Jainal vs COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner Mayor Salip Aloy Jainal and private respondent Julhatab J.

Talib were candidates for Mayor of Indanan, Sulu in the 10 May 2004 elections. On May 20, 2010, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Jainal as the winning candidate. On 23 May 2004, Talib filed a pre-proclamation case with the COMELEC praying for the annulment of election returns pertaining to twenty-one (21) precincts, and for his proclamation as the Mayor. Talib claimed that his official watchers were asked to leave the precincts before the counting and the preparation of the election returns. Furthermore, the election returns for these precincts did not bear the signatures of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) and his official watchers, a fact which indicates that said election returns were manufactured. Talib also noted that the number of votes cast exceeded the number of voters in Precinct Nos. 33A and 34A. Jainal prayed for the dismissal of Talibs petition, contending that the latters allegations were the proper subject of an election protest in the proper trial court. On March 22, 2005, the COMELEC (2nd Division) issued a Resolution, granting the petition in part, annulling the election returns from nine precincts. The proclamation of Jainal was likewise annulled. Jainal filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On September 18, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration but modified the resolution of its 2nd Division by declaring the election return pertaining to Precinct 9A of Barangay Adjid as valid. Talib filed the instant petition, including Ahajan as private respondent in his capacity as Vice-Mayor, who, under the provisions of the Local Government Code, will fill up the vacancy created by the annulment of petitioners proclamation. Vice-Mayor Hussi Ahajan Ahajan took his oath and assumed office as Acting Mayor pursuant to the COMELEC resolutions of 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006. Jainal likewise filed Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation before the COMELEC EN BANC praying for an order suspending the implementation and execution of the 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006 COMELEC resolutions. On 5 October 2006, the COMELEC granted the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation of Jainal and ordered Hussi Ahajan (Vice Mayor) to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor. Ahajan questions the validity of the 5 October 2006 Order of the COMELEC which directed him, as ViceMayor, or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC rightfully issued the 5 October 2006 Order directing the Vice Mayor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

HELD: No. Under Sec. 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc in Special Actions and Special Cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by this Court. The effects of the 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006 resolutions can no longer be suspended not only because the resolutions are already final and executory but also because the power to suspend enforcement lies only with this Court. Thus, in granting the motion and ordering the Vice-Mayor or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor of Indanan, Sulu, it committed what amounts to a usurpation of this Courts prerogative that is to issue the TRO which is precisely one of the reliefs sought in the present petition. It behooved the COMELEC en banc to deny or at least refuse to take action on the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation. With the nullification of petitioners proclamation, the position of Municipal Mayor of Indanan, Sulu is vacant. The Local Government Code is clear on the matter of succession. Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest-ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein: (b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay. (c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots. (d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors. For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. Verily, the vacancy created by the nullification of petitioners proclamation is in the nature of a permanent vacancy and may be qualified as a permanent incapacity to discharge the functions of his office. Ahajans assumption of the office of Mayor should be understood as subject to the result of the recount to be conducted in accordance with the issuances of the COMELEC. Thus, there is an immediate need for the COMELEC to speedily ascertain the true will of the electorate in the eight (8) precincts whose election returns were nullified. (G.R. No. 174551, March 7, 2007)

[G.R. No. 110216. September 10, 1993.] IGNACIO R. BUNYE v. ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ROMEO M. ESCAREAL SYLLABUS 1. CRIMINAL LAW; ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF THE ACCUSED PENDING TRIAL; OBJECTIVE; CASE AT BAR. The petitioners main argument against their preventive suspension is that it is unjustified or unnecessary for, having admitted repeatedly in no less than four (4) pleadings filed in related proceedings and found in the records of this case, that they did commit the acts constituting the offense charged against them, i.e., that they enacted and approved Kapasiyahan Blg. 45 and wrested the management and operation of the new public market in Alabang from the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihan ng Muntinpula, Inc. (or "Cooperative" for brevity) and transferred it to the Municipality of Muntinlupa, the fear of the Court that, unless they are preventively suspended, they may tamper with the records of that transaction, has no more validity. Moreover, the proceedings against the petitioners before the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan involves no factual issue but only the legal question of whether or not the cancellation by the petitioners of the Cooperatives subsisting lease contract over the Muntinlupa Public Market was justified by public interest or general welfare. Consequently, nothing can possibly be compromised or hampered by their remaining in office, since the said proceedings will no longer be for the purpose of receiving evidence on factual issues but only to hear arguments, position papers or memoranda, on the purely legal issue of whether the rescission of the Cooperatives market contract is a valid exercise of police power by the municipality. Absent any need for testimonial and/or documentary evidence, any apprehension that the petitioners might intimidate or coerce prospective witnesses against them, or tamper with office records under their control, is "more imaginary than real." Adverting to this Courts observation in Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271, 272, that the sole objective of an administrative suspension is "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the records and other evidence" and "to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official," the petitioners insist that as no such reason for their suspension exists, then the order suspending them should be set aside as a grave abuse of the courts discretion. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDATORY. Another point asserted by the petitioners is that their preventive suspension will "sow havoc and confusion in the government of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, to the certain shattering of the peace and order thereat," for without a mayor, vice-mayor and six (6) councilors, the local government would be paralyzed. Only eight (8) of the present members of the Sangguniang Bayan will remain to discharge the duties and responsibilities of that body. If two of them will be designated to take over the offices of the mayor and vice-mayor, the Sangguniang Bayan will be without a quorum to perform its functions. The Court finds no merit in those arguments. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public officials "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. In Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426, this Court ruled that such preventive suspension is mandatory; there are no ifs and buts about it. "Petitioner at the outset contends that Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, as amended, is unconstitutional as the suspension provided thereunder partake of a penalty even before a judgment of conviction is reached, and is thus violative of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent. "We do not accept the contention because: firstly, under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public officer upon the filing of a valid information is mandatory (People v. Albano, G.R. No. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511) . . ." "All told, preventive suspension is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a penalty. In fact, suspension particularly under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019 is mandatory once the validity of the information is determined (People v. CA, 135 SCRA 372)." Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of the petitioners.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE CANCELLED BY MERE ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGE. There is no merit in the petitioners argument that because they have repeatedly admitted that they had committed the acts constituting the offense charged against them, there is no cause for apprehension that they might tamper with the records in the offices under their control, or intimidate prospective witnesses against them. The Solicitor General correctly replied that it is not for the petitioners to say that their admissions are all the evidence that the prosecution will need to hold up its case against them. "The prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure nonintervention and noninterference for ninety (90) straight days from petitioners camp." This petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, who are the municipal mayor, vicemayor and incumbent councilors or members of the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The petition seeks to annul the resolution promulgated on May 11, 1993 by the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan preventively suspending them from office pending their trial for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act under an information alleging that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "That on or about August 1988, in the municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused all public officers being the Mayor (Ignacio R. Bunye), Vice-Mayor (Jaime D. Fresnedi), Municipal Attorney (Victor C. Aguinaldo), Municipal Councilors (Carlos C. Tensuan, Alejandro L. Martinez, Epifanio a. Espeleta, Rey E. Bulay, Lucio B. Constantino, Roman E. Niefes, Nemesio Q. Mozo, Rufino J. Joaquin, Nolasco L. Diaz and Roger C. Smith), Barangay Chairman of Putatan (Rufino Ibe) and Barangay Chairman of Alabang (Nestor Santos), all in the municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, said accused, while in the performance of their official functions, in conspiracy with one another and taking advantage of their official positions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enact Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 on August 1, 1988, and on the basis thereof, forcibly took possession of the New Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and thereafter took over the operation and Management of the aforesaid public market starting August 19, 1988, despite the fact that, there was a valid and subsisting lease contract executed on September 2, 1985 for a term of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years, between the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, represented by the former Municipal Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr. and the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (Kilusang Magtitinda for brevity), a Cooperative represented by its General Manager then, Amado G. Perez, and despite also the warnings from COA Chairman Domingo and MMC Governor Cruz that appropriate legal steps be taken by the MMC toward the rescission/annulment of the contract . . . to protect the interest of the Government, and . . . to evaluate throughly and study further the case to preclude possible damages of financial liabilities which the Court may adjudge against that municipality as an off-shoot of the case, which forcible take-over had caused undue injury to the aforesaid Cooperative members, and gave the Municipal Government, and in effect, the herein accused themselves, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of their official functions as aforesaid, through evident bad faith or gross inexcussable negligence, considering that, the Cooperative members had introduced improvements, including the construction of the KBS building, RR Section-Phases I and II, asphalting of the roads surrounding the market place, and for the purpose, the cooperative had invested Thirteen Million Four Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P13,479,900.00) in connection therewith, which had been deposited in trust to the Municipal Government, and in consideration thereof, the cooperative was extended the above long term lease to manage and operate the public market and to pay a monthly rental of P35,000.00 only said offense having been committed by the accused in their performance of official duties." (pp. 34-36, Rollo.). On motion of the Public Prosecutor, and over the opposition of the accused, the Sandiganbayan issued on May 11, 1993 a resolution suspending them pendente lite from public office pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a

valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him." library The petitioners fruitlessly sought a reconsideration of the order of suspension. In due time, they filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein they pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to stay the implementation of the assailed order or resolution. Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without granting the temporary restraining order prayed for, ordered the public respondents to comment on the petition. After deliberating on the petition, the public respondents comment thereon, and the petitioners reply to the comment, the Court is unconvinced that the petition ought to be granted. The petitioners main argument against their preventive suspension is that it is unjustified or unnecessary for, having admitted repeatedly in no less than four (4) pleadings filed in related proceedings and found in the records of this case, that they did commit the acts constituting the offense charged against them, i.e., that they enacted and approved Kapasiyahan Blg. 45 and wrested the management and operation of the new public market in Alabang from the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (or "Cooperative" for brevity) and transferred it to the Municipality of Muntinlupa, the fear of the Court that, unless they are preventively suspended, they may tamper with the records of that transaction, has no more validity. Moreover, the proceedings against the petitioners before the Second Division of the Sandiganbayn involves no factual issue but only the legal question of whether or not the cancellation by the petitioners of the Cooperatives subsisting lease contract over the Muntinlupa Public Market was justified by public interest or general welfare. Consequently, nothing can possibly be compromised or hampered by their remaining in office, since the said proceedings will no longer be for the purpose of receiving evidence on factual issues but only to hear arguments, position papers or memoranda, on the purely legal issue of whether the rescission of the Cooperatives market contract is a valid exercise of police power by the municipality. Absent any need for testimonial and/or documentary evidence, any apprehension that the petitioners might intimidate or coerce prospective witnesses against them, or tamper with office records under their control, is "more imaginary than real" (p. 16, Rollo). Adverting to this Courts observation in Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271, 272, that the sole objective of an administrative suspension is "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the records and other evidence" and "to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official," the petitioners insist that as no such reason for their suspension exists, then the order suspending them should be set aside as a grave abuse of the courts discretion. Another point asserted by the petitioners is that their preventive suspension will "sow havoc and confusion in the government of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, to the certain shattering of the peace and order thereat" (p. 13, Rollo), for without a mayor, vice-mayor and six (6) councilors, the local government would be paralyzed. Only eight (8) of the present members of the Sangguniang Bayan will remain to discharge the duties and responsibilities of that body. If two of them will be designated to take over the offices of the mayor and vicemayor, the Sangguniang Bayan will be without a quorum to perform its functions. The Court finds no merit in those arguments. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public officials "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court.

In Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426, this Court ruled that such preventive suspension is mandatory; there are no ifs and buts about it. "Petitioner at the outset contends that Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, as amended, is unconstitutional as the suspension provided thereunder partake of a penalty even before a judgment of conviction is reached, and is thus violative of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent. "We do not accept the contention because: firstly, under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public officer upon the filing of a valid information is mandatory (People v. Alban, G.R. No. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511) . . ." library "All told, preventive suspension is not violative of the Constitution as it is not penalty. In fact, suspension particularly under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019 is mandatory once the validity of the information is determined (People v. CA, 135 SCRA 372)." Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of the petitioners. There is no merit in the petitioners argument that because they have repeatedly admitted that they had committed the acts constituting the offense charged against them, there is no cause for apprehension that they might tamper with the records in the offices under their control, or intimidate prospective witnesses against them. The Solicitor General correctly replied that it is not for the petitioners to say that their admissions are all the evidence that the prosecution will need to hold up its case against them. "The prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure nonintervention and noninterference for ninety (90) straight days from petitioners camp" (p. 13, Solicitor Generals Comment). The fear of the petitioners that the municipal government of Muntinlupa will be paralyzed for ninety (90) days when they (petitioners) are preventively suspended, is remote. There will still remain eight (8) councilors who can meet as the Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter ego, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, will surely know how to deal with the problem of filling up the temporarily vacant positions of mayor, vice-mayor and six councilors in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code, R.A. 7160 (Samad v. COMELEC, Et Al., G.R. No. 107854 and Samad v. Executive Secretary, Et Al., G.R. No. 108642, July 16, 1993; Sanchez v. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454). WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

[G.R. No. 94010. December 2, 1991.] FELIPE EVARDONE, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [G.R. No. 95063. December 2, 1991.] ALEXANDER R. APELADO Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SYLLABUS 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXISTING LAWS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION REMAIN OPERATIVE UNTIL AMENDED, REVOKED OR REPEALED; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 337 CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE. Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Thus "MR. NOLLEDO. Besides, pending the enactment of a new Local Government Code under the report of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions, the former Local Government Code, which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 shall continue to be effective until repealed by the Congress of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library 2. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; VESTED WITH AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE ELECTIONS FOR THE RECALL OF LOCAL OFFICIAL UNDER SEC. 59 OF B.P. BLG. 337. Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of local elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the process of and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the necessary rules and regulations. The Election Code contains no special provisions on the manner of conducting elections for the recall of a local official. Any such election shall be conducted in the manner and under the rules on special elections, unless otherwise provided by law or rule of the COMELEC. Thus, pursuant to the rule-making power vested in respondent COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May 1990. 3. ID.; RIGHT TO RECALL; COMPLEMENTARY TO RIGHT TO ELECT OR APPOINT; ISSUE AS TO WHETHER OR NOT ELECTORATE HAS LOST CONFIDENCE IN THE INCUMBENT MAYOR IS A POLITICAL QUESTION. As held in Paredes v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 55628, march 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 6, there is no turning back the clock. "The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a public office is burdened with public interests and that the representatives of the people holding public offices are simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their respective offices." Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. 4. ID.; ID.; LIMITATION. Recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, which states. "SEC. 55. Who May Be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall May

not be Held. . . . (2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the officials assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election." The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337). These two (2) consolidated petitions have their origin in en banc Resolution No. 90-0557 issued by the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated 20 June 1990 which approved the recommendation of the Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar to hold and conduct the signing of the petition for recall of the incumbent Mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, on 14 July 1990. G.R. No. 94010 is a petition for prohibition with an urgent prayer for immediate issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the holding of the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990. G.R. No. 95063 is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside en banc Resolution No. 90-0660 of the respondent COMELEC nullifying the signing process held on 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar for the recall of Mayor Evardone of said municipality and en banc Resolution No. 90-0777 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, on the basis of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 12 July 1990 in G.R. No. 94010. Felipe Evardone (hereinafter referred to as Evardone) is the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately after proclamation. On 14 February 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victorino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival (hereinafter referred to as Apelado, Et. Al.) filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. In a meeting held on 20 June 1990, the respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 90-0557, approving the recommendation of Mr. Vedasto B. Sumbilla, Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar, to hold on 14 July 1990 the signing of the petition for recall against incumbent Mayor Evardone of the said Municipality. On 10 July 1990, Evardone filed before this Court a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No. 94010. On 12 July 1990, this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective immediately and continuing until further orders from the Court, ordering the respondents to cease and desist from holding the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990, pursuant to respondent COMELECs Resolution No. 2272 dated 23 May 1990. On the same day (12 July 1990), the notice of TRO was received by the Central Office of the respondent COMELEC. But it was only on 15 July 1990 that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC received the telegraphic notice of the TRO a day after the completion of the signing process sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO.

In an en banc resolution (No. 90-0660) dated 26 July 1990, the respondent COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court in G.R. No. 94010. Apelado, Et Al., filed a motion for reconsideration and on 29 August 1990, the respondent COMELEC denied said motion holding that: ". . . The critical date to consider is the service or notice of the Restraining Order on 12 July 1990 upon the principal i.e. the Commission on Election, and not upon its agent in the field." 1 Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 95063 which seeks to set aside en banc Resolution No. 90-0660 of respondent COMELEC. In G.R. No. 94010, Evardone contends that: "I. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the recommendation of the Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar to hold the signing of the petition for recall without giving petitioner his day in court. II. The COMELEC likewise committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating Resolution No. 2272 on May 22, 1990 which is null and void for being unconstitutional." 2 In G.R. No. 95063, Apelado, Et Al., raises the issue of whether or not the signing process of the petition for recall held on 14 July 1990 has been rendered nugatory by the TRO issued by this court in G.R. No. 94010 dated 12 July 1990 but received by the COMELEC field agent only on 15 July 1990. The principal issue for resolution by the Court is the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC on 23 May 1990 by virtue of its powers under the Constitution and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code). The resolution embodies the general rules and regulations on the recall of elective provincial, city and municipal officials. Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Said Section 3 provides: law library "SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units." Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature. The respondent COMELEC, in its Comment (G.R. No. 94010), avers that: "The constitutional provision does not refer only to a local government code which is in futurum but also in

esse. It merely sets forth the guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the present Local Government Code. Pending the enactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local Government Code remains operative. The adoption of the 1987 Constitution did not abrogate the provisions of BP No. 337, rules a certain provision thereof is clearly irreconciliable with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. In this case, Sections 54 to 59 of Batas Pambansa No. 337 are not inconsistent with the provision of the Constitution. Hence, they are operative." We find the contention of the respondent COMELEC meritorious. Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Thus "MR. NOLLEDO. Besides, pending the enactment of a new Local Government Code under the report of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions, the former Local Government Code, which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 shall continue to be effective until repealed by the Congress of the Philippines." 4 Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of local elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the process of and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the necessary rules and regulations.chanrobles.com : virtual law library The Election Code contains no special provisions on the manner of conducting elections for the recall of a local official. Any such election shall be conducted in the manner and under the rules on special elections, unless otherwise provided by law or rule of the COMELEC. 5 Thus, pursuant to the rule-making power vested in respondent COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May 1990. We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition. The next issue for resolution is whether or not the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held pursuant to Resolution No. 2272. In Governor Zosimo J . Paredes, Et. Al. v. Executive Secretary to the President of the Philippines, Et Al., 6 this Court held: ". . . What is sought in this suit is to enjoin respondents particularly respondent Commission from implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 86, specifically from conducting, holding and undertaking the plebiscite provided for in said act. The petition was filed on December 5, 1980. There was a plea for a restraining order, but Proclamation No. 2034 fixing the date for such plebiscite on December 6, 1980 had been issued as far as back as November 11, 1980. Due to this delay in filing this suit, attributable solely to petitioners, there was no time even to consider such a plea. The plebiscite was duly held. The certificate of canvass and proclamation of the

result disclosed that out of 2,409 total votes cast in such plebiscite, 2,368 votes were cast in favor of the creation of the new municipality, which, according to the statute, will be named municipality of Aguinaldo. There were only 40 votes cast against. As a result, such municipality was created. There is no turning back the clock. The moot and academic character of this petition is thus apparent. In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, Et. Al. on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following up and determining the outcome of such notice. Evardone alleges that it was only on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to know about the Resolution of respondent COMELEC setting the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition for prohibition only on 10 July 1990. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the respondent COMELEC and Apelado, Et. Al. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Paredes v. Executive Secretary 7 there is no turning back the clock. "The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a public office is burdened with public interests and that the representatives of the people holding public offices are simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their respective offices." 8 Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. 9 "Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a persons ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate." 10 The constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall the incumbent mayor (Evardone) has already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect. However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, which states. "SECTION 55. Who May Be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall May not be Held. . . . (2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the officials assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election." library The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. 11 Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337). ACCORDINGLY, both petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

[G.R. No. 127066. March 11, 1997.] REYNALDO O. MALONZO, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COMELEC, GENERALLY CONCLUSIVE ON APPEAL. Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. Moreover, to order the COMELEC to repeat the process of determining the notices propriety would be sanctioning a recycling of administrative functions, entailing added cost and waste of effort. Any doubt as to the propriety of the proceedings held during the recall assembly should be laid to rest. The charges of graft and corruption, violence and irregularities, before and during the session of the preparatory recall assembly are largely uncorroborated, and cannot override the substantiated findings of the respondent COMELEC. In sum, we are persuaded strongly by the principle that the findings of fact of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and the in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should be disturbed. 2. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; RECALL ELECTIONS UNDER SEC. 69 AND 70 OF R.A. 7160; PUNONG BARANGAYS AND SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY MEMBERS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY MAY CONVENE AND VOTE AS MEMBERS OF THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY. Petitioners insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the Liga ng mga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes that "respondent Liga is an organization of all barangays. It is not an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. The barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay captains as provided under Section 492 of the Local Government Code. It also provides that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the absence of the barangay chairman." The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported, in the record in accordance with the existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members conveyed and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, and not as members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on this ground. 3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN ADMINISTRATIVE AND QUASIJUDICIAL BODIES. In cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 4. ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, CONSTRUED. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support conclusion. It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.

5. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE TO OVERTURN PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY. To overturn the presumption of validity of performance of official duty, more than a mere scintilla of proof is needed, otherwise, one disgruntled fellow can destroy the foundations laid by the overwhelming majority, and, this is not the scenario envisioned by our democratic system of government. The Court is called upon to strike down Resolution 96-026, 1 dated November 18, 1996, of the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) calling for an Election for the Recall of the Petitioner Reynaldo O. Malonzo, the incumbent Mayor of Caloocan City. Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on May 8, 1995, winning over former Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year into his term, petitioners office as Mayor was put to serious question when on July 7, 1996, 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members and Sangguniang Kabataan chairmen, constituting a majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election, voted for the approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. 01-96, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him. Together with relevant documents, PRA Resolution No. 01-96 was filed with the COMELEC for appropriate action. In response, Mayor Malonzo filed a Petition with the respondent Commission alleging, principally, that the recall process was deficient in form and substance, and therefore, illegally initiated. The COMELEC found the petition devoid of merit and declared the recall proceedings to be in order. The COMELECs Resolution on the petition states pertinently: "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission En Banc hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the Petition. We approve and give DUE COURSE to PRA Resolution No. 01-96 entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE RECALL OF REYNALDO O. MALONZO AS MAYOR OF KALOOCAN CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. Accordingly and conformably with Section 71 R.A. 7160, the Commission SETS the date of the Election on Recall on December 14, 1996. We shall, by separate resolution, issue a calendar of activities involved in said exercise. SO ORDERED." On November 28, 1996, Mayor Malonzo came to us on a "Petition for Certiorari With Prayer For Temporary Restraining Order and Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction", assailing the COMELECs resolution as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Petition, in the main, raises the issue of the validity of the institution and proceedings of the recall, putting to fore the propriety of the service of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, and proceedings held, resulting in the issuance of the questioned Resolution. Due to the importance of the matters in issue, and the proximity of the Recall Election date declared by the COMELEC, the Court, on November 29, 1996, issued a Resolution 3 ordering the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from proceeding with the recall election projected on December 14, 1996, and directing the respondents to file their respective Comments. Private respondents Liga ng mga Barangay (Caloocan Chapter), Alex L. David, Conrado G. Cruz, Trinidad Repuno, Gloria M. Cruz, Mirali M. Durr, Fermin Jimenez, Aurelio Biluan, Rogelio Saraza, Helene Valbuena and Higino Rullepa, filed their Comment 4 on December 6, 1996, alleging that all the requirements for the

holding of a recall election were duly complied with and that the petition is therefore without basis. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of Comment 5 on February 7, 1997, with the surprising submission that the COMELEC was amiss in its duties as enforcer of election laws. According to the Solicitor General veracity of notices sent to 42 members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly were not directly passed upon by the COMELEC before it issued the questioned Resolution. It thus submits that the propriety of notices sent to said PRA members must first be determined by the COMELEC, after giving private respondents the chance to prove the same, otherwise, a discussion of the other issues in the present petition would be premature. At this juncture, the Court finds that there is no need to refer the matter of the veracity of the questioned notices sent to certain members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly back to the COMELEC, for .the reason that the COMELEC has already conducted an investigation into the same, and has found the proceedings instituting the recall to be in accord with law. The Solicitor Generals observation that the issue of veracity of the notices was not directly passed upon by the COMELEC is incorrect. On the contrary, the matter of validity of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly was sufficiently considered by the respondent Commission, as in response to petitioners request for a technical examination of the recall documents, the COMELEC directed its Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to resolve the matter of notices sent to the Preparatory Recall Assembly members. The ERSD in turn performed its task and reported its findings to the COMELEC. The following excerpts from Resolution UND 96-026 of the COMELEC reflect the results of the ERSDs investigation, and the resulting action of the COMELEC: "The ERSD Report gave the following information :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Three (3) lists of elected Barangay officials were used as reference, namely: COMELEC list; DILG list and Caloocan City list. According to the COMELEC listing, of the 188 barangays in Kalookan City, there should have been 1,692 members of the PRA. However, one barangay, Barangay 94, did not elect an SK Chairman, thus, there are of record, 1,691 elected barangay officials of Kalookan City, broken down as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Punong Barangay 188 Barangay Kagawads 1,316 SK Chairmen 187 (One Barangay, Barangay 94 did not elect its SK Chairman) The DILG registry is incomplete, showing only a listing of 1,390 barangay officials. The Kalookan City Talaan ng mga Barangay tallies with the COMELEC List. From the records, the following data is found: Of the 1,691 barangay officials, forty (40) had resigned. In the stead of twenty-eight (28) resignees, replacements were appointed. Twelve (12) positions however, remained vacant, there being no successors named therein. Twentytwo (22) barangay officials are deceased. Twelve (12) vacancies caused by such death were filled up by appointing replacements. Ten (10) vacant positions were however not filled up. There being twenty-two (22) unfilled posts, the total number of Barangay officials of Kalookan City at the time of the constitution of the Preparatory Recall Assembly was initiated is 1,669.

ERSD reported that there were a total of 1,927 notices sent, some members being served two or three notices. The Notices were sent in three modes; Personal, registered mail and by courier and they were in the name of the PRA member, and addressed at his residence or office of record. In its initial report, the Department stated that six persons listed in the COMELEC record as barangay officials were not duly notified. These were: Jose de Chavez, listed as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 6; Enrico Marasigan, listed as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 65; Pablo Musngi, listed as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 119; Rolando Ang, listed as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 109; and Pilar Pilares, Barangay Kagawad of Barangay 162 and Teresita Calayo, listed as kagawad of Barangay 182. Respondents explained the absence of notice to these persons thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 1. Jose de Chavez has been removed from office as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 6 by virtue of Resolution No. 95-011 passed on July 16, 1995, and has been replaced by Corazon Obusan by virtue of Resolution No. 95016 passed on August 1995, both promulgated by the Barangay Council of said barangay. In view of the fact that it is Corazon Obusan who is the recognized Barangay kagawad of the aforementioned barangay, as it appears in the official roster of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) the notice of the July 7, 1996 PRA session was duly served on her and not on Mr. de Chavez. 2. Enrico Marasigan has resigned as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 65 as evidenced by his resignation letter dated March 24, 1995. He was replaced by Ronio de la Cruz, by virtue of a Resolution passed by the Barangay Council of Barangay 65 dated August 10, 1995. Accordingly, the notice of the July 7, 1996 PRA session was duly served on Mr. de la Cruz and not on Mr. Marasigan. 3. Pablo Musngi ceased to be a Barangay kagawad of Barangay 119 by reason of his death on April 12, 1996. He has been replaced by Sylvia Saberola on whom notice of the July 7, 1996 session has been duly served. 4. Notices, both by personal delivery and by registered mail, were served on Mr. Rolando Ang at his official address at Barangay 109 Zone 10 East Grace Park, Caloocan City. The returns of the said service of notice, however, disclosed that he can no longer be located in the said address. He has, however, not informed the DILG of any change in his official address. 5. Pilar Pilares had been served notice by personal delivery but refused to sign acknowledgment receipt. She has likewise been served notice by registered mail as evidenced by the receipt in her behalf by a certain Ricardo Pilares III. (Respondents Comment, dated October 14, 1996.) As to Teresita Calayo, respondent defends lack of notice to her, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Teresita Calayo is not a duly elected kagawad of Barangay 182, Zone 16. Per certification issued by the Board of Election Tellers, Ms. Calayo did not win in the May 1994 Barangay Election. Records would show that it should be Kagawad Fermin Quintos who should be recognized as legitimate barangay kagawad of the said barangay having placed no. 7 in the election and not Ms. Calayo who appears to be a loser/9th place. There appears to be an apparent oversight in placing the name of Calayo in the subject PRA Resolution for signature, wherein it shows that both the names of Fermin Quintos and Teresita Calayo are included. (Respondents Compliance dated November 13, 1996, p. 6) In the ERSDs final and complete report, two (2) additional names were reflected as not having been served

notices and these were Lino Ramos and Teodulfo Abenoja, listed as kagawads of Barangay 174. Commenting on this report, respondents stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 1. As regards Tomas Daep and Teodulfo Abenoja (not Agenoja); Notice by registered mail was served on, and acknowledged by Tomas Daep, who personally signed the return card. There was actually an error committed by the ERSD when it concluded that Tomas Daep has already resigned and was replaced by Ernesto Taupa. Official records would show that Tomas Daep and Ernesto Taupa are still both presently holding the position of Kagawad of Barangay 174 Zone 15. Ernesto Taupa was officially appointed to the position vacated by Teodulfo Abenoja by virtue of the latters resignation on 15 March 1996. Teodulfo Abenoja, on the other hand, was appointed to the position vacated by Lino Ramos and Teodulfo Abenoja they, having resigned and, the latter, having been already replaced by Ernesto Taupa. Ernesto Taupa on the other, as correctly determined by the ERSD, was validly served with the notice of the PRA session two (2) days before the scheduled PRA meeting. Respondents submission, being substantiated by documents and uncontroverted by Petitioner are hereby accepted as meritorious. In addition to the aforenamed, three persons: Pablo de Castro, Ruben Ballega, and Jesus Tan claiming to be the Barangay captains of Barangay 116, Barangay 148 and Barangay 156, respectively, and therefore members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, came before the Commission and manifested that they were not duly notified about the PRA session. The records in custody of the Commission, however, revealed that there was no truth to their allegations. Pablo de Castro was served notice by registered mail on July 1, 1996, and this he received on July 3, 1996, as shown in the return card duly signed in acknowledgment. The same notice was served on him by courier (LBC) on July 5, 1996. Ruben Ballega was notified by personal service on July 1, 1996, the receipt of which was duly acknowledged and by registered mail on July 2, 1996. Jesus Tan Sr. was served notice personally and by registered mail. The personal service was completed on July 1, 1996, as shown by the receipt signed by his daughter, one Analiza T. Asque. The same notice was sent him by registered mail, received by the same daughter on July 2, 1996. The Commission however regards the sending of notice one thing, and the completion of service thereof another, for indeed, the requirement of notice can only be fully satisfied, if there was not only service, but also completion of service thereof. Thus, we were obliged to inquire more closely into the records and we found:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Personal services were acknowledged by receipts signed, if not by the addressee himself, then, as indicated

thereon, by his or her spouse, nearest relative or a person of sufficient discretion in the members residence or office. Service by registered mail was evinced by the return card duly signed by the addressee or by persons acting for him. There were instances when notices were served but were refused, this fact noted in the acknowledgment receipt by the server and his witnesses. The circumstances being thus, we hold that there was complete service of the notices as contemplated in Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Section 8. Completeness of Service. Personal service is complete upon delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides; Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time. That it was Alex David, President of the LIGA ng mga Barangay who sent the notices is of no moment. We had earlier determined that as member of the PRA, he can legally exercise the prerogatives attached to his membership in the Preparatory Recall Assembly, sending notices to the other members of its scheduled convening. It is evident from the foregoing and, therefore, the Commission so holds that the requirements of notice had been fully complied with." 6 Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. Moreover, to order the COMELEC to repeat the process of determining the notices propriety would be sanctioning a recycling of administrative functions, entailing added cost and waste of effort. Petitioner likewise attacks the COMELECs ruling on the validity of the proceedings held by the Preparatory Recall Assembly, in that it allegedly ruled that the LIGA ng mga Barangay is authorized to initiate the recall and convene the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Petitioner likewise averred that the session held, and the adoption of the recall resolution, by the recall assembly were tainted with irregularities, violence, graft and corruption. The pertinent provisions of law, as regards the initiation of the recall process, are Sections 69 and 70 of R.A. 7160:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "SEC. 69. By Whom Exercised. The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs. SEC. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.

(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be composed of the following:chanrob1es (2) City level. All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city; (c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective official in the local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose. (d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected. (1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his representative, and in the presence of a representative of the petitioner and a representative of the official sought to be recalled, and in a public place in the province, city, municipality, or barangay, as the case may be, shall be filed with the COMELEC through its office in the local government unit concerned. The COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall cause the publication of the petition in a public and conspicuous place for a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than twenty (20) days, for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness of the petition and the required percentage of voters. (2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be recalled." library Petitioners insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the Liga ng mga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes that "respondent Liga is an organization of all barangays. It is not an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. The barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay captains as provided under Section 492 of the Local Government Code. It also provides that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the absence of the barangay chairman." 7 The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record, in accordance with the existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, and not as members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on this ground. Any doubt as to the propriety of the proceedings held during the recall assembly should be laid to rest. As the respondent COMELEC pertinently observes: "The Minutes of the session of the Preparatory Assembly indicated that there was a session held. Attendees constitute the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Assembly, as we shall later on establish. Rules of procedure, simple they may be were formulated. Deliberations were conducted on the main issue, which was that of petitioners recall. The members were given the opportunity to articulate on their resolve about the matter. More importantly, their sentiments were expressed through their votes signified by their signatures and

thumbmarks affixed to the Resolution. No proof was adduced by Petitioner to substantiate his claim that the signatures appearing thereon represented a cause other than that of adopting the resolution. The law on recall did not prescribe an elaborate proceeding. Neither did it demand a specific procedure. What is fundamental is compliance with the provision that there should be a session called for the purpose of initiating recall proceedings, attended by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly, in a public place and that the resolution resulting from such assembly be adopted by a majority of all the PRA members." 8 The charges of graft and corruption, violence and irregularities, before and during the session of the preparatory recall assembly are largely uncorroborated, and cannot override the substantiated findings of the respondent COMELEC. "In cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." 9 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 10 It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. 11 To overturn the presumption of validity of performance of official duty, more than a mere scintilla of proof is needed, otherwise, one disgruntled fellow can destroy the foundations laid by the overwhelming majority, and this is not the scenario envisioned by our democratic system of government. In sum, we are persuaded strongly by the principle that the findings of fact of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby RESOLVED to DISMISS the present petition, for lack of merit. The decision of the respondent Commission on Elections to GIVE DUE COURSE to PRA Resolution No. 01-96 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Commission on Elections is hereby ORDERED to set the date of the Election on Recall in the city of Caloocan, which date shall not be later than thirty days after receipt of notice of this Resolution, which is immediately executory.

[G.R. No. 140560. May 4, 2000.] JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [G.R. No. 140714. May 4, 2000.] PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY, herein represented by its Chairman, RICHARD ADVINCULA, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS These are petitions arising from the proceedings initiated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Pasay City (PRA) in the Commission on Elections in E.M. No. 99-005 entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 01, S-1999 ADOPTED ON 29 MAY 1999 FOR THE RECALL OF MAYOR JOVITO CLAUDIO OF PASAY CITY. G.R. No. 140560 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the nullification of the resolution, 1 dated October 18, 1999, of the COMELEC giving due course to the petition for the recall of petitioner Jovito O. Claudio as mayor of Pasay City. On the other hand, G.R. No. 140714 is a petition for mandamus filed by the PRA, represented by its Chair, Richard Advincula, to compel the COMELEC to set the date for the holding of recall elections in Pasay City pursuant to the aforecited resolution of the COMELEC. The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998. Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr. in Barangay 11, Zone 4, Pasay City, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the PRA. Richard Advincula, private respondent in G.R. No. 140560 and petitioner in G.R. No. 140714, was designated chair. On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. In a letter dated June 29, 1999, Advincula, as chair of the PRA, invited the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Station Commander, and thirteen (13) Councilors of Pasay City to witness the formal submission to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition for recall. As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor. Pursuant to the rules of the COMELEC, copies of the petition were posted on the bulletin boards of the local COMELEC office, the City Hall, the Police Department, the public market at Libertad St. and Taft Avenue, and at the entrance of the Sta. Clara Church on P. Burgos St., all in Pasay City. Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the resolution was conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City designated by the COMELEC. Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the

convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case, 2 filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10 were actually double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction. In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions against it. On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its members, the COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. Based on the verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient. On whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner was a prejudicial question which must first be decided before any recall election could be held, the COMELEC ruled that it was not and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the case to delay the recall proceedings. Finally, on whether the petition for recall violated the bar on recall within one year from the elective officials assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the negative, holding that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudios assumption of office, it was held that the petition was filed on time. Hence, these petitions. Oral arguments were held in these cases in Baguio City on April 4, 2000, after which the Court, by the vote of 8 to 6 of its members, 3 resolved to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 140560 for lack of showing that the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the Court unanimously dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 140714 on the ground that the issue raised therein had become moot and academic. We now proceed to explain the grounds for our resolution. In its Resolution No. 3121, dated March 9, 2000, the COMELEC set the date of the recall elections in Pasay City on April 15, 2000. Consequently, the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 140714 to compel the COMELEC to fix a date for the recall elections in Pasay City is no longer tenable. We are thus left with only petitioner Claudios action for certiorari and prohibition. The bone of contention in this case is 74 of the Local Government Code (LGC) 4 which provides: Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. As defined at the hearing of these cases on April 4, 2000, the issues are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library WHETHER, under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) . . .

A. The word "recall" in paragraph (b) covers a process which includes the convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution. B. The term "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b) includes the election period for that regular election or simply the date of such election. (1) On Whether the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code Includes the Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution Petitioner contends that the term "recall" in 74(b) refers to a process, in contrast to the term "recall election" found in 74(a), which obviously refers to an election. He claims that "when several barangay chairmen met and convened on May 19, 1999 and unanimously resolved to initiate the recall, followed by the taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for the purpose of adopting a resolution to initiate the recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor of Pasay City for loss of confidence, the process of recall began" and, since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he had assumed office, the PRA was illegally convened and all proceedings held thereafter, including the filing of the recall petition on July 2, 1999, were null and void. The COMELEC, on the other hand, maintains that the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition for recall in this case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioners assumption of office, the recall was validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period. Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term "recall" as used in 74 refers to a process. They disagree only as to when the process starts for purposes of the one-year limitation in paragraph (b) of 74. We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. 5 However, as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited in support of this conclusion. First, 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the other hand, 69 provides that "the power of recall . . . shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings 6 but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall. Thus, there may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan Province in 1993) or petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC there is no legal limit on the number of times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall which paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective

local official. Indeed, this is the thrust of the ruling in Garcia v. COMELEC 7 where two objections were raised against the legality of PRAs: (1) that even the power to initiate recall proceedings is the sole prerogative of the electorate which cannot be delegated to PRAs, and (2) that by vesting this power in a PRA, the law in effect unconstitutionally authorizes it to shorten the term of office of incumbent elective local officials. Both objections were dismissed on the ground that the holding of a PRA is not the recall itself. With respect to the first objection, it was held that it is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people. With respect to the second objection, it was held that a recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office . . ." If these preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether the local official concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one year after the officials assumption of office, cannot apply to such proceedings. The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an elective local official. In the Bower case 8 cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC, 9 it was held that "The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed against any officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve months." But however the period of prohibition is determined, the principle announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official. It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before the official concerned has been in office for one-year would be to allow him to be judged without sufficient basis. As already stated, it is not the holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall resolutions that produces a judgment on the performance of the official concerned; it is the vote of the electorate in the Election that does. Therefore, as long as the recall election is not held before the official concerned has completed one year in office, he will not be judged on his performance prematurely. Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free

society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent. Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-year period in paragraph (b) is to provide the local official concerned a "period of repose" during which" [his] attention should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by disturbance due to political partisanship." Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in politics. From the day an elective official assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is not always easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically motivated and when it is not. The only safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of partisan politics is the good sense and self restraint of the people and its leaders against such shortcomings of our political system. A respite from partisan politics may, have the incidental effect of providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really the purpose of the limitation on recall under the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient basis for evaluating and judging the performance of an elected local official. In any event, it is argued that the judgments of PRAs are not "as politically unassailable as recalls initiated directly by the people." Justice Puno cites the "embarrassing repudiation by the people of [Kaloocan Citys] Preparatory Recall Assembly" when, instead of ousting Mayor Rey Malonzo, they reelected him. Two points may be made against this argument. One is that it is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing election the local official whose recall is sought is actually reelected. Laws converting municipalities into cities and providing for the holding of plebiscites during which the question of cityhood is submitted to the people for their approval are not always approved by the people. Yet, no one can say that Congress is not a good judge of the will of the voters in the locality. In the case of recall elections in Kaloocan City, had it been shown that the PRA was resorted to only because those behind the move to oust the incumbent mayor failed to obtain the signatures of 25% of the voters of that city to a petition for his recall, there may be some plausibility for the claim that PRAs are not as good a gauge of the peoples will as are the 25 % of the voters. Indeed, recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit cannot be more representative of the sentiments of the people than those initiated by PRAs whose members represent the entire electorate in the local government unit. Voters who directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable to political maneuverings or manipulations as are those composing PRAs. The other point regarding Justice Punos claim is that the question here is not whether recalls initiated by 25% of the voters are better. The issue is whether the one-year period of limitation in paragraph (b) includes the convening of the PRA. Given that question, will convening the PRA outside this period make it any more representative of the people, as the petition filed by 25 % of the registered voters is claimed to be? To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall 1. Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to 69, is a power which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b);

2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and 3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution. As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date. (2) On Whether the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such Election Petitioner contends, however, that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is within the second period of prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 114, but the election period as well, which is normally at least forty five (45) days immediately before the day of the election. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held. This contention is untenable. The law is unambiguous in providing that" [n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, 10 it could have expressly said so. Moreover, petitioners interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government units" more responsive and accountable." virtua1aw library Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election Code, 11 unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioners interpretation that the second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of the people. To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, 74 imposes limitations on the holding of recall elections. First, paragraph (a) prohibits the holding of such election more than once during the term of office of an elective local official. Second, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of such election within one year from the date the official assumed office. And third, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. As succinctly stated in Paras v. COMELEC, 12" [p]aragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is, during the second year of office." virtua1aw library

(3) On Whether the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the resolution of the COMELEC ordering the holding of a recall election. He contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page on which the signatures of the 74 begin. This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in this case. It was not raised before the COMELEC, in which the claim made by petitioner was that some of the names in the petition were double entries, that some members had withdrawn their support for the petition, and that Wenceslao Trinidads pending election protest was a prejudicial question which must first be resolved before the petition for recall could be given due course. The order of the COMELEC embodying the stipulations of the parties and defining the issues to be resolved does not include the issue now being raised by petitioner. Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written by mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is more probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of which the pages in question are part. The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now. WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No. 140714 is DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic.