MALINIAS VS. COMELEC G.R. NO.

146943 OCTOBER 4, 2002 FACTS: On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the COMELECs Law Department for violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881, against Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Victor Dominguez (Dominguez for brevity) was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Teofilo Corpuz (Corpuz for brevity) was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Anacleto Tangilag (Tangilag for brevity) was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province. Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc, and prevented them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further alleged that policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their supporters, who nevertheless eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol grounds. In their complaint, Malinias and Pilando requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to investigate and prosecute private respondents for the following alleged unlawful acts. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Malinias and Pilandos complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for alleged violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. 881 HELD: The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

may change his political party affiliation during his term of officeor within six months immediately preceding or following an election. ISSUE: W/N COMELEC was correct in dismissing petition which contended that Respondent San Luis should be disqualified from running due to turncoatism. HELD: No, he cannot be disqualified. He did not change affiliations during his term. He was expelled from the LP in 1978 and this cant be construed as a willful change of affiliation. At that time, no one even knew when the next elections were, so Respondent could not have changed affiliations simply to anticipate the next election. The constitutional prohibition cannot be applied to the period beyond the frame-up (1971-1975) term to which public officials were elected in 1971 because this would unduly impinge on freedom of association guaranteed to all. Between two constructions, one of which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so, the latter construction must be adopted.

Del Rosario v. Hamoy Case No. 35 No. L-77154 (June 30, 1987) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181 FACTS: For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for pre-trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff, the Respondent Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint for failure of the Plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case because the document did not have the required one-peso documentary stamp. HELD: Yes. Had Respondent Judge been less technical and more sensible, the present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court would have been avoided. By such rigidity, Respondent denied the Petitioner substantial justice. He could have easily required counsel for Plaintiff to buy the documentary stamp and affix it to the special power of attorney and it would not have taken ten minutes. The Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of Court themselves, fortified by jurisprudence, mandate a liberal construction of the rules and pleadings in order to effect substantial justice.

Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. COMELEC Case No. 246 G.R. No. L-53460 (May 27, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57 FACTS: Nacionalista Party (NP) filed a petition against Respondent San Luis of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for turncoatism. When Respondent San Luis ran as Governor of Laguna under Liberal Party (LP) in 1972, he won. The normal expiry for the term was 1975, but it was extended lawfully by the President. Now (1980) he is running for Governor again under KBL. Under the law, No elective public officer

Angeles vs. Gaite Facts 1. Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes Vistan, to take care and provide for as she grew up. Petitioner became attached to such child and took care of her as her own. Petitioner also gave the same attention to the half-brother of the grand niece. The latter would seek petitioners financial support ranging from daily subsistence to hospitalization expenses. After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grand niece, Michael Vistan, failed to do an important task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan had a falling out. Since no more support was given to the latter, he took his half-sister away. He brought her to different provinces while asked the help of certain individuals to mislead the petitioner and the police. The police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan through a dragnet operation. The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes. The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the case. This was however denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a decision to dismiss the case. Petitioner filed a petition for review with USEC. Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with SEC Perez and was also denied She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was dismissed by such on the ground of Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the dismissal Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since t diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.

the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated and clarified. No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x. Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x. It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot secondguess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary his own alter ego. BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS: Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear that There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem). These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latters expertise in said matter. The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government.

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Issue W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of the President? Ruling NO, it does not diminish the power of the President The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be. Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993 reads: In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by

International Corporate Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 63 G.R. No. L-6970 (Jan. 30, 1988) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181 FACTS: Private Respondent secured a loan from Petitioners predecessor in interest by mortgaging her properties. The amount approved for release was used to pay for her other obligations to Petitioner. Thus, private Respondent claimed that she never received anything from the approved loan. Private Respondent made a money market placement. Meanwhile, she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the bank refused to pay the interest earned by the placement, applying the amount instead to the deficiency in the mortgage. The mortgaged properties were auctioned. Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the money market investment which was subsequently granted by the court. The court issued a writ of execution against Petitioners property. Private Respondent filed an ex parte motion praying that five branches of the bank pay her the total amount of the money market interest, which was granted. Petitioner failed to comply with all the said orders. The supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred by erasures, alterations, and/or additions. Such bond was therefore rendered without force and effect. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made by the insurance company itself since there were no ready-made forms available. ISSUE: W/N there can be legal compensation in the case at bar. HELD: Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the setoff against the other is neither clear nor liquidated. Compensation cannot extend to unliquidated disputed claim arising from breach of contract. Petitioner is indebted to private Respondent in the amount of the money market interest. The debt of P6.81M of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in doubt. This prevents legal compensation from taking place under Art. 1290 of the Civil Code. The filing of insufficient or defective bond does not dissolve absolutely and unconditionally the injunction issued. The decision of the CA is affirmed. Genaro R. Reyes Construction Inc. v. Court of Appeals Case No. 51 G.R. No. 108718 (July 14, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57 FACTS: Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the notice of pre-termination in their contract for construction of the flood control facilities and land improvement works in Butuan City. Petitioners won in a public bidding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% negative slippage (delay in the infrastructure project), the government was either authorized to take over the project or let another contractor finish it. Petitioners however claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly by DPWH, but also termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reaches 15%. ISSUE: W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid. HELD: No, Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the

contract to other bidders. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or rescind the contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a negative slippage of 15% or more, according to P.D. 1870 and DPWH Circular No. 102. The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed construction projects with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily to save money and to avoid dislocation of the financial projections and/or cash flow of the government. Terminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously disqualified bidder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government. VETTE INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., INC. vs CHENG G.R. No. 170232 Dec 5, 2006 FACTS: Cheng filed an action for specific performance and damages against Vette Industrial Sales Co. for breaching their obligation contained in the Memorandum of Agreement. Under the MOA, the company acknowledged owing Cheng a sum of money as compensation for the shares he transferred, insurance proceeds and signing bonus. In their answer with counterclaim, Vettel Industrial claimed that the shares have already been paid; that the MOA is unenforceable and void. After failing to settle during mediation, the case was referred back to the court. On the day of the Pre-trial, Cheng and his counsel Atty. Ferrer failed to appear resulting to the dismissal of the case. Cheng filed a motion for reconsideration. Vette Industrial claims that the motion was procedurally defective because it was not served three days before the date of the hearing and no proof of service was given to the court, in violation of Sections 4 and 6 of Rule 15. The trial court granted the motion. Vette Industrial elevated the case to the CA. The ruling of the trial court was vacated and Chengs complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Both parties assailed the ruling before the SC. ISSUE: Is the rule of notice required under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court violated? RULING: No. Although the Court has consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule: 1. Where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; 2. Where the interest of substantial justice will be served; 3. Where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; 4. Where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed." A notice of hearing is conceptualized as an integral component of procedural due process intended to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse party is permitted time to study and answer the arguments in the motion. When the trial court received Chengs Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration, it did not immediately resolve the motion. Instead, it allowed Vette Industrial to file their comment and also leave to file a rejoinder if Cheng files a reply. The notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, SC is empowered to suspend their operation.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. DEANG MARKETING CORPORATION et al. 573 SCRA 375 (2008), SECOND DIVISION Deang Marketing Corporation (DMC), et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against Philippine National Bank (PNB) for reformation of contract and specific performance claiming that the dacion en pago arrangement forged by them already transformed DMCs loan obligation. Summons was served on PNB requiring it to Answer until May 5, 2006. DMC subsequently filed a Motion to Declare PNB in Default. The RTC thereafter received a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer. On May 16, 2006, RTC granted PNBs Motion. DMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of RTCs order denying their Motion to Declare PNB in default. The RTC denied such motion. DMC subsequently assailed RTCs Orders of May 16, 2006 and August 9, 2006 via certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA annulled the RTCs orders. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in declaring PNB in default HELD: PNBs Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer was laden with glaring lapses. It had, following the reglementary 15-day period after service of summons (unless a different period is fixed by the court), until May 5, 2006 within which to file an Answer or appropriate pleading. It filed the Motion for Extension, however, via a private courier on May 14, 2006, which was received by the trial court on May 15, 2006 or ten days late. It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file a pleadingmust be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. The courts discretion to grant a motion for extension is conditioned upon such motions timeliness, the passing of which render s the court powerless to entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was filed after the lapse of the prescribed period, there was no more period to extend. PNB was not candid enough to aver in the Motion for Extension that the period had lapsed, as it still toyed with the idea that it could get away with it. The allegations therein were crafted as if the said motion was timely filed. Notably, the May 16, 2006 Order expressed no inkling that the motion was filed out of time. The trial court either was deceived by or it casually disregarded the apparent falsity foisted by petitioner. In denying DMCs Motion for Reconsideration of its grant of PNBs Motion for Extension, the RTC ruled that it was inclined to reconsider or lift an order of default. By such ruling, the trial court preempted the dictates of orderly procedure by unduly anticipating and signifying a slant toward the remedies and arguments yet to be availed of and raised by PNB. In the present case, no satisfactory reason was adduced to justify the tardiness of the Answer and no compelling reason was given to justify its admission. The intention to delay was rather obvious. The Court thus finds PNBs negligenceinexcusable, as the circumstances behind and the reasons for the delay are detestable.

REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC. VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURTOF TAX APPEALS, G.R. No. L-28463, May 31, 1971 FACTS: From December 1963 to July 1964, Republic Flour Mills (petitioner) exported Pollardand/or bran which was loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade whileanchored near the breakwater. The Commissioner of Customs and The Court of Tax Appeals(respondent) assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues on the said exportations in thesum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid by petitioner under protestIn this case, Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would want the Court to interpret the wordsproducts of the Philippines found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code,as excludingbran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on the ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which isimported in the Philippines, they are merely waste from the production of flour. Another mainargument of the petitioner is that no government or private wharves or government facilitieswere utilized in exporting such products. In that way, it would not be liable at all for the wharfagedues assessed under such section by respondent Commission of Customs.On the other hand, the stand of respondent Commissione r of Customs was thatpetitioner was liable for wharfage dues upon receipt or discharge of the exported goods by avessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of the non-use of governmentowned or privatewharves. Respondent Court of Tax Appeals sustained the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs under the appropriate provision of the Tariff and Customs Code. ISSUE: Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law RULING/HELD: As stated on the Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, "There shall be levied,collected and paid on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of thePhilippines exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a feefor wharfage." appears to be quite precise. Section 2802 refers to what is imported andexported.The objective of this act must be carried out. Even if there is doubt to the meaning of thelanguage employed, the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded fromthe operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to sympatheticconsideration. It was desirable then that the gates to such efforts at unjustified restriction of thecoverage of the Act are kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, butdefiance of, a clear legislative mandateThe decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed withcosts against petitioner.

Serfino v. CA (GR L-40858, 15 September 1987) Ponente: Paras, J. Facts: On 25 August 1937, a parcel of land was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor (OCT 1839). On 14 December 1945, he sold said land in favor of Nemesia D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18 January 1946). OCT 1839 was lost during the war and upon petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental ordered the reconstitution thereof. Pursuant thereto, OCT 14-R (1839) was issued on 18 January 1946 in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. On that same day, TCT 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT 14-R (1839). On 15 August 1951, Nemesia Baltazar, sold said property to Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., and the latter did not present the documents for registration until 17 December 1964 to the Office of the Registry of Deeds. Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by another certificate of title, TCT 38985, in the name of Federico Serfino. On 19 November 1964, the spouses Serfinos mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00; which was inscribed in TCT No. 38985. The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to recover said land; and the lower court rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 38985; issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintiff; and the payment of the plaintiff PNB the loan of spouses Serfinos secured by said land. Both parties appealed from this decision of the trial court. Ruling on the assignment of errors, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification in its decision setting aside the decision of the trial court declaring plaintiff liable to PNB for payment, however, ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the Serfino spouses of the sum P1,839.49, representing the unpaid taxes and penalties paid by the latter when they repurchased the property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfino and PNB to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the auction sale of the disputed property was null and void. Held: The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the prescribed procedure in auction sales of property for tax delinquency being in derogation of property rights should be followed punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of which vitiates the sale. In the present case, Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely negligent in its payment of land taxes. The record shows that taxes were paid for the years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefor was obtained in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros Occidental of the land in dispute to the spouses Serfinos was void since the Province of Negros Occidental was not the real owner of the property thus sold. In turn, the spouses Serfinos title which has been derived from that of the Province of Negros Occidental is likewise void. However, the fact that the public auction sale of the disputed property was not valid cannot in any way be attributed to the mortgagees fault. The inability of the Register of Deeds to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of the scheduled public auction sale was partly due to the failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare the land in its name for a number of years and to pay the complete taxes thereon. PNB is therefore entitled to the payment of the mortgage loan as ruled by the trial court and exempted from the payment of costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision, with modification that PNB mortgage credit must be paid by Lopez Sugar Central.

People v Castaneda Facts: Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document. The complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto. That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a deed of sale the house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana, making it appear that his spouse gave her marital consent to said sale. At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecution stated that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria. Issue: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification. Held: No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other. In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband. It is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint. With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accusedhusband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Court of Appeals and A. Soriano Corp. 301 SCRA 152 Business Organization Corporation Law Trust Fund Doctrine Don Andres Soriano (American), founder of A. Soriano Corp. (ASC) had a total shareholdings of 185,154 shares. Broken down, the shares comprise of 50,495 shares which were of original issue when the corporation was founded and 134,659 shares as stock dividend declarations. So in 1964 when Soriano died, half of the shares he held went to his wife as her conjugal share (wifes legitime) and the other half (92,577 shares, which is further broken down to 25,247.5 original issue shares and 82,752.5 stock dividend shares) went to the estate. For sometime after his death, his estate still continued to receive stock dividends from ASC until it grew to at least 108,000 shares. In 1968, ASC through its Board issued a resolution for the redemption of shares from Sorianos estate purportedly for the planned Filipinization of ASC. Eventually, 108,000 shares were redeemed from the Soriano Estate. In 1973, a tax audit was conducted. Eventually, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment against ASC for deficiency withholding tax-at-source. The CIR explained that when the redemption was made, the estate profited (because ASC would have to pay the estate to redeem), and so ASC would have withheld tax payments from the Soriano Estate yet it remitted no such withheld tax to the government. ASC averred that it is not duty bound to withhold tax from the estate because it redeemed the said shares for purposes of Filipinization of ASC and also to reduce its remittance abroad. ISSUE: Whether or not ASCs arguments are tenable. HELD: No. The reason behind the redemption is not material. The proceeds from a redemption is taxable and ASC is duty bound to withhold the tax at source. The Soriano Estate definitely profited from the redemption and such profit is taxable, and again, ASC had the duty to withhold the tax. There was a total of 108,000 shares redeemed from the estate. 25,247.5 of that was original issue from the capital of ASC. The rest (82,752.5) of the shares are deemed to have been from stock dividend shares. Sale of stock dividends is taxable. It is also to be noted that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Tax Code presumes that every distribution of corporate property, in whole or in part, is made out of corporate profits such as stock dividends. It cannot be argued that all the 108,000 shares were distributed from the capital of ASC and that the latter is merely redeeming them as such. The capital cannot be distributed in the form of redemption of stock dividends without violating the trust fund doctrine wherein the capital stock, property and other assets of the corporation are regarded as equity in trust for the payment of the corporate creditors. Once capital, it is always capital. That doctrine was intended for the protection of corporate creditors.

ISSUE Whether or not Marcelino Villavert thru mother Domna Villavert is entitled todeath benefits? HELD Yes. As provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, All doubts in theimplementation and interpretation of the Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall beresolved in favor of the labor. Judgment rendered ordering the Government Service Insurance System topay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (Php6,000.00). ABELLA VS NLRCG.R. No. 71818 Date: July 20, 1987 Petitioners: Rosalina Perez Abella/Hda. Danao-Ramona Respondents: The Honorable National Labor Relations Commission, Romeo Quitco andRicardo Dionele, Sr., Ponente: Paras, J . FACTS: On June 27, 1960 the petioner, Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm land known asHacienda Danao-Ramona, for a period of ten (10) years. She opted to extend the leasedcontract for another ten (10) years. During the existence of the lease, she employed the privaterespondents Ricardo Dionele, Sr., and Romeo Quitco. Upon the expiration of her leaseholdrights, petitioner dismissed private respondents and turned over the hacienda to the ownersthereof on October 5, 1981, who continued the management, cultivation and operation of thefarm.On November 20, 1981, private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner atthe Ministry of Labor and Employment, Bacolod City District Office, for overtime pay, illegaldismissal and reinstatement with backwages. After the parties had presented their respectiveevidence, Labor Arbiter Manuel M. Lucas, Jr., in a Decision dated July 16, 1982, ruled that thedismissal is warranted by the cessation of business, but granted the private respondentsseparation pay. Petitioner appealed, the National Labor Relations Commission, in a Resolutionaffirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Motion forReconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay? HELD:The petition is devoid of merit. Article 284 of the Labor Code as amended by BP 130is the law applicable in this case. The purpose of Article 284 as amended is obvious-theprotection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure ofestablishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like private respondentsin the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled for the thirty three years ofservice in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in the case of Quitco. Although they wereabsorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that thelatter has assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as newemployees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing. It is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of theLabor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be theprimordial and paramount consideration.The instant petition is hereby dismissed and Decision of the Labor Arbiter and the resolution ofthe ministry of labor and employment are hereby affirmed.

Villavert vs ECC, 110 SCRA233 G.R. No. L-48605, December 14, 1981 FACTS: This is a petition to review decision of the Employees Compensation Commissionaffirming decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for death benefits on theground that acute hemmorhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease, thus, petitioner failed to showthe causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino Villavert and the nature of his employment. Hewas employed at the Philippine Constabulary as code verifier. However, due to shortage of qualified civilianpersonnel to handle certain task, he was assigned various tasks that would require him to render overtimeservices especially in the preparation of the checks for the salary of the Philippine Constabulary and theNational Integrated Police personnel throughout the country.