may not be expected to be impartial in the decision of particular cases. Permanent Transfer: Since transfer imports removal from one office and since a judge enjoys security of tenure, it cannot be affected without the consent of the judge concerned. Sec. 5(4) - The Supreme Court has the power to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of Justice.

This power is deemed to be an incidental and inherent power of the Supreme Court. (People vs Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172)

Sec. 5(5) - Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of Constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of Procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain.

For a more independent Judiciary: The authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and admission to the practice of law is a traditional power of the Supreme Court. The grant if this authority, coupled with its authority to integrate the Bar, to have administrative supervision over all courts, in effect places in the hands of the Supreme Court the totality of the administration of justice and thus makes for a more independent judiciary.

Enhances the capacity to render justice: it also enhances the Courts capacity to render justice, especially since, as the Supreme Court had occasion to say, it includes the inherent authority to suspend rules when the requirement of justice demand. Moreover, since it is to the Supreme Court that rule making authority has been given, rules promulgated by special courts and quasi-judicial bodies are effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Sec. 6 The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Section six provides that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all lower courts and personnel thereof. It is a significant innovation towards strengthening the independence of the judiciary. Before the 1973 Constitution, there was no constitutional provision on the subject and administrative supervision over the lower courts and their personnel was exercised by the Secretary of Justice. The previous set-up impaired the independence of judges who tended to defer to the pressures and suggestions of the executive department in exchange for favorable action on their requests and administrative problems.

This section exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul to the doctrine of separation of powers.

Qualifications

Sec. 7(1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

Congress may not alter the qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court and the constitutional qualifications of other members of the Judiciary. But Congress may alter the statutory qualifications of judges and justices of lower courts.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Competence. In determining the competence of the applicant or recommended for appointment, the Judicial and Bar Council shall consider his educational preparation, experience, performance and other accomplishments of the applicant.

Integrity. The Judicial and Bar Council shall take every possible step to verify the applicants record of and reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.

Probity and Independence. Any evidence relevant to the candidates probity and independence such as, but not limited to, decision he has rendered if he is an incumbent member of the judiciary or reflective of the soundness of his judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of character shall be considered.

G.R. No. 177721, 3 July 2007

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION, et. al. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA Facts: Petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation are peoples and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic cases aimed at protecting the peoples rights to self-governance and justice. Respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of releasing presidential appointments including those of Supreme Court Justices. Respondent Gregory Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in this court. Petitioners allege that Ermita, in the representation of the Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement of Associate Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. They contend that such appointment is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They claim that Ong is a Chinese Citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates Chinese citizenship. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of Ongs birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese. Petitioners invoke the Constitution which requires members of the Supreme Court to be natural-born citizens, or those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship. They maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after Ongs birth, his father was finally granted Filipino Citizenship. They maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after Ongs birth, his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen. They further assert that this birth certificate prevails over Ongs new Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration stating that he is a natural-born Filipino. Petitioners thereupon pray for the annulment of the appointment of Ong as Associate Justice of this Court. They filed a motion for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent and restrain Ermita from releasing the appointment of Ong, and to prevent and restraining respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this Court. Issue: Whether or not respondent Gregory Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Held: The petition is granted. It is clear from the records of this case that respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized with his father. Furthermore, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of Ongs ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, Ongs mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

G.R. No. L-17171

January 30, 1965

FERNANDO D. GUEVARA, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, respondent. Ramon C. Fernandez for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Facts: Sometime in 1954 the District Engineer of Sorsogon prepared a program of work and detailed estimate for the reconstruction of the Sorsogon Central School building at Burabod, Sorsogon. Specifications consisting of five pages were likewise prepared. The cost of painting was left out in the detailed estimate and specifications. The papers were submitted to the Division Engineer in Lucena, Quezon, who returned them duly approved with an authorized appropriation of P40,000.00 "provided that painting shall be included". Whereupon, the specification for painting was accordingly made and appended to the specifications as page six. The bidding was opened to all contractors including Fernando Guevara, Francisco V. Nicolas and Amadeo Briones. Fernando Guevara finally got the contract since he got the lowest declared bid amounting to P37,500.00. Contract has been signed by Guevara as well as the District Engineer. The construction finished after eighty five days after contract has been completed. The contract has been paid and Guevara was able to collect the final payment. Eight days after completion of the project, Guevara filed with the Director of Public Works a written claim for the payment of P4,620.00 representing cost of painting not covered by the contract. Issue: Whether or not the contract for the reconstruction of the school building included painting.

Ruling: 1. Testimonies of Santiago P. Ojeda, Juan S. Lopez and Cesar Gacias, senior carpenter, general foreman and clerk, respectively, in the District Engineer's Office. Santiago P. Ojeda testified that when he prepared the original specifications he did not include painting. Juan S. Lopez, however, declared that when the detailed estimate and specifications were approved by the Division Engineer, he prepared the specification for painting. Cesar Gacias testified that his duty was to distribute the specifications to prospective bidders; that upon receiving from Juan S.

Lopez the specifications in question he sorted and checked them; that said specifications contained six pages, with the specification for painting appearing on the sixth page; and that copies of the complete specifications were distributed to prospective bidders Guevara, Nicolas, Jabson and Briones. The presumption is that official duty has been regularly performed (Section 5[m], Rule 131, Rules of Court). 2. On the other hand, Santiago P. Ojeda, building inspector for the project, testified that Guevara submitted to the District Engineer, as required, sample of the paints he (Guevara) purchased. Hence, Guevara knew that painting was part of the specifications. 3. Guevaras assistant, Leoncio Vasquez, behaviour on trying to steal the sixth page of the contract where the painting cost was stated. 4. Guevaras twenty years experience as public works contractor. He must have acquired first hand knowledge of the mechanics of government contracting as well as skill in administering construction contracts. The practice of contractors, before submitting any bid or proposal, is to verify with the office of the District Engineer the fund available for a project, approval of the plans, specifications and program of work and other relevant and necessary matters in prosecuting a government contract. From his experience and know-how We can be certain that petitioner, prior to submission of his bid, called on the District Engineer of Sorsogon to make his verification. By doing so, he would have noted the first indorsement dated August 9, 1954 approving the detailed estimate and program of work and requiring that painting be included. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Auditor General, with costs against petitioner.

Courtesy: Seora Federico

1. What is POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE? Those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government, hence, those are issues that are beyond the jurisdiction of the court to decide. The term connotes a question of policy in matters concerning the government of the state as a body politic. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the validity or legality, of a particular measure or a contested act.

2. In Estrada vs Desierto case: Why the court did deny the petition of Estrada that the case filed against him by the Ombudsman should be prohibited?

Suggested Answer (actual answer from the case):

We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.[109] since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,

especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.[114] indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.

3. Can the members of the Supreme Court be appointed as arbitrary members? No. Sec 12 Art VII states that; the members of the SC and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Courtesy: CJ Jaranilla IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS AND THE ATTENDANCE OF COURT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES UNDER THE SUBPOENAS OF FEBRUARY 10, 2012 AND THE VARIOUS LETTERS FOR THE IMPEACHMENT PROSECUTION PANEL DATED JANUARY 19 AND 25, 2012.

Question (ISSUE): Whether or not the Court should comply with the subpoenas and the letters of the Prosecution Impeachment Panel in the Impeachment Court. Suggested Answer (RULING): Philippine law, rules and jurisprudence prohibit the disclosure of confidential or privileged information under well-defined rules. At the most basic level and subject to the principle of comity, Members of the Court, and Court officials and employees may not be compelled to testify on matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties, while testimony on matters external to their adjudicatory functions and duties may be compelled by compulsory processes. To summarize these rules, the following are privileged documents or communications, and are not subject to disclosure: (1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court's session on acts done material to pending cases, except where a party litigant requests information on the result of the raffle of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC; (2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before the Court; (3) Court records which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature, in particular, documents and other communications which are part of or related to the deliberative process, i.e., notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and similar papers. (4) Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees in the course of their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged even after their term of office.

(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that cannot be disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made available by the court to the general public. (6) The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy demands that the highest officials of each department be exempt from the compulsory processes of the other departments. (7) These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an institution, not to any justice or judge in his or her individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than the individual justices or judges, no sitting or retired justice or judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim exception without the consent of the Court.

Courtesy: Bb. Ocumen ARTICLE VIII JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality

Chavez vs. NHA G.R. No. 164527 August 15, 2007

FACTS: The National Housing Authority entered a Joint Venture Agreement with R-II Builders, Inc. which aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Joint Venture Agreement is constitutional and valid and the operative fact principle is applicable.

RULING: The answer is in the positive. They are constitutional and valid.

There were a lot of issues raised in the case, but for the purposes of the topic on the effect of declaration of unconstitutionality, the operative fact doctrine, as explained, applied in the present case.

It is well understood that the Constitution is supreme and paramount and once the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, it shall be void and the latter will govern. It is also true that prior to the declaration of nullity, such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. It is also entitled to obedience and respect. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

In the case at hand, the respondents had no reason to think that their agreements were unconstitutional or even questionable, as in fact, the concurrent acts of the executive department lent validity to the implementation of the Project. The SMDRP agreements have

produced vested rights in favor of the slum dwellers, the buyers of reclaimed land who were issued titles over said lands and the agencies and investors who made investments in the project. These properties and rights cannot be disturbed or questioned after the passage of around ten (10) years from the start of the SMDRP implementation. Evidently, the "operative fact" principle has set in. The titles to the lands in the hands of the buyers can no longer be invalidated.

Courtesy: Sir Florida 1. Who may be admitted to the bar? Qualifications: must be a Filipino citizen must be a resident of Philippines must be at least 21 years of age must be of good moral character must possess the required educational qualification, i.e. Must satisfactorily show that the applicant has obtained the pre-law course and there after completed the law proper. must pass the bar examination taken its lawyer's oath signed on the roll of attorney's

Case Digest: In Re Cunanan 94 Phil 534 Resolutions March 18, 1954

Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

Republic Act 6735: Initiative and Referendum Act

R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 solely, dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding due notice.

Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue: WON the payment of IBP dues suffer constitutional infirmity.

Held: No, all legislation directing the integration of the Bar has been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court.

When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why? The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

Courtesy: Yours truly What is Operative Fact Doctrine? The Doctrine of Operative Fact An unconstitutional law has an effect before being declared unconstitutional. Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. As a general rule, any act declared by the court to be unconstitutional has no legal effect whatsoever it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. Hence, what is followed is that when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and then latter shall govern. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of anunconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute pri or to adetermination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. What is Writ of Prohibition? It is a writ by which a superior court commands a lower court or a corporation, board or person acting without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, to desist from further proceeding in an action or matter. It will lie only when no appeal or any other remedy is available to the aggrieved party. Prohibition is a negative remedy prohibiting the doing of a certain act.

Courtesy: VP Bautista Bengzon vs Drilon G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992 EN BANC FACTS: Veto Power of the President / fiscal autonomy June 20, 1953 RA 910 enacted retirement pensions for retired Justices who served for at least 20 years in service and attained 70 years old. Some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. RA 910 was amended by RA 1792, Sec 3-A says that in case salary is increased or decreased, such increase or decrease will be deemed the retirement pension Identical retirement benefits given to Constitution. Commissions by virtue of RA 1568 amended by RA 3595. Same given to AFP by virtue of PD 758 The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any institution given the power to declare, in proper cases, that act of both the President and Congress are unconstitutional needs a high degree of independence in the exercise of its functions. Our jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress. Neither may it be increased without our advice and concurrence. Justices may not be removed until they reach age 70 except through impeachment. All courts and court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. The President may not appoint any Judge or Justice unless he or she has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme Court's supervision. Our salaries may not be decreased during our continuance in office. We cannot be designated to any agency performing administrative or quasi-judicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy. The Judiciary is not only independent of, but also co-equal and coordinate with the Executive and Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and section 30, Article VI, Constitution)

Issue: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. Held: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and subsisting. The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated November 28, 1991 is likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated.

Doctrine of Operative Fact Acts done pursuant to a law which was subsequently declared unconstitutional remain valid, but not when the acts are done after the declaration of unconstitutionality.

ART IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Courtesy: Maam Retulin 1. Does the Civil Service Commission have the authority to prescribe the qualification requirements for lawyer positions in the Office of the Ombudsman? Section 6, Article XI of the Constitution provides:

"Sec. 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law." Furthermore, ""The Ombudsman Act of 1989" section 11 thereof states: "Section 11. Structural Organization. The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Ombudsman, who shall have supervision and control of the said office." In addition, paragraph 5 of the same section of this Act emphasizes that: "(5) The position structure and staffing pattern of the Office of the Ombudsman, including the Office of the Special Prosecutor, shall be approved and prescribed by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman shall appoint all officers and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, including those of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, in accordance with the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations." Hence, the Civil Service Commission does not have the authority to prescribe the qualification requirements for lawyer positions in the Office of the Ombudsman.

2. Officials of the Office of the Ombudsman:

Conchita Carpio-Morales Orlando C. Casimiro Gerard A. Mosquera Pelagio S. Apostol Humphrey T. Monteroso

Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao

Rudiger G. Falcis II (OIC) Wendell Barreras-Sulit

Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Police Special Prosecutor

Courtesy: Miss Yapoyco BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, G.R. No. 177131 Present: CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.

- versus -

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

Promulgated: June 7, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Facts: The issue arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-011 on August 19, 1999 (the COA Resolution), with the subject Defining the Commissions policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines. In its whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the BSP was created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v.

National Labor Relations Commission,[6] the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution; and that the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code.

Position of the BSP: a. Republic Act No. 7278 which amended the BSPs charter after the cited case was decided. The most salient of all amendments in RA No. 7278 is the alteration of the composition of the National Executive Board of the BSP. The said RA virtually eliminated the substantial government participation in the National Executive Board by removing: (i) the President of the Philippines and executive secretaries, with the exception of the Secretary of Education, as members thereof; and (ii) the appointment and confirmation power of the President of the Philippines, as Chief Scout, over the members of the said Board.

The BSP believes that the cited case has been superseded by RA 7278. Thereby weakening the cases conclusion that the BSP is a government-controlled corporation (sic).

b. Also, the Government, like in other GOCCs, does not have funds invested in the BSP. What RA 7278 only provides is that the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, offices, agencies and instrumentalities can from time to time donate and contribute funds to the BSP.

xxxx Also the BSP respectfully believes that the BSP is no t appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code as stated in the COA resolution. As defined by Section 2(10) of the said code, instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. The BSP is not an entity administering special funds. It is not even included in the DECS National Budget. x x

Issue: Whether or not the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Ruling: The Supreme Court, however, held that not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exist another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as public corporations. These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to a different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its departments or offices. As presently constituted, the BSP is a public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the Department of Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and be economically viable to justify its existence under a special law. The economic viability test would only apply if the corporation is engaged in some economic activity or business function for the government, which is not the case for BSP. Therefore, being a public corporation, the funds of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. COA argument: 1. The BSP is a public corporation created under Commonwealth Act No. 111 dated October 31, 1936, and whose functions relate to the fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth. The manner of creation and the purpose for which the BSP was created indubitably prove that it is a government agency. Being a government agency, the funds and property owned or held in trust by the BSP are subject to the audit authority of respondent Commission on Audit pursuant to Section 2 (1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. Republic Act No. 7278 did not change the character of the BSP as a government-owned or controlled corporation and government instrumentality.

2.

3.

Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning: xxxx (10) "Instrumentality" refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. xxxx (12) "Chartered institution" refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State. (13) "Government-owned or controlled corporation" refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.

Courtesy: Mrs. Sanchez Eduardo P. Corsiga, Former Deputy Administrator, National Irrigation Administration, Petitioner, vs. Hon Quirico G. Defensor, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Iloilo City, and Romeo P. Ortiz, Respondents.

FACTS: Private respondent Romeo P. Ortiz was the senior Engineer B in the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Jalaur-Suage River Irrigation System, Region VI, tasked with the duty of assisting the irrigation Superintendent in the said station. Sometime June, 1995, petitioner Eduardo P. Corsiga issued ROM No. 52, reassigning private respondent to Aganan-Sta Barbara River Irrigation System. On July 31, 1995, private respondent filed with Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City a complaint for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 22462. 2. Whether private respondent has a cause of action despite his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

RULING: 1. The Regional Trial Court does NOT have jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 22462. The Civil Service Commission has the jurisdiction over all employees of Government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including the government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters. It is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. The National Irrigation Administration created under Presidential Decree No. 1702, is a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. Section 13 Rule VII of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides how appeal can be taken from a decision of a department or agency head. It stated that such decision shall be brought to the Merit System Protection Board. It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in requiring the establishment of a grievance procedure in Rule XII, Section 6 of the same rules, that decision of lower level officials be appealed to the agency head, then to the Civil Service Commission. Decision of the Civil Service Commission, in turn, may be elevated to the Court of Appeals. 2. He has NO cause of action. Being a NIA employee covered by Civil Service Commission, private respondent should have first complained to the NIA administration, and if necessary

then appeal to the Civil Service Commission. He goes to court without pursuing his administrative remedies and his action is premature. The petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 44123 is REVERSED. The orders dated January 8, 1996 and January 13, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City Branch 36 denying petitioners motion to dismiss and the motion for reconciliation, respectively, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 22462 ought to be and is hereby ordered DISMISSED. Costs against private respondent. ###

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner vs. HERMOGENES P. POBRE, respondent

FACTS: Respondent Hermogenes P. Pobre is a former government official who retired from the government service three times. Respondent first retired as commissioner of the Commission on Audit (COA) on March 31, 1986. He reentered the government and retired as chairman of the Board of Accountancy on October 31, 1990. He was then appointed as associate commissioner of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) of which he retired eventually as chairman on February 17, 2001. The first two times he retired, respondent Pobre received his terminal leave pay amounting to P310,522.60 and P55,000, respectively. On his third retirement, respondent Pobre claimed payment of his terminal leave based on his highest monthly salary as PRC chairman but to be reckoned from the date he first entered the government service as budget examiner in the defunct Budget Commission in 1958.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CSC had the jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of petitioners claim for terminal leave benefits when this claim was pending adjudication by the COA. 2. Whether or not a retired employee who had served a string of government agencies in his career was entitled to have his terminal leaves computed from the time of his original appointment to the first agency in the manner retirement annuities are computed under Section 13 of Commonwealth Act 186.

RULING:
1. Yes. Petitioner CSC anchors its authority to dispose of respondent Pobres claim for terminal leave benefits to its powers under the 1987 Administrative Code. Section 12 (17), Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Code enumerates the expanded powers and functions of petitioner CSC, among which is to administer the retirement program for government officials and employees.

On the other hand, the powers and functions of COA are delineated in Section 2 subsections (1) and (2) Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution
2.

Yes, as per Section 13 of Commonwealth Act 186 state: Section13. Computation of service. The aggregate period of service which forms the basis for retirement and calculating the amount of annuity described in section eleven hereof shall be computed from the date of original employment, whether as a classified or unclassified employee in the service of an "employer", including periods of service at different times and under one or more employers, and also periods of service performed overseas under the authority of the Republic of the Philippines and periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines prior to June sixteen, nineteen hundred fifty-one, and periods of honorable service in the Philippines under the authority of the United States Government if rendered prior to July four, nineteen hundred and forty-six: Provided, however, That in the case of an employee who is eligible for and receives retirement pay on account of military or naval service or on account of disability incurred therein, the period of service upon which such retirement pay is based shall be excluded: Provided, also, That periods of service rendered after June sixteen, nineteen hundred fifty-one during which premiums are not required shall be excluded, unless the premiums corresponding to said service be later on paid to the System with interest: And provided, further, That the period from January one, nineteen hundred and forty-two to February twenty-eight, nineteen hundred and forty-five and any period not exceeding one year at a time during which an officer or employee had been thereafter out of the service to the date of his reinstatement or reappointment before June sixteen, nineteen hundred fifty-one, shall be included for those who were in the service on December eight, nineteen hundred and forty-one, except those who were separated prior to the Japanese occupation, in the computation of total service, the annuity mentioned herein, and payment of premiums therefore. For the purpose of this section, the term "service" shall include only full- time service with compensation: Provided, that the Board may include part-time and other services with compensation under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. PASTOR B. TINAYA, respondent.

FACTS: On December 1, 1993, the CSC Regional Office No. VIII approved the appointment but only as temporary, effective for one (1) year from December 1, 1993 to November 30, 1994. The appointment was temporary due to respondents non-submission of his service record with respect to his three (3)-year work related experience prior to his appointment as municipal assessor, as required by the CSC Revised Qualification Standards. On December 16, 1993 respondent married the daughter of Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste. Meanwhile, Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste was on leave of absence from November 23, 1994 up to December 29, 1994. Vice-Mayor Rosario C. Luban was then the acting Mayor. On December 1, 1994, after the expiration of respondents temporary appointment, Acting Mayor Luban appointed him anew as municipal assessor effective that day. The appointment was permanent. The CSC Regional Office No. VIII initially disapproved respondents new appo intment. But upon appeal by Mayor Pricilla Justimbaste, the CSC, in its Resolution Dated May 4, 1995, approved respondents appointment as permanent. On November 9, 1999, CSC Regional Office No. VIII issued an order recalling respondents appointment in violation of the Law of Nepotism.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Mayor Justimbaste violate the Law of Nepotism. 2. Whether respondent be appointed permanent.

RULING:
1. Yes. As per Section 59, Chapter 8 of the Civil Service Law states: (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited. As used in this Section, the word relative and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. Mayor Justimbaste being the mother-in-law of the respondent had made the appointment violated the Law of Nepotism. 2. No. Due non-submission of his service record with respect to his three (3)-year work related experience prior to his employment as municipal assessor, as required by the CSC Revised Qualification Standards. And due to the violation of the Law of Nepotism.

Courtesy: Princess Sia Q1. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Ombudsman. Who are the members of the Office of the Ombudsman? A1. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.t has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties; (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer; (4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action; (5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents; (6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: provided, that the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public: provided, further, that any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true; (7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records; (9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein; (10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided; (11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein. (RA 6770, Sec. 15) Members of the Office of the Ombudsman: (RA 6770, Sec. 3)

Ombudsman Overall Deputy Deputies Special Prosecutor

Q2. Does the office of the Ombudsman shall have a disciplinary authority over members of the Senate? A2. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. (RA 6770, Sec. 21)

Q3. Can the president have a cognizant act to investigate the Deputy of the Ombudsman? State your basis. A3. Yes. Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act itself expressly vests the President with the power to remove a deputy of the Ombudsman, thus: A Deputy, or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process. Since the law expressly authorizes the President to remove a deputy of the Ombudsman for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, subject to the requirement of due

process, it is within the authority and jurisdiction of this Office to have conducted administrative proceedings against Deputy Ombudsman, to determine cause for his administrative culpability, and to impose the penalty of dismissal if the determination warrants the same. Withal, where not expressly provided for by law, the power to remove or discipline may be derived under the doctrine of necessary implication from the power to appoint (C. Cruz, The Law of Public Officers, 2003 Ed., Central Book Supply, Inc., page 223). Otherwise put, the power to appoint carries with it the implied power to remove or to discipline (Aguirre v. De Castro, G.R. No. 127631, 17 December 1999; Vide: DOH v. Camposano, et al., G.R. No., 157684, 27 April 2005; Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, 16 October 1997; Bagatsing v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-34952, 25 July 1975). In the words of the Supreme Court: Absent any contrary statutory provision, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or to discipline. Since respondent was appointed by the regional director of DECS, she may be disciplined or removed by the latter pursuant to law (Aguirre, supra). [Emphasis supplied] Under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act, the power to appoint the deputies of the Ombudsman is expressly vested in the President. Section 9, Article XI of the constitution provides thus: Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for each vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur. Similarly, Section 4 of the Ombudsman Act states: Sec. 4. Appointment. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least twenty one (21) nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three (3) nominees for each vacancy thereafter, which shall be filled within three (3) months after is occurs, each of which list shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation. xxx xxx xxx

Notably, no provision in the Constitution or the Ombudsman Act effectively enjoins the President from exercising the power to remove or discipline a deputy of the Ombudsman as the latters appointing authority. This implied power of the President may be starkly contrasted with his lack of the same power with respect to the Ombudsman, or the members of the Supreme Court, or the judges of inferior courts, whom the President is vested the express authority to appoint. With respect to the Ombudsman and the members of the Supreme Court, Section 2, article XI of the Constitution expressly provides that said public officers may be removed only through impeachment. With respect to judges of inferior courts Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to remove and discipline them.

Courtesy: Mr. Fernando What are the qualifications for Commission on Audit? Article IX D Section 1. There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, Certified Public Accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same profession.

Who is the Commissioner of COA? Ms. Ma. Gracia M. Pulido-Tan

What are the functions of COA? The Commission on Audit (COA) is the Philippines' Supreme State Audit Institution. The Philippine Constitution declares its independence as a constitutional office, grants it powers to audit all accounts pertaining to all government revenues and expenditures/uses of government resources and to prescribe accounting and auditing rules, gives it exclusive authority to define the scope and techniques for its audits, and prohibits the legislation of any law which would limit its audit coverage. Mandated Functions 1. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post- audit basis:

a. constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; b. autonomous state colleges and universities; c. other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and d. such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the

Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.

2. The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.

Courtesy: Little Ms. Sabaco

GALIDO vs. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January 18, 1988 local elections for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed duly-elected mayor. On January 25, 1988, private respondent Galeon filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the Commission on Elections. Its First Division reversed the RTC Decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor. The COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial C after the name Galido were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid. Undaunted by his previous failed actions, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and injunction before the Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary restraining order. In his comment, private respondent Saturnino R. Galeon moved for the dismissal of the present petition for three (3) main reasons: Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable; the petition involves pure questions of fact; and it is exactly the same petition involving identical allegations, grounds and legal issues. In his reply to the comment, petitioner cited Article IX (A), Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution; averred that the petition involves pure qustions of law; and that the dismissal with finality of the first petition did not refer to the merits of the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial court's decision involving marked ballots, be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party? RULING: Yes. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the Constitution, it is stated: Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy

thereof. Nevertheless, the Court does not believe that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. Finally, the records disclose that private respondent had already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez by virtue of the COMELEC decision. In this light, the petition at bar has become moot and academic. SORIANO vs. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioners Soriano, Jr., Abas, Jr., Almario, Landrito, Bunye IV, Arevalo, Espeleta, Oliquino, Marcelino, and Calalang and private respondents Espeleta, Bagatsing, Rongavilla, Constantino, Sevilla, Jr., Bulay, Jr., Corro, Camilon, Echavez, Teves, Ampaya, and Dela Rea were candidates for City Council for the First and Second Districts of Muntinlupa City in the May 10, 2004 elections. Private respondents were proclaimed duly elected councilors. Petitioners individually and separately filed election protest cases against private respondents, contesting the results of the elections in all the 603 precinct of the First District and the 521 precincts of the Second District of Muntinlupa City. On June 26, 2004, the COMELEC First Division isused two identical orders. The first order directed petitioners Arevalo, Espeleta, Oliquino, Marcelino, and Calalang and respondents Corro, Camilon, Echavez, Teves, Ampaya, and Dela Rea to deposit P454, 020 each to the COMELEC Cash Division to defray expenses in the revision of 603 protested and counterprotested precincts in the First District. The second order directed petitioners Soriano, Jr., Abas, Jr., Almario, Landrito, Bunye IV and respondents Espeleta, Bagatsing, Rongavilla, Constantino, Sevilla, Jr., Bulay, Jr. to deposit P408,990 each to the COMELEC Cash Division to defray expenses in the revision of 521 protested and counter-protested precincts in the Second District. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC First Division. On August 03, 2004, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. Petitioners alleged that the Orders dated June 26, 2004 of the COMELEC First Division were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On May 31, 2005, the COMELEC First Division issues another Order dismissing the protests and counter-protests for failure of the Protestants and protestess to pay the required cash deposits. ISSUES: Whether a writ of certiorari will lie in this case; and Whether the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated June 26, 2004.

RULING: The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the members of the division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc. In general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It just applied Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which explicitly states that filing fees shall be paid for each interest. Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

ARTICLE IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Commission on Elections

Cerbo vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 168411 February 15, 2007

En Banc

FACTS: The issue started in the 2004 elections for the positions of congressman, governor and vice-governor of Sultan Kudarat. The petitioners and respondents were running for the said positions hand on hand, however, the respondents were the ones proclaimed winners.

During the canvassing of the Municipal Certificates of Canvass (COC) by the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC), the petitioners objected the inclusion of the COC of the Municipality of Palimbang which was overruled by the board. They then filed a notice of appeal but they did not pursue it. The next day, the petitioners, instead, filed a "Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors and/or to Exclude Certificates of Canvass of the Municipalities of Palimbang and Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat." It was verbally denied by the board and, again, no appeal was taken from there. Hence, the winners were proclaimed.

The petitioners then filed another petition with, at this time, the COMELEC. It was a "Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors and Annulment of Proclamation" praying that the proclamation of respondents be set aside and that the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Palimbang be directed to reconvene, make the necessary corrections and to proclaim the winning candidates based thereon.

The COMELEC then suspended the effects of the proclamation of respondents so it can conduct an examination of the authenticity and genuineness of the election returns. However, the congressman respondent filed a motion to dismiss it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of COMELEC over him as he was already proclaimed representative. COMELEC granted the motion and set aside his suspension.

Eventually, COMELEC dismissed the petitioners petition for correction of manifest errors on the following grounds: 1. Lack of jurisdiction over the congressman respondent and the Lutayan COC

2. Cited errors were not related to the tabulation of entries and correction of manifest errors should pertain to errors that could not have been discovered during the canvassing, despite the exercise of due diligence. 3. Failure to appeal 4. Abandonment of the petition for correction of manifest error through the filing of the election protest

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners petition.

RULING: The answer is in the negative. The petition was dismissed.

1. COMELEC did not err in granting the motion of the respondent congressman. Having been proclaimed already as winner, COMELEC does not have the jurisdiction anymore which already belonged to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, and this holds true even if there is an allegation of nullity of proclamation.

2. The petition for the correction of manifest errors in the Lutayan COC cannot also be decided by the COMELEC because it only has an appellate jurisdiction over the matter. It cannot be considered as an appeal from the verbal denial of the PBOC of the first petition as the petition filed before the COMELEC did not include Lutayan.

3. The cited errors by the petitioners were not relative to the tabulation of entries but to the disparity between the numbers of precincts canvassed and the difference between the sequences of precincts listed in the local and national SOV. The petitioners also failed to specify the errors that are supposed to be manifest and are to be corrected in the Lutayan COC. What they alleged in their memorandum are grounds proper for election protest or exclusion of the COC and SOV, such as statistical improbability, abnormal turn out of voters, and other defects and abnormalities. In addition, the petition for correction of manifest errors evidently showed that the errors sought to be corrected were discovered during the canvassing.

This is based on the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, RULE 27 to read. . . xxxx

Sec. 5. Pre-proclamation controversies which may be filed directly with the Commission (a) the following pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly with the Commission: xxxx 2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two or more copies of the election returns of one precinct, two or more copies of the election returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the copying of figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass, or (4) so-called returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, and such errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidates had already been made.

4. No appeal was actually made and perfected. The subsequent filing of a petition for correction of manifest errors in the Palimbang COC with the PBOC appeared to be just an attempt to substitute the lost appeal, which is impermissible. The proper procedure under Section 7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure should be to appeal said ruling. However, the petitioners failed to do so. The ruling, therefore, has already attained finality.

5. In the abandonment of the petition for correction of manifest error through the filing of the election protest, it has been held that the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto amounts to the abandonment of one already filed, except when the protest was filed ad cautela. This thus deprives COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason for this rule is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding, so as to prevent confusion and conflict of authority. A reading of the allegation in the protest reveals that there was no mention that it was only filed as a precautionary measure in case his petition for correction of manifest error is resolved adversely. There was even no mention therein that a case for correction of manifest error and annulment between the same parties is pending before the Commission.

Courtesy: Kuya Julius

What are the functions and powers of Civil Service Commission?

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) is the central personnel agency of the Philippine government. One of the three independent constitutional commissions with adjudicative responsibility in the national government structure, it is also tasked to render final arbitration on disputes and personnel actions on Civil Service matters. Mandated Functions Under Executive Order No. 292, the Civil Service Commission shall perform the following functions: Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service; Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Laws and other pertinent laws; Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the government; Formulate policies and regulations for the administration, maintenance and implementation of position classification and compensation and set standards for the establishment, allocation and reallocation of pay scales, classes and positions; Render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters which shall be binding on all head of departments, offices and agencies and which may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari; Appoint and discipline its officials and employees in accordance with law and exercise control and supervision over the activities of the Commission; Control, supervise and coordinate Civil Service examinations. Any entity or official in government may be called upon by the Commission to assist in the preparation and conduct of said examinations including security, use of buildings and facilities as well as personnel and transportation of examination materials which shall be exempt from inspection regulations; Prescribe all forms for Civil Service examinations, appointment, reports and such other forms as may be required by law, rules and regulations; Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarily confidential, highly technical or policy determining; Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the development and retention of qualified and competent work force in the public service;

Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and action of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of the copy thereof; Issues subpoena and subpoena duces tecum for the production of documents and records pertinent to investigations and inquiries conducted by it in accordance with its authority conferred by the Constitution and pertinent laws; Advise the President on all matters involving personnel management in the government service and submit to the President an annual report on the personnel programs; Take appropriate actions on al appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age; Inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of the departments, agencies, bureaus, offices, local government including government-owned or controlled corporations; conduct periodic review of the decisions and actions of offices or officials to whom authority has been delegated by the Commission as well as the conduct of the officials and the employees in these offices and apply appropriate sanctions whenever necessary. Delegate authority for the performance of any functions to departments, agencies and offices where such functions may be effectively performed; Administer the retirement program of government officials and employees, and accredit government services and evaluate qualification for retirement; Keep and maintain personnel records of all officials and employees in the Civil Service; and Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency such as other functions as may be provided by law.

Officials of CSC
Dr. FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III CHAIRMAN NIEVES L. OSORIO COMMISSIONER
ROBERT S. MARTINEZ

COMMISSIONER

ART XI. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Courtesy: H.E Gloria 1. Who is a public officer? Public Officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation even nominal from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippines or performs in said government or in any branches public duties as an employee or agent or subordinate officials of any rank or class. 2. Who is are public officials? Public officials include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel whether or not they receive compensation regardless of amount 3. Can you consider an employee who received a one peso salary from the government still a public officer? Yes. Because a salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive . The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is naked or honorary office and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. It bears nothing under sec 3 of republic act no 6713, one maybe considered a public officials or officer whether or not one receives compensation, regardless of the amount. 4. Ruling in Laurel vs Desierto The contention of Vice president laurel has no merit. ISSUE: W/N Laurel, being the chairman of NCC and EXPOCORP, is a public officer HELD: YES. NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer RATIO: Ombudsmans Jurisdiction: The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient . It must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very

broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office. Definition of Public Officer: 1. Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989 defines who public officers are2.A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject: a. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. 3. Laurel insists he is not a public officer because: a. He was not delegated any sovereign functions; b. He did not receive any compensation as chairman of NCC; c. His office has no security of tenure because the NCC is an ad hoc body which is coterminous upon the happening of the 1998 Centennial Celebration. 4. Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as "the most important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not. a. The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised byhim for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. 5. SC holds that NCC performs executive functions. a. The executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance." The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. b. it can be seen that the NCC was given executive functions, to wit: promote economic development particularly in Central Luzon to attract investors to mitigate the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, among others. Promotion of industrialization and full employment is a fundamental state policy. c. The office has the primary task of harnessing the multi-sectoral components from the business, cultural, and business sectors to serve as effective instruments from the launching and overseeing of this long-term project; 6. That he did not receive compensation is of no consequence. a. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed

to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached7.It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a "public official" whether or not one receives compensation. a. "Public Officials" include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.

Courtesy: Father Jim 1. What is impeachment? Is a political and legal bodies and processes to remove an impeachable public official who does violate the following grounds, culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes. 2. Who are impeachable officials? President, vice-president, members of the supreme court, members of the constitutional commission, ombudsman, 3.outline the process of impeachment. A. The house of representatives shall have the exclusive to initiate all cases of impeachment, house initiates Impeachment proceedings, a. Vote of at least one third of all members of the house shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution or override its contrary resolution to the verified impeachment complaint. B. the senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all of cases of impeachment. Article XI,Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. (8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

Courtesy: Datu Aslahon What is RA 1379?

AN ACT DECLARING FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY FOUND TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS THEREFOR. Section 1 Definitions. (a) For the purposes of this Act, a "public officer or employee" means any person holding any public office or employment by virtue of an appointment, election or contract, and any person holding any office or employment, by appointment or contract, in any State owned or controlled corporation or enterprise. (b) "Other legitimately acquired property" means any real or personal property, money or securities which the respondent has at any time acquired by inheritance and the income thereof, or by gift inter vivos before his becoming a public officer or employee, or any property (or income thereof) already pertaining to him when he qualified for public office or employment, or the fruits and income of the exclusive property of the respondent's spouse. It shall not include: 1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held by, the respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person. 2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to another person or persons on or after the effectivity of this Act. 3. Property donated to the respondent during his incumbency, unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the court that the donation is lawful.

What is the scope and who are punishable in this act? Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal who shall conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of the city or province where said public officer or employee resides or holds office, a petition for a writ commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid, or any part thereof, should not be declared property of the State: Provided, That no

such petition shall be filed within one year before any general election or within three months before any special election. The resignation, dismissal or separation of the officer or employee from his office or employment in the Government or in the Government-owned or controlled corporation shall not be a bar to the filing of the petition: Provided, however, That the right to file such petition shall prescribe after four years from the date of the resignation, dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the office or employee concerned, except as to those who have ceased to hold office within ten years prior to the approval of this Act, in which case the proceedings shall prescribe after four years from the approval hereof. Section 12. Penalties. Any public officer or employee who shall, after the effective date of this Act, transfer or convey any unlawfully acquired property shall be repressed with imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine not exceeding ten thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine. The same repression shall be imposed upon any person who shall knowingly accept such transfer or conveyance.

What is the difference between forfeiture under RA No. 1379 and the AMLA? Forfeiture under the first law requires preliminary investigation. Civil forfeiture under AMLA does not. It is purely civil and can proceed independently of the criminal case. Under RA No. 1379, only ill-gotten wealth by public officials is covered.

What cases are related to RA 1379?

Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Troadio Tecson [G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990] Clarita D. Garcia vs Sandiganbayan and R.P., [ G.R. No. 170122, G.R. No. 171381]

Note: For more information please read R.A 1379 and spare time to read these related cases for a deeper comprehension.

Courtesy: Chief Salem 1. What charges and who will be charged in Sandigan Bayan? Answer: Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: "a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: "(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: "(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads; "(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads; "(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; "(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; "(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; "(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; "(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; "(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; "(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; "(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

2. Can Janet Napoles be charged in Sandigan Bayan? Answer: No, because she is not a government employee. 3. Who is the presiding judge of Sandigan Bayan? Answer: Judge Gregory Ong

ART. XVII AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS

Courtesy: Dr. Villaceran Article XVII Amendments or Revisions Article XVII stipulates that any amendment to and revision of the constitution may be proposed a three-fourths vote of all the members of Congress and a constitutional convention. The people may likewise propose amendments through an initiative of at least twelve percent of total registered voters. If further states that any amendment or revision is not valid without a ratification by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. Analysts distinguish between textual change of constitution by amendments and by revision. Amendment is the alteration of an existing constitution by the addition or subtraction of material.Revision is the replacement of one constitution by another. Revision is specifically referenced in the constitutions. The language of much state constitution is not as exercise as is desirable regarding this distinction between amendment and revision. The amendment clause is an essential part of any written constitution for two reasons. One, the more definite and rigid the provisions of a constitution are the precluding interpretation by the courts the greater is the need for such a clause. Two, the clause serves as a safety valve against violent change or even revolution by providing a procedure for orderly change. The formal amendment process represents a domestication of the right to revolution. Constitutional change may be formally made either by amendment or by revision. Providing both for its amendment and for its revision, the constitution renders moot the long standing debate whether it may radically be altered or whether it may only be changed so long as its basic design is retained. The Constitutions framers adopted the distinction between amendment and revision. Background on Constitutional Amendment and Revision of USA Constitution writers are neither infallible nor prescient, so all constitution must anticipate the need for change. Indeed, the process of altering the basic arrangements for governance may itself be salutary for citizens in a democracy. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1861, Each generation *has+ a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive of its own happiness Constitutional change in democracies occurs in two ways - - either by altering the meaning of the document through interpretation or by altering the text of the document through amendment or revision. Whereas for the United States Constitution, change through interpretation predominates, for state constitution textual change is far more common.

Basic Principles Experience suggests that constitutional change in the states should be guided by seven fundamental principles: 1. Because constitutional amendment and constitutional revision are not the same, provisions for each should be separate and distinct. 2. Constitutions should provide for at least two means for amendments; one that bypass the existing one institutions. 3. Constitutional revision may be initiated by legislature or without the legislature, but once started revision should proceed in a manner entirely distinct from the legislative process. 4. Sufficient constitutional detail is required defining amendment and revision methods that bypass the legislature to assure that these will be truly available and effective when used. 5. Whether achieved through the legislature or without its participation, procedural requirements for changing the constitution should be more demanding than those for passing ordinary legislation. 6. Constitutional change process should be all treated in the same location in the state constitution. 7. Because all constitutional change should be subject to popular ratification, necessary information must be provided in understandable form to inform public choice.

Definition of Terms 1. Amendments this is an alteration of one or a few specific provisions of the constitution. 2. Cha Cha Charter Change is constitutional reform in the Philippines refers to the political and other related processes involved in amending or revising the current 1987 constitution of the Philippines. 3. Constituent Assembly is a body composed for the purpose of drafting or adopting a constitution. 4. Constitutional Convention is now a gathering for the purpose of writing a new constitution or revising an existing constitution. 5. House Committee a congressional committee is a legislative sub- organization that handles a specific duty. 6. House of Representatives is the lower house of the congress of the Philippines. 7. Jus Cogens is a fundamental principle of international law which is accepted by the international community of states as a norm from which no derogation is ever permitted. 8. Legislature is a kind of deliberate assembly with the power to pass, amend and repeal laws.

9. People Initiative or PI is one of the modes in which the 1987 constitution of the Philippines could be amended. 10. Revision An examination of the entire Constitution. An act of revising.