Enforcing Human Rights Through The WTO A Critical Appraisal PDF

Enforcing Human Rights through the WTO A Critical Appraisal
Dean Dalke, LLB, BBA
No. 58
Occasional Papers in International Trade Law and Policy Articles varies sur la politique et le droit commercial international
AresearchessaysubmittedtotheFacultyofGraduateStudiesand Researchinpartialfulfilmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof MasterofArtsinTheNormanPatersonSchoolofInternationalAffairs, CarletonUniversity,Ottawa,Ontario,13July2004
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Dalke,Dean,1975 EnforcinghumanrightsthroughtheWTO:acriticalappraisal/DeanDalke.
(Occasionalpapersininternationaltradelawandpolicy=Articlesvarissur lapolitique etledroitcommercialinternational,ISSN11920173no.58) Includesbibliographicalreferences. ISBN1896871240
1.WorldTradeOrganization.2.Humanrights.3.International trade Socialaspects.4.Freetrade Socialaspects.I.Title. II.Series:Occasionalpapersininternationaltradelawandpolicy58.
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Table of Contents
Abstract.......................................................................................................................................i Introduction ................................................................................................................................1 1 OverviewofHumanRightsandTradeRegimes .....................................................................3 1.1 TheUNHumanRightsRegime .................................................................................3 1.2 TheTradeRegimeundertheWTO...........................................................................12 2 ConceptualIssuesArisingfromLinkageProposals ..............................................................17 2.1 CommonOriginsofHuman RightsandTradeLiberalization ....................................17 2.2 SynergybetweenTradeandHumanRights...............................................................19 2.3 IsThereConflictbetweentheWTOandHumanRights? ..........................................20 2.4 DoesInclusionofIntellectualPropertyintheWTOSupportLinkageClaims? ..........26 2.5 RacetotheBottomandEstablishingaLevelPlayingField .......................................27 3 PracticalIssuesArisingfromLinkageProposals...................................................................30 3.1 TheEffectivenessofSanctions .................................................................................30 3.2 AlternativestoSanctions..........................................................................................33 3.3 DoestheInstitutionalCapacityExistforMakingHumanRightsDeterminations? .....33 3.4 WouldEnforcingHumanRightsIncreasetheLegitimacyoftheWTO? ....................35 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................37 Bibliography..............................................................................................................................39
Abstract
Thesuccessoftheinternationaltraderegimehasledtoclaimsthathumanrightsbelinkedtothe WorldTradeOrganization(WTO).Thispaperexaminessuchalinkagebyaskingwhetherhuman rightsandtradearesufficientlyrelatedandwhetheralinkageisfeasibleasapracticalmatter. Thehumanrightsandinternationaltraderegimesshareacommonhistory,butdeveloped alongdifferenttrajectories.Thetraderegimedevelopedeffectiveenforcementmechanisms,while thehumanrightsregimeisoftencriticizedforitslackthereof.Uponcloserexamination,anen forcementmechanismforhumanrightsisnottheonlyanswer,andtheWTOsenforcement mechanismsmaynotbetheansweratall. Thispaperconcludesthatwhilethereareanumberofconceptualsimilaritiesbetweenthe tradeandhumanrightsregimes,theydonotprovideunequivocalsupportforalinkage.Moreim portantly,practicalproblemsin buildingsuchalinkageraiseseriousquestionsastoitsviability. DeanDalke
ENFORCINGHUMANRIGHTS THROUGHTHEWTO
ACRITICALAPPRAISAL
DEANDALKE
Introduction
Therearefewmeetingsofinternationalorganizationsthatarenotmetwithprotestsbyanti globalizationgroups.SincethemeetingoftheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)inSeattlein November1999,protestshavebeenaconstantfeatureofitsmeetings.Althoughtheprotestors arenotallmotivatedbythesamegoals,theirrankshaveconsistentlybeenpopulatedbylabour, environmental,andhumanrightsactivists.Ingeneral,theyfearthattheWTOobligationsthreaten standardsthatprotectlabour,humanrights,andtheenvironment,andtheycriticizetheWTOfor 1 notbeingadequatelysensitivetothoseconcerns. Inaddition,quiteapartfromthethreatofthe WTO,activistsseethesuccessfulenforcementmechanismoftheWTOandcompareitwithen forcementmechanismsforlabour,humanrights,andtheenvironment.Suchcomparisonsinevita blyshowtheweaknessesintheenforcementmechanismsofthelatter,leadingtocallsthatthe WTOcouldbeenlistedtoenforcesuchstandards.Thecauseofthehumanrights,labour,anden vironmentalactivistswasgivensomesupportbythenPresidentClintonwhostatedattheWTOs Seattleconference:
IbelievetheWTOmustmakesurethatopentradedoesindeedliftlivingstandards,re spectscorelaborstandardsthatareessentialnotonlytoworkerrights,buttohuman rights.That'swhythisyeartheUnitedStateshasproposedthattheWTOcreateaworking 2 groupontradeandlabor.
AlthoughtheideaofincorporatinglabourstandardsintotheWTOreceivedcontinuedsupport fromtheClintonadministrationandfromsomeEuropeancountries,itwasvehementlyopposed bydevelopingcountries.AnEgyptiandelegatetotheSeattleWTOmeetingstated:Ifyoustart usingtradeasalevertoimplementnontradeissues,thatwillbetheendofthemultilateraltrading
TheideathattheWTOcouldputprotectionoflabour,humanrights,andtheenvironmentinquestionhasalso receiveddiscussioninacademicliterature.See,e.g.,FrankJ.Garcia,TradingAwaytheHumanRightsPrinciple, BrooklynJournalofInternationalLaw 25(Winter1999),5197WilliamA.Dymond,CoreLabourStandards andtheWorldTradeOrganization:LaboursLoveLost,CanadianForeignPolicy8,no.3(Spring2001),99114 J.Dunoff,DoesGlobalizationAdvanceHumanRights?BrooklynJournalofInternationalLaw 25(Winter 1999),125139ErnstUlrichPetersmann,TimeforIntegratingHumanRightsintotheLawofWorldwideOr ganizations(JeanMonnetWorkingPaper7/01).

2
QuotedinClydeSummers,TheBattleinSeattle:FreeTrade,LaborRights,andSocietalValues,Universityof PennsylvaniaJournalofInternationalEconomicLaw 22(Spring2001),61.
Dalke: EnforcingHumanRightsthroughtheWTO:ACriticalAppraisal
3 system. TheUSproposaltoincludelabourrightsintheWTOwasexplicitlyrejectedatthe 4 SingaporeWTOministerialconference. Despiterejectingproposalstoenforcelabourstandards,theWTOcontinuestobesaddled withcallsforlinkingcertainissues,andavarietyoflinkageshavereceivedwidediscussioninaca demicliterature.Linkageclaimshavenotbeenlimitedtolabourstandards,butincludeclaimsthat environment,competitionlaw,andhumanrightsissues,amongothers,shouldbelinkedtothe WTO.ThispaperconsidersproposalstolinkhumanrightstotheWTO,usingtheobjectionsof theEgyptiandelegatetoSeattleasitsbasicframework,namely,whetherhumanrightsissuesare nontradeissues,andwhethertheirlinkwiththeWTOwouldspelltheendofthemultilateral tradingsystem.Theobjectioncanbestatedanotherway:therearebothconceptualissuesand practicalissues,relatedtoboththetradeandhumanrightsregimes,thatarisewithinproposalsto linktradeandhumanrights,anditisthoseissuesthatthispaperwilladdress.
ProposalsforLinkingHumanRightsandtheWTO
HumanrightscouldbelinkedtotheWTOinavarietyofways,someofwhichmaybestrongeror weakerthanothers.Thediscussioninthispaperconsiderstwoformsoflinkage.Thefirstwould involveamendingtheWTOtoallowindividualmemberstousetrademeasurestoenforcehuman rightsnorms.ThesecondwouldentailamoreelaboratemechanismwherebytheWTOwouldau thorizeormandatemultilateraltrademeasurestoenforcehumanrightsnorms. Thispaperdoesnotintendtoarticulateadetailedframeworkforenforcinghumanrights 5 undertheWTO,nordoesitintendtocritiquesuchdetailedproposals. However,togivesome tangibilitytothediscussion,itmaybeusefultooutlinesomeoftheessentialfeaturesofsucha proposal.ThefirstproposaltoallowWTOmemberstousetradesanctionstoenforcehuman rightswouldbequitesimple,similartotheexistingWTOprovisionswhichallowtrademeasures toprotectnationalsecurityetc.,althoughagreementwouldberequiredonwhichhumanrights normswouldbeenforceable.Thesecond,moreaggressive,humanrightsenforcementmechanism would: favourormandatemultilateralsanctionsanddiscourageunilateralones drawonanexistingformulationofhumanrightsnorms provideforcollaborationwithaspecialisedhumanrightsbodythatwoulddetermine 6 humanrightsviolations. OthercommonlyproposedformsoflinkageincluderequiringthatWTOmembersratifythemajor humanrightstreatiesorrequiringWTOmemberstosubmithumanrightsreportstotheWTO, similartothereportsrequiredundertheWTOsTradePolicyReviewMechanism.Thesepropos alswillnotbeevaluatedinthispaper.Thefirstproposalisnotparticularlycompellingsincemost
3 4 5
EgyptianrepresentativetoWTOnegotiationsSeattle,quotedinibid.,62. Dymond.
Foranexampleofsuchaproposal,seePatriciaStirling,TheUseofTradeSanctionsasanEnforcementMecha nismforBasicHumanRights:AProposalforAdditiontotheWorldTradeOrganization,AmericanUniversity JournalofInternationalLaw&Policy11(1996):146.

6
ThisframeworkisinspiredbyVirginiaLearysproposalforenforcinglabourstandardsundertheWTO.
WTOmembersarealreadypartytothemajorUNhumanrightstreaties.Thesecondproposal wouldinvolveaprocessalmostidenticaltothestatepartyreportingrequiredundertheUNhu manrightstreatiesandwouldthusbeunnecessarilyduplicative.Additionally,thispaperwillnot specificallyevaluateproposalstoenforcelabourorenvironmentalstandardsundertheWTO,by farthemostcommonformsoflinkageclaims.However,labourrightsinparticular,andtheenvi ronmentmoregenerally,dooverlapwithhumanrights,andtothatextentsuchlinkageclaimswill beaddressed.
1 1.1
OverviewofHumanRightsandTradeRegimes TheUNHumanRightsRegime
BeforeconsideringthefeasibilityofproposalsforenforcinghumanrightsundertheWTOitis usefultounderstandtheexistingregimefortheprotectionofhumanrights.Theinternationalhu manrightssystemisoftenviewedasbeingrelativelyineffective.Indeed,itsperceivedineffective ness,relativetotheeffectivenessoftheWTO,isakeymotivationforproposalstoenforcehuman rightsundertheWTO.Thissectionoutlinesthelegalnormsandinstitutionsofthehumanrights regimeandconsiderstheimplicationsforlinkagestotheWTOthatarisefromthenatureofthe humanrightsregimeitself. 1.1.1 SourcesOfHumanRightsNorms Humanrightsstandardsderivefromamixofcustomaryinternationallaw,declarationsandresolu tions,andtreaties.Ofthesesources,themostsignificantistheInternationalBillofRights,which comprisestheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,7 theInternationalCovenantonEco 8 nomic,SocialandCulturalRights, andtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPolitical 10 Rights9 . TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR)isundoubtedlythemostwidely 11 knowninternationalhumanrightsdocument. ItflowedfromtheestablishmentoftheUnitedNa
7 8
UNGARes.217(III),UNDoc.A/810(1948),adoptedbyvote480,with8abstentions[hereinafterUDHR].
(1996)993U.N.T.S.3,entryintoforce:3January1976,146ratifications[hereinafterCESCR].TheUDHR, CESCR,CCPRandOptionalProtocoltotheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsandthe Second OptionalProtocoltotheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,aimingattheabolitionofthedeath penaltyarecollectivelyknownasthe InternationalBillofHumanRights.Thereareanumberofadditionaltreaties addressingspecifichumanrightsissues.Mostnotableamongthesearethe ConventionontheEliminationofRa cialDiscrimination[adoptedin1965,cameintoforcein1969,162parties],the ConventionontheEliminationof DiscriminationagainstWomen[adopted1979,cameintoforce1981,.170parties],the ConventionagainstTorture [adopted1984,inforce1987,130parties],the ConventionontheRightsoftheChild[adopted1989inforce1990, 191parties]andthe InternationalConventionontheProtectionoftheRightsofAllMigrantWorkersandMem bersofTheirFamilies.Allcanbefoundat<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm>.
9
(1996)999U.N.T.S.171,entryintoforce:23March1976,149ratifications[hereinafterCCPR].
10
TheInternationalBillofRightsalsoincludesthe OptionalProtocoltotheInternationalCovenantonCiviland PoliticalRightsandthe SecondOptionalProtocoltotheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights, aimingattheabolitionofthedeathpenalty.

11 rd UNGARes.217(III),UNGAOR,3 Sess.,Supp.No.13,at71,adopted10December1948byvote480,with8 abstentions.TheUDHRsphilosophicalunderpinningscanbetracedbacktoGreekandRomanphilosophy,al
tions.TheUNwasfoundedtoensureinternationalpeaceandsecurity,andtherealizationofhu manrightswasconsideredintegraltoachievingthat.Accordingly,theCharteroftheUnitedNa tions(UNCharter)containsmanyreferencestohumanrights,andidentifiestherealizationofhu 12 manrightsasapurposeoftheUN. Inordertogivegreaterdefinition tothehumanrightsaspirationsoftheUNCharter,the UDHRwasnegotiatedandadopted,settingoutwithgreaterprecisionthehumanrightswhichthe 13 UNwouldstrivetorealize. However,asaUNGeneralAssemblydeclaration,theUDHRisnot alegallybindinginstrument.Whileithasnonethelesscontributedtothedevelopmentofbinding humanrightstreaties,andalthoughsomeofitsprovisionshavegainedthestatusofcustomary 14 internationallaw, therewasadesiretoestablishlegallybindinghumanrightsinstruments. TheUDHRrecognizesbothcivilandpoliticalrightsandeconomic,social,andcultural rights.Whenitcametonegotiatinghumanrightstreaties,itwasdecidedtocreateseparatein strumentsdistinguishedonthebasisofcivilandpoliticalrightsandeconomic,social,andcultural rights.TheseeventuallybecametheCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(CCPR)andthe 15 CovenantonEconomicSocialandCulturalRights(CESCR). Thereweretwomajorreasons forthisseparation.First,itwaswidelyheldthatthetwosetsofrightsrequireddifferentap proachestoimplementation.Civilandpoliticalrightscouldbeimplementedimmediatelyand 16 withoutcost,whileeconomic,social,andculturalrightscouldbeimplementedonlygradually. Similarly,somewereoftheviewthatacourtlikestructureshouldbecreatedforcivilandpoliti calrights,butthatnosuchmechanismwouldbeappropriateforeconomic,social,andcultural 17 rights. Thesecondreasonforbifurcatinghumanrightswaspolitical.Itwasthoughtthatstates thathadproblemsimplementingeconomic,social,andculturalrightscouldatleastundertaketo
thoughtheworkofenlightenmentphilosopherssuchasJohnLocke,JeanJacquesRousseau,andCharlesMontes quieuserveasmoredirectsourcesofinspirationforthemodernhumanrightssystem.Themodernhumanrights regimefindsitsfirstlegalorconstitutionalmanifestationintheUSDeclarationofIndependenceandtheFrench DeclarationoftheRightsofManandoftheCitizen.

12
H.M.Kindredetal.,InternationalLaw:ChieflyasInterpretedandAppliedinCanada,6thed.,(Toronto:Ed mondMontgomery,2000)at771.InthepreambleoftheCharterthePeoplesoftheUnitedNations...reaffirm faithinfundamentalhumanrights,inthedignityandworthofthehumanperson,intheequalrightsofmenand womenandofnationslargeandsmall...Additionally,Article55oftheUNChartercommitstheUnitedNations topromotehigherstandardsofliving,employment,anddevelopmentsolutionstointernationaleconomic,social, andhealthproblemsinternationalculturalandeducationalcooperationandrespectforhumanrights.

13 14 15
Ibid. L.Henkin,TheAgeofRights(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1990),19.
ThenegotiationofhumanrightstreatieshasnotbeenlimitedtotheCCPRandCESCR.Anumberofadditional humanrightstreatieswerenegotiated,mostnotableofwhicharethe ConventionontheEliminationofAllForms ofRacialDiscrimination,the ConventionagainstTorture,the ConventionontheEliminationofDiscrimination againstWomen,andthe ConventionontheRightsoftheChild.Thesetreatiestendgenerallytobemorespecific, givinggreatermeaningtotherightsenumeratedintheCCPRandCESCR.

16
AsbjornEide,StrategiesfortheRealizationoftheRighttoFood,inHumanRightsintheTwentyFirstCen tury:AGlobalChallenge,editedby KathleenE.Mahoney andPaulMahoney (DordrechtBoston:M.Nijhoff, 1993),461.

17
DavidM.Trubek,Economic,Social,andCulturalRightsintheThirdWorld:HumanRightsLawandHuman NeedsPrograms,inHumanRightsinInternationalLaw:LegalandPolicyIssues,editedbyT.Meron(Oxford shire:ClarendonPress,1984),211.
recognizecivilandpoliticalrights.Thisconcernappearstohavebeenmisplacedgiventhatmost 18 stateshaveratifiedbothcovenants. 1.1.2 TheNatureofHumanRights:Universal,Interdependent,andIndivisible TheUDHRgivesconcreteexpressiontotheuniversality,interdependence,andindivisibilityof humanrights.Universalityofhumanrightsmeansthatallhumanrightsmustapplywithsomeuni 19 formityandwithequalforcethroughouttheworld. Interdependenceofhumanrightsreflectsthe factthatthefullandmeaningfulenjoymentofaparticularrightisdependentonthepossessionof 20 alltheotherrights. Theindivisibilityofhumanrightsrecognizesthatallhumanrightssharethe 21 samebasiccharacteristics. TheUNhasatleastformallymaintainedtheuniversality,interdependence,andindivisibil 22 ityofhumanrights. SincetheUDHR,innumerableresolutionshaveassertedtheequalimpor 23 tanceofcivilandpoliticalrightsandeconomic,social,andculturalrights. TheViennaDeclara tionreaffirmstheuniversal,indivisibleandinterdependentandinterrelatednatureofhuman rightsandstatesthattheinternationalcommunitymusttreathumanrightsgloballyinafairand 24 equalmanner,onthesamefooting,andwiththesameemphasis. Nonetheless,thelevelofprotectionofeconomic,social,andculturalrightshasneverbeen equivalenttothatofcivilandpoliticalrights.PhilipAlstonnotedthattheUNCommission[on HumanRights]devotesaboutfivepercentofitstimetoeconomicandsocialrightsissuesother 25 humanrightsbodiesusuallyignorethem. Thepositionofmoststatesischaracterizedbysup portfortheequalityofeconomicandsocialrightswithcivilandpoliticalrightsbutafailureto entrencheconomicandsocialrightsorexplicitlyrecognizethemandprovideeffectiveredressto individualsforviolationsthereof.Infact,thereareoftendeepdivisions,withsometakingthe
18 19
Eide,461.
JohanD.vanderVyver,BookReview:KathleenE.MahoneyandPaulMahoney,eds.HumanRightsinthe TwentyFirstCentury:AGlobalChallenge(DordrechtBoston:M.Nijhoff,1993),EmoryInternationalLawRe view 8(Spring1995),798.

20 21
Ibid.
Ibid.,795796.VanderVyverarguesthatitisoverlysimplistictomerelyassertcategoricallythathumanrights areindivisibleandinterdependent.Itisbeyondthescopeofthispapertoconsiderthatquestion,asinteresting asitmaybe.Inanycase,thehumanrightsinstrumentsandmanydeclarationsestablishtheseprinciplesaspartof internationalhumanrightslaw.

22
KittyArambulo,DraftinganOptionalProtocoltotheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCultural Rights:CananIdealBecomeReality?U.C.DavisJournalofInternationalLawandPolicy2(Winter1996),128.
23
HenryJ.SteinerandPhilipAlston,InternationalHumanRightsinContext:Law,Politics,Morals,2ded.(Ox fordNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2000),237.
24
AdoptedbythesecondUNWorldConferenceonHumanRightsinVienna,UNDoc.A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add. 5atpara5.
25
PhilipAlston,EconomicandSocialRightsandtheRighttoHealth:AnInterdisciplinaryDiscussion,Session III,remarks,HarvardLawSchool,September1993,online:<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/Publi cations/economic2.html>(dateaccessed:10July2004).
viewthateconomic,social,andculturalrightsdonotconstituterightsatall,andothersviewing 26 themassuperiorto,andanecessaryprerequisitefor,civilandpoliticalrights. Despitetheformalequalitybetween civilandpoliticalrightsandeconomic,social,and culturalrights,theinstitutionalprotectionofthoserightshasdiverged.WhiletheCCPRprovides fortheHumanRightsCommittee(HRC,establishedin1976)tooverseeitsimplementation,a 27 similarcommitteefortheCESCRwasspecificallyrejected. TheCommitteeonEconomic,So cial,andCulturalRightswaseventuallyestablishedtomonitorimplementationoftheCESCRbut thereisstillnoindividualcomplaintsmechanismundertheCESCRincontrast,individualcom plaintsofviolationsofcivilandpoliticalrightsmaybemadebeforetheHRCundertheOptional 28 ProtocoltotheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights. Althoughtherehasbeen considerablediscussionregardinganindividual complaintsmechanismfortheCESCR,andal 29 thoughstepshavebeentakentowardthenegotiationofsuchaninstrument, itsrealizationisfar fromcertaintheUNCommissiononHumanRightsdidnotrenewthemandateoftheindepend 30 entexpertwhowastoreviewtheCommitteesproposalforanoptionalprotocoltotheCESCR. 1.1.3 ObservationsontheNatureofHRandImplicationsforEnforcementundertheWTO: WhichHumanRightsWouldBeEnforceableundertheWTO? Thereisawiderangeoflegalentitlementsthatcanbeconsideredhumanrightsanditwouldbe impossibletoenforceallofthemthroughtheWTO.Thus,anyproposaltoenforcehumanrights undertheWTOmustanswerthequestionofwhichhumanrightscouldreasonablybeenforced. Fromahumanrightsperspective,theobviousanswerseemstobethoserightsthathaveachieved thewidestacceptanceintheinternationalcommunity.TherightscontainedintheUDHRthus seemtobefairlygoodcandidates.However,theUDHR,initsentirety,isnot,andwasnotin tendedtobe,abindinghumanrightsinstrument.Itswideacceptanceisperhapsexplainedbythe factthatitishortatoryanddoesnotpurporttobebinding. SincetherightscontainedintheUDHRare,forthemostpart,spelledoutinbinding fashionintheCCPRandtheCESCR,perhapseitherorbothofthesedocumentscouldserveas thesourcefortherightsthatwouldbeenforcedundertheWTO.However,usingoneoreitherof theCCPRorCESCRissuretoraisethelongsimmeringdebateoverwhethercivilandpolitical rightsoreconomic,social,andculturalrightsaremostimportant.Additionally,therearemany rightsenumeratedinboththeCCPRandtheCESCRthatWTOmemberswouldhavedifficulty
26 27
SteinerandAlston,237.Forexample,theUnitedStateshassignedbutnotratifiedtheCESCR.
MatthewC.R.Craven,TheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights:APerspectiveon itsDevelopment(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),98.TheEconomicandSocialCounciloriginallyundertookthe monitoringofCESCR.However,in1986theECOSOCfinallyestablishedatreatybody theCommitteeonEco nomic,Social,andCulturalRights,asanindependentbodyofexperts,akintotheHRC.SeeMartinScheinin, EconomicandSocialRightsasLegalRights,inEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights:ATextbook,editedbyA. Eide,C.Krause,andA.Rosas(Boston:KluwerLawInternational,2001),45.

28 29
(1976)999U.N.T.S.No.171,enteredintoforce:23March1976,104ratifications.
th Atits57 Session,on20April2002,theCommissionadoptedResolution2001/30whichcalledfortheap pointmentofanindependentexperttoreviewtheCommitteesproposalforanoptionalprotocoltotheCESCR. 30
UNOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights,<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/tm.htm>[date accessed:24February2004].
with.Inbothdocuments,rightsareframedbroadlyandcoversuchawiderangeofobligations 31 thatitwouldbenearlyimpossibletofindastatethathasanunblemishedrecord. Toovercomesuchdifficulties,proponentsofenforcinghumanrightsundertheWTOhave proposedthatonlycorehumanrightsorthosethathaveachievedjuscogensstatuswouldbe enforceableundertheWTO.Forexample,Stirlingdefinesascorerightstherighttofreedomfrom 32 discrimination,slavery,genocide,torture,andarbitraryimprisonment. Similarly,theRestatement (Third)ofForeignRelationspositsthatcustomaryinternationalhumanrightslawprohibitsgeno cide,slavery,murderordisappearanceofpersons,torture,prolongedarbitrarydetention,racial discrimination,oraconsistentpatternofgrossviolationsofinternationallyrecognizedhuman 33 rights. Garciaoffersaslightlydifferentlist,arguingthatrightsinvolvinglife,freedom,security 34 andbodilyintegrityarecorehumanrights. CarvingcertaincorerightsoutfromtheUDHR,CCPR,orotherhumanrightsinstru mentsisattractiveasameansofobtainingagreementonenforcinghumanrightsthroughthe WTO,however,suchanapproachisnolessproblematic.Asapracticalmatter,openingupadis cussionwithintheWTOonwhichhumanrightsshouldbeenforcedwouldleaveWTOmembers miredinquagmire.Existinghumanrightsinstrumentswerethesubjectoflongnegotiations,and openingupsuchaprocessanewwouldbebothduplicativeandcontentious.Itisalsoproblematic fromahumanrightsperspective.Theinternationalhumanrightsregimehasconsistentlymain tained,atleastintheory,thepositionthathumanrightsareinterdependentandindivisible.To carveoutsomehumanrightsascorewouldbeinconsistentwiththatlogic,andmaydiminish theimportanceofotherwidelyrecognizedrights. Fromatradeperspective,itwouldalsobeproblematictochooseeithertherightscon tainedintheUDHRortheCCPRandCESCR,oralternativelytoselectagroupofcorerights, sincethoserightsmaynotbethemosttraderelatedrightsandthusmaynotlogicallyfitwithin theWTO.Indeed,fromatradeperspectivehumanrightsareoftennotconsideredtobetrade relatedinthefirstplace,andthereforeinappropriateforenforcementundertheWTO. 1.1.4 InstitutionalComponentsoftheHumanRightsSystem InstitutionalmechanismsfortheprotectionofhumanrightsundertheUNsystemcanbedivided 35 intoCharterbasedandtreatybasedbodies. TheCharterbasedbodiesarethoseestablishedun dertheUNCharterandincludetheGeneralAssembly,theSecurityCouncil,theEconomicand 36 SocialCouncil,andtheCommissiononHumanRights.
31 32 33 34 35
See,e.g.,Stirling. Ibid.,14. Restatement(Third)ofForeignRelationsLaw 702(1987). Garcia,86.
FrankNewmanandDavidWeissbrodt,InternationalHumanRights(Cincinnati:AndersonPublishingCo., 1990),3.
36
TheCharterbasedbodiesinclude additionalbodiesauthorisedbytheCharterbasedbodies,suchastheSub CommissiononPreventionofDiscriminationandProtectionofMinorities,andtheCommissionontheStatusof Women.
1.1.4.1CharterBodies TheCharterbasedbodiesarecomposedofUNmemberstates.TheGeneralAssemblyconsistsof allUNmembers,ofcourse,whiletheotherbodieshavemorelimitedmembership.Individual membersoftheCharterbodiessitasrepresentativesoftheirhomecountry,andgenerallytake positionsthatreflecttheforeignpolicyoftheircapitals.Themostrelevanttothepresentdiscus sionare:theUNCommissiononHumanRights,becauseitsmandateismostspecificallyrelated tohumanrightsandtheSecurityCouncil,sinceitistheonlybodythatcanauthorizeandinfact mandateenforcementaction,suchaseconomicsanctionsortheuseofforce. TheCommissiononHumanRightshasprimarilythreemechanismsbywhichitprotects humanrights:(1)itsannualsessioninwhichresolutionsonvarioushumanrightstopicsarede batedandadopted (2)theappointmentofspecialrapporteurswiththematicorcountryspecific 37 investigativemandatesand(3)acollectivecomplaintprocedure(1503procedure). TheEffectivenessofUNCharterBodies Theeffectiveimplementationofthevariousspecialrapporteurmandatesdependsinpartonthe cooperationofthetargetstate,butalsoonthepersonofthespecialrapporteur.Ifthespecialrap porteursubmitsaweakreportcontainingcompilationsofsecondhandoruncorroboratedinfor mation,theCommissionmaypaylittleattentiontothecountryorthemeinquestion.TheCom missionsresponsestoreportsbyitsspecialrapporteursandtohumanrightsissuesmoregener allycanoftenbeinfluencedbypoliticalconsiderations.The53membersoftheCommissiontake directionfrom theircapitals,andalliancepoliticsplaysasignificantrole.RegionalpowersandSe curityCouncilmembersareabletoblockmandatesandresolutionsthatmightimplicatetheirown humanrightsrecords.Additionally,therehasbeenaproliferationofmandateswithoutacommen 38 surateincreaseintheresourcesprovidedtotheCommission. Nonetheless,thesystemofinvesti gativemandateshasattainedconsiderableacceptancebyUNmemberstatesmoststatescooper atewiththeCommissionsspecialrapporteurs,andonlypariahstatesstillinvokeArticle2(7)of 39 theUNChartertostaveoffinvestigativemandates. ThecollectivecomplaintsmechanismallowstheCommissiontopursue,withthegovern mentconcerned,situationsthatappeartorevealaconsistentpatternofgrossandreliablyat 40 testedviolationsofhumanrights. Thisprocedureisundertakeninaclosedsession,afactor which,combinedwiththepoliticizationoftheprocedure,makesitincreasinglyineffectualand irrelevant.Schmidtarguesthattheprocedurenonethelesshassomeutility:Statesdoreplytore questsfordetailedinformationaboutallegedconsistentpatternsofgrosshumanrightsviolations,
37
Knownasthe1503procedureasitisgovernedbyEconomicandSocialCouncil(ECOSOC)Resolution1503 (XLVIII)ofMay1970.
38
MarkusSchmidt,DoestheUnitedNationsHumanRightsProgramMakeaDifference?(TheUNHuman RightsRegime:IsitEffective?ProceedingsoftheAmericanSocietyofInternationalLaw,912April1997), AmericanSocietyofInternationalLawProceedings91(1997),462.

39 40
Ibid. Ibid.,462.
andthespectreofthepublicprocedurehaspromptedseveralofthemtomakesome(albeitoften 41 cosmetic)improvements. 1.1.4.2 TreatyBodies Thetreatybasedbodiesentailcommitteeseachofwhich isresponsibleforoverseeingtheimple mentationofasingleUNhumanrightstreaty.Thetreatybodiesarecomposedofindependentex pertswhositintheirpersonalcapacityandnotasrepresentativesoftheircountries. Thetreatybodiesachievetheirmonitoringfunctionthroughoneormoreofthreeways. First,thetreatybodiesreceivereportsfromthestatespartiesdetailingtheircompliancewiththe treaty.ThetreatybodiesconsiderthesereportsandissueConcludingObservations,inwhichthey commentonthestatescompliance.Second,undertheCCPR,CERD,CAT,andCEDAW,indi vidualsmaysubmitcomplaintstothetreatybodies,allegingviolationsoftheirindividualrights. Thetreatybodiesreviewthesecomplaintsandissuetheirviewsastowhethertheindividuals rightswereviolated.Third,thetreatybodiescontributetotheinterpretationofhumanrightslaw byissuingGeneralComments,whichgivegreaterdefinitiontotherightsenumeratedintherele vanttreaties.TheCATandCEDAWalsohaveaninquiryprocedurewherebytheymayundertake missionstostatespartieswhenthetreatybodyhasaconcernregardingsystematicorgraveviola 42 tionsoftreatyrights. TheEffectivenessoftheUNTreatySystem Bysomemeasure,theUNhumanrightstreatysystemhasrecordedconsiderablesuccess.The treatybodysystemhasdevelopedquiterapidlythefirsttreatybody,theCommitteeon theElimi nationofRacialDiscrimination,haditsfirstmeetinginJanuary1970.Therearepresentlyseven committees.Additionally,ratificationofthetreatieshasincreasedmarkedly.Thetreatybodies havegreatlyimprovedtheirmethodsofconsideringreports,havepioneeredtheissuanceofGen eralComments,havedevelopedcoordinationwithotherhumanrightsinstitutions,andhavein 43 volvedNGOsintheirwork. Theprovisionforindividualcomplaintshasresultedinarichbodyofinternationalhuman rightsjurisprudence,whichhasbeenreferredtobynationalcourtsandreliedoninsomecases. Forexample,theUKJudicialCommitteeofthePrivyCouncilreferredtotheHumanRights Committeesdecisionsregardingthedeathrowphenomenon,andtheConstitutionalCourtof SouthAfricareliedontheHumanRightsCommitteesjurisprudenceindeclaringthatcapitalpun ishmentwasinconsistentwiththeSouthAfricanConstitution.ThedecisionsoftheHumanRights Committeehaveoftenbeenimplemented,includingthroughamendinginconsistentlegislation, 44 releasingprisoners,orprovidingcompensationtovictimsofhumanrightsviolations. Despitethe lackofenforcementpowers,treatybodieshaverequestedinterimmeasuresofprotectionunder
41 42
Ibid.
AnneBayefsky,IntroductiontotheUNHumanRightsTreatySystem,online: <http://www.bayefsky.com/introduction.php>(dateaccessed1April2003).
43
JamesCrawford,TheUNHumanRightsTreatySystem:ASysteminCrisis?inTheFutureofUNHuman RightsTreatyMonitoring,editedbyP.AlstonandJ.Crawford(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),3.
44
Schmidt,463464.
10
theindividual complaintsprocedures,inparticular,incasesofimminentextraditionorexecution ofcapitalsentences.Committeesrequestsforstaysofexecutionhavebeencompliedwithinall 45 buttwocapitalcases. Despitetherelativesuccessofthetreatybodysystem,itisgenerallyacceptedthatthesys temisindifficulty,ifnotincrisis.Tosomeextent,thisdifficultyistheproductofitssuccess increasedstateparticipationhasgreatlyincreasedtheworkload.However,thereismuchmoreto thecrisisthanthat. Thetreatybodysystem,basedonvoluntariness,goodfaith,andselfcriticismbystates parties,hassomeobviousweaknesses.Thesearecompoundedbythesporadicreportingproce dureandlackofadequatefollowupofbothconcludingobservationsandindividualcommunica 46 tions. Statepartyreportsareoftensubstantivelyinadequate,providingarecitationoflawswith 47 outgivinganyindicationofthefactualhumanrightssituation. Crawfordsuggeststhatthese shortcomingscouldbemitigatedbyadoptingsuchprocessesasstatevisits,adhocteams,and 48 widerdisseminationofviews. Thereportingprocedurealsosuffersfromabackloginstatereportsdueunderthevarious treaties.Forexample,in1998therewere145reportsoverduetotheHRC,and134reportsover 49 duetotheCommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights. Sixtypercentofstateparties havereportsoverdueundereachtreaty.Stateshavingthelargestnumberofoverduereportsfre quentlyincludethosewithextremelypoorhuman rightsrecords,suchasTogo,Liberia,theCen 50 tralAfricanRepublic,Somalia,Afghanistan,Cambodia,andLebanon. Thereisalsoaconsiderabledelayintheprocessingofreportsandcommunicationsbythe varioustreatybodies.Indeed,ifallstateswhosereportsareoverdueweretoactuallyreporton 51 time,thecommitteeswouldbeunabletocopewiththeworkload. Thisproblemiscompounded bythefactthatdespitetheincreaseinthenumberofstatespartiestothetreaties,andthusthe numberofreportsandcommunicationsthecommitteesmustprocess,therehasbeennocommen surateincreaseinthecommitteesmeetingtimesandnoneisexpected.Littleuseismadeofinter sessionaltime,ascommitteemembersarenotpaidforintersessionalworkandmosthaveother 52 fulltimecommitments. Thetreatybodiesareabletospend,onaverage,aboutsixhoursconsid eringastatepartyreport.However,afterlengthyoralpresentationsbythestatepartydelegation, thetimeleftfordialogueorexchangeisquitelimited.Statepartyrepresentativesareoftenunable 53 orunwillingtoanswerquestionsdirectly.
45 46 47 48 49 50
Ibid.,464. Crawford,8. Arambulo,125. Crawford,8. Ibid.,4.
Anne Bayefsky,paneldiscussion,TheUNHumanRightsRegime:Isiteffective?AmericanSocietyofInterna tionalLawProceedings91(1997),466467.

51 52 53
Crawford,6. Ibid.,5. Bayefsky,paneldiscussion,466467.
11
Thecommitteesalsoallsufferfromseriousresourceconstraints.Inparticular,thecom mitteesecretariatsareunderstaffedandunderpowered.Insomeacutecases,committeesessions havebeencancelledbecauseoflackoffunds.Moregenerally,therehavebeenrestrictionson 54 documentation,delayintranslation,andreducedfieldvisitsowingtoalackoffunds. Philip Alston,whochairedtheCommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights,providesanexam pleoftheseresourceconstraints,sayingImyselftypedabouthalfofourreportforlackofasec 55 retarywithwordprocessingexperience. Theselectionprocessforcommitteememberselectionbystatespartiesishaphazardor 56 involvesvotetrading,thuslimitedaccountistakenofcandidatesqualifications. Thetreatybodiessessionstendtobegivenlittlenoticebynewsmediaandevenatten dancebyNGOsisquitelimited.Bayefskynotesthatthetreatybodiesthemselvesdonotdevote muchenergytoengagingoreducatingthenewsmedia.Externalreportingisalsohamperedbe causeconcludingobservationsarereleaseddays,andsometimesweeks,afterconsiderationofthe 57 report. 1.1.5 TheNatureoftheUNHumanRightsSystemandImplicationsforLinkageClaims ItiswidelybelievedthatthelackofenforcementpowerremainsaprincipallacunaoftheUN 58 humanrightsprotectionsystem. DespitethepublicitythatthetreatybodiesandtheCommis sioncanbringtohumanrightsviolations,thepracticeofshamingagovernmentintocompliance 59 doesnotalwayshavethedesiredeffect. Thesystemoftenappearstobemerelyreactive,declar ingviolationslongaftertheyoccur.However,asingularfocusontheUNsystemslackofen forcementpowerprovidesanincompletepictureoftheeffectivenessofthesystem.Thelackof enforcementpowerisnotuniquetointernationalhumanrightsnormsitisaprobleminvirtually everyareaofinternationallaw,atleastinsofarasenforcementpowerisunderstoodtobeanalo goustoenforcementpowerunderdomesticlegalsystems.Accordingly,ananalysisoftheeffec tivenessoftheUNhumanrightssystemmustgobeyondassertionsofitslackofenforcement power.ThereareinfactanumberofmeansbywhichtheUNhumanrightssystemhaseffectively contributedtotherealizationofhumanrights.Theincreasingemphasisonpreventivemecha nisms,inparticularthroughprogramsoftechnicalcooperationandtheestablishmentofhuman rightsfieldoffices,demonstratesthattheUNhumanrightssystemcanachievesomemeasureof 60 successevenintheabsenceofeffectiveenforcementmeasures.
54 55
Crawford,7.
PhilipAlston,EconomicandSocialRightsandtheRighttoHealth:AnInterdisciplinaryDiscussion,Session III,remarks,HarvardLawSchool,September1993,online:<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/HRP/Publi cations/economic2.html#ses3>(dateaccessed:5April2003).

56 57 58 59 60
Crawford,9. Bayefsky,paneldiscussion,466467. Schmidt,464. Ibid. Ibid.
12
UndertheVoluntaryFundforTechnicalCooperationintheFieldofHumanRights,a numberofactivitieshavebeencarriedout,suchastechnicalassistanceandadvisoryservicesand trainingprogramsforlegalofficialssuchasjudges,lawenforcementofficers,andprisonadminis 61 trators,etc. Theestablishmentofhumanrightsfieldofficescanplayacriticalroleinpreventing humanrightsabuses,astheycanactasanearlywarningmechanismforsystematichumanrights 62 violations. Ultimately,assessmentsoftheUNhumanrightssystemmustbeundertakenwithagood 63 doseofpoliticalrealism. Ifoneexaminesinisolationindividualprogramsthatoperateundera perpetualshortageofresources,itiseasytodrawconclusionsthatthesystemisineffective.If, however,onesurveysthesystemasawhole,keepinginmindthehighlypoliticizednatureofhu manrightsandthefactthesystemhasbeenfunctioningforarelativelyshortperiodoftime,itbe 64 comesapparentthatconsiderableprogresshasbeenmade. Thisoverviewoftheeffectivenessofthehumanrightsregimerevealsthatitisnotasinef fectiveasitiscommonlyseentobe.Additionally,whereitcurrentlylackseffectiveness,itsshort comingsdonotnecessarilyrelatetoalackofadequateenforcementmechanisms.Articulatinga setofstandardsthathavegainedwideacceptanceandbringingattentiontohumanrightsviola tionsareperhapsthegreatestsuccessesofthehumanrightsregime,andaretheareasinwhich thereismuchpromise.Buteffortstowardbringinggreateracceptanceandpublicityforhuman rightsstillfallshort.Accordingly,thoseseekinggreaterrealizationofhumanrightsthroughalink withtheWTOmayfindtheircausebetterservedbylobbyingforgreaterresourcesfortheexisting humanrightsinstitutions.
1.2
TheTradeRegimeundertheWTO
1.2.1 SubstantiveLegalObligationsundertheWTOAgreements Themostsignificantlegalobligationsforthepurposesofthispaperarecontainedinthethree multilateralagreementsundertheWTO:theGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT) andthetwosideagreements,theGeneralAgreementonTradeinServices(GATS)andthe 65 AgreementonTradeRelatedAspectsofIntellectualPropertyRights(TRIPs). Therearealso twooptionalplurilateralagreementsthatcovergovernmentprocurementandtradeincivilair craft.ThemostimportantprincipleoftheWTOmultilateralagreementsistheprincipleofnon discrimination,whichismanifestedintheMostFavouredNation(MFN)andNationalTreatment 66 obligations.
61 62 63 64 65
Ibid.at465. Ibid. Ibid.at466. Ibid.
See,generally,JohnH.Jackson,WilliamJ.Davey,andAlanO.Sykes,Jr.,LegalProblemsofInternational EconomicRelations,3rded.(St.Paul:WestGroup,1995)MichaelJ.TrebilcockandRobertHowse,TheRegula tionofInternationalTrade,2nded.(London:Routledge,1999).

66
TrebilcockandHowse,26.
13
TheMFNprinciplerequiresthatanyadvantage,favour,privilege,orimmunitygrantedto anyproductorservicefromagivencountrymustbegrantedtolikeproductsorservicesoriginat inginallothermembercountries(GATTArticleIGATSArticleIITRIPsArticleIV).Thena tionaltreatmentprinciplerequiresthatonceforeigngoodsorserviceshaveenteredamembers territory,thosegoodsmustbeaccordedtreatmentnolessfavourablethanthataccordedtolike domesticproducts(GATT,ArticleIII:4.GATSArticle17,TRIPs,Article3).Thisappliesinre spectofalllaws,regulations,andrequirementsregardinginternalsale,andalsoappliestolaws, regulations,orpolicieswhichmaybefaciallyneutralbutwhichhaveadiscriminatoryintentor 67 effect. ArticleXIoftheGATTalsoprohibitstheuseofquantitativerestrictions,includingquotas orimportandexportlicencesthisissubjecttosomeexceptions,forexample,forbalanceofpay 68 mentscrisesandforprotectionofinfantindustriesbylessdevelopedcountries. Generalimport restrictionsintheformoftariffsarepermitted,butunderGATTArticleXXVIIImembersrecog nizetheimportanceofsubstantiallyreducingthegeneralleveloftariffsandcommittonegotia tionstoreducetariffs.MembersarealsoprohibitedunderArticleIIfromincreasingnegotiated tariffreductions,knownastariffbindings.BhagwatinotesthattheGATT/WTOsgreatestac complishmenthasbeenthereductionoftariffsamongOECDcountriestoalmostnegligiblelev 69 els TheGATScontainsMFNandnationaltreatmentobligationssimilartotheGATT,except thattheGATSobligationsareinrespectofservicesratherthangoods.TheGATSalsocontains 70 rulesoncompetitionandmonopolypolicyandgovernmentprocurement. UndertheTRIPs agreementWTOmembersagreetoprovideaminimumlevelofintellectualpropertyprotection.In particular,membersmustprovidecivilandadministrativeproceduresforintellectualproperty 71 holders.TRIPsalsocontainsMFNandnationaltreatmentobligations. 1.2.2 InstitutionalMechanismsforEnforcingWTOObligations TheDisputeSettlementUnderstanding(DSU)isundoubtedlytheelementoftheWTOthatis mostattractivetothoseseekingmoreeffectiveenforcementofhumanrightsnorms.Forthatrea son,itisworthwhiletoexamineingreaterdetailthenatureoftheWTOdisputesettlementproc ess. WhereaWTOmemberbelievesthatanothermemberhasnotfulfilleditsWTOobliga tions,theformermaysubmitacomplainttotheDisputeSettlementBody(DSB).Uponreceiptof acomplaint,partiesaregiven60daystosettletheirdispute.Ifattemptstosettleareunsuccessful, thecomplainingpartycanrequesttheestablishmentofapanel.Apanelconsistsofthreetofive tradeexpertswhomakearulingonthedisputebasedontherelevantWTOagreements.The
67 68 69
Ibid.,27,29. Ibid.,2930.
JagdishBhagwati,TheWorldTradingSystematRisk(NewYork:HarvesterWheatsheaf,1991),5see,gener ally,TrebilcockandHowse,26.
70 71
JohnH.Jackson,WilliamJ.Davey,andAlanO.Sykes,Jr.,291. Ibid.
14
panelsrulingcanbeappealedonpointsoflaw.Appealsareheardbythreemembersofaperma nentsevenmemberAppellateBody(AB).MembersoftheABmustberecognizedexpertsinthe 72 fieldoflawandinternationaltradeandmaynotbeaffiliatedwithanygovernment. TheWTOSecretariatemphasisesthatthegoalofthedisputesettlementsystemisnotto 73 makerulingsbutrather[t]osettledisputes,throughconsultationsifpossible. TheSecretariat notesthatbymidMarch2001,38outof228caseshadbeensettled,withoutgoingthroughthe 74 fullpanelprocess. WhenamemberisfoundinviolationofWTOobligations,itmustfollowtherecommenda tionsofthepanelorAB.Theviolatingpartyisgenerallyrequiredtobringitslaws,regulations,or policiesintocompliancewiththeprovisionsviolated.Ifapartyfailstocomplyafterareasonable time,itmustenternegotiationswiththecomplainingpartyinordertodeterminemutuallyac 75 ceptablecompensation, whichcouldincludeareductionintariffsinareasofinteresttothe complainantormonetarycompensation.Ifafter20daysthepartiescannotagreeoncompensa tion,thecomplainantmayrequestpermissionfromtheDSBtoimposelimitedtradesanctions (suspensionofconcessionsorobligations).Sanctionsare,inprinciple,tobeimposedinthesame sectorasthedispute,howeverifthisisnotpracticalorunlikelytobeeffective,otheractioncan betaken.TheSecretariatnotesthattheobjectiveistominimizethechancesofactionsspilling 76 overintounrelatedsectors,whileatthesametimeallowingtheactionstobeeffective. AnytraderetaliationauthorisedbytheDSBmustbelimitedtoacompensatorylevel.Thus 77 theWTOdoesnotenvisiontheuseofsanctionsprimarilyasadeterrent. Indeed,contraryper hapstotheviewsofthosemakinglinkageclaims,theWTOhasbeendescribedascontaining ratherweakremedies.Apartyfoundinviolationcancontinuetoviolateitsobligationsaslongas itiswillingtopaycompensationorfaceretaliationconsiderforexampletheECsresponsetothe 78 rulingsintheBeefHormonesandImportedBananasdecisions. Infact,theWTOhasnopoweratalltocompelcompliancewithitsrulings.Speyerde scribesthepoweroftheDSBasrestingonthefactthatnocountry,nomatterhowpowerful,is willingtobearthecosttoitsreputationofconsistentlystandingoutsidethebodyofinternational
72 73 74 75 76 77
WTOSecretariat,TradingintotheFuture,2ded.(Geneva:WTO,2001),3940. Ibid. Ibid.at38. Ibid.at40. Ibid.at40.
RobertE.Hudec,GATTLegalRestraintsontheUseofTradeMeasuresagainstForeignEnvironmentalPrac tices,inFairTradeandHarmonization:PrerequisitesforFreeTrade?editedbyJ.BhagwatiandR.Hudec (Cam bridge,Mass.:MITPress,1996),115.

78
J.PatrickKelly,TheWTOandGlobalGovernance:theCaseforContractualTreatyRegimes,WidenerLaw SymposiumJournal109(Spring2001),1289.ArticleIXX(1)ofthe DisputeSettlementUnderstandingprovides thatapanelortheAppellateBodyshallrecommendthatthelosingpartybringtheimpugnedmeasureintocon formitywiththerelevantagreement,whileArticleXXII(1)providesforcompensationorretaliationastemporary measuresintheeventtherulingorrecommendationisnotimplementedinareasonabletime.ArticleXXII(1)fur therprovidesthatfullimplementationispreferredtocompensationorretaliation.Accordingly,itmaywellbecon sistentwithamemberslegalobligationstooffercompensationortolerateretaliationinlieuoffullimplementa tion.
15
79 tradelaw. TheforceofGATTlawhasrestedinitsabilitytomakeobjectivelegalrulingsand ...inthetendencyofsuchrulingstoelicitcommunitypressureforcompliance.UltimatelyGATT lawworksbecausegovernmentswantittowork,notbecausetheyarebulliedintocomplianceby 80 tradesanctions. Althoughcompliancemaybeslow,mostcountrieswilleventuallycomply. Complianceisalsoencouragedbecauseanymembercanlodgeacomplaintifitcandemonstrate aprimafacieviolationevenofonlypotentialexportinterests,thusallowingacoalitionofmem 81 berstobeassembledthattogethercanexertsignificantpressureonthedefendant. TheWTOsmethodofcomplianceputsweakerstatesatadisadvantagetheycannotre 82 alisticallyimposetradesanctionstothesameeffectasthepowerfulstates. Alargeeconomy suchastheUnitedStatesortheEuropeanUnion,whichtradeswithawidearrayofothercoun tries,canimposetradesanctionsonimportsfromagivencountrywithoutmuchsufferingtoits owneconomy.Thelargeeconomywillbelikelytofindanalternatesourceofsupplyatasimilar price.Thesmalleconomywhosegoodsareexcludedis,however,likelytosufferconsiderably fromsuchsanctions.Itmaybeunabletofindanalternatebuyerforitsexportswithoutproviding substantialpriceconcessions.Shouldthesmalleconomyattempttoimposesanctionsonalarge economy,thelatterisunlikelytosuffersignificantloss.Exportsfromalargeeconomytoasmall economyareunlikelytobesignificanttothelargeeconomyinanycase,andtherelativescale meansthatpriceconcessionstosellthesanctionedgoodstoanotherbuyerareunlikelytocause seriousdisruptioninthelargeeconomy.Politicalconsiderationsarelikelytoaffectasmallecon omysmanoeuvrabilityinthesameway.Dependentonthelargeeconomyforvariouspolitical reasons,thesmalleconomyisunlikelytoattempttouseeconomicleverageforpoliticalends,and wouldnotlikelybesuccessfulifitdidsoattempt. Somehaveraisedtherelativepowerimbalanceasanobjectiontolinkinghumanrights,the 83 environment,orlabourwiththeWTO. However,itshouldbenotedthatthedisadvantagefaced bysmallercountriesexistscurrentlywithrespecttoallWTOobligations.Increasingtherangeof usesforWTOcondonedtrademeasureswouldfurtherdisadvantagesmallstates,butitwillbea matterofdegreeratherthanaqualitativedifference.Onbalance,itislikelytobemoreadvanta geousforsmallcountriestohavelargercountriessubmittheimpositionof sanctionstoWTOdis ciplinesthantoleaveittothelargecountriesunilateralwhims.
1.2.3 TheFunctioningoftheWTO:ImplicationsforHumanRightsLinkages ThefunctioningoftheWTOgivesrisetosomeobservationsabouttheviabilityofenforcinghu manrightsundertheWTO.First,theexistingdisputesettlementprocessisnotparticularlysus ceptibletomandatingmultilateraleconomicsanctionsinthesamefashionastheUNSecurity

79
BernhardSpeyer,DisputeSettlement:AGeminNeedofPolishandPreservation,inTheWorldTradeOrgani zationMillenniumRound:FreerTradeintheTwentyFirstCentury,editedbyK.G.DeutschandB.Speyer(Lon donNewYork:Routledge,2001),277.

80 81 82
Ibid. Ibid.
JagdishBhagwati,Afterword:TheQuestionofLinkage,AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw 96(January 2002),133.

83
Kelly,127128.
16
Council.WTOrulingsdirectlyaffectonlythepartiestothedispute.Second,WTOmandatedre taliationisintendedtocompensateratherthantodeter.Enforcementofhumanrightsnorms wouldbestbeservedbymeasuresthatdeterhumanrightsviolations.InsofarasWTOmandated retaliationiscompensatory,itcompensatesstatesbutdoesnotprovidecompensationtoaggrieved individuals.Incontrast,humanrightscomplaintsmechanismsgenerallyrequireindividualcom 84 pensation. TheHRC,forexample,initsviewsonindividualcommunications,oftenrequires statestocompensateindividualswhoserightsareviolated.Third,theobligationtonegotiatemu tuallyacceptablecompensationisnotnecessarilydesignedtoendtheviolation.Theviolating partycouldchoosetocontinuenoncompliantbehaviourbutprovidecompensation.Suchanap proachwouldbeinimicaltoenforcinghumanrightsconsideringthequalityofintereststhathuman rightsprotect. 1.2.4 ThePurposeoftheWTO AcommonperceptionoftheWTOisthatitsfundamentalpurposeisthepromotionoffree trade.TheimplicationofthatviewisthatitwouldbeinconsistentwiththepurposeoftheWTO tolinkhumanrightsandothernontradematterstotheWTO.Therearecertainlymanyrespects inwhichtheWTOhasreducedbarrierstotrade,andmanyofitsprovisionsclearlyrelatetotrade liberalization.ThemostobviousisperhapstheGATTArticleXIgeneralprohibitiononquantita tiverestrictions.Additionalexamplesarethecommitmenttonegotiatetariffreductions(GATT ArticleXXVIII)andthebindingofnegotiatedreductions(GATTArticleII).Thenon discriminationprincipleisalsoakeybulwarkagainstprotectionism. ThefreetradeorientationoftheWTOisalsoreflectedintheGATTpreambleinwhich memberscommittoenterintoreciprocal andmutuallyadvantageousarrangementsdirectedto thesubstantialreductionoftariffsandotherbarrierstotradeandtotheeliminationofdiscrimina torytreatmentininternationalcommerce.TheWTOSecretariatechoesthefreetradethemeof thepreamble,withsomequalification,however,statingthatthecentralpurposeoftheWTOsys temistotohelptradeflowasfreelyaspossiblesolongastherearenoundesirableside 85 effects. TheWTOSecretariatnotesthatitisnotcompletelyaccuratetocharacterizetheWTOas afreetradeinstitution,partlybecausethesystemallowstariffsandsomeotherlimitedformsof protection.Rather,thesystemismoreaccuratelydescribedasasystemofrulesdedicatedto open,fair,andundistortedcompetition.AccordingtotheSecretariat,thegoaloffaircompeti tionisreflectedintheprinciplesofnondiscrimination(MFNandnationaltreatment),theruleson 86 dumpingandsubsidies,andtheagreementsonagricultureandintellectualproperty. ThepreambleoftheAgreementEstablishingtheWTOalsoidentifiessustainabledevel opmentandenvironmentalprotectionasobjectivesoftheWTO.Theseobjectiveshavebeencited
84
See,e.g.,HumanRightsCommittee,GeneralCommentNo.31,TheNatureoftheGeneralLegalObligation ImposedonStatesPartiestotheCovenant,26/05/2004,CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13,para.16.
85 86
WTOSecretariat,4. Ibid.,7.
17
intheABsreasonsintheShrimpTurtlescase.TheSecretariatalsoaddsthatitiswidelyrecog 87 nizedbyeconomistsandtradeexpertsthattheWTOsystemcontributestodevelopment. TheviewoftheWTOasbeingprimarilycommittedtofreetradeiscalledintoquestionby somecommentators.OneUSnegotiatorexplainedthatintheGATTnegotiationsNoonewas committedtofreetrade,nooneexpectedanythinglikeit:andthetermdoesnotappearinthe 88 GATT. SteveCharnovitznotesthatthereisnoclearstatementoftheWTOsmissionandthat 89 itspurposeisnotselfevident. HeconcludesthattheWTOcomprehendsamlangeofpur 90 poses. EvenifoneacceptsthatthereissomeambiguityinthepurposeoftheWTO,itishardto denythattradeliberalizationisoneofitspurposes,ifnotthedominantone.Thepurposeofthe WTO,anditsrelationshiptohumanrights,canbebetterunderstoodbyexaminingthehistoryof itsdevelopment.
2 2.1
ConceptualIssuesArisingfromLinkageProposals CommonOriginsofHumanRightsandTradeLiberalization
TheWTOasaninstitutionbythatnameisrelativelyyoungitwasestablishedonlyin1995. However,theWTOsubsumedtheGATTanditslooselyinstitutionalizedsecretariat.TheGATT wasnegotiatedin1947(itbecameGATT1994uponcreationoftheWTO).Atthetime,the GATTwasintendedtobeapartofanInternationalTradeOrganisation(ITO)whichwastobe createdundertheauspicesoftheUN.AlthoughtheITOnevercameintoexistence,theGATT 91 hassurvived. ThestoryoftheGATTandtheITOisquitecloselylinkedtothedevelopmentofthein ternationalhumanrightsregime.BoththeGATTandthehumanrightsregimewereintendedto bekeycomponentsofthepostWorldWarIIinternationalorder.Thepostwarinstitution buildingwasdesignedtoensurepeaceandavoidanotherworldwar.Inpart,theseinstitutions 92 weredevelopedinresponsetotheexperienceoftotalitarianism. Boththetradeandhumanrights regimesshareacommonlibertariantraittheybothsetlimitsonstateaction andbothare 93 emanationsoftheruleoflaw. PetersmannaddsthatthefundamentalpurposeoftheBretton WoodsinstitutionsandtheITOwastoprotectliberty,nondiscrimination,ruleoflaw,social 94 welfareandotherhumanrightsvaluesthrougharulesbasedinternationalorder. Headdsthat
87 88 89
Ibid. Dunoff,130.
SteveCharnovitz,TriangulatingtheWorldTradeOrganization,AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw 96 (January2002),30.
90 91 92
Ibid.,55. Jackson,Davey,andSykes,295.
ThomasCottier,Trade andHumanRights:ARelationshiptoDiscover,JournalofInternationalEconomic Law 5(March2002),111.

93 94
Ibid. Petersmann,2.
18
thecreationofseparateinstitutionsfortrade,finance,humanrights,etc.,wasbasedontheeco 95 nomicprincipleofseparationofpolicyinstruments. Thissuggeststhattheseparationwasdue moretoanideaofbureaucraticefficiencythanamatterofprincipleinregardstotherelationship betweenhumanrightsandtradeortheeconomy. TheGreatDepressionandtheprewarperiodweremarkedbyeverincreasingresortto protectionism.Thepostwartradeandfinancialorderwasdesignedtoenablestatestomanage theirdomesticeconomiesandavoidrecoursetoanotherprotectionistracetothebottom.A keyelementofthisobjectiveistheGATT,underwhichstatesareobligatednottoimposequotas orrelatedimportrestrictions.AlthoughtheGATTdidnotobligestatestoeliminateorreduce othertraderestrictionslikeimporttariffs,theGATTwasdesignedtofacilitate,andmakebinding, 96 tariffconcessions. Jacksonsuggeststhatthegoalwastoenhanceworldeconomicwelfareand 97 thusincreasethepie,ratherthanquarrelabouthowtodivideitup. Inthisway,theGATT wasdesignedtopromotestability.TheBrettonWoodsinstitutionspursuedthesamegoalonthe 98 economicside. However,sincetradeliberalizationalsocreatesdislocation asresourcesare shiftedtomoreefficientindustriesacommitmenttoliberalizedtradealsorequiredacommit menttoprovideadjustmentassistancetovictimsofsuchdislocation.Dunoffdescribesthepost wartradingorderasrestinguponacomplexpoliticalcompromise:governmentswouldprovide unemploymentcompensation,adjustmentassistance,andotherdomesticsafetynetsinexchange 99 forpublicsupportforliberalizedtrade. AlthoughtheGATTdoesnotprovideforsuchsafety 100 nets,somesocialguaranteeswereenvisionedintheillfatedITO. Theinternationalhuman rightsregimecanalsobeseenasanintegralpartofthepostwarcompromise,andonemanifesta tionoftheguaranteeofadjustmentassistance.Thisisparticularlytrueofeconomic,social,and culturalrights,whichPresidentRooseveltincludedinhisvisionofhumanrightsinthepostwar 101 orderandwhichwerealsoultimatelyincludedintheUDHR. Economicandsocialrights,such astherightstosocialsecurityandhealthcare,guaranteeaminimumlevelofmaterialwellbeing criticaltothosewhomaysufferdislocationasaresultoftradeliberalization.Othereconomicand socialrights,suchastherighttoeducation,giveindividualsthetoolstoadjusttoandprosperun derincreasedtradeliberalization.
95 96
Ibid.
RobertHowse,FromPoliticstoTechnocracy andBackAgain:TheFateoftheMultilateralTradingRegime, AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw 96(January2002),95.

97
JohnH.Jackson,Afterword:TheLinkageProblemCommentsonFiveTexts,AmericanJournalofInterna tionalLaw 96(January2002),121122.

98 99
Dunoff,130.
Ibid.at131.SeealsoMichaelHartsdescriptionoftheKeynesianconsensusinCoercionorCooperation: SocialPolicyandFutureTradeNegotiations,CanadaUnitedStatesLawJournal20(1994),351390.
100
VirginiaA.Leary,WorkersRightsandInternationalTrade:TheSocialClause(GATT,ILO,NAFTA,US Laws),inFairTradeandHarmonization:PrerequisitesforFreeTrade?editedbyJ.BhagwatiandR.Hudec (Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1996),1978,citingPercyW.BidwellandWilliamDiebold,Jr.,TheUnited StatesandtheInternationalTradeOrganization,449InternationalCooperation(March1949).

101
vanderVyver,801802.
19
GiventhattheGATTaroseoutofaconcernwithensuringpostwarstability,astability whichrequiredadjustmentassistance,DunoffconcludesthatthefoundersoftheBrettonWoods institutionsandtheGATTwerenotcommittedtolaissezfaireormarketfundamentalism.In stead,theircommitmenttoliberalizedtradewasembeddedwithinacommitmenttoastatethat 102 wasdomesticallyinterventionist. Thisviewoftherelationshipbetweenfreetradeanddomestic redistributionisconsistentwithempiricalstudiesshowingthatstatesthataremostopentointer 103 nationaltradealsotendtohavethehighestratesofsocialspending. Thehistoricalmotivation forboththehumanrightsandtraderegimesindicatethatneitherregimeispremiseduponthe 104 witheringofthestate. Despitethesharedhistoryofhumanrightsandtrade,therearesomesignificantdifferences intheirevolutionandintheirprocessoflawmaking.Whiletraderulesdevelopedincrementally, throughnegotiationsandtradeoffsintraderounds,humanrightswerenegotiatedinarelatively comprehensivemannerresultingindefinite,albeitaspirational,norms.Thehumanrightsregimeis essentiallytopdown,whilethetraderegimedevelopedfromthebottomup.Thesedivergent pathshavecreatedverydifferentlegalcultures.Additionally,theincrementaldevelopmentof 105 traderegulationallowedforthedevelopmentofaneffectivedisputesettlementsystem. Anadditionaldistinctionbetweenthetradeandhumanrightsregimesisthathumanrights accordrightstoindividualsthatcan,orshouldbeabletobe,assertedagainstthestate.Incon trast,theWTOdoesnotguaranteeanindividualrighttotradeindeed,theWTOdoesnotes tablishorrecogniseindividualrightsatall.ObligationsundertakenundertheWTOcanonlybe 106 vindicatedattheinitiativeofgovernmentsthroughintergovernmentaldisputesettlement. In deed,theraisond'treoftheGATTwastohelpgovernmentsenterintoreciprocalandmutually advantageousarrangementsdirectedtothesubstantialreductionoftariffsandotherbarriersto 107 tradeandtotheeliminationofdiscriminatorytreatmentininternationalcommerce. Nonethe less,ifonelooksbeyondthemercantilistoriginsofinternational tradelaw,itisreallyintendedto 108 benefitindividualsitisultimatelyindividualswhoareproducers,traders,andconsumers. Theimpetustowardtradeliberalizationandthemovementtorecognisehumanrightswere bothborneoutoftheeventsleadinguptoandtheaftermathofWorldWarII.Notonlydothey shareacommonhistory,theyalsosharesimilarideologicalunderpinnings.Thiscommonhistory andideologymaynotbeapparentinthecurrentdebatesbetweenhumanrightsactivistsandpro ponentsoftradeliberalization.Nonetheless,thesharedhistoryandideologysuggestthatthere maybesomesynergiesbetweentherecognitionofhumanrightsandtheliberalizationoftrade.
102 103 104 105 106 107
Dunoff,131132. Ibid.,131. Ibid.,129. Cottier. Ibid.
SteveCharnovitz,TheGlobalizationofEconomicHumanRights,BrooklynJournalofInternationalLaw 25 (Winter1999),117118.
108
Ibid.
20
Thesharedhistoryandthepotentialsynergiessupporttheviewthathumanrightsandtradeare indeedrelated.
2.2
SynergybetweenTradeandHumanRights
Therecognitionofhumanrightsandtheliberalizationoftradeareinmanywaysmutuallyrein forcing.MancurOlsonobservesthatontheonehandallcountriesthathaveenjoyedsustained economicprosperityhavebeenstabledemocracies,andontheotherhandthatdemocracieshavea 109 muchbettertrackrecordofrespectforpropertyrightsthanautocracies. Inaverydirectway,tradeliberalizationsupportstherealizationofbasichumanlibertyand dignitysinceeconomicactivityandeconomiclibertyallowforindividualstoexercisetheirfree domanddignityasproducersandconsumers.Inamoreindirectway,economiclibertymaylead toincreasedwealth,whichisapreconditionforrecognizingmanyeconomic,social,andcultural 110 rights. Tradeliberalizationcanalsoindirectlycontributetotheenforcementofhumanrightsas itincreasescontactbetweenindividualsinoppressiveregimesandindividualsinhumanrights 111 observantregimes. Theinternationaltradeandhumanrightsregimesbothrequirerespectfortheruleoflaw. Anincreaseintheruleoflawineconomiclawislikelytoleadtoincreasedrespectfortheruleof 112 lawasitrelatestohumanrightsaswell. Ontheotherhand,tradeliberalization,evenifcon ceivedofonlyasastrategyforeconomicgrowth,requirestheruleoflawandanimpartialadmin 113 istrativeandjudicialsystem. Petersmannnotesthatanefficientmarkethashistoricallydepended 114 ontheprotectionofindividualfreedoms. Wheremarketdecisionsarebasedoninformation,one canreadilyappreciate,forexample,howfreedomofexpressioniscrucialtoensuringanefficient market. Thediscussionofthesynergybetweenhumanrightsandtradeservestwopurposes.It demonstratesthattradeisnotnecessarilyathreattotherealisationofhumanrights.Howeverit alsodemonstratesthathumanrightsarerelatedtotradeinsomefashion.Thesynergybetween humanrightsandtradedoesnotprovideacompletepictureoftheinteractionbetweenthehuman rightsandtraderegimes.Dunoffnotesthatalthoughthetworegimesstartedatthesametime andwithmanycommonpoliticalcommitments,theyquicklyassumeddifferenttrajectories.At timestheyhavemovedpromisinglyinthesamedirection.Atothertimes,theyhaveintersectedat
109
MancurOlson,PowerandProsperity:OutgrowingCommunistandCapitalistDictatorships(NewYork:Basic Books,2000),43,187.
110 111 112 113
Garcia,59. Ibid.,5960. Ibid.,60.
RobertHowseandM.Mutua,ProtectingHumanRightsinaGlobalEconomy:ChallengesfortheWorldTrade Organization(Montreal:Rights&Democracy,InternationalCentreforHumanRightsandDemocraticDevelop ment,2000).

114
Petersmann,7,seealso2021.
21
115 crosspurposes. Dunoffsinsightleadstothequestionofwhetherhumanrightsandtradewill, insomecases,conflict,andhowthatconflictshouldberesolved.
2.3
IsThereConflictbetweentheWTOandHumanRights?
Conflictbetweentradeandhumanrightscanbeassessedatboththegenerallevelandatthelevel ofspecificrules. 2.3.1 ConflictattheGeneralLevel Thehumanrightsandtraderegimesaresaidtoconflictbecausetheyrestonconflictingnormative bases.Dunoffidentifiestheefficiencymodelasthedominantnormativeaccountoftradelaw, 116 andarguesthattradelawisexclusivelyconcernedwitheconomicefficiencyandwelfare. Hu manrights,ontheotherhand,aresaidtoembodyminimumstandardsoftreatmentinaccordance withtheequalmoralworthofallpersons.Garciaarguesthathumanrightsarederivedfromthe nonutilitarianstrandofliberalismandarethusmattersof moraldutyandprinciplewhichfocus 117 onprinciplesabouthowpeopleareandarenottobetreated,regardlessoftheconsequences. Garcianotesthathumanrightsareexpressedinabsolutetermsandaresubjectneithertocom 118 promisenortoconsequentialjustifications. Thecharacterizationofthetradeandhumanrightsregimes,byDunoffandGarciarespec tively,suggeststhatatthegeneralleveltheirnormativebasesdifferirreconcilably.Whiletheir analysesarelikelyconsistentwithcommonperceptionsoftradeandhumanrights,theyare somewhatincomplete.ThenondiscriminationnormembodiedintheWTOagreementsfindsits justificationinmorethanmereeconomicefficiency.TheGATTscontinuedtolerancefortariffs andtheexceptionsprovidedinWTOagreementsalldemonstratethateconomicefficiencyisnot 119 theonlyvalueatplay. Similarly,thehumanrightsregimeadmitsofmorethanindividualdignityandworthasits onlyjustificatorybasis.Somehumanrightsnorms,suchasfreedomofexpressionortherightto property,alsohaveanefficiencycomponent.Additionally,therecognitionofhumanrightshasa utilitarianaspect,evidentinArticle55oftheUNCharterwhichcallsforuniversalrespectforhu manrightsasmeansofattainingthestabilityandwellbeingnecessaryforpeacefulandfriendly relationsamongnations.Finally,althoughhumanrightsnormsmaybeexpressedinabsolute terms,theyarerarelyrecognizedinpracticeasbeingabsolute.Infact,theynecessarilyrequire balancingwithotherhumanrightsandwithotherstateorprivateobjectivesthisbalancecanle 120 gitimatelydifferfromstatetostate. Althoughguaranteestoindividualautonomyarelesssus ceptibletobalancing,theynonethelessadmitofsomelimitationsguaranteeingpositiverightsin
115 116 117 118 119 120
Dunoff,132. Garcia,65. Ibid.,7172. Ibid.,7273. Hart,CoercionorCooperation,note99at374. Petersmann,5seealsoHowse,Technocracy,105butseeGarcia,75.
22
general,andeconomic,social,andculturalrightsinparticular,willinvariablybesubjecttoade 121 greeofbalancingandtradeoffs. 2.3.2 ConflictattheSpecificLevel TheimpositionofeconomicsanctionsagainsttheapartheidregimeofSouthAfricaisoftcredited 122 asplayingaroleintheeventualdemiseofapartheidinSouthAfrica. Manymodernhuman rightsactivistsfearthatsimilarsanctionswouldbeprohibitedunderthetradeliberalizationcom mitmentsoftheWTO.Thereare,ofcourse,countlessotherexamplesinwhichsanctionshave provenineffective.Evenapartfromtheeffectivenessofhumanrightssanctions,however,some activistsinsistonpreservingastatesdiscretiontoimposesanctionsasameansofexpressing moraldisapprobation.Itisclearthatvirtuallyallhumanrightsmotivatedtrademeasureswould constituteaprimafacieviolationoftheGATTnondiscriminationrequirementsofArticlesIand 123 IIIortheArticleXIprohibitionagainstquantitativerestrictions. Superficiallythen,itseemsob viousthatthereisaconflictbetweenspecifichumanrightsandtradenorms. Conflictbetweennormsis,however,amuchmorenarrowconcept.Aconflictexistsonly 124 ifthereareobligationswhichcannotbecompliedwithsimultaneously. Thereisnoconflict 125 whereonetreatylimitstheexerciseofaprivilegeordiscretionprovidedbyanothertreaty. To establishaconflictbetweenahumanrightsobligationandWTOrules,itmustbeshownthata humanrightsnormmandatesorprohibitsanactionthattheWTOconverselyprohibitsorman 126 dates. Sincetheprincipalhumanrightstreatiesdonotnecessarilyrequiretheimpositionofeco nomicsanctionsagainsthumanrightsviolators,itisdifficulttoconceiveofasituationinwhich 127 humanrightslawwouldconflictwiththeWTO. Althoughtheymaybelimited,therearesomecircumstancesinwhichhumanrightsnorms couldconflictwithWTOrules.SarahClevelandnotesthatmajorhumanrightstreatiesandjus cogensprohibittortureandgenocideandalsoprohibitanyactionsthataidorabetthecommission ofsuchcrimes.Clevelandsuggeststhatatradeagreementthatpromisedtoprovideastatewith militarytechnologythatwastobeusedforthepurposeofcommittinggenocidewouldviolatethe 128 prohibitionofaidingorabettingthecommissionoftortureorgenocide. Shenotesthatsucha situationisnotpurelyhypotheticalasthe1994genocideinRwandawasfacilitatedinpartbylarge
121 122
Charnovitz,GlobalizationofEconomicHumanRights,117.
JenniferDavis,SanctionsandApartheid:TheEconomicChallengetoDiscrimination,inEconomicSanc tions:PanaceaofPeacebuildinginaPostColdWarWorld?editedbyD.CortrightandG.A.Lopez(Boulder: WestviewPress,1995),173184.

123
SarahCleveland,HumanRightsSanctionsandInternationalTrade:ATheory ofCompatibility,Journalof InternationalEconomicLaw 5(March2002),133.

124
WolframKarl,ConflictsbetweenTreaties,inR.Bernhardt,ed.,EncyclopediaofPublicInternationalLaw, vol.7(1984),468.
125
GabrielleMarceau,WTODisputeSettlementandHumanRights,EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw 13, no.4(2002),753814,citedto<http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol13/No4/art1.pdf>,62.

126 127 128
Ibid.,6263. Ibid.,81. Cleveland,ATheory ofCompatibility.
23
macheteimports.Sheconcludesthat[f]orthebulkofhumanrightssanctions,however,treaties 129 andcustomaryinternationallawprovidenocleartrumpcard. Thecircumstancesandtheex ampleofferedbyClevelandarerathernarrow,andareaccordinglyoflittlepracticalortheoretical importtothepresentdiscussion.EveninClevelandsnarrowexample,itisnotclearthatgeneral tradesanctionsbystatesotherthantheexportingorimportingstateswouldberequiredbythe prohibitionongenocide,suchthatasituationwouldarisewherehumanrightslawmandatesa measurethattheWTOprimafacieprohibits.Accordingly,onecanreasonablyconcludethatitis virtuallyinconceivablethathumanrightsnormsandWTOruleswouldclearlyconflict. TheunlikelihoodofconflictbetweenhumanrightsandWTOrulesisapparentuponcon siderationofthenatureoftheobligationundertakenbystatesinrecognizinghumanrights.Inrati fyinghumanrightstreaties,statesundertaketorecognizethehumanrightsofindividualsunder 130 theirjurisdiction. ItisdifficulttoseehowStateXwouldtherebyhaveanobligationtoimpose sanctionsonStateYonthebasisthatStateYhasfailedtoadequatelyrecognizethehumanrights ofindividualsunderStateYsjurisdiction.StateYmay wellbeinviolationofitsobligationsun dertherelevanthumanrightstreaty,andalthoughinsuchcircumstancesStateXmayhaveadis cretiontoimposesanctionsonStateY,thereisnobasisforassertingthatStateXwouldbe obligedtodoso. TheFdrationInternationaledesLiguesdesDroitsdelHomme(FIDH)offersabroader 131 viewofthecircumstancesinwhichhumanrightsobligationsmightconflictwithWTOrules. TheFIDHnotesthatArticle55oftheUNCharteridentifiesthepromotionofhuman rightsasone ofthepurposesoftheUN.UnderArticle56,UNmemberspledgetotakejointandseparateac tionincooperationwiththeOrganizationtoachievetheUNspurpose.TheFIDHespousesthe viewthattheUNCharterobligationstopromotehuman rightsmustbeinterpretedinlightofthe UDHRandtheCovenants.TheobligationunderArticle56canbeseentoextendtoallhuman rights,ratherthantothemorelimitedsetofhumanrightswhichhaveattainedjuscogensstatus. BringinghumanrightsprotectionwithinthepurviewoftheUNCharteralsolendshumanrights measuresthesupportofArticle103whichstatesthattheUNCharterprevailsoverotherconflict 132 ingtreatyobligations. Theexpansiveviewgiventothehierarchybetweenhumanrightsandtradeobligationsby 133 theFIDHdoesnotappeartobewidelyheld,however. Itis,inanycase,subjecttothesame qualificationasClevelandsposition,namelythattheobligationtopromoteandprotecthuman rightsdoesnotnecessarilyrequiretheimpositionofeconomicsanctions.TheFIDHpositionalso admitsoffurthercriticism.Article56doesnotmandatenordoesitblessunilateralaction.The pledgeistotakeactionincooperationwiththeOrganization,whichcouldbeinterpretedasan
129 130
Ibid.
Marceau,89citestheICJjudgmentinCongov.Belgiumasstandingforthepropositionthatstatesdonothave extraterritorialjurisdictionundercustomaryinternationallawforhumanrightsviolationscommittedabroad.
131 132 133
Rapport,LOMCetlesdroitsdelHomme,No.320,November2001,citedinMarceau,7071. Marceau,7071. Ibid.
24
obligationtopursuemultilateral,andnotunilateral,action.Additionally,Article56cannotbesaid torequiretheimpositionofsanctionswhenotherlessrestrictivemeansareavailable. EventhoughthegeneralprohibitiononquantitativerestrictionsandtheMFNandnational treatmentobligationsundertheWTOmay primafacieprecludehumanrightstrademeasures,the WTOprovidessomeexceptionswhichmayresolveanyapparentconflict.Themostnotableex ceptiontoallaytheactivistsfearsthatsanctionsagainstanapartheidregimewouldbeprohibited istheexceptionforactiontakenpursuanttoaUNSecurityCouncilresolution.ArticleXXI(c)of theGATTprovidesthat[n]othinginthisAgreementshallbeconstrued...topreventanycon tractingparty fromtakinganyactioninpursuanceofitsobligationsundertheUnitedNations Charterforthemaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurity. InadditiontotheexceptionforactiontakenpursuanttoSecurityCouncilresolutions,the WTOrulesprovideforanumberofotherexceptions,someofwhichcouldallowforeconomic sanctionsintendedtoprotecthumanrights.Theexceptionsmostlikelytojustifyhumanrights sanctionsarefoundinArticleXXoftheGATT(theGATScontainssimilarexceptions).How ever,theWTOdisputesettlementprocedurehasyettoadjudicatethequestionofwhetherthese 134 exceptionscouldbeavailableforhumanrightssanctions. ArticleXX(a)oftheGATT1947allowsmemberstotakemeasuresfortheprotectionof publicmorals.Clevelandarguesthatthepublicmoralsexceptioncouldreasonablybeinter pretedtojustifytrademeasurestakenonthebasisofprotectinghumanrightsthathaveattained juscogensstatusorthatarerecognizedinatreatytowhichallthedisputantsareparty.Thus,the prohibitionsagainstgender,racialandreligiousdiscrimination,slavery,forcedlabour,exploitive childlabour,freedomofassociation,andtherighttopropertycouldpotentiallybeprotectedun 135 derArticleXX(a). TheGATTalsoexceptsmeasuresfortheprotectionofhuman,plantoranimallifeunder ArticleXX(b).Clevelandsuggeststhattheprotectionofhumanlifecouldjustifytradesanctions toenforcetheprohibitionsagainstgenocide,summaryexecution,disappearance,crimesagainst humanity,andtheexecutionofjuveniles.Clevelandalsoidentifiesslaveryasadenialofperson hood,andanotherbasisforinvokingArticleXX(b).Finally,Clevelandsuggeststhatweapons embargoesorgeneraltradeembargoesonstatesengagedinsystematicatrocitiesagainsthuman life,suchasagainstIdiAminsUganda,orMilosvicsYugoslavia,couldalsobejustifiedunder 136 ArticleXX(b). Finally,measuresrelatedtoproductsproducedbyprisonlabourarealsoexceptedunder GATTArticleXX(e).Theprisonlabourexceptionisquitespecificandthusnotaverygoodcan didateforservingtojustifyhumanrightstrademeasuresingeneral.Clevelandnonethelessargues thatitcouldextendtojustifyrestrictionsongoodsmadeunderconditionsakintoprisonlabour, 137 suchasforcedorbondedlabourandexploitivechildlabour.
134
Francesco Francioni,Environment,HumanRightsandthe LimitsofFreeTrade,inEnvironment,Human RightsandInternationalTrade,editedbyF.Francioni(Oxford:Hart,2001),17.

135
SarahCleveland,HumanRightsSanctionsandtheWTO,inEnvironment,HumanRightsandInternational Trade,editedbyF.Francioni(Oxford:Hart,2001),239.
136 137
Ibid.,238. Ibid.,239.
25
Thepublicmoralsandhumanlifeexceptionsarebothsubjecttotherequirementthatthe measuresadoptedbenecessary,whiletheprisonlabourexceptiononlyrequiresthatthemeas ureberelatedto.ThenecessityrequirementhasbeeninterpretedbytheABasrequiringthatthe defendantemploytheleasttraderestrictivemeasurereasonablyavailabletopromotethestates 138 validinterest. Inthecontextofhumanrightstradesanctions,itwouldbeverydifficulttodem onstratethatsanctionsaretheleasttraderestrictivemeasureavailable.Thereareinvariablyother measuresavailable,suchasdiplomaticsanctions,refusalofaeroplanelandingrights,removalof GSPtariffpreferences,etc.,thatthepartyinvokingArticleXXexceptionscouldemploy.Inde terminingwhethertrademeasureswouldbenecessary,thepanelorABwouldessentiallybere 139 quiredtoweighforeignpolicyoptions. Itisdoubtfulthatmemberswouldbewillingtodelegate thatkindofdecisionmakingauthoritytotheWTO.Thenecessitytestinvolvesbalancingtherela tiveimportanceofthevaluesprotectedwiththeeffectivenessofthemeasureandtheburdenon 140 internationaltrade. Itwouldundoubtedlybeverydifficulttodemonstratetheeffectivenessof humanrightsmeasuresascomparedwithothermeasuresavailable.Itisalsounclearonitsface whethertheArticleXX(a)and(b)exceptionscanbeinvokedonlytoprotecthumanlifeorpublic moralsinthestateimposingtraderestrictionsorwhethertheexceptionscanbeinvokedtojustify traderestrictionspurportedtoprotecthumanlifeorpublicmoralsinforeignstates,i.e.,inthe 141 statessubjecttothetraderestrictions. TheArticleXXexceptionsarealsosubjecttotherequirementsthattrademeasuresare notappliedinamannerthatconstitutesarbitraryorunjustifiablediscriminationoradisguised restrictiononinternationaltrade. ApartfromtheexceptionsinArticleXX,WTOmembersmayimposerestrictionson productsinadiscriminatoryfashion escapingMFNorNationalTreatmentobligationsifitcan beestablishedthattheproductsarenotlikeproducts.Inthecontextofhumanrightssanctions, however,adistinctionbetweenproductswillinvariablybebasedonanassertionthattheproducts 142 weremadeinawaythatviolateshumanrights. Thisiswhatisknownasadistinctionbasedon processorproductionmethods(PPM).Suchdistinctionsaregenerallynotacceptedasabasisfor 143 distinguishingproducts, althoughthispositionmayhavebeenalteredslightlybytheAsbestos
138 139
FranceAsbestoscase,citedatfootnote29inCleveland,ATheory ofCompatibility.
F.Roessler,DivergingDomesticPoliciesandMultilateralTradeIntegration,inFairTradeandHarmoniza tion:PrerequisitesforFreeTrade?editedbyJ.BhagwatiandR.Hudec (Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1996),35.

140
141
Cleveland,ATheory ofCompatibility,note129.
Roessler.ButseeSteveCharnovitz,TheMoralExceptioninTradePolicy,VirginiaJournalofInternational Law 38(Summer1998),689745.CharnovitznotesthatthedraftinghistoryofArticleXX(a)isinconclusivebut thatagreementspredatingtheGATTincludedmoralexceptionsthatwereconsideredtobedirectedatprotecting eitherdomesticmoralsormoralsinthetargetcountry.

142 143
Marceau,86.
See,e.g.,JapanCustomsDuties,TaxesandLabellingPracticesonImportedWinesandAlcoholicBeverages, 13October1987(adopted10November1987),GATTBISD(34thSupp)83,93(1988)UnitedStates RestrictionsonImportsofTuna,5.15,(3September1991,unadopted),DS21/R39S/155(unadopted),citedin Cleveland,ATheory ofCompatibility,note101.
26
144 case. Inanycase,trademeasuresbasedonPPMdistinctionswouldbeavailableonlyforsanc 145 tionsthattargetspecificproducts,andcouldnotservetojustifywidersanctions.
2.4 DoesInclusionofIntellectualPropertyintheWTOSupportLinkage Claims?

ThoseproposingtolinkhumanrightstotheWTOoftenpointtotheTRIPsagreementasjustifi cationforadditionallinkages.Therelationshipbetweenintellectualpropertyandtheothercom ponentsoftheWTOisnotobvious.GeorgeSorosnotedthatTheWTOopenedupaPandora's boxwhenitbecameinvolvedinintellectualpropertyrights.Ifintellectualpropertyrightsareafit 146 subjectfortheWTO,whynotlabourrights,orhumanrights? BhagwatiassertsthatTRIPs doesnotbelongintheWTOanddescribesitasameansbywhichthedevelopedcountriesmay 147 extractroyaltypaymentsfromthedevelopingworld. ThelessontobetakenfromtheinclusionofTRIPsintheWTOforotherlinkageclaims clearlydependsononesviewontheplaceofTRIPswithintheWTO.Ifitisviewedasanaberra tion,itcanhardlyserveasjustificationforadditionallinkageclaims.If,however,itisviewedas theharbingerofthefuturedirectionoftheWTO,thenitmayservetojustifyadditionallinkages. ObserversnoteamovetowardpositiveharmonizationundertheWTOashiftfromthe WTOstraditionalfocuson constraininggovernmentbehaviourtoactuallymandatinggovernment 148 intervention. Ifsuchashiftisindeedunderway,thenTRIPsislesslikelyanaberration,andits inclusionintheWTOcanserveassomejustificationfortheinclusionofothermattersthatarenot obviouslytraderelated. Theextenttowhichintellectualpropertyisnottraderelatedmaybeoverstated.Roessler characterizesTRIPsasbeingamatterofmarketaccessthatis,tradeinintellectualpropertyre quiresthatintellectual propertyrightsareprotectedintheimportingstates.Requiringthatlink agesrelatetoorfacilitatemarketaccessprovidesawayoflimitinglinkageclaims.Anotherap proachisofferedbyCharnovitz,whodescribestheTRIPslinkageasonewhichimprovesthepol icyeffectivenessoftheboththetradeandtheintellectualpropertyregimes.Theprotectionofin tellectualpropertyintheWTOfacilitatestradeinintellectualpropertyanditalsostimulatesinno vationsincemarketsforintellectualproperty(andthereturnthereon)areexpanded.Notsurpris
144
WTOAppellateBodyReportonEuropeanCommunitiesMeasuresAffectingAsbestosandAsbestosContaining Products,WT/DS135/AB/R12March2001(adopted5April2001).CitedinCleveland,ATheory ofCompati bility,note101.

145 146
See,e.g.,Marceau,86.
QuotedinStiglitz,AFairDealfortheWorld:AReviewofOnGlobalizationby GeorgeSoros,NYRev. Bks,23May2002,at<www.nybooks.com/articles/15403>,citedinPhilipAlston,ResistingtheMergerandAc quisitionofHumanRightsbyTradeLaw:AReplytoPetersmann,EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw 13,no. 4(2002),5,note11.

147 148
Bhagwati,Afterword,127.
Roessler,52.Seealso DavidW.Leebron,LyingDownwithProcrustes:AnAnalysisofHarmonization Claims,inFairTradeandHarmonization:PrerequisitesforFreeTrade?editedbyJ.BhagwatiandR.Hudec. (Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1996),41MichaelHartandWilliamDymond,TheFutureofMultiLevelGov ernance:LessonsfromFiftyYearsofCautiousTradePragmatism,inFestschriftforSylviaOstry,editedbyA. AlexandroffandR.Bhalla.(CarolinaPress)[forthcoming],10.
27
ingly,Charnovitznotesthatlinkagesthatenhancethepolicyeffectivenessofbothissues/regimes 149 arethemostcompellingformoflinkage. ItisdoubtfulthatlinkinghumanrightstotheWTO couldmeetthesetests.Somehumanrights,suchasthoseconcernedwithdueprocessandtherule oflawcouldwellfacilitatemarketaccess,particularlywithrespecttoinvestment.However,oth ers,particularlyeconomic,social,andculturalrights,wouldnotseemtomeetthattest.
2.5
RacetotheBottomandEstablishingaLevelPlayingField
ThefearofaracetothebottomanimatesavarietyofclaimstolinkissueswiththeWTO. Claimsforhumanrightslinkagesundoubtedlyalsorelytosomeextentonfearsofaracetothe bottom.Theconceptoftheracetothebottom positsthattradeliberalizationwillleadtocompeti tionbetweenjurisdictionsinagivenareaofstateregulationandthatsuchcompetitionwillleadto asuboptimallevelofregulation.Theconceptisperhapsmosteasilyunderstoodinthecontextof theenvironment.Theremovalofquantitativerestrictionsandtheloweringoftariffbarriersmeans that,forexample,widgetscanbeproducedinthelowestcostjurisdiction,ratherthanwherethe consumersreside.Widgetproducerswillprefertolocateinajurisdictionwheretheyarenotre quiredtocleanuptheirownmess.Sinceawidgetfactoryprovidesjobs,stateswillofferincen tivestowidgetfactoriesiftheylocateintheirjurisdiction,includingwaivingenvironmentalor 150 otherregulation. Similarly,thereisaconcernthattradeliberalizationwillspawnaracetothebottom for lowertaxesandthuslowersocialspending.Thisisofparticularconcerntothoseworkingforthe promotionofeconomic,social,andculturalrights.Astradeliberalizationcontributesinpartto capitalmobility,therearefearsthatmobilecapitalwillbeunwillingtopayhightaxestofundthe welfarestate,andwillthreatentomovetomoreamenablejurisdictions.Asaresult,statesmaybe inclinedtoscalebacksocialsafetynetsinordertomaintaincompetitivetaxstructures.Yetitis thoseverysafetynetsthatenableworkerstotoleratetheadjustmentsthatresultfromtradeliber 151 alization. Thedebtcrisisindevelopingcountriesmaybeanadditionalfactorwhichratchetsup 152 thecompetitionforcapital. Whiletheabovescenarios,andothersimilarexamples,seemtomakeintuitivesenseand thusserveasacompellinglogicforlinkageclaims,thereislittledefinitiveempiricalevidenceto supportthepredictionsoftheracetothebottomconcept.Theconsiderableevidencerelatingto 153 theracetothebottom providesnodefinitivesupportfortheeffectsitpredicts. Inthecontextof wages,thereissomeevidencethatrealwagesindevelopedcountriesin certainsectorsofthe economyandamongsomeworkershavedeclined,butthatmoregenerallytherehasbeennoim 154 pact.Asfarastheeffectondevelopingcountries,thereisconsiderableuncertainty. Similarly,
149
SteveCharnovitz,LinkingTopicsinTreaties,UniversityofPennsylvaniaJournalofInternationalEconomic Law 19(Summer1998),335336.

150 151 152 153
See,generally,ibid.,338. See,e.g.,Hart,CoercionorCooperation,357. Howse,Technocracy,103.
ChristopherMcCruddenandAnneDavies,APerspectiveonTradeandLabourRights,inEnvironment,Hu manRightsandInternationalTrade,editedby Francesco Francioni(Oxford:Hart,2001),184.

154
Ibid..
28
thereisnodefinitiveevidenceestablishingthatsocialspendinghasdeclinedinthefaceoftrade 155 liberalization. Indeed,moreopeneconomiesgenerallyhavehigherlevelsofgovernmentspend ingpercapita. Whiletheempiricalevidencedoesnotprovideunequivocalsupportfortheeffectspre dictedbytheracetothebottom,nordoesitssuperficiallycompellinglogicstanduptotougher scrutiny.AlthoughitmayappeartoberelevanttoclaimsoflinkinghumanrightstotheWTO,this relevanceseemstobedependentonarelationshiptospecifichumanrights,andnothumanrights moregenerally.Thatisbecausetheracetothebottomtheoryreallyonlyhasresonancewhenitis usedtosupportlinkagesthatbearoncompetitiveness.Thus,inthecontextoflabourandenvi ronmentalstandardsandsocialspendingandtaxationithassomeappeal.However,itdoesnot providesupportforlinkinghuman rightsmoregenerally.Itisdifficulttoimaginehowtherecould bearacetothebottom withrespecttosummaryexecutions,forexample,ortherighttoafair trial.Mosthumanrightsstandardsdonothaveanegativerelationshiptocompetitivenessitis difficulttoseehowviolatinganynumberofhumanrightswillincreasecompetitiveness.Indeed, giventhediscussionaboveregardingthesynergybetweenhumanrightsandtraderegulation, competitivenessismorelikelyenhancedbyrespectforhumanrights. Theracetothebottomtheoryisofteninvokedasjustificationforsettingabaselevelof standards.Thiswas,forexample,partofthemotivationbehindtheestablishmentoftheILOin 156 1919. Suchstandardsareoftenfurtherappealedtoonthebasisthattheirestablishmentwillen surefaircompetitionorwillpromotetheeconomicconceptofensuringthatexternalitiesare properlyinternalizedinthecostofproduction. Charnovitzoffersacombinationofappealingtofairnessandcostinternalizationnoting thateconomistsurgestatestousedomesticregulationtoensurethatcostsareinternalizedinto productprices.Hestatesthateconomistsalsowronglyurgecountriestoliberalizetradewith othercountriesthatdonotinternalizetheircostsandthushavelowerprices.Charnovitzcon 157 cludesthatfreecompetitionbetweendifferentcostinternalizingregimesisutterlyunfair. Establishingalevelplayingfieldfromwhichallcanthencompetemaybefairifallthe playerscanagreeonthestartingpoint.Learyattemptstoestablishabaselevelforcompetition, notingthat,whiletheadvantagesoftradeliberalizationarewidelyrecognized,thereisalsoarec ognitionthattherearesomegovernmentpoliciesthatarebeyondthepaleandthatcomparative 158 advantageshouldnotbebasedonsuchpolicies. Learysuggeststhattheuseofslaveryorforced labourwouldconstituteaninappropriatebasisofcomparativeadvantageandthattheimportation
155
Dunoff,136,citingDaniRodrik,Globalization,SocialConflictandEconomicGrowth,21WorldEcon.143 (1998).Rodriksstudiesrevealahighcorrelationbetweenopennessandgovernmentexpendituresbutalsoreveal thatatsomehigherpointofopenness,socialspendingdecreases.SeealsoPaulB.Stephan,BookReview,North westernJournalofInternationalLawandBusiness18(1997),246,reviewingDaniRodrik,HasGlobalization GoneTooFar?(Washington,DC:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,1997).

156 157
Charnovitz,Triangulating,38.
SteveCharnovitz,FreeTrade,FairTrade,GreenTrade:DefoggingtheDebate,CornellInternationalLaw Journal27(Summer,1994),463464.
158
Leary,221,citingSteveCharnovitz,PromotingWorldLabourRules,JournalofCommerce,April19,1994, at8A.
29
159 ofproductsproducedwithsuchlabourcouldbeprohibited. TheGATTexceptioninArticle XX(e)forproductsofprisonlabourprovidessomesupportforthatview.Basingcomparative advantageonforcedlabourmaywellbeunfairinthesenseusedbyCharnovitz.Criticsalso pointtolowwagesandtoughworkingconditionsasfurtherexamplesofunfaircompetition.The lowwagesandroughconditionsthatsomedevelopingcountryworkerstoleratemaywellbean affronttothesensibilitiesofmanypeopleinthedevelopedworld.Butapartfromthosepolicies thatarebeyondthepale,fairnessisoftenrelativeandcontextspecific.Andinaworldofsecond bests,onemustconsiderthealternativetolowwagesandtoughworkingconditionsifhigher wagesweretomakeituneconomicaltocontinuetooffersuchjobs,thoseworkersmaywellre 160 turntothecircumstancesofabsolutedesperationtheysoughttoavoidbytakingsuchjobs. To removethatoptionbymandatingfromwithouthigherlabourstandardsmaydoagreaterdisser vice,andcouldhardlybesaidtobefair. Theunderlyingrationaleforcostinternalizationisrootedineconomicconceptsofalloca tiveefficiency.Accordingly,itdoesnotnecessarilyimplicateconcernsoffairness.Inthecontext oftheenvironment,forexample,itseemsclearlyunfairtothesensibilitiesofthoseintheindustri alizedworldtocompetewithcountrieswhosecompetitiveadvantageisbasedonarefusaltoin ternalizepollutioncosts.However,departuresfromstrictadherencetocostinternalizationmay oftenreflectlegitimatepolicychoicesthatareappropriateintheparticularcontext. Ultimately,theinvocationofaracetothebottom andtheconcomitantcallsforharmoni zationtoensurefaircompetitionareoftendisguisedattemptstoeliminateacompetitorscom parativeadvantage.Forexample,Bhagwatinotesthatinthe1980stheUnitedStatescompileda listofover250JapanesedomesticpoliciesandpracticeswhichtheUSfeltimpededfaircompe 161 tition.ThelistincludedtheJapanesesavingsbehaviourandtheirlongworkinghours. Fairnessconcernsseemtodictatethatdomesticpolicychoicesastostandardsettingand costinternalizationshouldbegivenpresumptivedeference.Anyimpositionofharmonizedstan dardstoensurefairtradeorconsistentcostinternalizationmustprotectstatesabilitytochoose theirownpolicymix.Thisisespeciallytrueinthedomainofeconomic,social,andculturalrights, whichcanberealizedthroughawiderangeofprogrammes.However,themixwhichstates 162 choosecannotbegiventhesamelegitimacyifthechoiceismadeautocratically. Accordingly, themostcompellingcallsforlinkagetotheWTObasedonconcernsofaracetothebottom are 163 thosethatseektoguaranteedemocraticparticipation. Putanotherway,Klevorickarguesthat 164 thecaseisstrongerforharmonizingtheprocessbywhichstandardsareset. Sinceeconomic,
159
Ibid.
160
See,e.g.,RonaldCassandRichardBoltuck,AntidumpingandCountervailingDutyLaw:TheMirageofEq uitableInternationalCompetition,inFairTradeandHarmonization:PrerequisitesforFreeTrade?editedbyJ. BhagwatiandR.Hudec.(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1996),401.

161 162
Bhagwati,Afterword,129.
BrianA.Langille,GeneralReflectionsontheRelationshipofTradeandLabour(Or:FairTradeIsFree Trade'sDestiny),inFairTradeandHarmonization:PrerequisitesforFreeTrade?editedbyJ.BhagwatiandR. Hudec,vol.2(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1996),252253.

163 164
Howse,Technocracy,113. AlvinK.Klevorick,ReflectionsontheRacetotheBottom,inFairTradeandHarmonization:Prerequisites
30
social,andculturalrightsarealsoconcernedwithtakingthegainsfromtradeandcompensating thelosers,securingrightsofdemocraticparticipationwillsecuretheprocessbywhichdomestic 165 adjustmentsandredistributiontakeplace. Themostlegitimateformofprotectionfromtheracetothebottom thenisfoundnotin imposingastandardfromwithoutbutratherinensuringthatthepeoplemostdirectlyaffectedcan expresstheirdemocraticwill.Thiscarvesoutafairlynarrowsetofhumanrightsthatwouldbe amenabletoenforcementundertheWTObasedonlegitimatefearsofavoidingaracetothebot tom.Asnotedearlier,however,enforcingsomehumanrightsandnotothersmaybeproblematic fromtheperspectiveofhumanrightstheory.
3 3.1
PracticalIssuesArisingfromLinkageProposals TheEffectivenessofSanctions
Thereisasignificantbodyofliteraturediscussingtheeffectivenessofeconomicsanctionsinalter 166 ingstatebehaviour. Thispaperdoesnotintendtocanvassthatliteratureortoevaluateindetail whethersanctionscanbeaneffectiveforeignpolicytool.Theuseoftradesanctionstoenforce humanrightsnormsdoes,however,raisesomeuniqueissuesregardingtheeffectivenessofsanc tionsandisworthyofcommenthere. MuchoftheinterestinenforcinghumanrightsthroughtheWTOisbasedonobservations thattheWTO,withitsabilitytoauthorizeretaliation,hasarelativelystrongandeffectiveen forcementmechanism.Anumberofscholarshavenoted,however,thattheeffectivenessofsanc 167 tionsvariesinverselywith theimportanceofthechangesoughtinthetargetstate. Lavinputsit succinctly:Becausesanctionsareamarginaltool,theyaremosteffectivewhenappliedtomar 168 ginalissuessuchastechnicaltradematters. Lavinconcludesthatsanctionsaremoreeffective inresponsetotradeissues,whileengagementisamoreeffectiveresponsetohumanrightsprob lems.Accordingly,itmaybethatthesuccessoftheWTOenforcementmechanismsisaresultof itsrelativelymodestgoals,ratherthan duetoanyinherenteffectivenessofitsenforcement mechanisms. Onemayplottheconductinthetargetstateagainstwhichsanctionsmaybeimposed alongaspectrum,withtechnicalissuesononeendandsecurityorsovereigntyissuesontheother. Dependingontheparticularrightatstake,humanrightsmayfallondifferentpointsalongthis
forFreeTrade?editedbyJ.BhagwatiandR.Hudec,vol.2(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1996),465.
165 166
Langille,234.
See,e.g.,GaryC.HufbauerandJeffreyJ.Schott,EconomicSanctionsinSupportofForeignPolicyGoals (Washington,DC:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,1983)GaryC.Hufbauer,JeffreyJ.Schott,andKimberly AnnElliott,EconomicSanctionsReconsidered,2ded.(Washington,DC:InstituteforInternationalEconomics, 1990).

167
See,e.g.,DanielW.Drezner,Bargaining,Enforcement,andMultilateralSanctions:WhenIsCooperation Counterproductive?InternationalOrganization54,no.1(Winter2000),73102FranklinL.Lavin,Asphyxia tionorOxygen?The SanctionsDilemma,ForeignPolicy,no.104(Fall1996),139153andJackT.Patterson, ThePoliticalandMoralAppropriatenessofSanctions,inD.CortrightandG.A.Lopez,eds.,EconomicSanc tions:PanaceaorPeacebuildinginaPostColdWarWorld(Boulder:WestviewPress,1995),94.

168
Lavin,147.
31
spectrum,althoughitwouldbesafetosaythathumanrightswouldlikelyfitclosertosecurityor sovereigntyissuesthantheywouldtotechnicalissues.Indeed,mostactivistsandproponentsof linkinghumanrightstotheWTOwouldassertthattheirgoalsareimbuedwithmoralauthority. Paradoxically,thegreaterextenttowhichhumanrightslinkagesarebasedonmoralimperatives, thelesslikelythelinkagewillbesuccessfulinactuallychangingtargetstatebehaviour,sincethe rightsatstakearemorelikelytorisetotheleveloffundamentalissuesofsecurityorsovereignty inthetargetstate.Dreznerexplainsthatsanctionsimposedbasedonnormsorprinciplestendto beendowedwithanallornothingquality,inwhichcasethetargetstateismorelikelytoincrease itsresolve,andnegotiationandcompromisewillbemoredifficult.Itshouldbenotedthatthe WTOdisputesettlementprocedureputsapremiumonnegotiatedsettlementratherthancoercive enforcement. Wheretradesanctionsarebasedonmoralimperativesimbuedwithan allornothingqual ity,itismorelikelythattheywillappeartobeheavyhandedandthusseentoimpingeonthesov ereigntyofthetargetstate.Accordingly,theirimpositionislikelytobolstersupportforthetarget governmentratherthanundermineit.Theimpositionofsanctionsmayalsogivethetargetstate governmentaconvenientscapegoatforwhateverillsbefellthecountrybeforeimpositionofsanc tionswherethoseillsareexacerbatedtheblamewillbelaidatthefeetofthesanctioningcoun tries.Severalnotableexamplesofthesedynamicscomeeasilytomind,suchasUNsanctionsim posedon IraqunderSaddamHusseinthroughoutthe1990sandUSsanctionsagainstCuba. Theeffectivenessofsanctionsinalteringthebehaviourofthetargetstateselitemayfur therbeinverselyrelatedtotheextenttowhichthesanctionsareimposedtoenforceimportant moralnormsandprinciples.Theuseofnormsallowstargetstateelitestoconstructanidentity 169 basedontheiroppositiontotheproclaimednorm. Thisisofparticularconcernwheresanctions areimposedtoenforcehumanrightsnorms.Despitethewideratificationofhumanrightstreaties, statesevincedifferinglevelsofactualcommitmenttohumanrightsnorms.Therecognitionof humanrights,particularlycivilandpoliticalrights,hasbeenhinderedbyeliteswhoarguethathu manrightsembodyWesternindividualisticvaluesthatareinconsistentwiththeirsocietiescom munitarianvalues.170 Imposingsanctionsinthenameofenforcinghumanrightswouldlikelygive greatercredencetoleaderswhousesuchrhetoricasameansofmaintainingorincreasingtheir power. Althoughsanctionsrarelyseemtobeeffectiveinunderminingthelegitimacyofleaders andtheirimpugnedpoliciesinthetargetstate,theycouldpotentiallybeeffectiveiftheyimposea significanteconomicburdenonthetargetstateselites.Inpractice,however,sanctionsrarelyaf fectelitesifatall,certainlynottothesameextentasthetargetstatesgeneralpopulation.Be causeelitesaregenerallyinabetterpositiontocontroltransactionsthanthecivilianpopulation, theyarelesslikelytobeaffected,andareoftenabletoprofit.Damroschobservesthat[e]lites haveproventobeexceedinglyadeptatbleedingthelocaleconomyduringaperiodofinternation
169 170
Drezner.
ThemostnotableproponentofthisapproachisLeeKuanYew,formerPrimeMinisterofSingapore.Hehas suggestedthatmuchoftheeconomicsuccessamongEastAsianstatesmaybeattributabletoAsianvalues,which placegreaterimportanceondutiesanddisciplinethanonrightsandentitlements.SeeAmartyaSen,Human RightsandEconomicAchievements,inTheEastAsianChallengeforHumanRights,editedbyJ.R.Bauerand D.A.Bell(Cambridge,UKNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999),97.
32
allyimposedsanctions,andatmanipulatingwhatevertransactionsareallowedtooccurnotwith 171 standingthesanctions. Evenassumingthebestintentionstoprotecthumanrights,thepracticaldifficultiesofen forcementbysanction,throughtheWTOorotherwise,canbeillustratedinthecontextofchild labour.BhagwatinotesthatwhentheUnitedStatesthreatenedanimportbanonBangladeshi productsmadewithchildlabour,manytextilemillsdismissedtheirchildlabourers,asignificant 172 numberofwhomwerethenforcedintoprostitutionbydestitutefamilies. Theeffectivenessof suchthreatenedoractualimportbansonproductsmadewithchildlabourisdoubtfulgiventhat 173 onlyfivepercentofproductsmadewithchildlabourareactuallyexported. Intheexamplepro videdbyBhagwati,itisclearthattheintendedbeneficiariesarenotaidedbysanctions.Onemight alsoaskwhethersuchsanctionswillbeeffectiveinconvincingpoliticalandbusinessleadersofthe valueofthegoalsthesanctionspurporttoachieve.Assumingthatthoseleaderswerealready workingtominimizechildlabour,itislikelytoonlymaketheirtaskmoredifficulttheymust nowalsoconcernthemselveswithchildrenonthestreets.Ifsuchsanctionsresultintheclosingof factoriesandlossofexportincome,itwillmakeitmoredifficulttoprovidethebadlyneededso cialassistanceeducationandhealth,forexamplethatarekeytosolvingtherootoftheprob lemofchildlabour.Ifonecannotassumegoodfaithonthepartofsuchleaders,suchsanctions arenotlikelytoassisteither.Thesanctionsaremorelikelytorallythetargetstatepopulationin favouroflocalelites,whoseownpocketbookswouldlikelybeunaffected. Consideringdifficultexampleslikechildlabour,itisapparentthattradesanctionsrarely reachtherootoftheproblemtheyseektoaddress.Humanrightsabusesoftenstemfrompoverty andpoorgovernance,andsanctionsoftensimplyexacerbatepovertyandisolatethegovern 174 ment. Becauseitisdifficulttodeterminethelevelorgravityof humanrightsviolationssufficient tojustifytradesanctions,theywillinvariablybeimposedwithconsiderablediscretion.Thisprob lemismorerelevanttoproposalsthatwouldallowindividualWTOmemberstoimposesanctions, asopposedtoproposalsformultilateralimpositionofsanctionsundertheWTO.Ineithercase, however,itwillbeverydifficulttoextricatethebonafidehumanrightsmotivationfromapossi 175 bleprotectionistanimus. Suchaproblemalreadyexistswithmeasuresintendedtoprotect 176 health. Measurestoprotecthumanrightsarguablyinvolveanevengreatermeasureofdiscre tionthandomeasuresintendedtoprotecthealth. Thereisalsoalegitimacyprobleminherentinusingacoercivetoolliketradesanctionsto achievecompliancewithhumanrightsnorms.Asmentionedaboveindiscussingtheeffectiveness oftheWTOdisputesettlementsystem,complianceisoftendependentonlegitimacy.Imposing
171
LoriF.Damrosch,EnforcingRestraint:CollectiveInterventioninInternalConflicts(NewYork:Councilon ForeignRelationsPress,1993),298.
172 173 174 175 176
J.Bhagwati,Afterword,132. Ibid. Kelly,122. Ibid.,124. Ibid.,126127.
33
tradesanctionsondevelopingcountrieswithfewresourcesandseriousproblemsofpovertyis boundtoraiselegitimacyproblems,especiallygiventhatsanctionstendtoimpoverishthecitizens 177 ofthetargetstate. Imposingsanctionstoenforcehumanrightstheimplementationofwhich ofteninvolvesaparticularandcontestablebalanceofindividualandcollectiverightscouldin 178 volveimposingthepolicychoicesofonestateorgroupofstatesonthetargetstate. Thelegitimacyproblemiscompoundedbythefactthatsanctionswouldbeemployedto enforcehumanrightsnormsthatstateshaveneveragreedtoenforceinacoercivemanner.Stirling notesthathumanrightstreatiesnevermentionenforcementbutinsteadincludeobligationsto 179 recognizeorpromotehumanrights. Alstonnotesthathumanrightstreatiesdonotinclude enforcementmechanismsbecausestateshavesteadfastlyandveryopenlyrefusedtodevelopthe 180 systemanyfurther.
3.2
AlternativestoSanctions
Theuseoftradesanctionscouldbeacceptedwithgreatersympathyiftherewereadearthof othertoolsatthedisposalofthoseseekinggreaterhumanrightscompliance.Thediscussion aboveregardingtheeffectivenessofthehumanrightsregimerevealedthatastrongercommitment totheexistinghumanrightsinstitutionscouldyieldpositiveresults. WTOmembersalsocouldpromotehumanrightsbyofferingadditionaltariffconcessions todevelopedcountriesundertheGeneralizedSystemofPreferences(GSP),butmakingsuch 181 concessionscontingentoncompliancewithhumanrightsnorms. TheECsEverythingbut Armsproposaltopermitthepoorest48nationstoexportfreeoftariffsorquotasalloftheir 182 goodsexceptweaponsisagoodexample. Thereisawiderangeofforeignpolicyoptionsasidefromsanctionswhichcouldbeused toachievegreaterhumanrightscompliance.Kellynotesthatfinancialincentivesandphaseinob ligationshavebeenfactorsthathavealloweddevelopingcountriestoenterintoenvironmental 183 treaties. AwordofcautionregardingcarrotsisofferedbyChang,however,whosuggests thatcarrotsmightleadtoanincreaseintheoffendingactivityasameansofthenobtainingcom 184 pensationforceasingtheactivity.
177 178 179 180 181
Ibid.,120. Ibid.,121122. Stirling,1516. Alston,ResistingtheMergerReplytoPetersmann,27.
KyleBagwell,PetrosC.Mavroidis,andRobertW.Staiger.It'saQuestionofMarketAccess,AmericanJour nalofInternationalLaw 96(January2002),7071.

182 183 184
Kelly,133. Ibid.,131.
HowardF.Chang,AnEconomicAnalysisofTradeMeasurestoProtecttheGlobalEnvironment,Georgetown LawJournal83(1995),21312213,citedinHowse,Technocracy,103note27.
34
3.3 DoestheInstitutionalCapacityExistforMakingHumanRightsDetermina tions?

AsignificantpracticalimpedimenttoenforcinghumanrightsthroughtheWTOistheinstitutional 185 capacityforadjudicatingcomplaintsinvolvinghumanrightstrademeasures. Theissuearises withrespecttoboththeproposalforahumanrightsexceptionandforthemoreambitiouspro posalofactivehumanrightsenforcement.Inthecaseofthelatter,theinstitutionalimpediments areevengreater. Acomplaintinvolvingahumanrightsmeasurecouldsimplybedeterminedinthesame fashionasallotherWTOdisputes.However,thisraisesthequestionofwhethertheWTOhasthe 186 institutionalcapacitytomakedeterminationsregardingquestionsofhumanrights. Forhuman rightsactivists,WTOadjudicationwouldraisetheconcernthatthehumanrightsconsiderations maybegivenshortshrift.Thisconclusionneednotrequireimputingantipathyonthepartofthe WTOtowardhumanrightsobjectivesitisnaturalthattradespecialistswouldgivepredomi 187 nancetotradeconsiderations. Someincreasedsensitivitycouldbeobtainedthroughthesub missionof amicuscuriaebriefsfromhumanrightsorganizations,butitseemsunlikelytobesuffi cienttoaddressconcernsovertheWTOssensitivitytohumanrights. AlthoughtheWTODSUcurrentlyaddressesissuesoutsideitscorecompetenceoftrade law,forexampleinareassuchashealthandsafetyortheenvironment,makingsimilardetermina tionsinthecontextofhumanrightsseemsconsiderablymoreproblematic.First,itisnotclearthat humanrightsissueswouldariseinthesamemannerashealthandsafetyissues.Domestichealth andsafetystandardscanbechallengedundertheWTOasbeingdisguisedrestrictionsontrade. Howevertheimpetusforimposinghumanrightsinspiredtradesanctionsisoutwardlooking,that is,thegoalistochangethehumanrightsstandardsintheforeignstate.Thus,thefactthatthe WTOcurrentlyaddressesstandardsthatarenotinherentlytraderelateddoesnotfurtherthear gumentthatotherstandardsettingtasksshouldbebroughtwithinthepurviewoftheWTO.Sec ond,andthemoreseriousobstacle,isthatallowinghumanrightssanctionsundertheWTOwould necessarilyrequireWTOpanelstodeterminewhethertheallegedhumanrightsviolationsaresuf ficientlyegregioustojustifyeconomicsanctionsyetsuchadeterminationseemsinherentlypo 188 litical. TogivetheWTOresponsibilityformakingsuchdeterminationswouldthrowitslegiti macyintoseriousdoubt. NotonlydoestheWTOnothavetheexpertisetomakehumanrightsdeterminations, neitherdoesithavethecapacityforthekindofinformationorevidencegatheringthatwouldbe 189 necessarytomakelegitimatedeterminations. Thisisperhapsnotthemostcriticalobjection sincepartiestoadisputewouldundoubtedlysubmitevidence.
185 186 187 188 189
See,generally,Charnovitz,LinkingTopicsinTreaties,341342. Bhagwati,Afterword,132. DavidW.Leebron,Linkages,AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw 96(January2002),22. Kelly,120. Ibid.,129.
35
OnemightexpectthattheobjectionsbasedontheWTOsinstitutionalcapacitycouldbe overcomebyinvolvingaspecializedhumanrightsbodyintheprocess.Itmaybepossibletoes tablishaWTOhumanrightsbodyexpresslyforthatpurpose,consistingofhumanrightsex 190 perts. Whethersuchabodycouldestablishtherequisitelegitimacytodeterminewhencertain humanrightsviolationswouldjustifysanctionsis,however,anopenquestion.However,insofar aseventheUNSecurityCounciloftenhasgreatdifficultyinconvincingstatestoimposesanc tions,itisnotreadilyapparentthataspecializedhumanrightsbodywithintheWTOwouldbe abletoundertakesuchdeliberationswithgreaterease. Fromtheperspectiveofensuringlegitimacyamongthehumanrightscommunity,itwould seemmostadvantageoustohaveanexistinghumanrightsbodyundertakesomeadjudicativerole. However,recallingthestructureandcharacteristicsoftheUNhumanrightsinstitutions,itis doubtfulthatanappropriateinstitutionexists.Clearly,theUNCommissiononHumanRights,as aninherentlypoliticalbody,wouldbeinappropriateforthetask(italsositsonlyonceyearly).The WTOsgoalofgreaterpredictabilityintraderelationswouldnotbeachieved.Allowingapolitical bodytodeterminewhentoimposeWTOmandatedhumanrightssanctionswouldconstitutea stepbackfromthatlaudablegoal,whichisachievedbysubmittingdisputesforlegal,ratherthan political,resolution.TheUNHumanRightsCommitteeortheCommitteeonEconomic,Social, andCulturalRightsmayappeartobequalifiedcandidates,butwiththeirlimitedbudgets,limited meetingschedule,andexistingbacklog,theywouldbeunabletotakeonadditionalresponsibili ties.Inaddition,neitherbodycurrentlymakesthekindofdeterminationthatwouldbenecessary inaWTOhumanrightsdispute.Theprocessofissuingconcludingobservationsoncountryre portsisquitedifferentfromdeterminingathresholdlevelofhumanrightsviolationsthatwould justifyeconomicsanctions.Inaddition,neitherbodyindividuallywouldbesufficient,sincethey eachdealonlywithcivilandpoliticalrights,andeconomic,social,andculturalrights,respec tively.Whilehumanrightsproponentsmaybemorecomfortablewithanexistinghumanrights bodymakingdeterminationsastowhentradesanctionsshouldbeimposedtofurtherhuman rightsgoals,onemustalsowondertheextenttowhichmembersoftheWTOwouldbecomfort ablewithhavingahumanrightsbody,andnotatradebody,makethosedeterminations.
3.4
WouldEnforcingHumanRightsIncreasetheLegitimacyoftheWTO?
ItwouldbetritetosaythatamongantiglobalizationprotestorstheWTOsuffersfromalegiti macycrisis.ItisprobablyalsofairtosaythatscepticismtowardtheWTOrunswiderthanonly amongprotestors.Indeed,PetersmannandNicholshavebothrecognizedthattheWTOcould 191 benefitfromincreasedlegitimacy. Petersmanninparticularhasnotedthattheeconomic growthjustificationforfreetrademaynotserveasasufficientjustificatorybasisforfurthertrade 192 liberalizationandeconomicintegration. Heobservesthat:
190 191
See,e.g.,Stirling.
Petersmann,34,24PhilipM.Nichols,ForgottenLinkagesHistoricalInstitutionalismandSociologicalInsti tutionalismandAnalysisoftheWorldTradeOrganization,UniversityofPennsylvaniaJournalofInternational EconomicLaw 19(Summer1998),506.

192
Howse,Technocracy,105.
36
insideEurope,ithasbecomegenerallyrecognizedthateconomicorganizations... canpursuetheirobjectives...moreeffectivelyiftheyareseenbycitizensandna tionalparliamentstosupportandpromotehumanrightsandsocialjustice,andif theyempowerselfinterestedcitizenstoparticipateindemocraticrulemaking. Onthatbasis,PetersmannprescribesthattheWTOshouldpursuesocialjusticeasdefinedby 193 humanrightsinadditiontopursingeconomicefficiency. Themovetoincludehumanrightsasajustificatorybasisfortheinternationaltraderegime isoftenreferredtoasconstitutionalizationofthetraderegime,inthatitinvolvesanattemptto linkthebasicprinciplesofthetraderegimesuchasnondiscrimination,freedomofcontract,and therighttoproperty withinternationalhumanrightsnorms,elevatingthejustificatorybasesfor tradeliberalization tothesamelevelenjoyedbyhumanrightsnorms.Theconstitutionalizationof thetraderegimehasbeencriticizedbyAlstonandHowseonthebasis,respectively,thatitwould threatenthelegitimacyofhumanrightsnormsandthatthetraderegimedoesnothavethelegiti 194 macytomakethetradeoffsthatwouldberequiredbetweenhumanrightsandtradevalues. Thus,theissueoflinkagesandlegitimacycutsbothways. TheGATT/WTOtraderegimehashistoricallytakenapragmaticapproachtoimplement ingitsgoalofliberalizedtrade,buildingitslegitimacyonincrementalsuccesses.Thatapproach hastoleratedsomecontinuingformsofprotectionism.Anexampleofthisisthecontinuedtoler anceoftariffbarriers.Anotherexampleistheprovisionforantidumpingandcountervailduties. Whiledumpingmaybewelcomedbyconsumersandthoseencouragingincreasedcompetitive ness,dumpingisvehementlyopposedbycompetingdomesticproducerswhoaretypicallywell organized.Theywouldopposeincreasedtradeliberalizationuncompromisinglyifitdidnotpro videforantidumpingandcountervailremedies.Thus,CassandBoltuckobservethatthe GATT/WTOsystemhasbeenwillingtotoleratetraderestrictivemeasuresifitwillleadtogreater 195 overallacceptanceoftradeliberalization. Similarly,thepressurethatexistsinsomestatesfor unilateraldomestichumanrightsmeasurescouldbeforestalledifthereexistedamultilateral 196 mechanismforimposinghumanrightssanctions. Althougheitherapproachcompromisesthe goaloftradeliberalization,subjectingtheuseofhumanrightssanctionstoobjectivereviewbythe DSBmaybepreferableiftheonlyotheroptionistheimpositionofunilateralsanctionsatwill. IfenforcinghumanrightsundertheWTOwouldgarnergreatersupportfortheWTOas aninstitutionandforitsgoalsoftradeliberalizationandeconomicintegration,thenitmaybe worththecostofincreaseduseoftrademeasuresforhumanrightsprotection.Thelegitimacy gainsarespeculative,however.GiventhatthemostvehementoppositiontotheWTOcomesfrom labourandenvironmentalactivists,amechanismtoenforcehumanrightsmoregenerallymaynot deliverwhatthosegroupsdemand.
193 194 195 196
Petersmann,34,24. Alston,ResistingtheMergerReplytoPetersmannHowse,Technocracy,105. CassandBoltuck,401404. Leebron,Linkages,26.
37
ThequestionofwhetherenforcinghumanrightsthroughtheWTOwouldleadtoin creasedlegitimacymustalsobeaddressedfromadevelopingcountryperspective.Itappearsthat thepushforgreaterlabour,environment,andhumanrightssensitivityattheWTOcomespre dominantlyfromdevelopedcountries.Bhagwatinotesthatthereappearstobeatrendintrade 197 agreementsofincreasingtheburdensplacedondevelopingcountries. Italsoseemsthatthe countriesdemandingrespectforhumanrightsespeciallyifeconomic,social,andculturalrights 198 aretobeincludedarenottheoneswhowouldbepayingthebillforrealizingthoserights. It isperhapsthisthatpresentsagreaterthreattothelongtermlegitimacyofthetradesystemthan thelackofenforcementofhumanrights. AlthoughlinkingtheWTOandhumanrightsmayincreasetheWTOslegitimacy,itcould havetheoppositeeffectonthehumanrightsregime.Suchalinkagemayresultincountrieswith noseriouscommitmenttohumanrightsendorsingthelinkedsystemasameansofparticipatingin theWTO.Thosecountriesmaythenserveupobstaclestoincreasedrecognitionofhumanrights, 199 impedingthefunctioningofthehumanrightssystem. Inaddition,suchalinkagemayraiseex pectationsregardingstatescompliancewithhumanrightsnorms.Ifsuchexpectationscannotbe met,thefailuremaybeplacedatthefootofthehumanrightsnormsthemselves.Thisisaserious risk,inparticular,forpositiverightslikemanyoftheeconomic,social,andculturalrights,which areprogrammatic.Civilandpoliticalrightsareoftenconsiderednegativerightsthatcanbere spectedsimplybynoninterventioninindividualsaffairs.Thereis,forexample,nocostassoci atedwithreleasingthewronglyconvicted.Incontrast,therealizationofeconomic,social,and culturalrightsrequirespoliticalwillandeconomicandotherresources.Whileadjudicationbya WTOenforcementmechanismmightbesufficienttocompelrealizationofcertaincivilandpoliti 200 calrights,therealizationofeconomic,social,andculturalrightsrequiresmuchmore. ThelegitimacygainsoflinkinghumanrightsandtheWTOmayalsobeoutweighedby difficultiesindeterminingaccountability,shouldincreasedhumanrightsexpectationsnotbemet. Somepoliticaleconomistsmaintainthatinstitutionalspecializationprovidesabettermeansof 201 holdinginstitutionsaccountablebecauseitmakesiteasiertoassesstheirperformance. How ever,ifenforcementofhumanrightsisundertakenbytheWTO,itwouldbedifficulttodetermine whichregimesareresponsibleforcontinuingfailurestorespecthumanrights.
Conclusion
BoththesuccessoftheWTOanditsincreasingsignificanceininternationalaffairshaveledto claimsthatotherissuesbelinkedtotheWTO.Thetwinperceptionsthatthehumanrightsregime isineffectiveandthatincreasedtradeliberalizationisathreattotherecognitionofhumanrights
197
JagdishBhagwati,TheDemandstoReduceDomesticDiversityamongTradingNations,inFairTradeand Harmonization:PrerequisitesforFreeTrade?editedbyJ.BhagwatiandR.Hudec (Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress, 1996),28.

198 199 200 201
Ibid.,14. Leebron,Linkages,26. Cottier,7. Charnovitz,Triangulating,49.
38
haveledtodemandsthattheWTOandhumanrightsregimesbelinked.Thoseobjectingtosucha linkageoftenassertthathumanrightsandtradearenotrelatedandthatsuchalinkagewillpara lysethetraderegimethoseobjectionshaveservedasthegeneralframeworkforthisanalysis. Theexaminationofthehumanrightsregimeleadstoseveralconclusionsastotheviability oflinkageproposals.First,themostwidelyrecognizedhumanrightsnormsarenotuniversallyor equallyamenabletoenforcementundertheWTO.Ontheotherhand,selectingcertaincorenorms forenforcementundertheWTOwouldbeproblematicbothpoliticallyandconceptually:existing normsweretheproductofprotractednegotiationsandareviewedasinterdependentandindivisi ble.Second,theexistinghumanrightsenforcementmechanismshavebeenmoresuccessfulthanis oftenrealized,andcouldachievegreaterprogressiftheyweregivengreaterresources.Human rightsmaybebetterservedbystrengtheningtheexistingregimeratherthanattemptinganambi tiousandcontentiouslinkagewiththeWTO. WhiletheWTOisrightlyviewedashavingbeensuccessfulinachievingcompliancewith itsrules,uponcloserinspection,itsenforcementmechanismsmaybeillsuitedtoenforcinghuman rightsnorms.TheWTOenforcementmechanismsemphasizepragmatismandcompromiserather thandeterrenceandretribution.Humanrightsnormsmayrequireenforcementmechanismsthat avoidmoralambiguity.Additionally,theWTOspowertocompelcomplianceisderivednotfrom itsenforcementmechanismspersebutratherfromthecommitmentofitsmemberstothegoalsof theWTO. Abetterunderstandingofthehumanrightsandtraderegimesrevealsthattheyaremore closelyrelatedthanistypicallythought.Theysharesimilarhistoricalandconceptualunderpin nings,althoughtheyhavedevelopedalongdifferentpaths.Theirgoalsarenotgenerallyantago nistictooneanother,andinfacttheirrespectivesuccessisoften,butnotconsistently,mutually reinforcing.Atboththegeneralandspecificlevels,theconflictbetweentheirgoalsandnormsis greatlyexaggerated,iftheyconflictatall.Theseconceptualconsiderationsdonotmilitate stronglyfororagainstlinkageclaims.Otherspecificconceptualargumentsfororagainstlinkage claimsaresimilarlyambiguous.Forexample,theinclusionofintellectualpropertynormsin the WTOcanbeviewedaseitheranomalousorasindicativeoftheWTOsfuturedirection.Similarly, whilefearsofaracetothebottomanimatedemandsforaWTOhumanrightslinkage,themost fundamentalhumanrightsareperhapsthoseleastthreatenedby increasedtradeliberalization. Practicalconcernsgenerallymilitateagainstlinkageclaims.Economicsanctionsdonot haveaparticularlygoodtrackrecordasaneffectiveforeignpolicytool.Theirutilityisfurtherdi minishedwhentheyareappliedtoenforcinghumanrightsnorms.Theavailabilityofalternative measuresalsounderminestheappealofimposingeconomicsanctions.AneffectiveWTOhuman rightslinkagewouldrequireinstitutionalcapabilitiesindeclaringhumanrightsviolationsandde terminingappropriatesanctions.NeithertheUNhumanrightsregimenortheWTOhastheca pacitytoperformsuchtasks.Finally,itisfarfromclearthatendowingtheWTOwithahuman rightsmandatewouldservetoincreaseitslegitimacy. Inshort,whilehumanrightsandtradeareconceptuallyrelated,theirconceptualsimilari tiesdonotmakeasufficientlystrongcaseforlinkageclaims.Practicaldifficultiesraiseserious questionsastotheviabilityofenforcinghumanrightsthroughtheWTO.
39
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Enforcing Human Rights through the WTO A Critical Appraisal

Dean Dalke, LLB, BBA

AresearchessaysubmittedtotheFacultyofGraduateStudiesand Researchinpartialfulfilmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof MasterofArtsinTheNormanPatersonSchoolofInternationalAffairs, CarletonUniversity,Ottawa,Ontario,13July2004

(Occasionalpapersininternationaltradelawandpolicy=Articlesvarissur lapolitique etledroitcommercialinternational,ISSN11920173no.58) Includesbibliographicalreferences. ISBN1896871240

1.WorldTradeOrganization.2.Humanrights.3.International trade Socialaspects.4.Freetrade Socialaspects.I.Title. II.Series:Occasionalpapersininternationaltradelawandpolicy58.

Centrededroitetdepolitiquecommerciale Facultdedroit UniversitdOttawa 57LouisPasteur Ottawa(Ontario) CanadaK1N6N5

QuotedinClydeSummers,TheBattleinSeattle:FreeTrade,LaborRights,andSocietalValues,Universityof PennsylvaniaJournalofInternationalEconomicLaw 22(Spring2001),61.

Foranexampleofsuchaproposal,seePatriciaStirling,TheUseofTradeSanctionsasanEnforcementMecha nismforBasicHumanRights:AProposalforAdditiontotheWorldTradeOrganization,AmericanUniversity JournalofInternationalLaw&Policy11(1996):146.

TheInternationalBillofRightsalsoincludesthe OptionalProtocoltotheInternationalCovenantonCiviland PoliticalRightsandthe SecondOptionalProtocoltotheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights, aimingattheabolitionofthedeathpenalty.

AsbjornEide,StrategiesfortheRealizationoftheRighttoFood,inHumanRightsintheTwentyFirstCen tury:AGlobalChallenge,editedby KathleenE.Mahoney andPaulMahoney (DordrechtBoston:M.Nijhoff, 1993),461.

DavidM.Trubek,Economic,Social,andCulturalRightsintheThirdWorld:HumanRightsLawandHuman NeedsPrograms,inHumanRightsinInternationalLaw:LegalandPolicyIssues,editedbyT.Meron(Oxford shire:ClarendonPress,1984),211.

JohanD.vanderVyver,BookReview:KathleenE.MahoneyandPaulMahoney,eds.HumanRightsinthe TwentyFirstCentury:AGlobalChallenge(DordrechtBoston:M.Nijhoff,1993),EmoryInternationalLawRe view 8(Spring1995),798.

PhilipAlston,EconomicandSocialRightsandtheRighttoHealth:AnInterdisciplinaryDiscussion,Session III,remarks,HarvardLawSchool,September1993,online:<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/Publi cations/economic2.html>(dateaccessed:10July2004).

th Atits57 Session,on20April2002,theCommissionadoptedResolution2001/30whichcalledfortheap pointmentofanindependentexperttoreviewtheCommitteesproposalforanoptionalprotocoltotheCESCR. 30

See,e.g.,Stirling. Ibid.,14. Restatement(Third)ofForeignRelationsLaw 702(1987). Garcia,86.

TheCharterbasedbodiesinclude additionalbodiesauthorisedbytheCharterbasedbodies,suchastheSub CommissiononPreventionofDiscriminationandProtectionofMinorities,andtheCommissionontheStatusof Women.

MarkusSchmidt,DoestheUnitedNationsHumanRightsProgramMakeaDifference?(TheUNHuman RightsRegime:IsitEffective?ProceedingsoftheAmericanSocietyofInternationalLaw,912April1997), AmericanSocietyofInternationalLawProceedings91(1997),462.

Ibid.,464. Crawford,8. Arambulo,125. Crawford,8. Ibid.,4.

Anne Bayefsky,paneldiscussion,TheUNHumanRightsRegime:Isiteffective?AmericanSocietyofInterna tionalLawProceedings91(1997),466467.

Crawford,6. Ibid.,5. Bayefsky,paneldiscussion,466467.

PhilipAlston,EconomicandSocialRightsandtheRighttoHealth:AnInterdisciplinaryDiscussion,Session III,remarks,HarvardLawSchool,September1993,online:<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/HRP/Publi cations/economic2.html#ses3>(dateaccessed:5April2003).

Crawford,9. Bayefsky,paneldiscussion,466467. Schmidt,464. Ibid. Ibid.

Ibid.at465. Ibid. Ibid.at466. Ibid.

See,generally,JohnH.Jackson,WilliamJ.Davey,andAlanO.Sykes,Jr.,LegalProblemsofInternational EconomicRelations,3rded.(St.Paul:WestGroup,1995)MichaelJ.TrebilcockandRobertHowse,TheRegula tionofInternationalTrade,2nded.(London:Routledge,1999).

WTOSecretariat,TradingintotheFuture,2ded.(Geneva:WTO,2001),3940. Ibid. Ibid.at38. Ibid.at40. Ibid.at40.

RobertE.Hudec,GATTLegalRestraintsontheUseofTradeMeasuresagainstForeignEnvironmentalPrac tices,inFairTradeandHarmonization:PrerequisitesforFreeTrade?editedbyJ.BhagwatiandR.Hudec (Cam bridge,Mass.:MITPress,1996),115.

BernhardSpeyer,DisputeSettlement:AGeminNeedofPolishandPreservation,inTheWorldTradeOrgani zationMillenniumRound:FreerTradeintheTwentyFirstCentury,editedbyK.G.DeutschandB.Speyer(Lon donNewYork:Routledge,2001),277.

JagdishBhagwati,Afterword:TheQuestionofLinkage,AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw 96(January 2002),133.

ThomasCottier,Trade andHumanRights:ARelationshiptoDiscover,JournalofInternationalEconomic Law 5(March2002),111.

RobertHowse,FromPoliticstoTechnocracy andBackAgain:TheFateoftheMultilateralTradingRegime, AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw 96(January2002),95.

JohnH.Jackson,Afterword:TheLinkageProblemCommentsonFiveTexts,AmericanJournalofInterna tionalLaw 96(January2002),121122.

102 103 104 105 106 107

Dunoff,131132. Ibid.,131. Ibid.,129. Cottier. Ibid.

Garcia,59. Ibid.,5960. Ibid.,60.

RobertHowseandM.Mutua,ProtectingHumanRightsinaGlobalEconomy:ChallengesfortheWorldTrade Organization(Montreal:Rights&Democracy,InternationalCentreforHumanRightsandDemocraticDevelop ment,2000).

115 crosspurposes. Dunoffsinsightleadstothequestionofwhetherhumanrightsandtradewill, insomecases,conflict,andhowthatconflictshouldberesolved.

115 116 117 118 119 120

Dunoff,132. Garcia,65. Ibid.,7172. Ibid.,7273. Hart,CoercionorCooperation,note99at374. Petersmann,5seealsoHowse,Technocracy,105butseeGarcia,75.

JenniferDavis,SanctionsandApartheid:TheEconomicChallengetoDiscrimination,inEconomicSanc tions:PanaceaofPeacebuildinginaPostColdWarWorld?editedbyD.CortrightandG.A.Lopez(Boulder: WestviewPress,1995),173184.

SarahCleveland,HumanRightsSanctionsandInternationalTrade:ATheory ofCompatibility,Journalof InternationalEconomicLaw 5(March2002),133.

GabrielleMarceau,WTODisputeSettlementandHumanRights,EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw 13, no.4(2002),753814,citedto<http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol13/No4/art1.pdf>,62.

Ibid.,6263. Ibid.,81. Cleveland,ATheory ofCompatibility.

Rapport,LOMCetlesdroitsdelHomme,No.320,November2001,citedinMarceau,7071. Marceau,7071. Ibid.

Francesco Francioni,Environment,HumanRightsandthe LimitsofFreeTrade,inEnvironment,Human RightsandInternationalTrade,editedbyF.Francioni(Oxford:Hart,2001),17.

F.Roessler,DivergingDomesticPoliciesandMultilateralTradeIntegration,inFairTradeandHarmoniza tion:PrerequisitesforFreeTrade?editedbyJ.BhagwatiandR.Hudec (Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1996),35.

144 case. Inanycase,trademeasuresbasedonPPMdistinctionswouldbeavailableonlyforsanc 145 tionsthattargetspecificproducts,andcouldnotservetojustifywidersanctions.

2.4 DoesInclusionofIntellectualPropertyintheWTOSupportLinkage Claims?

WTOAppellateBodyReportonEuropeanCommunitiesMeasuresAffectingAsbestosandAsbestosContaining Products,WT/DS135/AB/R12March2001(adopted5April2001).CitedinCleveland,ATheory ofCompati bility,note101.

QuotedinStiglitz,AFairDealfortheWorld:AReviewofOnGlobalizationby GeorgeSoros,NYRev. Bks,23May2002,at<www.nybooks.com/articles/15403>,citedinPhilipAlston,ResistingtheMergerandAc quisitionofHumanRightsbyTradeLaw:AReplytoPetersmann,EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw 13,no. 4(2002),5,note11.

SteveCharnovitz,LinkingTopicsinTreaties,UniversityofPennsylvaniaJournalofInternationalEconomic Law 19(Summer1998),335336.

See,generally,ibid.,338. See,e.g.,Hart,CoercionorCooperation,357. Howse,Technocracy,103.

ChristopherMcCruddenandAnneDavies,APerspectiveonTradeandLabourRights,inEnvironment,Hu manRightsandInternationalTrade,editedby Francesco Francioni(Oxford:Hart,2001),184.

See,e.g.,RonaldCassandRichardBoltuck,AntidumpingandCountervailingDutyLaw:TheMirageofEq uitableInternationalCompetition,inFairTradeandHarmonization:PrerequisitesforFreeTrade?editedbyJ. BhagwatiandR.Hudec.(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1996),401.

BrianA.Langille,GeneralReflectionsontheRelationshipofTradeandLabour(Or:FairTradeIsFree Trade'sDestiny),inFairTradeandHarmonization:PrerequisitesforFreeTrade?editedbyJ.BhagwatiandR. Hudec,vol.2(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1996),252253.

See,e.g.,GaryC.HufbauerandJeffreyJ.Schott,EconomicSanctionsinSupportofForeignPolicyGoals (Washington,DC:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,1983)GaryC.Hufbauer,JeffreyJ.Schott,andKimberly AnnElliott,EconomicSanctionsReconsidered,2ded.(Washington,DC:InstituteforInternationalEconomics, 1990).

J.Bhagwati,Afterword,132. Ibid. Kelly,122. Ibid.,124. Ibid.,126127.

177 178 179 180 181

Ibid.,120. Ibid.,121122. Stirling,1516. Alston,ResistingtheMergerReplytoPetersmann,27.

KyleBagwell,PetrosC.Mavroidis,andRobertW.Staiger.It'saQuestionofMarketAccess,AmericanJour nalofInternationalLaw 96(January2002),7071.

3.3 DoestheInstitutionalCapacityExistforMakingHumanRightsDetermina tions?

185 186 187 188 189

See,generally,Charnovitz,LinkingTopicsinTreaties,341342. Bhagwati,Afterword,132. DavidW.Leebron,Linkages,AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw 96(January2002),22. Kelly,120. Ibid.,129.